MANAGEMENTUL CONFLICTELOR

ÎN SCOALA

(-documentar pentru masteranzii MEOPE - )

Prof.univ.dr. ION NEGREȚ-DOBRIDOR

7 decembrie 2oo9

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 I. Conflict management
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conflict management refers to the long-term management of intractable conflicts. It is the

label for the variety of ways by which people handle grievances — standing up for what they
consider to be right and against what they consider to be wrong. Those ways include such
diverse phenomena as gossip, ridicule, lynching, terrorism, warfare, feuding, genocide, law,
mediation, and avoidance. Which forms of conflict management will be used in any given
situation can be somewhat predicted and explained by the social structure — or social
geometry — of the case.

Conflict management is often considered to be distinct from conflict resolution. The latter
refers to resolving the dispute to the approval of one or both parties, whereas the former
concerns an ongoing process that may never have a resolution. Neither is it considered the
same as conflict transformation, which seeks to reframe the positions of the conflict parties.

Scientific studies
Scientific study of conflict management (also known as social control) owes its foundations
to Donald Black, who typologized its elementary forms and used his strategy of pure
sociology to explain several aspects of its variation. Research and theory on conflict
management has been further developed by Allan Horwitz, Calvin Morill, James Tucker,
Mark Cooney, M.P. Baumgartner, Roberta Senechal de la Roche, Marian Borg, Ellis Godard,
Scott Phillips, and Bradley Campbell.

Utilizing a multidisciplinary approach and avoiding semantic discussions, we could also state
that the father of conflict management is Thomas C. Schelling, an American economist and
Nobel Prize winner, who authored the Strategy of Conflict in 1960. Schelling’s main goal was
to lay the foundation for a theory of conflict that would include the fields of economics,
psychology, sociology and the law. Conflict is an omnipresent trait of human societies since it
is almost impossible to find two parties with entirely overlapping interests, thus a general
theory for bargaining and negotiation to address conflict is useful not only in the field of
international politics or business management, but also at the personal and intimate level.

Counseling
When personal conflict leads to frustration and loss of efficiency, counseling may prove to be
a helpful antidote. Although few organizations can afford the luxury of having professional
counselors on the staff, given some training, managers may be able to perform this function.
Nondirective counseling, or "listening with understanding", is little more than being a good
listener — something every manager should be. [1]

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Sometimes the simple process of being able to vent one's feelings — that is, to express them
to a concerned and understanding listener, is enough to relieve frustration and make it
possible for the frustrated individual to advance to a problem-solving frame of mind, better
able to cope with a personal difficulty that is affecting his work adversely. The nondirective
approach is one effective way for managers to deal with frustrated subordinates and co-
workers.[2]

There are other more direct and more diagnostic ways that might be used in appropriate
circumstances. The great strength of the nondirective approach (nondirective counseling is
based on the client-centered therapy of Carl Rogers), however, lies in its simplicity, its
effectiveness, and the fact that it deliberately avoids the manager-counselor's diagnosing and
interpreting emotional problems, which would call for special psychological training. No one
has ever been harmed by being listened to sympathetically and understandingly. On the
contrary, this approach has helped many people to cope with problems that were interfering
with their effectiveness on the job.[2]

References
1. ^ Henry P Knowles; Börje O Saxberg (1971). Personality and leadership behavior.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Chapter 8. OCLC 118832.
2. ^ a b Richard Arvid Johnson (1976). Management, systems, and society : an
introduction. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Pub. Co., 148-142. ISBN
0876205406 9780876205402. OCLC 2299496.

II. Donald Black

Donald Black is a University Professor of the Social Sciences at the University of Virginia.
After completing his doctorate at the University of Michigan in 1968, Professor Black
pursued postdoctoral studies as a Russell Sage Fellow in Law and Social Science at Yale Law
School, and continued at Yale University with appointments in both the Law School and the
Department of Sociology. In 1979 he moved to Harvard University, where he again held
appointments in both the Law School and the Department of Sociology. He came to the
University of Virginia in 1985, where he has occasionally taught in the Law School as well.
His University Professorship entitles him to teach in any school or department of the
University.

A theoretical sociologist with numerous publications in the sociology of law, morality, and
conflict, Professor Black's work has increasingly expanded to include such projects as a
theory of the differential success of ideas, a theory of scienticity, a theory of scientific theory,
and a theory of the behavior of supernatural beings such as God. His most recent book, The
Social Structure of Right and Wrong, was awarded both the 1994 Theory Prize and a
Distinguished Book Award of the American Sociological Association. He also authored The
Behavior of Law (translated into several languages), The Manners and Customs of the Police,
and Sociological Justice. A recent article, "The Epistemology of Pure Sociology," (published
in 1995 in Law & Social Inquiry) won a Distinguished Scholarship Award from the American
Sociological Association. He often serves on the editorial board of scholarly journals, and
edits a series of books called "Studies on Law and Social Control" for Oxford University
Press. He has been invited to lecture in numerous countries abroad, including Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Holland, France, Scotland, England, Poland, and Japan.

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Professor Black is the founder of pure sociology, a sociological paradigm that includes no
psychology or even people as such, and will soon publish a book on the subject entitled The
Death of the Person. A second book-length project is a general theory that predicts and
explains the occurrence of conflict in all human relationships. A symposium on Professor
Black's work can be found in the November 2002 issue of Contemporary Sociology. For
additional information, see " The Geometry of Law: An Interview with Donald Black"
published in June 2002 issue of the International Journal of the Sociology of Law.

Selected Publications

Books

The Social Organization of Law. New York: Academic Press, 1973 (with M. Mileski).

The Behavior of Law. New York: Academic Press, 1976 (soft cover edition, 1980).
Translations: Chinese, Portuguese, and Indonesian.

The Manners and Customs of the Police. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Toward a General Theory of Social Control. Volume 1: Fundamentals and Volume 2: Selected
Problems. Orlando: Academic Press, 1984

Sociological Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989 (Softcover edition, 1993).
Translations: Chinese

The Social Structure of Right and Wrong. San Diego: Academic Press, 1993 (revised
softcover edition, 1998). ASA Theory Prize, 1994, ASA Distinguished Book Award, 1994.

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 III.Thomas Schelling
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Thomas Schelling

Lecturing at Sharif University of Technology

14 April 1921
Born
Oakland, California, USA

Nationality United States

Fields Economics

Yale University
Institutions Harvard University
University of Maryland

University of California, Berkeley

Alma mater
Harvard University

Known for The Strategy of Conflict

Notable awards Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2005)

Thomas Crombie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of
foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public

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Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our
understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."

Biography
Early years

Schelling was born to John M. Schelling and Zelda M. Zyres in Oakland, California. He
received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in
1944. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University in 1951.

Career

He served with the Marshall Plan in Europe, the White House, and the Executive Office of
the President from 1948 to 1953.[1] He wrote most of his dissertation on national income
behavior working at night while in Europe. He left government to join the economics faculty
at Yale University, and in 1958 he was appointed Professor of Economics at Harvard. In 1969
he joined the Kennedy School at Harvard University.[1]

Schelling's book, The Strategy of Conflict (1960), has pioneered the study of bargaining and
strategic behavior and is considered one of the hundred books that have been most influential
in the West since 1945.[2] In this book he introduced the concept of the focal point, now
commonly called the Schelling point.

Schelling's economic theories about war were extended in Arms and Influence (1966).

In 1971, he published a widely cited article dealing with racial dynamics called "Models of
Segregation". In this paper he showed that a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the
same color could lead to total segregation. He used coins on graph paper to demonstrate his
theory by placing pennies and nickels in different patterns on the "board" and then moving
them one by one if they were in an "unhappy" situation. The positive feedback cycle of
segregation - prejudice - in-group preference can be found in most human populations, with
great variation in what are regarded as meaningful differences – gender, age, race, ethnicity,
language, sexual preference, religion, etc. Once a cycle of separation-prejudice-
discrimination-separation has begun, it has a self-sustaining momentum.

Schelling has been involved in the global warming debate since chairing a commission for
President Carter in 1980. He believes climate change poses a serious threat to developing
nations, but that the threat to the United States has been exaggerated. Drawing on his
experience with the post-war Marshall Plan, he has argued that addressing global warming is
a bargaining problem: if the world is able to reduce emissions, poor countries will receive
most of the benefits but rich countries will bear most of the costs.

Schelling previously taught for twenty years at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School
of Government, where he was the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, as well
as conducted research at IIASA, in Laxenburg, Austria between 1994 and 1999.

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Schelling was a contributing participant of the Copenhagen Consensus.[1]

Personal life

Schelling was married to Corinne Tigay Saposs from 1947 to 1991, with whom he had four
sons. His marriage to second wife, Alice M. Coleman occurred later that year.[3]

References
1. ^ a b c "Curriculum Vitae: Thomas C. Schelling". University of Maryland School of
Public Policy (2008). Retrieved on 2008-09-18.
2. ^ http://www.interleaves.org/~rteeter/grttls.html
3. ^ "Thomas C. Schelling". The Notable Names Database (2008). Retrieved on 2008-
11-18.

IV. 14 Most Read

Conflict Resources:

 21 Common Mistakes to Avoid When Responding

to Conflict
By Wayne Burleson

- The following is a list of common mistakes that we all make at sometime when responding to conflict. If we can just
take back our responsibility and become more aware of how negative some of our actions are, then we can learn to
become better peacemakers. Our war-making effort lets conflict control our lives or even ruin them.

Dealing with family farm problems is a challenging business and a daily test of anyone s
people skills. When conflict comes - and it always comes in some form - emotions flow, the
volume gets turned up, stress builds, and relationships wither.

The following is a list of common mistakes that we all make at sometime when responding to
conflict. If we can just take back our responsibility and become more aware of how negative
some of our actions are, then we can learn to become better peacemakers. Our war-making
effort lets conflict control our lives or even ruin them.

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Peacemaking is not an option for farm family success, it�s a requirement. Please think of
only yourself when reading this list. Discovering your errors is a much more effective
stimulant to change than pointing out other people�s faults. For a refresher on the finger
pointing problem, please read the previous peacemaking articles.

1. Becoming great actors

We should all be in the movies because most of us somehow kid ourselves by thinking that
we are totally blameless for the causes of most conflicts.

Push the pause button and wait a minute before you respond to any conflict. Carefully think
back about all your previous actions, and take a deep honest look at your hidden contributions
to the problem. Then muster up the courage to go talk matters over by stating the parts that
you may have caused.

2 .Playing the blame game

Blaming is a way of removing responsibility. Avoid using the "you" or "I" statements,
instead use the "we," "us," or "let�s" statements. We must learn that we do not control what
other people say or do, but take back the complete responsibility for all our actions, even the
ones we want to forget about.

3. Backing people into a corner and responding with loud answers

When you push hard in conflict, look out. Just like in the cartoons, for every action there
is going to be a reaction. Pressure can cause explosions of deep hidden resentments and the
war is on. Gentle words can lead you toward solutions Harsh words stir up anger and a desire
for revenge.

4 .Assuming that we know the facts and understand the "whole" problem

Take the time to clarify problems first with facts. Don�t respond to stories but seek real
causes. As author Steven Covey says, seek first to understand, ask questions, then respond to
be understood. Carefully prepare our words, then respond with long-range creative solutions.

5. Thinking only in self terms - worrying too much about our rebuttal

During conflict we tend to worry about our rebuttal and not paying attention to what the
other person is saying and that only gets us into deeper trouble. Stop and make yourself focus
on what the other person is saying and meaning. Restate what you think they said and then
respond. Seeing everything in our needs is not being responsible. Do unto others as you would
have them do unto you.

6 .Not understanding where conflict starts

Conflict usually starts by someone not getting something that they deeply desire. Try and
find that hidden thing there missing. It�s probably something that they think they should
have, but cannot have. This will help clarify what the problem is all about.

7. Repeating what someone said to someone else

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 This always turns the story a bit and starts to distort the facts. Good advice here is to
simply avoid any words that could not be said about the situation, if the other person was
standing beside you. In other words DO NOT GOSSIP or repeat a story about someone else.

8. Letting emotions control responses

During conflicts, emotions flow freely. Stop often and bite your tongue before you
respond. Think about the other person�s "whole life journey." Perhaps now is the time you
could help them by saying something nice instead of pointing out all their faults. In other
words try to focus on why they are so upset. Don�t let emotions control reactions. Practicing
self-control helps avoid regrets.

9 .Not understanding other people�s value systems

Each person is wired differently and responds to conflict differently. Some folks
are lions, they take charge and give orders, others are like beavers, they love lots of details.
Others act like otters, making jokes about serious matters or some respond like golden
retrievers, they rollover becoming very submissive. Let�s celebrate that we are all different.
Diversity makes teams more productive.

 Conflict Resolution in the Workplace

By Christine Kemp-Longmore

Conflict is an inevitable aspect of life. If the process of conflict resolution is viewed as an

opportunity for growth and change in a work environment, the potential for a positive
outcome is great. On an individual level, the ability to solve problems or manage change plays
an important role in one's success. In the same way, the overall ability of a company to solve
problems through collaborative efforts, has a strong impact on the organization's bottom line
and overall success.

As organizations continue to restructure work teams, the need for training in conflict
resolution will grow. Conflict arises from differences, and when individuals come together in
teams, their differences in terms of power, values, and attitudes contribute to the creation of
conflict. To avoid the negative consequences that can result from disagreements, most
methods of resolving conflict stress the importance of dealing with disputes quickly and
openly. Conflict is not necessarily destructive, however. When managed properly, conflict can
result in benefits for a team.

Resolving Conflict in Work Teams

A major advantage a team has over an individual is its diversity of resources, knowledge, and
ideas. However, diversity also produces conflict. As more and more organizations restructure
to work teams the need for training in conflict resolution will continue to grow. Varney (1989)
reports that conflict remained the number-one problem for most of the teams operating within
a large energy company, even after repeated training sessions on how to resolve conflict and
how to minimize the negative impact on team members. One reason for this may be that

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mangers and other leaders within organizations are not giving the issue of resolving conflict
enough attention. Varney's research showed that although most managers are aware of
disagreements and have received training in conflict resolution, they seldom assign a high
priority to solving conflict problems. With this in mind, it is critical that team members
possess skills to resolve conflict among themselves.

Conflict arises from differences. When individuals come together in work teams their
differences in terms of power, values and attitudes, and social factors all contribute to the
creation of conflict. It is often difficult to expose the sources of conflict. Conflict can arise
from numerous sources within a team setting and generally falls into three categories:
communication factors, structural factors and personal factors (Varney, 1989). Barriers to
communication are among the most important factors and can be a major source of
misunderstanding. Communication barriers include poor listening skills; insufficient sharing
of information; differences in interpretation and perception; and nonverbal cues being ignored
or missed. Structural disagreements include the size of the organization, turnover rate, levels
of participation, reward systems, and levels of interdependence among employees. Personal
factors include things such as an individual's self-esteem, their personal goals, values and
needs. In order for conflict to be dealt with successfully, managers and team members must
understand its unpredictability and its impact on individuals and the team as a whole.

Conflict in work teams is not necessarily destructive, however. Conflict can lead to new ideas
and approaches to organizational processes, and increased interest in dealing with problems.
Conflict, in this sense, can be considered positive, as it facilitates the surfacing of important
issues and provides opportunities for people to develop their communication and interpersonal
skills. Conflict becomes negative when it is left to escalate to the point where people begin to
feel defeated, and a combative climate of distrust and suspicion develops (Bowditch &
Buono, 1997). Nelson (1995) cautions that negative conflict can destroy a team quickly, and
often arises from poor planning. He offers this list of high potential areas from which negative
conflict issues commonly arise:

Administrative Procedures: If the team lacks good groundwork for what it's doing, its
members will not be able to coordinate their work.
People Resources: If the team does not have enough resources to do the job, it is inevitable
that some will carry too heavy a load. Resentment, often unexpressed, may build, so it is
crucial that team leaders ensure adequate resources.
Cost overruns: Often inevitable, cost overruns become a problem when proper measures are
not taken. The whole team should know early on when cost becomes a problem so additional
funding can be sought by the team. This way the problem can be resolved before it grows into
a problem for management.
Schedules: The schedule is highly consequential to the team's project and should be highly
visible. All members should be willing to work together to help each other meet their
deadlines.
Responsibilities: Each team member must know what areas are assigned and who is
accountable for them.
Wish Lists: Stick to the project at hand and avoid being sidetracked into trying to fit other
things into it. Wait and do the other things you would like to do after successful completion of
the original project.

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Team members can and should attempt to avoid negative conflict from occurring. Being
aware of the potential for negative conflict to occur, and taking the necessary steps to ensure
good planning will help.

Handling Negative Conflict

When negative conflict does occur there are five accepted methods for handling it: Direct
Approach, Bargaining, Enforcement, Retreat, and De-emphasis (Nelson, 1995). Each can be
used effectively in different circumstances.

1. Direct Approach: This may be the best approach of all. It concentrates on the leader
confronting the issue head-on. Though conflict is uncomfortable to deal with, it is best to look
at issues objectively and to face them as they are. If criticism is used, it must be constructive
to the recipients. This approach counts on the techniques of problem-solving and normally
leaves everyone with a sense of resolution, because issues are brought to the surface and dealt
with.

2. Bargaining: This is an excellent technique when both parties have ideas on a solution yet
cannot find common ground. Often a third party, such as a team leader, is needed to help find
the compromise. Compromise involves give and take on both sides, however, and usually
ends up with both walking away equally dissatisfied.

3. Enforcement of Team Rules: Avoid using this method if possible, it can bring about hard
feelings toward the leader and the team. This technique is only used when it is obvious that a
member does not want to be a team player and refuses to work with the rest. If enforcement
has to be used on an individual, it may be best for that person to find another team.

4. Retreat: Only use this method when the problem isn't real to begin with. By simply
avoiding it or working around it, a leader can often delay long enough for the individual to
cool off. When used in the right environment by an experienced leader this technique can help
to prevent minor incidents that are the result of someone having a bad day from becoming real
problems that should never have occurred.

5. De-emphasis: This is a form of bargaining where the emphasis is on the areas of

agreement. When parties realize that there are areas where they are in agreement, they can
often begin to move in a new direction.

Managing Cooperative Conflict

Though we often view conflict through a negative lens, teams require some conflict to operate
effectively. Cooperative conflict can contribute to effective problem solving and decision
making by motivating people to examine a problem. Encouraging the expression of many
ideas; energizing people to seek a superior solution; and fostering integration of several ideas
to create high-quality solutions (Tjosvold, 1988). The key is to understand how to handle it

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constructively. If members understand how to do it, differences that arise can result in benefits
for a team.

While it is true that suppressed differences can reduce the effectiveness of a team, when they
are brought to the surface, disagreements can be dealt with and problems can be resolved. The
actual process of airing differences can help to increase the cohesiveness and effectiveness of
the team through the increased interest and energy that often accompanies it. This in turn
fosters creativity and intensity among team members. In addition, bringing differences to the
surface can result in better ideas and more innovative solutions. When people share their
views and strive toward reaching a consensus, better decisions are reached. Team members
also improve their communication skills and become better at understanding and listening to
the information they receive when differences are freely aired. Fisher, Belgard, and Rayner
(1995) offer these tips on improving listening skills:

Listen for meaning.

Understanding is not agreeing.

Seek clarification before responding, if needed.
Apply listening skills when receiving a message.
Evaluate yourself for how well you listened at the end of any conversation.
The tension of well-managed conflict allows teams to confront disagreement through
healthy discussion and improve the decisions made (Rayeski & Bryant, 1994). This leads to
greater team efficiency and effectiveness. Effectively managing conflict allows teams to
stay focused on their goals. Swift and constructive conflict management leads to a broader
understanding of the problem, healthy expression of different ideas or alternatives, and
creates excitement from the positive interaction and involvement which will help the team
through periods of transition and on to greater levels of performance.

As teams become more responsible for managing themselves, it is important for organizations
to help them by identifying the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required to handle
conflict. Then developing plans to transfer these skills and capabilities over to their teams.
Because conflict is inevitable in teams, the focus needs to be on how it is managed. Conflict
that is poorly handled creates an environment of fear and avoidance of the subject. On the
other hand, if properly managed, it can lead to learning, creativity, and growth.

Team Resolution Process

Rayeski and Bryant (1994) recommend using the Team Resolution Process to handle conflict
when it occurs in teams. Conflict should first be handled on an informal basis between the
individuals involved. This, they say, will allow time for resolution or self-correction by the
individuals. If the conflict remains unsettled, a mediator can be brought in to help resolve the
situation. If resolution is still not achieved the dispute should be openly discussed in a team
meeting. A formal discipline process needs to occur, if resolution is not achieved after being
addressed at the team level.

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 The escalating process of Team Resolution is as follows:

1. Collaboration (One-on-one): Handle the new problem person-to-person. Use as many

facts as possible and relate the issue to customer, team, or organizational needs. Be open and
honest and conduct the session in a private setting. Document the concerns or issues, the
dates, and the resolution, if any, and have both parties sign it.

2. Mediation (One-on-one with Mediator): If collaboration did not work or was

inappropriate, handle the problem with a mediator. The mediator must be trained in conflict
resolution, understand policy and ethics, be trusted by the team, and have the ability to
remain neutral. Gather facts and talk over the issue with the people involved. Bring up as
many facts as possible and relate the issue to customer, team, or organizational needs. Be
open and honest and conduct the mediation session in private. Document it and have all
parties sign.

3. Team Counseling: The conflict is now a definite issue to the team. Collaboration and/or
Mediation could not be done, were not appropriate, or did not work. Handle the conflict at a
team meeting; put the problem on the next agenda and invite the necessary individuals.
Again, bring up the facts, relate the issue to customer, team, or organizational needs. Be open
and honest, discuss it in a private setting, document it, and have all parties sign it. Anyone on
the team can put an issue or problem on the team agenda, however, this step should be used
only after Collaboration, and Mediation has been ruled out.

Because every team is different, disputes that arise will be too. However, Stulberg (1987)
recognizes patterns common to all controversies. He calls them:

The Five-P's of Conflict Management:

1. Perceptions: People associate conflict with negative responses such as anger, fear, tension,
and anxiety. Rarely do we perceive any benefits from being involved in a dispute. Our
negative perceptions impact our approach in resolving conflict as we strive to eliminate the
source of these negative feelings.

2. Problems: Anyone can be involved in a conflict, and the amount of time, money, and
equipment needed for resolution will vary according to its complexity.

3. Processes: There are different ways to go about resolving disputes: Suppress the conflict,
give in, fight, litigate, mediate, etc.

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4. Principles: We determine the priorities of all resolution processes on the basis of an
analysis of our fundamental values regarding efficiency, participation, fairness, compliance,
etc.

5. Practices: Power, self-interest, and unique situations are all factors relating to why people
resolve disputes the way they do.

Stulberg proposed these patterns as an aid for formal mediators, but anyone dealing with
conflict can benefit from understanding the elements common to disagreements.

Negotiation

Although there are common patterns, there is no one best way to deal with conflict. Disputes
arise for different reasons and every team is unique. Varney (1989) proposes that negotiation
is the most effective response to conflict when both parties stand to gain something, each has
some power, and there is interdependency. Negotiation offers flexibility and viability other
responses, such as Avoidance, Confrontation, and Diffusion lack. The process of negotiation
involves listening to both sides, seeking out common areas of interest and agreement, and
building on them so that individuals can understand each other's points of view. Varney
believes there are four essential skills team leaders need to learn and apply to effectively
resolve disagreements using the negotiation process:

The four essential skills team leaders

Diagnosis: Recognizing areas of understanding and areas of differences.
Initiation: Bringing the disagreements to the surface.
Listening: Hearing not only what the other person is saying, but the Emotional aspects as
well.
Problem Solving: A process with numerous steps including data gathering, considering its
impact, examining alternatives, identifying solutions, and developing a plan of action.

In order to resolve their differences, Varney (1989) recommends bringing the parties together
and, with the assistance of a third party, asking the following questions:

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 The five good questions
What is the problem, as you perceive it?
What does the other person do that contributes to the problem?
What do you want or need from the other person?
What do you do that contributes to the problem?
What first step can you take to resolve the problem?

Each party should be questioned while the other listens, asking questions only for
clarification. Then the parties discuss a mutual definition and understanding of the problem.
They should be allowed to express their feelings and get hostility out of their systems at this
stage, but both parties must be willing to admit partial responsibility for the problem. This
requires good listening, low defensiveness, and an ability to stay in a problem-solving mode.
Agreement should be reached on what steps will be taken to resolve the problem, and should
be put in writing in order to prevent later misunderstandings.

The key to Varney's negotiation process is exposing the different positions as early as
possible. If conflict is left to simmer and then erupt into open warfare, it becomes much more
difficult to resolve. Revealing the sources of conflict early on enables people to understand
the facts of the dispute, before emotions get the upper hand, which may allow them to more
easily see their areas of agreement. When agreement areas are identified, people can then
work toward arriving at a consensus and develop a process for resolving problems in the
future.

Fisher et al. (1995) offers a similar five-step approach to resolving conflict

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 The Fisher’Five Steps

1. Acknowledge that the conflict exists.

2. Gain common ground by putting the conflict

in perspective with the goals and purpose of the team.

3.Seek to understand all angles of the disagreement,

keeping in mind that understanding is different from agreement.

4.Attack the issue, not each other.

Channel anger and hostility into problem solving and action planning.

5.Develop an action plan

describing what each person will do to solve the problem.

This method allows both parties to acknowledge the nature of the conflict, then jointly work toward
resolving it. As with Varney's (1989) approach, the key to this process is responding quickly and
effectively when conflict presents itself. Teams are cautioned to avoid covering up painful issues.
Sooner or later, unresolved issues tend to resurface, often in uglier forms than before. Along the
same lines, teams should not automatically defer an issue to management, as this disempowers the
team. Instead, they should learn how to handle disputes themselves, requesting help from
management only when their own attempts at resolution have failed. Fisher et al. (1995) stress that
team members should be encouraged to voice their concerns in team meetings rather than outside
the team setting, in an attempt to avoid what they call the AParking Lot Commentary (p. 212). This
happens when team members are afraid to voice feelings to the team so they begin to talk about
team issues in conversations with individuals. When this occurs it undermines the trust and integrity
of the team.

Sources of Conflict Among Project Teams

Though the recognition that conflict can be productive is not new ( for example, Coser, 1956;
Deutsh, 1969), some of the conflict issues that organizations are dealing with are. For
instance, one study (Kezsbom, 1992) looked at sources of conflict among project teams and

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found that the number one issue developed from goals and priority issues. Previous literature
(Posner, 1986; Thamhain & Wilemon, 1975) presented the number one source of conflict as
being disagreements over schedules, which ranked at number seven in Kezsbom's study. It
makes sense that goals and priority issues have risen on the list as organizations have evolved
into multi-project, streamlined environments. In these new complex, hybrid organizations,
employees often find themselves serving on a variety of project teams, being led by a variety
of project mangers while reporting directly to functional managers. This sets the stage for
Kezsbom's third conflict category: communication and information flow. When reporting
relationships are complex it becomes more difficult to share information.

Personality and interpersonal issues, ranked in the number two category by those in high
technology environments, presented another dramatic change from previous studies. This
change may be related to the increased use of cross-functional, self-directed teams in which
individuals with technical backgrounds must rely on the work of others to get their own work
done. This specifically illustrates how important it is to provide training in communication
and interpersonal skills to cross-functional team members, while emphasizing an appreciation
of the value of differences.

Overall, this study provides valuable insights for organizations, project leaders, and project
team members. Because goal and priority issues frequently change, communication must be
improved.

Kezsbom (1992) makes these recommendations:

More frequent and effective upward, downward, and team communications.

More frequent meetings and status review sessions to increase communication between
functions and minimize inconsistent perceptions of project goals and priorities.
Increase human relations training and facilitate more active team-building efforts.
Organizations must be aware that conflict grows from differences, but so does innovation. If
project teams are properly trained in human relations and team-building skills, production and
quality measures will increase.

No matter what kind of team it is, no method of managing conflict will work without mutual
respect and a willingness to disagree and resolve disagreements.

Donald Weiss, president of Self-Management Communication, Inc., believes each person on

the team must be willing to take the following four steps when a team meeting erupts into a
storm (Weiss, 1997): listen, acknowledge, respond, and resolve remaining differences.

Listen: To hear what someone else is saying is not the same as listening. To listen effectively
means clearing your mind of distractions and concentrating not only on the words but also on
nonverbal gestures, which often convey ninety percent of what the person is trying to say.
When resolving disagreements, you often have to deal with feelings first.
Acknowledge: You can acknowledge people's positions without agreeing with them. Show
this with statements like, "I understand that you're angry," "If I understand you, you think we
should", or "Let's explore your opinion further." You may still disagree with them, but at least

17
they know you've heard them.
Respond: You've listened and acknowledged what the other person is saying. Now it is your
turn to be heard. If you're offering criticism of your teammate's ideas, make sure it's
constructive, and if you're disagreeing with them, be ready to offer an alternative. Be willing,
also, to be questioned or challenged, while avoiding defensiveness when you answer.
Resolve remaining differences: Define the real problem by looking for what's causing the
disagreement. Then analyze it into its manageable parts. Now you can generate alternative
solutions to the problem and select the alternative on which everyone can agree.

For individuals to work effectively in teams they must be able to clearly communicate their
ideas, to listen, and be willing to disagree. Although it is difficult, learning to appreciate each
other's differences reflects a team's ability to manage conflict. When conflict occurs we must
not turn our backs and hope it will go away. Instead, we must learn to tolerate it, even
welcome it, for well-managed conflict can be the source of change and innovation. As more
and more organizations attempt to make the difficult transition to teams, they must develop
and provide programs for their employees which offer training in conflict management skills
and techniques. I hope the ideas in this paper can help organizations and their teams begin, or
continue, this challenging task.

Carole A. Townsley, RV Armstrong and Associates

References:

Bowditch, J. L., Buono, A. F. (1997). A primer on organizational behavior (4th ed.). New
York, NY: JohnWiley & Sons.

Coser, L. A. (1956). The functions of social conflict. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.Deutsh, M.
(1969). Conflicts: Productive and destructive. Journal of Social Issues, 25 (1), 7 - 41.

Fisher, K., Rayner, S., Belgard, W., (1995). Tips for teams: A ready reference for solving
common team problems. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Kezsbom, D. S. (1992). Re-opening Pandora's box: Sources of project conflict in the >90s.
Industrial Engineering, 24 (5), 54 - 59.

Nelson, M. (1995). Interpersonal team leadership skills. Hospital Material Management

Quarterly, 16 (4), 53 - 63.

Rayeski, E., & Bryant, J. D. (1994). Team resolution process: A guideline for teams to
manage conflict, performance, and discipline. In M. Beyerlein & M. Bullock (Eds.), The
International Conference on Work Teams Proceedings: Anniversary Collection. The Best of
1990 - 1994 (pp. 215 - 221). Denton: University of North Texas, Center for the Study of Work
Teams.

Stulberg, J. B. (1987). Taking charge / managing conflict. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

18
Thamhain, H., & Wilemon, D. L. (1975). Conflict management in project life cycles. Sloan
Management Review, 17 (3).

Varney, G. H. (1989). Building productive teams: An action guide and resource book. San
Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass, Inc.

Weiss, D. H. (1997). Four steps for managing team storms. Getting ResultsYFor the hands-on
Manager, 42 (7), 7.

I. How Work Teams Cope With Conflict

By na - Resolving conflict constructively is the most critical of team skills. Without this
ability, the team cannot develop the trust and bonding that allows moving from the Storming
stage into peak performance. Conflict resolution is not a stand-alone skill. There are specific
techniques and attitudes that are helpful, but conflict resolution interrelates with other skills.

Resolving conflict constructively is the most critical of team skills.

Without this ability, the team cannot develop the trust and bonding that allows moving from
the Storming stage into peak performance. Conflict resolution is not a stand-alone skill.
There are specific techniques and attitudes that are helpful, but conflict resolution
interrelates with other skills.

Communication Skills Other Skills That Prevent Conflict

Good communication skills prevent
conflict or destructive escalation. Many
of us do not communicate well.
Sometimes our body language does not fit
our verbal messages creating a cognitive
dissonance in the listener. We may
personalize issues. We may criticize
people rather than actions, behaviors, or
situations.
Listening effectively is the other half of
good communication. The most common
deficiency is letting our mind race ahead
of the speaker's voice. We may use this
speed difference to formulate responses or
defenses. Or we may allow our mind to
wander on other subjects and miss part of
what is said. This is, at best, frustrating
Other team skills have a collateral effect
of avoiding or mitigating conflict. Time
management prevents arguments about
who does what and when. Cross training
prevents boredom and prevents conflict
over workloads. Facilitation controls
meetings and reduces frustration over
wasted time.
Conflict Resolution Skills
Intervention occurs when parties to a
conflict are confronted. In the mildest
form, a team member quietly and
separately points out the situation to one
or more of the individuals involved. In the
strongest intervention the entire team
confronts the conflicted parties much as

19
 for the speaker. It also leads to
misunderstandings. Team members must
train their minds to focus on words and
message until the speaker finishes. Only
then should they analyze and formulate a
response.
Problem Solving
Problem solving skills define a problem,
gather information, analyze the
information, synthesize solutions, select
the best solution, and implement it. These
activities occur in distinct steps and in an
orderly and structured way.
Without good problem solving skills
people jump to conclusions. The
conclusions that various people jump to
are often wildly different. Without a
factual basis, the discussion turns to who
is "wrong" and who is "right" with an
undertone of who is "OK" or "Not OK".
Problem solving avoids conflict with
structure and consensus.
Teams can also bring problem solving
directly to bear on a conflict. They treat
the conflict as a problem, gather
information, analyze, search for solutions,
and implement.
friends and relatives might confront an
addict.
Feedback is an effective conflict
resolution technique. In feedback, one
individual confronts another in a
structured setting with a carefully crafted
statement. A feedback statement goes like
this:
"When you...(Describe The Behavior)"
"I feel...(Describe Your Emotion)"
"Because...(Describe The Reason For
the Emotion)"
"What do you think" (Wait For Response)
An example would be: "Jim, when you
are late for meetings it makes me angry
because your tardiness wastes everyone's
time and prevents our team from
conducting its business. What do you
think?" The addressee of the feedback
statement must then respond in a
structured way. A facilitator governs and
controls the process.
Feedback is powerful. It defuses anger
and brings rationality to a discussion.
Feedback and Intervention are only two
of many conflict resolution techniques.

II. Conflict analysis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conflict analysis or conflict assessment is an initial stage of conflict resolution in which

parties seek to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics in their relationship. [1] For
instance, in Darfur, conflict analysis of the Fur-Arab War in 1987 noted that "from time
immemorial, seasonal fluctuations in water and grazing land had led to conflict over natural
resources in Darfur."[2] Many schools, such as George Mason University, have programs
related to conflict analysis and resolution. There are also various subsets of conflict analysis
such as environmental conflict analysis, which deal with specific types of disputes.[3]

20
References

1. ^ Conflict Assessment, Beyond Intractability.

2. ^ Conflict Analysis
3. ^ Environmental Conflict Analysis

Amsterdam Center for Conflict Studies (ACS)

III. Conflict resolution

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conflict resolution is a range of processes aimed at alleviating or eliminating sources of

conflict. The term "conflict resolution" is sometimes used interchangeably with the term
dispute resolution or alternative dispute resolution. Processes of conflict resolution generally
include negotiation, mediation and diplomacy. The processes of arbitration, litigation, and
formal complaint processes such as ombudsman processes, are usually described with the
term dispute resolution, although some refer to them as "conflict resolution." Processes of
mediation and arbitration are often referred to as alternative dispute resolution.

In humans
Definitional controversy

There is considerable controversy about definitions and terminology in the field of conflict
resolution. This may be partly because the field is multidisciplinary. Academics and
practitioners are found within diverse disciplines including political science, international
relations, law, psychology, public administration, anthropology, business, education,
sociology, philosophy, health care and other fields of study or practice. Internationally, a
growing number of undergraduate and graduate programs are emerging in "conflict
resolution," "conflict management," "dispute resolution," "alternative dispute resolution,"
"conflict transformation," and "peace and conflict studies". In addition, many disciplines now
incorporate courses in negotiation, mediation or conflict management. In most jurisdictions,
no specific credentials are legally required by conflict resolution practitioners, many of whom
have no specific academic qualifications.

Many of the definitional concerns spring from diverse definitions of the terms "conflict" and
"dispute" and "resolution". The term "conflict" has been defined as "intense interpersonal
and/or intrapersonal dissonance (tension or antagonism) between two or more parties based
on incompatible goals, needs, desires, values, beliefs, and/or attitudes." [1] "Disputes" have
been defined as conflicts that have become particularized around a specific issue or issues. [2].
Some conflicts may not become manifest as articulated disputes. Thus, "conflict resolution"
tends to refer to processes that address the sources of conflict so as to prevent them from
escalating or eliminate the conflict altogether. The term "dispute resolution" refers to
21
settlement of disputes and complaints, which may or may not address or eliminate the sources
of the conflict.

Similar definition controversies have emerged over the term "resolution." Some scholars and
practitioners have pointed out that many disputes (and conflicts) cannot be resolved in that the
sources of the conflicts cannot be eliminated. Thus, the term "conflict management" has
emerged to convey the idea that even if resolution is impossible, conflicts and disputes can be
managed constructively.

Methods

There are many tools available to persons in conflict. How and when they are used depends
on several factors (such as the specific issues at stake in the conflict and the cultural context
of the disputants). The list of tools available to practitioners include negotiation, mediation,
community building, advocacy, diplomacy, activism, nonviolence, critical pedagogy, prayer
and counseling. In real world conflict situations, which range in scale from kindergarten
bullying to genocide, practitioners will creatively combine several of these approaches as
needed. Additionally, practitioners will often specialize in a particular scale (e.g.
interpersonal, community or international), or a particular variety of conflict (such as
environmental, religious or organizational), and repertoires of tools they find most useful.

Culture-based

Conflict resolution as both a professional practice and academic field is highly sensitive to
culture. In Western cultural contexts, such as the Canada and the United States, successful
conflict resolution usually involves fostering communication among disputants, problem
solving, and drafting agreements that meet their underlying needs. In these situations, conflict
resolvers often talk about finding the win-win solution, or mutually satisfying scenario, for
everyone involved (see Fisher and Ury (1981), Getting to Yes).

In many non-Western cultural contexts, such as Afghanistan, Vietnam and China, it is also
important to find 'win-win' solutions; however, getting there can be very different. In these
contexts, direct communication between disputants that explicitly addresses the issues at stake
in the conflict can be perceived as very rude, making the conflict worse and delaying
resolution. Rather, it can make sense to involve religious, tribal or community leaders,
communicate difficult truths indirectly through a third party, and make suggestions through
stories (see David Augsberger (1992), Conflict Mediation Across Cultures). Intercultural
conflicts are often the most difficult to resolve because the expectations of the disputants can
be very different, and there is much occasion for misunderstanding. A firm position in
diplomacy must be maintain.

Counseling

When personal conflict leads to frustration and loss of efficiency, counseling may prove to be
a helpful antidote. Although few organizations can afford the luxury of having professional
counselors on the staff, given some training, managers may be able to perform this function.
Nondirective counseling, or "listening with understanding", is little more than being a good
listener — something every manager should be. [3]

22
Sometimes the simple process of being able to vent one's feelings — that is, to express them
to a concerned and understanding listener, is enough to relieve frustration and make it
possible for the frustrated individual to advance to a problem-solving frame of mind, better
able to cope with a personal difficulty that is affecting his work adversely. The nondirective
approach is one effective way for managers to deal with frustrated subordinates and co-
workers.

There are other more direct and more diagnostic ways that might be used in appropriate
circumstances. The great strength of the nondirective approach (nondirective counseling is
based on the client-centered therapy of Carl Rogers), however, lies in its simplicity, its
effectiveness, and the fact that it deliberately avoids the manager-counselor's diagnosing and
interpreting emotional problems, which would call for special psychological training. No one
has ever been harmed by being listened to sympathetically and understandingly. On the
contrary, this approach has helped many people to cope with problems that were interfering
with their effectiveness on the job.[4]

In animals
Conflict resolution has also been studied in non-human like dogs, cats, monkeys, or
elephants.primates (see Frans de Waal, 2000). Aggression is more common among relatives
and within a group, than between groups. Instead of creating a distance between the
individuals, however, the primates were more intimate in the period after the aggressive
incident. These intimacies consisted of grooming and various forms of body contact. Stress
responses, like an increased heart rate, usually decrease after these reconciliatory signals.
Different types of primates, as well as many other species who are living in groups, show
different types of conciliatory behaviour. Resolving conflicts that threaten the interaction
between individuals in a group is necessary for survival, hence has a strong evolutionary
value. These findings contradicted previous existing theories about the general function of
aggression, i.e. creating space between individuals (first proposed by Konrad Lorenz), which
seems to be more the case in between groups conflicts.

In addition to research in primates, biologists are beginning to explore reconciliation in other

animals. Up until recently, the literature dealing with reconciliation in non-primates have
consisted of anecdotal observations and very little quantitative data. Although peaceful post-
conflict behavior had been documented going back to the 1960s, it wasn’t until 1993 that
Rowell made the first explicit mention of reconciliation in feral sheep. Reconciliation has
since been documented in spotted hyenas,[5] lions, dolphins,[6] dwarf mongooses, domestic
goats[7] and domestic dogs.[8]

Bibliography
 Augsburger, D. (1992). Conflict mediation across cultures. Louisville, Kentucky:
Westminster / John Knox Press.
 Bannon, I. & Paul Collier (Eds.). (2003). Natural resources and violent conflict:
Options and actions. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.
 Ury, F. & Rodger Fisher. (1981). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving
in. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

23
  Wilmot,W. & Jouyce Hocker. (2007). Interpersonal conflict. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill Companies.
 de Waal, Frans B. M. and Angeline van Roosmalen. 1979. Reconciliation and
consolation among chimpanzees. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 5: 55-66.
 de Waal, Frans B. M. 1989. Peacemaking Among Primates. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
 Judge, Peter G. and Frans B. M. de Waal. 1993. Conflict avoidance among rhesus
monkeys: coping with short-term crowding. Animal Behaviour 46: 221-232.
 Veenema, Hans et al. 1994. Methodological improvements for the study of
reconciliation. Behavioural Processes 31:29-38.
 de Waal, Frans B. M. and Filippo Aureli. 1996. Consolation, reconciliation, and a
possible cognitive difference between macaques and chimpanzees. Reaching into
thought: The minds of the great apes (Eds. Anne E. Russon, Kim A. Bard, Sue Taylor
Parker), Cambridge University Press, New York, NY: 80-110.
 Aureli, Filippo. 1997. Post-conflict anxiety in non-human primates: the mediating role
of emotion in conflict resolution. Aggressive Behavior 23: 315-328.
 Castles, Duncan L. and Andrew Whiten. 1998. Post-conflict behaviour of wild olive
baboons, I. Reconciliation, redirection, and consolation. Ethology 104: 126-147.
 Aureli, Filippo and Frans B. M. de Waal, eds. 2000. Natural Conflict Resolution.
University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
 de Waal, Frans B. M. 2000. Primates––A natural heritage of conflict resolution.
Science 289: 586-590.
 Silk, Joan B. 2002. The form and function of reconciliation in primates. Annual
Review of Anthropology 31: 21-44.
 Weaver, Ann and Frans B. M. de Waal. 2003. The mother-offspring relationship as a
template in social development: reconciliation in captive brown capuchins (Cebus
apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology 117: 101-110.
 Palagi, Elisabetta et al. 2004. Reconciliation and consolation in captive bonobos (Pan
paniscus). American Journal of Primatology 62: 15-30.
 Palagi, Elisabetta et al. 2005. Aggression and reconciliation in two captive groups of
Lemur catta. International Journal of Primatology 26: 279-294.
 Lorenzen, Michael. 2006. Conflict Resolution and Academic Library Instruction.
LOEX Quarterly 33, no. ½,: 6-9, 11.
 Winslade, John & Monk, Gerald. 2000. Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to
Conflict Resolution. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.

References

24
 1. ^ Stella Ting-Toomey. "Toward a Theory of Conflict and Culture." In Communication,
Culture and Organizational Processeses, edited by W. B. Gudykunst, L. P. Stewart,
and S. Ting-Toomey. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1985, at 72.
2. ^ Richard Abel, "A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society" (1973) 8
Law & Society Review 217 at 217.
3. ^ Henry P Knowles; Börje O Saxberg (1971). Personality and leadership behavior.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Chapter 8. OCLC 118832.
4. ^ Richard Arvid Johnson (1976). Management, systems, and society : an introduction.
Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Pub. Co., 148-142. ISBN 0876205406
9780876205402. OCLC 2299496.
5. ^ Wahaj, S. A., Guse, K. & Holekamp, K. E. 2001: Reconciliation in the spotted
hyena (Crocuta crocuta). Ethology 107, 1057—1074
6. ^ Weaver, A. 2003: Conflict and reconciliation in captive bottlenose dolphins,
Tursiops truncatus. Marine Mammal Science 19, 836—846.
7. ^ Schino, G. 1998: Reconciliation in domestic goats. Behaviour 135, 343—356.
8. ^ Cools, A. K. A., Van Hout, A. J.-M., Nelissen M. H. J. 2008: Canine Reconciliation
and Third-Party-Initiated Postconflict Affiliation: Do Peacemaking Social
Mechanisms in Dogs Rival Those of Higher Primates? Ethology 114, 53—63.

IV. Conflict resolution research

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conflict resolution is any reduction in the severity of a conflict. It may involve conflict
management, in which the parties continue the conflict but adopt less extreme tactics;
settlement, in which they reach agreement on enough issues that the conflict stops; or removal
of the underlying causes of the conflict. The latter is sometimes called “resolution,” in a
narrower sense of the term that will not be used in this article. Settlements sometimes end a
conflict for good, but when there are deeper issues—such as value clashes among people who
must work together, distressed relationships, or mistreated members of one’s ethnic group
across a border—settlements are often temporary.

Negotiation Research
Negotiation, the most heavily researched approach to conflict resolution, has mainly been
studied in laboratory experiments, in which undergraduate participants are randomly assigned
to conditions. These studies have mostly looked at antecedents of the strategies adopted by
negotiators and the outcomes attained, including whether agreement is reached, the joint
benefit to both parties, and the individual benefit to each party.

25
Negotiation Research Findings

Here are some of the more prominent findings from these studies (see Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993):

 Problem solving behavior, such as giving or requesting information about a party’s

priorities among the issues, encourages high joint benefit.
 Contentious behavior, such as making threats or standing firm on one’s proposals,
encourages failure to reach agreement or, if agreement is reached, low joint benefit.
 Conceding makes agreement more likely but favors the other party’s interests.
 Prosocial motivation (resulting, for example, from positive mood or the expectation of
future interaction with the other party) encourages problem solving and high joint
benefit and discourages contentious behavior, but only when resistance to yielding is
high (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).
 The party who makes the first offer tends to achieve greater benefit than the other
party.
 Three states of mind discourage concession making: viewing concessions as
producing loss rather than as foregoing gain; focusing attention on one’s goal rather
than one’s limit (i.e., the alternative that is minimally tolerable); and adopting a fixed-
pie perspective, in which one views the other’s gain as one’s loss, rather than an
expandable pie perspective.
 Adopting any of the states of mind above diminishes the likelihood of agreement; but
if agreement is reached, it increases the likelihood of winning, especially if the other
party adopts the opposite state of mind (Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004).]]

Cultural Differences in Negotiation Findings

Recent experiments have also found some cultural differences in negotiation behavior
(Gelfand & Brett, 2004):

 Negotiators from individualistic cultures tend to take a more contentious approach,

while those from collectivistic cultures are more concerned about maintaining positive
relationships and hence more likely to cooperate (concede or engage in problem
solving).
 Accountability to constituents encourages contentious behavior for individualists, it
encourages cooperative behavior for collectivists.
 Research tells us that people with a high need for closure (for rapid decision making)
tend to think and act in accustomed ways. It follows that high need for closure should
accentuate contentious behavior in individualistic societies and cooperative behavior
in collectivistic societies, an hypothesis that has received support.

Research into Third Party Involvement

26
Third parties often become involved in conflict resolution, either being called in by the
disputants or acting on their own because the conflict annoys them or the community they
serve.

Two common forms of third-party intervention are:

 arbitration and
 mediation.
In arbitration, the third party listens to both sides and then renders a decision, which can be
either binding or advisory. Most mediation consists of third-party assistance with negotiation.
When conflict is severe and the disputants have difficulty talking calmly with each other,
mediators can put them into contact and help them develop a cease-fire or settlement. If the
disputants cannot or will not meet each other, mediators commonly become intermediaries
and shuttle between them. Sometimes a chain of two intermediaries is necessary because there
is no single individual who can communicate effectively with both sides.

Mediation Research Findings

Mediation has been studied in both the laboratory and the field. Research (see Kressel &
Pruitt, 1989) suggests that:

 Interpersonal mediation is usually successful in producing settlements.

 Disputants generally prefer mediation over arbitration, since it allows them to retain
control over the final decision. This means that in med-arb, where failure to reach
agreement in mediation is followed by binding arbitration, disputants will work
harder to reach agreement than in straight mediation.
 In the case of small claims disputes, that mediation produces more compliance with
the agreement than adjudication (a form of arbitration), perhaps because mediated
decisions accord more with the parties’ needs.
 To be fully successful, mediators must be seen as impartial between the two parties.
 Having stronger initial ties to one side than the other is less damaging to the
perception of impartiality than exhibiting bias during the mediation session.
 Disputants even sometimes prefer that the mediator be close to the other party so that
he or she can exert influence over that party.

Mediator Tactics Discoveries

More than 100 distinct mediator tactics have been identified. Among the tactics that have
been shown to work well, in the sense of producing long-lasting agreements beneficial to both
sides are:

 Helping the parties to understand each other’s positions, challenging them to come
up with new ideas, and requesting their reactions to new ideas.
 When conflict is severe, mediators often have to be quite active and even pushy
(e.g., telling disputants that their demands are unrealistic) in order to achieve
agreement.

27
  When conflict is less intense, and the disputants are capable of talking productively
with each other, it is best for mediators to be relatively inactive.
 When disputant discussions are unproductive it is best to separate the parties
(“caucusing”) and engage in problem solving with each of them.
 Compliance to the terms of an agreement is enhanced when the parties emerge from
the mediation with a positive relationship and when they view the mediation process
as a fair one in which all of the issues came out.
 Continued third-party attention to the conflict has been found to encourage
compliance to agreements reached at the end of internal war (Hampson, 1996).
 When there is a continuing relationship between disputants, helping them find a
settlement for their current disagreement is often not enough. New conflicts may arise
or deeper issues resurface.
 Within the specific continuing relationship of marriage, marital therapists have found
that training both the parties in problem solving skills, such as effective
communication, identifying key issues, developing solutions that satisfy both parties’
needs, helps ease marital problems. Two evaluation studies have shown the value of
this approach, and one of them (Johnson & Greenberg, 1985) has demonstrated that
emotionally focused therapy is even more effective.
 Emotionally focused therapy is the practice where, persistent maladaptive interaction
patterns are identified, and husband and wife are encouraged to reveal the feelings
and needs associated with these patterns and to “accept and respond to” their partner’s
feelings and needs.
 Programs have also been developed for training school children in problem solving
skills, and evaluations of these programs have generally been quite positive.
 In addition, many school systems have adopted peer mediation programs, in which
students are trained to mediate conflicts that arise in their school. Evaluations of these
programs have also been quite positive (Coleman & Deutsch, 2001).

