AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO.

2
G.R. NO. L-37364
MAY 9, 1975

FACTS:

Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, Benigno S.

Aquino Jr. was arrested on 23 September 1972, pursuant to General Order 2-
A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political and state
power in the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at
Fort Bonifacio in Rizal province.

On 25 September 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus in which

he questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and
detention. The Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it,
and required the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philipines, the Secretary
of National Defense, etc. to file their respective answers, after which the case
was heard. Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda. Aquino's last
Reply memorandum was dated 30 November 1972.

On 17 September 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and

upheld the validity of martial law and the arrest and detention of Aquino. The
original petition in the case was filed on 23 August 1973. It sought to restrain
the Military Commission from proceeding with the hearing and trial of Aquino
on 27 August 1973. Because of the urgency of the petition, the Supreme Court
called a hearing on Sunday, August 26, on the question of whether with its
membership of only 9 Justices, it had a quorum to take cognizance of the
petition in view of the constitutional questions involved. At that hearing, the
Court asked the parties to agree to seek from the Military Commission a
postponement of Aquino's trial the following day.

The purpose was to relieve the Court of the pressure of having to

decide the question of quorum without adequate time to do so. When the
proceedings before the Military Commission opened the following day,
however, Aquino questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he
did not wish to participate in the proceedings even as he discharged both his
defense counsel of choice and his military defense counsel. The proceedings
were thereupon adjourned to another day. In the meantime, for Aquino's
assurance, a Special Committee, composed of a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court, to be designated by the Chief Justice, as Chairman, and four
(4) members to be designated respectively by petitioner, the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of
National Defense, was created to reinvestigate the charges against Aquino.
The Secretaries of Justice and National Defense designated their
representatives but Aquino refused to name his.

The Chief Justice asked former Justice J. B. L. Reyes but the latter
declined, as he also declined in his capacity as President of the IBP to
designate a representative to the Committee. As a result, with only two of its
members designated, the Special Committee has not been able to function.
On 4 September 1973, a supplemental petition alleging the creation of the
Special Committee and questioning the legality of its creation was filed. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Secretary of Justice were included
as respondents. Subsequently, the Court resolved to require the respondents
to file their answer and on 21 August 1974, within the extended period granted
by the Court, respondents, with, the exception of the Chief Justice, filed their
answer to the supplemental petition. Thereafter, Aquino was required to file a
reply and was granted additional time after the lapse of the original period, but
instead of doing so, Aquino asked for the admission of a second supplemental
petition challenging the continued enforcement of martial law in the
Philippines, in the light of Presidential statements to the effect that with the
coming into force of the new Constitution on 17 January 1973, martial law was
"technically and legally" lifted.

To this petition respondents answered. Thereafter, the parties

submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument as per
Resolution of the Supreme Court on 14 January 1975. On 24 March 1975,
Aquino filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission be
prohibited from proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order
dated 10 March 1975, the same being illegal, until further orders from the
Supreme Court. On 14 April 1975, the Supreme Court issued a restraining
order against Military Commission No. 2, restraining it from further proceeding
with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated 10 March 1975 until
the matter is heard and further orders are issued.

When the case was called for hearing, Aquino's counsel presented to
this Court a motion to withdraw the petition, as well as all other pending
matters and/or incidents in connection therewith. Respondents' counsel
interposed objections to the granting of the aforesaid motion to withdraw. After
the hearing, the Supreme Court Resolved: "(a) to require the Solicitor General
to furnish the Court as well as the petitioner and the latter's counsel, with
copies of the transcript of all the stenographic notes taken at the hearing
before the Military Commission No. 2 for the perpetuation of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution in various criminal cases filed against herein
petitioner, within five (5) days from today; (b) to request the Solicitor General
and the AFP Judge Advocate General to make the necessary arrangements
for the petitioner to confer with his counsel on matters connected with the
aforementioned motion to withdraw; (c) to allow counsel for the petitioner, if
they so desire, to file a manifestation in amplification of the aforesaid motion to
withdraw, within ten (10) days from the date they confer with the petitioner,
and thereafter to allow the Solicitor General to file a counter-manifestation
within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof; and (d) to consider the
case submitted for decision after submission by both parties of their respective
pleadings on the motion to withdraw." Subsequently, the parties manifested
their compliance.
ISSUE:

Whether Aquino may waive his right to be present during the hearings
before the Military Commission.

