People v. Turco
The Supreme Court agrees with the lower court’s finding of credibility in the
G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of
his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard
a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco
immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware
of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the
use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid
her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12
meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the
grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded
in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part
despite Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she
reports the incident to anybody.
For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster
enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed
Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste
time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and
eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco,
meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.
The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.
In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the
rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical
certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not
presented in court to explain the same.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is
with merit
Held:
1. No.
testimony and evidence presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Yes. With regards to appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while
the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in
official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an
opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show
his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between admissibility
of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility
is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to
such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while
evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely,
evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special
rule forbids its reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim
herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does
not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces
the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.
G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of
rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of
the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of
Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the
undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly make her lie
down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and removed her short
pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and
intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant and
finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty, after which trial ensued.
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of
its witnesses - Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the
police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the
victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata,
the medical record clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto
Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after the incident - is
abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang,
Isabela, Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8,
t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and her
deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6)
months old at the time of incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock
(7:00 p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by
a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her
grandmother who was already sleeping in the room. About to enter the said room,
Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who
was it, the party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are
referring to whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years
and appellant is her second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to
befall her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use of towel,
covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed
his right hand on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen
which was about twelve (12) meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no
time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her
shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19, id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to
no avail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Escelea's private part. The victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id). Still
dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and held the victim's breast.
Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to
anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.
(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the
other hand, upon reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled
with blood (p. 23, id). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the harrowing
experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell her
brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed
Alejandro, the victim's father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste
time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27,
id).
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital.
She was examined by Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical
certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint
against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her
granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant
denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also
advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was
trying to project that the complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio
Turco, Jr. are sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme
Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of
appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary
love affair is an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof.
Nowhere in the record of the case that the same was substantiated, though mentioned
by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused and/or his witnesses must present any token of
the alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare
allegation of the defense, not to mention its utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is
hard to understand how such a relationship could exculpate a person from the rape of
a terrified young child barely a little over the age of twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a
love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs. Sergio
Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court
Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R.
No. 122474, October 17, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1,
October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made
with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a paramount
importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or
they are sixth civil degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin
of the father of the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended
family, the relationship between the complainant and the accused being only second
degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and
care for a younger relative (the complainant). It is very hard to understand or
comprehend why a cousin files a case of rape against her cousin, unless it is true.
There is no showing that there was compelling motive why the case be filed against
the accused, except that the rape really happened.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her
father would bring an action against the accused, except that the accused had raped
Escelea Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were not true
that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself to an
embarrassment and traumatic experience connected with the litigation of this rape
case. We are aware of the Filipino culture especially on virginity. We likened it as a
mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced together ... not ever. This
is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant belonged, poor and helpless and
everything is entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve
(12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So
poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a
house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and expose
herself to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to
the court is a shout for help ... let us try to hear it.
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the
accused "GUILTY" of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
I We agree with the trial court.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES
OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic]
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE
CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING
THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND
TO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00
REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt considering that other than the written statement of the
complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the
Municipal Trial Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence
was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only
presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that
immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a
towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able
to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated
accused-appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no
actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer
who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of
rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are
(3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be referring to whom?
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284
SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289
SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]). A Rodegelio, sir.

Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in
rape is the credibility of complainant's testimony. this case?

The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years A Yes, sir.
old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her
family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did
neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes herself to the you do?
danger of the dark night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of
credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court. A I opened the door, sir.

Complainant narrated the incident in this wise: Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?

Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
hear anything?
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
A Yes, sir.
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q What was that?
Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A I heard a call, sir.
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
Q How was the call made?
Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right hand on your neck,
A It is just by saying: "Lea". where was he? Was he infront or behind?

Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any? A He was at my back, sir.

A I answered: "Who is that?" Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next
with that position?
Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A He covered my mouth, sir. A Our pig pen, Your Honor.

Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next? Q Who owned that pig pen?

A He told me to walk, sir. A My father, Your Honor.

Q Where did he bring you? Q How far is that pig pen to your house?

A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir. A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).

Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place? COURT:

A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir. It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.

Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken? PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)

A Yes, sir. Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought
to the pig pen or the place where you were sexually abused, were you place inside or
Q Do you have a copra kiln? outside?

ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:

The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, Leading, Your Honor.
leading, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
I will withdraw.
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place
which you do not know? Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you
were brought by the accused?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Inside the grasses, sir.
Q What place?
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused
A Pig pen, Your Honor. do to you?

Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen? A He put me down, sir.
Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next? Q And was he able to insert his private part?

A He mounted on me, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next? Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?

A He molested me, sir. A I felt pain, sir.

Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body? Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was
already inside your private part?
A Yes, sir.
A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q What?
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us
A My shortpants and panty, sir. whether you have already experienced or you have already your menstruation at that
time?
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did
he totally remove it from your body? A No, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused had sexually abused you
and you said you felt pains after he consumated the sexual act, after that what did he
do next after consumating the act?
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me
A He abused me, sir. and hold my nipple, sir.

Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your? Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you
and hold your breast, did he tell you anything?
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?
Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir.
A I tried to move my body, sir.
A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened
Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, you in Chavacano dialect, what happened next after that?
what did the accused do?
No more, sir.
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the
defense counsel asked her about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8,
1995. The query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she also
watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home,
accused-appellant came and called her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he
answered "so Totong". When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow
a guitar. She said that she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet
around. He insisted but to no avail, and hence he just went home. She went to sleep
afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant came
to borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly,
she said that the incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that
transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents.
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent
confusion concerning the events that transpired, and her fear of both accused-
appellant and her father.
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs.
Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young
and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed
by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true (People vs.
Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of the trial court's
observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs -
almost illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that
she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her
virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken ... can no longer be pieced
together ... not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant
belonged, poor and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony,
having intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the
record that the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he
asked the victim what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37).
Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts
details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs.
Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not
remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one's life
experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes
deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life,
which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs.
Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming
testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs.
Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or
isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-
appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial
court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially
one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and
the victim. At this juncture, we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon - the
mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that
makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree
relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as
closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care
of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the
prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to
understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she
having no compelling motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the
conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to
state that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault
on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's
fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that
she did not disclose the incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well
as of accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a
twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points
presented by the defense that must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing)
accused-appellant and the victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the
proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, .we Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
agree with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of
accused-appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs.
Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the
like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?
just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were
sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and A Yes, sir, we are only close.
photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this
theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly
abandoning this line. Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were
already friends?
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was
between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate A Yes, sir.
relationship but by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of
the incident, when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who (tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
he was, the victim knew right away that her caller was accused-appellant when the
latter replied "Si Totong". However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:

Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas
victim Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent friendship between them, as in San Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
follows:
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the
complainant Escelea Tabada?
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of
Escelea Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.
A They are cousins, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A I do not know her, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas? truth?

A No, Your Honor. A Yes, sir.

(ibid, p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually
happened since the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not
presented in court to explain the same.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify.
While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since
entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must
first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless
the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place
emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative
value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent.
Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to
be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus,
while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible
because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in
favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the
rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence and must be modified.
In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to
the victim as indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by any of the
circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction
of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as
moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis thereof (People vs.
Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the
offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to
penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured
hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the
testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is
well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of
rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258
SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a
medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo,
supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.
Expert Travel &Tours Inc. vs CA In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of the board
GR 152392, May 26, 2005 of directors of private corporation is is a reality, in light of RA 8792. The SEC issued
Callejo Sr. J. SEC memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to
Facts: Korean Air Lines (KAL) filed a complaint against Expert Travel & Tours Inc be complied with related to such conferences.
(ETI) with the RTC of Manila for collection of sum of money plus attorney’s fees and
damages. The verification and certification against non-forum shopping was signed by
Atty. Mario Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal The Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the
counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint. ETI moved to Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
dismiss the complaint on the ground that said lawyer was not authorized to execute authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification
the verification and certification against non-forum shopping as required by Section 5 against non forum shopping.
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo
was its resident agent and was reported as such with the SEC as required by the Petition granted.
Corporation Code of the Philippines. Also, it further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was
the Corporate Secretary of KAL.
At the hearing, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that thru a resolution of KAL Board of
Directors approved during a special meeting, he was authorized to file the complaint.
Thru an affidavit submitted by its general manager, it was alleged that a special
teleconference was held and and in that same teleconference the Board approved a
resolution authorizing him to execute the certification against non-forum shopping
and to file the complaint. However, the general manager provided no written copy of
the said resolution.