Ethno-Political Conflict Research

Investigators have looked at the impact of several kinds of third-party interventions in
international and ethno-political conflict, including peacekeeping, mediation, and problem
solving workshops. Peacekeeping is the use of lightly armed troops to manage conflict in a
war zone. Most peacekeeping has been done by the United Nations, drawing on the military
forces of its members. Traditional peacekeeping involved enforcing ceasefires, but in the last
few years, the peacekeeper’s duties have grown to include such services as the delivery of
humanitarian aid, the supervision of elections, and maintenance of law and order. Research
shows that as they go about these new responsibilities, peacekeepers– officers more so than
enlisted men— often become heavily involved in negotiation and mediation. One study found
that as conflict becomes more severe, peacekeeper mediators are more likely to meet
separately with the disputants, to urge the disputants to relax, and to rely on force (Wall,
Druckman, & Diehl, 2002).

Peacekeeping Research Findings

28
Peacekeeper mediation is done at the local level. Mediation at the intergovernmental level is a
much older practice that has recently come under study with statistical analyses of large
samples of historical mediations (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000). Among the findings in this
research are:

 Mediation is more likely to be successful when the parties are of equal power, when
they have been friendly in the past, when there have been relatively few fatalities in
the period before mediation, when the mediator is of high rank, and when mediation
comes after a test of strength between the parties.
 The latter finding is compatible with ripeness theory (Zartman, 2000), which was
developed from comparative case studies of violent ethno-political conflicts. This
theory holds that two conditions are necessary for disputants to enter into and move
forward in negotiation, bilateral or mediated: (a) both sides perceive that they are in a
hurting stalemate, and (b) both sides develop optimism about the outcome of
mediation—a “perceived way out.”

Putting Conflict Research to Use

Several types of problem solving (interactive conflict resolution) workshops have been
developed in the last few decades for repairing faulty international and inter-group relations.
These are usually held over a period of several days, and attended by mid-level opinion
leaders and decision makers from both sides of a conflict, under the leadership of scholar-
practitioners. The aims of these workshops are to teach the parties about conflict in general
and their conflict in particular, to forge understanding between the parties and, if possible, to
develop joint projects that will contribute to reconciliation. Evaluation studies have shown
that these workshops improve attitudes toward the other side, increase complexity of thinking
about the conflict, and facilitate further communication with people on the other side (Fisher,
1997). There is also evidence that some alumni of these workshops have later contributed to
high level negotiations between the conflicting parties.

Research on conflict resolution is still in its infancy and there is much more work to be done.
But the findings reported above suggest that this field of study has made a good beginning.

Additional resources
CUNY Dispute Resolution Consortium

 CUNY Dispute Resolution Consortium at John Jay College of Criminal Justice-

'The Dispute Resolution Headquarters in New York City'

The City University of New York Dispute Resolution Consortium (CUNY DRC) serves as an
intellectual home to dispute-resolution faculty, staff and students at the City University of
New York and to the diverse dispute-resolution community in New York City. At the United
States' largest urban university system, the CUNY DRC has become a focal point for
furthering academic and applied conflict resolution work in one of the world's most diverse
cities. The CUNY DRC conducts research and innovative program development, has co-
organized countless conferences, sponsored training programs, resolved a wide range of
intractable conflicts, published research working papers and a newsletter. It also maintains an

29
extensive database of those interested in dispute resolution in New York City, a website with
resources for dispute resolvers in New York City and since 9/11, the CUNY DRC assumed a
leadership role for dispute-resolvers in New York City by establishing an extensive electronic
mailing list, sponsoring monthly breakfast meetings, conducting research on responses to
catastrophes, and managing a public awareness initiative to further the work of dispute
resolvers.

External links
 City University of New York Dispute Resolution Consortium (CUNY DRC)
 Kelman, H.C., International Conflict and Conflict Resolution Research Papers
 Billikopf, Gregorio. Mediation of Interpersonal Conflict - Use of Pre-Caucus -
University of California Party-Directed Mediation

Bibliography
 Bercovitch, J., & Houston, A. (2000). Why do they do it like this? An analysis of the
factors influencing mediation behavior in international conflicts. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 44, 170-202.

 Coleman, P., & Deutsch, M. (2001). Introducing cooperation and conflict resolution
into schools: A systems approach. In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner, & D. D. N. Winter,
Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 223-239).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

 De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on
integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and test of two theories. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889-905.

 Fisher, R. J. (1997). Interactive conflict resolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University

Press.

 Gelfand, M. J., & Brett, J. M. (Eds.) (2004), The handbook of negotiation and culture.
Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.

 Hampson, F. O, (1996). Nurturing peace: Why peace settlements succeed or fail.

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

 Johnson, S. M., & Greenberg, L. S. (1985). Differential effects of experiential and

problem-solving interventions in resolving marital conflict. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 53, 175-184.

 Kressel, K., & Pruitt, D. G. (1989). Conclusion: A research perspective on the

mediation of social conflict. In Kressel, K., Pruitt, D. G., & Associates, Mediation
research (pp. 394-435). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

30
  Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Buckingham,
England: Open University Press.

 Thompson, L., Neale, M., & Sinaceur, M. (2004). The evolution of cognition and
biases in negotiation research: An examination of cognition, social perception,
motivation, and emotion. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.) (2004), The handbook
of negotiation and culture (pp. 7-44). Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.

 Wall, J. A., Druckman, D., & Diehl, P. F. (2002), Mediation by international

peacekeepers. In J. Bercovitch (Ed.) (2002). Studies in international mediation (pp.
141-164). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.

 Zartman, I. W. (2000). Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond. In P. C. Stern &
D. Druckman (Eds.), International conflict resolution after the Cold War. Washington,
DC: National Academy Press.

V. Negotiation
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Negotiation is a dialogue intended to resolve disputes, to produce an agreement upon courses

of action, to bargain for individual or collective advantage, or to craft outcomes to satisfy
various interests. It is the primary method of alternative dispute resolution.

Negotiation occurs in business, non-profit organizations, government branches, legal

proceedings, among nations and in personal situations such as marriage, divorce, parenting,
and everyday life. The study of the subject is called negotiation theory. Those who work in
negotiation professionally are called negotiators. Professional negotiators are often
specialized, such as union negotiators, leverage buyout negotiators, peace negotiators,
hostage negotiators, or may work under other titles, such as diplomats, legislators or brokers.
Approaches to negotiation
Negotiation typically manifests itself with a trained negotiator acting on behalf of a particular
organization or position. It can be compared to mediation where a disinterested third party
listens to each sides' arguments and attempts to help craft an agreement between the parties.
It is also related to arbitration which, as with a legal proceeding, both sides make an
argument as to the merits of their "case" and then the arbitrator decides the outcome for both
parties.

Negotiation involves three basic elements: process, behavior and substance. The process
refers to how the parties negotiate: the context of the negotiations, the parties to the
negotiations, the tactics used by the parties, and the sequence and stages in which all of these
play out. Behavior refers to the relationships among these parties, the communication between
them and the styles they adopt. The substance refers to what the parties negotiate over: the
agenda, the issues (positions and - more helpfully - interests), the options, and the
agreement(s) reached at the end.

31
Skilled negotiators may use a variety of tactics ranging from negotiation hypnosis, to a
straight forward presentation of demands or setting of preconditions to more deceptive
approaches such as cherry picking („alegerea cireșelor bune”). Intimidation and salami
tactics („strategia tăierii salamului în felii” ) may also play a part in swaying the outcome of
negotiations.

The advocate's approach

In the advocacy approach, a skilled negotiator usually serves as advocate for one party to the
negotiation and attempts to obtain the most favorable outcomes possible for that party. In this
process the negotiator attempts to determine the minimum outcome(s) the other party is (or
parties are) willing to accept, then adjusts their demands accordingly. A "successful"
negotiation in the advocacy approach is when the negotiator is able to obtain all or most of the
outcomes their party desires, but without driving the other party to permanently break off
negotiations, unless the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is acceptable.

Traditional negotiating is sometimes called win-lose because of the assumption of a fixed

"pie", that one person's gain results in another person's loss. This is only true, however, if only
a single issue needs to be resolved, such as a price in a simple sales negotiation.

The "win/win" negotiator's approach

During the early part of the twentieth century, academics such as Mary Parker Follett
developed ideas suggesting that agreement often can be reached if parties look not at their
stated positions but rather at their underlying interests and requirements to reach a decision
that benefits both parties.

During the 1960s, Gerard I. Nierenberg recognized the role of negotiation in resolving
disputes in personal, business and international relations. He published The Art of
Negotiating, where he states that the philosophies of the negotiators determine the direction a
negotiation takes. His Everybody Wins philosophy assures that all parties benefit from the
negotiation process which also produces more successful outcomes than the adversarial
“winner takes all” approach.

In the 1970s, practitioners and researchers began to develop win-win approaches to

negotiation. Win-win is taken from Economic Game Theory, and has been adopted by North
American negotiation academics loosely to mean Principled Negotiation. Getting to YES was
published by Roger Fisher and William Ury as part of the Harvard negotiation project. The
book's approach, referred to as Principled Negotiation, is also sometimes called mutual gains
bargaining. The mutual gains approach has been effectively applied in environmental
situations (see Lawrence Susskind and Adil Najam) as well as labor relations where the
parties (e.g. management and a labor union) frame the negotiation as "problem solving". If
multiple issues are discussed, differences in the parties' preferences make win-win negotiation
possible. For example, in a labor negotiation, the union might prefer job security over wage
gains. If the employers have opposite preferences, a trade is possible that is beneficial to both
parties. Such a negotiation is therefore not an adversarial zero-sum game.

There are a tremendous number of other scholars who have contributed to the field of
negotiation, including Gerard E. Watzke at Tulane University, Sara Cobb at George Mason
University, Len Riskin at the University of Missouri, Howard Raiffa at Harvard, Robert

32
McKersie and Lawrence Susskind at MIT, and Adil Najam and Jeswald Salacuse at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Other Negotiation Styles

Shell identified five styles/responses to negotiation[1]. Individuals can often have strong
dispositions towards numerous styles; the style used during a negotiation depends on the context
and the interests of the other party, among other factors. In addition, styles can change over time.

CELE CINCI STILURI DE

NEGOCIERE
ALE LUI SHELL

1. Accommodating:
Individuals who enjoy solving the other party’s problems and preserving personal
relationships. Accommodators are sensitive to the emotional states, body language, and
verbal signals of the other parties. They can, however, feel taken advantage of in situations
when the other party places little emphasis on the relationship.
2. Avoiding:
Individuals who do not like to negotiate and don’t do it unless warranted. When negotiating,
avoiders tend to defer and dodge the confrontational aspects of negotiating; however, they
may be perceived as tactful and diplomatic.
3. Collaborating:
Individuals who enjoy negotiations that involve solving tough problems in creative ways.
Collaborators are good at using negotiations to understand the concerns and interests of the
other parties. They can, however, create problems by transforming simple situations into
more complex ones.
4. Competing:
Individuals who enjoy negotiations because they present an opportunity to win something.
Competitive negotiators have strong instincts for all aspects of negotiating and are often
strategic. Because their style can dominate the bargaining process, competitive negotiators
often neglect the importance of relationships.
5. Compromising:
Individuals who are eager to close the deal by doing what is fair and equal for all parties
involved in the negotiation. Compromisers can be useful when there is limited time to
complete the deal; however, compromisers often unnecessarily rush the negotiation process
and make concessions too quickly.

Emotion in negotiation
Emotions play an important part in the negotiation process, although it is only in recent years
that their effect is being studied. Emotions have the potential to play either a positive or
negative role in negotiation. During negotiations, the decision as to whether or not to settle,
rests in part on emotional factors. Negative emotions can cause intense and even irrational
behavior, and can cause conflicts to escalate and negotiations to break down, while positive
emotions facilitate reaching an agreement and help to maximize joint gains.
33
 AFFECT
EFFECT:

Dispositional affects affect the various stages of the negotiation process: which strategies are
planned to be used, which strategies are actually chosen, [2] the way the other party and its
intentions are perceived,[3] the willingness to reach an agreement and the final outcomes. [4]
Positive affectivity (PA) and negative affectivity (NA) of one or more of the negotiating sides
can lead to very different outcomes.

Positive affect in negotiation

Even before the negotiation process starts, people in a positive mood have more confidence, [5]
and higher tendencies to plan to use a cooperative strategy. [2] During the negotiation,
negotiators who are in a positive mood tend to enjoy the interaction more, show less
contentious behavior, use less aggressive tactics[6] and more cooperative strategies.[2] This in
turn increases the likelihood that parties will reach their instrumental goals, and enhance the
ability to find integrative gains.[7] Indeed, compared with negotiators with negative or natural
affectivity, negotiators with positive affectivity reached more agreements and tended to honor
those agreements more.[2] Those favorable outcomes are due to better decision making
processes, such as flexible thinking, creative problem solving, respect for others' perspectives,
willingness to take risks and higher confidence. [8] Post negotiation positive affect has
beneficial consequences as well. It increases satisfaction with achieved outcome and
influences one’s desire for future interactions.[8] The PA aroused by reaching an agreement
facilitates the dyadic relationship, which result in affective commitment that sets the stage for
subsequent interactions.[8]
PA also has its drawbacks: it distorts perception of self performance, such that performance is
judged to be relatively better than it actually is. [5] Thus, studies involving self reports on
achieved outcomes might be biased.

Negative affect in negotiation

Negative affect has detrimental effects on various stages in the negotiation process. Although
various negative emotions affect negotiation outcomes, by far the most researched is anger.
Angry negotiators plan to use more competitive strategies and to cooperate less, even before
the negotiation starts.[2] These competitive strategies are related to reduced joint outcomes.
During negotiations, anger disrupts the process by reducing the level of trust, clouding parties'
judgment, narrowing parties' focus of attention and changing their central goal from reaching
agreement to retaliating against the other side.[6] Angry negotiators pay less attention to
opponent’s interests and are less accurate in judging their interests, thus achieve lower joint
gains.[9] Moreover, because anger makes negotiators more self-centered in their preferences, it
increases the likelihood that they will reject profitable offers. [6] Anger doesn’t help in

34
achieving negotiation goals either: it reduces joint gains[2] and does not help to boost personal
gains, as angry negotiators don’t succeed in claiming more for themselves. [9] Moreover,
negative emotions lead to acceptance of settlements that are not in the positive utility function
but rather have a negative utility.[10] However, expression of negative emotions during
negotiation can sometimes be beneficial: legitimately expressed anger can be an effective way
to show one's commitment, sincerity, and needs. [6] Moreover, although NA reduces gains in
integrative tasks, it is a better strategy than PA in distributive tasks (such as zero-sum).[8]

Conditions for emotion effect in negotiation

Research indicates that negotiator’s emotions do not necessarily affect the negotiation
process. Albarracın et al. (2003) suggested that there are two conditions for emotional effect,
both related to the ability (presence of environmental or cognitive disturbances) and the
motivation:

1. Identification of the affect: requires high motivation, high ability or both.

2. Determination that the affect is relevant and important for the judgment: requires that
either the motivation, the ability or both are low.

According to this model, emotions are expected to affect negotiations only when one is high
and the other is low. When both ability and motivation are low the affect will not be
identified, and when both are high the affect will be identify but discounted as irrelevant for
judgment.[11] A possible implication of this model is, for example, that the positive effects PA
has on negotiations (as described above) will be seen only when either motivation or ability
are low.

The effect of the partner’s emotions

Most studies on emotion in negotiations focus on the effect of the negotiator’s own emotions
on the process. However, what the other party feels might be just as important, as group
emotions are known to affect processes both at the group and the personal levels. When it
comes to negotiations, trust in the other party is a necessary condition for its emotion to
affect,[3] and visibility enhances the effect. [7] Emotions contribute to negotiation processes by
signaling what one feels and thinks and can thus prevent the other party from engaging in
destructive behaviors and to indicate what steps should be taken next: PA signals to keep in
the same way, while NA points that mental or behavioral adjustments are needed. [8]
Partner’s emotions can have two basic effects on negotiator’s emotions and behavior:
mimetic/ reciprocal or complementary.[4] For example, disappointment or sadness might lead
to compassion and more cooperation.[8] In a study by Butt et al. (2005) which simulated real
multi-phase negotiation, most people reacted to the partner’s emotions in reciprocal, rather
than complementary, manner.

Specific emotions

were found to have different effects on the opponent’s feelings and strategies chosen:

35
 ANGER

caused the opponents to place lower demands and to concede more in a zero-sum
negotiation, but also to evaluate the negotiation less favorably.[12] It provoked both
dominating and yielding behaviors of the opponent.[4].

PRIDE

led to more integrative and compromise strategies by the partner.[4]

GUILT or REGRET

expressed by the negotiator led to better impression of him by the opponent, however it
also led the opponent to place higher demands.[3]. On the other hand, personal guilt was
related to more satisfaction with what one achieved.[8]

WORRY or DISAPPOINTMENT

left bad impression on the opponent, but led to relatively lower demands by the
opponent.[3]

Problems with lab negotiation studies

Negotiation is a rather complex interaction. Capturing all its complexity is a very difficult
task, let alone isolating and controlling only certain aspects of it. For this reason most
negotiation studies are done under laboratory conditions, and focus only on some aspects.
Although lab studies have their advantages, they do have major drawbacks when studying
emotions:

 Emotions in lab studies are usually manipulated and are therefore relatively ‘cold’ (not
intense). Although those ‘cold’ emotions might be enough to show effects, they are
qualitatively different from the ‘hot’ emotions often experienced during negotiations.
[13]

 In real life there is self-selection to which negotiation one gets into, which effects the
emotional commitment, motivation and interests. However this is not the case in lab
studies.[8]
 Lab studies tend to focus on relatively few well defined emotions. Real life scenarios
provoke a much wider scale of emotions.[8]
 Coding the emotions has a double catch: if done by a third side, some emotions might
not be detected as the negotiator sublimates them for strategic reasons. Self report
measures might overcome this, but they are usually filled only before or after the
process, and if filled during the process might interfere with it.[8]

36
Notes
1. ^ Shell, R.G. (2006). Bargaining for advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
2. ^ a b c d e f Forgas, J. P. (1998) "On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on
negotiator cognition and behavior". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 565–
577.

3. ^ a b c d Van Kleef, G.A., De Dreu, C.KW., & Manstead, A.S.R. (2006) "Supplication and
Appeasement in Conflict and Negotiation: The Interpersonal Effects of Disappointment,
Worry, Guilt, and Regret". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(1), 124–142

4. ^ a b c d Butt AN, Choi JN, Jaeger A (2005) "The effects of self-emotion, counterpart emotion,
and counterpart behavior on negotiator behavior: a comparison of individual-level and dyad-
level dynamics". Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(6), 681 - 704

5. ^ a b Kramer, R. M., Newton, E. & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993) "Self-enhancement biases and

negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood". Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 56, 110-133.

6. ^ a b c d Maiese, Michelle "Emotions" Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2005
downloaded: 30.08.2007

7. ^ a b Carnevale, P. J. D. & Isen, A. M. (1986) "The influence of positive affect and visual
access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation". Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 1-13.

8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004) I laughed, I cried, I settled:
The role of emotion in negotiation. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.), The handbook of
negotiation and culture (pp. 71–94). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

9. ^ a b Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997) "The influence of anger and
compassion on negotiation performance". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 70, 175–187.

10. ^ Davidson, M. N., & Greenhalgh, L. (1999) "The role of emotion in negotiation: The impact
of anger and race". Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 7, 3–26.

11. ^ Albarracin D. & Kumkale, G.T. (2003) "Affect as Information in Persuasion: A Model of
Affect Identification and Discounting". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(3)
453-469.

12. ^ Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). "The interpersonal
effects of anger and happiness in negotiations". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
86, 57–76.

13. ^ Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000) "Negotiation".
Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 279–314.

References and further reading

 Gil Allouche's article on Negotiations Negotiations - The Art of Bargaining
 William Hernandez Requejo & John L. Graham, Global Negotiation: The New Rules,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, ISBN 1-4039-8493-X

37
 Ronald M. Shapiro and Mark A. Jankowski, The Power of Nice: How to Negotiate So
Everyone Wins - Especially You!, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-471-08072-1

 David Lax and James Sebenius, 3D Negotiation, Harvard Business School Press, 2006.

 Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro, Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate,
Viking/Penguin, 2005.

 Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen, foreword by Roger Fisher, Difficult
Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most, Penguin, 1999, ISBN 0-14-028852-X

 Catherine Morris, ed. Negotiation in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: A Selected

Bibliography. Victoria, Canada: Peacemakers Trust.

 Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Belknap Press 1982, ISBN 0-674-04812-
1

 William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation,
revised second edition, Bantam, January 1, 1993, trade paperback, ISBN 0-553-37131-2; 1st
edition under the title, Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People, Bantam,
September, 1991, hardcover, 161 pages, ISBN 0-553-07274-9

 William Ury, Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving in, Revised 2nd edition, Penguin USA, 1991, trade paperback, ISBN 0-14-015735-2;
Houghton Mifflin, April, 1992, hardcover, 200 pages, ISBN 0-395-63124-6. The first edition,
unrevised, Houghton Mifflin, 1981, hardcover, ISBN 0-395-31757-6

 Principled Negotiation definition, together with a business view on whether Principled

Negotiation is used in Business.

 The political philosopher Charles Blattberg has advanced a distinction between negotiation
and conversation and criticized those methods of conflict-resolution which give too much
weight to the former. See his From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First,
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-19-829688-6, a work of
political philosophy; and his Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada, Montreal and
Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-7735-2596-3, which applies that
philosophy to the Canadian case.

 Leigh L. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, Prentice Hall 0ct.2000, ISBN 0-
13-017964-7

 Nicolas Iynedjian, Négociation - Guide pratique, CEDIDAC 62, Lausanne 2005, ISBN 2-
88197-061-3

 Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, ed. ‘’Handbook of negotiation and culture’’, 2004.
ISBN 0804745862

 Emotion and conflict from the ‘’Beyond Intractability’’ Database

 Gerard I. Nierenberg, The Art of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for Gaining

Advantageous Bargains, Barnes and Noble, (1995), hardcover, 195 pages, ISBN 1-56619-816-
X

 Andrea Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., The Negotiator's Fieldbook, American Bar
Association (2006). ISBN 1590315456[1]

 A Professor Explains How to Negotiate, Negoatiating tips from Adam Galinsky.

38
  Dr. Chester Karrass [2] Effective Negotiating Tips

 Charles Arthur Willard Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for
Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. 1996.

 Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. 1989.

 Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge University of
Alabama Press. 1982.

VI. Cherry picking

( „a te aștepta să culegi doar cireșe gustoase,

a ignora că pot fi și unele stricate” )

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cherry picking may also refer to the process of collecting erroneous coins.

Cherry picking is the act of pointing at individual cases or data that seem to confirm a
particular position, while ignoring a significant portion of related cases or data that may
contradict that position.

The term is based on the perceived process of harvesting fruit, such as cherries. The picker
would be expected to only select the ripest and healthiest fruits. An observer who only sees
the selected fruit may thus wrongly conclude that most, or even all, of the fruit is in such good
condition.

Cherry picking can be found in many logical fallacies. For example, the "fallacy of anecdotal
evidence" tends to overlook large amounts of data in favor of that known personally, while a
false dichotomy picks only two options when more are available.

General
To select (only what one considers to be best, most desirable, profitable, etc.) from a number
of options.

In specific fields

39
Business

Cherry picking is also used to refer to business policies of picking out profitable customers
from a large base. An example of this use is that by insuring only healthy people and refusing
to insure those who were unhealthy or are likely to become unhealthy, a health insurance
company can cherry pick the most profitable customers. If an auto insurance company insured
only good drivers by cherry picking them from among all drivers this would enable a
company to gain an advantage over a company that insures all drivers.

To prevent auto insurance companies from cherry picking only the good drivers and leaving
poorer drivers without any insurance, most states in the U.S.A. require auto insurance
companies to insure a certain number of drivers with poor records.[citation needed]

Statistics

Cherry picking can refer to the selection of data or data sets so a study or survey will give
desired, predictable results which may be misleading or even completely contrary to actuality.

Software configuration management

In the jargon of software configuration management, cherry picking is used to describe the
action of selecting which patches (or changesets, or commits) should be ported from one
branch to another.

VII. Win-win game

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A win-win game is a game which is designed in a way that all participants can profit from it
in one way or the other. In conflict resolution a win-win strategy is a conflict resolution
process that aims to accommodate all disputants.

Types
 In mathematical game theory such games are also called non-zero-sum games.
 In the context of group-dynamic games, win-win games are also called 'cooperative
games', 'new games' or 'games without losers'.
 In colloquial speech, a win-win situation often refers to situation where one benefits,
not necessarily through someone else's loss.
 Win-win-win is where both parties win, and the middle man wins as a successful
negotiator.
 The TKI Thomas Kilman Conflict Profile is a simple model that reveals your
preference under stress and pressure. A Collaboration style is seen to be win-win
focused.

40
Group-dynamics
Group-dynamics win-win games have been increasingly popular since the end of the Vietnam
war and have been successfully applied to all levels of society.

Group-dynamics win-win games emphasize the importance of cooperation, fun, sharing,

caring and over-all group success in contrast to domination, egotistic behaviour and personal
gain. All players are treated as equally important and valuable. Win-win games often also
carry an ethical message of caring for the environment and a holistic approach to life and
society. Win-win games are a powerful tool to give people self-confidence and a 'we'
experience, especially when they have suffered from emotional isolation.

An example would be a game where all players try to carry a huge 'earth ball' (a ball several
meters in diameter) over their heads while negotiating an obstacle course. This is a typical
example of a win-win game for several reasons:

 there are no losers (everyone enjoys the accomplished task).

 all players are involved (no-one is left out or sits out).
 the game is psychologically working on many levels (communication, supporting each
other, having fun in a group etc)

Note that there are also mathematical win-win games; the mathematical term being non-zero-
sum games. Such games are often simply represented by a matrix of pay-outs.

VIII. Win-Win, Win-Lose,

and Lose-Lose Situations

By
Brad Spangler

June 2003

The Basics

Win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose are game theory terms that refer to the possible outcomes of
a game or dispute involving two sides, and more importantly, how each side perceives their
outcome relative to their standing before the game. For
example, a "win" results when the outcome of a negotiation is
better than expected, a "loss" when the outcome is worse than
expected. Two people may receive the same outcome in measurable terms, say $10, but for
one side that may be a loss, while for the other it is a win. In other words, expectations
determine one's perception of any given result.

41
Win-win outcomes occur when each side of a dispute feels they have won. Since both sides
benefit from such a scenario, any resolutions to the conflict are likely to be accepted
voluntarily. The process of integrative bargaining aims to achieve, through cooperation, win-
win outcomes.

Win-lose situations result when only one side perceives the outcome as positive. Thus, win-
lose outcomes are less likely to be accepted voluntarily. Distributive bargaining processes,
based on a principle of competition between participants, tend to end in win-lose outcomes.

Lose-lose means that all parties end up being worse off. An example of this would be a
budget-cutting negotiation in which all parties lose money. In some lose-lose situations, all
parties understand that losses are unavoidable and that they will be evenly distributed. In such
situations, lose-lose outcomes can be preferable to win-lose outcomes because the distribution
is at least considered to be fair.[1]

In other situations, though, lose-lose outcomes occur when win-win outcomes might have
been possible. The classic example of this is called the prisoner's dilemma in which two
prisoners must decide whether to confess to a crime. Neither prisoner knows what the other
will do. The best outcome for prisoner A occurs if he/she confesses, while prisoner B keeps
quiet. In this case, the prisoner who confesses and implicates
the other is rewarded by being set free, and the other (who
stayed quiet) receives the maximum sentence, as s/he didn't
cooperate with the police, yet they have enough evidence to convict. (This is a win-lose
outcome.) The same goes for prisoner B. But if both prisoners confess (trying to take
advantage of their partner), they each serve the maximum sentence (a lose-lose outcome). If
neither confesses, they both serve a reduced sentence (a win-win outcome, although the win is
not as big as the one they would have received in the win-lose scenario).

This situation occurs fairly often, as win-win outcomes can only be identified through
cooperative (or integrative) bargaining, and are likely to be overlooked if negotiations take a
competitive distributive) stance.

The key thing to remember is that any negotiation may be reframed (placed in a new context)
so that expectations are lowered. In the prisoner's dilemma, for example, if both prisoners are
able to perceive the reduced sentence as a win rather than a loss, then the outcome is a win-
win situation. Thus, with lowered expectations, it may be possible for negotiators to craft win-
win solutions out of a potentially lose-lose situation. However, this requires that the parties
sacrifice their original demands for lesser ones.

NOTES

[1] The above definitions were drawn from: Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, Encyclopedia of
Conflict Resolution (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 306-307, 309-310.

IX. Salami tactics

( a prezenta problema

42
 „în felii subțiri pentru a nu se vedea întregul salam” )

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Salami tactics, also known as the salami-slice strategy, is a divide and conquer process of
threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. With it, an aggressor can influence and
eventually dominate a landscape, typically political, piece by piece. In this fashion, the
"salami" is taken in slices, until one realizes (too late) that it's gone in its entirety. In some
cases it includes the creation of several factions within the opposing political party and then
dismantling that party from the inside, without causing the "sliced" sides to protest.

According to the Dictionary of Modern Thought by Alan Bullock and Olier Stallybrass, [1] the
term was coined in the late 1940s by the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi to describe the actions of the
Hungarian Communist Party (szalámitaktika). Rakosi claimed he came to power by getting
his opposition to slice off its right wing, then its centrists, until only those collaborating with
the Communists remained in power.[2]

This strategy was also used in the majority of Eastern European countries in the second half
of the 1940s.

Similar tactics had been used previously by many different political parties and groups
wishing to consolidate their power in various countries. For example, Adolf Hitler's Nazi
Party achieved absolute power in Germany within the early months of 1933 by squeezing out
his conservative partners, after those conservative partners helped in the outlawing of
Communists and Social Democrats and granting emergency powers to him.

The term "salami tactics" is also used in business and means that someone presents problems
or solutions in pieces, and so it is hard to get the big picture.

The term "Salami Tactics" was used in the British Political Satire Yes Prime Minister in Series
1 Episode 1 "The Grand Design". In this television show, the Prime Minister's Chief Scientific
Advisor opines that the Soviets won't suddenly invade Western Europe, but will annex areas
slice by slice and thus Prime Minister Jim Hacker realizes he will never push the nuclear
button to stop the Soviets. Yes Minister is a multi-award winning satirical British sitcom
written by Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn that was first transmitted by BBC television and
radio between 1980 and 1984, split over three seven-episode series. The sequel, Yes, Prime
Minister, ran from 1986 to 1988. In total this made 38 episodes, all but one of which lasts for
half an hour.

Set in the private office in Whitehall of a British government cabinet minister (and, in the
sequel, in 10 Downing Street), the series follows the ministerial career of Jim Hacker MP,
played by Paul Eddington. His various struggles to formulate and enact legislation or effect
departmental changes are opposed by the will of the British Civil Service, in particular his
Permanent Secretary (senior civil servant), Sir Humphrey Appleby, played by Nigel
Hawthorne. His Principal Private Secretary Bernard Woolley, played by Derek Fowlds is
usually caught between the two, although heavily influenced by Sir Humphrey. Almost every
programme ends with the line "Yes, Minister" (or "Yes, Prime Minister"), uttered (usually) by
Sir Humphrey as he quietly relishes his victory over his "political master" (or, occasionally,
acknowledges defeat).

43
A huge critical and popular success, the series received a number of awards; including several
BAFTAs and in 2004 came sixth in the Britain's Best Sitcom poll. It was the favourite
television programme of the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher.[3] As the series
revolves around the inner workings of central government, most of the scenes take place in
private locations, such as offices and exclusive lounges. Lynn says "there was not a single
scene set in the House of Commons because... government does not take place in the House of
Commons; some politics... and much theatre takes place there. Government happens in
private. As in all public performances, the real work is done in rehearsal, behind closed doors.
Then the public, and the House, are shown what the government wishes them to see."

The dominant running theme is the struggle between (The Rt Hon.) James "Jim" Hacker M.P.,
the newly-appointed Minister in the (fictional) Department of Administrative Affairs, and his
civil servants and ministerial colleagues. Chief among his officials are Sir Humphrey
Appleby, KCB, MVO, MA (Oxon), who is the department's Permanent Secretary, and
Bernard Woolley, Hacker's Principal Private Secretary. "Behind the scenes" influence is also
exerted when Sir Humphrey consults (or is summoned by) the Cabinet Secretary Sir Arnold
Robinson at their St James's Gentlemen's club.

The different ideals and self-interested motivations of the characters are frequently contrasted.
Whilst Hacker occasionally approaches an issue from a sense of idealism and a desire to be
seen to improve things, he ultimately sees his re-election as the only endorsement of his
success. In order to achieve this he must appear to the voters to be effective and responsive to
the public will. To his party (and, in the first incarnation, the Prime Minister) he must act as a
loyal and effective party member. Sir Humphrey, on the other hand, genuinely believes (along
with most of the other civil servants who are depicted) that it is the Civil Service that knows
what is best for the country, which is usually "coincidentally" what is best for the Civil
Service. Most of Sir Humphrey's actions are motivated by his wish to maintain the prestige,
power, and influence he enjoys inside a large, bureaucratic organisation, and also to preserve
the numerous perks of his position: automatic honours, a substantial income, a fixed
retirement age and a large index-linked pension, and the practical impossibility of being made
redundant or being sacked. In fact, a good deal of the tension in their relationship comes from
Hacker's awareness that it is the politicians who are liable to lose their jobs if civil service
ineptitude comes to public attention. In "Doing the Honours" he notes:

In private industry if you screw things up you get the boot; in the civil service if you screw
“ things up I get the boot. ”
Hacker, then, sees his task as the initiation of departmental reforms and economies, a
reduction of the level of bureaucracy and staff numbers in the Civil Service, and the
government of the country according to his party's policies. To do so, or to at least look as if
he has, would be a vote-winner. Conversely, Sir Humphrey sees his role as ensuring that
politics is kept out of government as much as possible, and that the status quo is upheld as a
matter of principle. He will block any move that seeks either to prevent the further expansion
of the civil service or to reduce the complexity of its bureaucracy.

Much of the show's humour thus derives from the antagonism between Cabinet ministers
(who believe they are in charge) and the members of the British Civil Service who really run
the country. A typical episode centres on Jim Hacker's suggesting and pursuing a reform, and
Sir Humphrey's ingenious blocking of all Hacker's lines of approach. More often than not Sir

44
Humphrey prevents him from achieving his goal, while mollifying Hacker with some positive
publicity, or at least a means to cover up his failure. Occasionally, however, Hacker does get
his way, as in "The Greasy Pole" and "A Victory for Democracy".

Initially, Woolley naïvely sees his job as the disinterested implementation of the Minister's
policies, but he gradually finds that this conflicts with his institutional duty to the department
and, sometimes (since Sir Humphrey is responsible for formally assessing Woolley's
performance), his own potential career development.[1] Consequently, another recurring
scenario is one where Bernard must "walk the tightrope" – that is, arbitrate between his two
conflicting duties by resorting to elaborate verbosity (much like Sir Humphrey) to avoid
explicitly choosing one over the other.

The first series featured Frank Weisel, Hacker's political adviser, played by Neil Fitzwiliam.
While his name is pronounced W-"eye"-sel, Sir Humphrey and Bernard persistently call him
"Mr Weasel". Weisel does not appear after the first series, following his convenient
acceptance of a position on a quango (Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation)
tasked, appropriately, with investigating the appointment of other quangos. After the third
series, following Sir Humphrey's promotion to Cabinet Secretary, Hacker becomes Prime
Minister and requests that Bernard Woolley continue as his Principal Private Secretary. The
first series of Yes, Prime Minister introduced Dorothy Wainwright (played by Deborah
Norton) as a highly able Special Political Adviser to the Prime Minister. Her experience and
insight into many civil service tricks ensures a lasting mutual distrust between her and Sir
Humphrey (he once refers to her as "the Wainwright female") and an invaluable second
opinion for Hacker.

Hacker's home life is shown occasionally throughout the series. His wife, Annie (Diana
Hoddinott), is clearly frustrated by the disruptions caused by her husband's political career
and is at times somewhat cynical about her husband's politics. Meanwhile, his sociology
student daughter, Lucy (Gerry Cowper), becomes an environmental activist in one episode
(her only on-screen appearance, despite several other mentions), campaigning against one of
her father's departmental policies.

Sir Humphrey's personal characteristics include his complicated sentences, his ineffable
snobbery, his cynical views on government, and his superciliousness. Hacker's attributes
include occasional indecisiveness, and a tendency to launch into ludicrous Churchillian
speeches. Bernard is apt to linguistic pedantry. Sir Humphrey often discusses matters with
other Permanent Secretaries, who appear similarly sardonic and jaded, and the Cabinet
Secretary (whom he will eventually succeed in Yes, Prime Minister), Sir Arnold Robinson
(John Nettleton) an archetype of cynicism, haughtiness and conspiratorial expertise. This
fairly counter-intuitive view of government administration is not only Sir Humphrey's: it is
completely taken for granted by the civil service.

The Yes, Prime Minister episode "The Bishop's Gambit" parodied liberal theology and politics
in the Church of England. Hacker thought that the church is a Christian institution, but Sir
Humphrey gleefully informed him that most of the bishops do not believe in God, and that a
theologian's job is partly to explain why an agnostic or atheist can be a church leader.

Almost all the episodes end with one of the characters (usually Sir Humphrey) saying "Yes,
Minister" or "Yes, Prime Minister" accordingly. Each episode of the former was more or less
self-contained, but the first series of Yes, Prime Minister had a loose story arc relating to

45
Hacker's attempts to reform the United Kingdom's armed forces, while the second was mostly
devoted to concluding storylines and character arcs that had been seen over the course of the
show.

Politics
Lynn joined the Cambridge Union in his first year at the University of Cambridge because he
thought that he might like to enter politics. "All of the main debaters there, aged twenty, were
the most pompous, self-satisfied, self-important bunch of clowns that i've ever clapped eyes
on. They were all behaving as if they were on the government front bench, and twenty years
later they all were: Michael Howard; John Selwyn Gummer; Kenneth Clarke. I thought at that
point that the only way that I could ever contribute to politics is making fun of the
politicians."[5]

The series, then, intended to satirise politics and government in general, rather than any
specific party. The writers placed Hacker at the centre of the political spectrum, and were
careful to identify his party headquarters as "Central House" (a combination of Conservative
Central Office and Labour's Transport House). The terms "Labour" and "Conservative" are
scrupulously avoided throughout the series, favouring terms such as "the party" or "the
Government" and "the opposition."[1] In the first scene of the first episode, "Open
Government", Hacker is shown at the declaration of his constituency result wearing a white
rosette, with other candidates sporting the red and blue rosettes associated with the two
leading British parties. The one exception to this neutrality occurs very briefly in "The
National Education Service", when Sir Humphrey explains to Bernard how the policy of
comprehensive education is retained through successive governments, using different
arguments according to which party is in power. Even there, Humphrey does not reveal which
party Jim Hacker represents. Despite this, the overall thrust was toward government reduction
rather than expansion. The episode "Jobs for the Boys", for example, rejected corporatism.

In a 2004 documentary, Armando Iannucci compared Yes Minister to George Orwell's

Nineteen Eighty-Four in how it has influenced the public's view of the state. Although Lynn
comments that the word "spin" has "probably entered the political vocabulary since the
series,"[4] Iannucci suggests that the show "taught us how to unpick the verbal tricks that
politicians think they can get away with in front of the cameras." [5] The series depicted the
media-consciousness of politicians, reflecting the public relations training they undergo to
help them deal with interviews and reading from autocue effectively. This is particularly
evident in the episode "The Ministerial Broadcast," in which Hacker is advised on the effects
of his clothes and surroundings. The episode "A Conflict of Interest" humorously lampoons
the various political stances of Britain's newspapers through their readership. The writers were
inspired by a variety of sources, including sources inside government, published material and
contemporary news stories. Some situations were conceived as fiction, but were later revealed
to have real-life counterparts. The episode "The Compassionate Society" depicts a hospital
with five hundred administrative staff but no doctors, nurses or patients. Lynn recalls that
"after inventing this absurdity, we discovered there were six such hospitals (or very large
empty wings of hospitals) exactly as we had described them in our episode."[4]

In a programme screened by the BBC in early 2004, paying tribute to the series, it was
revealed that Jay and Lynn had drawn on information provided by two insiders from the
governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, namely Marcia Williams and Bernard
Donoughue.[5] The published diaries of Richard Crossman also provided inspiration.[4][8]

46
The episode entitled "The Moral Dimension", in which Hacker and his staff engage in the
scheme of secretly consuming alcohol on a trade mission to the fictional Islamic state of
Qumran, was based on a real incident that took place in Pakistan, involving Callaghan and
Donoughue, the latter of whom informed Jay and Lynn about the incident. Jay says that "I
can't tell you where, I can't tell you when and I can't tell you who was involved; all I can tell
you is that we knew that it had actually happened. That's why it was so funny. We couldn't
think up things as funny as the real things that had happened." Media historian Andrew Crisell
suggests that the show was "enriched by the viewers' suspicion that what they were watching
was unhealthily close to real life."

Fusing inspiration and invention, Lynn and Jay worked on the story "for anything from three
days to two weeks," and only took "four mornings to write all the dialogue. After we wrote
the episode, we would show it to some secret sources, always including somebody who was
an expert on the subject in question. They would usually give us extra information which,
because it was true, was usually funnier than anything we might have thought up." [ Designers
Valerie Warrender and Gloria Clayton were given access to the Cabinet Rooms and the State
Drawing Rooms. For security purposes, the arrangements of the rooms were altered, and the
views from the windows were never shown, in order to conceal the layout of the buildings.[12]

X. Bargaining
( Târguiala )
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Dongxiang men
haggling over sheep in Gansu province, China

47
Bargaining or haggling („tocmeala” ) is a type of negotiation in which the buyer and seller
of a good or service dispute the price which will be paid and the exact nature of the
transaction that will take place, and eventually come to an agreement. Bargaining is an
alternative pricing strategy to fixed prices.

Bargaining is also the 3rd stage of the Kübler-Ross model (commonly known as the stages of
dying).

Dickering refers to the same process, albeit with a slight negative (petty) connotation.

Contexts Where Bargaining is Allowed

Not all transactions are open to bargaining. Both religious beliefs and regional custom may
determine whether or not the seller is willing to bargain.

Regional differences

In North America and Europe bargaining is restricted to expensive or one-of-a-kind items

(automobiles, jewellery, art, real estate, trade sales of businesses) and informal sales settings
such as flea markets and garage sales. In other regions of the world bargaining may be the
norm even for small commercial transactions.

In almost all large complex business negotiations, a certain amount of bargaining takes place.
One simplified 'western' way to decide when it's time to bargain is to break negotiation into 2
stages: creating value and claiming value. Claiming value is another phrase for bargaining.
Many cultures take offence when they perceive the other side as having started bargaining too
soon. This offence is usually as a result of their wanting to first create value for longer before
they bargain together. The Chinese culture by contrast places a much higher value on taking
time to build a business relationship before starting to create value or bargain. Not
understanding when to start bargaining has ruined many a otherwise positive business
negotiation.[1]

In areas where bargaining at the retail level is common, the option to bargain often depends
on the presence of the store's owner. A chain store managed by clerks is more likely to use
fixed pricing than an independent store managed by an owner or one of owner's trusted
employees.The store's ambiance may also be used to signal whether or not bargaining is
appropriate. For instance, a comfortable and air-conditioned store with posted prices usually
do not allow bargaining, but a stall in a bazaar or marketplace may. Supermarkets and other
chain stores almost never allow bargaining. However, the importance of ambiance may
depend on the cultural commitment to bargaining. In Israel, prices on day-to-day items
(clothing, toiletries) may be negotiable even in a Western style store manned by a clerk.

In India, a sign posted with the phrase fixed price indicates that bargaining is not allowed,
although quite often this is not the case.

Religious differences

Quakers require fixed price contracts.Traditionally, Jews had a limit on the allowable profit
margin. Limits were also placed on renegotiations of a price for services.

48
 Theories
Behavioral theory

The personality theory in bargaining emphasizes that the type of personalities determine the
bargaining process and its outcome. A popular behavioral theory deals with a distinction
between hard-liners and soft-liners. Various research papers refer to hard-liners as warriors,
while soft-liners are shopkeepers.

Game theory

Bargaining games refer to situations where two or more players must reach agreement
regarding how to distribute an object or monetary amount. Each player prefers to reach an
agreement in these games, rather than abstain from doing so; however, each prefers that
agreement which most favours his interests. Examples of such situations would be the
bargaining involved in a labour union and the directors of a company negotiating wage
increases, the dispute between two communities about the distribution of a common territory
or the conditions under which two countries can start a programme of nuclear disarmament.
Analyzing these kinds of problem looks for a solution specifying which component in dispute
will correspond to each party involved.

Players in a bargaining problem can bargain for the objective as a whole at a precise moment
in time. The problem can also be divided so that parts of the whole objective become subject
to bargaining during different stages.

In a classical bargaining problem the result is an agreement reached between all interested
parties, or the status quo of the problem. It is clear that studying how individual parties make
their decisions is insufficient for predicting what agreement will be reached. However,
classical bargaining theory assumes that each participant in a bargaining process will choose
between possible agreements, following the conduct predicted by the rational choice model. It
is particularly assumed that each player's preferences regarding the possible agreements can
be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.

Nash [1950] defines a classical bargaining problem as being a set of joint allocations of utility,
some of which will correspond to that the players would obtain if they reach an agreement,
and another which represents what they would get if they failed to do so.

A bargaining game for two players is defined as a pair (F,d) where F is the set of possible joint
utility allocations (possible agreements), and d is the disagreement point.

For the definition of a specific bargaining solution is usual to follow Nash's proposal, setting
out the axioms this solution should satisfy. Some of the most frequent axioms used in the
building of bargaining solutions are efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, scalar invariance, monotonicity, etc.

The Nash bargaining solution is the bargaining solution which maximizes the product of
agent's utilities on the bargaining set.

49
The Nash bargaining solution, however, only deals with the simplest structure of bargaining.
It is not dynamic (failing to deal with how pareto outcomes are achieved). Instead for
situations where the structure of the bargaining game is important, a more mainstream game
theoretic approach is useful. This can allow players preferences over time and risk to be
incorporated into the solution of bargaining games. It can also show how the detail can matter.
For example the Nash bargaining solution for Prisoners' Dilemma is different from the Nash
equilibrium.

Processual theory

This theory isolates distinctive elements of the bargaining chronology in order to better
understand the complexity of the negotiating process. Several key features of the processual
theory include:

 Bargaining range
 Critical risk
 Security point
 Toughness dilemma

Integrative theory

Integrative bargaining (also called "interest-based bargaining," "win-win bargaining") is a

negotiation strategy in which parties collaborate to find a "win-win" solution to their dispute.
This strategy focuses on developing mutually beneficial agreements based on the interests of
the disputants. Interests include the needs, desires, concerns, and fears important to each side.
They are the underlying reasons why people become involved in a conflict.

"Integrative refers to the potential for the parties' interests to be [combined] in ways that
create joint value or enlarge the pie."[1] Potential for integration only exists when there are
multiple issues involved in the negotiation. This is because the parties must be able to make
trade-offs across issues in order for both sides to be satisfied with the outcome.[1]

Narrative theory

A very different approach to conceptualizing bargaining is as co-construction of a social

narrative, where narrative, rather than economic logic drives the outcome.

Automated bargaining

When a bargaining situation is complex, finding Nash equilibrium will be difficult using game
theory. Evolutionary computation methods have been designed for automated bargaining, and
demonstrated efficient and effective for approximating Nash equilibrium (e.g. see Automated
Bargaining project at University of Essex).

50
 XI. Kübler-Ross model
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Kübler-Ross model first introduced by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross in her 1969 book "On
Death and Dying", describes, in five discrete stages, a process by which people allegedly deal
with grief and tragedy, especially when diagnosed with a terminal illness. The stages are
known as the...

FIVE STAGES OF GRIEF.

51
 1.DENIAL:
"I feel fine.";

"This can't be happening, not to me!"

2.ANGER:
"Why me? It's not fair!"

"NO! NO! How can this happen!"

3.BARGAINING:
"Just let me live to see my children graduate.";

"I'll do anything, can't you stretch it out? A few more years."

4.DEPRESSION:
"I'm so sad, why bother with anything?"

"I'm going to die . . . What's the point?"

5.ACCEPTANCE:
"It's going to be OK.";

"I can't fight it, I may as well prepare for it."

Kübler-Ross originally applied these stages to any form of catastrophic personal loss (job,
income, freedom). This also includes the death of a loved one, divorce, drug addiction, or
infertility. Kübler-Ross also claimed these steps do not necessarily come in the order noted
above, nor are all steps experienced by all patients, though she stated a person will always
experience at least two.

Others have noticed that any significant personal change can elicit these stages. For example,
experienced criminal defense attorneys are aware that defendants who are facing stiff
sentences, yet have no defenses or mitigating factors to lessen their sentences, often
experience the stages. Accordingly, they must get to the acceptance stage before they are
prepared to plead guilty.

52
Additionally, the change in circumstances does not always have to be a negative one, just
significant enough to cause a grief response to the loss (Scire, 2007). Accepting a new work
position, for example, causes one to lose their routine, workplace friendships, familiar drive to
work, or even customary lunch sources.

The most common factor is when the person doesn't have the capacity to change their
situation, at least not without considerable loss to themselves, thus a person who would go
through these stages would not need to continue if they found a way out of the situation: e.g.,
If a person losing their house was at the bargaining stage but then somehow found a way out
of the situation, then they'd have no reason to become depressed. So the 'stages of grief' could
be linked to a lack of control or ability, e.g., people who have lost limbs, people on the bad
end of an ultimatum, people under threat, and so on.

Grief
In 1974, The Handbook of Psychiatry defined grief („reacția la pierderi” ) as "...the normal
response to the loss of a loved one by death," and response to other kinds of losses were
labelled "Pathological Depressive Reactions." This has become the predominant way for
counsellors and professionals to approach grief, loss, tragedy and traumatic experiences. [1]
Kubler-Ross also viewed the various stages as equally valid coping mechanisms, allowing an
individual to work through their disease process or loss over time.

Research
A February 2007 study of bereaved individuals, from Yale University obtained some findings
that were consistent with the five-stage theory and others that were inconsistent with it. [2] In
2008, Skeptic Magazine[3] published the findings of the Grief Recovery Institute, which
contested the concept of stages of grief as they relate to people who are dealing with the
deaths of people important to them.

