Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Finalcompletecivdigests
Finalcompletecivdigests
Table of contents:
page
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-2
Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Land Titles . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-13
Torts & Damages . . . . . . . . . .14-22
Oblicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22-40
Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-42
Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43-49
Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49-62
Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63-71
AGENCY
2000
1996
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As to the issue of forgery, the Court ruled that mere variance of the signatures is not conclusive
proof of forgery for forgery cannot be presumed. (Tenio-Obsequio v. CA, G.R. No. 107967, 1 Mar. 1994)
Even granting that petitioner’s signature was falsified, and the GPA and deed of sale void, such would not
revoke title subsequently issued in favor of private respondent, an innocent purchaser for value, one
relying on the notarized GPA presented by petitioner’s wife. Being the wife of the owner and having with
her the title to the property, there was no reason for private respondent not to believe in her authority.
1995
TOYOTA SHAW v. CA (244 SCRA 320, May 1995)
Civil Law/Agency/Sales/Contract to sell: A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent
Definiteness of price is essential element in formation of a binding contract of sale.
PARTNERSHIP
2000
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It would seem that under the Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of partnership, specifically
particular partnership which has for its object specific undertaking. The Supreme Court has however
recognized a distinction between these 2 business forms and has held that although a corporation cannot
enter into a partnership, it may however engage in a joint venture with others.
1999
1998
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LAND TITLES
2001
2000
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World War II. Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief is denied to a claimant whose
right has become "stale" by reason of negligence or inattention for a long period of time.
By placing the pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the land by MWSS,
subjecting the land to its will and control. [Under Article 531 of the Civil Code, "Possession is acquired by
the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of
our will, or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."] Petitioners cannot
argue that MWSS’ possession was not "open". The existence of the pipes was indicated above the
ground by "pilapils".
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA (G.R. No. 130174, July 14, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Public Lands/ Res Judicata: An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land
must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all
lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase
or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition
of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public
land by decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration
under P. D. No. 1529 [Formerly Act No. 496.] is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The
land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land
can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no
title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of
registration."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTIPULAR (G.R. No. 136588, July 20, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Reconstitution of Title: Before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to hear and
decide a reconstitution case, compliance with the following requisites is imperative:
1. That the notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing;
2. That the notice state among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title if
known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear
and file their claim of objection to the petition;
3. That a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties) whose address is known at least thirty
days prior to the date of the hearing; and
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4. That at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.
These requisites are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional.
DE GUZMAN v. THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No.
143281, August 3, 2000)
Civil law/Land Titles/Recovery from Assurance Fund under the Property Registration Decree: The ff.
persons may recover from the Assurance Fund:
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part; and
b. that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the
court personnel, or the Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now, the
Property Registration Decree; or
2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part;
b. that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the
provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of
such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of owner's duplicate, or in any entry
or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and
c. that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land
or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine
that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. That petitioners eventually lost the
property to the original owners, however, does not entitle them to compensation under the Assurance
Fund. Petitioners' recourse is not against the Assurance Fund but against the rogues who duped them.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs. CA (G. R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Property/ Easements/ Buyers in Good Faith: Under the Original Certificate of Title,
there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law This reservation, unlike the other imposed on the grant, was
not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No.
141, further provides that lands granted by patent shall further be subject to a right of way.
In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of
the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of
way.
As to the issue of good faith, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is
charged with notice of burdens and claims that are annotated on the title
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1999
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1998
1997
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property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned
to Cabrera, much less to NCH.
1996
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legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in
cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed
within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public
forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. "Public land
fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be reverted to the state in accordance with
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
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these conditions upon the right of a mining claim holder under the Bill, there should remain no doubt now
that such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of ownership, and neither were they
intended to be so.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO y ESTEBAN v. CA (Dec. 18, 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Rights Under Spanish Titles and Grants/Remedial Law/Jurisdiction of A Probate
Court: A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the decedent's estate. Neither is it confirmed to the issue of the validity
of wills. Thus in Trinidad v. CA (202 SCRA 106, 116 [1991]), we held that questions of title to any property
apparently still belonging to the estate of the deceased may be passed upon in probate with the consent
of all parties, without prejudice to third persons. Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the
determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from inventory
and accounting may be resolved by the probate court. (Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353, 356-357 [1939])
Under P.D. 892 (effective 16 Feb. 1976), all holders of Spanish titles/grants should cause their
lands covered thereby to be registered under Act No. 496 within 6 months from date of effectivity or until
16 Aug. 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance results in a re-classification of their land. Spanish titles can no
longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.