HELD:

As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or

statutory right may be waived if such waiver is not against public policy. The
personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for
felony, involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital
to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modern authority is in favor
of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil
case." There are, for instance, certain rights secured to the individual by the
fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an
accused to defend himself in person and by attorney, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet
the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights
necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair
and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise
of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be
waived.

Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may

proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused. It is now provided that
"after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." Thus, considering the provisions of the Constitution and the
absence of any law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial,
there appears, therefore, no logical reason why Aquino, although he is
charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to
be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right
was conferred upon him for his protection and benefit. Further, Section 7 of
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for the
prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided,
shall be considered a waiver," Similarly, Presidential Decree 328 expressly
provides that "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of
the deposition shall be considered a waiver."

Herein, then, Aquino has the full right to waive his presence at said
proceedings. Since only 6 Justices (Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio,
Muñoz Palma and Aquino) are of the view that Aquino may waive his right to
be present at all stages of the proceedings while 5 Justices (Castro, Makasiar,
Esguerra, Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in agreement that he may so waive
such right, except when he is to be identified, the result is that the Military
Commission's Order requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings
before it should be modified, in the sense that Aquino's presence shall be
required only in the instance just indicated.
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

G.R. NO: 32025

SEPTEMBER 23, 1929

FACTS:

Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco

Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to
take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such
was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he
who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition
for a writ of prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").

HELD:

The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present
at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear. The privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall
he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This
text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this
privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein,
writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is
more serious, the present case is similar to that of producing documents of
chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or
chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same eminent Professor
Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production or
Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness)
in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form
of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the
tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may
be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally
conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who
is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is
more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels,
because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as
the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of
Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true
that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under
their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran
to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter
for comparison.
BERMUDEZ VS. CASTILLO

PER. REC. 714-A, 64 PHIL 485

JULY 26, 1937

FACTS:

In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the

office of the Solicitor-General against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection
with this administrative case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in
support of his defense, the six letters. He contended that said six letters are
Maria Bermudez's. Bermudez denied that the letters were hers. Bermudez,
however, admitted that three others were in her own handwriting. As Castillo
believed that the three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were
insufficient for purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the
case and as he was determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he
required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the
investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the
trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate
herself and alleging that the three other letters and the other letters already in
Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do.
The investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to the trial
required, thereby denying Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree to the
decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the
investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be
ordered to require and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens of her
handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose.

ISSUE:

Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillo’s

possession which were allegedly in her handwriting.

HELD:

The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively
to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its
purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to
discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and
assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he
should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any
condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional
provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it. Thus, Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked
by her.
BROWN VS. WALKER

161 US 591

MARCH 23, 1896

FACTS:

Brown had been subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury, at a

term of the district court for the Western district of Pennsylvania, to testify in
relation to a charge then under investigation by that body against certain
officers and agents of the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, for an alleged
violation of the interstate commerce act. Brown appeared for examination, in
response to the subpoena, and was sworn.

After testifying that he was auditor of the railway company, and that it
was his duty to audit the accounts of the various officers of the company, as
well as the accounts of the freight department of such company during the
years 1894 and 1895, he was asked the question: "Do you know whether or
not the Alleghany Valley Railway Company transported, for the Union Coal
Company, during the months of July, August, and September, 1894, coal, from
any point on the Low Grade Division of said railroad company to Buffalo, at a
less rate than the established rates in force between the terminal points at the
time of such transportation?" To this question he answered: "That question,
with all respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline to answer, for the
reason that my answer would tend to accuse and incriminate myself" He was
then asked: "Do you know whether the Alleghany Valley Railway Company,
during the year 1894, paid to the Union Coal Company any rebate, refund, or
commission on coal transported by said railroad company, from points on its
Low Grade Division, to Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company obtained a
transportation of such coal between the said terminal points at a less rate than
the open tariff rate, or the rate established by said company? If you have such
knowledge, state the amount of such rebates or drawbacks or commissions
paid, to whom paid, the date of the same, and on what shipments, and state
fully all the particulars within your knowledge relating to such transaction or
transactions." He answered "That question I must also decline to answer, for
the reason already given."