Notes
1. ^ [1]
2. ^ [2]

3. ^ Russell Friedman and John W. James, The Myth of the Stages of Dying, Death and Grief,
Skeptic Magazine, (2008), Vol. 14 No. 2

References
 Kubler-Ross, E (1973) On Death and Dying, Routledge, ISBN 0415040159
 Kubler-Ross, E (2005) On Grief and Grieving: Finding the Meaning of Grief Through
the Five Stages of Loss, Simon & Schuster Ltd, ISBN 0743263448
 Scire, P (2007). "Applying Grief Stages to Organizational Change."

53
Further reading
 An Attributional Analysis of Kübler-Ross' Model of Dying, by Mark R Brent. Harvard
University, 1981.
 An Evaluation of the Relevance of the Kübler-Ross Model to the Post-injury
Responses of Competitive Athletes, by Johannes Hendrikus Van der Poel, University of
the Free State. Published by s.n, 2000.

XII. ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS

five stages of grief

( KUBLER-ROSS MODEL

FOR DEATH AND BEREAVEMENT COUNSELLING,

PERSONAL CHANGE AND TRAUMA)

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (which is the correct spelling; Elizabeth Kubler Ross is a common
incorrect form and used above for search-engine visibility). Incidentally, 'counselling' is UK
English and 'counseling' is US English.

Dr Elisabeth Kübler-Ross pioneered methods in the support and counselling of personal

trauma, grief and grieving, associated with death and dying. She also dramatically improved
the understanding and practices in relation to bereavement and hospice care.

Her ideas, notably the five stages of grief model (denial, anger, bargaining, depression,
acceptance), are also transferable to personal change and emotional upset resulting from
factors other than death and dying.

We can clearly observe similar reactions to those explained by Kübler-Ross's grief model in
people confronted with far less serious traumas than death and bereavement, such as by work
redundancy, enforced relocation, crime and punishment, disability and injury, relationship
break-up, financial despair and bankruptcy, etc.

This makes the model worthy of study and reference far outside of death and bereavement.
The 'grief cycle' is actually a 'change model' for helping to understand and deal with (and
counsel) personal reaction to trauma. It's not just for death and dying.

This is because trauma and emotional shock are relative in terms of effect on people. While
death and dying are for many people the ultimate trauma, people can experience similar
emotional upsets when dealing with many of life's challenges, especially if confronting
something difficult for the first time, and/or if the challenge happens to threaten an area of
psychological weakness, which we all possess in different ways. One person's despair (a job-
change, or exposure to risk or phobia, etc) is to another person not threatening at all. Some
people love snakes and climbing mountains, whereas to others these are intensely scary

54
things. Emotional response, and trauma, must be seen in relative not absolute terms. The
model helps remind us that the other person's perspective is different to our own, whether we
are the one in shock, or the one helping another to deal with their upset.

The study of death and dying is actually known as thanatology (from the Greek word
'thanatos' meaning death). Elisabeth Kübler-Ross is accordingly sometimes referred to as a
thanatologist, and she is considered to have contributed significantly to the creation of the
genre of thanatology itself.

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's seminal book was On Death & Dying, published in 1969, in which
she explained her now classically regarded 'five stages of grief'. The book and its ideas were
quite revolutionary at the time, reflecting Kübler-Ross's outspoken and bold approach, which
is paradoxical given the sensitivity and compassion of her concepts.

Kübler-Ross was a catalyst. She opened up and challenged previously conservative (sweep it
under the carpet, don't discuss it, etc) theories and practices relating to death and
bereavement, and received an enormously favourable response among carers, the dying and
the bereaved, which perhaps indicates the level of denial and suppression that had earlier
characterised conventional views about the subject - particularly in the western world, where
death is more of a taboo than in certain other cultures.

As stated, and important to emphasise, Kübler-Ross's five stages of grief model was
developed initially as a model for helping dying patients to cope with death and bereavement,
however the concept also provides insight and guidance for coming to terms with personal
trauma and change, and for helping others with emotional adjustment and coping, whatever
the cause. This has probably helped her ideas to spread and to enter 'mainstream' thinking.

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and her ideas have now become synonymous with emotional response
to trauma, and to grief support and counselling, much like Maslow is fundamentally
associated with motivational theory; Kolb with learning styles, and Gardner with multiple
intelligence.

As with much other brilliant pioneering work, the Kübler-Ross model is elegantly simple. The
five stages of grief model is summarised and interpreted below.

This Kübler-Ross five stages and terminology are featured here with permission from the
Elisabeth Kübler Ross Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. Please look at the two
websites www.ekrfoundation.org, and www.elisabthkublerross.com, both of which enable and
sustain Dr Kübler-Ross's values and mission, and extend help to those who need it.

Please be aware that the interpretation and contextual material on this webpage represents my
own thoughts on the subject. I would encourage you to develop your own ideas too - this is a
deeply significant area and one that can be interpreted in many ways. My interpretation and
associations are not an attempt to reproduce Kübler-Ross's thinking, they seek to provide a
modern context, and to relate the basic model to the philosophies of this website.

Use of and reference to the Elisabeth Kübler-Ross five stages for commercial purposes, and
publication of EKR quotations, require permission from the EKR Foundation. You can use
freely the other aspects of this page subject to the normal terms for using this website, briefly
summarised at the foot of this page.

55
 ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS
- five stages of grief -

Also known as the 'grief cycle', it is important to bear in mind that Kübler-Ross did not intend
this to be a rigid series of sequential or uniformly timed steps. It's not a process as such, it's a
model or a framework. There is a subtle difference: a process implies something quite fixed
and consistent; a model is less specific - more of a shape or guide. By way of example, people
do not always experience all of the five 'grief cycle' stages. Some stages might be revisited.
Some stages might not be experienced at all. Transition between stages can be more of an ebb
and flow, rather than a progression. The five stages are not linear; neither are they equal in
their experience. People's grief, and other reactions to emotional trauma, are as individual as a
fingerprint.

In this sense you might wonder what the purpose of the model is if it can vary so much from
person to person. An answer is that the model acknowledges there to be an individual pattern
of reactive emotional responses which people feel when coming to terms with death,
bereavement, and great loss or trauma, etc. The model recognises that people have to pass
through their own individual journey of coming to terms with death and bereavement, etc.,
after which there is generally an acceptance of reality, which then enables the person to cope.

The model is perhaps a way of explaining how and why 'time heals', or how 'life goes on'.
And as with any aspect of our own or other people's emotions, when we know more about
what is happening, then dealing with it is usually made a little easier.

Again, while Kübler-Ross's focus was on death and bereavement, the grief cycle model is a useful
perspective for understanding our own and other people's emotional reaction to personal trauma
and change, irrespective of cause.

FIVE STAGES OF GRIEF

EKR stage Interpretation

1 - Denial Denial is a conscious or unconscious refusal to

accept facts, information, reality, etc., relating to the
situation concerned. It's a defence mechanism and

56
 perfectly natural. Some people can become locked in
this stage when dealing with a traumatic change that
can be ignored. Death of course is not particularly
easy to avoid or evade indefinitely.

Anger can manifest in different ways. People dealing

with emotional upset can be angry with themselves,
and/or with others, especially those close to them.
2 - Anger
Knowing this helps keep detached and non-
judgemental when experiencing the anger of
someone who is very upset.

Traditionally the bargaining stage for people facing

death can involve attempting to bargain with
whatever God the person believes in. People facing
less serious trauma can bargain or seek to negotiate a
3 - Bargaining
compromise. For example "Can we still be
friends?.." when facing a break-up. Bargaining rarely
provides a sustainable solution, especially if it's a
matter of life or death.

Also referred to as preparatory grieving. In a way it's

the dress rehearsal or the practice run for the
'aftermath' although this stage means different things
depending on whom it involves. It's a sort of
4 - Depression
acceptance with emotional attachment. It's natural to
feel sadness and regret, fear, uncertainty, etc. It
shows that the person has at least begun to accept the
reality.

Again this stage definitely varies according to the

person's situation, although broadly it is an
indication that there is some emotional detachment
5 - Acceptance and objectivity. People dying can enter this stage a
long time before the people they leave behind, who
must necessarily pass through their own individual
stages of dealing with the grief.

(Based on the Grief Cycle model

first published in On Death & Dying, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, 1969.

Interpretation by Alan Chapman 2006-08.)

ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS
57
 ( short biography )

Dr Elisabeth Kübler-Ross was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on July 8, 1926. She was one of
triplet sisters. Kübler-Ross studied medicine against her father's wishes, at Zurich, later
settling in the US in 1958 and becoming a US citizen in 1961.

Her experiences at the end of the Second World War, including the aftermath of the Majdanek
(Maidanek) concentration camp at Lublink (now Ukraine) as a member of the International
Voluntary Service for Peace, reinforced her destiny to focus on the humanistic perspective of
death and dying. According to some accounts the young Elisabeth's childhood treatment by
her father was very harsh, which might explain additionally how she became so intensely
concerned for people's worst suffering.

Her seminal book On Death & Dying was published in 1969, in which she explained the
process of dying in which she first described her now classically regarded Five Stages of
Grief. The book, and the supporting publication of her ideas in Time magazine, achieved wide
circulation, so that Elisabeth Kübler-Ross soon became known for her pioneering work with
the terminally ill, and for her ideas in the counselling and support of those affected by death
and bereavement.

Kübler-Ross spent much of the 1970's running workshops and speaking to audiences about
her ideas, which quickly gained popular appeal and general acceptance among the caring
professions, and which had significant positive influence over the development of hospice
care and attitudes towards death and the care of the dying.

In the 1980's Kübler-Ross turned her attention to the plight of babies born with AIDS, and
also founded a healing and workshop centre which she called Healing Waters, on a 300-acre
farm in Virginia.

Kübler-Ross's work has not always been universally applauded. Detractors tend to focus on
the 'vagueness' of the grief cycle model (which reminds us of the need to appreciate it as a
guide, rather than a rigid process), and her interest in the after-life linked to near-death
experiences also attracted mixed response, as one might expect given her iconic status, and
the understandable scientific caution of much of her audience.

Whatever, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross was a remarkable woman who carved out unique reputation
in her field - indeed she arguably defined the field itself.

Later in her life she suffered personal tragedy: a fire destroyed her Virginia home, and a series
of strokes left her in ill health. She moved to Scottsdale Arizona and retired soon afterwards in
1996.

Other critically admired works include Living with Death and Dying (1981) and On Life
After Death (1991) which are among more than 20 books that Kübler-Ross wrote or co-
authored on subjects related to death and grieving, and caring for those affected by
bereavement.

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross died on 24 August 2004. The Elisabeth Kübler-Ross Foundation (EKR
Foundation) was formed in to keep Elisabeth's spirit alive. The EKR Foundation seeks to

58
continue Elisabeth's life work through the education of bereavement carers, and to promote
and enable the compassionate support of families affected by death across the world.

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross was inducted into the The National Women's Hall of Fame in 2007, a
national nonprofit organization that annually recognizes the contributions to civilization of
American women in a variety of disciplines. "It's only when we truly know and understand
that we have a limited time on earth - and that we have no way of knowing when our time is
up, we will then begin to live each day to the fullest, as if it was the only one we had."

***

(Dr Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, 1926-2004, psychiatrist, humanitarian, teacher, author, and

pioneer of bereavement and hospice care. Used with permission, with thanks to
www.ekrfoundation.org and www.elisabethkublerross.com.)

This quote is available with many other inspirational sayings on the posters section.

XIII. Game theory

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social sciences (most
notably economics), biology, engineering, political science, international relations, computer
science (mainly for artificial intelligence), and philosophy. Game theory attempts to
mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in
making choices depends on the choices of others. While initially developed to analyze
competitions in which one individual does better at another's expense (zero sum games), it has
been expanded to treat a wide class of interactions, which are classified according to several
criteria. Today, "game theory is a sort of umbrella or 'unified field' theory for the rational side
of social science, where 'social' is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human
players (computers, animals, plants)" (Aumann 1987).

59
Traditional applications of game theory attempt to find equilibria in these games—sets of
strategies in which individuals are unlikely to change their behavior. Many equilibrium
concepts have been developed (most famously the Nash equilibrium) in an attempt to capture
this idea. These equilibrium concepts are motivated differently depending on the field of
application, although they often overlap or coincide. This methodology is not without
criticism, and debates continue over the appropriateness of particular equilibrium concepts,
the appropriateness of equilibria altogether, and the usefulness of mathematical models more
generally.

Although some developments occurred before it, the field of game theory came into being
with the 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern. This theory was developed extensively in the 1950s by many scholars.
Game theory was later explicitly applied to biology in the 1970s, although similar
developments go back at least as far as the 1930s. Game theory has been widely recognized as
an important tool in many fields. Eight game theorists have won Nobel prizes in economics,
and John Maynard Smith was awarded the Crafoord Prize for his application of game theory to
biology.

Representation of games
The games studied in game theory are well-defined mathematical objects. A game consists of
a set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and a specification of
payoffs for each combination of strategies. Most cooperative games are presented in the
characteristic function form, while the extensive and the normal forms are used to define
noncooperative games.

Extensive form

An extensive form game

The extensive form can be used to formalize games with some important order. Games here
are often presented as trees (as pictured to the left). Here each vertex (or node) represents a
point of choice for a player. The player is specified by a number listed by the vertex. The lines
out of the vertex represent a possible action for that player. The payoffs are specified at the
bottom of the tree.

In the game pictured here, there are two players. Player 1 moves first and chooses either F or
U. Player 2 sees Player 1's move and then chooses A or R. Suppose that Player 1 chooses U
and then Player 2 chooses A, then Player 1 gets 8 and Player 2 gets 2.

The extensive form can also capture simultaneous-move games and games with incomplete
information. To represent it, either a dotted line connects different vertices to represent them

60
as being part of the same information set (i.e., the players do not know at which point they
are), or a closed line is drawn around them.

Normal form
Player 2 Player 2
The normal (or strategic form) game is chooses Left chooses Right
usually represented by a matrix which
shows the players, strategies, and payoffs Player 1
chooses Up 4, 3 –1, –1
(see the example to the right). More
generally it can be represented by any
Player 1
function that associates a payoff for each
player with every possible combination of
chooses Dow 0, 0 3, 4
n
actions. In the accompanying example
there are two players; one chooses the Normal form or payoff matrix of a 2-player, 2-
row and the other chooses the column. strategy game
Each player has two strategies, which are
specified by the number of rows and the number of columns. The payoffs are provided in the
interior. The first number is the payoff received by the row player (Player 1 in our example);
the second is the payoff for the column player (Player 2 in our example). Suppose that Player
1 plays Up and that Player 2 plays Left. Then Player 1 gets a payoff of 4, and Player 2 gets 3.

When a game is presented in normal form, it is presumed that each player acts simultaneously
or, at least, without knowing the actions of the other. If players have some information about
the choices of other players, the game is usually presented in extensive form.

Characteristic function form

In cooperative games with transferable utility no individual payoffs are given. Instead, the
characteristic function determines the payoff of each coalition. The standard assumption is
that the empty coalition obtains a payoff of 0.

The origin of this form is to be found in the seminal book of von Neumann and Morgenstern
who, when studying coalitional normal form games, assumed that when a coalition C forms, it
plays against the complementary coalition ( ) as if they were playing a 2-player game.
The equilibrium payoff of C is characteristic. Now there are different models to derive
coalitional values from normal form games, but not all games in characteristic function form
can be derived from normal form games.

Formally, a characteristic function form game (also known as a TU-game) is given as a pair
(N,v), where N denotes a set of players and is a characteristic function.

The characteristic function form has been generalised to games without the assumption of
transferable utility.

Partition function form

The characteristic function form ignores the possible externalities of coalition formation. In
the partition function form the payoff of a coalition depends not only on its members, but also
on the way the rest of the players are partitioned (Thrall & Lucas 1963).

61
Application and challenges
Game theory has been used to study a wide variety of human and animal behaviors. It was
initially developed in economics to understand a large collection of economic behaviors,
including behaviors of firms, markets, and consumers. The use of game theory in the social
sciences has expanded, and game theory has been applied to political, sociological, and
psychological behaviors as well.

Game theoretic analysis was initially used to study animal behavior by Ronald Fisher in the
1930s (although even Charles Darwin makes a few informal game theoretic statements). This
work predates the name "game theory", but it shares many important features with this field.
The developments in economics were later applied to biology largely by John Maynard Smith
in his book Evolution and the Theory of Games.

In addition to being used to predict and explain behavior, game theory has also been used to
attempt to develop theories of ethical or normative behavior. In economics and philosophy,
scholars have applied game theory to help in the understanding of good or proper behavior.
Game theoretic arguments of this type can be found as far back as Plato.[1]

Political science

The application of game theory to political science is focused in the overlapping areas of fair
division, political economy, public choice, positive political theory, and social choice theory.
In each of these areas, researchers have developed game theoretic models in which the players
are often voters, states, special interest groups, and politicians.

For early examples of game theory applied to political science, see the work of Anthony
Downs. In his book An Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957), he applies a hotelling
firm location model to the political process. In the Downsian model, political candidates
commit to ideologies on a one-dimensional policy space. The theorist shows how the political
candidates will converge to the ideology preferred by the median voter. For more recent
examples, see the books by Steven Brams, George Tsebelis, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan
Helpman, or David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks.

A game-theoretic explanation for democratic peace is that public and open debate in
democracies send clear and reliable information regarding their intentions to other states. In
contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect
concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and
unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy
(Levy & Razin 2003).

Economics and business

Economists have long used game theory to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena,
including auctions, bargaining, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation,
and voting systems. This research usually focuses on particular sets of strategies known as
equilibria in games. These "solution concepts" are usually based on what is required by norms
of rationality. In non-cooperative games, the most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. A
set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies.

62
So, if all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral
incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are doing.

The payoffs of the game are generally taken to represent the utility of individual players.
Often in modeling situations the payoffs represent money, which presumably corresponds to
an individual's utility. This assumption, however, can be faulty.

A prototypical paper on game theory in economics begins by presenting a game that is an

abstraction of some particular economic situation. One or more solution concepts are chosen,
and the author demonstrates which strategy sets in the presented game are equilibria of the
appropriate type. Naturally one might wonder to what use should this information be put.
Economists and business professors suggest two primary uses.

Descriptive

A three stage Centipede Game

The first known use is to inform us about how actual human populations behave. Some
scholars believe that by finding the equilibria of games they can predict how actual human
populations will behave when confronted with situations analogous to the game being studied.
This particular view of game theory has come under recent criticism. First, it is criticized
because the assumptions made by game theorists are often violated. Game theorists may
assume players always act in a way to directly maximize their wins (the Homo economicus
model), but in practice, human behavior often deviates from this model. Explanations of this
phenomenon are many; irrationality, new models of deliberation, or even different motives
(like that of altruism). Game theorists respond by comparing their assumptions to those used
in physics. Thus while their assumptions do not always hold, they can treat game theory as a
reasonable scientific ideal akin to the models used by physicists. However, additional
criticism of this use of game theory has been levied because some experiments have
demonstrated that individuals do not play equilibrium strategies. For instance, in the centipede
game, guess 2/3 of the average game, and the dictator game, people regularly do not play
Nash equilibria. There is an ongoing debate regarding the importance of these experiments.[2]

Alternatively, some authors claim that Nash equilibria do not provide predictions for human
populations, but rather provide an explanation for why populations that play Nash equilibria
remain in that state. However, the question of how populations reach those points remains
open.

Some game theorists have turned to evolutionary game theory in order to resolve these
worries. These models presume either no rationality or bounded rationality on the part of
players. Despite the name, evolutionary game theory does not necessarily presume natural
selection in the biological sense. Evolutionary game theory includes both biological as well as
cultural evolution and also models of individual learning (for example, fictitious play
dynamics).

63
Prescriptive or normative analysis

On the other hand, some scholars see game theory not as a Cooperate Defect
predictive tool for the behavior of human beings, but as a
suggestion for how people ought to behave. Since a Nash Cooperate -1, -1 -10, 0
equilibrium of a game constitutes one's best response to
the actions of the other players, playing a strategy that is Defect 0, -10 -5, -5
part of a Nash equilibrium seems appropriate. However,
this use for game theory has also come under criticism. The Prisoner's Dilemma
First, in some cases it is appropriate to play a non-
equilibrium strategy if one expects others to play non-equilibrium strategies as well. For an
example, see Guess 2/3 of the average.

Second, the Prisoner's dilemma presents another potential counterexample. In the Prisoner's
Dilemma, each player pursuing his own self-interest leads both players to be worse off than
had they not pursued their own self-interests.

Biology
Hawk Dove
Unlike economics, the payoffs for games in biology are
often interpreted as corresponding to fitness. In addition, v−c,
Hawk 2v, 0
the focus has been less on equilibria that correspond to a v−c
notion of rationality, but rather on ones that would be
maintained by evolutionary forces. The best known Dove 0, 2v v, v
equilibrium in biology is known as the Evolutionarily
stable strategy or (ESS), and was first introduced in The hawk-dove game
(Maynard Smith 1982). Although its initial motivation did
not involve any of the mental requirements of the Nash equilibrium, every ESS is a Nash
equilibrium.

In biology, game theory has been used to understand many different phenomena. It was first
used to explain the evolution (and stability) of the approximate 1:1 sex ratios. (Fisher 1930)
suggested that the 1:1 sex ratios are a result of evolutionary forces acting on individuals who
could be seen as trying to maximize their number of grandchildren.

Additionally, biologists have used evolutionary game theory and the ESS to explain the
emergence of animal communication (Harper & Maynard Smith 2003). The analysis of
signaling games and other communication games has provided some insight into the evolution
of communication among animals. For example, the Mobbing behavior of many species, in
which a large number of prey animals attack a larger predator, seems to be an example of
spontaneous emergent organization.

Biologists have used the hawk-dove game (also known as chicken) to analyze fighting
behavior and territoriality.

Maynard Smith, in the preface to Evolution and the Theory of Games writes, "[p]aradoxically,
it has turned out that game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of
economic behaviour for which it was originally designed". Evolutionary game theory has
been used to explain many seemingly incongruous phenomena in nature.[3]

64
One such phenomenon is known as biological altruism. This is a situation in which an
organism appears to act in a way that benefits other organisms and is detrimental to itself.
This is distinct from traditional notions of altruism because such actions are not conscious, but
appear to be evolutionary adaptations to increase overall fitness. Examples can be found in
species ranging from vampire bats that regurgitate blood they have obtained from a night’s
hunting and give it to group members who have failed to feed, to worker bees that care for the
queen bee for their entire lives and never mate, to Vervet monkeys that warn group members
of a predator's approach, even when it endangers that individual's chance of survival. [4] All of
these actions increase the overall fitness of a group, but occur at a cost to the individual.

Evolutionary game theory explains this altruism with the idea of kin selection. Altruists
discriminate between the individuals they help and favor relatives. Hamilton's rule explains
the evolutionary reasoning behind this selection with the equation c<b*r where the cost ( c )
to the altruist must be less than the benefit ( b ) to the recipient multiplied by the coefficient of
relatedness ( r ). The more closely related two organisms are causes the incidence of altruism
to increase because they share many of the same alleles. This means that the altruistic
individual, by ensuring that the alleles of its close relative are passed on, (through survival of
its offspring) can forgo the option of having offspring itself because the same number of
alleles are passed on. Helping a sibling for example, has a coefficient of ½, because an
individual shares ½ of the alleles in its sibling’s offspring. Ensuring that enough of a sibling’s
offspring survive to adulthood precludes the necessity of the altruistic individual producing
offspring.[4]

Computer science and logic

Game theory has come to play an increasingly important role in logic and in computer
science. Several logical theories have a basis in game semantics. In addition, computer
scientists have used games to model interactive computations. Also, game theory provides a
theoretical basis to the field of multi-agent systems.

Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms. In particular, the k-server
problem, which has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-
answer games (Ben David, Borodin & Karp et al. 1994). Yao's principle is a game-theoretic
technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized
algorithms, and especially of online algorithms.

Philosophy

Game theory has been put to several uses in philosophy. Responding to two papers by W.V.O.
Quine (1960, 1967), Lewis (1969) used game theory to develop a philosophical account of
convention. In so doing, he provided the first analysis of
Stag Hare
common knowledge and employed it in analyzing play in
coordination games. In addition, he first suggested that
one can understand meaning in terms of signaling games.
Stag 3, 3 0, 2
This later suggestion has been pursued by several
philosophers since Lewis (Skyrms (1996), Grim, Kokalis, Hare 2, 0 2, 2
and Alai-Tafti et al. (2004)). Following Lewis (1969)
Stag hunt
game-theoretic account of conventions, Ullmann Margalit
(1977) and Bicchieri (2006) have developed theories of social norms that define them as Nash
equilibria that result from transforming a mixed-motive game into a coordination game. [5]

65
Game theory has also challenged philosophers to think in terms of interactive epistemology:
what does it mean for a collective to have common beliefs or knowledge, and what the
consequences of this knowledge are for the social outcomes resulting from agents’
interactions. Philosophers who have worked in this area include Bicchieri (1989, 1993)[6],
Skyrms (1990)[7] and Stalnaker (1999)[8]

In ethics, some authors have attempted to pursue the project, begun by Thomas Hobbes, of
deriving morality from self-interest. Since games like the Prisoner's dilemma present an
apparent conflict between morality and self-interest, explaining why cooperation is required
by self-interest is an important component of this project. This general strategy is a
component of the general social contract view in political philosophy (for examples, see
Gauthier (1986) and Kavka (1986).[9]

Other authors have attempted to use evolutionary game theory in order to explain the
emergence of human attitudes about morality and corresponding animal behaviors. These
authors look at several games including the Prisoner's dilemma, Stag hunt, and the Nash
bargaining game as providing an explanation for the emergence of attitudes about morality
(see, e.g., Skyrms (1996, 2004) and Sober and Wilson (1999)).

Yao's principle
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Yao's principle states that the expected cost of any randomized algorithm for solving a given
problem, on the worst case input for that algorithm, can be no better than the expected cost,
for a worst-case random probability distribution on the inputs, of the deterministic algorithm
that performs best against that distribution. Thus, to establish a lower bound on the
performance of randomized algorithms, it suffices to find an appropriate distribution of
difficult inputs, and to prove that no deterministic algorithm can perform well against that
distribution. This principle is named after Andrew Yao, who first proposed it.

Yao's principle may be interpreted in game theoretic terms, via a two-player zero sum game in
which one player, Alice, selects a deterministic algorithm, the other player, Bob, selects an
input, and the payoff is the cost of the selected algorithm on the selected input. Any
randomized algorithm R may be interpreted as a randomized choice among deterministic
algorithms, and thus as a strategy for Alice. By von Neumann's minimax theorem, Bob has a
randomized strategy that performs at least as well against R as it does against the best pure
strategy Alice might choose; that is, Bob's strategy defines a distribution on the inputs such
that the expected cost of R on that distribution (and therefore also the worst case expected
cost of R) is no better than the expected cost of any single deterministic algorithm against the
same distribution.

References
 Yao, Andrew (1977), "Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity",
Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp.
222–227

66
 Andrew Yao
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Andrew Chi-Chih Yao (Chinese: 姚 期 智 ; pinyin: Yáo Qīzhì) is a prominent computer

scientist and computational theorist. Yao used the minimax theorem to prove what is now
known as Yao's Principle.

Yao was born in Shanghai, China. He completed his undergraduate education in physics at the
National Taiwan University, before completing a Ph.D. in physics at Harvard University in
1972, and then a second PhD in computer science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.

In 1996 he was awarded the Knuth Prize. He received the Turing Award, the most prestigious
award in computer science, in 2000, "in recognition of his fundamental contributions to the
theory of computation, including the complexity-based theory of pseudorandom number
generation, cryptography, and communication complexity".

From 1982 to 1986, he was a full professor at Stanford University. From 1986 to 2004, he
was the William and Edna Macaleer Professor of Engineering and Applied Science at
Princeton University, where he continued to work on algorithms and complexity. In 2004, he
became a Professor of the Center for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University (CASTU) and the
director of the Institute for Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), Tsinghua University in
Beijing.

He is a member of U.S. National Academy of Sciences, a fellow of the American Academy of

Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a
Fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery, and a foreign member of Chinese
Academy of Sciences. His wife, Frances Yao, is also a well-known theoretical computer
scientist.

Evolutionary Game Theory

First published Mon Jan 14, 2002;

substantive revision Tue May 27, 2003

Evolutionary game theory originated as an application of the mathematical theory of games to

biological contexts, arising from the realization that frequency dependent fitness introduces a
strategic aspect to evolution. Recently, however, evolutionary game theory has become of
increased interest to economists, sociologists, and anthropologists--and social scientists in
general--as well as philosophers. The interest among social scientists in a theory with explicit
biological roots derives from three facts. First, the ‘evolution’ treated by evolutionary game
theory need not be biological evolution. ‘Evolution’ may, in this context, often be understood
as cultural evolution, where this refers to changes in beliefs and norms over time. Second, the
rationality assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory are, in many cases, more

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appropriate for the modelling of social systems than those assumptions underlying the
traditional theory of games. Third, evolutionary game theory, as an explicitly dynamic theory,
provides an important element missing from the traditional theory. In the preface to Evolution
and the Theory of Games, Maynard Smith notes that "[p]aradoxically, it has turned out that
game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of economic behaviour for
which it was originally designed." It is perhaps doubly paradoxical, then, that the subsequent
development of evolutionary game theory has produced a theory which holds great promise
for social scientists, and is as readily applied to the field of economic behaviour as that for
which it was originally designed.

1. Historical Development
Evolutionary game theory was first developed by R. A. Fisher [see The Genetic Theory of
Natural Selection (1930)] in his attempt to explain the approximate equality of the sex ratio in
mammals. The puzzle Fisher faced was this: why is it that the sex ratio is approximately equal
in many species where the majority of males never mate? In these species, the non-mating
males would seem to be excess baggage carried around by the rest of the population, having
no real use. Fisher realized that if we measure individual fitness in terms of the expected
number of grandchildren, then individual fitness depends on the distribution of males and
females in the population. When there is a greater number of females in the population, males
have a higher individual fitness; when there are more males in the population, females have a
higher individual fitness. Fisher pointed out that, in such a situation, the evolutionary
dynamics lead to the sex ratio becoming fixed at equal numbers of males and females. The
fact that individual fitness depends upon the relative frequency of males and females in the
population introduces a strategic element into evolutions.

Fisher's argument can be understood game theoretically, but he did not state it in those terms.
In 1961, R. C. Lewontin made the first explicit application of game theory to evolutionary
biology in "Evolution and the Theory of Games" (not to be confused with the Maynard Smith
work of the same name). In 1972, Maynard Smith defined the concept of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (hereafter ESS) in the article "Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting."
However, it was the publication of "The Logic of Animal Conflict," by Maynard Smith and
Price in 1973 that introduced the concept of an ESS into widespread circulation. In 1982,
Maynard Smith's seminal text Evolution and the Theory of Games appeared, followed shortly
thereafter by Robert Axelrod's famous work The Evolution of Cooperation in 1984. Since
then, there has been a veritable explosion of interest by economists and social scientists in
evolutionary game theory (see the bibliography below).

2. Two Approaches to Evolutionary Game Theory

There are two approaches to evolutionary game theory. The first approach derives from the
work of Maynard Smith and Price and employs the concept of an evolutionarily stable
strategy as the principal tool of analysis. The second approach constructs an explicit model of
the process by which the frequency of strategies change in the population and studies
properties of the evolutionary dynamics within that model.

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As an example of the first approach, consider the problem of the Hawk-Dove game, analyzed
by Maynard Smith and Price in "The Logic of Animal Conflict." In this game, two individuals
compete for a resource of a fixed value V. (In biological contexts, the value V of the resource
corresponds to an increase in the Darwinian fitness of the individual who obtains the resource;
in a cultural context, the value V of the resource would need to be given an alternate
interpretation more appropriate to the specific model at hand.) Each individual follows exactly
one of two strategies described below:

(șoimul )Initiate aggressive behaviour, not stopping until injured or until one's opponent backs
Hawk
down.

Dove (porumbelul )Retreat immediately if one's opponent initiates aggressive behaviour.

If we assume that (1) whenever two individuals both initiate aggressive behaviour, conflict
eventually results and the two individuals are equally likely to be injured, (2) the cost of the
conflict reduces individual fitness by some constant value C, (3) when a Hawk meets a Dove,
the Dove immediately retreats and the Hawk obtains the resource, and (4) when two Doves
meet the resource is shared equally between them, the fitness payoffs for the Hawk-Dove
game can be summarized according to the following matrix:

Hawk Dove

Hawk ½(V - C) V

Dove 0 V/2

Figure 1: The Hawk-Dove Game

(The payoffs listed in the matrix are for that of a player using the strategy in the appropriate
row, playing against someone using the strategy in the appropriate column. For example, if
you play the strategy Hawk against an opponent who plays the strategy Dove, your payoff is
V; if you play the strategy Dove against an opponent who plays the strategy Hawk, your
payoff is 0.)

In order for a strategy to be evolutionarily stable, it must have the property that if almost
every member of the population follows it, no mutant (that is, an individual who adopts a
novel strategy) can successfully invade. This idea can be given a precise characterization as
follows: Let ΔF(s1,s2) denote the change in fitness for an individual following strategy s1
against an opponent following strategy s2, and let F(s) denote the total fitness of an individual
following strategy s; furthermore, suppose that each individual in the population has an initial
fitness of F0. If σ is an evolutionarily stable strategy and μ a mutant attempting to invade the
population, then

F(σ) = F0 + (1-p)ΔF(σ,σ) + pΔF(σ,μ)

F(μ) = F0 + (1-p)ΔF(μ,σ) + pΔF(μ,μ)

where p is the proportion of the population following the mutant strategy μ.

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Since σ is evolutionarily stable, the fitness of an individual following σ must be greater than
the fitness of an individual following μ (otherwise the mutant following μ would be able to
invade), and so F(σ) > F(μ). Now, as p is very close to 0, this requires that either that

ΔF(σ,σ) > ΔF(μ,σ)

or that

ΔF(σ,σ) = ΔF(μ,σ) and ΔF(σ,μ) > ΔF(μ,μ)

(This is the definition of an ESS that Maynard Smith and Price give.) In other words, what
this means is that a strategy σ is an ESS if one of two conditions holds: (1) σ does better
playing against σ than any mutant does playing against σ, or (2) some mutant does just as well
playing against σ as σ, but σ does better playing against the mutant than the mutant does.

Given this characterization of an evolutionarily stable strategy, one can readily confirm that,
for the Hawk-Dove game, the strategy Dove is not evolutionarily stable because a pure
population of Doves can be invaded by a Hawk mutant. If the value V of the resource is
greater than the cost C of injury (so that it is worth risking injury in order to obtain the
resource), then the strategy Hawk is evolutionarily stable. In the case where the value of the
resource is less than the cost of injury, there is no evolutionarily stable strategy if individuals
are restricted to following pure strategies, although there is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
players may use mixed strategies.[1]

As an example of the second approach, consider the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma. In this
game, individuals choose one of two strategies, typically called "Cooperate" and "Defect."
Here is the general form of the payoff matrix for the prisoner's dilemma:

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate (R,R′) (S,T′)

Defect (T,S′) (P,P′)

Figure 2: Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Payoffs listed as (row, column).

where T > R > P > S and T′ > R′ > P′ > S′. (This form does not require that the payoffs for
each player be symmetric, only that the proper ordering of the payoffs obtains.) In what
follows, it will be assumed that the payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma are the same for
everyone in the population.

How will a population of individuals that repeatedly plays the Prisoner's Dilemma evolve? We
cannot answer that question without introducing a few assumptions concerning the nature of
the population. First, let us assume that the population is quite large. In this case, we can
represent the state of the population by simply keeping track of what proportion follow the
strategies Cooperate and Defect. Let pc and pd denote these proportions. Furthermore, let us
denote the average fitness of cooperators and defectors by WC and WD, respectively, and let W

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denote the average fitness of the entire population. The values of WC, WD, and W can be
expressed in terms of the population proportions and payoff values as follows:

WD = F0 + pcΔF(C,C) + pdΔF(C,D)
WD = F0 + pcΔF(D,C) + pdΔF(D,D)
W = pcWC + pdWD

Second, let us assume that the proportion of the population following the strategies Cooperate
and Defect in the next generation is related to the proportion of the population following the
strategies Cooperate and Defect in the current generation according to the rule:

We can rewrite these expressions in the following form:

If we assume that the change in the strategy frequency from one generation to the next are
small, these difference equations may be approximated by the differential equations:

These equations were offered by Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Zeeman (1979) to provide
continuous dynamics for evolutionary game theory and are known as the replicator dynamics.

The replicator dynamics may be used to model a population of individuals playing the
Prisoner's Dilemma. For the Prisoner's Dilemma, the expected fitness of Cooperating and
Defecting are:

WC = F0 + pcΔF(C,C) + pdΔF(C,D)

= F0 + pcR + pdS

and

WD = F0 + pcΔF(D,C) + pdΔF(D,D)

= F0 + pcT + pdP.

Since T > R and P > S, it follows that WD > WC and hence WD > W > WC. This means that

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 and

Since the strategy frequencies for Defect and Cooperate in the next generation are given by

and

respectively, we see that over time the proportion of the population choosing the strategy
Cooperate eventually becomes extinct. Figure 3 illustrates one way of representing the
replicator dynamical model of the prisoner's dilemma, known as a state-space diagram.

Figure 3: The Replicator Dynamical Model of the Prisoner's Dilemma

We interpret this diagram as follows: the leftmost point represents the state of the population
where everyone defects, the rightmost point represents the state where everyone cooperates,
and intermediate points represent states where some proportion of the population defects and
the remainder cooperates. (One maps states of the population onto points in the diagram by
mapping the state when N% of the population defects onto the point of the line N% of the way
to the leftmost point.) Arrows on the line represent the evolutionary trajectory followed by the
population over time. The open circle at the rightmost point indicates that the state where
everybody cooperates is an unstable equilibrium, in the sense that if a small portion of the
population deviates from the strategy Cooperate, then the evolutionary dynamics will drive
the population away from that equilibrium. The solid circle at the leftmost point indicates that
the state where everybody Defects is a stable equilibrium, in the sense that if a small portion
of the population deviates from the strategy Defect, then the evolutionary dynamics will drive
the population back to the original equilibrium state.

At this point, one may see little difference between the two approaches to evolutionary game
theory. One can confirm that, for the Prisoner's Dilemma, the state where everybody defects is
the only ESS. Since this state is the only stable equilibrium under the replicator dynamics, the
two notions fit together quite neatly: the only stable equilibrium under the replicator dynamics
occurs when everyone in the population follows the only ESS. In general, though, the
relationship between ESSs and stable states of the replicator dynamics is more complex than
this example suggests. Taylor and Jonker (1978), as well as Zeeman (1979), establish
conditions under which one may infer the existence of a stable state under the replicator
dynamics given an evolutionarily stable strategy. Roughly, if only two pure strategies exist,
then given a (possibly mixed) evolutionarily stable strategy, the corresponding state of the
population is a stable state under the replicator dynamics. (If the evolutionarily stable strategy
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is a mixed strategy S, the corresponding state of the population is the state in which the
proportion of the population following the first strategy equals the probability assigned to the
first strategy by S, and the remainder follow the second strategy.) However, this can fail to be
true if more than two pure strategies exist.

The connection between ESSs and stable states under an evolutionary dynamical model is
weakened further if we do not model the dynamics by the replicator dynamics. For example,
suppose we use a local interaction model in which each individual plays the prisoner's
dilemma with his or her neighbors. Nowak and May (1992, 1993), using a spatial model in
which local interactions occur between individuals occupying neighboring nodes on a square
lattice, show that stable population states for the prisoner's dilemma depend upon the specific
form of the payoff matrix.[2]

When the payoff matrix for the population has the values T = 2.8, R = 1.1, P = 0.1, and S = 0,
the evolutionary dynamics of the local interaction model agree with those of the replicator
dynamics, and lead to a state where each individual follows the strategy Defect--which is, as
noted before, the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the prisoner's dilemma. The figure
below illustrates how rapidly one such population converges to a state where everyone
defects.

Generation 1 Generation 2 Generation 3

Generation 4 Generation 5 Generation 6

Figure 4: Prisoner's Dilemma: All Defect

However, when the payoff matrix has values of T = 1.2, R = 1.1, P = 0.1, and S = 0, the
evolutionary dynamics carry the population to a stable cycle oscillating between two states. In
this cycle cooperators and defectors coexist, with some regions containing "blinkers"
oscillating between defectors and cooperators (as seen in generation 19 and 20).

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 Generation 1 Generation 2 Generation 19 Generation 20

Figure 5: Prisoner's Dilemma: Cooperate

Notice that with these particular settings of payoff values, the evolutionary dynamics of the
local interaction model differ significantly from those of the replicator dynamics. Under these
payoffs, the stable states have no corresponding analogue in either the replicator dynamics nor
in the analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies.

A phenomenon of greater interest occurs when we choose payoff values of T = 1.61, R = 1.01,
P = 0.01, and S = 0. Here, the dynamics of local interaction lead to a world constantly in flux:
under these values regions occupied predominantly by Cooperators may be successfully
invaded by Defectors, and regions occupied predominantly by Defectors may be successfully
invaded by Cooperators. In this model, there is no "stable strategy" in the traditional
dynamical sense.[3]

Generation 1 Generation 3 Generation 5 Generation 7

Generation 9 Generation 11 Generation 13 Generation 15

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 Figure 6: Prisoner's Dilemma: Chaotic

These models demonstrate that, although numerous cases exist in which both approaches to
evolutionary game theory arrive at the same conclusion regarding which strategies one would
expect to find present in a population, there are enough differences in the outcomes of the two
modes of analysis to justify the development of each program.

3. Why Evolutionary Game Theory?

Although evolutionary game theory has provided numerous insights to particular evolutionary
questions, a growing number of social scientists have become interested in evolutionary game
theory in hopes that it will provide tools for addressing a number of deficiencies in the
traditional theory of games, three of which are discussed below.

3.1 The equilibrium selection problem

The concept of a Nash equilibrium (see the entry on game theory) has been the most used
solution concept in game theory since its introduction by John Nash in 1950. A selection of
strategies by a group of agents is said to be in a Nash equilibrium if each agent's strategy is a
best-response to the strategies chosen by the other players. By best-response, we mean that no
individual can improve her payoff by switching strategies unless at least one other individual
switches strategies as well. This need not mean that the payoffs to each individual are optimal
in a Nash equilibrium: indeed, one of the disturbing facts of the prisoner's dilemma is that the
only Nash equilbrium of the game--when both agents defect--is suboptimal.[4]

Yet a difficulty arises with the use of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept for games: if we
restrict players to using pure strategies, not every game has a Nash equilbrium. The game
"Matching Pennies" illustrates this problem.

Heads Tails

Heads (0,1) (1,0)

Tails (1,0) (0,1)

Figure 7: Payoff matrix for the game of Matching Pennies

(Row wins if the two coins do not match, whereas Column wins if the two coins match).

While it is true that every noncooperative game in which players may use mixed strategies has
a Nash equilibrium, some have questioned the significance of this for real agents. If it seems
appropriate to require rational agents to adopt only pure strategies (perhaps because the cost
of implementing a mixed strategy runs too high), then the game theorist must admit that
certain games lack solutions.

A more significant problem with invoking the Nash equilibrium as the appropriate solution
concept arises because games exist which have multiple Nash equilibria (see the section on

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Solution Concepts and Equilibria, in the entry on game theory). When there are several
different Nash equilibria, how is a rational agent to decide which of the several equilibria is
the "right one" to settle upon?[5] Attempts to resolve this problem have produced a number of
possible refinements to the concept of a Nash equilibrium, each refinement having some
intuitive purchase. Unfortunately, so many refinements of the notion of a Nash equilibrium
have been developed that, in many games which have multiple Nash equilibria, each
equilibrium could be justified by some refinement present in the literature. The problem has
thus shifted from choosing among multiple Nash equilibria to choosing among the various
refinements. Some (see Samuelson (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection)
hope that further development of evolutionary game theory can be of service in addressing
this issue.

3.2 The problem of hyperrational agents

The traditional theory of games imposes a very high rationality requirement upon agents. This
requirement originates in the development of the theory of utility which provides game
theory's underpinnings (see Luce (1950) for an introduction). For example, in order to be able
to assign a cardinal utility function to individual agents, one typically assumes that each agent
has a well-defined, consistent set of preferences over the set of "lotteries" over the outcomes
which may result from individual choice. Since the number of different lotteries over
outcomes is uncountably infinite, this requires each agent to have a well-defined, consistent
set of uncountably infinitely many preferences.

Numerous results from experimental economics have shown that these strong rationality
assumptions do not describe the behavior of real human subjects. Humans are rarely (if ever)
the hyperrational agents described by traditional game theory. For example, it is not
uncommon for people, in experimental situations, to indicate that they prefer A to B, B to C,
and C to A. These "failures of the transitivity of preference" would not occur if people had a
well-defined consistent set of preferences. Furthermore, experiments with a class of games
known as a "beauty pageant" show, quite dramatically, the failure of common knowledge
assumptions typically invoked to solve games.6] Since evolutionary game theory successfully
explains the predominance of certain behaviors of insects and animals, where strong
rationality assumptions clearly fail, this suggests that rationality is not as central to game
theoretic analyses as previously thought. The hope, then, is that evolutionary game theory
may meet with greater success in describing and predicting the choices of human subjects,
since it is better equipped to handle the appropriate weaker rationality assumptions.

3.3 The lack of a dynamical theory in the traditional theory of games

At the end of the first chapter of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, von Neumann and
Morgenstern write:

We repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly static. A dynamic theory would
unquestionably be more complete and therefore preferable. But there is ample evidence from other
branches of science that it is futile to try to build one as long as the static side is not thoroughly
understood. (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, p. 44)

The theory of evolution is a dynamical theory, and the second approach to evolutionary game
theory sketched above explicitly models the dynamics present in interactions among

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individuals in the population. Since the traditional theory of games lacks an explicit treatment
of the dynamics of rational deliberation, evolutionary game theory can be seen, in part, as
filling an important lacuna of traditional game theory.

One may seek to capture some of the dynamics of the decision-making process in traditional
game theory by modeling the game in its extensive form, rather than its normal form.
However, for most games of reasonable complexity (and hence interest), the extensive form
of the game quickly becomes unmanageable. Moreover, even in the extensive form of a game,
traditional game theory represents an individual's strategy as a specification of what choice
that individual would make at each information set in the game. A selection of strategy, then,
corresponds to a selection, prior to game play, of what that individual will do at any possible
stage of the game. This representation of strategy selection clearly presupposes hyperrational
players and fails to represent the process by which one player observes his opponent's
behavior, learns from these observations, and makes the best move in response to what he has
learned (as one might expect, for there is no need to model learning in hyperrational
individuals). The inability to model the dynamical element of game play in traditional game
theory, and the extent to which evolutionary game theory naturally incorporates dynamical
considerations, reveals an important virtue of evolutionary game theory.

4. Philosophical Problems
of Evolutionary Game Theory
The growing interest among social scientists and philosophers in evolutionary game theory
has raised several philosophical questions, primarily stemming from its application to human
subjects.

4.1 The meaning of fitness in cultural evolutionary interpretations

As noted previously, evolutionary game theoretic models may often be given both a biological
and a cultural evolutionary interpretation. In the biological interpretation, the numeric
quantities which play a role analogous to "utility" in traditional game theory correspond to the
fitness (typically Darwinian fitness) of individuals.[7] How does one interpret "fitness" in the
cultural evolutionary interpretation?

In many cases, fitness in cultural evolutionary interpretations of evolutionary game theoretic

models directly measures some objective quantity of which it can be safely assumed that (1)
individuals always want more rather than less and (2) interpersonal comparisons are
meaningful. Depending on the particular problem modeled, money, slices of cake, or amount
of land would be appropriate cultural evolutionary interpretations of fitness. Requiring that
fitness in cultural evolutionary game theoretic models conform to this interpretative constraint
severely limits the kinds of problems that one can address. A more useful cultural
evolutionary framework would provide a more general theory which did not require that
individual fitness be a linear (or strictly increasing) function of the amount of some real
quantity, like amount of food.

In traditional game theory, a strategy's fitness was measured by the expected utility it had for
the individual in question. Yet evolutionary game theory seeks to describe individuals of
limited rationality (commonly known as "boundedly rational" individuals), and the utility

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theory employed in traditional game theory assumes highly rational individuals.
Consequently, the utility theory used in traditional game theory cannot simply be carried over
to evolutionary game theory. One must develop an alternate theory of utility/fitness, one
compatible with the bounded rationality of individuals, that is sufficient to define a utility
measure adequate for the application of evolutionary game theory to cultural evolution.

4.2 The explanatory irrelevance of evolutionary game theory

Another question facing evolutionary game theoretic explanations of social phenomena

concerns the kind of explanation it seeks to give. Depending on the type of explanation it
seeks to provide, are evolutionary game theoretic explanations of social phenomena irrelevant
or mere vehicles for the promulgation of pre-existing values and biases? To understand this
question, recognize that one must ask whether evolutionary game theoretic explanations target
the etiology of the phenomenon in question, the persistence of the phenomenon, or various
aspects of the normativity attached to the phenomenon. The latter two questions seem deeply
connected, for population members typically enforce social behaviors and rules having
normative force by sanctions placed on those failing to comply with the relevant norm; and
the presence of sanctions, if suitably strong, explains the persistence of the norm. The
question regarding a phenomenon's etiology, on the other hand, can be considered
independent of the latter questions.

If one wishes to explain how some currently existing social phenomenon came to be, it is
unclear why approaching it from the point of view of evolutionary game theory would be
particularily illuminating. The etiology of any phenomenon is a unique historical event and, as
such, can only be discovered empirically, relying on the work of sociologists, anthropologists,
archaeologists, and the like. Although an evolutionary game theoretic model may exclude
certain historical sequences as possible histories (since one may be able to show that the
cultural evolutionary dynamics preclude one sequence from generating the phenomenon in
question), it seems unlikely that an evolutionary game theoretic model would indicate a
unique historical sequence suffices to bring about the phenomenon. An empirical inquiry
would then still need to be conducted to rule out the extraneous historical sequences admitted
by the model, which raises the question of what, if anything, was gained by the construction
of an evolutionary game theoretic model in the intermediate stage. Moreover, even if an
evolutionary game theoretic model indicated that a single historical sequence was capable of
producing a given social phenomenon, there remains the important question of why we ought
to take this result seriously. One may point out that since nearly any result can be produced by
a model by suitable adjusting of the dynamics and initial conditions, all that the evolutionary
game theorist has done is provide one such model. Additional work needs to be done to show
that the underlying assumptions of the model (both the cultural evolutionary dynamics and the
initial conditions) are empirically supported. Again, one may wonder what has been gained by
the evolutionary model--would it not have been just as easy to determine the cultural
dynamics and initial conditions beforehand, constructing the model afterwards? If so, it would
seem that the contributions made by evolutionary game theory in this context simply are a
proper part of the parent social science--sociology, anthropology, economics, and so on. If so,
then there is nothing particular about evolutionary game theory employed in the explanation,
and this means that, contrary to appearances, evolutionary game theory is really irrelevant to
the given explanation.

If evolutionary game theoretic models do not explain the etiology of a social phenomenon,
presumably they explain the persistence of the phenomenon or the normativity attached to it.