Petitioners, however, are not without recourse. P.D. 892 grants all holders of Spanish titles the
right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, within 6 months from the effectivity of P.D.
892. Thereafter, however, any Spanish title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as
evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system. All instruments
affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
1995
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2000
RULINGS: Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within
the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage, “ both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-
delict and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
Moral damages. - The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Compensation for loss of earning capacity - Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss
of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet
employed at the time of death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. It is
not necessary that education, as a guide to future earnings, relate to a specific occupation like lawyer or
doctor. Evidence of education in general studies is admissible to ascertain future earning.
FOOD TERMINAL INC. vs. CA (G.R. No. 108397, June 21, 2000.)
Torts; Negligence; Damages
X engaged the services to Y company for the care and custody of X’s goods. The basic issue
raised is whether or not the Y was negligent in the care and custody of the goods during storage. Y
practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature of the cold storage area at 2 to 4
degrees centigrade at all times, and this caused the deterioration of the yeast stored therein. But Y
claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for the deterioration of the goods. Since negligence has
been established, Y is liable for damages.
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An indemnity for loss of earning capacity is justified, it appearing from the testimony of the
surviving spouse that the deceased was 40 years old at the time of his untimely death and earned P4,200
monthly. The testimony of the surviving spouse is sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can
make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of the earning capacity of the victim.
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is not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled only to the bigger amount of the
2, assuming the awards vary in 2 cases.
1999
1998
1997
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surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. Thus, in
the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the
surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the
necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa to the plaintiff, have been
applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a
patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires 2-pronged evidence: evidence
as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing
that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into 2 inquiries:
whether the doctor's actions in fact casued the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate
cause of the patient's injury.
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which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have
been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below constituted conduct falling below
the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation.
1996
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The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising
from crimes or quasi-delicts must be reserved otherwise, they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action. (Dulay v. CA, 243 SCRA 220 [1995]; Yakult v. CA, 190 SCRA 347 [1990])
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means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
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committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care. (citations omitted)
3) Damages awarded were the following: actual damages (life expectancy and loss of earning
capacity); pecuniary loss, loss of support and service; and moral and mental suffering. The loss of
earning capacity is based on 2 factors: number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed, and the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs should be fixed [Gives Villa Rey formula].
1995
2000
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VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION CORP vs. ROXAS (G.R. No. 133576, July 13, 2000)
Civil Law/ Contracts/ Statute of Frauds/ Implied Trusts/ Sales: The verbal agreement entered into
between petitioner Viewmaster and respondent Allen Roxas was an agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within a year from the making thereof. To be taken out of the operation of the Statute of
Frauds, the agreement must be fully performed on one side within one year from the making thereof. In
the case at bar, since neither of the parties has fully performed their obligations within the one-year
period, then it behooves this Court to declare that the case falls within the coverage of the Statute of
Frauds. Also, as the sale of fifty percent (50%) of Allen Roxas’s shareholdings in State Investment would
amount to more than five hundred pesos (P500.00), the contract must be in writing to be enforceable.
There is no implied trust here for in order for the provisions of Article 1448 to apply in the
case at bar "the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property."
It bears stressing that respondent Allen Roxas obtained a loan from First Metro Investments, Inc. not from
petitioner Viewmaster. It was FMIC that provided the funds with which Allen Roxas acquired the
controlling interest in State Investment Trust, Inc. FMIC lent the money to Roxas because the latter
needed the money and not to obtain any beneficial interest in the shares of stock in State Investment.
Viewmaster merely facilitated the loan by acting as guarantor of the loan and nothing more.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BPI (G.R. No. 125167, September 8, 2000)
Civil Law/ Oblicon/ Action for Written Contract: The nature of an action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. In this case, petitioners' complaint alleges facts constituting its cause of action based on a
written contract, the deed of pledge. Hence, the prescriptive period is ten (10) years.
SBMA v. UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF TAIWAN (G.R. No. 131680, September 14, 2000)
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Civil Law/ Oblicon/ Extrajudicial Rescission: A stipulation authorizing a party to extrajudicially rescind a
contract and to recover possession of the property in case of contractual breach is lawful. But when
a valid objection is raised, a judicial determination of the issue is still necessary before a takeover
may be allowed. In the present case, however, respondents do not deny that there was such a
breach of the Agreement; they merely argue that the stipulation allowing a rescission and a recovery
of possession is void. Hence, the other party may validly enforce such stipulation.