The grand jury reported these questions and answers to the court, and
prayed for such order as to the court might seem meet and proper. Upon the
presentation of this report, Brown was ordered to appear and show cause why
he should not answer the said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and,
upon the hearing of the rule to show cause, it was found that his excuses were
insufficient, and he was directed to appear and answer the questions, which
he declined to do. Whereupon he was adjudged to be in contempt and
ordered to pay a fine of 5 dollars, and to be taken into custody until he should
have answered the questions. He thereupon petitioned the circuit court for a
writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued, Brown was produced in court, the
hearing was had, and on 11 September 1895, it was ordered that the petition
be dismissed, the writ of habeas corpus discharged, and Brown remanded to
the custody of the marshal. Brown appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the Brown, as a witness and not an accused, can refuse to

answer the questions about the anomalies in the Alleghany Valley Railway
Company, in light of the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination.

HELD:

The Act of Congress of 1 February 1893 is supposed to have been

passed in view of the opinion of the US Supreme court in Counselman v.
Hitchcock (142 US 547), to the effect that section 860 of the Revised Statutes,
providing that no evidence given by a witness shall be used against him, his
property or estate, in any manner, in any court of the United States, in any
criminal proceeding, did not afford that complete protection to the witness
which the a endment was intended to guaranty. The inference from the
language of said decision is that, if the statute does afford such immunity
against future prosecution, the witness will be compellable to testify. So also in
Emery's Case (107 Mass. 172, 185) and in Cullen v. Com. (24 Grat. 624),
upon which much reliance was placed in Counselman v. Hitchcock, it was
intimated that the witness might be required to forego an appeal to the
protection of the fundamental law, if he were first secured from future liability
and exposure to be prejudiced, in any criminal proceeding against him, as fully
and extensively as he would be secured by availing himself of the privilege
accorded by the constitution. To meet this construction of the constitutional
provision, the act in question was passed, exempting the witness from any
prosecution on account of any transaction to which he may testify. The danger
of extending the principle announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the
privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful
protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real
purpose of securing immunity to some third person, who is interested in
concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is bound to
aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the
pretext of shielding his own good name, to be made the tool of others, who are
desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege.

The act of congress in question, securing to witnesses immunity from

prosecution, is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a class of
legislation which is not uncommon either in England or in this county. Although
the constitution vests in the president "power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment," this
power has never been held to take from congress the power to pass acts of
general amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals after
conviction, although "it extends to every offense known to the law, and may be
exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment." It is entirely
true that the statute does not purport, nor is it possible for any statute, to shield
the witness from the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the
exposure of his crime; but the authorities are numerous, and very nearly
uniform, to the effect that, if the proposed testimony is material to the issue on
trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.

The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in

vindicating his character, but to protect him against being compelled to furnish
evidence to convict him of a criminal charge. If he secure legal immunity from
prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty which it is
reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good. If it be once
conceded that the fact that his testimony may tend to bring the witness into
disrepute, though not to incriminate him, does not entitle him to the privilege of
silence, it necessarily follows that, if it also tends to incriminate, but at the
same time operates as a pardon for the offense, the fact that the disgrace
remains no more entitles him to immunity in this case than in the other.
Herein, the grand jury was engaged in investigating certain alleged violations
of the interstate commerce act. Brown, the witness, was the auditor of the
road, whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the officers, and the money
paid out by them. Having audited the accounts of the freight department during
the time in question, he was asked whether he knew of any such
discrimination in favor of the Union Coal Company, and declined to answer
upon the ground that he would thereby incriminate himself. As he had not
apparent authority to make the forbidden contracts, to receive the money
earned upon such contracts, or to allow or pay any rebates, drawbacks, or
commissions thereon, and was concerned only in auditing accounts, and
passing vouchers for money paid by others, it is difficult to see how, under any
construction of section 10 of the interstate commerce act, he could be said to
have willfully done anything, or aided or abetted others in doing anything, or in
omitting to do anything, in violation of the act, his duty being merely to see that
others had done what they purported to have done, and that the vouchers
rendered by them were genuine. But, however this may be, it is entirely clear
that he was not the chief, or even a substantial, offender against the law, and
that his privilege was claimed for the purpose of shielding the railway or its
officers from answering a charge of having violated its provisions.

To say that, notwithstanding his immunity from punishment, he would

incur personal odium and disgrace from answering these questions, seems
too much like an abuse of language to be worthy of serious consideration. But,
even if this were true, he would still be compelled to answer, if the facts sought
to be elucidated were material to the issue. If witnesses standing in Brown's
position were at liberty to set up an immunity from testifying, the enforcement
of the interstate commerce law, or other analogous acts, wherein it is for the
interest of both parties to conceal their misdoings, would become impossible,
since it is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the inhibited
contracts that the facts can be ascertained. While the constitutional provision
is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its
object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, that the witness was
compellable to answer.
GALMAN VS. PAMARAN

G.R. NO. 71208-09

AUGUST 30, 1985

ALSO PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 71212-13

FACTS:

On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned

down to death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in
Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing
and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the
tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board
which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to
the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings
wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who
appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General
Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt.
Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero
Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2
reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its
Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly
authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano
Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for
appropriate action.