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Yet we rarely need an evolutionary game theoretic model to identify a particular social
phenomenon as stable or persistent as that can be done by observation of present conditions
and examination of the historical records; hence the charge of irrelevancy is raised again.
Moreover, most of the evolutionary game theoretic models developed to date have provided
the crudest approximations of the real cultural dynamics driving the social phenomenon in
question. One may well wonder why, in these cases, we should take seriously the stability
analysis given by the model; answering this question would require one engage in an
empirical study as previously discussed, ultimately leading to the charge of irrelevance again.

4.3 The value-ladenness of evolutionary game theoretic explanations

If one seeks to use an evolutionary game theoretic model to explain the normativity attached
to a social rule, one must explain how such an approach avoids committing the so-called
"naturalistic fallacy" of inferring an ought-statement from a conjunction of is-statements. [8]
Assuming that the explanation does not commit such a fallacy, one argument charges that it
must then be the case that the evolutionary game theoretic explanation merely repackages
certain key value claims tacitly assumed in the construction of the model. After all, since any
argument whose conclusion is a normative statement must have at least one normative
statement in the premises, any evolutionary game theoretic argument purporting to show how
certain norms acquire normative force must contain--at least implicitly--a normative statement
in the premises. Consequently, this application of evolutionary game theory does not provide
a neutral analysis of the norm in question, but merely acts as a vehicle for advancing
particular values, namely those smuggled in the premises.

This criticism seems less serious than the charge of irrelevancy. Cultural evolutionary game
theoretic explanations of norms need not "smuggle in" normative claims in order to draw
normative conclusions. The theory already contains, in its core, a proper subtheory having
normative content--namely a theory of rational choice in which boundedly rational agents act
in order to maximize, as best as they can, their own self-interest. One may challenge the
suitability of this as a foundation for the normative content of certain claims, but this is a
different criticism from the above charge. Although cultural evolutionary game theoretic
models do act as vehicles for promulgating certain values, they wear those minimal value
commitments on their sleeve. Evolutionary explanations of social norms have the virtue of
making their value commitments explicit and also of showing how other normative
commitments (such as fair division in certain bargaining situations, or cooperation in the
prisoner's dilemma) may be derived from the principled action of boundedly rational, self-
interested agents.

Bibliography
The following bibliography, although it tries to be comprehensive, is by no means complete.
If you are aware of articles, books, monographs, etc. which you believe should be included,
but are not, please notify the author.

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 Alexander, J. McKenzie (2000) "Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice," Philosophy
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 Alexander, Jason and Brian Skyrms (1999) "Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?"
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TYPES OF GAMES
Cooperative or non-cooperative

A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance the
legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. In noncooperative games this is not
possible.

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Often it is assumed that communication among players is allowed in cooperative games, but
not in noncooperative ones. This classification on two binary criteria has been rejected
(Harsanyi 1974).

Of the two types of games, noncooperative games are able to model situations to the finest
details, producing accurate results. Cooperative games focus on the game at large.
Considerable efforts have been made to link the two approaches. The so-called Nash-
programme has already established many of the cooperative solutions as noncooperative
equilibria.

Hybrid games contain cooperative and non-cooperative elements. For instance, coalitions of
players are formed in a cooperative game, but these play in a non-cooperative fashion.

Symmetric and asymmetric

A symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend only
on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them. If the identities of the players
can be changed without changing the payoff to the
E F
strategies, then a game is symmetric. Many of the
commonly studied 2×2 games are symmetric. The
standard representations of chicken, the prisoner's
E 1, 2 0, 0
dilemma, and the stag hunt are all symmetric games.
Some scholars would consider certain asymmetric games F 0, 0 1, 2
as examples of these games as well. However, the most
An asymmetric game
common payoffs for each of these games are symmetric.
Most commonly studied asymmetric games are games where there are not identical strategy
sets for both players. For instance, the ultimatum game and similarly the dictator game have
different strategies for each player. It is possible, however, for a game to have identical
strategies for both players, yet be asymmetric. For example, the game pictured to the right is
asymmetric despite having identical strategy sets for both players.

Zero sum and non-zero sum

Zero sum games are a special case of constant sum games, A B

in which choices by players can neither increase nor
decrease the available resources. In zero-sum games the A –1, 1 3, –3
total benefit to all players in the game, for every
combination of strategies, always adds to zero (more B 0, 0 –2, 2
informally, a player benefits only at the equal expense of
others). Poker exemplifies a zero-sum game (ignoring the A zero-sum game
possibility of the house's cut), because one wins exactly
the amount one's opponents lose. Other zero sum games include matching pennies and most
classical board games including Go and chess.

Many games studied by game theorists (including the famous prisoner's dilemma) are non-
zero-sum games, because some outcomes have net results greater or less than zero.
Informally, in non-zero-sum games, a gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with
a loss by another.

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Constant sum games correspond to activities like theft and gambling, but not to the
fundamental economic situation in which there are potential gains from trade. It is possible to
transform any game into a (possibly asymmetric) zero-sum game by adding an additional
dummy player (often called "the board"), whose losses compensate the players' net winnings.

Simultaneous and sequential

Simultaneous games are games where both players move simultaneously, or if they do not
move simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the earlier players' actions (making
them effectively simultaneous). Sequential games (or dynamic games) are games where later
players have some knowledge about earlier actions. This need not be perfect information
about every action of earlier players; it might be very little knowledge. For instance, a player
may know that an earlier player did not perform one particular action, while he does not know
which of the other available actions the first player actually performed.

The difference between simultaneous and sequential games is captured in the different
representations discussed above. Often, normal form is used to represent simultaneous games,
and extensive form is used to represent sequential ones; although this isn't a strict rule in a
technical sense.

Perfect information and imperfect information

A game of imperfect information

(the dotted line represents ignorance on the part of player 2)

An important subset of sequential games consists of games of perfect information. A game is

one of perfect information if all players know the moves previously made by all other players.
Thus, only sequential games can be games of perfect information, since in simultaneous
games not every player knows the actions of the others. Most games studied in game theory
are imperfect information games, although there are some interesting examples of perfect
information games, including the ultimatum game and centipede game. Perfect information
games include also chess, go, mancala, and arimaa.

Perfect information is often confused with complete information, which is a similar concept.
Complete information requires that every player know the strategies and payoffs of the other
players but not necessarily the actions.

Infinitely long games

Games, as studied by economists and real-world game players, are generally finished in a
finite number of moves. Pure mathematicians are not so constrained, and set theorists in
particular study games that last for an infinite number of moves, with the winner (or other
payoff) not known until after all those moves are completed.

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The focus of attention is usually not so much on what is the best way to play such a game, but
simply on whether one or the other player has a winning strategy. (It can be proven, using the
axiom of choice, that there are games—even with perfect information, and where the only
outcomes are "win" or "lose"—for which neither player has a winning strategy.) The
existence of such strategies, for cleverly designed games, has important consequences in
descriptive set theory.

Discrete and continuous games

Much of game theory is concerned with finite, discrete games, that have a finite number of
players, moves, events, outcomes, etc. Many concepts can be extended, however. Continuous
games allow players to choose a strategy from a continuous strategy set. For instance,
Cournot competition is typically modeled with players' strategies being any non-negative
quantities, including fractional quantities.

Differential games such as the continuous pursuit and evasion game are continuous games.

Metagames

These are games the play of which is the development of the rules for another game, the target
or subject game. Metagames seek to maximize the utility value of the rule set developed. The
theory of metagames is related to mechanism design theory.

History
The first known discussion of game theory occurred in a letter written by James Waldegrave
in 1713. In this letter, Waldegrave provides a minimax mixed strategy solution to a two-person
version of the card game le Her. It was not until the publication of Antoine Augustin
Cournot's Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses
(Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth) in 1838 that a general
game theoretic analysis was pursued. In this work Cournot considers a duopoly and presents a
solution that is a restricted version of the Nash equilibrium.

Although Cournot's analysis is more general than Waldegrave's, game theory did not really
exist as a unique field until John von Neumann published a series of papers in 1928. While
the French mathematician Émile Borel did some earlier work on games, Von Neumann can
rightfully be credited as the inventor of game theory. Von Neumann was a brilliant
mathematician whose work was far-reaching from set theory to his calculations that were key
to development of both the Atom and Hydrogen bombs and finally to his work developing
computers. Von Neumann's work in game theory culminated in the 1944 book Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. This profound
work contains the method for finding mutually consistent solutions for two-person zero-sum
games. During this time period, work on game theory was primarily focused on cooperative
game theory, which analyzes optimal strategies for groups of individuals, presuming that they
can enforce agreements between them about proper strategies.

In 1950, the first discussion of the prisoner's dilemma appeared, and an experiment was
undertaken on this game at the RAND corporation. Around this same time, John Nash
developed a criterion for mutual consistency of players' strategies, known as Nash

90
equilibrium, applicable to a wider variety of games than the criterion proposed by von
Neumann and Morgenstern. This equilibrium is sufficiently general, allowing for the analysis
of non-cooperative games in addition to cooperative ones.

Game theory experienced a flurry of activity in the 1950s, during which time the concepts of
the core, the extensive form game, fictitious play, repeated games, and the Shapley value were
developed. In addition, the first applications of Game theory to philosophy and political
science occurred during this time.

In 1965, Reinhard Selten introduced his solution concept of subgame perfect equilibria,
which further refined the Nash equilibrium (later he would introduce trembling hand
perfection as well). In 1967, John Harsanyi developed the concepts of complete information
and Bayesian games. Nash, Selten and Harsanyi became Economics Nobel Laureates in 1994
for their contributions to economic game theory.

In the 1970s, game theory was extensively applied in biology, largely as a result of the work
of John Maynard Smith and his evolutionarily stable strategy. In addition, the concepts of
correlated equilibrium, trembling hand perfection, and common knowledge[10] were introduced
and analysed.

In 2005, game theorists Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann followed Nash, Selten and
Harsanyi as Nobel Laureates. Schelling worked on dynamic models, early examples of
evolutionary game theory. Aumann contributed more to the equilibrium school, introducing
an equilibrium coarsening, correlated equilibrium, and developing an extensive formal
analysis of the assumption of common knowledge and of its consequences.

In 2007, Roger Myerson, together with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin, was awarded of the
Nobel Prize in Economics "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory."
Among his contributions, is also the notion of proper equilibrium, and an important graduate
text: Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict (Myerson 1997).

Notes
1. ^ Ross, Don. "Game Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2008
Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved on 2008-08-21.
2. ^ Experimental work in game theory goes by many names, experimental economics,
behavioral economics, and behavioural game theory are several. For a recent discussion on
this field see Camerer (2003).

3. ^ Evolutionary Game Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

4. ^ a b Biological Altruism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

5. ^ E. Ullmann Margalit, The Emergence of Norms, Oxford University Press, 1977. C.

Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge
University Press, 2006.

6. ^ "Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge ",

Erkenntnis 30, 1989: 69-85. See also Rationality and Coordination, Cambridge University
Press, 1993.

7. ^ The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Harvard University Press, 1990.

91
 8. ^ "Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games." In Cristina Bicchieri,
Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, eds., The Logic of Strategy. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999.

9. ^ For a more detailed discussion of the use of Game Theory in ethics see the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry game theory and ethics.

10. ^ Although common knowledge was first discussed by the philosopher David Lewis in his
dissertation (and later book) Convention in the late 1960s, it was not widely considered by
economists until Robert Aumann's work in the 1970s.

Textbooks and general references

 Aumann, Robert J. (1987), "game theory,", The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2,
pp. 460–82.

 _____ (2008). "game theory," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition.
Abstract.

 Dutta, Prajit K. (1999), Strategies and games: theory and practice, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-
262-04169-0. Suitable for undergraduate and business students.

 Fernandez, L F.; Bierman, H S. (1998), Game theory with economic applications, Addison-
Wesley, ISBN 978-0-201-84758-1. Suitable for upper-level undergraduates.

 Fudenberg, Drew; Tirole, Jean (1991), Game theory, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-06141-4.
Acclaimed reference text, public description.

 Gibbons, Robert D. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press,
ISBN 978-0-691-00395-5. Suitable for advanced undergraduates.

 Published in Europe as A Primer in Game Theory, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf,

ISBN 978-0-7450-1159-2.

 Gintis, Herbert (2000), Game theory evolving: a problem-centered introduction to modeling

strategic behavior, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-00943-8

 Green, Jerry R.; Mas-Colell, Andreu; Whinston, Michael D. (1995), Microeconomic theory,
Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-507340-9. Presents game theory in formal way
suitable for graduate level.

 Gul, Faruk (2008). "behavioural economics and game theory," The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.

 Hansen, Pelle G.; Hendricks, Vincent F., eds., Game Theory: 5 Questions, New York, London:
Automatic Press / VIP, ISBN 9788799101344. Snippets from interviews.

 Isaacs, Rufus, Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory With Applications to Warfare and
Pursuit, Control and Optimization, New York: Dover Publications, ISBN 978-0-486-40682-4

 Miller, James H. (2003), Game theory at work: how to use game theory to outthink and
outmaneuver your competition, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 978-0-07-140020-6. Suitable
for a general audience.

92
  Myerson, Roger B. (1997), Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, ISBN
978-0-674-34116-6

 Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An introduction to game theory, Oxford University Press, ISBN
978-0-19-512895-6. Undergraduate textbook.

 Poundstone, William (1992), Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory and the
Puzzle of the Bomb, Anchor, ISBN 978-0-385-41580-4. A general history of game theory and
game theoreticians.

 Rasmusen, Eric (2006), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (4th ed.),
Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 978-1-4051-3666-2, http://www.rasmusen.org/GI/index.html

 Rubinstein, Ariel; Osborne, Martin J. (1994), A course in game theory, MIT Press, ISBN 978-
0-262-65040-3. A modern introduction at the graduate level.

 Williams, John Davis (1954), The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of
Games of Strategy, Santa Monica: RAND Corp.,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/2007/RAND_CB113-1.pdf Praised primer and
popular introduction for everybody, never out of print.

Historically important texts

 Aumann, R.J. and Shapley, L.S. (1974), Values of Non-Atomic Games, Princeton University
Press

 Cournot, A. Augustin (1838), "Recherches sur les principles mathematiques de la théorie des
richesses", Libraire des sciences politiques et sociales (Paris: M. Rivière & C.ie)

 Edgeworth, Francis Y. (1881), Mathematical Psychics, London: Kegan Paul

 Fisher, Ronald (1930), The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford: Clarendon Press

 reprinted edition: The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection: A Complete Variorum

Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 978-0-19-850440-5

 Luce, R. Duncan; Raiffa, Howard (1957), Games and decisions: introduction and critical
survey, New York: Wiley

 reprinted edition: Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey, New York:
Dover Publications, 1989, ISBN 978-0-486-65943-5

 Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press,
ISBN 978-0-521-28884-2

 Nash, John (1950), "Equilibrium points in n-person games", Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36 (1): 48–49, ISSN 0027-8424,
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/search?
sendit=Search&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage=&DOI=&author1=nash&author2=&title
=equilibrium&andorexacttitle=and&titleabstract=&andorexacttitleabs=and&fulltext=&andore
xactfulltext=and&fmonth=Jan&fyear=1915&tmonth=Feb&tyear=2008&fdatedef=15+January
+1915&tdatedef=6+February+2008&tocsectionid=all&RESULTFORMAT=1&hits=10&hitsb
rief=25&sortspec=relevance&sortspecbrief=relevance

93
  Shapley, L.S. (1953), A Value for n-person Games, In: Contributions to the Theory of Games
volume II, H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds.)

 Shapley, L.S. (1953), Stochastic Games, Proceedings of National Academy of Science Vol. 39,
pp. 1095-1100.

 von Neumann, John (1928), "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftspiele", Mathematische Annalen
100 (1): 295–320, ISSN 0025-5831, http://www.digizeitschriften.de/home/services/pdfterms/?
ID=363311

 von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (1944), Theory of games and economic behavior,
Princeton University Press

 Zermelo, Ernst (1913), "Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des
Schachspiels", Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians 2: 501–4

Websites

 Paul Walker: History of Game Theory Page.

 David Levine: Game Theory. Papers, Lecture Notes and much more stuff.

 Alvin Roth: Game Theory and Experimental Economics page - Comprehensive list of links to
game theory information on the Web

 Adam Kalai: Game Theory and Computer Science - Lecture notes on Game Theory and
Computer Science

 Mike Shor: Game Theory .net - Lecture notes, interactive illustrations and other information.

 Jim Ratliff's Graduate Course in Game Theory (lecture notes).

 Valentin Robu's software tool for simulation of bilateral negotiation (bargaining)

 Don Ross: Review Of Game Theory in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

 Bruno Verbeek and Christopher Morris: Game Theory and Ethics

 Chris Yiu's Game Theory Lounge

 Elmer G. Wiens: Game Theory - Introduction, worked examples, play online two-person zero-
sum games.

 Marek M. Kaminski: Game Theory and Politics - syllabuses and lecture notes for game theory
and political science.

 Web sites on game theory and social interactions

 Kesten Green's Conflict Forecasting - See Papers for evidence on the accuracy of forecasts
from game theory and other methods.

 McKelvey, Richard D., McLennan, Andrew M., and Turocy, Theodore L. (2007) Gambit:
Software Tools for Game Theory.

Nash equilibrium

94
In game theory, Nash equilibrium
(named after John Forbes Nash, who
proposed it) is a solution concept of a
game involving two or more players,
in which each player is assumed to
know the equilibrium strategies
of the other players, and no
player has anything to gain by
changing only his or her own strategy
(i.e., by changing unilaterally). If each
player has chosen a strategy and no
player can benefit by changing his or
her strategy while the other players
keep theirs unchanged, then the
current set of strategy choices and
the corresponding payoffs constitute a
Nash equilibrium. In other words, to be
in a Nash equilibrium, each
player must answer negatively to the question: "Knowing the strategies of the other players,
and treating the strategies of the other players as set in stone, can I benefit by changing my
strategy?"

Stated simply, Amy and Bill are in Nash equilibrium if Amy is making the best decision she
can, taking into account Bill's decision, and Bill is making the best decision he can, taking
into account Amy's decision. Likewise, many players are in Nash equilibrium if each one is
making the best decision that they can, taking into account the decisions of the others.
However, Nash equilibrium does not necessarily mean the best cumulative payoff for all the
players involved; in many cases all the players might improve their payoffs if they could
somehow agree on strategies different from the Nash equilibrium (e.g. competing
businessmen forming a cartel in order to increase their profits).

History
The concept of the Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies was first developed by Antoine
Augustin Cournot in his theory of oligopoly (1838). Firms choose a quantity of output to
maximize their own profit. However, the best output for one firm depends on the outputs of
others. A Cournot equilibrium occurs when each firm's output maximizes its profits given the
output of the other firms, which is a pure-strategy NE. However, the modern game-theoretic
concept of NE is defined in terms of mixed-strategies, where players choose a probability
distribution over possible actions. The concept of the mixed strategy NE was introduced by
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 book The Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. However, their analysis was restricted to the very special case of zero-
sum games. They showed that a mixed-strategy NE will exist for any zero-sum game with a
finite set of actions. The contribution of John Forbes Nash in his 1951 article Non-

95
Cooperative Games was to define a mixed strategy NE for any game with a finite set of
actions and prove that at least one (mixed strategy) NE must exist.

Definitions
Informal definition

Informally, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player can do better by unilaterally

changing his or her strategy. As a heuristic, one can imagine that each player is told the
strategies of the other players. If any player would want to do something different after being
informed about the others' strategies, then that set of strategies is not a Nash equilibrium. If,
however, the player does not want to switch (or is indifferent between switching and not) then
the set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium.

Each strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response to all other strategies in that
equilibrium.[1]

The Nash equilibrium may sometimes appear non-rational in a third-person perspective. This
is because it may happen that a Nash equilibrium is not pareto optimal.

The Nash equilibrium may also have non-rational consequences in sequential games because
players may "threat"-en each other with non-rational moves. For such games the Subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium may be more meaningful as a tool of analysis.

Formal definition

Let (S, f) be a game, where Si is the strategy set for player i, S=S1 X S2 ... X Sn is the set of
strategy profiles and f=(f1(x), ..., fn(x)) is the payoff function. Let x − i be a strategy profile of
all players except for player i. When each player i {1, ..., n} chooses strategy xi resulting in
strategy profile x = (x1, ..., xn) then player i obtains payoff fi(x). Note that the payoff depends
on the strategy profile chosen, i.e. on the strategy chosen by player i as well as the strategies
chosen by all the other players. A strategy profile x* S is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no
unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player, that is

A game can have a pure strategy NE or an NE in its mixed extension (that of choosing a pure
strategy stochastically with a fixed frequency). Nash proved that if we allow mixed
strategies, then every n-player game in which every player can choose from finitely many
strategies admits at least one Nash equilibrium.

When the inequality above holds strictly (with > instead of ) for all players and all feasible
alternative strategies, then the equilibrium is classified as a strict Nash equilibrium. If
instead, for some player, there is exact equality between and some other strategy in the set
S, then the equilibrium is classified as a weak Nash equilibrium.

Examples

96
 Competition game

This can be illustrated by a two-

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
player game in which both
chooses chooses chooses chooses players simultaneously choose a
'0' '1' '2' '3' whole number from 0 to 3 and
they both win the smaller of the
Player 1 chooses '0' 0, 0 2, -2 2, -2 2, -2 two numbers in points. In
addition, if one player chooses a
larger number than the other, then
Player 1 chooses '1' -2, 2 1, 1 3, -1 3, -1
he/she has to give up two points
to the other. This game has a
Player 1 chooses '2' -2, 2 -1, 3 2, 2 4, 0 unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium: both players
Player 1 chooses '3' -2, 2 -1, 3 0, 4 3, 3 choosing 0 (highlighted in light
red). Any other choice of
strategies can be improved if one
A competition game of the players lowers his number
to one less than the other player's
number. In the table to the left, for
example, when starting at the green square it is in player 1's interest to move to the purple
square by choosing a smaller number, and it is in player 2's interest to move to the blue square
by choosing a smaller number. If the game is modified so that the two players win the named
amount if they both choose the same number, and otherwise win nothing, then there are 4
Nash equilibria (0,0...1,1...2,2...and 3,3).

Coordination game

Player 2 Player 2
The coordination game is a classic adopts adopts
(symmetric) two player, two strategy strategy 1 strategy 2
game, with the payoff matrix shown to
the right, where the payoffs satisfy A>C Player 1 adopts strategy 1 A, A B, C
and D>B. The players should thus
coordinate, either on A or on D, to
receive a high payoff. If the players' Player 1 adopts strategy 2 C, B D, D
choices do not coincide, a lower payoff is
A coordination game
97
rewarded. An example of a coordination game is the setting where two technologies are
available to two firms with compatible products, and they have to elect a strategy to become
the market standard. If both firms agree on the chosen technology, high sales are expected for
both firms. If the firms do not agree on the standard technology, few sales result. Both
strategies are Nash equilibria of the game.

Driving on a road, and having to choose either to drive on the left or to drive on the right of
the road, is also a coordination game. For example, with payoffs 100 meaning no crash and 0
meaning a crash, the coordination game can be defined with the following payoff matrix:

In this case there are two pure

Drive on the Lef Drive on the Right
strategy Nash equilibria, when both
choose to either drive on the left or
Drive on the Lef 100, 100 0, 0 on the right. If we admit mixed
strategies (where a pure strategy is
Drive on the Right 0, 0 100, 100 chosen at random, subject to some
fixed probability), then there are
three Nash equilibria for the same
The driving game case: two we have seen from the
pure-strategy form, where the
probabilities are (0%,100%) for
player one, (0%, 100%) for player two; and (100%, 0%) for player one, (100%, 0%) for
player two respectively. We add another where the probabilities for each player is (50%,
50%).

Prisoner's dilemma

(note differences in the orientation of the payoff matrix)

The Prisoner's Dilemma has the same payoff matrix as depicted for the Coordination Game,
but now C > A > D > B. Because C > A and D > B, each player improves his situation by
switching from strategy #1 to strategy #2, no matter what the other player decides. The
Prisoner's Dilemma thus has a single Nash Equilibrium: both players choosing strategy #2
("betraying"). What has long made this an interesting case to study is the fact that D < A (ie.,
"both betray" is globally inferior to "both remain loyal"). The globally optimal strategy is
unstable; it is not an equilibrium.

Nash equilibria in a payoff matrix

There is an easy numerical way to identify Nash Equilibria on a Payoff Matrix. It is especially
helpful in two-person games where players have more than two strategies. In this case formal
analysis may become too long. This rule does not apply to the case where mixed (stochastic)
strategies are of interest. The rule goes as follows: if the first payoff number, in the duplet of
the cell, is the maximum of the column of the cell and if the second number is the maximum
of the row of the cell - then the cell represents a Nash equilibrium.

We can apply this rule to a 3x3 matrix:

98
 Using the rule, we can very quickly (much faster
Option A Option B Option C
than with formal analysis) see that the Nash
Equlibria cells are (B,A), (A,B), and (C,C). Indeed,
Option A 0, 0 25, 40 5, 10 for cell (B,A) 40 is the maximum of the first
column and 25 is the maximum of the second row.
Option B 40, 25 0, 0 5, 15 For (A,B) 25 is the maximum of the second
column and 40 is the maximum of the first row.
Same for cell (C,C). For other cells, either one or
Option C 10, 5 15, 5 10, 10 both of the duplet members are not the maximum
of the corresponding rows and columns.
A Payoff Matrix
This said, the actual mechanics of finding
equilibrium cells is obvious: find the maximum of
a column and check if the second member of the pair is the maximum of the row. If these
conditions are met, the cell represents a Nash Equilibrium. Check all columns this way to find
all NE cells. An NxN matrix may have between 0 and NxN pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Network traffic

99
 Sample network graph.

Values on edges are the travel time experienced by a 'car' travelling down that edge. X is the number
of cars travelling via that edge.

An extension of Nash equilibria is in determining the expected flow of traffic in a network.

Consider the graph on the right. If we assume that there are n "cars" traveling from A to D,
what is the expected distribution of traffic in the network?

This situation can be modeled as a "game" where every traveler has a choice of 3 strategies,
where each strategy is a route from A to D (either ABD, ABCD, or ACD). The "payoff" of
each strategy is the travel time of each route. In the graph on the right, a car travelling via
ABD experiences travel time of (1 + x / 100 + 2, where x is the number of cars traveling on
edge AB. Thus, payoffs for any given strategy depend on the choices of the other players, as is
usual. However, the goal in this case is to minimize travel time, not maximize it. Equilibrium
will occur when the time on all paths is exactly the same. When that happens, no single driver
has any incentive to switch routes, since it can only add to his/her travel time. For the graph
on the right, if, for example, 100 cars are travelling from A to D, then equilibrium will occur
when 25 drivers travel via ABD, 50 via ABCD, and 25 via ACD. Every driver now has a total
travel time of 3.75.

Notice that this distribution is not, actually, socially optimal. If the 100 cars agreed that 50
travel via ABD and the other 50 through ACD, then travel time for any single car would
actually be 3.5, which is less than 3.75.

Stability
The concept of stability, useful in the analysis of many kinds of equilibrium, can also be
applied to Nash equilibria.

A Nash equilibrium for a mixed strategy game is stable if a small change (specifically, an
infinitesimal change) in probabilities for one player leads to a situation where two conditions
hold:

1. the player who did not change has no better strategy in the new circumstance

100
 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy

If these cases are both met, then a player with the small change in his mixed-strategy will
return immediately to the Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is said to be stable. If condition
one does not hold then the equilibrium is unstable. If only condition one holds then there are
likely to be an infinite number of optimal strategies for the player who changed. John Nash
showed that the latter situation could not arise in a range of well-defined games.

In the "driving game" example above there are both stable and unstable equilibria. The
equilibria involving mixed-strategies with 100% probabilities are stable. If either player
changes his probabilities slightly, they will be both at a disadvantage, and his opponent will
have no reason to change his strategy in turn. The (50%,50%) equilibrium is unstable. If
either player changes his probabilities, then the other player immediately has a better strategy
at either (0%, 100%) or (100%, 0%).

Stability is crucial in practical applications of Nash equilibria, since the mixed-strategy of

each player is not perfectly known, but has to be inferred from statistical distribution of his
actions in the game. In this case unstable equilibria are very unlikely to arise in practice, since
any minute change in the proportions of each strategy seen will lead to a change in strategy
and the breakdown of the equilibrium.

A Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) (similar to a Strong Nash Equilibrium) occurs

when players cannot do better even if they are allowed to communicate and collaborate before
the game. Every correlated strategy supported by iterated strict dominance and on the Pareto
frontier is a CPNE[2]. Further, it is possible for a game to have a Nash equilibrium that is
resilient against coalitions less than a specified size, k. CPNE is related to the theory of the
core.

Occurrence
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium and is played among players under certain
conditions, then the NE strategy set will be adopted. Sufficient conditions to guarantee that
the Nash equilibrium is played are:

1. The players all will do their utmost to maximize their expected payoff as described by the
game.
2. The players are flawless in execution.

3. The players have sufficient intelligence to deduce the solution.

4. The players know the planned equilibrium strategy of all of the other players.

5. The players believe that a deviation in their own strategy will not cause deviations by any
other players.

6. There is common knowledge that all players meet these conditions, including this one. So,
not only must each player know the other players meet the conditions, but also they must
know that they all know that they meet them, and know that they know that they know that
they meet them, and so on.

Where the conditions are not met

101
Examples of game theory problems in which these conditions are not met:

1. The first condition is not met if the game does not correctly describe the quantities a player
wishes to maximize. In this case there is no particular reason for that player to adopt an
equilibrium strategy. For instance, the prisoner’s dilemma is not a dilemma if either player is
happy to be jailed indefinitely.
2. Intentional or accidental imperfection in execution. For example, a computer capable of
flawless logical play facing a second flawless computer will result in equilibrium. Introduction
of imperfection will lead to its disruption either through loss to the player who makes the
mistake, or through negation of the 4th 'common knowledge' criterion leading to possible
victory for the player. (An example would be a player suddenly putting the car into reverse in
the game of 'chicken', ensuring a no-loss no-win scenario).

3. In many cases, the third condition is not met because, even though the equilibrium must
exist, it is unknown due to the complexity of the game, for instance in Chinese chess.[3] Or, if
known, it may not be known to all players, as when playing tic-tac-toe with a small child who
desperately wants to win (meeting the other criteria).

4. The fourth criterion of common knowledge may not be met even if all players do, in fact,
meet all the other criteria. Players wrongly distrusting each other's rationality may adopt
counter-strategies to expected irrational play on their opponents’ behalf. This is a major
consideration in “Chicken” or an arms race, for example.

Where the conditions are met

Due to the limited conditions in which NE can actually be observed, they are rarely treated as
a guide to day-to-day behaviour, or observed in practice in human negotiations. However, as a
theoretical concept in economics, and evolutionary biology the NE has explanatory power.
The payoff in economics is money, and in evolutionary biology gene transmission, both are
the fundamental bottom line of survival. Researchers who apply games theory in these fields
claim that agents failing to maximize these for whatever reason will be competed out of the
market or environment, which are ascribed the ability to test all strategies. This conclusion is
drawn from the "stability" theory above. In these situations the assumption that the strategy
observed is actually a NE has often been borne out by research.

102
 NE and non-credible threats

Extensive and Normal form illustrations

that show the difference between SPNE and other NE.

The blue equilibrium is not subgame perfect

because player two makes a non-credible threat at 2(2) to be unkind (U ).

The nash equilibrium is a superset of the subgame perfect nash equilibrium. The subgame
perfect equilibrium in addition to the Nash Equilibrium requires that the strategy also is a
Nash equilibrium in every subgame of that game. This eliminates all non-credible threats, that
is, strategies that contain non-rational moves in order to make the counter-player change his
strategy.The image to the right shows a simple sequential game that illustrates the issue with
subgame imperfect Nash equilibria. In this game player one chooses left(L) or right(R), which
is followed by player two being called upon to be kind (K) or unkind (U) to player one,
However, player two only stands to gain from being unkind if player one goes left. If player
one goes right the rational player two would de facto be kind to him in that subgame.
However, The non-credible threat of being unkind at 2(2) is still part of the blue (L, (U,U))
nash equilibrium. Therefore, if rational behavior can be expected by both parties the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium may be a more meaningful solution concept when such dynamic
inconsistencies arise.

Proof of existence
As above, let σ − i be a mixed strategy profile of all players except for player i. We can define a
best response correspondence for player i, bi. bi is a relation from the set of all probability
distributions over opponent player profiles to a set of player i's strategies, such that each
element of

103
 bi(σ − i)

is a best response to σ − i. Define

One can use the Kakutani fixed point theorem to prove that b has a fixed point. That is, there
is a σ * such that . Since b(σ * ) represents the best response for all players to σ
*
, the existence of the fixed point proves that there is some strategy set which is a best
response to itself. No player could do any better by deviating, and it is therefore a Nash
equilibrium.

When Nash made this point to John von Neumann in 1949, von Neumann famously dismissed
it with the words, "That's trivial, you know. That's just a fixed point theorem." (See Nasar,
1998, p. 94.)

Alternate proof using the

Brouwer fixed point theorem

We have a game G = (N,A,u) where N is the number of players and

is the action set for the players. All of the actions sets Ai are finite. Let
denote the set of mixed strategies for the players. The finiteness of
the Ais insures the compactness of Δ.

We can now define the gain functions. For a mixed strategy , we let the gain for
player i on action be

Gaini(σ,a) = max{0,ui(ai,σ − i) − ui(σi,σ − i)}

The gain function represents the benefit a player gets by unilaterally changing his strategy. We
now define where

gi(σ)(a) = σi(a) + Gaini(σ,a)

for .

We see that

We now use g to define as follows.

Let

104
for . It is easy to see that each fi is a valid mixed strategy in Δi. It is also easy to check
that each fi is a continuous function of σ, and hence f is a continuous function. Now Δ is the
cross product of a finite number of compact convex sets, and so we get that Δ is also compact
and convex. Therefore we may apply the Brouwer fixed point theorem to f. So f has a fixed
point in Δ, call it σ * .

I claim that σ * is a Nash Equilibrium in G. For this purpose, it suffices to show that

This simply states the each player gains no benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy which
is exactly the necessary condition for being a Nash Equilibrium.

Now assume that the gains are not all zero. Therefore, , , and such
that Gaini(σ * ,a) > 0. Note then that

So let . Also we shall denote as the gain vector indexed by

actions in Ai. Since f(σ * ) = σ * we clearly have that . Therefore we see that

Since C > 1 we have that is some positive scaling of the vector . Now I
claim that

. To see this, we first note that if Gaini(σ * ,a) > 0 then this is true by definition of
the gain function. Now assume that Gaini(σ * ,a) = 0. By our previous statements we have that

and so the left term is zero, giving us that the entire expression is 0 as needed.

So we finally have that

105
where the last inequality follows since is a non-zero vector. But this is a clear
contradiction, so all the gains must indeed be zero. Therefore σ * is a Nash Equilibrium for G
as needed.

Computing Nash equilibria

If a player A has a dominant strategy sA then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which A plays
sA. In the case of two players A and B, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which A plays sA and
B plays a best response to sA. If sA is a strictly dominant strategy, A plays sA in all Nash
equilibria. If both A and B have strictly dominant strategies, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in which each plays his strictly dominant strategy.

In games with mixed strategy Nash equilibria, the probability of a player choosing any
particular strategy can be computed by assigning a variable to each strategy that represents a
fixed probability for choosing that strategy. In order for a player to be willing to randomize,
his expected payoff for each strategy should be the same. In addition, the sum of the
probabilities for each strategy of a particular player should be 1. This creates a system of
equations from which the probabilities of choosing each strategy can be derived.[1]

Examples

In the matching pennies game, player A Player A plays H Player A plays T

loses a point to B if A and B play the
same strategy and wins a point from B
if they play different strategies. To Player B plays H -1, +1 +1, -1
compute the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium, assign A the probability p Player B plays T +1, -1 -1, +1
of playing H and (1-p) of playing T, and
assign B the probability q of playing H
and (1-q) of playing T. Matching pennies

106
E[payoff for A playing H] = (-1)q + (+1)(1-q) = 1-2q
E[payoff for A playing T] = (+1)q + (-1)(1-q) = 2q-1
E[payoff for A playing H] = E[payoff for A playing T] ⇒ 1-2q = 2q-1 ⇒ q = 1/2

E[payoff for B playing H] = (+1)p + (-1)(1-p) = 2p-1

E[payoff for B playing T] = (-1)p + (+1)(1-p) = 1-2p
E[payoff for B playing H] = E[payoff for B playing T] ⇒ 2p-1 = 1-2p ⇒ p = 1/2

Thus a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game is for each player to randomly choose H
or T with equal probability.

References
Game Theory textbooks

 Dutta, Prajit K. (1999), Strategies and games: theory and practice, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-
04169-0. Suitable for undergraduate and business students.

 Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991) Game Theory MIT Press.

 Morgenstern, Oskar and John von Neumann (1947) The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior Princeton University Press

 Myerson, Roger B. (1997), Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, ISBN
978-0-674-34116-6

 Rubinstein, Ariel; Osborne, Martin J. (1994), A course in game theory, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-
262-65040-3. A modern introduction at the graduate level.

Original Papers

 Nash, John (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games" Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 36(1):48-49.
 Nash, John (1951) "Non-Cooperative Games" The Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286-295.

Other References

 Mehlmann, A. The Game's Afoot! Game Theory in Myth and Paradox, American
Mathematical Society (2000).

 Nasar, Sylvia (1998), "A Beautiful Mind", Simon and Schuster, Inc.

Notes
1. ^ a b von Ahn, Luis. "Preliminaries of Game Theory". Retrieved on 2008-11-07.
2. ^ D. Moreno, J. Wooders (1996). "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium". Games and Economic
Behavior 17: 80–112. doi:10.1006/game.1996.0095.

107
 3. ^ Nash proved that a perfect NE exists for this type of finite extensive form game – it can be
represented as a strategy complying with his original conditions for a game with a NE. Such
games may not have unique NE, but at least one of the many equilibrium strategies would be
played by hypothetical players having perfect knowledge of all 10 150 game trees

XIV. List of games in game theory

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Game theory studies strategic interaction between individuals in situations called games. Classes of
these games have been given names. This is a list of the most commonly studied games.

Explanation of features
Games can have several features, a few of the most common are listed here.

 Number of Players: Each person who makes a choice in a game or who receives a
payoff from the outcome of those choices is a player.
 Strategies per player: In a game each player chooses from a set of possible actions,
known as strategies. If the number is the same for all players, it is listed here.
 Number of pure strategy Nash equilibria: A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
which represents mutual best responses to the other strategies. In other words, if every
player is playing their part of a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to
unilaterally change his or her strategy. Considering only situations where players play
a single strategy without randomizing (a pure strategy) a game can have any number
of Nash equilibria.
 Sequential game: A game is sequential if one player performs her actions after
another, otherwise the game is a simultaneous move game.
 Perfect information: A game has perfect information if it is a sequential game and
every player knows the strategies chosen by the players who preceded them.
 Constant sum: A game is constant sum if the sum of the payoffs to every player are
the same for every set of strategies. In these games one player gains if and only if
another player loses.

108
 List of games

Number of
pure Constant
Strategies Perfect
Game Players strategy Sequential sum (e.g.
per player information
Nash Zero sum)
equilibria

BATTLE OF THE
2 2 2 No No No
SEXES

CAKE CUTTING infinite infinite variable[1] No Yes Yes

CENTIPEDE
2 variable 1 Yes Yes No
GAME

CHICKEN (AKA
2 2 2 No No No
HAWK-DOVE)

COORDINATION
N variable >2 No No No
GAME

COURNOT GAME 2 infinite[2] 1 No No No

DEADLOCK 2 2 1 No No No

DICTATOR GAME 2 infinite[2] 1 N/A[3] N/A[3] Yes

DINER'S
N 2 1 No No No
DILEMMA

DOLLAR
2 2 0 Yes Yes No
AUCTION

109
EL FAROL BAR N 2 variable No No No

GUESS 2/3 OF
N infinite 1 No No Yes
THE AVERAGE

KUHN POKER 2 12 & 4 0 Yes No Yes

MATCHING
2 2 0 No No Yes
PENNIES

MINORITY
N 2 variable No No No
GAME

NASH
BARGAINING 2 infinite[2] infinite[2] No No No
GAME

PIRATE GAME N infinite[2] infinite[2] Yes Yes Yes

PRISONER'S
2 2 1 No No No
DILEMMA

ROCK, PAPER,
2 3 0 No No Yes
SCISSORS

SCREENING
N variable variable Yes No No
GAME

SIGNALING
N variable variable Yes No No
GAME

STAG HUNT 2 2 2 No No No

TRUST GAME 2 infinite 1 Yes Yes No

110
WAR OF
2 2 0 No No No
ATTRITION

ULTIMATUM
2 infinite[2] infinite[2] Yes Yes No
GAME

PRINCESS AND
2 infinite 0 No No Yes
MONSTER GAME

Notes
1. ^ For the cake cutting problem, there is a simple solution if the object to be divided is
homogenous; one person cuts, the other choses who gets which piece (continued for
each player). With a non-homogenous object, such as a half chocolate/half vanilla
cake or a patch of land with a single source of water, the solutions are far more
complex.
2. ^ a b c d e f g h There may be finite strategies depending on how goods are divisible.
3. ^ a b Since the dictator game only involves one player actually choosing a strategy (the
other does nothing), it cannot really be classified as sequential or perfect information.

References
 Arthur, W. Brian “Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality”, American
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 84,406-411, 1994.
 Bolton, Katok, Zwick 1998, "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of
kindness" International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 27, Number 2
 Gibbons, Robert (1992) A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf
 Glance, Huberman. (1994) "The dynamics of social dilemmas." Scientific American.
 H. W. Kuhn, Simplified Two-Person Poker; in H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (editors),
Contributions to the Theory of Games, volume 1, pages 97-103, Princeton University
Press, 1950.
 Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994).
 McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey (1992) "An experimental study of the centipede game,"
Econometrica 60(4), 803-836.
 Nash, John (1950) "The Bargaining Problem" Econometrica 18: 155-162.
 Ochs, J. and A.E. Roth (1989) "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining"
American Economic Review 79: 355-384.
111
  Rapoport, A. (1966) The game of chicken, American Behavioral Scientist 10: 10-14.
 Rasmussen, Eric: Games and Information, 2004
 Shor, Mikhael. "Battle of the sexes". GameTheory.net. Retrieved on September 30,
2006.
 Shor, Mikhael. "Deadlock". GameTheory.net. Retrieved on September 30, 2006.
 Shor, Mikhael. "Matching Pennies". GameTheory.net. Retrieved on September 30,
2006.
 Shor, Mikhael. "Prisoner's Dilemma". GameTheory.net. Retrieved on September 30,
2006.
 Shubik, Martin "The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior
and Escalation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 1, 1971, 109-111.
 Sinervo, B., and Lively, C. (1996). "The Rock-Paper-Scissors Game and the evolution
of alternative male strategies". Nature Vol.380, pp.240-243
 Skyrms, Brian. (2003) The stag hunt and Evolution of Social Structure Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Battle of the Sexes

A husband and wife agree to meet this evening, but cannot recall if
they will be attending the opera or a boxing match. He prefers the
boxing match and she prefers the opera, though both prefer being
together to being apart. Thus, while both parties prefer to find
themselves at the same place, the husband and wife cannot agree
which event to attend. This is an example of a coordination game.
When expressed in the normal form, it becomes evident that there
are two pure strategy (and one mixed strategy) equilibria.

updated: 15 August 2005

112
 Battle of the sexes
(game theory)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Opera Football Opera Football

The Battle of the
Sexes is a two-player
Opera 3,2 0,0 Opera 3,2 1,1
coordination game
used in game theory. Football 0,0 2,3 Football 0,0 2,3
Imagine a couple.
Battle of the Sexes 1 Battle of the Sexes 2
The husband would
most of all like to go
to the football game. The wife would like to go to the opera. Both would prefer to go to the
same place rather than different ones. If they cannot communicate, where should they go?

The payoff matrix labeled "Battle of the Sexes (1)" is an example of Battle of the Sexes,
where the wife chooses a row and the husband chooses a column.

This representation does not account for the additional harm that might come from going to
different locations and going to the wrong one (i.e. he goes to the opera while she goes to the
football game, satisfying neither). In order to account for this, the game is sometimes
represented as in "Battle of the Sexes (2)".

This second representation bears some similarity to the Game of chicken.

Equilibrium analysis
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where both go to the opera and another
where both go to the football game. For the first game, there is also a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, where the players go to their preferred event more often than the other. For
the payoffs listed above, each player attends their preferred event with probability 3/5.

This presents an interesting case for game theory since each of the Nash equilibria is deficient
in some way. The two pure strategy Nash equilibria are unfair; one player consistently does
better than the other. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (when it exists) is inefficient. The
players will miscoordinate with probability 13/25, leaving each player with an expected return

113
of 6/5 (less than the return one would receive from constantly going to one's less favored
event).

One possible resolution of the difficulty involves the use of a correlated equilibrium. In its
simplest form, if the players of the game have access to a commonly observed randomizing
device, then they might decide to correlate their strategies in the game based on the outcome
of the device. For example, if the couple could flip a coin before choosing their strategies,
they might agree to correlate their strategies based on the coin flip by, say, choosing football
in the event of heads and opera in the event of tails. Notice that once the results of the coin
flip are revealed neither the husband nor wife have any incentives to alter their proposed
actions – that would result in miscoordination and a lower payoff than simply adhering to the
agreed upon strategies. The result is that perfect coordination is always achieved and, prior to
the coin flip, the expected payoffs for the players are exactly equal.

References
 Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions: An Introduction and Critical Survey,
Wiley & Sons. (see Chapter 5, section 3).
 Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991) Game theory, MIT Press. (see Chapter 1, section 2.4)

XV. Prisoner's Dilemma

A game frequently displayed in television police dramas. Two
partners in crime are separated into separate rooms at the police
station and given a similar deal. If one implicates the other, he may
go free while the other receives a life in prison. If neither implicates
the other, both are given moderate sentences, and if both implicate
the other, the sentences for both are severe. Each player has a
dominant strategy to implicate the other, and thus in equilibrium
each receives a harsh punishment, but both would be better off if
each remained silent. In a repeated or iterated prisoner's dilemma,
cooperation may be sustained through trigger strategies such as tit
for tat.

updated: 15 August 2005

Prisoner's dilemma

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

114
 Will the two prisoners cooperate,
or will both of them betray to lessen their own terms,
ending up with longer ones?

The Prisoner's Dilemma constitutes a problem in game theory. It was originally framed by
Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized
the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the "Prisoner's Dilemma" name
(Poundstone, 1992).

In its "classical" form, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is presented as follows:

Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a
conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same
deal. If one testifies ("defects") for the prosecution against the other and the other
remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-
year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in
jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence.
Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured
that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation.
How should the prisoners act?

If we assume that each player prefers shorter sentences to longer ones, and that each gets no
utility out of lowering the other player's sentence, and that there are no reputation effects from
a player's decision, then the prisoner's dilemma forms a non-zero-sum game in which two
players may each "cooperate" with or "defect" from (i.e., betray) the other player. In this
game, as in all game theory, the only concern of each individual player ("prisoner") is
maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff. The unique
equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution—that is, rational choice leads the
two players to both play defect even though each player's individual reward would be greater
if they both played cooperatively.

In the classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that the
only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. In simpler terms, no matter
what the other player does, one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect.
Since in any situation playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players
will play defect, all things being equal.

In the iterated prisoner's dilemma the game is played repeatedly. Thus each player has an
opportunity to "punish" the other player for previous non-cooperative play. Cooperation may
then arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive to defect is overcome by the threat of
115
punishment, leading to the possibility of a cooperative outcome. So if the game is infinitely
repeated, cooperation may be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium although both players
defecting always remains an equilibrium and there are many other equilibrium outcomes.

In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not strictly matching the
formal criteria of the classic or iterative games; for instance, those in which two entities could gain
important benefits from cooperating or suffer from the failure to do so, but find it merely difficult or
expensive, not necessarily impossible, to coordinate their activities to achieve cooperation.

Strategy for the classical prisoner's dilemma

The classical prisoner's dilemma can be summarized thus:

Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays

Prisoner A: 10 years
Prisoner A Stays Silent Each serves 6 months
Prisoner B: goes free

Prisoner A: goes free

Prisoner A Betrays Each serves 5 years
Prisoner B: 10 years

In this game, regardless of what the opponent chooses, each player always receives a higher
payoff (lesser sentence) by betraying; that is to say that betraying is the strictly dominant
strategy. For instance, Prisoner A can accurately say, "No matter what Prisoner B does, I
personally am better off betraying than staying silent. Therefore, for my own sake, I should
betray." However, if the other player acts similarly, then they both betray and both get a lower
payoff than they would get by staying silent. Rational self-interested decisions result in each
prisoner's being worse off than if each chose to lessen the sentence of the accomplice at the
cost of staying a little longer in jail himself. Hence a seeming dilemma. In game theory, this
demonstrates very elegantly that in a non-zero sum game a Nash Equilibrium need not be a
Pareto optimum.

Generalized form
We can expose the skeleton of the game by stripping it of the prisoner framing device. The
generalized form of the game has been used frequently in experimental economics. The
following rules give a typical realization of the game.

There are two players and a banker. Each player holds a set of two cards: one printed
with the word "Cooperate", the other printed with "Defect" (the standard terminology
for the game). Each player puts one card face-down in front of the banker. By laying
them face down, the possibility of a player knowing the other player's selection in
advance is eliminated (although revealing one's move does not affect the dominance

116
 analysis[1]). At the end of the turn, the banker turns over both cards and gives out the
payments accordingly.

If player 1 (red) defects and player 2 (blue) cooperates, player 1 gets the Temptation to Defect
payoff of 5 points while player 2 receives the Sucker's payoff of 0 points. If both cooperate
they get the Reward for Mutual Cooperation payoff of 3 points each, while if they both defect
they get the Punishment for Mutual Defection payoff of 1 point. The checker board payoff
matrix showing the payoffs is given below.

Example PD payoff matrix

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5

Defect 5, 0 1, 1

In "win-lose" terminology the table looks like this:

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate win-win lose much-win much

Defect win much-lose much lose-lose

These point assignments are given arbitrarily for illustration. It is possible to generalize them, as
follows:

Canonical PD payoff matrix

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate R, R S, T

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 Defect T, S P, P

Where T stands for Temptation to defect, R for Reward for mutual cooperation, P for
Punishment for mutual defection and S for Sucker's payoff. To be defined as Prisoner's
dilemma, the following inequalities must hold:

T>R>P>S

This condition ensures that the equilibrium outcome is defection, but that cooperation Pareto
dominates equilibrium play. In addition to the above condition, if the game is repeatedly
played by two players, the following condition should be added.[2]

2R>T+S

If that condition does not hold, then full cooperation is not necessarily Pareto optimal, as the
players are collectively better off by having each player alternate between cooperate and
defect.

These rules were established by cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter and form the formal
canonical description of a typical game of Prisoner's Dilemma.

A simple special case occurs when the advantage of defection over cooperation is independent
of what the co-player does and cost of the co-players defection is independent of one's own
action, i.e. T+S = P+R.