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subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. Due execution of
documents representing a contract is one thing, but perfection of the contract is definitely another.
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1999
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Civil Law/ Contracts/Equitable Mortgage: Where the presumptions under the law that a contract is an
equitable mortgage are present, it shall be considered as such regardless of its nomenclature: (1) when
the price of a sale with the right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase
another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the
purchaser retains a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the
thing sold, and; (6) in any other case where it may fairly be inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or performance of any other obligation.
In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by its form or title but by the
intention of the parties.
1998
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the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered
by him.
1997
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the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the creditor's
injury. A strong wind causing the collapse of the windmill cannot be considered fortuitous, for it must be
present where windmills are constructed. There must have been an inherent defect in the windmill itself.
(4) In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not
ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. (Art. 1169) When the windmill
failed to function properly it became incumbent upon petitioner to repair it in accordance with the
stipulated guaranty. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have been in delay; instead, it is petitioner who
should bear the expenses for the reconstruction of the windmill. Art. 1167 provides that if a person
obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
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that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the payment of a loan. And
upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in
consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.
Sales with a right to repurchase are not favored. As before, instruments shall not be construed to
be sales with a right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous effects which follow, unless the terms
of the document and the surrounding circumstances so require. Whenever, under the terms of the
writing, any other construction can be fairly and reasonably inferred, such construction will be adopted
and the contract construed as a mere loan unless the court sees that, if enforced according to its terms, it
is not an unconscionable pact.
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Civil Law/Contracts/ Sale with Assumption of Mortgage: In sales with assumption of mortgage, the
assumption of mortgage is a condition to the seller's consent so that without approval by the mortgagee,
no sale is perfected.
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1996
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2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton manner. (Octol v. Ybañez,
111 SCRA 79 [1982]; De Leon v. CA, 165 SCRA 166 [1988])
In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach of petitioner's obligation to pay there is no
evidence that it acted in a fraudulent manner. Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory damages
which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be awarded.
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Civil Law/Contracts/Estoppel: Estoppel has set in where petitioner had partially paid the amount and
acquiesced to the respondent’s rate.
RIZAL SURETY v. CA & TRANSOCEAN TRANSPORT (G.R. No. 96727, Aug. 28, 1996)
Civil Law/ Contracts/Trusts: In Mindanao Devt. Authority v. CA (113 SCRA 429, 436-437 [1982]), this
Court held the elements of an express trust:
1) Competent trustor and trustee;
2) An ascertainable trust res; and
3) Sufficiently certain beneficiaries.
There is no need for stilted formalities. There must be a present and complete disposition of the
trust propoerty, notwithstanding that the enjoyment in the beneficiary will take place in the future. Also, the
purpose must be an active one to prevent trust from being executed into a legal estate or interest, and
one not in contravention of some prohibition of statute or rule of public policy.
Power of administration must be other than a mere duty to perform a contract although the
contract is for a 3rd party beneficiary. A declaration of terms is essential, and these must be stated with
reasonable certainty in order that the trustee may administer, and the court, if called upon to do so, may
enforce the trust.
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PHIL. INTL. TRADING CORP. v. ANGELES (G.R. No. 108461, October 1996)
Civil Law/Publication of Laws: In Tañada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446 [1986]), we ruled that executive
issuances meant to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, must be
published.
SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. v. RTC (G.R. No. 113926, October 1996)
Civil Law/Interest/Usury: Should the rate of interest on a loan as stipulated in a contract (23%
here), far in excess of the ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law prevail over §2 of CB
Circular No. 905 which prescribes that the rate of interest thereof shall continue to be 12% per annum?
Circular No. 905 merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law. Where the rate of interest
was agreed upon by the parties freely, it is not for respondent court to change the stipulations in the
contract where it is not illegal. Further, Art. 1306, NCC provides that contracting parties may establish
stipulations as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, etc. We find no valid reason
for the respondent court to impose a 12% interest rate on the principal balanc. In a loan, the interest due
should be that stipulated in writing, and in the absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% p.a. (Eastern
Shipping v. CA, 234 SCRA 78) Hence, only in the absence of a stipulation can the court impose the 12%
interest rate.