After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the

Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder — one for
the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for
the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on
the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same
fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories,
along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the
accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution
represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered
as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the
Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the
admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude
Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence
against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in
derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of
the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be
rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
 Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed
separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking
the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the
immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their
respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to
invoke their right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding
Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to
present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the
Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved,
issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending
motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the
memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments,
raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the
prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3
June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which
includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences
produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked
in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer
of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion
for exclusion.

On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting

all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or
other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD
1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved
for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two
separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against

oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board.

HELD:

Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the

Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity
charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person
or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before
the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other
similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of
the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their
conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person
called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be
denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify
will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors
and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and
called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person
testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to
determine the character and extent of his participation therein.

Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the

said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were
detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave
their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be
witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice.
They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain
of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed
behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves,
both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental
law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886.

When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were

not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It
must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the
Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person shall be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded,
Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no
other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than
criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against
himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the
Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et.
al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the
right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the
pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations
and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance
with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver,
et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process
clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face
of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al.
cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true
regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of
a grant of immunity by law.

ISSUE (2):

Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before

the board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying
witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
HELD (2):

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which

grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as
"transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use
immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the
first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any
statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do
not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his
invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the
use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still
runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process,
demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain
silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be
used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are
not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the
Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying
witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

A literal interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the

Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision renders
inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary
rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a
witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of
the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions
under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed
immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity
granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness.
PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

G.R. NO. L-25018

MAY 26, 1969

FACTS:

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative

case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing
thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his
first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the
same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965,
Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered
that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to
await the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the
amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador
Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in
intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of
Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to
be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A
decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim
of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and
the Gatbontons appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in

administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a
witness against himself.

HELD:

The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to

allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a
penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a
right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as
1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."
Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine
anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand—with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from
Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is
the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with
the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.
PEOPLE VS. OTADORA

GR NO. L-2154

APRIL 26, 1950

FACTS:

Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in

August 1946, a criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her
husband Francisco Galos. These were arrested and had to file a bond. The
case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In
December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors
surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition of real property and
damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on 24 June
1947. Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through
Amando Garbo.

Thereafter they conversed on several occasions. In the early part of

May 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if
he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would
give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to
Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being offered.
(1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun, procured
from one Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a pair of
trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a flashlight. Early in the
morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were
shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of 21
June 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to
escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-
judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with
offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On 25
June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against Otadora and
Carreon in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary
investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first
instance, where on 3 September 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the
assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a
separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness
for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's criminal connection with the bloody affair
was collaborated, among others, by Otodora’s possession of the pants of
Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied ownership
of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him
perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and sentenced to death and other
accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Hilaria Carreon appealed.

ISSUE:
 Whether Galos’ fitting of the pants is contrary to the constitutional
protection against self incrimination.

HELD:

When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered

to put it on, and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly; this gave the
defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection
against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No timely
objection was made, however, upon that specific ground. It is doubted whether
the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Measuring or photographing
the party is not within the privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is the
removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that
the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
PEOPLE VS. DE LUNA

G.R. NO. 77969

JUNE 22, 1989

FACTS:

Patrick de Luna was charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, under the following information, "That on or
about the 17th day of December 1986, at about 7:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body
thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries: 'Cardio respiratory
arrest, secondary to severe multiple injuries, traumatic.' and as a consequence
of said injuries Tricia died in the next day.

Contrary to law." De Luna, assisted by Counsel-de-Oficio Atty. David

Ompoc, when arraigned on 23 December 1986, entered a plea of guilty with
the qualification that "hindi ko sinasadya." The accused allegedly waived his
right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for the
court the degree of culpability of the accused under the present charge. The
trial court, on 23 December 1986, rendered the decision convicting de Luna of
the crime of Murder, and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua (life
imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00. de
Luna appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution, when the accused pleaded guilty during the arraignment.