Human behavior
in the Prisoner's Dilemma
One experiment based on the simple dilemma found that approximately 40% of participants
played "cooperate" (i.e., stayed silent).[3]

The iterated
prisoner's dilemma
If two players play Prisoner's Dilemma more than once in succession, having memory of at
least one previous game, it is called iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Amongst results shown by
Nobel Prize winner Robert Aumann in his 1959 paper, rational players repeatedly interacting
for indefinitely long games can sustain the cooperative outcome. Popular interest in the
iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) was kindled by Robert Axelrod in his book The Evolution of
Cooperation (1984). In this he reports on a tournament he organized in which participants
have to choose their mutual strategy again and again, and have memory of their previous

118
encounters. Axelrod invited academic colleagues all over the world to devise computer
strategies to compete in an IPD tournament. The programs that were entered varied widely in
algorithmic complexity, initial hostility, capacity for forgiveness, and so forth.

Axelrod discovered that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with
many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do very poorly in the
long run while more altruistic strategies did better, as judged purely by self-interest. He used
this to show a possible mechanism for the evolution of altruistic behaviour from mechanisms
that are initially purely selfish, by natural selection.

The best deterministic strategy was found to be "Tit for Tat," which Anatol Rapoport
developed and entered into the tournament. It was the simplest of any program entered,
containing only four lines of BASIC, and won the contest. The strategy is simply to cooperate
on the first iteration of the game; after that, the player does what his opponent did on the
previous move. Depending on the situation, a slightly better strategy can be "Tit for Tat with
forgiveness." When the opponent defects, on the next move, the player sometimes cooperates
anyway, with a small probability (around 1%-5%). This allows for occasional recovery from
getting trapped in a cycle of defections. The exact probability depends on the line-up of
opponents.

By analysing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a
strategy to be successful.

Nice
The most important condition is that the strategy must be "nice", that is, it will not
defect before its opponent does (this is sometimes referred to as an "optimistic"
algorithm). Almost all of the top-scoring strategies were nice; therefore a purely
selfish strategy will not "cheat" on its opponent, for purely utilitarian reasons first.
Retaliating
However, Axelrod contended, the successful strategy must not be a blind optimist. It
must sometimes retaliate. An example of a non-retaliating strategy is Always
Cooperate. This is a very bad choice, as "nasty" strategies will ruthlessly exploit such
players.
Forgiving
Successful strategies must also be forgiving. Though players will retaliate, they will
once again fall back to cooperating if the opponent does not continue to play defects.
This stops long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, maximizing points.
Non-envious
The last quality is being non-envious, that is not striving to score more than the
opponent (impossible for a ‘nice’ strategy, i.e., a 'nice' strategy can never score more
than the opponent).

Therefore, Axelrod reached the oxymoron-sounding conclusion that selfish individuals for
their own selfish good will tend to be nice and forgiving and non-envious.

The OPTIMAL (POINTS-MAXIMIZING) STRATEGY for the one-time PD game is

simply defection; as explained above, this is true whatever the composition of opponents may
be. However, in the iterated-PD game the optimal strategy depends upon the strategies of
likely opponents, and how they will react to defections and cooperations. For example,
consider a population where everyone defects every time, except for a single individual

119
following the Tit-for-Tat strategy. That individual is at a slight disadvantage because of the
loss on the first turn. In such a population, the optimal strategy for that individual is to defect
every time. In a population with a certain percentage of always-defectors and the rest being
Tit-for-Tat players, the optimal strategy for an individual depends on the percentage, and on
the length of the game.

A strategy called Pavlov (an example of Win-Stay, Lose-Switch) cooperates at the first
iteration and whenever the player and co-player did the same thing at the previous iteration;
Pavlov defects when the player and co-player did different things at the previous iteration. For
a certain range of parameters, Pavlov beats all other strategies by giving preferential treatment
to co-players which resemble Pavlov.

Deriving the optimal strategy is generally done in two ways:

1. BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM: If the statistical distribution of opposing

strategies can be determined (e.g. 50% tit-for-tat, 50% always cooperate) an optimal
counter-strategy can be derived analytically.[4]
2. MONTE CARLO simulations of populations have been made, where individuals with
low scores die off, and those with high scores reproduce (a genetic algorithm for
finding an optimal strategy). The mix of algorithms in the final population generally
depends on the mix in the initial population. The introduction of mutation (random
variation during reproduction) lessens the dependency on the initial population;
empirical experiments with such systems tend to produce Tit-for-Tat players (see for
instance Chess 1988), but there is no analytic proof that this will always occur.

Although Tit-for-Tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from
Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [2] and consisting of
Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a
new strategy at the 20th-anniversary Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma competition, which proved
to be more successful than Tit-for-Tat. This strategy relied on cooperation between programs
to achieve the highest number of points for a single program. The University submitted 60
programs to the competition, which were designed to recognize each other through a series of
five to ten moves at the start. Once this recognition was made, one program would always
cooperate and the other would always defect, assuring the maximum number of points for the
defector. If the program realized that it was playing a non-Southampton player, it would
continuously defect in an attempt to minimize the score of the competing program. As a
result,[5] this strategy ended up taking the top three positions in the competition, as well as a
number of positions towards the bottom.

This strategy takes advantage of the fact that multiple entries were allowed in this particular
competition, and that the performance of a team was measured by that of the highest-scoring
player (meaning that the use of self-sacrificing players was a form of minmaxing). In a
competition where one has control of only a single player, Tit-for-Tat is certainly a better
strategy. Because of this new rule, this competition also has little theoretical significance
when analysing single agent strategies as compared to Axelrod's seminal tournament.
However, it provided the framework for analysing how to achieve cooperative strategies in
multi-agent frameworks, especially in the presence of noise. In fact, long before this new-
rules tournament was played, Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene pointed out the
possibility of such strategies winning if multiple entries were allowed, but remarked that most
probably Axelrod would not have allowed them if they had been submitted. It also relies on

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circumventing rules about the prisoner's dilemma in that there is no communication allowed
between the two players. When the Southampton programs engage in an opening "ten move
dance" to recognize one another, this only reinforces just how valuable communication can be
in shifting the balance of the game.

If an iterated PD is going to be iterated exactly N times, for some known constant N, then it is
always game theoretically optimal to defect in all rounds. The only possible Nash equilibrium
is to always defect. The proof goes like this: one might as well defect on the last turn, since
the opponent will not have a chance to punish the player. Therefore, both will defect on the
last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent
will defect on the last no matter what is done, and so on. For cooperation to emerge between
game theoretic rational players, the total number of rounds must be random, or at least
unknown to the players. However, even in this case always defect is no longer a strictly
dominant strategy, only a Nash equilibrium. The superrational strategy in this case is to
cooperate against a superrational opponent, and in the limit of large fixed N, experimental
results on strategies agree with the superrational version, not the game-theoretic rational one.

Another odd case is "play forever" prisoner's dilemma. The game is repeated infinitely many
times, and the player's score is the average (suitably computed).

The prisoner's dilemma game is fundamental to certain theories of human cooperation and
trust. On the assumption that the PD can model transactions between two people requiring
trust, cooperative behaviour in populations may be modelled by a multi-player, iterated,
version of the game. It has, consequently, fascinated many scholars over the years. In 1975,
Grofman and Pool estimated the count of scholarly articles devoted to it at over 2,000. The
iterated prisoner's dilemma has also been referred to as the "Peace-War game".[6]

Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Most work on the iterated prisoner's dilemma has focused on the discrete case, in which
players either cooperate or defect, because this model is relatively simple to analyze.
However, some researchers have looked at models of the continuous iterated prisoner's
dilemma, in which players are able to make a variable contribution to the other player. Le and
Boyd[7] found that in such situations, cooperation is much harder to evolve than in the discrete
iterated prisoner's dilemma. The basic intuition for this result is straightforward: in a
continuous prisoner's dilemma, if a population starts off in a non-cooperative equilibrium,
players who are only marginally more cooperative than non-cooperators get little benefit from
assorting with one another. By contrast, in a discrete prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat
cooperators get a big payoff boost from assorting with one another in a non-cooperative
equilibrium, relative to non-cooperators. Since Nature arguably offers more opportunities for
variable cooperation rather than a strict dichotomy of cooperation or defection, the continuous
prisoner's dilemma may help explain why real-life examples of Tit-for-Tat-like cooperation
are extremely rare in Nature (ex. Hammerstein [8]) even though Tit-for-Tat seems robust in
theoretical models.

Learning psychology and game theory

Where game players can learn to estimate the likelihood of other players defecting, their own
behaviour is influenced by their experience of the others' behaviour. Simple statistics show
that inexperienced players are more likely to have had, overall, atypically good or bad

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interactions with other players. If they act on the basis of these experiences (by defecting or
cooperating more than they would otherwise) they are likely to suffer in future transactions.
As more experience is accrued a truer impression of the likelihood of defection is gained and
game playing becomes more successful. The early transactions experienced by immature
players are likely to have a greater effect on their future playing than would such transactions
affect mature players. This principle goes part way towards explaining why the formative
experiences of young people are so influential and why, for example, those who are
particularly vulnerable to bullying sometimes become bullies themselves.

The likelihood of defection in a population may be reduced by the experience of cooperation

in earlier games allowing trust to build up.[9] Hence self-sacrificing behaviour may, in some
instances, strengthen the moral fibre of a group. If the group is small the positive behaviour is
more likely to feed back in a mutually affirming way, encouraging individuals within that
group to continue to cooperate. This is allied to the twin dilemma of encouraging those people
whom one would aid to indulge in behaviour that might put them at risk. Such processes are
major concerns within the study of reciprocal altruism, group selection, kin selection and
moral philosophy.

Douglas Hofstadter's Superrationality

Douglas Hofstadter in his Metamagical Themas proposed that the definition of "rational" that
led "rational" players to defect is faulty. He proposed that there is another type of rational
behavior, which he called "superrational", where players take into account that the other
person is presumably superrational, like them. Superrational players behave identically, and
know that they will behave identically. They take that into account before they maximize their
payoffs, and they therefore cooperate.

This view of the one-shot PD leads to cooperation as follows:

 Any superrational strategy will be the same for both superrational players, since both
players will think of it.
 therefore the superrational answer will lie on the diagonal of the payoff matrix
 when you maximize return from solutions on the diagonal, you cooperate

However, if a superrational player plays against a rational opponent, he will serve a 10-year
sentence, and the rational player will go free.

One-shot cooperation is observed in human culture, wherever religious and ethical codes
exist.

Superrationality is not studied by academics, as rationality excludes any superrational

behavior.

Morality

While it is sometimes thought that morality must involve the constraint of self-interest, David
Gauthier famously argues that co-operating in the prisoners dilemma on moral principles is
consistent with self-interest and the axioms of game theory. [citation needed] In his opinion, it is most
prudent to give up straightforward maximizing and instead adopt a disposition of constrained

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maximization, according to which one resolves to cooperate in the belief that the opponent
will respond with the same choice, while in the classical PD it is explicitly stipulated that the
response of the opponent does not depend on the player's choice. This form of
contractarianism claims that good moral thinking is just an elevated and subtly strategic
version of basic means-end reasoning.

Douglas Hofstadter expresses a strong personal belief that the mathematical symmetry is
reinforced by a moral symmetry, along the lines of the Kantian categorical imperative:
defecting in the hope that the other player cooperates is morally indefensible. [citation needed] If
players treat each other as they would treat themselves, then they will cooperate.

Real-life examples
These particular examples, involving prisoners and bag switching and so forth, may seem
contrived, but there are in fact many examples in human interaction as well as interactions in
nature that have the same payoff matrix. The prisoner's dilemma is therefore of interest to the
social sciences such as economics, politics and sociology, as well as to the biological sciences
such as ethology and evolutionary biology. Many natural processes have been abstracted into
models in which living beings are engaged in endless games of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). This
wide applicability of the PD gives the game its substantial importance.

In politics

In political science, for instance, the PD scenario is often used to illustrate the problem of two
states engaged in an arms race. Both will reason that they have two options, either to increase
military expenditure or to make an agreement to reduce weapons. Neither state can be certain
that the other one will keep to such an agreement; therefore, they both incline towards
military expansion. The paradox is that both states are acting rationally, but producing an
apparently irrational result. This could be considered a corollary to deterrence theory.

In science

In sociology or criminology, the PD may be applied to an actual dilemma facing two inmates.
The game theorist Marek Kaminski, a former political prisoner, analysed the factors
contributing to payoffs in the game set up by a prosecutor for arrested defendants (see
references below). He concluded that while the PD is the ideal game of a prosecutor,
numerous factors may strongly affect the payoffs and potentially change the properties of the
game.

In environmental studies, the PD is evident in crises such as global climate change. All
countries will benefit from a stable climate, but any single country is often hesitant to curb
CO2 emissions. The benefit to an individual country to maintain current behavior is greater
than the benefit to all countries if behavior was changed, therefore explaining the current
impasse concerning climate change.[10]

In program management and technology development, the PD applies to the relationship

between the customer and the developer. Capt Dan Ward, an officer in the US Air Force,
examined The Program Manager's Dilemma in an article published in Defense AT&L, a
defense technology journal.[11]

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In sports

PD frequently occurs in cycling races, for instance in the Tour de France. Consider two
cyclists halfway in a race, with the peloton (larger group) at great distance behind them. The
two riders often work together (mutual cooperation) by sharing the tough load of the front
position, where there is no shelter from the wind. If neither of the riders makes an effort to
stay ahead, the peloton will soon catch up (mutual defection). An often-seen scenario is one
rider doing the hard work alone (cooperating), keeping the two ahead of the peloton. Nearer
to the finish (where the threat of the peloton has disappeared), the game becomes a simple
zero-sum game, with each rider trying to avoid at all costs giving a slipstream advantage to
the other rider. If there was a (single) defecting rider in the preceding prisoners' dilemma, it is
usually he who will win this zero-sum game, having saved energy in the cooperating rider's
slipstream. The cooperating rider's attitude may seem extremely naive, but he often has no
other choice when both riders have different physical profiles. The cooperating rider typically
has an endurance profile, whereas the defecting rider will more likely be a sprinter. When
continuously taking the head position of the twosome, the 'cooperating' rider is merely trying
to ride away from the defecting sprinter using his endurance advantage over long distance,
thus avoiding a sprint duel at the finish, which he would be bound to lose, even if the
sprinting rider had cooperated. Just after the escape from the peloton, the endurance-sprinter
difference is less of importance, and it is therefore at this stage of the race that mutual
cooperation PD can usually be observed. Arguably, it is this almost unavoidable presence of
PD (and its transition in zero-sum games) that (unconsciously) makes cycling an exciting
sport to watch.

PD hardly applies to running sports, because of the negligible importance of air resistance
(and shelter from it).

In high school wrestling, sometimes participants intentionally lose unnaturally large amounts
of weight so as to compete against lighter opponents. In doing so, the participants are clearly
not at their top level of physical and athletic fitness and yet often end up competing against
the same opponents anyway, who have also followed this practice (mutual defection). The
result is a reduction in the level of competition. Yet if a participant maintains their natural
weight (cooperating), they will most likely compete against a stronger opponent who has lost
considerable weight.

In economics

Advertising is sometimes cited as a real life example of the prisoner’s dilemma. When
cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to
decide how much money to spend on advertising. The effectiveness of Firm A’s advertising
was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B. Likewise, the profit derived
from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A. If both Firm
A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period the advertising cancels out, receipts
remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising. Both firms would
benefit from a reduction in advertising. However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm
A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one
firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent
on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy and this is not a prisoner's
dilemma but rather is an example of a stag hunt. The outcome is similar, though, in that both
firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes

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cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations. For instance, cigarette manufacturers
endorsed the creation of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would
reduce costs and increase profits across the industry. [9] This analysis is likely to be pertinent in
many other business situations involving advertising.

Without enforceable agreements, members of a cartel are also involved in a (multi-player)

prisoners' dilemma.[12] 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum
level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly stealing business (and
profits) from other cartel members. Ironically, anti-trust authorities want potential cartel
members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for consumers.

In law

The theoretical conclusion of PD is one reason why, in many countries, plea bargaining is
forbidden. Often, precisely the PD scenario applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to
confess and testify against the other prisoner/suspect, even if each is innocent of the alleged
crime. Arguably, the worst case is when only one party is guilty — here, the innocent one is
unlikely to confess, while the guilty one is likely to confess and testify against the innocent.

In the media

In the 2008 edition of Big Brother (UK), the dilemma was applied to two of the housemates,
Lisa Appleton and Sara Folino. A prize fund of £50,000 was available. If housemates chose to
share the prize fund, each would receive £25,000. If one chose to share, and the other chose to
take, the one who took it would receive the entire £50,000. If both chose to take, both
housemates would receive nothing. The housemates had a minute to discuss their decision,
and were given the possibility to lie. Both housemates declared they would share the prize
fund, but either could have potentially been lying. When asked to give their final answers by
Big Brother, both housemates did indeed choose to share, and so won £25,000 each.

Multiplayer dilemmas

Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players. Although metaphorical, Hardin's tragedy of
the commons may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each
villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or
even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons").
Such multi-player PDs are not formal as they can always be decomposed into a set of classical
two-player games. The commons are not always exploited: William Poundstone, in a book
about the Prisoner's Dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand
where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for someone to take a paper without
paying (defecting) but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others,
destroying the system.

Because there is no mechanism for personal choice to influence others' decisions, this type of
thinking relies on correlations between behavior, not on causation. Because of this property,
those who do not understand superrationality often mistake it for magical thinking. Without
superrationality, not only petty theft, but voluntary voting requires widespread magical
thinking, since a non-voter is a free rider on a democratic system.

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Related games
Closed-bag exchange

Hofstadter[13] once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to
understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several
examples he used was "closed bag exchange":

Two people meet and exchange closed bags, with the understanding that one of them
contains money, and the other contains a purchase. Either player can choose to honour
the deal by putting into his bag what he agreed, or he can defect by handing over an
empty bag.

In this game, defection is always the best course, implying that rational agents will never play.
However, in this case both players cooperating and both players defecting actually give the
same result, so chances of mutual cooperation, even in repeated games, are few.

Friend or Foe?

Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in
the United States. It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested by real people, but
in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. As each pair is
eliminated, they play a game of Prisoner's Dilemma to determine how their winnings are split.
If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50-50. If one cooperates and the other
defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both
defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the payoff matrix is slightly different from the
standard one given above, as the payouts for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the
opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium,
compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If you know your
opponent is going to vote Foe, then your choice does not affect your winnings. In a certain
sense, Friend or Foe has a payoff model between "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken".

The payoff matrix is

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate 1, 1 0, 2

Defect 2, 0 0, 0

This payoff matrix was later used on the British television programmes Shafted and Golden
Balls.

Notes

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1. ^ A simple "tell" that partially or wholly reveals one player's choice — such as the Red player
playing their Cooperate card face-up — does not change the fact that Defect is the dominant
strategy. When one is considering the game itself, communication has no effect whatsoever.
However, when the game is being played in real life considerations outside of the game itself
may cause communication to matter. It is a point of utmost importance to the full implications
of the dilemma that when we do not need to take into account external considerations, single-
instance Prisoner's Dilemma is not affected in any way by communications. Even in single-
instance Prisoner's Dilemma, meaningful prior communication about issues external to the
game could alter the play environment, by raising the possibility of enforceable side contracts
or credible threats. For example, if the Red player plays their Cooperate card face-up and
simultaneously reveals a binding commitment to blow the jail up if and only if Blue Defects
(with additional payoff -11,-10), then Blue's Cooperation becomes dominant. As a result,
players are screened from each other and prevented from communicating outside of the game.
2. ^ Dawkins, Richard (1989). The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5.
Page: 204 of Paperback edition

3. ^ Tversky, Amos (2004). Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings. MIT Press.
ISBN 026270093X.

4. ^ For example see the 2003 study “Bayesian Nash equilibrium; a statistical test of the
hypothesis” for discussion of the concept and whether it can apply in real economic or
strategic situations (from Tel Aviv University).

5. ^ The 2004 Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament Results show University of Southampton's

strategies in the first three places, despite having fewer wins and many more losses than the
GRIM strategy. (Note that in a PD tournament, the aim of the game is not to “win” matches —
that can easily be achieved by frequent defection). It should also be pointed out that even
without implicit collusion between software strategies (exploited by the Southampton team)
tit-for-tat is not always the absolute winner of any given tournament; it would be more precise
to say that its long run results over a series of tournaments outperform its rivals. (In any one
event a given strategy can be slightly better adjusted to the competition than tit-for-tat, but tit-
for-tat is more robust). The same applies for the tit-for-tat-with-forgiveness variant, and other
optimal strategies: on any given day they might not 'win' against a specific mix of counter-
strategies.An alternative way of putting it is using the Darinian ESS simulation. In such a
simulation Tit-for-Tat will almost always come to dominate, though nasty strategies will drift
in and out of the population because a Tit-for-Tat population is penetratable by non-retaliating
nice strategies which in turn are easy prey for the nasty strategies. Richard Dawkins showed
that here no static mix of strategies form a stable equilibrium and the system will always
oscillate between bounds.

6. ^ Shy, O., 1996, Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press.

7. ^ Le, S. and R. Boyd (2007) "Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma" Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 245, 258–267.

8. ^ Hammerstein, P. (2003). Why is reciprocity so rare in social animals? A protestant appeal.

In: P. Hammerstein, Editor, Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, MIT Press. pp.
83–94.

9. ^ a b This argument for the development of cooperation through trust is given in The Wisdom
of Crowds , where it is argued that long-distance capitalism was able to form around a nucleus
of Quakers, who always dealt honourably with their business partners. (Rather than defecting
and reneging on promises — a phenomenon that had discouraged earlier long-term
unenforceable overseas contracts). It is argued that dealings with reliable merchants allowed

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 the meme for cooperation to spread to other traders, who spread it further until a high degree
of cooperation became a profitable strategy in general commerce

10. ^ The Economist (2007) [1].

11. ^ Ward, D. (2004) The Program Manager's Dilemma The Program Manager's Dilemma
(Defense AT&L, Defense Acquisition University Press).

12. ^ Nicholson, Walter (2000), Intermediate Microeconomics (8th ed.), Harcourt

13. ^ Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985). Metamagical Themas: questing for the essence of mind and
pattern. Bantam Dell Pub Group. ISBN 0-465-04566-9. - see Ch.29 The Prisoner's Dilemma
Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation.

References
 Robert Aumann, “Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games”, in R. D.
Luce and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory 23 of Games IV, Annals of
Mathematics Study 40, 287–324, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
 Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. ISBN 0-465-02121-2

 Bicchieri, Cristina (1993). Rationality and Coordination. Cambridge University Press

 Kenneth Binmore, Fun and Games.

 David M. Chess (1988). Simulating the evolution of behavior: the iterated prisoners'
dilemma problem. Complex Systems, 2:663–670.

 Dresher, M. (1961). The Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

 Flood, M.M. (1952). Some experimental games. Research memorandum RM-789. RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

 Kaminski, Marek M. (2004) Games Prisoners Play Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-
691-11721-7 http://webfiles.uci.edu/mkaminsk/www/book.html

 Poundstone, W. (1992) Prisoner's Dilemma Doubleday, NY NY.

 Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

 Rapoport, Anatol and Albert M. Chammah (1965). Prisoner's Dilemma. University of

Michigan Press.

 S. Le and R. Boyd (2007) "Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's

Dilemma" Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 245, 258–267. Full text

 A. Rogers, R. K. Dash, S. D. Ramchurn, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings (2007)

“Coordinating team players within a noisy iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament”
Theoretical Computer Science 377 (1-3) 243-259. [3]

Further reading

128
  Bicchieri, Cristina and Mitchell Green (1997) "Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation
in the Prisoner's Dilemma", in G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.),
Contemporary Action Theory: The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, Kluwer.
 Plous, S. (1993). Prisoner's Dilemma or Perceptual Dilemma? Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 30, No. 2, 163-179.

STRATEGIILE OPTIME
BAZATE PE SIMBIOZA PENTRU
SUPRAVIEȚUIRE
(„ Tit-for-tat”, „Pițigoiul ochi-pentru-ochi” , „peștele iertător” , strategia „strângerii de
mână”etc.)

Tit-for-tat Story
by Chris Meredith

Long before humans started playing games, natural selection discovered the fundamentals of
game theory and shaped animal societies according to its rules. Within species, individuals
adopt alternative competing strategies with frequencies that reflect the success of each
strategy. Evolutionary Stable Strategies occur when alternative competing strategies are at
equilibrium. Competition within species has generated many Evolutionary Stable Strategies
with colourful titles like: Bourgeois, Scrounger, Sneaky, Satellite, Transvestite, and Sex-
change. However, co-operation within and between species has generated only one
Evolutionary Stable Strategy., TIT FOR TAT.

The importance of TIT FOR TAT to the evolution of co-operative behaviour was discovered
in a very unusual way, through a worldwide computer competition to find the winning
strategy for the well known paradox 'The Prisoner's Dilemma'. In 1981 TIT FOR TAT won
that competition, and ever since then it has grown in stature to where it now dominates our
thinking about the evolution of co-operative behaviour in animal and human societies.

Animal games

Animals behave in ways that improve their chances of survival and reproduction. Common
sense tells us that this is how they should behave, and it is easy to accept that animal
behaviour is a product of natural selection. Nevertheless, animal behaviour is complex and
quite difficult to analyse unless it is broken down into its component strategies. A species'
behaviour is best described as a collection of strategies, each one of which promotes survival
and reproduction in its own way. Some strategies are employed by every member of a species,
some are not.

An example of the former is the pre-hibernation behaviour of British red squirrels. At the
beginning of winter all these squirrels provide for hibernation in exactly the same way

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because their provisioning behaviour has been naturally selected by a fixed environmental
condition - the onset of winter. A strategy like this, which all the members of a species adopt,
is called a single 'optimum' strategy.

Within every species many strategies cannot be classified as single 'optimum' strategies
because they are not universally adopted. Instead, alternative competing strategies exist, and
individuals can display one of several strategies at any given time. For example, in most
animal species the males adopt more than one strategy for attracting females and more than
one strategy for acquiring resources. A new type of explanation is required to explain the
evolution of these alternative competing strategies. It turns out that we all know this
explanation because we all play games. The first rule of playing games is, 'watch the other
players.' Your best game strategy often depends upon the strategies adopted by your
opponents. It should come as no surprise that natural selection discovered this rule long before
humans started playing games. Here is the explanation for the evolution of alternative
competing strategies within animal societies. In their quest for survival and reproduction,
animals are pitted against the other members of their species in exactly the same way as game
players confront each other. This point was first realised by Maynard Smith (1972) and his
application of game theory to the evolution of animal strategies launched an entirely new way
of analysing animal behaviour.

Hawks and doves

Evolutionary game theory is derived from the theory of games first formalised by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Their aim was to describe economic behaviour but,
paradoxically, it turns out that their theory is far more successful in biology than in
economics. The main reason for this is the fact that the variables in biology are less volatile
than those in economics. Natural selection and population dynamics are far more predictable
than human rationality and self-interest.

As a simple demonstration of evolutionary game theory consider a game where there are just
two sorts of strategies. 'Hawks' always fight to injure or kill their opponents, though in the
process they risk injury to themselves. 'Doves' simply display and never engage in serious
rights. These two strategies are chosen to represent the two possible extremes that we may see
in nature. How would evolution proceed in this particular game? Consider what would happen
if all the individuals were Doves. Every contest would be between a Dove and a Dove so a
truant Hawk would do very well and its genes would spread. It is clear that a Dove population
is not stable because it can be invaded by a mutant adopting the Hawk strategy.

Now consider a population comprising Hawks. Every contest would be between a Hawk and a
Hawk so the costs would be very high. A mutant Dove in such a population would do better
than the Hawks so Dove genes would spread. In this model of Hawks and Doves natural
selection would favour a mixed population of both Doves and Hawks, and the stable
equilibrium would be when the average payoffs for a Hawk are equal to those for a Dove.
When alternative competing strategies are at equilibrium it is described as an Evolutionary
Stable State.

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Horny mating

Evolutionary Stable States arise when the strategy options open to an individual are
determined for life by factors like size, genetics or colour, etc. For example, some males
might put their resources into highly competitive ability and have bright colours and weapons.
This lifestyle would be 'fast and furious', the male mating at a fast rate but living for only a
short time because of the high costs invoked. Other males might put their resources into
survival and although they would reproduce at a slower rate this disadvantage may be offset
by a longer lifespan. A particularly good example of this occurs in some figwasps. Some
males of these species are wingless and put their resources into fighting; they have large heads
and mandibles that can chop another figwasp in half. These males have no wings and remain
inside the fig where they hatch and fight to mate with newly hatched females that develop
from larvae in that fig. Other males of the same species are winged and put their resources
into dispersal; they have tiny heads and mandibles, are not aggressive and fly off to mate with
females that have emerged from the fruit.

The difference between fighting and dispersing males is a genetic difference, each maintained
at an equilibrium frequency determined by its average relative pay-off. Sometimes dispersing
will do better than fighting and vice versa. For example, if figs contain only a few emerging
females, dispersal will pay. If, on the other hand, many individuals are born in the same fruit,
a male would have access to many females and it would pay to stay home and fight.

A similar example occurs in the bee Centris pallida (Alcock et al, 1977). In this species small
body size is fixed throughout life as a consequence of poor feeding conditions when young.
Large males search for females by patrolling over the ground, searching for buried virgin
females about to emerge. When they discover an emerging female they dig her up and
copulate. It takes several minutes to dig up a female, during which time the other males are
attracted to the site by the activity. There are often violent fights and only large males are able
to defend their discoveries successfully. It is not surprising, therefore, that only large males
adopt the strategy of patrolling and digging. Small males search for mates by hovering above
the emergence areas and pursuing airborne females who have escaped the diggers.
Observations have shown that large males have the greatest mating success so it is probable
that the smaller males are forced to adopt hovering throughout their lives to make the best of a
bad job.

In the Centris pallida Evolutionary Stable State we can see the beginning of choice, even if it
is a forced choice. The small males would have been diggers but their small size forced them
into hovering for a living. Intermediate males do make a choice, digging sometimes and
hovering others. They assess their chances and behave as a digger or hoverer with frequencies
that reflect their success with each strategy. Perhaps a more accurate way of describing the
Evolutionary Stable State of the bee Centris pallida is to say that the males have adopted a
strategy that is - 'If small, hover; if large, patrol and dig'. This is a better way of describing the
males' mating behaviour because it introduces choice based on an individual's assessment of a
situation. When alternative competing strategies occur, most of the time assessment and
choice are involved. By giving Centris pallida one strategy with choice rather than two
discrete strategies, the real situation is more accurately modelled. A strategy like this which is
stable and has choice built into it is called an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. It differs from
evolutionary stable states and single optimum strategies because it has choice, and natural
selection has determined the frequency with which each behaviour (choice) occurs within the
strategy.

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Bourgeois

The concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) relies upon the notion that animals can
assess the relative pay-offs for the different roles within a strategy. For example, in our earlier
Hawk-Dove game imagine that each individual could assess whether to play Hawk or Dove.
The frequency of Hawk behaviour would remain at 66.6% and that of Dove at 33.3%, but
individuals would exert a choice, playing each role when they thought appropriate. This is a
Hawk-Dove Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) - as opposed to the Hawk-Dove Evolutionary
Stable State described earlier - because role choice based on assessment is now involved.

A strategy very similar to a Hawk-Dove ESS is widespread in nature. It is called 'Bourgeois'

and operates on the rule - 'play Hawk if you are an owner and Dove if you are an intruder'.
Such a Bourgeois strategy is an ESS and cannot be invaded by Hawk or Dove strategies
because Bourgeois individuals avoid more damaging encounters than the pure Hawks and win
more encounters than pure Doves.

One example from Nature involves male Hamadryas baboon contests over females (Kummer
et al, 1974). In the wild, a male Hamadryas baboon forms a long-lasting relationship with
several females. Kummer showed that if male A was permitted to form a bond with a strange
female, then a second male B, who had watched the interaction, will not subsequently
challenge A for ownership. If, on a later occasion, male B forms a bond with a female he will
not be challenged by A. Escalated fights do occur between two males if each perceives
himself as the owner of the same female. It seems clear that for Male Hamadryas baboons,
ownership, and not any perceived difference in size or strength, is decisive in settling contests.

A similar Bourgeois strategy exists amongst male lions where clear ownership of an oestrus
female by a consorting male will prevent other males from challenging him. It makes good
sense for lions to avoid fighting amongst themselves.

Assessing

There are many examples of ESSs where individuals select their strategy after assessing their
opponents. Male dung flies, Scafophaga stercoraria have to decide whether to stay or go as a
cowpat grows stale. They hang around cowpats and attempt to mate with females as they
arrive but progressively fewer females arrive as the cowpat grows stale. If other males stay it
pays to go and vice versa. Parker (1978) found that male stay times are distributed so as to
give the same reproductive success to the males adopting the different strategies. Staying-
Going was an ESS for male dung flies.

Scroungers

Quite a large number of ESSs fit a model called the Producer-Scrounger model. A producer
invests time and energy in guarding or creating some resource, which scroungers parasitise.
The ESS point occurs when producer and scrounger fitness are equal.

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Many animal behaviours in nature fit the Producer-Scrounger model. Successful male red
deer control harems of about five hinds. Excluded males hang around and wait for an
opportunity to break up harems. If the antlers of two harem owners become locked together in
a rutting contest, then a motley collection of geriatric, and Juvenile 'sneaky rutters' move in
(Clifton-Brock et al, 1979).

Excluded young male elephant seals are a bit more subtle than excluded red deer. At four
years of age they are too small to compete for harem ownership, being only about the size of a
female, but they use this to their advantage and sneak into harems as 'pretend' females. When
his lordship is otherwise engaged in some titanic struggle, they quickly throw away their
disguise, expose their growing tusks and pounce upon a not entirely unsuspecting female. The
females tolerate these juveniles but protest loudly during copulation. They seem to be using
such incursions to keep their bull seal on the tips of his flippers (Le Boeuf, 1974).

Bargaining

So far we have only considered animal competition and have ignored situations where sharing
a resource might benefit 'contestants'. For example, territorial battles are over a divisible
resource and it is quite obvious that sometimes two 'contestants' could benefit in fitness by
sharing a space rather than by engaging in an escalated contest. This does happen and male
lions share territories and females, as do some baboons, chimpanzees, and many other
primates. Compromise is a reality, particularly if the costs of escalated fighting are high. This
is not meant to imply that animals who share resources or engage in bargaining are more
intelligent than those who never bargain. The only suggestion is that natural selection has
favoured Bargaining ESS for some species and not for others. In its simplest form a
Bargaining ESS consists of two roles - to agree to a bargain or not to agree to a bargain. As
always, the ratio of 'bargain' to 'no bargain' is a measure of the success of each role in a
Bargaining ESS. Of course the model could be complicated by dividing bargainers into
honest-bargainers and bluff-bargainers, but there is no data from nature that I know of to
support this view. Human bargaining certainly does have a lot of bluff about it, but it seems
that bargaining between animals has to be done honestly. Bluff-bargaining may pose too great
a threat to the central notion of bargaining which is to avoid the costs of conflict.

A striking example of honest trading or bargaining has been described (Hazlett, 1980). In
hermit crabs there is good evidence that empty shells are a limiting resource.

An individual may find itself in a shell which is either too large or too small. A large crab in a
small shell and a small crab in a big shell can both benefit by exchange, and such exchanges
do in fact take place. One crab will initiate an exchange by tapping or shaking the shell of
another in a manner that is characteristic of the species. The non-initiating crab may stay
inside its shell, or it may come out of its shell after first tapping the initiator on its shell. If it
comes out of its shell an exchange of shells takes place. When an exchange of shells would
leave a non-initiating crab in a shell further from its preferred size, then no exchange takes
place. Neither the size nor the sex of the initiating crab influences the likelihood of an
exchange, so it seems that an exchange requires mutual benefit, and cannot be enforced by the
initiator.

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Exchanges take place between members of different species, provided the initiator has in its
repertoire a signal appropriate to the other species.

Since different species of crab prefer different types of shell, interspecific exchanges afford
opportunities of mutual benefit additional to those arising in intraspecific interactions.

The presence of honesty in this bargaining system is easy to explain because there is no
special disadvantage associated with failure to agree. It pays each crab to acquire accurate
information about whether an exchange would benefit it.

From what we know, animal bargaining is honest and based on complete information. In
contrast, human bargaining, if not entirely dishonest, is at best based on incomplete
information. Consider the following imaginary example of wage bargaining. The management
would prefer to give no rise at all, but would pay 10% rather than face a strike. The union
would like as big a rise as possible, but would be willing to settle for 5% rather than strike.
Clearly a settlement would be welcomed by both sides at some point between 5% to 10%. The
union, however, does not know that the management will go to 10% and the management
does not know that the union would settle for 5%. Furthermore, it would not pay the union to
announce right away that it would settle for 5% because, if it did, that is all it would get. This
then is a game of incomplete information; each side knows something that the other does not.

What eventuates in these situations are 'delicate negotiations' where the players employ a
varied set of signals designed to explore the other side's position with a view to achieving a
compromise. It is, in effect, a cloak and dagger game of give and take played very seriously
by both sides. It is a compromise not true co-operation, however bargaining does employ a
strategy that led to the evolution of co-operation.

You scratch my back ...

Evolutionary biologists have had considerable trouble explaining the evolution of co-
operative behaviour. The problem is that co-operation can always be exploited by selfish
individuals who cheat. It seems that natural selection should always favour the cheats over the
co-operators. Co-operation involves doing and receiving favours and this means that the
opportunity to cheat and not return a favour is a very real possibility. Trivers (1971) tackled
this problem and developed the theory of reciprocal altruism based on the idea that co-
operation could evolve in species clever enough to discriminate between co-operators and
cheats. The concept is summarised in the saying 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours'.
Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism is particularly successful in explaining human behaviour
because reciprocal altruism is a major part of all human activities.

As a first means of eliciting reciprocity we use displays of generosity, gratitude, sympathy and
sincerity. These 'guarantors' of reciprocity typically operate at the family, friend, and local
community levels. If they fail to generate appropriate reciprocity we employ moralistic
aggression in the form of sermons and lectures designed to bully all the cheats back into line.
Moralistic aggression is the number one weapon of religions around the world. The strength
and weakness of religions lies in their promise of 'reciprocation after death'. The sky is offered
but how can we tell if it is true" Religions have found that moralistic aggression of the hell-

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fire-and-damnation variety is needed to calm such doubts and keep the flow of altruism
coming their way.

As a final act of determination to keep us all reciprocating, we punish the non-reciprocators

with fines, gaol, torture and death. So it really is true that crimes against property are more
serious than crimes against people. They threaten our reciprocal altruism adaptation far more
than the odd killing or rape ever will. Societies founded on reciprocal altruism fear cheats
more than anything else, even although we only seem to be able to catch the stupid ones.

Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism was an important advance in our understanding of the
evolution of co-operation but it was a 'special theory' rather than a 'general theory'. The
discovery of how co-operative behaviour could evolve in species far less intelligent than
humans, came in a surprising way - from a detailed study of the well known paradox 'The
Prisoner's Dilemma'.

The prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma refers to an imaginary situation in which two individuals are
imprisoned and are accused of having co-operated to perform some crime. The two prisoners
are held separately, and attempts are made to induce each one to implicate the other. If neither
one does, both are set free. This is the co-operative strategy available to both prisoners. In
order to tempt one or both to defect, each is told that a confession implicating the other will
lead to his or her release and, as an added incentive, to a small reward. If both confess, each
one is imprisoned. But if one individual implicated the other and not vice versa, then the
implicated partner receives a harsher sentence than if each had implicated the other.

The prisoner's dilemma is that if they both think rationally then each one will decide that the
best course of action is to implicate the other even although they would both be better off
trusting each other. Consider how one prisoner thinks. If his partner fails to implicate him then
he should implicate his partner and get the best possible pay-off. If his partner has implicated
him he should still 'cheat' - since he suffers less than if he trusts his partner. However, the
situation is more complicated than this analysis suggests. It is fairly obvious that the players'
strategic decisions will also depend upon their likelihood of future encounters. If they know
that they are destined never to meet again, defection is the only rational choice. Both
individuals will cheat and both will end up relatively badly-off. But if the prisoner's dilemma
is repeated a number of times, then it may be advantageous to co-operate on the early moves
and cheat only towards the end of the game. When people know the total number of games of
prisoner's dilemma, they do indeed cheat more often in the final games.

Robert Axelrod was interested in finding a winning strategy for repeated prisoner's dilemmas
games. He conducted a computer tournament where people were invited to submit strategies
for playing 200 games of prisoner's dilemma (Axlerod and Hamilton, 1981). Fourteen game
theorists in disciplines such as economics and mathematics submitted entries. These 14, and a
totally random strategy, were paired with each other in a round robin tournament. Some of
these strategies were highly intricate. But the result of the tournament was that the simplest of
all strategies submitted attained the highest average score. This strategy, called TIT FOR TAT
by its submitter Anatol Rapoport, had only two rules. On the first move co-operate. ON each
succeeding move do what your opponent did the previous move. Thus, TIT FOR TAT was a

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strategy of co-operation based on reciprocity. By conceptualising reciprocal altruism as a
series of prisoner's dilemmas we can see that TIT FOR TAT might be the Evolutionary Stable
Strategy for our reciprocal altruism adaptation. It might even help to explain the evolution of
co-operation in a more general way than Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism.

TIT FOR TAT

The results of Axelrod's tournament were published and people were invited to submit
programs for a second tournament. This was identical in form to the first, except that matches
were not of exactly 200 games, but were of a random length with median 200; this avoided
the complication of programs that might have special cheating rules for the last game. This
time there were 62 entries from six countries. Most of the contestants were computer
hobbyists but also present were professors of evolutionary biology, physics and computer
science as well as the disciplines represented earlier. Rapoport again submitted TIT FOR TAT
and again it won with a leg in the air. Ultimately it displaced all other strategies and became
the equivalent of an ESS for prisoner's dilemma.

From an analysis of the 3-million choices made in the second competition, four features of
TIT FOR TAT emerged:

1. Never be the first to defect

2. Retaliate only after your partner has defected
3. Be prepared to forgive after carrying out just one act of retaliation
4. Adopt this strategy only if the probability of meeting the same player again
exceeds 2/3.

These results provide a model for the evolution of co-operative behaviour. At first sight it
might seem that the model is relevant only to higher animals which can distinguish between
their various opponents. If so, TIT FOR TAT would simply be Trivers' theory of reciprocal
altruism restated. But TIT FOR TAT is more than this and can be applied to animals that
cannot recognise each other - as long as each individual starts co-operative encounters with
very minor, low cost moves and gradually escalates as reciprocation occurs.

Axelrod and Hamilton emphasise that a formal theory for the evolution of co-operation needs
to answer three questions.

1. How can a co-operative strategy get an initial foothold in an environment which is

predominantly non-co-operative?
2. What type of strategy can thrive in a varied environment composed of other
individuals using a wide diversity of more or less sophisticated strategies?
3. Under what conditions can such a strategy, once fully established, resist invasion
by mutant strategies (such as cheating)?

The studies of TIT FOR TAT answer these questions about initial viability, robustness and
stability. Provided that the probability of future interaction between two individuals is
sufficiently great, co-operation based on reciprocity can indeed get started in an asocial world,
can flourish in a variegated environment and can defend itself once fully established.

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According to Axelrod, TIT FOR TAT is a successful ESS because it is 'nice', 'provokable' and
'forgiving'. A nice strategy is one which is never first to defect. In a match between two nice
strategies, both do well. A provokable strategy responds by defecting at once in response to
defection. A forgiving strategy is one which readily returns to co-operation if its opponent
does so; unforgiving strategies are likely to produce isolation and end co-operative
encounters.

Since the appearance of TIT FOR TAT as a model for the evolution of co-operation, there
have been many strategies derived from it: TIT FOR TWO TATS, SUSPICIOUS TIT FOR
TAT and ALWAYS DEFECT to name just three. Under varying conditions all achieve some
success but none demonstrate the robustness of TIT FOR TAT. However the real proof of this
theory is in nature where TIT FOR TAT is beginning to be identified.

Forgiving fish

Vervet monkeys and olive baboons are more likely to go to the assistance of an animal that
has helped them in the past (Packer, 1977). One might expect vervets and baboons to play TIT
FOR TAT as they live in complex societies with many chances to interact. Of course they are
also intelligent enough to distinguish between reciprocation and cheats, so, if Axelrod and
Hamilton are correct, we would expect TIT FOR TAT to evolve as their co-operative strategy.
This is what appears to have happened.

Recent evidence, however, suggests that much less sociable and much less intelligent animals
may also play TIT FOR TAT. Tree swallows, Tachycineta bicolour, live in groups, but not all
the birds in a group are parents. The non-breeders hang around and may kill young birds then
usurp a nest. Parents, however, generally do not chase off non-breeders, which suggests that
some mutual restraint is present. Non-breeders, by staying near the colony, learn the
characteristics of a good nest site. Parents benefit by having extra birds around to challenge
predators. So the elements of the Prisoner's Dilemma are there; both types of bird gain if they
show restraint - the non-breeders gain information and, perhaps, the nesting site while the
breeders produce extra young.

Michael Lombardo (1985) changed things around experimentally. He made it seem as if the
non-breeders had defected by putting two stuffed nestlings in the nest in place of the live
young. The parents attacked the non-breeders as if they were the culprits but stopped their
attacks and resumed their co-operative relationship as soon as the live nestlings were returned
to the nest. Many other helper-parent relationships are now being re-analysed for TIT FOR
TAT.

Possibly the most beautiful empirical test of the TIT FOR TAT model comes from Manfred
Milinski's laboratory experiments with stickleback fish (Miliniski, 1987). His experiment was
based upon the observation that, during the early stages of an attack by a stalking pike, some
minnows or three spined sticklebacks leave their shoal to approach within 4-6 body lengths of
the predator, for what has been called a 'predator inspection visit'. In the wild, sticklebacks
often approach a stalking predator, probably to identify it accurately and gauge its readiness to
attack. If the little fish do so together they can get closer to the predator and, should it attack,
they might be better protected by being in a group and confusing the predator. Two fish
engaged in such an inspection behaviour can be regarded as co-operating if they either stay

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close together or take turns in leading the advance towards the predator. If one fish
consistently lags behind, it may be regarded as a defector (gaining the advantages of
inspection with less accompanying risk). There is, therefore, a series of choices to be made.
Each time one fish swims closer, the companion can co-operate and go along with it, or
defect. If it defects, it runs less risk of being eaten itself, and it may gain more information
than the 'sucker' as it watches its fate.

Milinski gave sticklebacks, Gasterosteus acofeatus, the chance to alter their behaviour
according to that of a companion. He put a stickleback in a tank from which it could see a
large predatory cicid - a fish that resembles the perch, a common predator of sticklebacks.
Also in the tank was a mirror angled either to be a co-operating mirror or a defecting mirror.

When the co-operating mirror was in place a stickleback had the illusion of a co-operating
companion, but with a defecting mirror the companion lagged behind and eventually
disappeared.

In this experiment, those fish with a co-operating mirror went closer to the ciclid and stayed
there longer than the fish with a defecting mirror. Milinski observes that the sticklebacks acted
as if they perceived that a companion was either following them or staying increasingly
behind. Other aspects of TIT FOR TAT seem to be fulfilled too. The fish often forgave its
cowardly companion image, approaching the ciclid again and again. This is because at first
the companion moves forward too, irrespective of which mirror is in place. It eventually
defects if the defecting mirror is in place, but since its first move was co-operative, it is
forgiven for its previous defections - exactly what the theory of TIT FOR TAT predicted
would happen.

It is beginning to appear that the strategy of TIT FOR TAT is very bit as robust in real life as it
is in computer competitions. Laboratory tests of TIT FOR TAT have become a growth
industry as the theory gains in stature. We can expect new revelations about its worth as a
theory to explain the evolution of co-operative behaviour. But whatever the outcome of this
debate, one fact remains unchallenged. TIT FOR TAT is a major regulator of human
behaviour. It may be a Culturally Stable Strategy (CSS) - one that humans just learned as a
way of regulating our co-operative behaviour - or it may indeed be a very necessary, naturally
selected co-operative Evolutionary Stable Strategy.

Tit for tat

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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 A handshake when meeting someone is an example of initial cooperation

For the Laurel and Hardy film, see Tit for Tat (1935 film).

Tit for tat is a highly effective strategy in game theory for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. It
was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, held around
1980. Based on the English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation" ("tit for tat"), an agent
using this strategy will initially cooperate, then respond in kind to an opponent's previous
action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent
is not. This is similar to reciprocal altruism in biology.

Overview
This strategy is dependent on four conditions that has allowed it to become the most prevalent
strategy for the prisoner's dilemma:

1. Unless provoked, the agent will always cooperate

2. If provoked, the agent will retaliate

3. The agent is quick to forgive

4. The agent must have a good chance of competing against the opponent more than
once.

In the last condition, the definition of "good chance" depends on the payoff matrix of the
prisoner's dilemma. The important thing is that the competition continues long enough for
repeated punishment and forgiveness to generate a long-term payoff higher than the possible
loss from cooperating initially.

A fifth condition applies to make the competition meaningful: if an agent knows that the next
play will be the last, it should naturally defect for a higher score. Similarly if it knows that the
next two plays will be the last, it should defect twice, and so on. Therefore the number of
competitions must not be known in advance to the agents.

Against a variety of alternative strategies, tit for tat was the most effective, winning in several
annual automated tournaments against (generally far more complex) strategies created by
teams of computer scientists, economists, and psychologists. Game theorists informally
believed the strategy to be optimal (although no proof was presented).

It is important to know that tit for tat still is the most effective strategy if the average
performance of each competing team is compared. The team which recently won over a pure
tit for tat team only outperformed it with some of their algorithms because they submitted
multiple algorithms which would recognize each other and assume a master and slave
relationship (one algorithm would "sacrifice" itself and obtain a very poor result in order for
the other algorithm to be able to outperform Tit for Tat on an individual basis, but not as a pair
or group). Still, this "group" victory illustrates an important limitation of the Prisoner's

139
Dilemma in representing social reality, namely, that it does not include any natural equivalent
for friendship or alliances. The advantage of "tit for tat" thus pertains only to a Hobbesian
world of rational solutions, not to a world in which humans are inherently social.[citation needed]

Example of play Cooperate Defect

Assume there are 4 agents: 2 are Tit for Tat players

("variables") and 2 are "Defectors", simply trying to Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5
maximize their own winnings by always giving evidence
against the other. Assume that each player faces the other
Defect 5, 0 1, 1
3 in a match lasting 6 games. If one player gives evidence
against a player who does not, the former gains 5 points
and the latter nets 0. If both refrain from giving evidence, Prisoner's dilemma example
both gain 3 points. If both give evidence against each
other, both gain 1 point.

When a variable faces off against a defector, the former refrains from giving evidence in the
first game while the defector does the opposite, gaining the control 5 points. In the remaining
5 games, both players give evidence against each other, netting 1 point each game. The final
score is: Defector - 10 | Variable - 5.

When the variables face off against each other, each refrains from giving evidence in all 6
games. 6 * 3 = 18 points, the final score being Variable(1) - 18 | Variable(2) - 18.