MACTAN CEBU INTL. AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. CA (G.R. No. 121506, October 1996)
Civil Law/Contracts/Statute of Frauds: Under Art. 1403, NCC, a contract for the sale of real property shall
be unenforceable unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing
and subscribed the party charged or his agent. Evidence of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. In case at bench,
the deed of sale and verbal agreement allowing the right of repurchase should be
considered an integral whole. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is in itself the
note or memorandum evidencing the contract. Thus, the requirement of the Statute of
Frauds has been sufficiently complied with. Moreover, the principle of the Statute of
Frauds only applies to executory contracts and not to contract either partially or totally
performed (Victoriano v. CA, 194 SCRA 19), as in this case, where the sale has been
consummated; hence, the same is taken out of the scope of the Statute of Frauds.
As the deed of sale has been consummated, by virtue of which, petitioner accepted some
benefits thereunder, it cannot now deny the existence of the agreement. (Art. 1405, NCC) The Statute of
Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing fraud and should not be made the instrument to further
them. (National Bank v. Phil. Vegetable Oil, 49 Phil. 857)
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Perhaps, another reason to annul the document is that the second page manifests that the
number of the subdivision plan and the respective area of the lot were merely handwritten while the rest
of the statements were typed, which leads us to conclude that the handwritten figures were not available
at the time the document was formalized.
1995
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falls due and that he is applying the installment payments to cover said interest. Otherwise, the creditor
cannot apply the payments to the interest and then hold the debtor in default for non-payment of
installments on the principal (Art. 1253, Civil Code).
SALES
2001
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Civil Law/Sales/Judicial Sale/Inadequacy of Price: Mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a
judicial sale of real property. But where the inadequacy is purely shocking to the conscience, such
that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly be
likely to consent to it, the sale shall be declared null and void.
2000
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SPOUSES HUANG (G.R. No. 137290, July 31,
2000)
Sales; Option Contracts- It can not be said a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had
been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite
agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a
binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the
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respondent the sum of P10,000 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be considered
as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under
Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter — the
terms of the payment — still had to be mutually covenanted.
Thus, it is not the giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential
elements of the contract of sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.
DISTAJO vs. CA
Civil Law/Sales/Persons Prohibited from Purchasing: Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;” x x x
Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the prohibition against agents purchasing property in
their hands for sale or management is not absolute. It does not apply if the principal consents to the sale
of the property in the hands of the agent or administrator.
1998
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contracting parties indicate interest on the contract to the time the contract comes into existence – the
perfection stage.
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SUCCESSION
LEGITIMES (886-914)
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least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator.
We are convinced that it is mandatory, the word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have
ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea
of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used in a statute is mandatory.
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and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration.
This function necessarily includes the examination of the properties of the deceased so as to rule on
whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution. Thus in
Trinidad v. CA (202 SCRA 106) we held that questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to
the estate of the deceased may be passed upon in probate with the consent of all parties, without
prejudice to third persons. Questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain
properties ought to be included or excluded from inventory and accounting may be resolved by the
probate court. (Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353)
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The clear intent of testator X to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner,
not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.”
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from X are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a
guide, however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
PARTITION (1078-1105)
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Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of
the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person
cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. Regardless of whether a parol partition or
agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition
has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership
by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the
rights of the parties thereunder.
PROPERTY
KINDS
EASEMENTS
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VILLANUEVA v. VELASCO
(G.R. No. 130845. November 27, 2000)
The easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement,
and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a
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compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article
617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.
The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of
private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the
needs of private respondents' estate.
POSSESSION
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE v. HEIRS OF PASTOR (G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000.)
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the present action involves the title to or
possession of a parcel of land. To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government
may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute
respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or
right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its
inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand.
OWNERSHIP
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In Republic v. CA, it was stated that the Public Land Act (CA 141) requires that the applicant must
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
in the Public Land Act. CA 141, however, has been superseded by RA 1942, which in turn has been
amended by PD 1073.
Not having complied with all the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a
right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Oral partition of property
valid where evidence supports the same; Written proof of oral partition not required in Art. 1403; A TCT
merely evidences and is not constitutive title; Proof needed for damages
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CO-OWNERSHIP
MERCADO v. CA (1995)
A co-owner can only alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property, thus, a co-owner does not
lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without
the former's knowledge and consent
ACCRETION
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SPOUSES BENITEZ v. CA & SPOUSES MACAPAGAL (G.R. No. 104828, Jan. 16, 1997)
The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts, are: after conducting a relocation
survey, private respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners' house;
notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being dated 26 Oct. 1989; and private
respondents sued for ejectment within 1 year from last demand.