The trial court gave due credence to the claim of Atty. Aguinaldo and the general
manager. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that the court cannot take
judicial notice of the said teleconference without any hearing, which was denied by
the RTC. CA also denied the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court can take judicial notice of the said teleconference.
Held: Things of “common knowledge” of which courts take judicial matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable
of ready and unquestionable determination. As the common knowledge of man ranges
far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business
transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing
is interactive group communication through an electronic medium, bringing people
together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles.
G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI).
The Antecedents
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of
South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the
Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo
and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against ETI
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the principal
amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification
and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who
indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had
caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was
not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as
required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion,
contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the Corporation
Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the
corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification
card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been
authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors
approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was
given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The
trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar
motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit3 of even date, executed by its
general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a
special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It
was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a
resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 denying the motion to dismiss,
giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board
of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which it
approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without
any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order5dated August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC.
In its comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo
dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
SECRETARY’S/RESIDENT AGENT’S CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and appointed
Corporate Secretary and Resident Agent of KOREAN AIRLINES, a foreign
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the Republic of Korea and also duly registered and authorized to do business
in the Philippines, with office address at Ground Floor, LPL Plaza Building,
124 Alfaro St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on June 25,
1999 at which a quorum was present, the said Board unanimously passed,
voted upon and approved the following resolution which is now in full force
and effect, to wit:
 RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A.
Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed
and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to
effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours.
They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate,
defend, sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the
filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-Trial
Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the
above-mentioned claim.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of
January, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Resident Agent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January, 1999, Atty.
Mario A. Aguinaldo exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No.
14914545, issued on January 7, 2000 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 119; (Sgd.)
Page No. 25; ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Book No. XXIV Notary Public
Series of 2000. Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo
was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the appellate court,
Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June
25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for
taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus,
ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the Court by way of petition for review
on certiorari and raises the following issue:
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT
RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT
PETITION?7
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court can
be determined only from the contents of the complaint and not by documents or
pleadings outside thereof. Hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, and the CA erred in considering the affidavit of
the respondent’s general manager, as well as the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s
Certification and the resolution of the board of directors contained therein, as proof of
compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner also maintains that the RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said
teleconference without prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner
reiterates its submission that the teleconference and the resolution adverted to by the
respondent was a mere fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern technology is
used in the field of business is a factual issue; hence, cannot be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On the merits of the petition,
it insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident agent and corporate secretary, is
authorized to sign and execute the certificate of non-forum shopping required by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top of the board resolution approved during
the teleconference of June 25, 1999. The respondent insists that "technological
advances in this time and age are as commonplace as daybreak." Hence, the courts
may take judicial notice that the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc.
had provided a record of corporate conferences and meetings through FiberNet using
fiber-optic transmission technology, and that such technology facilitates voice and
image transmission with ease; this makes constant communication between a foreign-
based office and its Philippine-based branches faster and easier, allowing for cost-
cutting in terms of travel concerns. It points out that even the E-Commerce Law has
recognized this modern technology. The respondent posits that the courts are aware
of this development in technology; hence, may take judicial notice thereof without
need of hearings. Even if such hearing is required, the requirement is nevertheless
satisfied if a party is allowed to file pleadings by way of comment or opposition
thereto.
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of
teleconferencing as a means of conducting meetings of board of directors for purposes
of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a legitimate
means of gathering a quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken judicial
notice of by the court. It asserts that safeguards must first be set up to prevent any
mischief on the public or to protect the general public from any possible fraud. It
further proposes possible amendments to the Corporation Code to give recognition to
such manner of board meetings to transact business for the corporation, or other
related corporate matters; until then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing cannot
be the subject of judicial notice.
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting on June
25, 1999 through teleconferencing where Atty. Aguinaldo was supposedly given such
an authority is a farce, considering that there was no mention of where it was held,
whether in this country or elsewhere. It insists that the Corporation Code requires
board resolutions of corporations to be submitted to the SEC. Even assuming that
there was such a teleconference, it would be against the provisions of the Corporation
Code not to have any record thereof.
The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by the
respondent in its pleadings were mere fabrications foisted by the respondent and its
counsel on the RTC, the CA and this Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.— The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory8 and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused.
The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the certification must be
accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not
he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even
his counsel may be unaware of such facts.9 Hence, the requisite certification executed
by the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice.10
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed,
for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person,
including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be
established by the documents. The reason was explained by the Court in National
Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 as follows:
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only
through properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
…
The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those
expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied
by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said
powers through its board of directors and/or its duly-authorized officers
and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed
only by natural persons duly-authorized for the purpose by corporate by-
laws or by specific act of the board of directors. "All acts within the powers
of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection; and except so
far as limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter,
by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general principles of law which
govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the officer or agent
of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for
 the corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting in their
stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents
of individuals and private persons."
… pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
… For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its
own retained counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and
president, may not even know the details required therein.
Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the complaint
or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule is that compliance
with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the dismissal of a complaint based on
its non-compliance with the rule, is impermissible. However, in exceptional
circumstances, the court may allow subsequent compliance with the rule.12 If the
authority of a party’s counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is
disputed by the adverse party, the former is required to show proof of such authority
or representation.
In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority of Atty.
Aguinaldo to execute the requisite verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent. It was, thus, incumbent upon the
respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such
authority to execute the requisite verification and certification for and in its behalf.
The respondent, however, failed to do so.
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which was incorporated in the
complaint and signed by Atty. Aguinaldo reads:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Suite 210
Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini cor. P. Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila, after having
sworn to in accordance with law hereby deposes and say: THAT -
1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the above
entitled case and have caused the preparation of the above complaint;
2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained therein are
true and correct based on the records on files;
3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If I
subsequently learned that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or
agency within five (5) days from such notice/knowledge.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 1999,
affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 00671047 issued
on January 7, 1999 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 1005; (Sgd.)
Page No. 198;
Book No. XXI ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Series of 1999. Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913
As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that Atty.
Aguinaldo had been authorized to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping by
the respondent’s Board of Directors; moreover, no such board resolution was
appended thereto or incorporated therein.
While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines, this
does not mean that he is authorized to execute the requisite certification against
forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation
Code, the authority of the resident agent of a foreign corporation with license to do
business in the Philippines is to receive, for and in behalf of the foreign corporation,
services and other legal processes in all actions and other legal proceedings against
such corporation, thus:
 SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. – A resident agent may either be an
individual residing in the Philippines or a domestic corporation lawfully
transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an
individual, he must be of good moral character and of sound financial
standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. – The Securities and Exchange
Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the
license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation
that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a
written power of attorney designating some persons who must be a resident
of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be
served in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and
consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held
as valid as if served upon the duly-authorized officers of the foreign
corporation as its home office.14
Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a certificate
of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. This is
because while a resident agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal (a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines), such resident may not be
aware of actions initiated by its principal, whether in the Philippines against a
domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country where such corporation
was organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino
citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent, was not
specifically authorized to execute the said certification. It attempted to show its
compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its complaint by submitting, on
March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to have been approved by its Board of
Directors during a teleconference held on June 25, 1999, allegedly with Atty.
Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance. However, such attempt of the respondent
casts veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a teleconference was held, but
also on the approval by the Board of Directors of the resolution authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of
modern technology, persons in one location may confer with other persons in other
places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and Atty.
Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondent’s Board of Directors in South
Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondent’s claim
that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as
well as Atty. Aguinaldo’s certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they
may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.
As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.17
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business
transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing
is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations)
through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people
together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. 18 This
type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic
types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound;
(2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and
(3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional
capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It
was first introduced in the 1960’s with American Telephone and Telegraph’s
Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new technology.
Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly
service charge for using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty
than as an actual means for everyday communication.20In time, people found it
advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate
governance, because of the money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldn’t normally attend a
distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little
expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings
are shorter and more oriented to the primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference
from any location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate
teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information
exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated
teleconferences than an FTF meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because
of the following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that aren’t
made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as
negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and
meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one
person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the
complexity of group communication. Although it may be easier to
communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate.
Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of
directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The
Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on
November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such
conferences.24Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may
have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a
teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not
convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not
inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing
Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against
forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention
that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The
respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident
agent in the Philippines. Even the identification card25 of Atty. Aguinaldo which the
respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of
the respondent’s Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the
teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then
prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the board
resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion.26 The respondent,
however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said
resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court granted the
motion per its Order27 dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an
extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000.28 It was on
the said date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk
Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said
teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved
the following resolution:
 RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo &
Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take
with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid
account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to
prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute any document or paper
necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-
trial Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the
above-mentioned claim.29
respondent filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretary’s/Resident
Agent’s Certificate30 dated January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25,
1999 never took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s
Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully
foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint
against the petitioner.