When the defectors face off, each gives evidence against the other in all 6 games. 6 * 1 = 6
points, the final score being Defector(1) - 6 | Defector(2) - 6.

The final score for each variable is 5 (game against defector(1)) + 5 (game against
defector(2)) + 18 (game against variable) = 28 points. The final score for each defector is 10
(against variable(1)) + 10 (against variable(2)) + 6 (against defector) = 26 points.

Despite the fact that the variables never won a match and the defectors never lost a match, the
variables still came out ahead, because the final score is not determined by the winner of
matches, but the scorer of points. Simply put, the variables gained more points tying with
each other than they lost to the defectors. The more variables that there are in the game, the
more advantage it is to be a variable.

(This example was taken from Piers Anthony's novel, Golem in the Gears.)

Implications
The success of the strategy, which is largely cooperative, took many by surprise. In successive
competitions various teams produced complex strategies which attempted to "cheat" in a
variety of cunning ways, but Tit for Tat eventually prevailed in every competition.

Some theorists believe this result may give insight into how groups of animals (and
particularly human societies) have come to live in largely (or entirely) cooperative societies,
rather than the individualistic "red in tooth and claw" way that might be expected from
individual engaged in a Hobbesian state of nature. This, and particularly its application to

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human society and politics, is the subject of Robert Axelrod's book The Evolution of
Cooperation.

Problems
While Axelrod has empirically shown that the strategy is optimal in some cases, two agents
playing tit for tat remain vulnerable. A one-time, single-bit error in either player's
interpretation of events can lead to an unending "death spiral". In this symmetric situation,
each side perceives itself as preferring to cooperate, if only the other side would. But each is
forced by the strategy into repeatedly punishing an opponent who continues to attack despite
being punished in every game cycle. Both sides come to think of themselves as innocent and
acting in self-defense, and their opponent as either evil or too stupid to learn to cooperate.

This situation frequently arises in real world conflicts, ranging from schoolboy fights to civil
and regional wars. Tit for two tats could be used to avoid this problem."Tit for Tat with
forgiveness" is sometimes superior. When the opponent defects, the player will occasionally
cooperate on the next move anyway. This allows for recovery from getting trapped in a cycle
of defections. The exact probability that a player will respond with cooperation depends on
the line-up of opponents.

The reason for these issues is that tit for tat is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.[1] If one
agent defects and the opponent cooperates, then both agents will end up alternating cooperate
and defect, yielding a lower payoff than if both agents were to continually cooperate. While
this subgame is not directly reachable by two agents playing tit for tat strategies, a strategy
must be a Nash equilibrium in all subgames to be subgame perfect. Further, this subgame may
be reached if any noise is allowed in the agents' signaling. A subgame perfect variant of tit for
tat known as "contrite tit for tat" may be created by employing a basic reputation mechanism.
[2]

Tit for two tats

Tit for Two Tats is similar to Tit for Tat in that it is nice, retaliating, forgiving and non-
envious, the only difference between the two being how nice the strategy is.

In a tit for tat strategy once an opponent defects, the tit for tat player immediately responds by
defecting on the next move. This has the unfortunate consequence of causing two retaliatory
strategies to continuously defect against one another resulting in a poor outcome for both
players. A tit for two tats player will let the first defection go unchallenged as a means to
avoid the "death spiral" of the previous example. If the opponent defects twice in a row, the tit
for two tats player will respond by defecting.

This strategy was put forward by Robert Axelrod during his second round of computer
simulations at RAND. After analyzing the results of the first experiment he determined that
had a participant entered the tit for two tats strategy it would have emerged with a higher
cumulative score than any other program. As a result he himself entered it with high
expectations in the second tournament. Unfortunately due to the more aggressive nature of the
programs entered in the second round, tit for two tats did significantly worse than tit for tat
due to aggressive strategies being able to take advantage of its highly forgiving nature. [citation
needed]

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 Real world use
Peer-to-peer file sharing

BitTorrent peers use Tit for Tat strategy to optimize their download speed.[3] More specifically,
most BitTorrent peers use a variant of Tit for two Tats which is called optimistic unchoking in
BitTorent terminology. BitTorrent peer have a limited number of upload slots to allocate to
other peers. Cooperation is achieved when upload bandwidth is exchanged for download
bandwidth. Consequently, when a peer's upload bandwidth is saturated, it will use a Tit for Tat
strategy. Optimistic unchoking corresponds very strongly to always cooperating on the first
move in prisoner’s dilemma. Periodically, a peer will allocate an upload slot to a randomly
chosen peer (unchoke). This is called optimistic unchoking. This allows to search for more
cooperating peers and to give a second chance to previously non-cooperating peers.

War

The tit for tat strategy has been detected by analysts in the spontaneous non-violent behaviour,
called "live and let live" that arose during the First World War. The Christmas truce of 1914
appears to be an example.

Popular culture
The tit for tat strategy was employed in an episode of Numb3rs, where FBI agents were
interrogating and attempting to obtain information from an inmate on death row. The strategy
was working, but the FBI would not implement a "tit for two tats".

References
1. ^ Gintis, Herbert (2000). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton University Press. ISBN
0691009430.
2. ^ Boyd, Robert (1989). "Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma Game". Journal of Theoretical Biology 136: 47–56. doi:10.1016/S0022-
5193(89)80188-2.

3. ^ Bram Cohen, Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent, May 22, 2003,

http://www.bittorrent.org/bittorrentecon.pdf

XVI.Traveler's dilemma
142
 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In game theory, the traveler's dilemma (sometimes abbreviated TD) is a type of non-zero-
sum game in which two players attempt to maximise their own payoff, without any concern
for the other player's payoff.

The game was formulated in 1994 by Kaushik Basu and goes as follows:[1][2]:

An airline loses two suitcases belonging to two different travelers. Both suitcases happen to
be identical and contain identical antiques. An airline manager tasked to settle the claims of
both travelers explains that the airline is liable for a maximum of $100 per suitcase, and in
order to determine an honest appraised value of the antiques the manager separates both
travelers so they can't confer, and asks them to write down the amount of their value at no
less than $2 and no larger than $100. He also tells them that if both write down the same
number, he will treat that number as the true dollar value of both suitcases and reimburse
both travelers that amount. However, if one writes down a smaller number than the other, this
smaller number will be taken as the true dollar value, and both travelers will receive that
amount along with a bonus/malus: $2 extra will be paid to the traveler who wrote down the
lower value and a $2 deduction will be taken from the person who wrote down the higher
amount. The challenge is: what strategy should both travelers follow to decide the value they
should write down?

One variation of the original traveler's dilemma in which both travelers are offered only two
integer choices, $2 or $3, is identical mathematically to the Prisoner's dilemma (often
abbreviated "PD") and thus TD can be viewed as an extension of PD. The traveler's dilemma
is also related to the game Guess 2/3 of the average in that both involve deep iterative deletion
of dominated strategies in order to demonstrate the Nash equilibrium, and that both lead to
experimental results that deviate markedly from the game-theoretical predictions.

For the traveler's dilemma, game theory predicts that both will write down the value '$2' if
their strategies were purely rational. The $2 in this instance is the Nash equilibrium point for
the game. However, when the game is played experimentally, most participants select the
value '$100' or a value close to '$100', including those who have not thought through the logic
of the decision as well as those who understand themselves to be making a non-rational
choice. Furthermore, the travelers are rewarded by deviating strongly from the Nash
equilibrium in the game and obtain much higher rewards than would be realized with the
purely rational strategy. These experiments fail to show either that most people use purely
rational strategies nor that they would be better off financially if they were to do so. The
paradox has led some to question the value of game theory in general, whilst others have
suggested that a new kind of reasoning is required to understand how it can be quite rational
ultimately to make non-rational choices.

Payoff matrix
The canonical payoff matrix is shown below (if only integer inputs are taken into account):

Canonical TD payoff matrix

143
 100 99 98 97 ⋯ 3 2

100 100, 100 97, 101 96, 100 95, 99 ⋯ 1, 5 0, 4

99 101, 97 99, 99 96, 100 95, 99 ⋯ 1, 5 0, 4

98 100, 96 100, 96 98, 98 95, 99 ⋯ 1, 5 0, 4

97 99, 95 99, 95 99, 95 97, 97 ⋯ 1, 5 0, 4

⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮

3 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 ⋯ 3, 3 0, 4

2 4, 0 4, 0 4, 0 4, 0 ⋯ 4, 0 2, 2

References
1. ^ Kaushik Basu, "The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game
Theory"; American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, pages 391-395; May 1994.
2. ^ Kaushik Basu,"The Traveler's Dilemma"; Scientific American Magazine, June 2007

Chicken (game)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The game of Chicken, also known as the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift[1] game, is an influential
model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each
player prefers not to yield to the other, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst
possible one for both players. The name "Chicken" has its origins in a game in which two
drivers drive towards each other on a collision course: one must swerve, or both may die in
the crash, but if one driver swerves and the other does not, the one who swerved will be called
a "chicken," meaning a coward; this terminology is most prevalent in the political science and
economics. The name "Hawk-Dove" refers to a situation in which there is a competition for a
shared resource and the contestants can choose either conciliation or conflict; this terminology
is most commonly used in biology and evolutionary game theory. From a game-theoretic

144
point of view, "Chicken" and "Hawk-Dove" are identical; the different names stem from
parallel development of the basic principles in different research areas. [2] The game has also
been used to describe the mutual assured destruction of nuclear warfare.[3]

The game is similar to the prisoner's dilemma game in that an "agreeable" mutual solution is
unstable since both players are individually tempted to stray from it. However, it differs in the
cost of responding to such a deviation. This means that, even in an iterated version of the
game, retaliation is ineffective, and a mixed strategy may be more appropriate.

Popular versions
The game of Chicken models two drivers, both headed for a single lane bridge from opposite
directions. The first to swerve away yields the bridge to the other. If neither player swerves,
the result is a costly deadlock in the middle of the bridge, or a potentially fatal head-on
collision. It is presumed that the best thing for each driver is to stay straight while the other
swerves (since the other is the "chicken" while a crash is avoided). Additionally, a crash is
presumed to be the worst outcome for both players. This yields a situation where each player,
in attempting to secure his best outcome, risks the worst. A similar version, under the name of
"chickie run", is a central plot element in the movie Rebel Without a Cause where the
characters played by James Dean and Corey Allen race their cars towards a cliff instead of
each other.[4]

The phrase game of Chicken is also used as a metaphor for a situation where two parties
engage in a showdown where they have nothing to gain, and only pride stops them from
backing down. Bertrand Russell famously compared the game of Chicken to nuclear
brinkmanship:

Since the nuclear stalemate became apparent, the Governments of East and West have adopted the
policy which Mr. Dulles calls 'brinkmanship'. This is a policy adapted from a sport which, I am told, is
practised by some youthful degenerates. This sport is called 'Chicken!'. It is played by choosing a long
straight road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from
opposite ends. Each car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach
each other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves from the
white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts 'Chicken!', and the one who has swerved
becomes an object of contempt. As played by irresponsible boys, this game is considered decadent and
immoral, though only the lives of the players are risked. But when the game is played by eminent
statesmen, who risk not only their own lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings,
it is thought on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and
courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible. This, of course, is absurd. Both
are to blame for playing such an incredibly dangerous game. The game may be played without
misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than
nuclear annihilation. The moment will come when neither side can face the derisive cry of 'Chicken!'
from the other side. When that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into
destruction.[3]

Brinkmanship involves the introduction of an element of uncontrollable risk: even if all

players act rationally in the face of risk, uncontrollable events can still trigger the catastrophic
outcome.[5] In the "chickie run" scene this happens when Corey Allen's character cannot
detach himself from the car and dies in the crash. The basic game-theoretic formulation of

145
Chicken has no element of risk, and is also the contraction of a dynamic situation into a one-
shot interaction.

The Hawk-Dove version of the game imagines two players (animals) contesting an indivisible
resource who can choose between two strategies, one more escalated than the other. [6] They
can use threat displays (play Dove), or physically attack each other (play Hawk). If both
players choose the Hawk strategy, then they fight until one is injured and the other wins. If
only one player chooses Hawk, then this player defeats the Dove player. If both players play
Dove, there is a tie, and each player receives a payoff lower than the profit of a hawk
defeating a dove.

Game theoretic applications

Chicken Swerve Straight
A formal version of the game of Chicken has been the
subject of serious research in game theory.[7] Two versions
Swerve 0, 0 -1, +1
of the payoff matrix for this game are presented here
(Figures 1 and 2). In Figure 1 the outcomes are -10, -
Straight +1, -1
represented in words, where each player would prefer to 10
win over tying, prefer to tie over losing, and prefer to lose
over crashing. Figure 2 presents numerical payoffs which Fig. 2: Chicken with numerical
payoffs
conform to this situation. Here the benefit of winning is 1,
the cost of losing is -1, and the cost of crashing is -10.

Both "Chicken" and "Hawk-Dove" are anti-coordination games, in which it is mutually

beneficial for the players to play different strategies. In this way it can be thought of as the
opposite of a coordination game, where playing the same strategy Pareto dominates playing
different strategies. The underlying concept is that players use a shared resource. In
coordination games, sharing the resource creates a benefit for all: the resource is non-
rivalrous, and the shared usage creates positive externalities. In anti-coordination games the
resource is rivalrous but non-excludable and sharing comes at a cost (or negative externality).

Because the "loss" of swerving is so trivial compared to the crash that occurs if nobody
swerves, the reasonable strategy would seem to be to swerve before a crash is likely. Yet,
knowing this, if one believes one's opponent to be reasonable, one may well decide not to
swerve at all, in the belief that he will be reasonable and decide to swerve, leaving the other
player the winner. This unstable situation can be formalized by saying there is more than one
Nash equilibrium, which is a pair of strategies for which neither player gains by changing his
own strategy while the other stays the same. (In this case, the pure strategy equilibria are the
two situations wherein one player swerves while the other does not.)

Hawk-Dove
Hawk Dove
In the biological literature, this game is referred to as
Hawk-Dove. The earliest presentation of a form of the Hawk X, X W, L
Hawk-Dove game was by John Maynard Smith and
George Price in their 1973 Nature paper, "The logic of Dove L, W T, T
animal conflict".[8] The traditional [6][9] payoff matrix for
Fig. 4: General Hawk-Dove game
146
the Hawk-Dove game is given in Figure 3, where V is the value of the contested resource, and
C is the cost of an escalated fight. It is (almost always) assumed that the value of the resource
is less than the cost of a fight is, i.e., C > V > 0. If C ≤ V, the resulting game is not a game of
Chicken.

The exact value of the Dove vs. Dove playoff varies between model formulations. Sometimes
the players are assumed to split the payoff equally (V/2 each), other times the payoff is
assumed to be zero (since this is the expected payoff to a war of attrition game, which is the
presumed models for a contest decided by display duration).

While the Hawk-Dove game is typically taught and discussed with the payoffs in terms of V
and C, the solutions hold true for any matrix with the payoffs in Figure 4, where
W > T > L > X.[9]

Hawk-Dove variants

Biologists have explored modified versions of classic Hawk-Dove game to investigate a

number of biologically relevant factors. These include adding variation in resource holding
potential, and differences in the value of winning to the different players, [10] allowing the
players to threaten each other before choosing moves in the game,[11] and extending the
interaction to two plays of the game.[12]

Pre-commitment

One tactic in the game is for one party to signal their intentions convincingly before the game
begins. For example, if one party were to ostentatiously disable their steering wheel just
before the match, the other party would be compelled to swerve [13]. This shows that, in some
circumstances, reducing one's own options can be a good strategy. One real-world example is
a protester who handcuffs himself to an object, so that no threat can be made which would
compel him to move (since he cannot move). Another example, taken from fiction, is found in
Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. In that film, the Russians sought to deter American attack
by building a "doomsday machine," a device that would trigger world annihilation if Russia
was hit by nuclear weapons.[14] However, the Russians failed to signal — they deployed their
doomsday machine covertly.

Players may also make non-binding threats to not swerve. This has been modeled explicitly in
the Hawk-Dove game. Such threats work, but must be wastefully costly if the threat is one of
two possible signals ("I will not swerve"/"I will swerve"), or they will be costless if there are
three or more signals (in which case the signals will function as a game of "Rock, Paper,
Scissors").[11]

Best response mapping and Nash equilibria

147
 Fig.5 - Reaction correspondences for both players in a discoordination game. Compare with
replicator dynamic vector fields below

All anti-coordination games have three Nash equilibria. Two of these are pure contingent
strategy profiles, in which each player plays one of the pair of strategies, and the other player
chooses the opposite strategy. The third one is a mixed equilibrium, in which the each player
probabilistically chooses between the two pure strategies. Either the pure, or mixed, Nash
equilibria will be evolutionarily stable strategies depending upon whether uncorrelated
asymmetries exist.

The best response mapping for all 2x2 anti-coordination games is shown in Figure 5. The
variables x and y in Figure 5 are the probabilities of playing the escalated strategy ("Hawk" or
"Don't swerve") for players X and Y respectively. The line in graph on the left shows the
optimum probability of playing the escalated strategy for player Y as a function of x. The line
in the second graph shows the optimum probability of playing the escalated strategy for
player X as a function of y (note the axes have not been rotated, and so the dependent variable
is plotted on the abscissa, and the independent variable is plotted on the ordinate). The Nash
equilibria are where the players' correspondences agree, i.e., cross. These are shown with
points in the right hand graph. The best response mappings agree (i.e., cross) at three points.
The first two Nash equilibria are in the top left and bottom right corners, where one player
chooses one strategy, the other player chooses the opposite strategy. The third Nash
equilibrium is a mixed strategy which lies along the diagonal from the bottom left to top right
corners. If the players do not know which one of them is which, then the mixed Nash is an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), as play is confined to the bottom left to top right diagonal
line. Otherwise an uncorrelated asymmetry is said to exist, and the corner Nash equilibria are
ESSes.

Strategy polymorphism vs strategy mixing

The ESS for the Hawk-Dove game is a mixed strategy. Formal game theory is indifferent to
whether this mixture is due to all players in a population choosing randomly between the two
pure strategies (a range of possible instinctive reactions for a single situation) or whether the
population is a polymorphic mixture of players dedicated to choosing a particular pure
strategy(a single reaction differing from individual to individual). Biologically, these two
options are strikingly different ideas. The Hawk-Dove game has been used as a basis for
evolutionary simulations to explore which of these two modes of mixing ought to
predominate in reality.[15]

Symmetry breaking

148
In both "Chicken" and "Hawk-Dove", the only symmetric Nash equilibrium is the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium, where both individuals randomly chose between playing
Hawk/Straight or Dove/Swerve. This mixed strategy equilibrium is often sub-optimal — both
players would do better if they could coordinate their actions in some way. This observation
has been made independently in two different contexts, with almost identical results.[16]

[edit] Correlated equilibrium and Chicken Dare Chicken

Consider the version of "Chicken" pictured in Figure 6. Dare 0,0 7,2

Like all forms of the game, there are three Nash equilibria.
The two pure strategy Nash equilibria are (D, C) and (C, Chicken 2,7 6,6
D). There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where each
player Dares with probability 1/3. Fig. 6: A version of Chicken

Now consider a third party (or some natural event) that draws one of three cards labeled: (C,
C), (D, C), and (C, D). After drawing the card the third party informs the players of the
strategy assigned to them on the card (but not the strategy assigned to their opponent).
Suppose a player is assigned D, he would not want to deviate supposing the other player
played their assigned strategy since he will get 7 (the highest payoff possible). Suppose a
player is assigned C. Then the other player will play C with probability 1/2 and D with
probability 1/2. The expected utility of Daring is 0(1/2) + 7(1/2) = 3.5 and the expected utility
of chickening out is 2(1/2) + 6(1/2) = 4. So, the player would prefer to chicken out.

Since neither player has an incentive to deviate, this probability distribution over the
strategies is known as a correlated equilibrium of the game. Notably, the expected payoff for
this equilibrium is 7(1/3) + 2(1/3) + 6(1/3) = 5 which is higher than the expected payoff of the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Uncorrelated asymmetries and solutions to the Hawk-Dove game

Although there are three Nash equilibria in the Hawk-Dove game, the one which emerges as
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends upon the existence of any uncorrelated
asymmetry in the game (in the sense of anti-coordination games). In order for row players to
choose one strategy and column players the other, the players must be able to distinguish
which role (column or row player) they have. If no such uncorrelated asymmetry exists then
both players must choose the same strategy, and the ESS will be the mixing Nash equilibrium.
If there is an uncorrelated asymmetry, then the mixing Nash is not an ESS, but the two pure,
role contingent, Nash equilibria are.

The standard biological interpretation of this uncorrelated asymmetry is that one player is the
territory owner, while the other is an intruder on the territory. In most cases, the territory
owner plays Hawk while the intruder plays Dove. In this sense, the evolution of strategies in
Hawk-Dove can be seen as the evolution of a sort of prototypical version of ownership.
Game-theoretically, however, there is nothing special about this solution. The opposite
solution — where the owner plays dove and the intruder plays Hawk — is equally stable. In
fact, this solution is present in a certain species of spider; when an invader appears the
occupying spider leaves. In order to explain the prevalence of property rights over "anti-
property rights" one must discover a way to break this additional symmetry.[16]

149
 Replicator dynamics

Fig 7a: Vector field

for two population replicator dynamics
and Hawk-Dove

Replicator dynamics is a simple model of strategy change commonly used in evolutionary

game theory. In this model, a strategy which does better than the average increases in
frequency at the expense of strategies that do worse than the average. There are two versions
of the replicator dynamics. In one version, there is a single population which plays against
itself. In another, there are two population models where each population only plays against
the other population (and not against itself).

In the one population model, the only stable state is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Every initial population proportion (except all Hawk and all Dove) converge to the mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium where part of the population plays Hawk and part of the population
plays Dove. (This occurs because the only ESS is the mixed strategy equilibrium.) In the two
population model, this mixed point becomes unstable. In fact, the only stable states in the two
population model correspond to the pure strategy equilibria, where one population is
composed of all Hawks and the other of all Doves. In this model one population becomes the
aggressive population while the other becomes passive. This model is illustrated by the vector
field pictured in Figure 7a. The one dimensional vector field of the single population model
(Figure 7b) corresponds to the bottom left to top right diagonal of the two population model.

Fig. 7b: Vector field for single population replicator dynamics

The single population model presents a situation where no uncorrelated asymmetries exist,
and so the best players can do is randomize their strategies. The two population models
provide such an asymmetry and the members of each population will then use that to correlate
their strategies. In the two population model, one population gains at the expense of another.
Hawk-Dove and Chicken thus illustrate an interesting case where the qualitative results for
the two different version of the replicator dynamics differ wildly.[17]

Related games

150
Prisoner's dilemma

"Chicken" and "Prisoner's dilemma" share the premise of

a mutually agreeable, "compromise" solution (C, C) that is C A
threatened by a Pareto dominated, "aggressive" solution
(A, A). The threat comes from the fact each player is C 3, 3 0, 5
individually better off switching to A if the other player
plays C, but if both switch they end up in (A, A). The A 5, 0 1, 1
games differ in their response to one player switching
individually. Assuming player 1 chooses A, the best Fig. 8b: Prisoner's dilemma with
response in "Prisoner's dilemma" for player 2 is to switch Nash equilibrium
to A as well, while in "Chicken" player 2 is better off
remaining in C: "Prisoner's dilemma" allows player 2 to retaliate while "Chicken" does not.
This has consequences if the game is played repeatedly: in the iterated prisoner's dilemma it is
possible for (C, C) to be stable if the threat of retaliation is credible, while in iterated game of
chicken, a stable compromise can only be achieved through brinkmanship.

Brinkmanship

"Chicken" and "Brinkmanship" are often used synonymously in the context of conflict, but in
the strict game-theoretic sense, "brinkmanship" refers to a strategic move designed to avert
the possibility of the opponent switching to aggressive behavior. The move involves a
credible threat of the risk of irrational behavior in the face of aggression. If player 1
unilaterally moves to A, a rational player 2 cannot retaliate since (A, C) is preferable to
(A, A). Only if player 1 has grounds to believe that there is sufficient risk that player 2
responds irrationally (usually by giving up control over the response, so that there is sufficient
risk that player 2 responds with A) player 1 will retract and agree on the compromise.

War of attrition

Like "Chicken", the "War of attrition" game models escalation of conflict, but they differ in
the form in which the conflict can escalate. Chicken models a situation in which the
catastrophic outcome differs in kind from the agreeable outcome, e.g., if the conflict is over
life and death. War of attrition models a situation in which the outcomes differ only in
degrees, such as a boxing match in which the contestants have to decide whether the ultimate
prize of victory is worth the ongoing cost of deteriorating health and stamina.

Notes
1. ^ 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation
2. ^ Osborne and Rubenstein (1994) p. 30.

3. ^ a b Russell (1959) p. 30.

4. ^ Fink et al. (1998).

5. ^ Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) pp. 205–222.

6. ^ a b Maynard Smith and Parker (1976).

7. ^ Rapoport and Chammah (1966) pp. 10–14 and 23–28.

151
 8. ^ Maynard Smith and Price (1973).

9. ^ a b Maynard Smith (1982).

10. ^ Hammerstein (1981).

11. ^ a b Kim (1995).

12. ^ Cressman (1995).

13. ^ Kahn (1965), cited in Rapoport and Chammah (1966)

14. ^ "DR. STRANGELOVE Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love The BOMB (Script
of movie)". Retrieved on 2007-04-29.

15. ^ Bergstrom and Goddfrey-Smith (1998)

16. ^ a b Skyrms (1996) pp. 76–79.

17. ^ Weibull (1995) pp. 183–184.

References
 Bergstrom, C.T. and Godfrey-Smith, P. (1998). "On the evolution of behavioral
heterogeneity in individuals and populations". Biology and Philosophy 13: 205–231.
doi:10.1023/A:1006588918909.
 Cressman, R. (1995). "Evolutionary Stability for Two-stage Hawk-Dove Games".
Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics 25: 145–155.
 Deutsch, M. (1974). The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive
Processes. Yale University Press, New Haven. ISBN 978-0300016833.
 Dixit, A.K. and Nalebuff, B.J. (1991). Thinking Strategically. W.W. Norton. ISBN
0393310353.
 Fink, E.C., Gates, S., Humes, B.D. (1998). Game Theory Topics: Incomplete
Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games. Sage. ISBN 0761910166.
 Hammerstein, P. (1981). "The Role of Asymmetries in Animal Contests". Animal
Behavior 29: 193–205. doi:10.1016/S0003-3472(81)80166-2.
 Kahn, H. (1965). On escalation: metaphors and scenarios. Praeger Publ. Co., New
York. ISBN 978-0313251634.
 Kim, Y-G. (1995). "Status signaling games in animal contests". Journal of Theoretical
Biology 176: 221–231. doi:10.1006/jtbi.1995.0193.
 Osborne, M.J. and Rubenstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT press. ISBN
0-262-65040-1.
 Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University
Press. ISBN 978-0521288842.
 Maynard Smith, J. and Parker, G.A. (1976). "The logic of asymmetric contests".
Animal Behaviour 24: 159–175. doi:10.1016/S0003-3472(76)80110-8.

152
  Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G.R. (1973). "The logic of animal conflict". Nature 246:
15–18. doi:10.1038/246015a0.
 Moore, C.W. (1986). The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving
Conflict. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. ISBN 978-0875896731.
 Rapoport, A. and Chammah, A.M. (1966). "The Game of Chicken". American
Behavioral Scientist 10.
 Russell, B.W. (1959). Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. George Allen and Unwin,
London. ISBN 0041720032.
 Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. New York: Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 0521555833.
 Weibull, Jörgen W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
ISBN 0-262-23181-6.

Pirate game
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

From Howard Pyle's

Book of Pirates

The pirate game is a simple mathematical game. It illustrates how, if assumptions

conforming to a homo economicus model of human behaviour hold, outcomes may be
surprising. It is a multi-player version of the ultimatum game.

153
The Game
There are five rational pirates, A, B, C, D and E. They find 100 gold coins. They must decide
how to distribute them.

The Pirates have a strict order of seniority: A is superior to B, who is superior to C, who is
superior to D, who is superior to E.

The Pirate world's rules of distribution are thus: that the most senior pirate should propose a
distribution of coins. The pirates should then vote on whether to accept this distribution; the
proposer is able to vote, and has the casting vote in the event of a tie. If the proposed
allocation is approved by vote, it happens. If not, the proposer is thrown overboard from the
pirate ship and dies, and the next most senior pirate makes a new proposal to begin the system
again.

Pirates base their decisions on three factors. First of all, each pirate wants to survive.
Secondly, each pirate wants to maximize the amount of gold coins he receives. Thirdly, each
pirate would prefer to throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be equal.[1]

The Result
It might be expected intuitively that Pirate A will have to allocate little if any to himself for
fear of being voted off so that there are fewer pirates to share between. However, this is as far
from the theoretical result as is possible.

This is apparent if we work backwards: if all except D and E have been thrown overboard, D
proposes 100 for himself and 0 for E. He has the casting vote, and so this is the allocation.

If there are three left (C, D and E) C knows that D will offer E 0 in the next round; therefore,
C has to offer E 1 coin in this round to make E vote with him, and get his allocation through.
Therefore, when only three are left the allocation is C:99, D:0, E:1.

If B, C, D and E remain, B knows this when he makes his decision. To avoid being thrown
overboard, he can simply offer 1 to D. Because he has the casting vote, the support only by D
is sufficient. Thus he proposes B:99, C:0, D:1, E:0. One might consider proposing B:99, C:0,
D:0, E:1, as E knows he won't get more, if any, if he throws B overboard. But, as each pirate
is eager to throw each other overboard, E would prefer to kill B, to get the same amount of
gold from C.

Assuming A knows all these things, he can count on C and E's support for the following
allocation, which is the final solution:

 A: 98 coins
 B: 0 coins
 C: 1 coin
 D: 0 coins
 E: 1 coin[1]

154
Also, A:98, B:0, C:0, D:1, E:1 or other variants are not good enough, as D would rather throw
A overboard to get the same amount of gold from B.

Extension
The game can easily be extended to up to 200 pirates (or further if you increase the amount of
gold). Ian Stewart extended it to an arbitrary number of pirates in the May 1999 edition of
Scientific American, with further interesting results.[1]

References
1. ^ a b c Stewart, Ian (1999-05), "A Puzzle for Pirates", Scientific American: 98–99,
http://euclid.trentu.ca/math/bz/pirates_gold.pdf

Dictator game
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The dictator game is a very simple game in experimental economics, similar to the
ultimatum game. Experimental results in the dictator game have often been cited as a
conclusive rebuttal of the rationally self-interested individual (homo economicus) model of
economic behavior,[1] although this conclusion is controversial.[2]

In the dictator game, the first player, "the proposer", determines an allocation (split) of some
endowment (such as a cash prize). The second player, the "responder", simply receives the
remainder of the endowment not allocated by the proposer to himself. The responder's role is
entirely passive (he has no strategic input into the outcome of the game). As a result, the
dictator game is not formally a game at all (as the term is used in game theory). To be a game,
every player's outcome must depend on the actions of at least some others. Since the
proposer's outcome depends only on his own actions, this situation is one of decision theory
and not game theory. Despite this formal point, the dictator game is used in the game theory
literature as a degenerate game.

This "game" has been used to test the homo economicus model of individual behavior: if
individuals were only concerned with their own economic well being, proposers (acting as
dictators) would allocate the entire good to themselves and give nothing to the responder.
Experimental results have indicated that individuals often allocate money to the responders,
reducing the amount of money they receive. [3] These results appear robust, Henrich, et al.
discovered in a wide cross cultural study that proposers do allocate a non-zero share of the
endowment to the responder.[1]

If these experiments appropriately reflect individuals' preferences outside of the laboratory,

these results appear to demonstrate that either:

1. Proposers fail to maximize their own expected utility, or

2. Proposer's utility functions include benefits received by others.

155
Additional experiments have shown that subjects maintain a high degree of consistency across
multiple versions of the dictator game in which the cost of giving varies. [4] This suggests that
dictator game behavior is, in fact, altruism instead of the failure of optimizing behavior. Other
experiments have shown a relationship between political participation and dictator game
giving, suggesting that it may be an externally valid indicator of concern for the well-being of
others.[5][6]

Challenges
Some authors have suggested that giving in the dictator game does not entail that individuals
wish to maximize other's benefit (altruism). Instead they suggest that individuals have some
negative utility associated with being seen as greedy, and are avoiding this judgment by the
experimenter. Some experiments have been performed to test this hypothesis with mixed
results.[7]

Further experiments testing experimental effects have been performed. Bardsley has
performed experiments where individuals are given the opportunity to give money, give
nothing, or take money from the respondent.[2] In these cases most individuals far from
showing altruism actually take money. And comparing the taking games with dictator games
which start from the same endowments, most people who give in the dictator game would
take in a taking game. Bardsley suggests two interpretations for these results. First, it may be
that the range of options provides different cues to experimental subjects about what is
expected of them. "Subjects might perceive dictator games as being about giving, since they
can either do nothing or give, and so ask themselves how much to give. Whilst the taking
game... might appear to be about taking for analogous reasons, so subjects ask themselves
how much to take."[2] On this interpretation dictator game giving is a response to demand
characteristics of the experiment. Second, subjects' behavior may be affected by a kind of
framing effect. What a subject considers to be an appropriately kind behavior depends on the
range of behaviors available. In the taking game, the range includes worse alternatives than
the dictator game. As a result giving less, or even taking, may appear equally kind.

Trust game
The trust game extends the dictator game one step by having the reward that the dictator can
(unilaterally) split between himself and a partner partially decided by an initial gift from that
partner. The initial move is from the dictator's partner, who must decide how much of his or
her initial endowment to trust with him (in the hopes of receiving some of it back). Normally,
he is encouraged to give something to the dictator through a specification in the game's rules
that her endowment will be increased by a factor from the researchers. The experiments rarely
end in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of "no trust". In fact, a recent pair of studies of
identical and fraternal twins in the USA and Sweden suggests that behavior in this game is
heritable.[8]

References
1. ^ a b Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and
Herbert Gintis (2004) Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and
Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press.

156
 2. ^ a b c Bardsley, Nicholas. (2005) "Altruism or artifact? A Note on Dictator Game
Giving" CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2005-10.
3. ^ For example, Bolton, Katok, Zwick 1998, "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness
versus acts of kindness" International Journal of Game Theory 27:2 (Article Abstract).
This paper includes a review of dictator games going back to 1994 (Forsythe R,
Horowitz JL, Savin NE, Sefton M, 1994 Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. in
Games and Economic Behavior). For an overview see Camerer, Colin (2003)
Behavioral Game Theory Princeton University Press, Princeton.
4. ^ Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of
the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism." Econometrica 70:2, 737-753.
5. ^ Fowler JH, Kam CD "Beyond the Self: Altruism, Social Identity, and Political
Participation," Journal of Politics 69 (3): 811-825 (August 2007)
6. ^ Fowler JH. "Altruism and Turnout," Journal of Politics 68 (3): 674-683 (August
2006)
7. ^ Hoffman Elizabeth, McCabe Kevin, Shachat Keith and Smith Vernon (1994)
"Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games" Games and
Economic Behavior 7(3): 346-380 and Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick
(1998) "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness" [1]
International Journal of Game Theory 27:269-299.
8. ^ Cesarini, David; Christopher T. Dawes, James H. Fowler, Magnus Johannesson,
Paul Lichtenstein, Björn Wallace (11 March 2008). "Heritability of Cooperative
Behavior in the Trust Game". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105
(10): 3721-3726. doi:10.1073/pnas.0710069105,
http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/heritability_of_cooperative_behavior.pdf.

Further reading
 Haley, K.; D. Fessler (2005). "Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an
anonymous economic game". Evolution and Human Behaviour 26: 245–256.
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002. Concludes that people tend to be more
generous if there is a picture of a pair of eyes watching them.

 For a recent review of the dictator game in experiments see Angela A. Stanton:
Evolving Economics: Synthesis

DEADLOCK
(IMPASUL)

Description

157
The simplest of William Poundstone's social dilemmas in which the
each player has a dominant strategy and the equilibrium is Pareto
optimal. The only thing qualifying it as a social dilemma is the
arbitrary assignment of labels to the strategies. Similar to the
Prisoner's Dilemma, each player hopes for the other to cooperate,
but neither does. However, unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
resulting equilibrium is Pareto optimal.

Example

Player 2

cooperate defect

cooperate 1,1 0,3

Player 1
defect 3,0 2,2

General Form

Player 2

L R

U a,w b,x
Player 1
D c,y d,z

Where the following relations hold:

c>d>a>b
x>z>w>y

updated: 12 August 2005

MATCHING PENNIES
Meciul banilor

Scenario
To determine who is required to do the nightly chores, two children
first select who will be represented by "same" and who will be
represented by "different." Then, each child conceals in her palm a
penny either with its face up or face down. Both coins are revealed
simultaneously. If they match (both are heads or both are tails), the

158
child "same" wins. If they are different (one heads and one tails),
"different" wins. The game is equivalent to "odds or evens" and quite
similar to a three strategy version - rock, paper, scissors.

Description
The game is zero sum. The only equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Each plays each strategy with equal probability, resulting in an
expected payoff of zero for each player.

Example

same

heads tails

heads -1,1 1,-1

different
tails 1,-1 -1,1

General Form

Player 2

L R

U a,w b,x
Player 1
D c,y d,z

Where the following relations hold:

c = b = -a = -d
w = z = -x = -y

updated: 12 August 2005

Matching pennies
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Heads Tails
Matching pennies is the name for a simple example game
used in game theory. It is the two strategy equivalent of
Heads +1, -1 -1, +1
Rock, Paper, Scissors. Matching pennies, also called the
Pesky Little Brother Game or Parity Game, is used Tails -1, +1 +1, -1
primarily to illustrate the concept of mixed strategies and
Matching pennies
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

159
The game is played between two players, Player A and Player B. Each player has a penny and
must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails. The players then reveal their choices
simultaneously. If the pennies match (both heads or both tails), Player A receives one dollar
from Player B (+1 for A, -1 for B). If the pennies do not match (one heads and one tails),
Player B receives one dollar from Player A (-1 for A, +1 for B). This is an example of a zero-
sum game, where one player's gain is exactly equal to the other player's loss.

The game can be written in a payoff matrix (pictured right). Each cell of the matrix shows the
two players' payoffs, with Player A's payoffs listed first.

This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium since there is no pure strategy (heads or
tails) that is a best response to a best response. Alternatively, there is no strategy set where
neither player would want to switch when told what the other would do. Instead, the unique
Nash equilibrium of this game is in mixed strategies: each player chooses heads or tails with
equal probability. In this way, each player makes the other indifferent between choosing heads
or tails, so neither player has an incentive to try another strategy.

Of course, most human players cannot or will not faithfully apply the equilibrium strategy,
especially if Matching pennies is played repeatedly. In a repeated game, if one is sufficiently
adept at psychology, it may be possible to predict the opponent's move and choose
accordingly, in the same manner as expert Rock, Paper, Scissors players. In this way, a
positive expected payoff might be attainable, whereas against an opponent who plays the
equilibrium, one's expected payoff is zero.

The matching pennies game is mathematically equivalent to a game children play called
"choosing" or "odds and evens", where two players simultaneously display one or two fingers,
with the winner determined by whether or not the number of fingers match. Again, the only
strategy for these games to avoid being exploited is to play the equilibrium.

Tragedy of the commons

Tragedia comunelor
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The Tragedy of the Commons" is an influential article discussing the commons dilemma; it
was written by Garrett Hardin and first published in the journal Science in 1968.[1] The article
describes a dilemma in which multiple individuals acting independently in their own self-
interest can ultimately destroy a shared resource even where it is clear that it is not in anyone's
long term interest for this to happen. The essence of the commons dilemma has been
discussed by theorists since ancient history, but not under that name. It has also been studied
more recently, such as in game theory.

Central to Hardin's article is a metaphor of herders sharing a common parcel of land (the
commons), on which they are all entitled to let their cows graze. In Hardin's view, it is in each
herder's interest to put as many cows as possible onto the land, even if the commons is
damaged as a result. The herder receives all of the benefits from the additional cows, while

160
the damage to the commons is shared by the entire group. If all herders make this individually
rational decision, however, the commons is destroyed and all herders suffer.

Hardin's article has been variously interpreted either as an argument for the privatization of
community assets or for increased government regulation.[citation needed]

Garrett Hardin's essay

Precis

At the beginning of his essay, Hardin draws attention to problems that cannot be solved by
technical means (i.e., as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the
techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human
values or ideas of morality"). Hardin contends that this class of problems includes many of
those raised by human population growth and the use of the Earth's natural resources.

To make the case for "no technical solutions", Hardin notes the limits placed on the
availability of energy (and material resources) on Earth, and also the consequences of these
limits for "quality of life". To maximize population, one needs to minimize resources spent on
anything other than simple survival, and vice versa. Consequently, he concludes that there is
no foreseeable technical solution to increasing both human populations and their standard of
living on a finite planet.

From this point, Hardin switches to non-technical or resource management solutions to

population and resource problems. As a means of illustrating these, he introduces a
hypothetical example of a pasture shared by local herders. The herders are assumed to wish to
maximize their yield, and so will increase their herd size whenever possible. The utility of
each additional animal has both a positive and negative component:

 Positive: the herder receives all of the proceeds from each additional animal.
 Negative: the pasture is slightly degraded by each additional animal.

Crucially, the division of these costs and benefits is unequal: the individual herder gains all of
the advantage, but the disadvantage is shared among all herders using the pasture.
Consequently, for an individual herder the rational course of action is to continue to add
additional animals to his or her herd. However, since all herders reach the same rational
conclusion, overgrazing and degradation of the pasture is its long-term fate. Nonetheless, the
rational response for an individual remains the same at every stage, since the gain is always
greater to each herder than the individual share of the distributed cost. The overgrazing cost
here is an example of an externality.

Because this sequence of events follows predictably from the behaviour of the individuals
concerned, Hardin describes it as a "tragedy".

In the course of his essay, Hardin develops the theme, drawing in examples of latter day
"commons", such as the atmosphere, oceans, rivers, fish stocks, national parks, advertising,
and even parking meters. The example of fish stocks had led some to call this the "tragedy of

161
the fishers".[2] A major theme running throughout the essay is the growth of human
populations, with the Earth's resources being a general commons.

The essay also addresses potential management solutions to commons problems including
privatization, polluter pays, and regulation. Keeping with his original pasture analogy, Hardin
categorises these as effectively the "enclosure" of commons, and notes a historical
progression from the use of all resources as commons (unregulated access to all) to systems in
which commons are "enclosed" and subject to differing methods of regulated use in which
access is prohibited or controlled. Hardin argues against relying on conscience as a means of
policing the commons, suggesting that this favours selfish individuals – often known as free
riders – over those who are more altruistic.

In the context of avoiding over-exploitation of common resources, Hardin concludes by

restating Hegel's maxim (which was actually written by Engels), "liberty is the recognition of
want." He suggests that "liberty" completes the tragedy of the commons. By recognising
resources as commons in the first place, and by recognising that, as such, they require
management, Hardin believes that humans "can preserve and nurture other and more precious
freedoms."

Aside from its subject matter (resource use), the essay is notable (at least in modern scientific
circles) for explicitly dealing with issues of morality, and doing so in one of the scientific
community's premier journals, Science. Indeed, the subtitle for the essay is "The population
problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality."

Meaning

The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite
resource ultimately dooms the resource through over-exploitation. This occurs because the
benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to
maximize use of the resource to the point in which they become reliant on it, while the costs
of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available (which may be a
wider class of individuals than those who are exploiting it). This, in turn, causes demand for
the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball to the point that the resource is
exhausted. The rate at which exhaustion of the resource is realized depends primarily on three
factors: the number of users wanting to consume the commons, the consumptiveness of theirs
uses, and the relative robustness of the commons.[3]

Like William Lloyd and Thomas Malthus before him, Hardin was primarily interested in the
problem of human population growth. In his essay he also focused on the use of larger
(though still limited) resources such as the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, as well as pointing
out the "negative commons" of pollution (i.e., instead of dealing with the deliberate
privatisation of a positive resource, a "negative commons" deals with the deliberate
commonisation of a negative cost, pollution).

As a metaphor, the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The phrase is
shorthand for a structural relationship and the consequences of that relationship, not a precise
description of it. The "tragedy" should not be seen as tragic in the conventional sense, nor
must it be taken as condemnation of the processes that are ascribed to it. Similarly, Hardin's
use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading Hardin to later remark that he
should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons".[4]

162
The tragedy of the commons has particular relevance in analyzing behaviour in the fields of
economics, evolutionary psychology, game theory, politics, taxation, and sociology. Some
also see it as an example of emergent behaviour, with the "tragedy" the outcome of individual
interactions in a complex system.

Controversy

Even today, Hardin's essay is a source of controversy. Some of this controversy stems from
disagreement over whether individuals will always behave in the selfish fashion posited by
Hardin. Others have argued that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to
cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests.
Hardin's piece has also been used to promote the interests of Western economic ideology. G.
N. Appell, an anthropologist, states: "Hardin's claim has been embraced as a sacred text by
scholars and professionals in the practice of designing futures for others and imposing their
own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have
incomplete understanding and knowledge."[5]

More significantly, controversy has been fueled by the "application" of Hardin's ideas to real
situations. In particular, some authorities have read Hardin's work as specifically advocating
the privatization of commonly owned resources. Consequently, resources that have
traditionally been managed communally by local organisations have been enclosed or
privatized. Ostensibly, this serves to "protect" such resources, but it ignores the pre-existing
management, often appropriating resources and alienating indigenous (and frequently poor)
populations. In effect, private or state use may result in worse outcomes than the previous
commons management.[6] As Hardin's essay focuses on resources that are fundamentally
unmanaged rather than communally managed, this may be a mischaracterisation of his ideas,
given that Hardin discussed how usage of public property could be controlled in a number of
different ways to stop or limit over-usage.

Hardin's advocacy of clearly defined property rights has frequently been misread as an
argument for privatization, or private property, per se. The opposite situation to a tragedy of
the commons is sometimes referred to as a tragedy of the anticommons: a situation where
rational individuals (acting separately) collectively waste a given resource by under-utilizing
it.

Precedents
In practice, related theories have been described by authors throughout history. Thucydides
(ca. 460 B.C.-ca. 395 B.C.), for example, expressed the concept thus: "[T]hey devote a very
small fraction of time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution
of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come to his neglect, that it is
the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion
being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays." [7] Aristotle (384
B.C.-322 B.C.) similarly argued "That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in
which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the
other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the
proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon

163
it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he
is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more
inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants
are often less useful than a few."[8]

More recently, William Forster Lloyd noted the comparison with medieval village land
holding in his 1833 book on population.[9]

Such a notion is not merely an abstraction, but its consequences have manifested literally in
such common grounds as Boston Common, where overgrazing led to discontinuation of the
common's use as public grazing ground.[10]

Application
Modern commons

"The Tragedy of the Commons" can be applied to environmental issues such as sustainability.
The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society
today, such as water, land, fish, and non-renewable energy sources like oil and coal. When
water is used at a higher rate than the reservoirs are replenished, fish consumption exceeds its
reproductive capacity, or oil supplies are exhausted, then we face a tragedy of the commons.

Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction
of the Grand Banks, the destruction of salmon runs on rivers which have been dammed – most
prominently in modern times on the Columbia River in the Northwest United States, and
historically in North Atlantic rivers – the devastation of the sturgeon fishery – in modern
Russia, but historically in the United States as well – and, in terms of water supply, the limited
water available in arid regions (e.g., the area of the Aral Sea) and the Los Angeles water
system supply, especially at Mono Lake and Owens Lake.

Other situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include pollution caused by
driving cars. There are many negative externalities of driving; these include congestion,
carbon emissions, and traffic accidents. Every time Arthur gets in a car, it becomes more
likely that Zelda – and millions of others – will suffer in each of those areas.[11]

More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:

 Planet Earth
o Uncontrolled human population growth leading to overpopulation.[1]

o Water - Water pollution, Water crisis of over-extraction of groundwater and

wasting water due to overirrigation[12]
o Forests - Frontier logging of old growth forest and slash and burn[13]

o Energy resources and climate - Burning of fossil fuels and consequential global
warming
o Animals - Habitat destruction and poaching leading to the Holocene mass
extinction[14]

164
 o Oceans - Overfishing[15]

 Public resources
o Radio frequencies - Unlicensed frequencies used for wireless communications
especially 802.11 a/b/g, detailed under Part 15 (FCC rules) are vulnerable to
the overuse of high power transmitters, especially overdriven transmitters with
dirty signal profiles, and especially when combined with omnidirectional
antennas

Modern solutions

Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of political
philosophy. The most common solution is regulation by an authority. Frequently, such
regulation is in the form of governmental regulations limiting the amount of a common good
available for use by any individual. Permit systems for extractive economic activities
including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising and timber extraction are examples of
this approach. Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on
behalf of the commons. Alternatively, resource users themselves can cooperate to conserve
the resource in the name of mutual benefit.

Another solution for certain resources is to convert common good into private property,
giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability. Effectively, this is what took
place in the English "Enclosure of the Commons". Increasingly, many agrarian studies
scholars advocate studying traditional commons management systems to understand how
common resources can be protected without alienating those whose livelihoods depend upon
them.

Libertarians and classical liberals often cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of
what happens when Lockean property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a
government.[16][17][18] These people argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to
allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, privatizing it. [19] In
1940 Ludwig von Mises wrote concerning the problem:

If land is not owned by anybody, although legal formalism may call it public property, it is used
without any regard to the disadvantages resulting. Those who are in a position to appropriate to
themselves the returns — lumber and game of the forests, fish of the water areas, and mineral deposits
of the subsoil — do not bother about the later effects of their mode of exploitation. For them, erosion
of the soil, depletion of the exhaustible resources and other impairments of the future utilization are
external costs not entering into their calculation of input and output. They cut down trees without any
regard for fresh shoots or reforestation. In hunting and fishing, they do not shrink from methods
preventing the repopulation of the hunting and fishing grounds. [20]

Critics of this solution have pointed out that many commons, such as the ozone layer or global
fish populations, would be extremely difficult or impossible to privatize.[citation needed]

Psychologist Dennis Fox used a number, what is now termed "Dunbar's number", to take a
new look at the tragedy of the commons. In a 1985 paper titled "Psychology, Ideology,
Utopia, & the Commons", he stated "Edney (1980, 1981a) also argued that long-term
solutions will require, among a number of other approaches, breaking down the commons into
smaller segments. He reviewed experimental data showing that cooperative behavior is indeed

165
more common in smaller groups. After estimating that "the upper limit for a simple, self-
contained, sustaining, well-functioning commons may be as low as 150 people" (1981a, p.
27).

The Coast Salish managed their natural resources in a place-based system where families
were responsible for looking after a place and its resources. [21] Access to food was the major
source of wealth and the empowerment of generosity was highly valued so it made sense for
them to take care of the resources.

A popular solution to the problem is also the "Coasian" one, where the people using the
commons support one another so not to destroy the resource.

