Hegel‟s

Master-
Slave
Dialectics
Copyright © P. Bornedal
 HEGEL’S MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTICS
In Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectics we are taking about two figures: master and slave. We are not exactly talking about two
distinct persons, not about actual individuals; we are abstractly talking about two kinds of self-consciousness. We have in
Hegel dialectics a „master-self-consciousness‟ and a „slave-self-consciousness‟ standing opposed to each other.
Hegel wants to explain what is the difference between a „master-self-consciousness‟ and a „slave-self-consciousness‟ –
and he wants to explain the dialectics between them, that is, how they interact interdependently. We can start by imagining
two heads facing each other, one of the heads is the master, the lord, the other head represents the slave, the bondsman.
Within each head, A and B, we imagine a self-consciousness is seated – that means, a consciousness of self; my
understanding of who I am.
Hegel starts by claiming that my understanding of who I am, always involves the other‟s understanding. This means, if
we return to our two heads, that if we have the self-consciousness of head B, this self-consciousness is a mirror of what it
sees outside itself, that is, head A. So, it is nothing in itself. The same with head A, this self-consciousness is also a mirror of
what it sees outside itself, that is, a mirror of head B.
This is why Hegel in his first sentence of the section says: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the
fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” 111. And in a later passage: “Self-
consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has
lost itself, or it finds itself as an other being: secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as
an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.” 111
This means that self-consciousness is not an essence in the human being; it is implanted from the outside, namely from
the outside of the other being. If we have our two heads, we thus find that the self-consciousness in head A is the image of B,
and the self-consciousness in head B is A. Every individual is another. More down to earth, we are essentially social beings.
Our sense of self does not grow out of ourselves, but only insofar as we relate to and see ourselves as the other. For example:
in the family, the young boy does not grow out a self-consciousness entirely of himself, he mirrors himself in what is his
most important other, and that is presumably his father. His self-understanding becomes thus dependent on his father, or what
he sees as and understands being his father. In this example, the child is of course the slave or the bondsman, and the father is
the master or the lord. This also implies that the child needs more recognition from his father than the father needs
recognition from the child.
 The Struggle for Recognition
as a “Life-and-Death Struggle”
Two beings facing each other exist only in a dialectical relationship. That is, in a relationship where there is interaction
between the two beings. If there is no other mirroring self-consciousness, no self-consciousness evolves at all. If the child has
no father, or any other figure of authority in which to reflect himself, he develops no self-consciousness, no obvious self-
identity. He probably remains on some animal stage, or becomes schizophrenic or something of that order. Exactly because
one‟s self-consciousness cannot grow out from oneself, one cannot start to nurture self-consciousness all by oneself. A person
needs another figure of authority in which to mirror himself. In Hegel‟s dialectical relationship two beings “recognize
themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” 112.
The next step to understand in Hegel is that there is no equality in this dialectical relationship. If we have a father and a
child, the child obviously needs more recognition from the father than the father from the child. The relationship is always a
master-slave, or a lord-bondsman relationship, somebody is in the top position, and the other is in the bottom position. The
two beings are split up in two extremes, says Hegel: “as extremes they are opposed to one another, one being only
recognized, the other only recognizing.” 113.
If there is no such struggle, then we have two beings, A and B, independent of each other; they are not concerned with
each other, and therefore not mirroring themselves in each other. They are unaware of each other, not engaged in each other,
and just occupied by the business of life. It is the mode of behavior one adopts to people one pass by on the street, for
example. You don‟t engage yourself in them; they are nothing to you; they are, Hegel says, “for one another like ordinary
objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being of Life. . . they have not as yet exposed themselves to each
other in the form of pure being-for-self, or as self-consciousness.” 113.