But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent "do[es] not IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
keep a written copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no records of board Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept. This belied the respondent’s Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint
earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to submit the of the respondent.
questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main office in Korea. The
respondent gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a copy of
the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) SO ORDERED.
that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that
the resolution was embodied in the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate signed by
Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the said certificate.

The respondent’s allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on

June 25, 1999 and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance)
is incredible, given the additional fact that no such allegation was made in the
complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long before
the complaint was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint,
or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on
January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a
meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the
Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later
that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent
alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the
resolution was approved was held via teleconference.

Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a
Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a
teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint,
which was filed on September 6, 1999. More importantly, the respondent did not
explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9,
1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not
explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its
Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the
Prieto vs Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)
“if the party desires the court to take judicial notice of the record of another case, he
should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and give the other party the chance
to be heard on the matter.”
Facts
Gabriel Prieto and Zeferino Arroyo are owners of parcels of land adjoining to each
other. When Arroyo died, the certificate of title in his name was cancelled and a
transfer of certificate of title was then issued to his heirs. The heirs of Arroyo filed a
petition before the CFI claiming that the technical description in their title does not
conform to the decision of the land registration court where the area given in their
title is less than 157 sq meters than to what they are entitled and thus prayed for the
correction of the description in their title. The court directed the Register of Deeds to
change the description in the transfer certificate of title. Prieto now filed an action
against the defendants with the petition to annul the order made by the court claiming
that a portion of his land was unjustly added to the defendant’s title. But during the
special proceeding Prieto and his counsel failed to appear and the court issued an
order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute.
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge. If the party desires the court to take judicial notice of
the record of another case, he should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and
give the other party the chance to be heard on the matter instead of sending motion
for postponement of the hearing.
The court finds his argument academic since no appeal was made from the order
dismissing the said petition thus the decision has become already final. Moreover, the
court finds res judicata as operative in the case since there are similar in the identity
of the parties, subject matter and cause of action in the two cases involved thus the
order of dismissal in the first petition now operates to bar the institution of the
second petition.

Prieto filed an action for annulment of the special proceeding and prayed to reconvey
the 157 sq meters of lot that was taken from him and was added to the title of the
defendants. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata
which the court allowed. Prieto now contends that there is no res judicata and
invoked the court to have been erred in dismissing his first petition to annul the
special proceeding even when he did not appear in court as no parole evidence is
needed to support his petition where the matters concerning the land registration
proceeding are parts of the record of the court which are well within the court’s
judicial notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the court should have taken judicial notice on the land
registration case adjudicated in the same court instead of dismissing the first
petition to annul the special proceeding?