In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be
based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to
breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, Managing the Commons, co-
written with John A. Baden.[22] He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the
"reproductive right" in order to safeguard all other rights. Only one large country has adopted
this policy, the People's Republic of China. In the essay, Hardin had rejected education as an
effective means of stemming population growth. Since that time, it has been shown that
increased educational and economic opportunities for women correlates well with reduced
birthrates in most countries, as does economic growth in general.[citation needed]

Application to evolutionary biology

A parallel was drawn recently [23] between the tragedy of the commons and the competing
behaviour of parasites that through acting selfishly eventually diminish or destroy their
common host.

Application to social evolution

A tragedy of the commons is brought about by selfish individuals whose genes for selfish
behaviour would therefore come to predominate, so the metaphor cannot explain how altruism
arises. This question is addressed instead by models of possible mechanisms that can give rise
to "reciprocal altruism", leading to ideas like the "tit for tat" rule (reciprocation). These
models freed evolutionary theory from the limitations imposed by the concept of "inclusive
fitness", a previous explanation for altruism, which proposed that organisms help others only
to the extent that by doing so they increase the probability of passing shared genes to the next
generation.

The idea has been applied to other areas of sociobiology and behavioral ecology, such as in
the evolution of virulence or sexual conflict, where males may fatally harm females when
competing for matings.[24] It is also raised as a question in studies of social insects, where
scientists wish to understand why insect workers do not undermine the "common good" by
laying eggs of their own and causing a breakdown of the society.

The idea of evolutionary suicide, where adaptation at the level of the individual causes the
whole species or population to be driven extinct, can be seen as an extreme form of an
evolutionary tragedy of the commons.

The commons dilemma

166
The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term
selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the common good. In
academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or
aspects of it, including resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common pool resource.

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities
are likely to under- or over-harvest common resources in both the laboratory and field.
Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural
factors that might be conducive to commons management.

In game theory, which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic
situations, the corresponding "game", developed by the ecologist Garrett Hardin, is known as
the Commonize Costs — Privatize Profits Game (CC–PP game).

Motivational factors

First, the research shows that some people are more motivated than others to manage the
common resource responsibly. Using the commons dilemma game, researchers found that
people with "prosocial" value orientations harvest less from a resource during a period of
scarcity. "Prosocial" individuals are also more inclined to engage in sustainable environmental
behaviours such as taking public transport (instead of an automobile), conserving energy and
water, and explaining their decisions in terms of environmental impact.[citation needed]

Motivation to conserve a common resource is also promoted by people’s group ties. When
people identify with their group, they are more likely to exercise personal restraint, as well as
compensate for greedy harvest decisions of ingroup members more so than outgroup
members.[citation needed] Similarly, in the field, strongly knit communities are usually better at
managing resource shortages than communities with weak social ties. Group identity may
promote a long-term perspective on resource management, which makes it easier for people to
sacrifice their immediate interest on behalf of their local community. Group identification
may also increase the social interdependencies between community members, so that they
care more for the social rewards and punishments of their community.

The state of the common resource can also shape motivations. Research has manipulated the
reasons that people were given for resource overuse. When greedy people were seen as
causing the depletion, participants were more greedy than when there was deemed to be a
natural cause (such as a sudden drought). Resource uncertainty further contributes to over-
harvesting. In commons dilemmas, uncertainty about the pool size tends to increase individual
harvesting and expectations about how much other people harvest. When there is uncertainty,
people overestimate the size of the resource and perceive greater variability in how much
other people take. Similarly, uncertainty about the replenishment rate of the pool also
increases harvesting. The most likely explanation is that people have an optimistic bias. In the
fisheries example, each individual prefers to maximize their profits by fishing without limits.
However, it is better for the group as a whole if everyone limits how much they fish so that
there will be enough fish next year.[25]

Strategic factors

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Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the
order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people
harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to
a predetermined sequence – first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter
games: the harvests of those who come first – the leaders – are higher than the harvest of
those coming later – the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel
entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule,
whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule. Another strategic factor is
the ability to build up reputations. Research found that people take less from the common
pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest
less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.

Structural factors

Much research has focused on when and why people would like to structurally rearrange the
commons to prevent a tragedy. Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons
that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all".[26] One of the proposed solutions is to appoint
a leader to regulate access to the commons. Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a
common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a
difficult task. Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the
group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. There is a general
aversion against autocratic leadership, although it may be an effective solution, possibly
because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.

Another structural solution is the privatization of the commons, which has been very effective
in experimental and field research. However, privitatization raises concerns about social
justice, as not everyone may be able to get an equal share. It also may erode people's personal
and social motivations to cooperate in preserving a resource.[citation needed]

The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common
resources. Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water
and energy conservation – for example, through installing water and electricity meters in
houses. Selective rewards work provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental
carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to
organize a carpool.[citation needed] Much field research on commons dilemmas has combined
solutions obtained in experimental research.[citation needed] Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues
looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land
irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to
successful resource management. One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable
boundaries (e.g., land) can be preserved much easier. A second factor is resource dependence;
there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion, and it must be difficult to find
substitutes. The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a
thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better. [citation needed] A final
condition is that there are appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with
built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse.

Notes

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1. ^ a b Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (December
13, 1968), pp. 1243-1248. Also available here and here.
2. ^ Samuel Bowles: Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton
University Press, pp. 27–29 (2004) ISBN 0691091633

3. ^ Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons Tragic Institutions | Environmental Law | Vol. 37

(2007), pp. 515-571 at 536

4. ^ Will commons sense dawn again in time? | The Japan Times Online

5. ^ Appell, G. N. (1993). Hardin's Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual

Confusions. Working Paper 8. Phillips, ME: Social Transformation and Adaptation Research
Institute.

6. ^ Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David
Policansky (1999): Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, in: Science,
Vol. 284, 9 April, pp. 278-282.

7. ^ Thucydides (ca. 460 B.C.-ca. 395 B.C.), History of the Peloponnesian War, Book I, Sec.
141; translated by Richard Crawley (London: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton &
Co., 1910).

8. ^ Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.), Politics, Book II, Chapter III, 1261b; translated by Benjamin
Jowett as The Politics of Aristotle: Translated into English with Introduction, Marginal
Analysis, Essays, Notes and Indices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), Vol. 1 of 2. See also
here, here, here or here.

9. ^ William Forster Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1833).

10. ^ Loewen, James. Lies Across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong. New York: The
New Press, 1999. p. 414 ISBN 0965003172

11. ^ Stephen J. Dunber and Steven D. Levitt "Not-So-Free-Ride" The New York Times

12. ^ I.A. Shiklomanov, Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources, Water International
25(1): 11-32 (2000)

13. ^ * Wilson, E.O., 2002, The Future of Life, Vintage ISBN 0-679-76811-4

14. ^ Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996, The Sixth Extinction : Patterns of Life and the
Future of Humankind, Anchor, ISBN 0-385-46809-1

15. ^ ch 11-12. Mark Kurlansky, 1997. Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World,
New York: Walker, ISBN 0-8027-1326-2.

16. ^ Robert J. Smith, "Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property
Rights in Wildlife", Cato Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 439-468.

17. ^ Murray N. Rothbard, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution", Cato Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1
(Spring 1982), pp. 55-100. Also available here.

18. ^ "Free-Market Environmentalism Reading List", The Commons Blog.

19. ^ John Locke, "Sect. 27" and following sections in Second Treatise of Government (1690).
Also available here.

20. ^ Ludwig von Mises, Part IV, Chapter 10, Sec. VI, Nationalökonomie: Theorie des Handelns
und Wirtschaftens (Geneva: Editions Union, 1940). The quote provided is that of Mises's

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 expanded English translation, Chapter XXIII: "The Data of the Market", Sec. 6: "The Limits
of Property Rights and the Problems of External Costs and External Economies", Human
Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949). Also available
here.

21. ^ http://www.coastalrevelations.com/images/news/Traditional_Ecological_Knowledge.pdf

22. ^ Managing the Commons by Garrett Hardin and John Baden

23. ^ The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and
excludability in evolutionary biology Francisco Dionisio and Isabel Gordo Evolutionary
Ecology Research 2006

24. ^ Sex, death and tragedy Daniel J. Rankin and Hanna Kokko Laboratory of Ecological and
Evolutionary Dynamics May 2006

25. ^ http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/061.html

26. ^ Hardin, 1244

References
 Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., & Hogg, M. (1999). Resolving social
dilemmas. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
 Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
 Messick, D. M., Wilke, H. A. M., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P. E., & Lui,
L. (1983). Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social
dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 294 309.
 Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Van Vugt, M. (2001). Community identification moderating the impact of financial
incentives in a natural social dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27,
1440-1449.
 Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Meertens, R. M. and Joireman, J. A. (1996). Why
structural solutions to social dilemmas might fail: A field experiment on the first
carpool priority lane in Europe. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59, 364-374.

Further reading
 Hardin, G. (May 1998). "Extensions of "The Tragedy of the Commons"". Science 280
(5364): 682–683. doi:10.1126/science.280.5364.682.
 Hardin, G. (1994). "The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons". Trends in Ecology &
Evolution 9: 199.
 Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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 The Tragedy of the Commons
Garrett Hardin

The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality.

The author is professor of biology, University of California, Santa Barbara. This article is based on a
presidential address presented before the meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science at Utah State University, Logan, 25 June 1968.

At the end of a thoughtful article on the future of nuclear war, Wiesner and York (1)
concluded that: "Both sides in the arms race are ... confronted by the dilemma of steadily
increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. It is our considered
professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers
continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to
worsen the situation."

I would like to focus your attention not on the subject of the article (national security in a
nuclear world) but on the kind of conclusion they reached, namely that there is no technical
solution to the problem. An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published
in professional and semipopular scientific journals is that the problem under discussion has a
technical solution. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in
the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in
human values or ideas of morality.

In our day (though not in earlier times) technical solutions are always welcome. Because of
previous failures in prophecy, it takes courage to assert that a desired technical solution is not
possible. Wiesner and York exhibited this courage; publishing in a science journal, they
insisted that the solution to the problem was not to be found in the natural sciences. They
cautiously qualified their statement with the phrase, "It is our considered professional
judgment... ." Whether they were right or not is not the concern of the present article. Rather,
the concern here is with the important concept of a class of human problems which can be
called "no technical solution problems," and, more specifically, with the identification and
discussion of one of these.

It is easy to show that the class is not a null class. Recall the game of tick-tack-toe. Consider
the problem, "How can I win the game of tick-tack-toe?" It is well known that I cannot, if I
assume (in keeping with the conventions of game theory) that my opponent understands the
game perfectly. Put another way, there is no "technical solution" to the problem. I can win
only by giving a radical meaning to the word "win." I can hit my opponent over the head; or I
can drug him; or I can falsify the records. Every way in which I "win" involves, in some
sense, an abandonment of the game, as we intuitively understand it. (I can also, of course,
openly abandon the game--refuse to play it. This is what most adults do.)

The class of "No technical solution problems" has members. My thesis is that the "population
problem," as conventionally conceived, is a member of this class. How it is conventionally
conceived needs some comment. It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the
population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the evils of overpopulation without
relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy. They think that farming the seas or
developing new strains of wheat will solve the problem--technologically. I try to show here

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that the solution they seek cannot be found. The population problem cannot be solved in a
technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game of tick-tack-toe.

WHAT SHALL WE MAXIMIZE?

Population, as Malthus said, naturally tends to grow "geometrically," or, as we would now
say, exponentially. In a finite world this means that the per capita share of the world's goods
must steadily decrease. Is ours a finite world?

A fair defense can be put forward for the view that the world is infinite; or that we do not
know that it is not. But, in terms of the practical problems that we must face in the next few
generations with the foreseeable technology, it is clear that we will greatly increase human
misery if we do not, during the immediate future, assume that the world available to the
terrestrial human population is finite. "Space" is no escape (2).

A finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must
eventually equal zero. (The case of perpetual wide fluctuations above and below zero is a
trivial variant that need not be discussed.) When this condition is met, what will be the
situation of mankind? Specifically, can Bentham's goal of "the greatest good for the greatest
number" be realized?

No--for two reasons, each sufficient by itself. The first is a theoretical one. It is not
mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time. This was
clearly stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (3), but the principle is implicit in the theory
of partial differential equations, dating back at least to D'Alembert (1717-1783).

The second reason springs directly from biological facts. To live, any organism must have a
source of energy (for example, food). This energy is utilized for two purposes: mere
maintenance and work. For man, maintenance of life requires about 1600 kilocalories a day
("maintenance calories"). Anything that he does over and above merely staying alive will be
defined as work, and is supported by "work calories" which he takes in. Work calories are
used not only for what we call work in common speech; they are also required for all forms of
enjoyment, from swimming and automobile racing to playing music and writing poetry. If our
goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: We must make the work
calories per person approach as close to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no
sports, no music, no literature, no art. ... I think that everyone will grant, without argument or
proof, that maximizing population does not maximize goods. Bentham's goal is impossible.

In reaching this conclusion I have made the usual assumption that it is the acquisition of
energy that is the problem. The appearance of atomic energy has led some to question this
assumption. However, given an infinite source of energy, population growth still produces an
inescapable problem. The problem of the acquisition of energy is replaced by the problem of
its dissipation, as J. H. Fremlin has so wittily shown (4). The arithmetic signs in the analysis
are, as it were, reversed; but Bentham's goal is still unobtainable.

The optimum population is, then, less than the maximum. The difficulty of defining the
optimum is enormous; so far as I know, no one has seriously tackled this problem. Reaching
an acceptable and stable solution will surely require more than one generation of hard
analytical work--and much persuasion.

We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to
another it is ski lodges for thousands. To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to

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shoot; to another it is factory land. Comparing one good with another is, we usually say,
impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared.

Theoretically this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a
criterion of judgment and a system of weighting are needed. In nature the criterion is survival.
Is it better for a species to be small and hideable, or large and powerful? Natural selection
commensurates the incommensurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural
weighting of the values of the variables.

Man must imitate this process. There is no doubt that in fact he already does, but
unconsciously. It is when the hidden decisions are made explicit that the arguments begin. The
problem for the years ahead is to work out an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic
effects, nonlinear variation, and difficulties in discounting the future make the intellectual
problem difficult, but not (in principle) insoluble.

Has any cultural group solved this practical problem at the present time, even on an intuitive
level? One simple fact proves that none has: there is no prosperous population in the world
today that has, and has had for some time, a growth rate of zero. Any people that has
intuitively identified its optimum point will soon reach it, after which its growth rate becomes
and remains zero.

Of course, a positive growth rate might be taken as evidence that a population is below its
optimum. However, by any reasonable standards, the most rapidly growing populations on
earth today are (in general) the most miserable. This association (which need not be
invariable) casts doubt on the optimistic assumption that the positive growth rate of a
population is evidence that it has yet to reach its optimum.

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicitly
exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. In economic affairs,
The Wealth of Nations (1776) popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who
"intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote . . . the public
interest" (5). Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did
any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since
interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that
decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this
assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-faire in
reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so
as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine
our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible.

TRAGEDY OF FREEDOM IN A COMMONS

The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first
sketched in a little-known pamphlet (6) in 1833 by a mathematical amateur named William
Forster Lloyd (1794-1852). We may well call it "the tragedy of the commons," using the word
"tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead used it (7): "The essence of dramatic tragedy is not
unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things." He then goes
on to say, "This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by
incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape
can be made evident in the drama."

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The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such
an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars,
poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the
long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more
or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my
herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.

1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman
receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly
+1.

2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more
animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative
utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of 1.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only
sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of
the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned
thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial (8). The
individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a
whole, of which he is a part, suffers.

Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing, but the inexorable
succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.

A simple incident that occurred a few years ago in Leominster, Massachusetts, shows how
perishable the knowledge is. During the Christmas shopping season the parking meters
downtown were covered with plastic bags that bore tags reading: "Do not open until after
Christmas. Free parking courtesy of the mayor and city council." In other words, facing the
prospect of an increased demand for already scarce space. the city fathers reinstituted the
system of the commons. (Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost by
this retrogressive act.)

In an approximate way, the logic of the commons has been understood for a long time,
perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate.
But it is understood mostly only in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized. Even
at this late date, cattlemen leasing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more
than an ambivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring federal authorities to increase the
head count to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance. Likewise,
the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons.

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Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas."
Professing to believe in the "inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after
species of fish and whales closer to extinction (9).

The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the
commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in
extent--there is only one Yosemite Valley--whereas population seems to grow without limit.
The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to
treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone.

What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We
might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might
be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as
defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come,
first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable
possibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose--or acquiesce in the destruction
of the commons that we call our National Parks.

POLLUTION
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is
not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in--sewage,
or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air,
and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight. The calculations of
utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the
wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before
releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our
own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.

The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something
formally like it. But the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the
tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws
or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge
them untreated. We have not progressed as far with the solution of this problem as we have
with the first. Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us from
exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a factory on the
bank of a stream--whose property extends to the middle of the stream, often has difficulty
seeing why it is not his natural right to muddy the waters flowing past his door. The law,
always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly
perceived aspect of the commons.

The pollution problem is a consequence of population. It did not much matter how a lonely
American frontiersman disposed of his waste. "Flowing water purifies itself every 10 miles,"
my grandfather used to say, and the myth was near enough to the truth when he was a boy, for
there were not too many people. But as population became denser, the natural chemical and
biological recycling processes became overloaded, calling for a redefinition of property rights.

HOW TO LEGISLATE TEMPERANCE?

Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally
recognized principle of morality, namely: the morality of an act is a function of the state of the
system at the time it is performed (10). Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the
general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public, the same behavior in a

175
metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American
bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not in
any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be
appalled at such behavior.

In passing, it is worth noting that the morality of an act cannot be determined from a
photograph. One does not know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to the
grassland is harming others until one knows the total system in which his act appears. "One
picture is worth a thousand words," said an ancient Chinese; but it may take 10,000 words to
validate it. It is as tempting to ecologists as it is to reformers in general to try to persuade
others by way of the photographic shortcut. But the essense of an argument cannot be
photographed: it must be presented rationally--in words.

That morality is system-sensitive escaped the attention of most codifiers of ethics in the past.
"Thou shalt not . . ." is the form of traditional ethical directives which make no allowance for
particular circumstances. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient ethics, and
therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world. Our epicyclic
solution is to augment statutory law with administrative law. Since it is practically impossible
to spell out all the conditions under which it is safe to burn trash in the back yard or to run an
automobile without smog-control, by law we delegate the details to bureaus. The result is
administrative law, which is rightly feared for an ancient reason--Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?--"Who shall watch the watchers themselves?" John Adams said that we must have
"a government of laws and not men." Bureau administrators, trying to evaluate the morality of
acts in the total system, are singularly liable to corruption, producing a government by men,
not laws.

Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to enforce); but how do we legislate
temperance? Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best through the mediation of
administrative law. We limit possibilities unnecessarily if we suppose that the sentiment of
Quis custodiet denies us the use of administrative law. We should rather retain the phrase as a
perpetual reminder of fearful dangers we cannot avoid. The great challenge facing us now is to
invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways
to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks.

FREEDOM TO BREED IS INTOLERABLE

The tragedy of the commons is involved in population problems in another way. In a world
governed solely by the principle of "dog eat dog"--if indeed there ever was such a world--how
many children a family had would not be a matter of public concern. Parents who bred too
exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care
adequately for their children. David Lack and others have found that such a negative feedback
demonstrably controls the fecundity of birds (11). But men are not birds, and have not acted
like them for millenniums, at least.

If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; if the children of
improvident parents starved to death; if, thus, overbreeding brought its own "punishment" to
the germ line--then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families.
But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state (12), and hence is confronted with
another aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

In a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family, the religion, the race, or the class (or
indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group) that adopts overbreeding as a policy to secure

176
its own aggrandizement (13)? To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that
everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of
action.

Unfortunately this is just the course of action that is being pursued by the United Nations. In
late 1967, some 30 nations agreed to the following (14):

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and
fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of
the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.

It is painful to have to deny categorically the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as
uncomfortable as a resident of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the
17th century. At the present time, in liberal quarters, something like a taboo acts to inhibit
criticism of the United Nations. There is a feeling that the United Nations is "our last and best
hope," that we shouldn't find fault with it; we shouldn't play into the hands of the
archconservatives. However, let us not forget what Robert Louis Stevenson said: "The truth
that is suppressed by friends is the readiest weapon of the enemy." If we love the truth we
must openly deny the validity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is
promoted by the United Nations. We should also join with Kingsley Davis (15) in attempting
to get Planned Parenthood-World Population to see the error of its ways in embracing the same
tragic ideal.

CONSCIENCE IS SELF-ELIMINATING
It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an
appeal to conscience. Charles Galton Darwin made this point when he spoke on the centennial
of the publication of his grandfather's great book. The argument is straightforward and
Darwinian.

People vary. Confronted with appeals to limit breeding, some people will undoubtedly
respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger
fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. The difference
will be accentuated, generation by generation.

In C. G. Darwin's words: "It may well be that it would take hundreds of generations for the
progenitive instinct to develop in this way, but if it should do so, nature would have taken her
revenge, and the variety Homo contracipiens would become extinct and would be replaced by
the variety Homo progenitivus" (16).

The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children (no matter which) is
hereditary--but hereditary only in the most general formal sense. The result will be the same
whether the attitude is transmitted through germ cells, or exosomatically, to use A. J. Lotka's
term. (If one denies the latter possibility as well as the former, then what's the point of
education?) The argument has here been stated in the context of the population problem, but it
applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a
commons to restrain himself for the general good--by means of his conscience. To make such
an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from
the race.

PATHOGENIC EFFECTS OF CONSCIENCE

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The long-term disadvantage of an appeal to conscience should be enough to condemn it; but
has serious short-term disadvantages as well. If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to
desist "in the name of conscience," what are we saying to him? What does he hear? --not only
at the moment but also in the wee small hours of the night when, half asleep, he remembers
not merely the words we used but also the nonverbal communication cues we gave him
unawares? Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two
communications, and that they are contradictory: (i) (intended communication) "If you don't
do as we ask, we will openly condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen"; (ii) (the
unintended communication) "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a
simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons."

Everyman then is caught in what Bateson has called a "double bind." Bateson and his co-
workers have made a plausible case for viewing the double bind as an important causative
factor in the genesis of schizophrenia (17). The double bind may not always be so damaging,
but it always endangers the mental health of anyone to whom it is applied. "A bad
conscience," said Nietzsche, "is a kind of illness."

To conjure up a conscience in others is tempting to anyone who wishes to extend his control
beyond the legal limits. Leaders at the highest level succumb to this temptation. Has any
President during the past generation failed to call on labor unions to moderate voluntarily their
demands for higher wages, or to steel companies to honor voluntary guidelines on prices? I
can recall none. The rhetoric used on such occasions is designed to produce feelings of guilt in
noncooperators.

For centuries it was assumed without proof that guilt was a valuable, perhaps even an
indispensable, ingredient of the civilized life. Now, in this post-Freudian world, we doubt it.

Paul Goodman speaks from the modern point of view when he says: "No good has ever come
from feeling guilty, neither intelligence, policy, nor compassion. The guilty do not pay
attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests, which might
make sense, but to their anxieties" (18).

One does not have to be a professional psychiatrist to see the consequences of anxiety. We in
the Western world are just emerging from a dreadful two-centuries-long Dark Ages of Eros
that was sustained partly by prohibition laws, but perhaps more effectively by the anxiety-
generating mechanism of education. Alex Comfort has told the story well in The Anxiety
Makers (19); it is not a pretty one.

Since proof is difficult, we may even concede that the results of anxiety may sometimes, from
certain points of view, be desirable. The larger question we should ask is whether, as a matter
of policy, we should ever encourage the use of a technique the tendency (if not the intention)
of which is psychologically pathogenic. We hear much talk these days of responsible
parenthood; the coupled words are incorporated into the titles of some organizations devoted
to birth control. Some people have proposed massive propaganda campaigns to instill
responsibility into the nation's (or the world's) breeders. But what is the meaning of the word
responsibility in this context? Is it not merely a synonym for the word conscience? When we
use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to
browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest? Responsibility is a
verbal counterfeit for a substantial quid pro quo. It is an attempt to get something for nothing.

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If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in the sense Charles Frankel
uses it (20). "Responsibility," says this philosopher, "is the product of definite social
arrangements." Notice that Frankel calls for social arrangements--not propaganda.

MUTUAL COERCION MUTUALLY AGREED UPON

The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of
some sort. Consider bank-robbing. The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank
were a commons. How do we prevent such action? Certainly not by trying to control his
behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rather than rely on
propaganda we follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the
definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons. That we thereby
infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret.

The morality of bank-robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete

prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say "Thou shalt not rob banks," without
providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created by coercion. Taxing is a good
coercive device. To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we
introduce parking meters for short periods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We need not
actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need merely make it increasingly
expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what we offer
him. A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word
coercion.

Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-
letter words, its dirtiness can be cleansed away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and
over without apology or embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary
decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its
meaning. The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by
the majority of the people affected.

To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even
to pretend we enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble about them. But we accept
compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless.
We institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror
of the commons.

An alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable. With real estate and
other material goods, the alternative we have chosen is the institution of private property
coupled with legal inheritance. Is this system perfectly just? As a genetically trained biologist
I deny that it is. It seems to me that, if there are to be differences in individual inheritance,
legal possession should be perfectly correlated with biological inheritance--that those who are
biologically more fit to be the custodians of property and power should legally inherit more.
But genetic recombination continually makes a mockery of the doctrine of "like father, like
son" implicit in our laws of legal inheritance. An idiot can inherit millions, and a trust fund
can keep his estate intact. We must admit that our legal system of private property plus
inheritance is unjust--but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that
anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to
contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.

It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is
thoughtlessly governed by a double standard. Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is

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often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has
pointed out (21), worshippers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible
without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact. As nearly as I can
make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious
assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that the choice we face is between reform
and no action; if the proposed reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all,
while we wait for a perfect proposal.

But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is also action.
It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its
discoverable advantages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience. On the basis of
such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable
assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable.

RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY
Perhaps the simplest summary of this analysis of man's population problems is this: the
commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density.
As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect
after another.

First we abandoned the commons in food gathering, enclosing farm land and restricting
pastures and hunting and fishing areas. These restrictions are still not complete throughout the
world.

Somewhat later we saw that the commons as a place for waste disposal would also have to be
abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domestic sewage are widely accepted in the
Western world; we are still struggling to close the commons to pollution by automobiles,
factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing operations, and atomic energy installations.

In a still more embryonic state is our recognition of the evils of the commons in matters of
pleasure. There is almost no restriction on the propagation of sound waves in the public
medium. The shopping public is assaulted with mindless music, without its consent. Our
government is paying out billions of dollars to create supersonic transport which will disturb
50,000 people for every one person who is whisked from coast to coast 3 hours faster.
Advertisers muddy the airwaves of radio and television and pollute the view of travelers. We
are a long way from outlawing the commons in matters of pleasure. Is this because our Puritan
inheritance makes us view pleasure as something of a sin, and pain (that is, the pollution of
advertising) as the sign of virtue?

Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal
liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary
complains of a loss. It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of
"rights" and "freedom" fill the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually
agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so. Individuals
locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin once they see the
necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel
who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity."

The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of
abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of

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overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all. At the moment, to avoid hard
decisions many of us are tempted to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood.
The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences
selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the
short.

The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by
relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. "Freedom is the recognition of
necessity"--and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the
freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

REFERENCES

1. J. B. Wiesner and H. F. York, Sci. Amer. 211 (No. 4), 27 (1964).

2. G. Hardin, J. Hered. 50, 68 (1959) ; S. von Hoernor, Science 137, 18 (1962) .
3. J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1947), p.11.
4. J. H. Fremlin, New Sci., No. 415 (1964), p. 285.
5. A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Modern Library, New York, 1937), p. 423.
6. W. F. Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford,
England, 1833), reprinted (in part) in Population, Evolution, and Birth Control, G. Hardin,
Ed. (Freeman, San Francisco, 1964), p. 37.
7. A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Mentor, New York, 1948), p. 17.
8. G. Hardin, Ed. Population, Evolution, and Birth Control (Freeman, San Francisco,
1964), p. 56.
9. S. McVay, Sci. Amer. 216 (No. 8), 13 (1966).
10. J. Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Westminster, Philadelphia, 1966).
11. D. Lack, The Natural Regulation of Animal Numbers (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1954).
12. H. Girvetz, From Wealth to Welfare (Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, Calif., 1950).
13. G. Hardin, Perspec. Biol. Med. 6, 366 (1963).
14. U. Thant, Int. Planned Parenthood News, No. 168 (February 1968), p. 3.
15. K. Davis, Science 158, 730 (1967) .
16. S. Tax, Ed., Evolution after Darwin (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960), vol. 2, p.
469.
17. G. Bateson, D. D. Jackson, J. Haley, J. Weakland, Behav. Sci. 1, 251 (1956) .
18. P. Goodman, New York Rev. Books 10(8), 22 (23 May 1968).
19. A. Comfort, The Anxiety Makers (Nelson, London, 1967).

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20. C. Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (Harper, New York, 1955), p. 203.
21. J. D. Roslansky, Genetics and the Future of Man (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New
York, 1966), p. 177.

School-Based Conflict Management

A summary of a thesis by Mahduri Pendharkar (1995)

This report by Madhuri Pendharkar includes a summary of a thesis entitled The Effects of
Instruction in Conflict Resolution on the Attitudes About Conflict of Rural Grade Eight
Students. Also included are background information on the evolution of school-based conflict
management and peer mediation programs, information about the content and benefits of
these programs, and a list of resources for student activities. Managing conflict at school has
been an age-old challenge for educators. Recently, attention has been drawn to the level of
violence in schools and society. Initiating a conflict management or peer mediation program
can be a proactive way to address concerns about violence. Conflicts are a natural part of life
and therefore a natural part of school life. Learning to deal constructively with conflict is a
life-skill students need. When students learn to resolve their own conflicts, the atmosphere at
school is more pleasant for everyone. Teachers can spend more time teaching and students
can spend more time learning.

Introduction

How can educators help students become responsible adults? Over the past decade or more,
the focus of instruction has been evolving to make classrooms more conducive to student
empowerment. Students are being encouraged to take part in planning and evaluating their
own learning. Chart 1 details some of the changes in curricular focus.

Paradigm Shift (Saskatchewan Education, 1993)

Traditional
Focus on content
Passive learning
Teacher-centred
Single text book
One teaching method

Evolving
Balance of content and process
Active learning
Child-centred
Resource based learning
A variety of teaching methods

A similar shift in behaviour management strategies is needed to reflect these curricular

changes. In traditional models of discipline, adults are responsible for managing student

182
behaviour. Students are expected to follow the rules or live with the consequences. Since
instruction is no longer strictly teacher-directed, it seems reasonable that neither should
classroom behaviour be strictly teacher-managed. If we want students to develop into
responsible adults who can work cooperatively and constructively with others, we must teach
the interpersonal skills required and give students opportunities to practice these skills. Many
educators searching for ways to enhance constructive interpersonal skills have discovered that
school-based conflict management and mediation programs can provide a structure for
students to acquire these skills.

Background to the Problem

Schools have traditionally been expected to teach children academic skills. Schools are also
places where students interact with one another, their teachers, and educational administrators.
Many educators believe student behaviour affects academic achievement; therefore, negative
behaviour has always been a concern to educators. In the last decade, the concern about
student behaviour has escalated to alarm (Boothe, Bradley, Flick, Keough, & Kirk, 1993).
Negative interactions may lead to learning problems because students who spend time arguing
and fighting have little time or energy for academic pursuits.

Traditional disciplinary practices include various forms of punishment based on the

assumption that if negative behaviours are eliminated, the classroom climate will be
conducive to learning. Many models of traditional discipline include building positive rapport
with students to reduce negative interactions. "Logical" or "natural" consequences are used to
extinguish negative behaviour when it arises (Canter & Canter, 1992; Dreikurs, Grunwald &
Pepper, 1982). Consequences usually begin with a warning, followed, in sequence, by an in-
class time-out, segregation from peers and missing a recess. They escalate to noon-hour or
after school detention. The most serious offences require parent meetings and suspensions.
After numerous disciplinary interactions, a student may be permanently expelled.

In traditional models of discipline, adults are responsible for managing student behaviour.
Students are expected to follow the rules or live with the consequences. They seem to be
expected to behave in a socially appropriate manner with little opportunity to practice
responsibility. Critics of traditional disciplinary practices believe that the emphasis on
punishment "thwarts development of student responsibility, leadership, independence and
interdependence" (Dreyfuss, 1990, p 22).

Negative social behaviours seem related to low academic achievement. Seventy-six percent of
American school administrators who responded to a survey on school violence reported that
low-achieving students are the most likely perpetrators of school violence (Boothe et al.,
1993). It seems logical that if negative social behaviours of students were reduced and
replaced by positive ones, academic achievement would be enhanced.

As the job market has become more and more competitive, high school graduation has
become a minimum requirement for all students. Academic skills are judged as important but
the ability to work cooperatively and constructively with peers and supervisors has become as
important. A growing body of research suggests that although many students do not possess
the social skills necessary to interact cooperatively and constructively, these skills can be
taught (Goldstein, 1988). Educators searching for a way to reduce negative interactions and
increase positive ones are finding that school-based conflict management and mediation
programs can provide a structure for students to acquire positive interaction skills (Van Slyck

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& Stern, 1991). Improved social skills can help students achieve success at school and in the
marketplace.

Conflict Resolution and Peer Mediation

During the Peace Movement of the 1960s and 1970s several community-based dispute
resolution centers emerged across the United States and Canada. These centers promote
mediation as a speedy, humane, and less expensive alternative to the courts (Duffy, Grosch &
Olczak, 1991). The process of mediation is based on the concept of "win/win" solutions
(resolutions that address the needs of both disputants). Community-based dispute resolution
centers typically mediate landlord-tenant matters, environmental concerns, family and divorce
cases and a variety of other community problems. They try to assist disputants to reach
agreements through mediation rather than litigation. Participants typically report satisfaction
with the process and outcome and are often more accepting of the outcome than parties who
seek justice in the courts (Duffy et al. 1991). Since the early 1980s, the number of community
dispute resolution agencies has increased. Many have developed and promoted school-based
conflict resolution programs (Roderick, 1988).

The first school-based conflict resolution program began in New York City in 1972. Peer
medication programs appeared by the early 1980s in San Francisco, Chicago and New York.
In Canada, the first high school peer mediation program was initiated in Ottawa in 1987.
Presently, there are over 350 conflict resolution programs in schools in the United States and
programs have been initiated in most Canadian provinces (Picard, 1990).

Rationale

Students need to know how to manage and resolve conflicts if they are to become responsible
members of schools and of society. Some educators believe competence in conflict resolution
skills can lead to increased social and academic achievement in the short run and a more
harmonious world in the long run (Van Slyck & Stern, 1991). These skills should be
incorporated into existing curricular areas for the following reasons:

1. Escalating violence in schools is a concern to educators and to the general public. It seems
that many young people do not acquire the skills on peaceful conflict resolution on their own
or from their families; therefore, there are some good reasons for thinking these skills should
be taught.

2. Students who lack conflict resolution skills often spend more time and energy in negative
interactions with peers and teachers than in attaining the goals of the curriculum. Negative
interactions often lead to consequences such as time-out, in-school suspension, suspension,
and so on. Levin (1990) found a high correlation between number of disciplinary
interventions and the risk of dropping out of school. High school completion is a basic
requirement for entry into the work force, so schools must teach the skills that students
require.

3. Saskatchewan Education, Training and Employment has mandated that the Common
Essential Learnings (CELs) be incorporated into the education of each and every
Saskatchewan student. The CELs are a set of six interrelated areas containing understandings,
values, skills and processes that are considered important foundations for learning in all
school subjects (Saskatchewan Education, 1988). Instruction in conflict resolution can be a

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way to weave three of the six CELs into the classroom; specifically: (a) Critical and Creative
Thinking: during the process of resolving conflicts students learn to generate and evaluate
creative solutions. (b) Personal and Social Values and Skills: students learn to analyze
conflicts from many points of view and to resolve conflicts in mutually satisfying ways. Also,
self-reliance is promoted. Adult intervention is not required when students can resolve their
disputes. (c) Communication: students learn to use neutral language (discuss issues without
taking sides), express needs and feelings, and maintain open lines of communication as ways
to nurture relationships.

4. When students resolve their disputes, educators spend less time dealing with discipline
problems, leaving more time to assist students with academic pursuits.

5. Students, in their adolescent years, value the opinions of their peer group above other
reference groups (Seltzer, 1989). Conflict management and peer mediation programs
capitalize on the importance of peers in the lives of typical students.

Conflict Management Programs:

Possible Benefits

For School Staff

* Less time is spent on settling student disputes
* Reduces tension among students and staff
* Better staff/student relationships leads to improved school climate

For All Students

* Active involvement in the problem-solving process
* Increases commitment to making solutions work
* Provides positive modelling for solving problems
* Increases student responsibility for solving problems
* Decreases adult intervention in conflicts
* Encourages open communication
* Teaches students positive ways to meet personal needs

For Peer Mediators

* Develops leadership skills
* Enhances communication skills
* Often results in improved academic performance
* Improves self-esteem
* Increases status with peers
* Refines strategies to solve problems

For Families
* Conflict resolution skills learned at school can be used at home with parents and siblings

For Society
* Could lead to fewer violent acts
* Constructive conflict resolution skills could be applied to family life and to the work place
when students become adults

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 Statement of Problem

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of teaching conflict resolution skills on
student attitudes about conflict. The research questions were:

1. Can instruction in conflict resolution skills affect students' attitudes about conflict?

2. Do male and female students respond differently to instruction designed to enhance their
conflict resolution skills?

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following definitions were used:

Conflict. Tension between two or more social entities (individuals, groups, or larger
organizations) that arises from incompatibility of actual or desired responses (Raven &
Kruglanski, 1970).

Attitude. A relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation

predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner (Rokeach, 1962).

Confrontation. A physical or verbal attack used to solve a conflict. The use of confrontation
usually results in a "win-lose" solution: one of the parties is believed to be right; the other is
believed to be wrong. (Sadalla, Henriquez & Holmberg, 1987)

Conflict Resolution Skills. Skills needed to identify and deal with conflicts constructively.
These skills include using neutral language, active listening, identifying and understanding
distinct points of view, identifying problems, and negotiating and mediating to resolve
disputes.

"Win-win" Solutions. Resolving conflicts in ways that address and meet the needs of all
conflicting parties.

Peer Mediation. A structured process used to enable trained pairs of students to act as
mediators to help resolve disputes among members of their peer group. Peer mediation is an
alternative to disciplinary programs used in most schools. Students and teachers are taught
conflict resolution skills so that they can help others resolve conflicts.

Common Essential Learnings (CELs). A set of six interrelated areas containing

understandings, values, skills and processes which are considered important as foundations
for learning in all school subjects. The six CELs are: Communication, Numeracy, Critical and
Creative Thinking, Technological Literacy, Personal and Social Values and Skills, and
Independent learning (Saskatchewan Education, 1988).

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This review of the literature is presented under the following subheadings: background on
teaching social skills, effects of instructional intervention on student behaviour, gender

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differences and behavioural intervention, and school-based conflict resolution and peer
mediation programs. Literature related to peer counselling was excluded because it is not an
instructional intervention.

Background on Teaching Social Skills

Social skills are socially acceptable learned behaviours that enable a person to interact with
others in ways that elicit positive responses and assist in avoiding negative responses
(Cartledge & Milburn, 1986). The techniques used to successfully resolve conflicts are social
skills. Glasser (1985) suggested that many children exhibit negative behaviours at school
because they lack the skills necessary to use positive behaviours to meet their basic needs.
The skills necessary to interact in a constructive and cooperative manner may not have been
developed for several reasons: (a) Changes in the traditional family structure have reduced
children's exposure to parents who model constructive conflict resolution. In some cases, both
parents work and have limited time to interact with family members. In other cases, children
live with a single parent. In such cases, children may have limited exposure to positive models
of adults resolving conflicts. (b) Changes in popular culture expose children to negative
models of conflict resolution. For example, popular movies and television shows often portray
violence as a glamorous and effective way to solve problems. Limited constructive social
skills among youth is a major concern for parents, educators, and society.

In recent years, research related to improving students' interactive skills has focused on
training students in positive behaviours. Most research has been in special education and has
examined the impact of social skills or interpersonal problem-solving training. While the
movement to teach conflict resolution and peer mediation skills appears to have developed
independently of the movement promoting instruction in social skills to students who are
dysfunctional in the classroom, the movements share two common assumptions: (a) many
students lack appropriate interaction skills, and (b) positive interaction skills can be
successfully taught to students. The first seems to be conventional wisdom: few parents or
educators disagree that many children lack appropriate interaction skills. The second
assumption continues to be questioned: can inappropriate attitudes and behaviour be
influenced by intervention?

Effects of Instructional Intervention on Student Behaviour

Research in this review involves pre-adolescents and adolescents who are learning disabled,
behaviour or conduct disordered, delinquent, socially withdrawn, mildly mentally
handicapped or at risk for school suspension. These populations were selected because they
most closely resemble the target population of this study.

Bandura (cited in Goldstein, 1988) found that three major components were necessary to
teach children new social skills: (a) appropriate behaviour must be modeled, preferably by
several people in a variety of situations, (b) learners must be given opportunities to practise
the behaviour with necessary guidance until they perform it "skillfully and spontaneously,"
and (c) learners must be rewarded for successfully using the new behaviours outside of the
training environment. The first two requirements are common in most social skills,
interpersonal problem-solving and conflict resolution curricula (Goldstein, 1988; Schrumpf,
Crawford & Usadel, 1991); the third is more difficult to provide. It is presumed that students
using constructive interpersonal skills will be rewarded socially by improved peer
relationships.

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Social skills and interpersonal problem-solving training have been part of special education
for over two decades. Research on the effectiveness of these programs continues to be mixed.
Gresham (cited in Coleman, Wheeler & Webber, 1993) suggested that to evaluate the
effectiveness of interpersonal skills training accurately, three categories of outcomes must be
examined: (a) problem-solving or cognitive measures, indicating knowledge of the skills
taught, (b) behaviour ratings, indicating more global and stable patterns of behaviour, and (c)
direct observation of behaviour.

A significant body of research shows intervention can affect the depth of knowledge of skills
taught, fewer studies report significant effects on behaviour ratings, and even fewer show the
behaviour of students changed as a result of intervention (Coleman et al., 1993; McIntosh,
Vaughn & Zaragoza, 1991). In spite of the large number of studies on the effectiveness of
interpersonal skills intervention, researchers do not agree on its effectiveness. For example, in
a review of nine studies of the effects of interpersonal problem-solving training, Coleman et
al., (1993), concluded the "basic assumption that problem-solving training mediates social
behaviour and automatically generalizes to a variety of behaviours and settings is not
supported by these findings" (p. 26). On the other hand, Torrey, Vassa, Maag and Kramer
(1992) found that "social skills training can produce durable and generalized improvement in
students' interpersonal functioning" (p. 254).

Several factors seem to affect the effectiveness of social skills or interpersonal problem-
solving training.

1. Setting and Severity of Disorder. Students who were taught in resource room settings for
part of the day with primary placement in regular classrooms showed more effects than
students enrolled in segregated special education classes (McIntosh et al., 1991). Students
with severe disorders showed fewer effects than students with mild disorders (Coleman et al.,
1993). This could mean that heterogeneous groups of students would be even more receptive
to intervention than students with mild disorders.

2. Length of Intervention. More instructional time generally resulted in more significant

effects (McIntosh et al., 1991; Coleman et al., 1993).

3. Selection Procedures for Participants. Studies that targeted students identified as deficient
in social skills showed more effects than studies that targeted whole groups of exceptional
children, regardless of personal characteristics (McIntosh et al., 1991; Coleman et al., 1993).

4. Teaching Strategies Used. Studies using cognitive behaviour modification (including

coaching, modelling, roleplaying, feedback, and mnemonic strategies) were more effective
than those without these elements (McIntosh et al., 1991).

5. Accompanying Interventions. Combining social skills or interpersonal problem-solving

training with other interventions may be more effective than relying on one strategy alone.
Ninness, Fuerst and Rutherford (1991) coupled social skills training with self-management
strategies to alter the behaviour of three emotionally disturbed adolescents. Trapani and
Gettinger (1989) reported improved communication skills and standardized spelling scores for
preadolescent boys with learning disabilities as a result of social skills training paired with
cross-age tutoring.

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In conclusion, it appears that curricular intervention can effect the attitudes and behaviours of
exceptional populations. Although further research is needed, teachers continue to use
interpersonal skills training. It is possible that curricular intervention can be more effective
with heterogeneous populations.

Gender Differences and Behavioural Intervention

In our society, males tend to exhibit more acting out, aggressive behaviours than females. For
example, over 90% of all violent criminal offenses are committed by men (London Family
Court Clinic, 1993). Researchers suggest that schools reflect society in this behavioural trend.
In a study investigating the communication and conflict resolution strategy development of
high school youth, McDowell (1990) found females tended to integrate arguments and offer
tradeoffs to reach solutions while males tended to assert their opinions forcefully and
preferred to assume control or dominate arguments. The Canadian Panel on Violence Against
Women (cited in London Family Court Clinic, 1993) reported that many girls feel unsafe in
school and report a high level of violence, harassment, and sexism. Males, it seems, are more
likely to use open confrontation to address conflicts than females. It is possible that females
use less observable emotional tactics to deal with conflicts.

Males and females may respond differently to behavioural interventions. In a study

investigating the effectiveness of interpersonal skills training on self-reported conflict
resolution styles of Grade 11 students, trained females used nonconfrontational strategies
more often than nontrained females. The same effect was not noted for trained males
(McFarland & Culp, 1992). Many of the studies of social skills intervention and conflict
resolution instruction did not investigate gender differences; therefore, more research is
needed to confirm if gender differences exist in this area.

Boys are targeted for behavioural intervention more often than girls. Several studies targeting
boys report positive results. Weist, Borden, Finney and Ollendick (1991) reported that two
eleven year old boys with interpersonal problems were trained in specific social skills that
were generalized to untrained role-play scenes with novel partners. A preventative treatment
program for 172 disruptive primary-aged boys resulted in less fighting and theft than for
untreated boys with similar characteristics (Tremblay McCord, Boileau & Charlebois, 1991).
Similar results were reported about intervention with boys with behavioural disorders (Sasso,
Melloy & Kavale, 1990), boys with learning disabilities (Trapani & Gettinger, 1989), and
boys who were juvenile offenders (Hains, 1989).

In conclusion, males tend to be more aggressive than females. Some evidence suggests that
females are more receptive to instruction in interpersonal skills than males; however, as
indicated by a large body of literature, intervention with males can also be successful.

Conflict Resolution and Peer Mediation Programs

More than 350 schools in the United States and Canada have implemented some form of
instruction in conflict resolution and peer mediation for students. The number of school-based
conflict resolution programs grows yearly. To date, research to assess the effectiveness of
these programs has been inconclusive.

According to Van Slyck and Stern (1991) many studies documented have been characterized
by "a lack of methodological rigor" and the lack of appropriate control groups, the failure to

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control for pretreatment differences, the ignoring of possible placebo effects, the failure to use
standardized, reliable, and valid quantitative instruments, and over reliance on unvalidated,
qualitative data. (p. 267)

Criticism of studies of school based conflict resolution programs has also been directed at the
research questions. Johnson, Johnson and Dudley (1992) report these studies "focused on
identifying how many conflicts occurred within secondary schools, how many students were
involved, and whether peer mediation resulted in an agreement". They state that the impact of
conflict management training programs on students' ability to manage conflicts had not been
studied prior to their study in 1992.

In spite of shortcomings in research methods, Van Slyck and Stern (1991) suggested the
consistent results lend credibility to the findings of these studies. A review of several of these
programs follows.

The Law and Public Service Magnet High School was established in Cleveland in 1982. In
this school, students are included in the governance process, and a school-based peer
mediation program has been established (Dreyfuss, 1990). As well as incorporating peer
mediation into the curriculum and discipline continuum, students participate in a learning
experience in the community in each of their four years in high school. School administrators
reported that mediation saved "about half of the time they had traditionally spent resolving
student-to-student conflicts". The director of the program observed:

We saw the climate of the school become one where the student ethos rejected fights as a way
of settling disputes; where students held each other accountable for their behaviour; where
students dealt openly and effectively with anger, fear, and aggression; and where students
used their school-learned skills of conflict resolution to provide service in the community. (p
23)

Students became so skilled at handling disputes that, in many cases, mediation was no longer
necessary.

In San Francisco, the Community Board began school-based mediation in 1982 (Davis &
Porter, 1985). The program has three major components: (a) A conflict resolution course is
taught in high schools. It includes experiential exercises, reading and discussion, and specific
activities on interpersonal communication, assertiveness, one-to-one conflict resolution skills
and conflict mediation skills for third parties. (b) Classroom meetings are conducted in
Kindergarten through Grade 5 classrooms. The meetings take place for about 20 minutes
immediately following lunch hour. Alternate conflict resolution methods are taught to students
through discussion of problems, role-playing and structured experiences. (c) Conflict
managers are trained to mediate disputes on the playground. Students from Grades 4 and 5 are
selected by their peers based on leadership ability. They represent the gender division and
racial/ethnic identify of the school. Students receive 15 hours of training in active listening,
problem solving, critical thinking, teamwork, assertiveness, open communication and conflict
management. They wear "conflict manager" t-shirts and, using a simplified version of the
mediation process, make themselves available on the playground to help students resolve
disputes (Davis & Porter, 1985).

Evaluations from the Community Board projects in San Francisco show that conflicts in the
school decreased. The principals of the four schools using the Conflict Manager program

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stated "conflict managers make significant contributions to a calm, friendly atmosphere on the
playground". They noted "what students learn about resolving conflicts on the playground is
carried into the classrooms" and results in less teacher time on "refereeing disputes". These
principals also observed that "conflict managers teach what they have learned to parents,
siblings, and friends" (cited in Davis & Porter, 1985, p. 24).

Gentry and Benenson (1992) implemented the Community Board Program in an elementary
school in central Illinois and evaluated its effects on how students trained in conflict
resolution skills deal with sibling conflicts at home. Students trained as conflict managers
reported a significant decline in the frequency and intensity of conflicts with siblings. Parents
of these children perceived a similar decline in the frequency of conflicts and their need to
intervene. They reported a significant improvement in their child's use of productive talk
during conflicts.

School Mediators Alternative Resolution Team (SMART) was initiated in New York in 1983.
The program has four components: (a) Classroom seminars are designed to generate campus-
wide interest in mediation and to recruit mediators and cases. Seminars are conducted over
two days during regular 40 minute periods and re incorporated into core subject areas. (b)
Mediators are trained. Students, school personnel, and parents volunteer. Training takes 20
hours and is devoted to skills such as setting up a hearing, gaining trust, gathering facts,
questioning, note-taking, identifying and priorizing issues, and writing an agreement. Training
programs are limited to 25 participants. Those who complete the training receive a certificate
and are considered eligible to be a mediator. (c) Disputes are mediated. Administrators,
teachers, security guards, counsellors and students can make referrals to mediation. Referrals
are processed by the coordinator who interviews the parties to determine if the case is
appropriate for mediation and, if so, selects the mediator(s). (d) Follow-up interviews are
conducted to assess compliance with mediated agreements and to offer additional service, if
necessary.

