Pp VS CHARLIE AND AIDA COMILA
I n f a c t , e v e n i f t h e r e i s n o c o n s i d e r a t i o n
Facts:
On April 5, 1999, in the
R T C o f B a g u i o C i t y , a n Information for Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and
penalized under Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38(b),
34 and 39 of PD N o . 4 4 2 , o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e
N e w L a b o r C o d e , a s a m e n d e d , w a s f i l e d against
Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra. On
the charge of illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that "she was
merely trying to help the applicants to process their papers, believing
that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really
send the applicants to Italy." W ith respect to co-appellant
Charlie Comila, the defense submits that the prosecution
"miserably failed to prove his participation in the illegal
recruitment and estafa." The trial and appellate courts found both
appellants guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the
crimes charged against them, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment was committed in large
scale by a syndicate
Held: The Supreme Court is fully convinced that both the trial and
appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants
guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the crimes
charged against them. Through the respective
t e s t i m o n i e s o f i t s w i t n e s s e s , t h e prosecution
has satisfactorily established that both appellants were
then engaged in
unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The
crime of illegal recruitment is committed when,
among other things, a person who, without being
duly authorized according to law represents or
gives the distinct impression that he or she has the
power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to
whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given
to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that
employment.
i n v o l v e d , a p p e l l a n t w i l l s t i l l b e d e e m e d a s having
engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently
demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to private
complainants. To be engaged in the practice
and placement, it is plain that there must
at least be a promise or offer of an
employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad. As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for
him to feign ignorance of the i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e n t a c t i v i t i e s
of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation
therein.
PP VS JAMILOSA
Facts:
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she
met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus.
She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA, Quezon City
where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was
seated beside her and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers
for employment abroad. The appellant told her that his sister is a
head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA and
he could help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly salary of
Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in
two (2) weeks time. He further averred that he has connections with
the US Embassy, being a US FBI agent on official mission in the
Philippines for one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay
the amount of US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant
gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him if she is
interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They
then went to her house where she gave him the photocopies of her
all the required documents. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed
to the appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in
North EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a photocopy
of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got several pieces
of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would
sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not
issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry. Thereafter, the
appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she was
booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles,
California, USA on February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits
before their scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and
passports; however, the appellant who was supposed to be with
them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and
informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because
he had to go to the province because his wife died. She and her
companions were not able to leave for the United States. They went
to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but nobody
knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel
where he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired
from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person
connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that
she is a registered nurse by profession. In the morning of January
22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her
cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she
was going to meet the appellant who is an FBI agent and was willing
to help nurses find a job abroad. Upon the scheduled meet up, the
appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad and told
them that he has a sister in the United States. Lagman told the
appellant that she had no working experience in any hospital but the
appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one. The
appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American
visa and an additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred
Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North
EDSA, Quezon City wherein she handed to the latter her passport
and transcript of records. The appellant promised to file the said
documents with the US embassy. After 1 week, they met again at the
same place and the appellant showed to her a photocopy of her US
visa. This prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00 and 2
bottles of Black Label to the appellant without any issue of receipt by
the latter.
Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company,
called her because her number was appearing in the appellant’s
cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew him because
they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to
pay his telephone bills in the amount of P100,000.00. She became
suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. 1 week before her
scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they called up the appellant
but he said he could not meet them because his mother passed
away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a
complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared
that she first met the appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North
EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her.
The appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI and
he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy. The
appellant told her that he could help her and her companions Haidee
Raullo, Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find jobs in the US as
staff nurses in home care centers.
On February 14, 1996, the appellant got her passport and picture.
The following day, she gave the appellant the amount of US$300.00
and a bottle of cognac as "grease money" to facilitate the processing
of her visa. When she asked for a receipt, the appellant assured her
that there is no need for one because she was being directly hired as
a nurse in the United States.
She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers
Plaza and this time, the appellant required her to submit photocopies
of her college diploma, nursing board certificate and PRC license.
The appellant was able to get a ticket confirmation and told her that
they will meet again the following day for her to give P10,000.00
covering the half price of her plane ticket. Singh did not meet the
appellant as agreed upon. Instead, she went to Bamba to inquire if
the latter gave the appellant the same amount and found out that
Bamba has not yet given the said amount. They then paged the
appellant through his beeper and told him that they wanted to see
him. However, the appellant avoided them and reasoned out that he
could not meet them as he had many things to do. When the
appellant did not show up, they decided to file a complaint for illegal
recruitment with the NBI.
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of large scale illegal recruitment and which was
affirmed by the CA.
Hence this appeal which appellant emphasized that the criminal
Information charging him with illegal recruitment specifically
mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such, receipts to show
proof of payment are indispensable.
Issues: W/N appellant is guilty of large scale illegal recruitment even
without proof of issuance of receipt by the prosecution.
Held:
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is
burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person
charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused
did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed
the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.
As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining
witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be
credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the
findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored,
misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or
document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have
received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability.
Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered
as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is
sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. As the Court held in
People v. Sagaydo:
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their
money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on
the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for
employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to
leave for work abroad nor get their money back.