Ruling:
G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965
GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO,
JR., defendants-appellees.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for plaintiff-appellant.
Quijano and Azores and J. P. Arroyo for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 4280. Since only
questions of law are involved the appeal has been certified to this Court.
In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a
petition for registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2, Plan Psu-
106730 (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025). After the proper proceedings Original
Certificate of Title No. 39 covering said lot was issued in his name. The same year and
in the same Court Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining
parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C. No. 173; G.L.R.O. No.
1474). As a result Original Certificate of Title No. 11 was issued in his name.
After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued in the
names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack, Joker, Nonito and
Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a
petition (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No. 900) in which they
claimed that the technical description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and
in the original certificate of their predecessor did not conform with that embodied in
the decision of the land registration court, and was less in area by some 157 square
meters. They therefore prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to Section
112 of the Land Registration Act; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another
one issued to them containing the correct technical description. The petition was filed
in the registration record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 900.
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to make it conform to
that embodied in the decision of the Court on March 8, 1950, and to correct therein
the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden
Arroyo'.
On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two lots) a
petition to annul the order of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900. At the hearing of
the petition on July 12, 1957 neither he nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the
trial court on the same day issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to
prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on September 5,
1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present action for
annulment of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein entered on May 23,
1956. He also prayed that the 157 square meters allegedly taken from his lot by virtue
of said order be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff
opposed, and on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is from the order of
dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been
taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was irregular
and illegal mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same was instituted
almost six years after the issuance of the decree and title sought to be corrected, and
hence the order of the court dated May 23, 1956 for the correction of the technical
description in appellees' title is void ab initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No. 900 but the
propriety of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground of res adjudicata.
The validity of the said proceedings was the issue in the first case he filed. But because
of his failure and that of his counsel to attend the hearing the court dismissed the case
for failure to prosecute. Since no appeal was taken from the order of dismissal it had
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, the court not having provided otherwise
(Rule 30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein,
defendants-appellees here, as they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading
in that case. Appellees, on the other hand, allege that they had voluntarily submitted
to the court's jurisdiction after they were served copies of the petition. This allegation
finds support in the record, particularly in the following statement of appellant in his
brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but was
postponed to January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the respondents.
Upon motion for postponements of respondents, now defendants-appellees,
the hearing of January 14, 1957 was postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing
set for May 16, 1957 was again postponed upon motion of the respondents
to July 12, 1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first
petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it, the
matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025,
and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial notice and
cognizance of the said court.
appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by
incorporating therein only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu-106730 as
appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and maintaining consequently the description limits
and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner, Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in
accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The claim for
damages as well as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are
not materially different from his prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in
the premises" contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two
cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of
the second.
The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in
the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San
Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take
judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or
manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for
postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised
by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his
first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present
action was filed.

The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.

Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant
seeks that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material
significance is the fact that in the complaint in the instant case there is an express
prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters of land, taken from appellant as a
result of such correction of title. For that area would necessarily have reverted to
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent
court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into
account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square
meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of
ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of
Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the
disputed lot.1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the
Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction,
conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be
allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed
provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did.
She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son
and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused,
claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he
inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been
living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that
the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land
planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual
findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The
trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered
the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of
land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated
October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1",
paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00—the first
P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh.
"A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C",
deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in
1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations
of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as
disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length.2 The
challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an
earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the
above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which
were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is
not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In
fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l,"
were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate
court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and
"Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
 Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits
"A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for
the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally
offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,3 "At the trial on the
merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings
of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
patties at the trial.4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it
may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of
the case. But we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case
before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because,
even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda
Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the
defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify
the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the
exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta
to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in
taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which
was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule
"courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending
before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge.7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed
in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with
the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at
the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending.8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of
objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the
consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the
records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of
the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here.
On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before
it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took
judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to
the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other
evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this
justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel
that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the
plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was
the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another
property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no
explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa
Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land
in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have
held in many cases.1âwphi1 However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the
accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property
since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax
declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the
petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property.9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the
land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material
in supporting a claim of ownership.10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the
subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for
more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels
of land.11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require
her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial
court is that he was not much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond
only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At
best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he
should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would
have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of
living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we
do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon
were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were
made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they
were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had
been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed
there until she died.12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name.13 Jose
Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot.14 He even mortgaged the land to
the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who
acknowledged him as the owner.15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an
overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that
they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not
conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain
their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been
totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when
it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice
thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing
doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built
upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to
prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly
cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence
supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial
judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. v CA GR No 122480, April 12, 2000

FACTS:
The case involves a claim for tax refund on the amount of P112,491 representing BPI’s
tax withheld for 1989. This was initially filed with the CIR alleging that the company
did not apply the 1989 refundable amount to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or
other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.
But, without waiting for CIR, it filed a petition for review with the CTA which
dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether BPI is entitled to the refund