So, self-consciousness first develops when two beings enter into a relationship; and this relationship is always a struggle
for recognition; it is in order words a rivalry or a competition. This struggle Hegel also describes dramatically as a „life-and-
death-struggle‟; that is, the two consciousnesses standing over and against one another wants each other‟s „death,‟ and they
are both prepared to risk their own life in order to achieve the „death of the other.‟
“In so far as it is the action of the other, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action,
action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-
conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle.” 114.
 To “Risk one‟s Life” for
the Sake of Recognition
We are here not necessarily talking about the actual death of the other, but we a definitely talking about the „death‟
or the defeat of the other‟s self-consciousness. That means, the elimination and neutralization of the other as a rival;
we want to reduce him or her to nothing, so far below our own victorious self-consciousness that he/she can be
ignored.
We are talking about competition between individuals, and one does not need to compete with individuals that
one is completely superior to. One tends to compete with individuals one‟s equal or superior. In this competition,
each competitor wants to defeat the other one. Each wants to become the superior, and reduce the other to
inferiority. This is the essence of Hegel‟s „life and death struggle.‟
When you step into such a competitive relationship, you – as Hegel puts it – “risk your life.” Even more, if you
do not “risk your life,” you are nothing and you will become nothing. That means, that you as self-conscious being
will not and cannot assert yourself as truth, if not you „risk your life.‟ You risk of course only your life if it is from
the beginning uncertain that you will win the competition; it must be the case that the other self-conscious being
might defeat you. If there is no uncertainty, if you do not engage anybody equal or superior to you, you take no risk
and you gain no recognition.
The person who does not enter Hegel‟s „life and death struggle‟ is simply the person who just wants to get on
with his life. In the concrete it is the person with no strong ambitions, aspirations, or desires. He is dangerous to
nobody, because he challenges nobody. This person we may recognize as a person, but in the struggle for
recognition, he is nothing to you: “The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person,
but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self consciousness. Similarly, just as each
stakes his own life, so each must seek the other‟s death, for it values the other no more than itself.” 114.
In the struggle for recognition, we have A and B facing each other, determined to defeat each other. A stakes
everything on defeating B, and B stakes everything on defeating A. And like A is other to B, B is other to A. They
find or define themselves as something that is outside themselves; but in order to regain their self-consciousness
they must eliminate this outside, this externality, this other. And it is why Hegel says that they want the “death” of
the other.
 Love as Example
of a “Life-and-Death
Struggle”
for Recognition

Love can be seen as a struggle for recognition, where one „risks one‟s life‟ in order to be recognized by the
other. Love is also a „master-slave‟ relationship, where there is typically inequality between the parties; one
is the master and one is the slave, that means, one is recognized, another is recognizing: A is more
„recognized‟ by the B, than B is „recognized‟ by A. There is a struggle going on between the parties about
who desires who, and how much, and this is usually not a complete equilibrium. We also typically find that
A wants to „defeat‟ B, i.e., she wants to defeat his independence, his self-consciousness, because she wants
full recognition (and vice versa).
The typical movie scenario: In the beginning of the relationship, the guy cannot give up his friends, his
pub, his sports, his shabby bachelor life; then, as the movie progresses, he realizes that relationship and
family life demands this renunciation. In this scenario, the woman eventually wins the struggle for
recognition, and the man is defeated. She has sought the „death‟ of the man, not his physical death, but the
death of his independence and self-consciousness, and he has finally surrendered. Here the woman is the
master or the lord, and the man is the slave or the bondsman.
 The Master-Slave Flip-Flop
If there is no self-consciousness except in such a dialectical relationship, the subject can only pose itself by being opposed.
It now wants to eliminate its opponent, says Hegel. But something strange happens if or when the opponent is actually
defeated. Because the subject can never pose itself positively, its sense of identity is produced in contrast to the other being
to which it stands opposed. If this other being is defeated, it also no longer offer opposition, i.e., a chance for recognition.
Therefore, there is in every defeat of the other, every victory, a sense of disappointment. The struggle for recognition, is
immediately followed by a loss of recognition.
