FATA REFORMS

Different tribal agencies constituting Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

are naturally connected to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and each agency is
directly linked, from communication infrastructure to socioeconomic interaction,
to the adjacent area of KP. The tribal areas (erstwhile known as FATA) have gone
through radical changes after the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. The events
that followed the tragic 9/11 incident and the ensuing US invasion of Afghanistan
and the preceding rule of the Taliban religious movement radicalized the region
further. This prolonged militancy in tribal areas led to massive death and damages
that also spread to other parts of Pakistan, killing at least 60,000 people and
leaving millions displaced. The estimated damage to Pakistan’s infrastructure has
been more than $118 billion.

However, there is a ray of hope for Fata, if reforms are introduced. On Nov 8,
2015, the prime minister announced the formation of a Fata Reforms Committee
on foreign affairs. In the wake of the APS tragedy, the government announced the
National Action Plan to counter terrorism. To achieve the objectives set in the
NAP, bringing FATA into the national mainstream was inevitable so as to improve
the socioeconomic indicators and to reduce the incidence of poverty that at 73
percent is the highest in the country, according to a recent report on
“Multidimensional Poverty,” issued by the Planning Commission of Pakistan.

Furthermore, the question of Afghanistan objecting to the merger of FATA and KP

does not arise because Durand Line is not just about FATA but covers a distance of
around 2500 km stretching from Zhob in Balochistan to Chitral in KP and these
areas are the same general administration of Pakistan as would be FATA after its
merger with KP.
Maintaining the present status is not acceptable to anyone except a few vested
interests. These vested interests are beneficiaries of the status quo (which is
plagued by black economy, misuse of authority and resources, illegal cross-border
movement of goods, lack of accountability, security-related internal and external
actors) and would like to divide people about the constitutional status of FATA and
stop progress on this issue even in future.

There are two kinds of reform decisions required — these pertain to the political
and development aspects. Secondly, it would be important to give extra weight to a
process of consultation over the substance of reform. Both are important but in this
case, the process must receive more attention.

As Fata constitutes the borderland with Afghanistan that is already under intense
security stress there is danger of chaos. This situation necessitates the
strengthening of internal security that may be built around three parameters: a) a
strong border security force near the international border to prevent unauthorized
movement along 350km of Fata’s border with Afghanistan; b) a full strength
Frontiers Corps to maintain internal order inside the agencies; c) a strong frontier
Corps-like force (by amalgamating the Frontier Constabulary) that will cover the
ridge line between the districts and former agencies.

To conclude it will be appropriate to merge Fata with KP as both the Malakand and
Gilgit-Baltistan models are flawed; it needs to be done to prevent more violence in
northwest Pakistan.

The primary first step for Fata reform will be the holding of a referendum for its
merger with KP because without it there will be no legitimacy and ordinary
tribesmen would be dissatisfied. Secondly, for the purposes of restoring social
cohesion in Fata and reducing the threat of violence, the government must
undertake a well-funded reconciliation program; other aspects like changes in the
law and the manner of policing should be finalized in the form of a transition
program. It is a propitious moment for Fata reforms and must be made good use of
while the Pakistan Army is still in the ascendant in Fata.