RULING:
Yes. In the present case, the return attached to the company’s motion for
reconsideration clearly showed that it suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the
holding of the CA and CTA, BPI could not have applied the amount as a tax credit.
When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not
invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it.
G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000
items are reflected:
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes,
so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When
it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke
technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should
enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993
Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is
hereby DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit.4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution5 denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Less:
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that
petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of
the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case.
However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return
that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be
applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in
the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable
amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual
Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged
business losses it incurred for the same year.
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review
 with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112,491.00.
The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's
petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence
its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the
fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00
(inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the
present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same
was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6,
1994.6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not
credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous
declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount
will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990.
Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to grant
the claim for refund. . . .
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are
regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be
construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon the
taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence its
entitlement to the claim for refund.8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
refund of P112,491.90, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid
for the taxable year 1989.9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and
was thus entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the
1986 Tax Code which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1)
to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year,
petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the said
amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner
informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax
refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was
forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner
declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax
as a tax credit for the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed
to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this
presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would have shown
that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded
that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate
court are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia,
the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court
failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different
conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply
the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the
manager of petitioner's accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise
presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's
vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be
automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities
for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the
quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In
fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all
taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not
do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment
return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the
taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred
P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in
dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an
opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached
thereto. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said
Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after
the trial.1âwphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically
provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical
rules of evidence." 13 The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of
truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should
not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a
controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly
showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA
and the CTA, petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to
consider the said Return, as well as the other documentary evidence presented during
the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. 14 But there can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the CTA and even before
this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in
1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund
which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioner's first two
quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records
shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by
respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA.
Indeed, to rebut respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its
Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A"
thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a
Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for
refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a
net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . . ." 18 Respondent, however, urges this Court not to
take judicial notice of the said case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of
matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case,
the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the
Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at
all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even
dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take
judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if
they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have
easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein — that petitioner suffered a
net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact
established by petitioner's other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's
case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did
not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and
are to be construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case,
we hold that petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly
comply with the rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent. These
circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to disregard this cold,
undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have
applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and
legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money
not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens.
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes,
so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments of such
taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and
uprightness.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess
creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
CITY OF MANILA V. GERARDO GARCIA Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967 permits.

FACTS
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area in
Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to
1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city.
There they lived thru the years to the present.
The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder
and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take
judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has
been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants
must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school
building annex is paramount.

Few years thereafter, defendants were given written permits — each labeled "lease
contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer,
pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave
each of defendants to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for
the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate.

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants

appealed.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.

RULING
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification that an appropriation of P100,000.00
was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. The defendants were wrong in insisting that they have acquired
the legal status of tenants. They entered the land, built houses of second-class
materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were
erected without city pemits, thus, illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued when the effects of
the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well
adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry.
Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode.
And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
Amt. due from
Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — 1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN,
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA —
LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE 3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA,
MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO 4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
— SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ,
ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, 5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. (Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

SANCHEZ, J.:
7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, 8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by
Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and
10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to
consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city.
There they lived thru the years to the present. 11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, 12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, 13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez,
Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor 14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits —
each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon 15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the
16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16
name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente
on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants 17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
exhibited none.
18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1äwphï1.ñët Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40