The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao
failed to produce receipts as proof of their payment to accused-
appellant does not free the latter from liability. The absence of
receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment.
As long as the witnesses can positively show through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in
prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense
despite the absence of receipts.
SANTOSA DATUMAN VS FIRST COSMOPOLITAN
Doctrine: The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA approved
contract and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the
original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing
breaches of the original POEA-approved contract.
FACTS: Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan
Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B.
Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and conditions:
Site of employment - Bahrain Employees
Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady Basic Monthly Salary -
US$370.00 Duration of Contract - 1 year Foreign Employer -
Mohammed Sharif Abbas Ghulam Hussain. On April 17, 1989,
petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required
placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her
passport when she arrived there; and instead of working as a
saleslady, she was forced to work as a domestic helper with a salary
of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to US$100.00.
This was contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her
Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by
the POEA. On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to
sign another contract, transferring her to another employer as
housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two (2) years.
She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to return her
passport but her pleas were unheeded. She continued working
against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from
September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued
failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993,
she was able to finally return to the Philippines through the help of
the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department. In May 1995,
petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office
against respondent for underpayment and non-payment of salary,
vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare. While the case was
pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for
underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months,
non-payment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare.
LA RULING: Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision
finding respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment
Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of
US$4,050.00 representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15)
months; and, (b) the amount of BD 180.00 representing the refund of
plane ticket.
NLRC RULING: Affirmed LA with modification. NLRC reduced the
award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00
ratiocinating as follows: Accordingly, we find that the claims for
salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed
prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May
31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the
cause of action for salary differential accrues at the time when it falls
due, it is clear that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to
April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of
US$370.00 vis-à-vis the amount of salary received which was
$100.00, complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said
period in the amount of $2,970.00
CA RULING: CA issued the assailed Decision granting the petition
and reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that the
provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f), Rule II,
Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations were not made to
make the local agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts
that may be done by the foreign principal or the direct employer
abroad. It is only as regards the principal contract to which it is privy
shall its liability extend.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not holding respondent liable
for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of
Employment.
SC RULING: YES. On whether respondent is solidarily liable for
petitioner's monetary claims – YES Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA
Rules and Regulations states that: Section 1. Requirements for
Issuance of License. - Every applicant for license to operate a private
employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written
application together with the following requirements: xxx f. A verified
undertaking stating that the applicant: xxx (3) Shall assume joint and
solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract;
including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability
compensation and repatriation. (emphasis supplied).
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency
shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer. This Court
has, time and again, ruled that private employment agencies are
held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against
recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the
aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
him. This is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate
the plight of the working class. We cannot agree with the view of the
CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first.
The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEAapproved
contract and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the
original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing
breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To be sure,
Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or
alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts
already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same
without the approval of the DOLE. In Placewell International Services
Corporation v. Camote, we held that the subsequently executed side
agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer
which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA
is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. The said side agreement cannot supersede the terms of the
standard employment contract approved by the POEA. Hence, in the
present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from
US$370.00 to US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for violating the
POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms,
and conditions of her employment. Consequently, the solidary
liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for
petitioner's money claims continues although she was forced to sign
another contract in Bahrain. It is the terms of the original POEA-
approved employment contract that shall govern the relationship of
petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign
employer. It is the recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that
the terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved
by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly
by its foreign client/principal. On whether petitioner's claims for
underpaid salaries have prescribed – PARTLY Prescribed Article
291 of the Labor Code which provides that: Art. 291. Money Claims.
- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
years from the time that cause of action accrued; otherwise, they
shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of
petitioner had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned from September 1, 1989 when petitioner
was forced to sign another contract against her will. To determine for
which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not
prescribed, we must count three years prior to the filing of the
complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior to May
31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on May 31,
1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11)
months. We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary
differential due to petitioner at US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as
approved salary rate - US$100.00 as salary received = US$290 as
underpaid salary per month x 11 months). However, it should be for
the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April
1994 as erroneously stated in the NLRC's Decision.
PP VS HU
Facts:
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc.
(Brighturn), a land-based recruitment agency duly licensed by the
POEA to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of
workers abroad. Brighturn was authorized by the POEA to recruit,
process and deploy land-based workers for the period 18 December
1999 to 17 December 2001.
Genoves and Hu where charged with illegal recruitment in large
scale following the complaint from 6 people that they promised the
latter employment/job placement abroad and collected fees from
them. However, when the job placements never materialized, the
complainants demanded that the money the gave/paid as placement
fees to be returned to them. Hu was not able to refund the same. 4 of
these complainants were promised employment during the validity of
Brighturn’s license. Garcia applied on April 2002, when Brighturn’s
license has already expired. Hu referred Garcia to Best One, another
recruitment agency but here placement fees were paid with
Brighturn.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of Brighturn,
a duly authorized land-based recruitment agency. Brighturn had
foreign principals in Taiwan who were looking for skilled individuals
willing to work in a foreign country. Hu alleged that Brighturn had an
established recruitment procedure wherein applicants were only
required to pay the corresponding placement fees after the POEA
had already approved their employment contracts. According to Hu,
announcements were posted all over Brighturns premises warning
job applicants to pay placement fees only to the cashier. After the
expiration of its license issued by the POEA on 18 December 1999,
Brighturn failed to pursue its application for renewal due its inability
to post the required cash bond. Brighturn was thus constrained to
refer all pending applications to Best One.