HELD:

The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt,
freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning
of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the complaint or information. While it is true that a plea of guilty
admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating and
qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification stated by de
Luna as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial
court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its consequences.
Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect of the
technical language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the
offense. In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of
guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend
himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose
the penalty fixed by law.
 Under the circumstances of the case, de Luna's qualified plea of guilty
is not a valid plea of guilty. While the Court has had the occasion to rule that it
is permissible for an accused to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with
the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances, considering, however, the
gravity of the offense charged, the more prudent course for the trial court to
follow is to reject the plea made by de Luna and direct the parties to submit
their respective evidence. When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. Thus, after a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it
is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the
degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense
charged. Notwithstanding the waiver made by de Luna as to the presentation
of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be
required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or
require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition
of the prescribed penalties.
PEOPLE VS. GALLARDE

G.R. NO. 133025

FEBRUARY 17, 2000

FACTS:

In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and

Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors
converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all
surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon
Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime
and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde
suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime
whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the
road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took
hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going.
Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but
Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that
Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan
informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife
Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors
search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde
squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's
house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was,
Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question,
"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the
searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was
impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the
toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo
Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking
with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers.

Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The

searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the
disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some
earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror.
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she
is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain
Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way
though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and
turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to
you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people
found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless
Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde
was taken without any counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was
charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. During the
arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the
defense waived the holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February 1998,
the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a
decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex
crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His
motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its
Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his

constitutional right against self incrimination.

HELD:

The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of

counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in
the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled
to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his
body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have
the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and
to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
PEOPLE VS. RONDERO

G.R. NO. 125687

DECEMBER 9, 1999

FACTS:

On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a
barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was not
around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help
of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene.
Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for
assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to
look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 a.m. of
26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and
the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every
classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way
home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was
then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about
1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was
washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told
Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he
saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for
Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After
some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He
again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary.

The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found

Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her
right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her
fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down
and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body.
Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper
with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other
slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at
the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts
under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo
led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier
washing his hands.

The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood.
After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to
their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they
found Mylene's body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the
artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and
arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and
short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's
wife, Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When
asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about
their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were
found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with
hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30
March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the
hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination on the
specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim
had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair
specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those
of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death.
Rondero moved for reconsideration.

On 10 November 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its

earlier decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that
under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under
12 years of age. Rondero appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are
admissible as evidence.

HELD:

Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is

actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from Rondero and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for
what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
PEOPLE VS. SALAS

G.R. NO. L-66469

JULY 29, 1986

FACTS:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation,
an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner,
taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving
the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so
he escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail
bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless
(Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under
certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended
all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is
before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.

HELD:

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all
criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." Section 19,thus,
allows trial in absentia, The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his
continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a)
he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his
failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may
now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of
the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The
same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he
has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
PEOPLE VS. TRANCA

G.R. NO. 110357

AUGUST 17, 1994

FACTS:

On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went to

the office of the National Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) and
proceeded to the desk of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano. Sgt. Jose
Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco
Matundan, and PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano to a briefing.
The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a certain "Jon-Jon"
(later identified as Carlos Tranca y Arellano) was selling shabu along
Kalayaan Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust
team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and
the rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave
to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 and which had been
dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The
team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target area. At the corner of
Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer spotted Tranca, who
was standing in front of the house, and pointed him out to the team members.
The team then circled back and alighted from their vehicles. As planned, Sgt.
Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of the team took
vantage points so as to observe the operation and close in at the opportune
time. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to Tranca and told the latter that
his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked
Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered in the affirmative and asked
for the quantity to be bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare, tapatan mo na lang
itong piso ko." (In illegal drug parlance, "piso" means one hundred pesos)
Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to
Tranca the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he
received and upon ascertaining that it was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged
signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers
then closed in on Tranca. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents
and arrested Tranca. Upon interrogation by Capt. Miano, Tranca voluntarily
surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked money . Tranca
was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters.

On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief

Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of Tranca and a P100 bill with
serial number SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation
and found the presence of fluorescent powder thereon. She likewise exposed
the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and discovered flourescent power
on his hands, face and on the opening of the left-side pocket of the white
shorts that he was then wearing. In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Tranca was charged with the
violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Criminal Case 2574). The case was
assigned to Branch 136 of the said court. Tranca pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca denied the allegations against him
and contended that he was framed by the police officers.

On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision finding

Tranca guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court. The defense contends that the rights of Tranca against
self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet
ray examination.