 22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48
P7,580.69
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On
September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to
clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to
vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was
followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and
March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to
vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover
possession.2
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts
heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly
rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs.
Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial
court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That
document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in
Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of
an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is
indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the
admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the
trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was
need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited
the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case
is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was
done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its
contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case
solely for this purpose.4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not
profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have
taken — because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance
4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts
sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the
municipal board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the
certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside
for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third
direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises.
The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The
permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been
asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we
say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to
throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical
right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the
city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants.
They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon
without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected
without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has
become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose
problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They
constitute proof that respect for the law and the rights of others, even those
of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked
on the pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever
convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and even against
the will, of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their
belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of
some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus
prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands
have not been spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into
property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice
grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite
often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of
forcible entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of
some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these
squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if
not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters have become
insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of
law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the
detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the
rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into the
validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the
mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down
and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two
decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have,
if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet,
usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal,
without permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the
lands" of the City of Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in
question. It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila
cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of
giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal
entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official
norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it
fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets
disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain.
Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in
this country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give
permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted
are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on
the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for
school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that
housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a
perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have
to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school
building annex is paramount.10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid
constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder
and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the
prejudice of the education of the youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands
of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally
ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate
system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary
instruction".12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public
nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities
themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. They say that the case should have been started in the municipal
court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice for them to
vacate was only served in September, 1961, and suit was started in July,
1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have
reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period
from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their
possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long
after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.14Upon the premises, we vote to
affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants. So
ordered.
 SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
J. Corona
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These
were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the
property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU
and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.
"One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent
with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the
City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to
do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who
are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of
manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.
x----------------------x
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.
x----------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines
Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective
motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the
business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and
marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines.2 The DOE is a governmental
agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 76383 and tasked to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the
government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and
conservation.4
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila,
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on
November 28, 2001,6 and became effective on December 28, 2001 after
publication.7 Sections 1 and 3 thereof state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those]
portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track
in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero
de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L.
Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig
River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that
"the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.9 In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period
of six months starting July 25, 2002.10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution No.
97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business
permits to the oil companies.12
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our
March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the
Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city,"13 including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need
not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought
to intervene and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007
and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April 11, 2007, we conducted the oral arguments
in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movants-intervenors oil companies
and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had
filed a complaint against respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application
for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction.14 The case was docketed as civil case no. 03-106377. On the same day,
Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of
Ordinance No. 8027 and with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.15 This was docketed as civil case no.
03-106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila,
Branch 39 issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php
2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be
issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their officers, agents,
representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or acting in
their behalf, during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron and Shell] the
necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal.16
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking
the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This was docketed
as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined the
parties to maintain the status quo.17
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also
known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of
2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006.19
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20,
asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.20 This was docketed as civil case no.
06-115334. Petron filed its own complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 41.21 This was docketed as civil case no. 07-116700.22 The court issued
a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8119.23
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw
complaint and counterclaim on February 20, 2007.24 In an order dated April 23, 2007,
the joint motion was granted and all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were
withdrawn.25
Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as issues
for our resolution:
1. whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this
case;26
2. whether the following are impediments to the execution of our March 7,
2007 decision:
(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of which
were not previously brought by the parties to the attention of the
Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction and status quo order issued by the RTC of
Manila, Branches 39 and 42 and
 3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly encroach
upon the DOE’s powers and functions involving energy resources.
During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to rule on the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of
consolidated cases involving this issue in the RTC.27 The importance of settling this
controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was emphasized, considering its
impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here. The parties
were after all given ample opportunity to present and argue their respective
positions. By so doing, we will do away with the delays concomitant with litigation
and completely adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as the final
arbiter of all legal disputes.
Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan
Terminals is called for to put our discussion in the proper context.
History Of The Pandacan Oil Terminals
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the
Pasig river. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated
as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for
various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation of goods
and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial zone.28 Among its early
industrial settlers were the oil companies. Shell established its installation there on
January 30, 1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company
began marketing its products in the country.30 In 1922, it built a warehouse depot
which was later converted into a key distribution terminal.31 The corporate presence
in the Philippines of Esso (Petron’s predecessor) became more keenly felt when it
won a concession to build and operate a refinery in Bataan in 1957.32 It then went on
to operate a state-of-the-art lube oil blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where
it manufactures lubes and greases.33
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine
Islands. Although Manila was declared an open city, the Americans had no interest in
welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous attempt to fend off the Japanese
Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan Terminals and
hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese
Army of a valuable logistics weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum,
causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as
follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel
storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in
smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and all riverside
buildings. … For one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a cloud of smoke
by day, a pillar of fire by night.35
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of
depots and service stations inoperative.36
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt
itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of their depots.37 But the
district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a
bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a densely populated
area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it
home.38 Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses,
churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated
there.39 Malacañang Palace, the official residence of the President of the Philippines
and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away.40 There is a private
school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of
informal settlers.41 More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high
schools situated near these facilities.42 A university with a student population of about
25,000 is located directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig river.43
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals
and depot facilities.44 The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan,
both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a
114-kilometer45 underground pipeline system.46 Petron’s refinery in Limay, Bataan,
on the other hand, also services the depot.47 The terminals store fuel and other
petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila,48 50%
of Luzon’s consumption and 35% nationwide.49 Fuel can also be transported through
barges along the Pasig river or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.
We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to
intervene in this case.
Intervention Of The Oil Companies And The DOE Should Be Allowed In The
Interest of Justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve
a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.50 The pertinent rules
are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
SEC. 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-
in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:
(1) Legal interest
(a) in the matter in controversy; or
(b) in the success of either of the parties; or
I against both parties; or
(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof;
(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights
of original parties;
(3) Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate
proceeding51 and
(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As a
rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment" as Section 2, Rule 19
expressly provides. Both filed their separate motions after our decision was
promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,52 a recently decided case
which was also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the appropriate
time to file the motions-in-intervention was before and not after resolution of the
case.53
The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of
substantial justice:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to
make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is
aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.54
The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property
rights.55
[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other
parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action
were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be against the
policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct
interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor
in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the
establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.56
We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027. Their claim is that they will need to spend
billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their oil depots out of Manila.
Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time of its filing on
December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our March 7, 2007
decision to protect their interests. But they did not.57 Neither did they offer any
worthy explanation to justify their late intervention.
Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time, we will
allow it because they raised and presented novel issues and arguments that were not
considered by the Court in its March 7, 2007 decision. After all, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court before which the case is pending.58 Considering the compelling reasons favoring
intervention, we do not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of rights of the original parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their intervention will
enable us to rule on the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for
the RTC’s decision.
The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct and
immediate as Ordinance No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national
authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It seeks to intervene in order to
represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if the
Pandacan Terminals’ operations are discontinued. We will tackle the issue of the
alleged encroachment into DOE’s domain later on. Suffice it to say at this point that,
for the purpose of hearing all sides and considering the transcendental importance of
this case, we will also allow DOE’s intervention.
The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of Ordinance
No. 8027
Under Rule 65, Section 359 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did not unlawfully
fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully prevented from
doing so by virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of
Manila, Branches 39 and 42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in
favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court granted the joint motion of the
parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.60
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs.
Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself by
saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the civil cases and that a TRO
was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and Shell. It is true
that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court would not have
been left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated
the Court, by way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of
20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty that
this had already lapsed.61 Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in
his rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The
parties and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the
parties.62 Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They
can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings.
They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may
they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal impediments to
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. ― A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(g) IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
 probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to
be protected exists prima facieand (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of
that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented will cause an
irreparable injustice.
The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is
a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such,
cannot be restrained by injunction.63 Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance
is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its
enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of said writ is proper only
when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the
judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal
right to the remedy sought....64 (Emphasis supplied)
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for issuing the
injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be issued, is guided by the
following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant; (2) a
violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the Writ
to prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these requisites are
present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately
operating their business in the Pandacan Terminal for many years and they
have made substantial capital investment therein. Every year they were
issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have not been
declared illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of its vital
importance to the national economy, it was included in the Investment
Priorities Plan as mandated under the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the
plaintiff/petitioners have a right, therefore, to continue their operation in
the Pandacan Terminal and the right to protect their investments. This is a
clear and unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the City
Council of Manila reclassifying the area where the Pandacan Terminal is
located from Industrial II to Commercial I and requiring the
plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their business
has certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to continue their
legitimate business in the Pandacan Terminal and deprived them of their
huge investments they put up therein. Thus, before the Court, therefore,
determines whether the Ordinance in question is valid or not, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction be issued to
prevent serious and irreparable damage to plaintiff/petitioners.65
Nowhere in the judge’s discussion can we see that, in addition to a showing of a
clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced
that they had made out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough
to overcome the presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and
ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in
clear and unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement
enjoined.67 The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.68
X—x—x
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the determination of actual
cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.69
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the invalidity
or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself.70 We see no reason to
set aside the presumption. The ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be
unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to commercial. Prima
facie, this power is within the power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial,
commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost all jurisdictions
inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of their inhabitants.71
X—x—x
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its
territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive
and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be established exclusively
in the latter zone.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority,
derived from the police power, of forbidding the appellant to continue the
manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated, which has been
declared residential....72
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is
unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs
issued in the Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.
We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed as
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However, we are confronted with the question
of whether these writs issued by a lower court are impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of the mandamus petition). As already
discussed, we rule in the negative.
Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance
No. 8119 entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement
and Amendment thereto" which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The
simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the
rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the
enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court.73
Although, Section 50 of RA 40974 provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take
judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila,
should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the
party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal
ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not
before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take
judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party
desires it to have notice of.75 Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a
trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to
take judicial notice of local ordinances.76
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to
remove any discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take
notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in
obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance available to
the court for it to take notice.77
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 because he believed that it was different from
Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with each other.78
In the same way that we deem the intervenors’ late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here,
inexcusable.
The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027
was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron
assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint
motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the issue ...has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No.
8119]."79 They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the
respondent.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not
supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should
be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119
superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s)
validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt
at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears
advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions
regarding the validity of a statute85 or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the
merits of the argument of implied repeal.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing
the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of
said ordinance’s constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance
No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his
answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119
replaced Ordinance No. 8027:81

... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with
the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance
[No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance
No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that
is[,] seven years;82 (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis
supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a
position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded,83 the aforestated rule is
not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in
civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same" as this case before
us.84 To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case
in which it is offered.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786
FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City
where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant
of letters of administration and alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was
legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy
Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate court’s judgment and stated that Aida Sy-
Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.

HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law as a

question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence
relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that
they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign
law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said
law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they
do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
[Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding
among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27;
Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp.
65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo,
pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat
with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had
not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's
Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7,
1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of
Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be
valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the
estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
 (4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah
as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA
decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals
to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of
Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided
to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT
HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the
following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19,
1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her
elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an]
agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement
was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was
set, and invitations were sent out; that the said agreement was
complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho,
and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38
years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that
she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China
before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written document
[is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the
parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the
custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker
who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the
bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-
be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the
wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on
January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings
with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that
same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her
daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties
but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the
parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride;
that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the
bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the
bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the
town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that
during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom),
there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the
door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during
her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that
document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and
 the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can
still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's
family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that
document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it
in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after
her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy
Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the
same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in
1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the
Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat
made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and
that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed
by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo,
pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married
give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and
"Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If
married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip
also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of
China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of
the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of
Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).]
The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect
to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken
by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a
marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as
found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony
of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for
adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following
are entered: "Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and,
"Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
 (2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had
five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze
Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977,
pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for
presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze
Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat
expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai
Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition
of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who
are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25)
years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband
and wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise
decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they
begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel
Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955;
Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo
Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the
furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided
into two equal shares between, and distributed
to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to
Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to
their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be
retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his
obligation to give to the aforenamed children an
amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 )
monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties,
of the real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in
the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be
transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel
Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion
Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding,
the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal
separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title
seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial
Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-
47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass
upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act
No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as
an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident
shall be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63]
but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.