Private respondents' cause of action springs from Rule 70, §1 xxx That petitioners occupied the
land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior
possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one distinction between forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. In the former, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession through FISTS,
thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. In the latter, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing
is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. (citation omitted) Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale
by the vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.
DONATIONS
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One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the
true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
Bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud, or if they are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
(PNB v. CA, 187 SCRA 735 [1990])
PARTITION
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without the consent of the latter. Such act of leasing the property is an act of strict ownership. Moreover,
although there was no note or memorandum or any deed of partition offered in evidence, such partition is
valid. A contract is obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into provided all essential
requisites are present. Written proof of oral partition is not required under Art. 1403 of the NCC. In
addition to that, neither a transfer certificate of title nor a subdivision plan is essential for its validity. A
transfer certificate of title merely evidences and is not constitutive of title. Such certificate can’t confer title
where no title had been vested by some of the means provided by law. A transfer certificate of title is not
one of the means of acquiring ownership of the property.
QUIETING OF TITLE
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Reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the
land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of
title over a particular property. Even if the reconstitution proceedings had not been instituted, the
Bernardos are not precluded from establishing by other evidence, such as the certificate of sale allegedly
issued to Tomas Bernardo, the requisite proof of validity of TCT No. 12658.
REPUBLIC v. THE HEIRS OF MAGDATO (G.R. No. 137857, September 11, 2000)
In an action for quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land, and damages,
the mortgagee of the equipment and other improvements located on the land is not an indispensable
party, if the said mortgagee does not claim any right to ownership or possession of such real estate.
Hence, the non-joinder of the mortgagee in such suit does not justify an annulment of the judgment
thereon on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
That the action for recovery of possession necessarily includes the removal of equipment located
thereon does not make APT an indispensable party. As noted earlier, FILMARCO, not APT or DBP, was
the owner of the said equipment. Hence, respondents acted correctly in impleading FILMARCO, not APT
or DBP. Certainly, if the claim of APT is adversely affected by the removal or transfer of the property to
another place, it should proceed against FILMARCO, not against respondents. Such transfer or removal
is the concern of FILMARCO, not the respondents. In any event, it should be underscored that the civil
action seeks the recovery of the land, not of the equipment thereon.
EJECTMENT
Petitioner's reliance on such doctrine is misplaced, as said cases dealt with additional damages and
charges other than liquidated damages, i.e., those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in
case of breach thereof. Here, the MTC was merely enforcing paragraph 10 of the lease contract. The
freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to
law, etc. is settled.
TALA REALTY v. BANCO FILIPINO (G.R. No. 137980, June 20, 2000.)
Since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate which it unilaterally imposed
and to which respondent did not agree, there lies no ground for ejectment. In such a case, there could still
be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals. The lessor was correct in asking for the
ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but also
all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this
Court, there have been instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs.
Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all…it gave petitioner good ground for
instituting ejectment proceedings. Cited case: if ever petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal
increase in rental rate, it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have deposited the
original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner.
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ACCION PUBLICIANA
CUTANDA vs. HEIRS OF CUTANDA (G.R. No. 109215, July 11, 2000)
We hold that prescription, not laches, is the proper ground for holding private respondent’s action to be
barred. Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that by prescription, one acquires ownership and other real
rights through the lapse of time, in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. In the same
way, rights and actions are lost by prescription. There are thus two kinds of prescription: (1) the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time, or acquisitive prescription; and (2) the loss of a right of action by
the lapse of time, or extinctive prescription.
Private respondents’ action was an accion publiciana to recover the right of possession and to be
declared owners of the subject lands. Their complaint squarely put in issue the ownership of the lands in
dispute. It may thus be properly treated as an accion reivindicatoria. As found by the Court of Appeals
and by the trial court, however, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Cutanda, acquired
possession of said lands in 1933. On the other hand, private respondents did not assert ownership over
the lands until 1988 or 55 years later, when they filed their present complaint for recovery of possession.
It is settled that the remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10
years from dispossession. Under Art. 555(4) of the Civil Code, the real right of possession is lost after the
lapse of 10 years. [Art. 555 (4) provides: A possessor may lose his possession: (4) By the possession of
another, subject to the provisions of Art. 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But
the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.] In this case, an action for recovery
of possession and ownership of lands was brought only after 26 years had elapsed. Hence, insofar as
petitioners are concerned, private respondents’ cause of action was barred, not by laches, but by
extinctive prescription, regardless of whether their complaint is considered as an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria. As regards the private respondents who did not appeal from the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, this question is now final.