Davis (1986) reported that during SMART's first two years at William Cullen Bryant School
in Long Island, Queens, New York, 260 disputes were resolved through mediation. In follow-
up interviews, students reported 90% of these agreements were upheld. Six hundred and
twenty students used mediation to settle problems and reconcile differences. More than 30
students who went through mediation as disputants subsequently decided to become
mediators. Suspensions for fighting dropped from 63 in the 1982-1983 school year, to 34 in
1983-1984, to 18 in 1984-1985. From 1985 to 1987, the program was expanded to include
four more high schools and a junior school. Student incidents not involving weapons or injury
are now referred to mediation at these schools (Lam, 1989).

Stern, Van Slyck and Valvo (cited in Van Slyck & Stern, 1992) conducted the first reported
empirical study on a school-based mediation program. They examined the impact of the
program on the school in three areas: (a) impact on school discipline climate, defined as the
perceptions of students and faculty concerning issues such as discipline and violence in the
school, as well as the number of disciplinary problems and violent incidents; (b) the effect on
student peer mediators, including self-image; and (c) the effect on student disputants,
including the number and nature of disciplinary problems experienced subsequent to a
mediation. The program was implemented in a middle school in New York State. The
majority of the students had minority backgrounds from low-income families. Nearly one-half
were welfare recipients. Peer mediators were selected by the administration to represent a

191
cross-section of the school population. They were trained in basic mediation skills over a
three week period.

The peer mediation program had a positive effect on all three areas. Overall school discipline
climate improved,the level of violent disciplinary problems were reduced, and there were
beneficial effects on students who were peer mediators. The most dramatic effect for the peer
mediators was increased self-image, social morality, and vocational-educational attitudes.

Dispute Management in the Schools Project (DMSP) was a three year cooperative project of
the University of Hawaii and the Hawaii State Department of Education. Beginning January
1986, the project was designed to train student mediators to manage disputes at a high school,
a feeder intermediate school, and a feeder elementary school. Student mediators, perceived
leaders who volunteered to participate, completed a 20 hour training program. They were on
call throughout the school day and agreed to make up all school work missed. Araki (1990)
reported "scheduling mediation sessions at the convenience of all parties was a major
problem" (p. 55).

During the second and third year of the project, 133 out of 136 mediated cases reached
agreement. Twelve cases were teacher-student disputes mediated by a student and teacher
team. School personnel reported that co-mediators seemed to work most effectively. Females
were more likely to use mediation than males and students in Grades 7, 8 and 9 used the
mediation services more than other age groups. Thirty-one percent of the mediated disputes
were among Grade 8 students, 18% among Grade 7 and 11% among Grade 9 students. Ethnic
group distribution was in proportion to that of the schools. The types of disputes mediated
were: gossip/rumour, harassment, arguments, and classroom behaviour (Araki & Takeshita,
1991).

The overall leadership roles of the student mediators were enhanced through training in
questioning for feelings as well as facts, analyzing and synthesizing problems, listening
supportively, and communicating verbally and nonverbally. Student mediators improved
academically, especially those with marginal grades. Teachers and administrators observed
improved attitudes of mediators and disputants (Araki, 1990). In spite of positive perceptions
of the program by participants, empirical data showed no improvement in school climate, no
reduction in retention, suspension or dismissal incidents, and no improvement in student
attendance (Araki, Takeshita & Kadomoto, 1989).

The New Mexico Center for Dispute Resolution conducted an extensive evaluation of their
Mediation in the Schools Program in 1986-1987 (Jenkins & Smith, 1987). Seventeen
elementary schools, five middle/junior high schools and one high school were involved. Both
urban and rural populations and three major ethnic groups (Indian, Hispanic, and Anglo) were
represented.

Grade 4, 5 and 6 teachers were asked to teach a 19 lesson unit on conflict resolution. Students
were nominated by teachers and peers or volunteered to serve as conflict managers. Final
student selection (based on leadership skills, gender, and ethnicity) was made by a committee
of teachers. Conflict managers went through an intensive 12-16 hour training sequence to
learn a 14-step mediation process involving problem solving, active listening and
communication skills. Pairs of mediators were scheduled to be on playground duty to observe
conflicts between students and offer mediation services.

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At the middle and high school levels, mediators were selected on criteria similar to those in
the elementary program. After students were trained, meditations were held in a special room.
In addition to student-to-student conflicts, conflicts between students and teachers or
administrators were also handled. Teachers were trained, along with students, in a 14-hour
training course. Pairs of students mediated student disputes and a student-adult team mediated
student-adult disputes.

Post-test results indicated positive effects on the student mediators in problem solving and
conflict resolution skills, self-concept and commitment to school. Positive effects were
observed in elementary and middle years groups. Lack of a control group may have reduced
the validity of the results obtained from the high school group.

At the elementary level, student mediators acquired problem solving and conflict resolution
skills to a greater extent than did students not exposed to the Mediation in the Schools
Program. Teachers believed that students trained as mediators showed improved verbal skills
and self-concept and decreased use of violence.

At the middle school level, students trained as mediators showed improvement in all areas:
self-concept, peer relations, communication abilities, knowledge of problem solving and
conflict resolution and commitment/attachment to school. The data includes evidence that
middle school students were more receptive to the program than their counterparts in
elementary or high school.

Johnson, Johnson and Dudley (1992) reported implementing a peer mediation program in a
middle-class elementary school in suburban Minneapolis. Peer mediation training was
conducted in four stages: (a) introduction to conflict training; (b) negotiation training; (c)
mediation training; and (d) periodic refresher lessons to refine students' negotiation skills.
Once training was completed, peer mediation was made available to the students. Each day
the teacher would choose two students to be the class mediators. The mediators would wear
mediator t-shirts, patrol the playground and lunchroom, and be available to mediate conflicts
that occurred in the classroom or school.

Teachers reported that, after the training, conflicts among students became less severe and
destructive. Conflicts referred to the teacher were reduced by 80 percent and those referred to
the principal were reduced to zero. Many students reported using negotiation and mediation
skills at home with their siblings. Several parents said they observed carry-over effects at
home. Trained students were much more likely than untrained students to discuss conflicts
and negotiate solutions. When placed in a simulated conflict situation four to five months
after the training had ended, pairs of trained students engaged in more negotiation steps than
did pairs of untrained students.

The International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, from Teachers' College at
Columbia University trained several students from an alternative high school in New York
City in cooperative Learning and Conflict Resolution. Students from three campuses
participated in the study. One group was trained in cooperative learning, one in conflict
resolution, and one in both conflict resolution and cooperative learning. Deutsch (1992) found
that students, teachers, and administrators had generally positive views of the training and
results. Researchers thought the group that received both types of training was most positively
affected. This impression was not supported by the empirical data. A qualitative study of the
same project (Mitchell, 1992) reported that a needs assessment should have been conducted

193
separately for each site before the project began and that if more time had been available,
prior to implementation, to build trust and rapport between the trainers and school personnel,
the project might have been more successful. Complications were student absenteeism, lack
of interest by students and staff in the research component, and limited funding. Interviewers
indicated that as students improved in managing conflicts they experienced increased social
support, improved relations, higher self-esteem, increases in personal control, and high
academic performance (Deutsch, 1992).

To conclude, evaluations of conflict management programs suggest positive results. Students,

teachers, administrators, and parents seem to feel that training in conflict resolution can affect
attitude and behaviour. Generalization to other settings seems possible. The results in many of
the studies are tentative because of questionable methods. Research is needed to discover the
long-term effects of conflict resolution training and peer mediation as alternatives to
traditional disciplinary practices.

Conflict Management Programs: Content

* Students learn about conflict.

- styles of dealing with conflict
- reasons for conflict
- feelings and attitudes related to conflict

* Students learn about communication.

- active listening skills
- using neutral language
- clearly expressing feelings and needs

* Students learn about solving problems.

- working cooperatively to meet the needs of both
- creating options
- looking at both points of view
- negotiating to resolve disputes
- mediating to resolve dispute

What is Peer Mediation?

Mediation is an alternative to the traditional disciplinary practices (dentention, suspension,

etc.) that occur in schools. It is a structured process that enables two disputing students to talk
out and resolve their problem with the assistance of a pair of neutral peers. The end result is a
written contract.

Mediation is a voluntary process. Conflicting parties must agree to try to solve the problem
together or may choose to proceed through traditional disciplinary actions, instead.

A group of students are selected to be peer mediators. These students should be a

representative sample of the larger group in terms of gender, academic ability, general
interest, etc. The selection process could be a combinatin of teacher nomination, student
nomination and self nominiation.

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The mediation group could be organized like a club, managed by a teacher-coordinator. The
teacher would match mediators to disputing students appropriately and help the students with
their mediation skills.

Mediation services would be made available to students by request or by teacher or

administrator referral. The teacher-coordinator would decide which disputes were suitable for
mediation. The process could take place before or after school, at noon hour, or during class
with teacher permission.

If a contract established through mediation is broken, students could return to mediation or

administrative intervention could take place.

Peer mediation can be used at the classroom level, with a specific age group such as middle
years students, or as an integral part of the discipline cycle of an entire school.

The Mediation Process

Peer mediators usually work in pairs. If possible, each mediator should be selected to
represent the same gender and/or interest as each of the disputants. Peer mediators follow a
set process. This process can be adjusted according to the maturity of the students. The
following are guidelines for middle years students:

1. Open the session

- introductions
- establish rules
- overview of process for disputants

2. Gather information
- each disputant takes a turn explaining the problem
- mediators summarize both sides using neutral language

3. Focus on common interests

- mediators find out what each person wants
- mediators encourage disputants to imagine what the other disputant wants
- mediators summarize common interests

4. Problem Solving
- disputant brainstorm options
- mediators encourage by asking each disputant what s/he could do to help resolve the
problem

5. Resolution
- disputants select from the brainstormed list
- mediators write up an agreement

Research Procedures

The purpose of the current study was to discover the effects of instruction in conflict
resolution skills on student attitudes about conflict. A pretest was administered to the
instructed group prior to instruction. An identical posttest was administered. A comparison

195
group that did not participate in the instructional unit also completed the pretest and posttest.
Students were not randomly assigned to groups. Students in the instructed group were grade
eight students from schools in which an administrator expressed an interest in starting a
conflict management program. There were 94 students in the instructed group. Students in the
comparison group were enrolled in the only other school in the jurisdiction with a grade eight
class. There were 25 students in the comparison group.

One administrator and one staff member from each of the participating schools attended a
three day short course conducted by Saskatoon Community Mediation Services in August
1993. Print information as well as after-school sessions were made available to other
interested staff members.

Instruction in conflict resolution skills took place in either Health 8 or Social Studies 8
classes. Topics studied are detailed in Chart 3. A strong emphasis on group work and role
playing persisted throughout the unit of study so students were able to practise the skills that
had been introduced. About 16 hours of class time was devoted to learning about and
practising conflict resolution skills.

The Student Attitudes About Conflict scale (Jenkins & Smith, 1987), a 32-item, 4-point Likert
Scale with "Strongly Agree" and "Strongly Disagree" as endpoints, was used as the pretest
and posttest instrument. In addition, six open-ended questions that are part of School
Mediation Program Evaluation Kit (Lam, 1989) were added to the scale so student behaviour
could be reported and compared to attitudes.

The unit of study was intended to train a group of students from which peer mediators could
be selected. Following the selection of peer mediators using a combination of self, peer and
teacher nomination, peer mediation was make available to students in grades six through eight
in the participating schools.

Results

At posttest, overall differences between instructed and comparison groups were evident.
Students in the instructed group reported more positive attitudes about conflict than did
comparison group students. Also, boys in the instructed group showed more positive attitudes
about conflict than did boys in the comparison group.

Gender effects were also noted. Females reported more positive attitudes about conflict than
males, regardless of whether they were in the instructed or comparison groups. Females
reported significantly improved attitudes toward conflict on the overall scale, on the school
attachment/commitment subscale, and on the conflict resolution/problem solving subscale.

Student responses to six open-ended items showed no strong differences between control and
experimental groups. Gains in attitude reported by students in the experimental group and by
females in the control group did not result in more reported problem-solving behaviour.
Gender differences, however, were observed. Females reported more use of problem solving
than did males. Males indicated more use of confrontation than females.

Discussion

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Teaching conflict resolution strategies to middle years students can have an effect on their
attitudes about conflict. Females may acquire the skills of constructive conflict resolution
from day-to-day social interactions, but males seem to require direct intervention to affect
their attitudes.

Males have traditionally demonstrated more aggressive and violent behaviours than females.
The present study supports the hypothesis that the aggressive attitudes traditionally attributed
to males can be moderated by instruction. This moderation of attitudes can have an impact on
behaviour.

Improvement in student attitudes about conflict may have been limited by the nature of the
instructional unit. It was approximately 15-20 hours in length and delivered over a period of
two and half months in Health (School A) or Social Studies (School B). During the
intervention, students were exposed to other styles of reacting to conflict used by teachers,
parents, peers, TV characters, etc. These alternate models of dealing with conflict may or may
not have reinforced the ideas promoted by the unit on conflict management. For example,
students may be more likely to change their attitudes about conflict if the significant adults in
their lives model constructive conflict resolution. If adults in authority use anger, threats and
coercion to manipulate behaviour, students may not believe conflicts can be resolved to the
satisfaction of both parties.

Modifications to the intervention may have resulted in more pronounced improvements in

student attitudes about conflict. For example, the intervention could have been longer or,
presented in a more multi-disciplinary format. If the unit had been presented in conjunction
with more intensive parent and teacher education, strategies presented in the intervention
could have been systematically reinforced outside of the classroom.

Brophy (cited in Bentro & Van Bockern, 1994) asserts that the quality of human relationships
in a classroom may be more influential than the specific interventions used. So, the climate of
the classroom may have influenced the receptiveness of students to the intervention.

This study was initiated by the researcher, a school division consultant. Although an effort
was made to include school personnel in the planning and delivery of the intervention,
ownership for the project remained with the researcher. Greater changes in the attitudes of the
students may have occurred if the project had been initiated by the teachers in the schools
who had direct contact with the students and were in a position to model and reinforce
positive models of conflict resolution on a daily basis.

Recommendations for Further Research

1. Instruction in conflict resolution skills is a developing component in Saskatchewan schools.

Similar studies should be conducted in a variety of settings, urban and rural, with varied
populations, elementary and high school, to verify and extend the results of this study.

2. The researcher suggests that longitudinal studies are needed to discover the effects of
instruction in conflict resolution skills on the behaviour of students. The effects of instruction
on teacher perceptions of student behaviour should also be examined.

3. The effects of instruction in conflict resolution skills on student behaviour and on teacher
perceptions of student behaviour need to be examined.

197
4. Pairing instruction in conflict resolution skills with other interventions could increase its
effectiveness. For example, cooperative learning skills could enhance students' abilities to
work together, and promote increased problem solving behaviour.

5. For a conflict management or peer mediation program to be used as an integral part of the
discipline process, the teachers must understand and support it. If teaching staff had had more
opportunities to become familiar with the conflict management program and the mediation
process, the program might have been more readily accepted and used in the schools.

Understanding and Resolving Conflicts

Unit Objectives

Students will demonstrate increasing:

* understanding that people respond to conflict using three main styles: avoidance, aggression
and problem solving
* ability to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each response style
* ability to identify which response style is being used in given conflict situations
* understanding that conflicts are caused by attempts to meet basic individual needs
* understanding that conflicts result from limited resources or different values
* ability to identify the causes and types of conflict
* ability to identify actions that can lead to escalation or de-escalation of conflict
* understanding that clear communication can be a means of avoiding or resolving conflicts
* ability to use active listening techniques and neutral language as a means of maintaining
clear lines of communication
* ability to understand various points of view
* ability to identify problems
* ability to resolve conflicts using problem-solving techniques such as negotiation and
mediation

Sources for Student Activities

The Community Board Program. (1992). Starting a conflict managers program. San
Fransisco, CA: The Community Board.

Edwards, C. & Marson, M. (1990). Peer mediation: Learning a lifeskill: Student workbook.
Victoria, BC: Maria Marson and Constance L. Edwards.

Picard, C. (1990). Peer mediation training manual. Toronto, ON: Picard & Associates.

Sadalla, B., Henriquez, M. & Holmberg, M. (1987). Conflict resolution: A secondary school
curriculum. San Fransisco, CA: The Community Board.

Saskatoon Community Mediation Services. (1993). Peer mediationL Student workbook.

Saskatoon, SK: Community Mediation Services.

Schmidt, F. & Friedman, A. (1985). Creative conflict solving for kids grades 5-9. Miami
Beach, FL: Grace Contrino Abrams Peace Education Foundation, Inc.

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Schmidt, F. & Friedman, A. (1991). Creative conflict solving for kids grades 3-4. Miami
Beach, FL: Grace Contrino Abrams Peace Education Foundation, Inc.

Schrumpf, F., Crawford, D., & Usadel, H. Chu. (1991). Peer mediation: Conflict resolution in
schools. Champaign, IL: Research Press Company.

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McIntosh, R., Vaughn, S., & Zaragoza, N. (1991). A review of social interventions for
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Mitchell, V. (1992). A qualitative study of training in conflict resolution and cooperative

learning in an alternative high school. New York, NY: Teachers' College, Columbia
University: The International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. (ERIC
Document No. ED 359 273)

Ninness, H.C., Fuerst, J., & Rutherford, R.D. (1991). Effects of self- management training
and reinforcement on the transfer of improved conduct in the absence of supervision. Journal
of Applied Behavior Analysis, 24, 499-508. (From Psychological Abstracts, 1992, 79,
Abstract No. 07211)

Picard, C. (1990). Peer mediation training manual. Toronto, ON: Picard & Associates.

Raven, B.H., & Kruglanski, A. (1970). Conflict and power. In P. Swingle (Ed.), The structure
of conflict (pp. 69-109). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Roderick, T. (1988). Johnny can learn to negotiate. Educational Leadership, 45(4), 86-90.

Rokeach, M. (1962). Beliefs, attitudes and values. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

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Sadalla, G., Henriquez, M. & Holmberg, M. (1987). Conflict resolution: A secondary school
curriculum. San Francisco, CA: The Community Board Program, Inc.

Saskatchewan Education. (1993). Student Evaluation: A Teacher Handbook. Regina, SK:

Author

Saskatchewan Education. (1988) Understanding the common essential learnings: A handbook

for teachers. Regina, SK: Author

Sasso, G., Melloy, K., & Kavale, K. (1990). Generalization, maintenance, and behavioral
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Disorders, 16(1), 9-22. (From Psychological Abstracts, 1991, 78, Abstract No. 13354)

Seltzer, V. (1989). The psychosocial worlds of the adolescent: Public and private. New York,
NY: Wiley.

Torrey, G.K., Vasa, S.F., Maag, J.W., & Kramer, J.J (1992). Social skills interventions across
school settings: Case study review of students with mild disabilities. Psychology in the
Schools, 29.

Trapani, C., & Gettinger, M. (1989). Effects of social skills and cross-age tutoring on
academic achievement and social behaviors of boys with learning disabilities. Journal of
Research and Development in Education, 23(1), 1-9. (From Psychological Abstracts, 1990,
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Tremblay, R., McCord, J., Boileau, H., Charlebois, P., et al. (1991). Can disruptive boys be
helped to become competent? Psychiatry, 54(2), 148-161. (From Psychological Abstracts,
1991, 78, Abstract No. 31055)

Van Slyck, M., & Stern, M. (1991). Conflict resolution in educational settings. In G. Duffy, J.
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Weist, M., Borden, M., Finney, J., & Ollendick, T. (1991). Social skills training for children:
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Preparing Teachers for Conflict Resolution in the Schools.

ERIC Digest.

by Girard, Kathryn L.

Violence prevention, conflict resolution, peer mediation, peaceable classrooms: These are
the words that frame a growing movement in education. Violence prevention connotes both
a need and a program, a part of which may address conflict resolution skills. Conflict
resolution refers generally to strategies that enable students to handle conflicts peacefully
and cooperatively outside the traditional disciplinary procedures. Peer mediation is a
specific form of conflict resolution utilizing students as neutral third parties in resolving

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disputes. A peaceable classroom or school results when the values and skills of cooperation,
communication, tolerance, positive emotional expression, and conflict resolution are taught
and supported throughout the culture of the school.

Conflict resolution in education is linked to democracy and citizenship, developing a

peaceful world, cooperative learning, multicultural education, prejudice reduction, social
justice, violence prevention and intervention, critical thinking and problem-solving, and
site-based management. In recent years, the growth of violence in schools has fueled
interest in conflict resolution. There is, however, concern among conflict resolution
practitioners that the need for immediate fixes to problems may lead to unrealistic and
inappropriate goals and expectations. The press to address issues of social justice and
prejudice leads to similar concerns. Experienced practitioners view conflict resolution as
only one component in preparing youth to find nonviolent responses to conflict, in
promoting social justice, and in reducing prejudice in school communities (Bettmann &
Moore, 1994; Bodine, Crawford, & Schrumpf, 1994; DeJong, 1994; Miller, 1994).

Classroom curriculum, classsroom management, and school- or district-based programs are

main entry points for conflict resolution in schools. Information and skills find their way
quietly into individual classrooms through social studies, English, literature, science, and
even math curricula, as well as through direct instruction in communication and
cooperative problem solving. Some teachers, often in conjunction with curricular
initiatives, choose to incorporate principles of conflict resolution in classroom management.
Since peer mediation typically requires participation, support, and resources beyond those
of a single classroom, entire schools and sometimes whole districts may be involved. Such
comprehensive efforts may entail substantial parent education and staff development and
are very dependent on strong administrative leadership (Lieber & Rogers, 1994; National
Association for Mediation in Education [NAME], 1994).

This Digest will discuss several approaches, both inservice and preservice, to preparing
teachers to play a role in conflict resolution within schools and will identify problematic
issues related to preparation.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN TEACHER EDUCATION

The study of conflict and its resolution encompasses many fields. Accordingly, teaching,
research, and writing occurs in many academic departments. Course materials typically
draw from social psychology, education, law, sociology, communication, and anthropology,
as represented in foundation texts (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Axelrod, 1984;
Hocker & Wilmot, 1991; Duryea, 1992).
Inservice Training

Conflict resolution in schools has grown rapidly. The National Association for Mediation in
Education (NAME) estimates that in 1984, the year of its founding, there were
approximately 50 school-based conflict resolution programs. Eleven years later NAME
estimates the number of programs at well over 5,000. One of those early programs was the
Responding to Conflict Creatively Program (RCCP) sponsored by Educators for Social
Responsibility, which now operates in 300 schools nationwide. Other programs have
expanded similarly. The New Mexico Center for Dispute Resolution has carried out a

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statewide school mediation program for 10 years and currently involves over 30,000
students. Through the Community Board Program, three-fourths of San Francisco's schools
have peer conflict managers (National Institute for Dispute Resolution [NIDR], 1994;
Inger, 1991).

Educators primarily learn about conflict resolution on their own or through staff
development programs. The issue of whether teachers can conduct peer mediation and other
conflict resolution programs without training is a central question. While mediation and
peaceable school curricula are available to individual teachers, the authors encourage
substantial training (Kreidler, 1984; Bodine et al., 1994; Schmidt, 1994). NAME provides a
curriculum and program to train those interested in conducting staff development in schools
(Townley & Lee, 1993). Training is viewed as necessary due to the difficulty in changing
adult attitudes and behavior. Without sufficient training to address teachers' own behavior,
there is the danger that the adults' words will not match their actions. Since modeling is
essential, training is viewed as essential (Bodine et al., 1994; Lieber & Rogers, 1994;
Miller, 1994).

Who conducts training for teachers? In Massachusetts one source is the Office of the
Attorney General. Some states, such as Ohio, sponsor dispute resolution centers or
commissions. University faculty based in special programs or in schools of law, education,
or public justice provide training. In many states private nonprofit organizations work
specifically on peace or conflict resolution in schools (NIDR, 1994).

Other issues arising in the preparation of inservice teachers echo problems encountered in
any change effort. They include the importance of the principal's leadership; the need for
targeted follow-up support to teachers; the fit (or lack of it) between program demands and
resources; and the need for systemic, school-wide change versus individual classroom
change (DeJong, 1994; Lieber & Rogers, 1994).

Preservice and Graduate Preparation

The inclusion of conflict resolution within preservice and graduate education programs has
grown more slowly but curricula have found their way into schools and departments of
education in a variety of ways. The subject has been introduced within the frameworks of
existing courses and as separate courses. Coursework combined with action research is
viewed as particularly effective (Girard & Koch, 1995; Lieber & Rogers, 1994; Hughes,
1994).

NAME and NIDR initiated the Conflict Resolution in Teacher Education Project in 1993.
That project brought together experts in prejudice reduction, multiculturalism, conflict
resolution, and teacher education, including representatives from professional associations
and specialties of health, counseling, and administration. The project's curriculum, Conflict
Resolution in the Schools (Girard & Koch, 1996), is the first comprehensive set of
materials directed at the incorporation of conflict resolution in the professional preparation
of educators. It includes background material and instructional modules on the nature of
conflict, foundation skills, conflict resolution processes, rationales for conflict resolution in
schools, and application options for schools and teacher education. Eleven colleges and
universities participated in a pilot training based on this curriculum and then implemented

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conflict resolution at their home sites.

CONCLUSION

Limited evaluation studies show positive trends related to aggression, student self-image
and skills, and overall school climate (Lam, 1989; Metis, 1990). However, the full benefits
of conflict resolution in schools may depend on the inclusion of this subject in the
preservice curriculum; more comprehensive training; support of teachers, administrators,
and parents at sites; and expansion from individual to school- and district-wide programs.

Two resources for additional information are:

* National Association for Mediation in Education, 205 Hampshire House, Box 33635,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003-3635. (413) 545-2462.

* National Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 500, Washington,
DC 20036. (202) 466-4764.

REFERENCES

References identified with an EJ or ED number have been abstracted and are in the ERIC
database. Journal articles (EJ) should be available at most research libraries; most
documents (ED) are available in microfiche collections at more than 900 locations.
Documents can also be ordered through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service: (800)
443-ERIC.

Axelrod, R. M. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

Bettmann, E. H., & Moore, P. (1994). Conflict resolution programs and social justice.
Education and Urban Society, 27(1), 11-21.

Bodine, R., Crawford, D., & Schrumpf, F. (1994). Creating the peaceable school: A
comprehensive program for teaching conflict resolution. Champaign, IL: Research Press.

DeJong, W. (1994, Spring). School-based violence prevention: From the peaceable school
to the peaceable neighborhood. NIDR Forum, 25, 8-18.

Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

Duryea, M. L. (1992). Conflict and culture: A literature review and bibliography. Victoria,
Canada: University of Victoria Institute for Dispute Resolution.

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. New
York: Houghton Mifflin.

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Girard, K., & Koch, S. (1996). Conflict resolution in the schools: A manual for educators.
San Francisco: Josey-Bass, Inc.

Hocker, J., & Wilmot, W. (1991). Interpersonal conflict. Third edition. Dubuque, IA: W. C.
Brown.

Hughes, H. W. (1994, February). From fistfights to gunfights: Preparing teachers and

administrators to cope with violence in school. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, Chicago, IL. ED 366 584.

Inger, M. (1991). Conflict resolution programs in schools. ERIC digest no.74. New York:
ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education. ED 338 791.

Kreidler, W. J. (1984). Creative conflict resolution: More than 200 activities for keeping
peace in the classroom-K-6. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Lam, J. A. (1989). The impact of conflict resolution programs on schools: A review and
synthesis of the evidence. Second edition. Amherst, MA: National Association for
Mediation in Education. ED 358 535.

Lieber, C., & Rogers, J. (1994). Challenging beliefs and bureaucracies in an urban school
system. Education and Urban Society, 27(1), 45-70.

Metis Associates, Inc. (1990). The resolving conflict creatively program: 1988-1989.
Summary of significant findings. New York: Author. ED 348 422.

Miller, E. (1994, May/June). Peer mediation catches on, but some adults don't. Harvard
Education Letter, p.8.

National Association for Mediation in Education [NAME]. (1994). Initiating conflict

resolution in schools: Teaching skills for effective, non-violent problem solving. Amherst,
MA: Author.

National Institute for Dispute Resolution [NIDR]. (1994). Survey of schools dispute
resolution programs across the country. NIDR News, 1(7), 6-9.

Schmidt, F. (1994). Mediation: Getting to winwin! Miami: Peace Education Foundation,

Inc.

Townley, A., & Lee, M. (1993). Training for trainers: Staff development in conflict
resolution skills. Amherst, MA: National Association for Mediation in Education.

INFUSING AND INTEGRATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION INTO THE

SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND CULTURE

( Reprinted by permission of the Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR), a

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 merged organization of AFM, CREnet and SPIDR.)

Overview

Integrating conflict resolution into the curriculum and culture of schools can be
accomplished in thefollowing ways:
• teaching a stand-alone course which covers the basic concepts and skills
• integrating core concepts and skills into a single discipline course, such as language arts,
socialstudies, health or consumer science
• teaching a stand-alone course and integrating core concepts and skills into a variety of other
disciplines
• creating a multi-disciplinary teaching strategy which uses core themes as units of focus
• infusing conflict resolution concepts, skills and values into the day to day activities of the
classroom, including teaching strategies, teachable moments and classroom rituals
• institutionalizing the practices and principles of conflict resolution, social and emotional
learningand inter-group relations into the culture and policies of the school.

Definitions and Strategies

Integration here refers to “the process of carefully designing a set of experiences for
kids in the existing curriculum, including the integration between conflict resolution and a
range of disciplines in an organized manner in order to enhance the learning.” Examples of
places to integrate conflict resolution include: language arts, social studies, health and
consumer studies. It is recommended to focus on one discipline or team to integrate into so
that all students receive the material in a coordinated way. Infusion is used here as an
umbrella term used to describe the teaching and modeling of conflict resolution concepts,
skills and values throughout the classroom and school culture. Examples of infusion include:
morning gatherings, teambuilders, classroom meetings, active listening, collaborative problem
solving, restorative discipline and cooperative teaching strategies. Both infusion and
integration are
important strategies which should work together to weave a comprehensive and coordinated
approach to conflict resolution education. In addition to integrating conflict resolution into a
single discipline, one can also create a multi- disciplinary strategy in which 2-3 disciplines
(such as language arts, social studies and science) create a focused center for study (such as
conflict, tolerance, nonviolence, community) using thematic questions
and units. Even more coordinated is an inter-disciplinary integration in which an organized
learning center is created among all the disciplines. It is generally held that each integration
strategy becomes more complex and sophisticated as more disciplines are involved, and it
requires more planning time for authentic, useful integration to occur. The ideal is for a school
to use both integration and single discipline education (i.e., teaching a conflict resolution class
for all incoming students). Most experts agree that each strategy has its own strengths and
weaknesses and the strongest strategy includes using both single discipline and integration
together. Each teacher and school must take sufficient planning and professional education
and development time to discover how to make this work best.

Framework

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 A suggested framework for an integrated and comprehensive approach to conflict
resolution education and school climate change starts with four core elements:
1.Classroom Infusion, including:
• Gatherings and closings
• Skill training
• Modeling
• Positive discipline
• Classroom meetings/Morning meetings
• Classroom Agreement
2. Curriculum Integration, including:
• Teaching through a matrix of concepts, skills and processes
• Implementation schedule for the year (e.g., 1 lesson/week;weeks/concept)
• Mapping units among disciplines
.Interdisciplinary unit
•Aligning with academic content standards & performance-based assessments
3.Cooperative, Student-Centered Teaching Strategies, including:
• Cooperative grouping
• Journaling
• Reflection time
• Rotation stations
• Paired sharing
• Role-playing
• Creative controversy
• Socratic questioning
• Duet poetry
• Service learning projects
• Quote reflection and discussion
• Case studies
4.School or District Leadership, including:
• Financial support
• Curricular and policy support and creativity
Classroom culture refers to the “ways things are done” in the classroom and includes
such things as: how students feel and behave, what rules and routines are established, the
relationship the teacher has with her or his students, and the implicit and explicit norms and
values that exist. Curriculum integration refers to the academic lessons and activities that are
used in the learning process. Teaching strategies refers to the ways teachers structure learning
activities.
Additional areas of infusion into the school culture include:
1.Visible Reminders (Posters, Quotes, Student Artwork)
2.Integration into School’s Mission Statement
3.Evaluation Component
4.Staff Norms and Modeling
5.Positive and Restorative Discipline
6.Specific Projects (Peacebuilders, Assemblies, Plays, Days of Peace)
7.Resource Library and Bibliography
8.Monthly Meetings with Team
9.Peer Mediation and Community Service Program

Benefits

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Integrating conflict resolution into various subject matters provides the following benefits:
• helps to bring excitement to existing material
• leads to meaningful connections between subjects
• improves student understanding and subject competence of both conflict resolution
and social studies, language arts, drama, science, etc.
• stimulates critical and creative thinking
• enhances emotional competency
• increases academic achievement and student success
Infusing conflict resolution into the classroom and school culture provides the following
benefits:
• helps create a classroom and school climate which is caring, respectful and
responsible
• provides continual opportunity for learning, modeling and skill development
• connects day to day relationships and activities with school philosophy and curricular
goals
• creates culture change rather than surface results
• increases academic achievement and student success

Resources

 National Curriculum Integration Project, www.ncip.org (Comprehensive

research project and website complete with strategies, integrated lessons,
articles and other valuable resources)
 The Promise of Integrating Conflict Resolution into the Classroom. The Forum,
National Institute for Dispute Resolution. June 1998, Number 35. (Journal
issue devoted to integration with seven articles by leading practitioners).

Organizations:
 Colorado School Mediation Project, 2885 Aurora Ave. Suite 13 Boulder CO 80303
(Experienced in integration strategies and distributes CRE curricula with integration
strategies)
 Educators for Social Responsibility, 23 Garden Street, Boston, MA 02138
(Experienced in integration strategies and distributes CRE curricula with integration
strategies)
 Charboneau and Galloway, 240 Maine St., Brunswick, ME 04011 (Experienced in
integration strategies).

Curricula:
 Trash Conflicts: An Integrated Science and Social Studies Curriculum on the Ethics of
Disposal. Amy Balin with Jeffrey Benson and Lucile Burt.
 Educators for Social Responsibility. Boston:1993.Dialogue: Turning Controversy into
Community. Jeffrey Benson & Rachel Poliner.
 Educators for Social Responsibility. Boston:1997. The Power of Numbers. Fred Gross,
Patrick Morton & Rachel Poliner.
 Educators for Social Responsibility. Boston:1993.Productive Conflict Resolution: A
Comprehensive Curriculum and Teacher’s Guide for Conflict Resolution Education.
(available K-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-12). Colorado School Mediation Project. Boulder, CO.:
1997. 350-450 pages. (303) 444-7671.

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  Conflict Resolution Tools, Middle Version: Teaching Through the Curriculum.
Montgomery County Public Schools. Department of Academic Programs, Rockville,
MD: 1994. (301) 279-3163. (Elementary version available, too)
 Teaching Conflict Resolution Through Childrens’ Literature. William Kreidler.
Scholastic Books. New York, NY.: 1995.

ETAPELE
MANAGEMENTULUI CONFLICTELOR

Managing Conflict
A Guide for Watershed Partnerships

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT.

What is conflict?

Conflict is a natural disagreement resulting from individuals or groups that differ in attitudes,
beliefs, values or needs. It can also originate from past rivalries and personality differences.
Other causes of conflict include trying to negotiate before the timing is right or before needed
information is available.

The ingredients of conflict.

Needs - Needs are things that are essential to our well-being. Conflicts arise when we ignore others'
needs, our own needs or the group's needs. Be careful not to confuse needs with desires (things we
would like, but are not essential).

Perceptions - People interpret reality differently. They perceive differences in the severity, causes and
consequences of problems. Misperceptions or differing perceptions may come from: self-perceptions,
others' perceptions, differing perceptions of situations and perceptions of threat.

Power - How people define and use power is an important influence on the number and types of
conflicts that occur. This also influences how conflict is managed. Conflicts can arise when people try
to make others change their actions or to gain an unfair advantage.

Values - Values are beliefs or principles we consider to be very important. Serious conflicts arise when
people hold incompatible values or when values are not clear. Conflicts also arise when one party
refuses to accept the fact that the other party holds something as a value rather than a preference.

Feelings and emotions - Many people let their feelings and emotions become a major influence over
how they deal with conflict. Conflicts can also occur because people ignore their own or others'
feelings and emotions. Other conflicts occur when feelings and emotions differ over a particular issue.

Conflict is not always negative. In fact, it can be healthy when effectively managed. Healthy conflict
can lead to...
Growth and innovation
New ways of thinking
Additional management options

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If the conflict is understood, it can be effectively managed by reaching a consensus that meets both
the individual's and society's needs. This results in mutual benefits and strengthens the relationship.
The goal is for all to "win" by having at least some of their needs met.

How public and private conflicts differ.

Most of us have experience with conflict management and negotiation in private disputes (with
a salesman, among family members or with your employer).

Public conflicts, like those that can occur during watershed management efforts and other
environmental issues often are rooted in trying to balance environmental protection and economic
growth and jobs. Keep in mind, however, that effective watershed management can result in both
economic and environmental benefits. Some complicating factors include:

Distribution of costs and benefits. Those who benefit may not be the same as those who pay the
costs.

Perceptions of problems. People tend to blame others for causing the problem.

Speed of clean-up or other actions. Some will want changes to take place more quickly
than others.

MANAGING CONFLICT
There are five steps to managing conflict. These steps are:
Analyze the conflict
Determine management strategy
Pre-negotiation
Negotiation
Post-negotiation

Step 1: Analyze the conflict.

The first step in managing conflict is to analyze the nature and type of conflict. To do this, you'll find it
helpful to ask questions.

Answers may come from your own experience, your partners or local media coverage. You may want
to actually interview some of the groups involved. Additional information regarding analyzing conflicts
can be found in the Guide to Information and Resources.

Step 2: Determine management strategy.

Once you have a general understanding of the conflict, the groups involved will need to analyze and
select the most appropriate strategy. In some cases it may be necessary to have a neutral facilitator to
help move the groups toward consensus.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Collaboration

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 Compromise
Competition
Accommodation
Avoidance

1. Collaboration –

This results from a high concern for your group's own interests, matched with a high concern for the
interests of other partners. The outcome is "win/win." This strategy is generally used when concerns
for others are important. It is also generally the best strategy when society's interest is at stake. This
approach helps build commitment and reduce bad feelings. The drawbacks are that it takes time and
energy. In addition, some partners may take advantage of the others' trust and openness. Generally
regarded as the best approach for managing conflict, the objective of collaboration is to reach
consensus. (See the Building Local Partnerships guide for more information about consensus.)

2. Compromise –

This strategy results from a high concern for your group's own interests along with a moderate
concern for the interests of other partners. The outcome is "win some/lose some." This strategy is
generally used to achieve temporary solutions, to avoid destructive power struggles or when time
pressures exist. One drawback is that partners can lose sight of important values and long-term
objectives. This approach can also distract the partners from the merits of an issue and create a
cynical climate.

3. Competition –

This strategy results from a high concern for your group's own interests with less concern for others.
The outcome is "win/lose." This strategy includes most attempts at bargaining. It is generally used
when basic rights are at stake or to set a precedent. However, it can cause the conflict to escalate and
losers may try to retaliate.

4. Accommodation –

This results from a low concern for your group's own interests combined with a high concern for the
interests of other partners. The outcome is "lose/win." This strategy is generally used when the issue is
more important to others than to you. It is a "goodwill gesture." It is also appropriate when you
recognize that you are wrong.The drawbacks are that your own ideas and concerns don't get
attention. You may also lose credibility and future influence.

5. Avoidance –

This results from a low concern for your group's own interests coupled with a low concern for the
interests of others. The outcome is "lose/lose." This strategy is generally used when the issue is trivial
or other issues are more pressing. It is also used when confrontation has a high potential for damage
or more information is needed. The drawbacks are that important decisions may be made by default.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS EXERCISE:

Think of a controversial issue to analyze. On a separate sheet of paper, answer these questions.

A. Groups involved
Who are the groups involved?
Who do they represent?
How are they organized?
What is their power base?

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 Are the groups capable of working together?
What are the historical relationships among the groups?
B. Substance
How did the conflict arise?
How are the main and secondary issues described?
Can negative issues be reframed positively?
Are the issues negotiable?
Have positions been taken and, if so, are there common
interests?
What information is available and what other information is
needed?
What values or interests are challenged?

C. Possible strategies
Would consensus serve all interests?
Are there external constraints or other influences that must
be accommodated?
What are the past experiences (if any) of the groups working
together?
What is the timeline for a decision?
How will the public and the media be involved and informed?
Will an outside negotiator be needed?

Step 3: Pre-negotiation.

To set the stage for effective negotiation, the groundwork must be laid. The following should occur
prior to negotiation.

Initiation - One partner raises the possibility of negotiation and begins the process. If no one is willing
to approach the others to encourage them to reach an agreement, a trusted outsider could be brought
in as a facilitator.

Assessment - Conditions must be right for negotiation to be successful. Key players must be
identified and invited. Each side must be willing to collaborate with the others. Reasonable deadlines
and sufficient resources to support the effort must exist. Spokespersons for each group must be
identified and involved. Parties need to determine which issues are negotiable and which are not.

Ground rules and agenda - The groups must agree on ground rules for communication, negotiation
and decision making. They should agree on the objectives of the negotiation process. An agenda of
issues to be covered needs to be developed.

Organization - Meeting logistics must be established, including agreed upon times and places.
People must be contacted and encouraged to attend. Minutes must be taken so that information can
be distributed before and after meetings.

Joint fact-finding - The groups must agree on what information is relevant to the conflict. This should
include what is known and not known about social and technical issues. Agreement is also needed on
methods for generating answers to questions.

Step 4: Negotiation.

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Interests - When negotiating be sure to openly discuss interests, rather than stated positions.
Interests include the reasons, needs, concerns and motivations underlying positions. Satisfaction of
interests should be the common goal.

Options - To resolve conflicts, concentrate on inventing options for satisfying interests. Do not judge
ideas or favor any of the options suggested. Encourage creativity, not commitment.

Evaluation - Only after the partners have finished listing options, should the options be discussed.
Determine together which ideas are best for satisfying various interests.

Written agreement - Document areas of agreement and disagreement to ensure common

understanding. This helps ensure that agreements can be remembered and communicated clearly.

Commitment - Every partner must be confident that the others will carry out their parts of the
agreement. Discuss and agree upon methods to ensure partners understand and honor their
commitments.

When evaluating options...

Use objective criteria for ranking ideas
Make trade-offs among different issues
Combine different options to form acceptable agreements

Step 5: Post-negotiation.

Once negotiation is complete, the group will need to implement the decisions made. Some key steps
include:

Ratification - The partners must get support for the agreement from organizations that have a role to
play in the agreement. These organizations should be partners and should have been involved in the
previous steps. Each organization will need to follow its own procedures to review and adopt the
agreement.

Implementation - You and your partners' jobs are not done when you've reached agreement.
Communication and collaboration should continue as the agreement is carried out. The partnership
will need to have a plan to monitor progress, document success, resolve problems, renegotiate terms
and celebrate success.

Negotiation skills.
Negotiation is an important skill for coming to an agreement when conflicts develop at home, at work
and when dealing with issues like those related to watershed management. When negotiating...

Separate people from the problem.

When negotiating, remember you're dealing with people who have their own unique needs, emotions
and perceptions.

Some conflicts are based on differences in thinking and perceptions. These conflicts may exist mainly
in peoples' minds. It helps for each party to put themselves into the other's shoes so they can
understand each other's point of view.

Identify and openly discuss differences in perceptions, being careful not to place blame. In addition,
recognize and understand the other side's emotions as well as your own.

Interest vs. Position

People often confuse interests with positions. An interest may be reducing litter in roadside ditches.
There are many possible ways of addressing this interest. One might be the position of mandatory

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recycling. Another position might be a deposit on bottles and cans. Still another could be organizing a
clean-up day.

Focus on interests, not positions.

Focusing on interests, rather than positions, makes it possible to come up with better agreements.
Even when people stand on opposite positions, they usually have a few shared interests.

It takes time and effort to identify interests. Groups may not even be clear about their own interests. It
helps to write down each group's interests as they are discovered. It helps to ask why others take the
positions or make the decisions they do. Partners will have multiple interests. Interests involving
important human needs (such as security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition and
control over one's life) are difficult to negotiate.

Develop optional solutions.

When developing optional solutions that meet the interests of all sides, try to meet as many of each
side's interests as possible. Start by inviting all sides to brainstorm ideas (before reaching a decision).
Brainstorming is discussed in the Leading & Communicating guide.

Some obstacles to developing innovative options are:

Judging and rejecting prematurely
Searching for a single best answer
Putting limits on scope or vision
Considering only your own interests

To overcome these obstacles, view the situation through the eyes of different partners. Focus on
shared interests to make the process smoother for all involved. Look for meaningful opportunities, not
simple solutions.

Developing objective criteria.

When developing criteria for selecting or combining possible alternatives, revisit the conflicting
interests. These can't be ignored or "wished" away. Instead discuss them as you begin developing
criteria for judging alternatives. Also keep in mind principles such as fairness, efficiency and scientific
merit.

Strive for criteria that are legitimate, practical and unbiased. You may also find it helps to explore the
criteria used in making past decisions and discuss criteria with your partners or outside experts.

Sources of information.
To start down the road toward an effective local watershed partnership, you may want to read some of
these other guides from the Conservation Technology Information Center by calling 765-494-9555.
See our catalog to order this online.

Building Local Partnerships

Getting to Know Your Watershed
Leading & Communicating
Putting Together a Watershed Plan
Reflecting on Lakes
Groundwater & Surface Water: Understanding the Interaction
Wetlands: A Key Link in Watershed Management
Guide to Information and Resources
Nonpoint Source Water Quality Contacts

The author acknowledges the following sources of information that were used in developing this guide.
You may also find these publications helpful. They should be available through your local bookstore.

Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes.

Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987, New York, NY: Basic Books.

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Creating the High Performance Team.
Steve Buchholz and Thomas Roth, 1987, New York, NY: Wiley.
The Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution: Preserving Relationship at Work, at Home,
and in the Community.
Dudley Weeks, 1992, New York, NY: St. Martins Press.
Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In.
Robert Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, 1991, New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide to Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements.
Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
The Planner as Dispute Resolver: Concepts and Teaching Materials.
A. Bruce Dotson, David Godschalk, and Jerome Kaufman, 1989, Washington, DC: National Institute
for Dispute Resolution.

About this guide...

This guide is one of a series for people who want to organize a local partnership to protect their
watershed. The guides will not solve all your problems. They were designed to provide guidance for
going through the process of building a voluntary partnership, developing a watershed management
plan and implementing that plan. Because the characteristics of each watershed are unique; you may
wish to select and use the portions of this guide that are applicable to your particular situation.

Although the series is written for watershed-based planning areas, the ideas and process can be used
for developing other types of plans (such as wildlife areas) to match the concerns of the partnership.
Regardless of the area, remember a long-term, integrated perspective - based on a systematic,
scientific assessment - can be used to address more than one concern at a time.

Special thanks...
Special thanks to Dr. Thomas J. Hoban, Associate Professor, North Carolina State University, who
dedicated long hours to writing this guide. Without his help this guide would not be possible.

Special thanks also go to the following professionals who carefully reviewed this guide. Their
experience and thoughtful guidance enriched it. Their time and insight is deeply appreciated.

Tom Davenport
US EPA, Region 5, Water Division
Nancy Garlitz
USDA SCS, Office of Public Affairs
Kathy Minsch
Puget Sound Water Quality Authority
Chris Novak
National Pork Producers Council
Sandy Olsenholler
Planner, Swan Creek Watershed
Frank Phelps
Farmer, Indian Lake Watershed
Frank Sagona
TVA, Middle Fork Holston River Watershed
Ed Sprunger
Coordinator, Eel River Watershed
Joan Warren
US EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds

The Know Your Watershed campaign is coordinated by the Conservation Technology Information
Center (CTIC), a nonprofit public/private partnership dedicated to the advancement of environmentally
beneficial and economically viable natural resource systems. It provides information and data about
agricultural and natural resource management systems, practices and technologies. The center was
established in 1982 under the charter of the National Association of Conservation Districts.

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 How to Apply the 12 Steps

for Management Conflict and Resolution

By Elizabeth Tull

Summary: A unique approach to conflict management and resolution based on the twelve step
programs used in recovery programs like Alcoholics Anonymous.

1. Admit there is a problem.

The very first step in dealing with any problem is to acknowledge that there is a problem.
Surrendering to the idea that control is an illusion allows one to be proactive rather than
reactive which creates opportunity for solution.

2. Recognize that a power other than yourself can restore you to sanity.

You do not have to do it alone. You can go to mentors, peer managers, a coach, or even
business literature to tap into additional experience, tools and solutions.

3. Choose to turn it over.

Sometimes the biggest obstacle is you. There are times when the best thing you can do is to
get out of the way and let others do their jobs.

4. Analyze the situation to determine the cause.

Where did you drop the ball or where could you have handled the situation differently? Look
for specific situations, especially those where you can see you were part of the problem and
not the solution. The question to ask: 'Have I truly set my people up to succeed in every area
of their responsibilities?' Look for consistent patterns in which you are the liability.
Remember, if it begins with you, it can end with you.

5. Create a successful plan of action with another person.

An objective view eliminates blind spots and also brings attention to what we do not see
ourselves. This step must be taken with someone with integrity and who is concerned about
both the business success and your success and has a proven track record of creating results.

6. Humbly get into action.

Stop Creating Conflict

It's better to prevent
unnecessary conflict than to
manage conflict once the
flames have started.

There is a reason servant leadership creates companies that thrive financially as well as in
employee/management relationships. Become a servant-leader and reap the benefits, both
personally and professionally.
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 7. Let your side of the street sparkle.

Take stock of your personal inventory and identify where and with whom you need resolution.
Then, decide what action you will take in order to complete/restore relationships.

8. Be entirely ready to implement your plan of action.

Be committed to resolving the situation. Any second-guessing or conflicting intentions should

be discussed and put to rest. Willingness is a state of being, not just an attitude. It may
sometimes be necessary to modify your plan of action if you are not getting the results you
looked for, but don't quit before the miracle.

9 Lead by example.

Be an active part of the solution and admit your piece of the problem. Show up as a leader
who accepts personal responsibility and earn respect. You don't need to demand it. People will
go where you lead them, so lead by example.

10. Create an outline for others.

Stop Letting Conflict

Control YOU
Learn to manage conflict by
"using your head", rather
than your heart. Find out
about pro's and con's of
different conflict methods.

Once you have increased productivity and have the trust, respect and loyalty of the people
involved (up, down and across the board), write down these steps as guidlines for yourself and
others to operate from.Be available to support other managers and MIT's through this process.

Elizabeth Tull is a Legacy Strategist who assists people in Disovering, Developing and
Delivering Legacies of Excellence, Humanity and Extraordinary Living. Come visit and sign
up for The Coaching Catalyst newsletter http://www.agapelegacycoach.com

Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/

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