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these
individuals went to her office demanding the return of their placement
fees by showing their official receipts. Hu averred that when she
examined such receipts, she found that private complainants paid
their placement fees to Riverland and not to Brighturn as shown in
the heading of the said receipts which bore the name and address of
Riverland and its proprietress, Genoves. Hu denied knowing
Genoves.
On 4 January 2005, the TC rendered a decision finding Hu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale and which the CA affirmed the LC’s decision. Hence this
petition.
Issue: W/N Hu is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?
Held:
No. Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur,
namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code. The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with the addition of a
third element the recruiter committed the same against three or more
persons, individually or as group.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons
whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does
not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless,
it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the
offense was committed against three or more persons.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that illegal recruitment was committed against
three or more persons. What found that the illegal recruitment was
committed against only one person; that is, against Garcia
alone. Illegal recruitment cannot successfully attach to the
allegations of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, since they testified
that they accomplished their pre-employment requirements
through Brighturn from June 2001 up to October of the same
year, a period wherein Brighturns license to engage in
recruitment and placement was still in full force and effect.
The Court found Hu guilty of simple illegal recruitment committed
against Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the
position of Electronic Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due to
the alleged suspension of Brighturns license, Hu referred her to a
neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu continued collecting
placement fees from her.
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected
employer, placement or bureau, is included in recruitment.
Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in referring Garcia to another recruitment
agency squarely fell within the purview of recruitment that was
undertaken by Hu after her authority to recruit and place workers
already expired on 17 December 2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The
absence of receipts in the case of illegal recruitment does not
warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the
prosecutions case. As long as the prosecution is able to establish
through credible and testimonial evidence, as in the case at bar, that
the appellant had engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the
offense can be very well justified.
BECKMEN SERVICE EXPORTER VS CUARESMA
April 7, 2009
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen
Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify
spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in
actual damages with interest.
FACTS:
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.2 (Becmen) to serve
as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding
salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining
physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of
Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning.
Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The
following day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City
conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report
indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not
poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining
physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions
at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her
left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on
her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-
muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture
wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area.
On March 11, 1999, Jasmin’s remains were exhumed and examined
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology
report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile,
metallic poison and insecticides.
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents
and her surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00
for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral
expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against
Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company
(Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral
and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and
motion for substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency
relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc.
(White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines.
Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it
adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the position paper it
subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Giving weight to
the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin died of
poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed
suicide. In any case, Jasmin’s death was not service-connected, nor
was it shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her
parents have received all corresponding benefits they were entitled
to under the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found no
legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City
and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report,
respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002
Resolution11 declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced,
Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal
aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physician’s
report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be
inconclusive. It declared that Jasmin’s death was the result of an
“accident” occurring within the employer’s premises that is
attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she
lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as
nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the
form of Jasmin’s lost earnings, including future earnings, in the total
amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all
other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration,
whereupon the Commission issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution12
reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to
US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White
Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals. On June 28, 2006, the appellate court
rendered its Decision:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the
execution of the decision, it should first be enforced against White
Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is
already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White
Falcon).
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings that Jasmin’s
death was compensable, the same having occurred at the
dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer.
Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within
the employer’s premises, arising out of and in the course of her
employment.
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that
although Jasmin’s death was compensable, however, there is no
evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the
amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected,
because the same may be charged only against the perpetrator of
the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that
Jasmin’s beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum equivalent
of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her
monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months,
with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos.
182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a
reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was denied. They are
now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
184298-99 with G.R. Nos. 182978-79.
ISSUE:
Whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way
of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
RULING:
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public
interest, and neither shall act oppressively against the other, or
impair the interest or convenience of the public. In case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of
misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219
(10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in
actions referred to in Article 21.36
White Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not
automatically result in Becmen’s freedom or release from liability.
This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation
v. NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be
held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right
to be reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that
whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No.
81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon
Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.,
and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and
solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin
Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following
amounts:
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3) Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award; and,
4) Costs of suit.
Onus probandi of payment of benefits
PIGCALUAN V SECURITY AND CREDIT INVESTIGATION INC
It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which
he is entitled by law. Rather, it is on the employer that the burden of
proving payment of these claims rests.

SCII (employer) presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to

the bank to show that Canoy and Pigcaulan (employees) received
their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are already
integrated in the employees’ monthly salaries. However, the
documents presented do not prove SCII’s allegation. SCII failed to
show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files or
similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been
paid. With respect to 13th month pay, SCII presented proof that this
benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To repeat,
the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on
SCII, being the employer. It is a rule that one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it. “Even when the plaintiff alleges non-
payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment.” Since SCII failed to provide convincing proof that it has
already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay,
service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for
the year 2000.

PALEA V PAL