HLURB JURISDICTION
ARRANZA v. B.F. HOMES, INC. (G.R. No. 131683. June 19, 2000.)
What complicated the jurisdictional issue in this case is the fact that petitioners are primarily praying for
the retention of respondent's obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement that Receiver Orendain
had entered into with them but which the present Board of Receivers had revoked.
The HLURB should take jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint because it pertains to matters
within the HLURB's competence and expertise. The HLURB should view the issue of whether the Board
of Receivers correctly revoked the agreements entered into between the previous receiver and the
petitioners from the perspective of the homeowners' interests, which P.D. No. 957 aims to protect.
Whatever monetary awards the HLURB may impose upon respondent are incidental matters that should
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be addressed to the sound discretion of the Board of Receivers charged with maintaining the viability of
respondent as a corporation. Any controversy that may arise in that regard should then be addressed to
the SEC.
Thus, the proceedings at the HLURB should not be suspended notwithstanding that respondent
is still under receivership. The TRO that this Court has issued should accordingly continue until such time
as the HLURB shall have resolved the controversy.
ESTOPPEL
PRESCRIPTION
RES JUDICATA
ADVERSE CLAIMS
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LEASE
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to remove the house, even though petitioners' lot may suffer damage thereby, as long as the damage
caused is not more than reasonably necessary.
LHUILLIER, vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 128058. December 19, 2000)
A covenant to renew a lease, which makes no provision on its terms, implies an extension or renewal
subject to the same terms in the original lease contract. Since the parties did not make a new one, the
terms and conditions of the original except the provision on the rate and period of lease are deemed
extended. Corollarily, Art. 1678 of the Civil Code did not apply. 9 The parties agreed that all
improvements introduced by the lessee would accrue to the benefit of the owner at the end of the lease,
without reimbursement. 10 This stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy,
binds the parties and is the law between them.
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2001
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Civil Law/Persons/Contracting Second Marriage/Property Regime: (1) Under Article 40 of the Family
Code, a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only
for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she
could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.
(2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
"Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage."
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this property regime, the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the
form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
regime.
In contrast, under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
2000
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the other spouse does not prove that the property was acquired during their marriage. Further, that the
husband is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident is not a sufficient ground to
render him incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties
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were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together,
they could not have owned properties in common. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically
covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
On the premise that he is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of the properties in co-
ownership and the conveyance to him of his share.
1999
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Civil Law/Persons/Support/ Renunciation/ Compromise/Filiation: (1) The right to receive support cannot
be renounced; neither can future support be the subject of compromise, Art. 301, CC. The agreement for
the dismissal of the case for support amounted to a renunciation and a compromise which cannot be
countenanced.
(2) Filiation or lack of it cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. While it is true that in
order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must 1st be shown between the claimant and the parent,
however, paternity and filiation or lack of it is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for
the court to declare its existence or absence. Although in this case, the admission may be binding upon
the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish lack of
filiation.
1998
1997
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(2) Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and
the determination of the estate of the decedent and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper
probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
TISON v. CA
Civil Law/Family Code/Paternity and Filiation/Succession: There is no presumption in law more firmly
established than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And it is settled that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Thus, the issue of whether petitioners are the
legitimate children of the decedent cannot be properly controverted in this action for reconveyance;
moreover, private respondent, as a mere transferee of decedent's surviving spouse, is not the proper
party to impugn filiation of petitioners.
Burden of proof is on private respondent- party denying the presumption bears burden to
overthrow presumption by substantial and credible evidence. Presumption of legitimacy is so strong that
its effect is to shift the burden to other party; unless rebutted, a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence
and support a finding or decision.
1996
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Civil Law/Family Code/Illegitimate Child/ Recognition: Private respondent's action for compulsory
recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Art. 285, Civil Code while petitioners
submit that with the advent of the New Family Code, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
complaint on the ground of prescription. The Court upheld Tayag v. CA (209 SCRA 665 [1992])
wherein the right of action of the minor child has been deemed vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
As in Republic v. CA (205 SCRA 356 [1992]), the fact of filing of the petition already vested in
the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance
with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
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innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation (Art. 147, FC) or
declaration of nullity of the marriage. (Arts. 43, 50 & 51, FC)
Meanwhile, under Art 148, FC, when the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such are prima facie presumed to
be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the AC or CP, as the case
may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already expressed.
1995
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marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Psychological incapacity was not meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as
extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Art. 36 should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties in the marriage. The intendment of
the law was to confine the meaning of the phrase to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
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