Moreover, since master-slave relationships are always unequal, the master produces another self-identity by seeing
himself in contrast to the slave, than the self-identity the slave produces by seeing himself in contrast to the master. The
master poses himself in opposition to a being that is defeated, which is nothing, which is dependent; the slave poses himself
in opposition to a being that is victorious, which is everything, which is independent. Master and slave “exist as two
opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is
the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is
bondsman.” 115.
Since self-consciousness in nothing in itself, but only defines itself according to what it sees as outside itself, the self-
consciousness of A, the master, defines itself according to the slave, and the self-consciousness of B, the slave, defines itself
according to the master. The master, A, can consequently never be sure of his own truth, because he asserts himself in
contrast to a being that is nothing. “The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of
the bondsman.” 117. The master cannot find recognition in the consciousness of the slave, because he has degraded him
totally. The master also doesn‟t need to assert himself in relation to the slave, because you don‟t need recognition from
someone who is nothing. Now the master does not seek recognition, and does not need to work for recognition or to prove
himself against an opponent being, because the opponent being is so utterly defeated. As consequence the master becomes
complacent and lazy. He does not need to work for recognition.
In contrast, the slave looks up to the master and wants to become like the master. He therefore begins to nurture a self-
consciousness that is ideal in form, namely the ideal self-consciousness he sees outside himself as his master‟s self-
consciousness. He strives to realize this ideal and this means that he engages himself in whatever work necessary to become
his ideal. He becomes the opposite of lazy and complacent; he becomes industrious and diligent. In this he also goes outside
of his narrow self, since he is realizing an ideal that is outside himself.
 The Slave Realizes Himself Through Work,
and Becomes Eventually Master
Now, in contrast to the master, the slave works on realizing something. He realizes himself through work on a thing, an
object, or a project; if he is a painter, he works on his painting and produces an object; if he is a composer, he works on his
composition and produces an object; if he is an industrialist, he works on his factory and builds a factory, etc. The master, on
the contrary, works on realizing no object, he merely enjoys and merely consumes. He may go to the theater and listen to the
music of the composer, but he has produced nothing himself; he may buy the painting, but he paints nothing himself.
Therefore, the slave overcomes the otherness of thing-hood more thoroughly than the master. The slave creates a world
through his work, the master creates nothing.
Hegel is almost certainly thinking here of the declining aristocracy of the 19th century. Historically, the aristocracy
became a weaker and weaker class during the 19th century. Because they had everything or were used to have everything,
they did not need to work for a living. They were used to live a life in luxury so far above the common man that they had no
sense of the reality outside their castles or estates. However, another class began during the 19th century to surpass them
financially and economically, namely the early capitalists. They were on the contrary industrious. They built factories,
imported and exported goods, established banks, understood the benefits of industrialization and became immensely
successful.
We may see Hegel‟s dialectics as an attempt to explain the psychological premises of this success. The old master, the
aristocrat, is opposed by the common man, whom he regards as nobody, and from whom he does not seek recognition. The
old master therefore does not need to assert himself. He resorts to his comfortable, complacent, luxurious, lazy life. The old
slave, the manufacturer, the early capitalist, is opposed by the master, the aristocrat, who has always been ready to reduce
him to nothing. He therefore lives in a fear of „death‟ that very concretely motivates him into excellence.
As said, Hegel is likely to have before himself the ailing, degenerate and impotent aristocracy of his days, when he
suggests this very abstract theory of competing beings. Marx will take over Hegel „struggle for recognition,‟ but he will apply
it to another relationship, namely the relationship between so-called bourgeoisie and proletariat. Writing several decades
later, Marx now sees the bourgeois or the capitalist as the master, that is, the inherently lazy, unproductive being in a
relationship, where the proletariat is the slave, the diligent being that strives for recognition. Hegel‟s struggle for recognition
becomes in Marx a class-struggle. Two opposing classes are trying to defeat each other, and as in Hegel, it is the oppressed
class that he predicts eventually will become successful.