ISUUE:

Whether the subjection of Tranca’s body to ultraviolet powder violates

Tranca’s right against selfincrimination.

HELD:

What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-

incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his
will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's body to
ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the
presence of counsel.
SCHMERBER VS. CALIFORNIA

384 US 757

JUNE 20, 1966

FACTS:

Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for

injuries suffered in an accident involving the automobile that he had apparently
been driving. At the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was then
withdrawn from Schmerber's body by a physician at the hospital. Schmerber
was charged in Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The chemical
analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at
the time of the offense which indicated intoxication, and the report of this
analysis was admitted in evidence at the trial. Schmerber objected to receipt of
this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn
despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. He
contended that in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the
admission of the analysis in evidence denied him due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
secured against the States by that Amendment: his privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Appellate Department of
the California Superior Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the
conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether Schmerber was thus compelled "to be a witness against

himself."

HELD:

In requiring Schmerber to submit to the withdrawal and chemical

analysis of his blood the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to
discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense.
He submitted only after the police officer rejected his objection and directed
the physician to proceed. The officer's direction to the physician to administer
the test over Schmerber's objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of
the privilege. If the scope of the privilege coincided with the complex of values
it helps to protect, the Court might be obliged to conclude that the privilege
was violated. However, as the passage in Miranda implicitly recognizes, the
privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it helps to
protect suggest. History and a long line of authorities in lower courts have
consistently limited its protection to situations in which the State seeks to
submerge those values by obtaining the evidence against an accused through
"the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum, the
privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." It
is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of
responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a
subpoena to produce one's papers.

On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that
it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear
in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that
the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but
that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or
physical evidence" does not violate it. Schmerber's testimonial capacities were
in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was
irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on
that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, was neither Schmerber's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by Schmerber, it was not inadmissible on
privilege grounds.
SOUTH DAKOTA VS. NEVILLE

459 US 553

FEBRUARY 23, 1983

FACTS:

Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped Neville's car after
they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked Neville for his
driver's license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the car, Neville
staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The officers smelled
alcohol on his breath. Neville did not have a driver's license, and informed the
officers that it was revoked after a previous drivingwhile-intoxicated conviction.
The officers asked Neville to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight
line. When Neville failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest
and read his Miranda rights. Neville acknowledged that he understood his
rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. Reading from a printed
card, the officers then asked Neville to submit to a blood-alcohol test and
warned him that he could lose his license if he refused. Neville refused to take
the test, stating "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." The officers again read
the request to submit to a test, and then took Neville to the police station,
where they read the request to submit a third time. Neville continued to refuse
to take the test, again saying he was too drunk to pass it. Neville was
thereafter charged. South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to
submit to a blood-alcohol test "may be admissible into evidence at the trial."
Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress all evidence of his refusal to
take the blood-alcohol test.

The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the
South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated Neville's federal
constitutional rights; the officers failed to advise Neville that the refusal could
be used against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before
the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds
that 32-23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the
federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. The court reasoned that
the refusal was a communicative act involving Neville's testimonial capacities
and that the State compelled this communication by forcing Neville "to choose
between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing
testimonial evidence against himself."
ISSUE:

Whether the the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to

submit to such a test likewise offend the right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South

Dakota has enacted an "implied consent" law. This statute declares that any
person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a
chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while
intoxicated. In Schmerber v. California (384 U.S. 757 [1966]), the Court upheld
a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized that a coerced
blood test infringed to some degree the "inviolability of the human personality"
and the "requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused
`by its own independent labors,'" but noted the privilege has never been given
the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. The Court therefore
held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling "communications"
or "testimony." Since a blood test was "physical or real" evidence rather than
testimonial evidence, the Court found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment
privilege.

South Dakota further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the

refusal to be used against the defendant at trial. As the Court recognized in
Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one
hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in
many cases. The situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation
from a person who indicates refusal by complete inaction, to one who nods his
head negatively, to one who states "I refuse to take the test," to Neville here,
who stated "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." Since no impermissible
coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test,
regardless of the form of refusal, the Court prefer to rest its decision on this
ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other
circumstances. The values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered
when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol
test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so
safe, painless, and commonplace, that Neville concedes, as he must, that the
State could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the
test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly
legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a
second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that
choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced Neville into
choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true
choice. To the contrary, the State wants Neville to choose to take the test, for
the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far
stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test. Therefore, a refusal to
take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not
an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against
self-incrimination.
UNITED STATES VS. GARCIA

G.R. NO. L-3951

MARCH 14, 1908

FACTS:

Simeon de los Santos, Feliciano Garcia, Alberto Tolentino, and a

certain Gutierrez, were charged for the crime of robbery. De los Santos,
Garcia and Gutierrez were convicted of the crime charged, while Tolentino
was acquitted. Counsel for Simeon de los Santos insists that there is no
evidence of record connecting de los Santos with the commission of the crime
other than his own confession in the court of the justice of the peace, and that
this confession was improperly admitted in evidence, it not affirmatively
appearing that it was made voluntarily.

On the other hand, counsel for Feliciano Garcia calls attention to the
fact that one of his coaccused, Alberto Tolentino, was acquitted by the trial
judge although he was identified by the witness Soto as a member of the band
which committed the crime, and yet Garcia was convicted upon the testimony
of this witness; and thus argues that since the trial court did not accept Soto's
testimony as to Tolentino, it should not have been accepted as to Garcia.
Lastly, the counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los Santos asked for a new
trial on the ground that, their counsel in the trial court having been taken ill
before the trial, they were not able to secure the presence of their witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense can complain, about the failure to secure the
presence of witnesses at trial, on appeal.

HELD:

As to the allegation of the counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los

Santos their counsel in the trial court having been taken ill before the trial, they
were not able to secure the presence of their witnesses, to warrant the
conduct of a new trial; the record discloses, however, that, it appearing that
the original counsel assigned to defend these accused was sick at the time of
the trial, new counsel was assigned for their defense by the court, and it does
not appear that any effort was made to secure the presence of witnesses nor
was any motion made to the court for a continuance for that purpose. The
appellants in a criminal case can not be heard for the first time on appeal to
complain that they could not secure the presence of witnesses at the trial,
when it does not appear that they made any effort so to do before or during
the progress of the trial, or that they sought the aid of the court to compel the
attendance of their witnesses, or objected to proceeding without them.
UNITED STATES VS. JAVIER

G.R. NO. L-12990

JANUARY 21, 1918

FACTS:

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened his

carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche,
municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open
and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the
Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of
sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered Lazaro Javier, Apolinario
Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw
the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the
Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro
Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao
was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his
corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one
seen in the possession of Javier. Javier was charged for stealing the carabao
before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of
Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of sergeant Presca, now
deceased, was presented in court by the prosecution. Presca's signature in
the statement was identified. Javier alleged that the lower court erred in
admitting said sworn statement as evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now

deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch as the accused is not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof

HELD:

The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions

the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and the
provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states taht "In all
criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at the
trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the
clause of the Bill of Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be
tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In
other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential.
A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn
statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.

The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is

therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a
witness deceased, given in a former action between the same relating to the
same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of
the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower
court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or
a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, the sworn statement was improperly
received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the Court could find this
to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a new trial.
The Court however is convinced that this would gain the accused nothing
except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the
accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
U.S v. ONG SIU HONG

G.R NO. 12778

AUGUST 3, 1917

FACTS:

Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth.
Ong Siu Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret
Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the
accused was compelled to be a witness against himself.

ISSUE:

Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself

when the morphine was forced from his mouth.

HELD:

By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands

in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following leading authorities, and
the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force
a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers
and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in
the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be
used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of
the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or
thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence.
The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
U.S VS. TAN TENG

G.R. NO. 7081

SEPTEMBER 7, 1912

FACTS:

Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September

1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the
city of Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near
the said house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the
house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath,
returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for
some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder
upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts
upon hers, and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later,
perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter
was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time
of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the
morning of September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to
find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was
called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one
who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore
every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known
as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the
body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose
of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination
showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged
with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that
the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the
substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to
testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S.
Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos,
as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced
him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison
correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he
has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground
that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against self incrimination.

HELD:

As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a

man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection,
in principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features
with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the
result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property
upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against
him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using
the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property
and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used
against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be
required to give testimony against him.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMER

G.R. NO. 16444

SEPTEMBER 8, 1920

FACTS:

In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the
crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First
Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the
court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one
or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person
was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

ISUUE:

Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined

by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code
of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.

HELD:

Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and
inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely
abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by
exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to
lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a
sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a
disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme
case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it
must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in
accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental
influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a
proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force
shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary
and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable
presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient
any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical
examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of
the same sex can be seen.