The Rise of Nationalist Politics in Baltic Republics Under the Purview

of the Soviet Union.

Term Paper
Aaditya Krishnamurthy
PRN: 16060321001
Comparative Politics
Professor Alok Oak
ABSTRACT:
This paper aims to look at the rise of nationalism, specifically ethnic nationalism, and its
manifestation in the Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia. These republics were members of the
Soviet Union during the point of study, and with the help of their respective ethnic nationalist
movements, they were able to achieve their goal of independence. The independence movements
in Latvia and Estonia took on a life of their own due to the rise of their respective nationalist
movements, and helped them achieve their end goal of self-governance. By analysing the cases
of these two Baltic republics, this paper attempts to ascertain the factors that the led to the rise of
nationalism in these two republics, and attempts to explain the manifestation of the nationalist
sentiments. These two republics have faced a great history of subservience, dating all the way
back to their accession into the Russian empire. After gaining independence in the post-First
World War era, the two republics enjoyed nearly 20 years of freedom, before being reoccupied
by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Their respective struggles for independence
came about due to the hardships they faced in the near 40 years they spent as part of the Soviet
Union.
 Aaditya Krishnamurthy
PRN: 16060321001
Comparative Politics
15th May 2019
Term Paper: The Rise of Nationalist Politics in Baltic Republics Under the Purview of the Soviet
Union.

Research Question: What factors lead to the rise of ethnic nationalism and how did this ethnic
nationalism manifest itself in Soviet-controlled Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia?

Introduction

Nationalism, according to Gellner, is a political principle which believes that the political
and the national unit should be combined in harmony. “Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of
anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its
fulfilment” (Gellner, pp.1, 1983). Nationalist politics takes place when certain bodies in the state,
most often political parties, encapsulate nationalist sentiments in their policy and decision-
making process and their agenda. Nationalist politics often end up spreading a message of “Us
vs. Them” against certain groups within the nation, that are believed to be outsiders, not the
natural residents and citizens of the nation. Gellner’s definition of nationalism is dependent on
his definitions of state and nation. He refers to Max Weber’s definition of the state, which he
describes as the agency present in a society which holds the monopoly of legitimate violence. By
this he means that the use of violence holds legitimacy and doesn’t hold consequences when
exercised the central authority. Gellner argues this idea, claiming the existence of states that do
not centralize violence within the territory they control, using the examples of feudal states,
which see private wars between landholders. However, Gellner amends his views, by saying that
Weber’s arguments hold more weight in the contemporary political context. Gellner considers
the existence of a state as an important pre-condition for nationalism. With regards to the nation,
Gellner faces a tougher challenge defining it. He considers a nation to be much like a state, in
that it is not a necessity. Gellner comes up with two definitions of nation, the first being that of a
shared culture (system of ideas, signs and associations and ways of behaving), and the second
being based on recognition (two men are from the same nation if they recognize each other as
belonging to the same nation).

In 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Latvia and Estonia, along with others, became
independent nation states once again. What makes their formation significant is the use of strong
national symbols to unify the people and their support. With reform communism at the helm, few
would have seen the problem of new Baltic nation-state formation coming, especially those in
Gorbachev’s government. The fact that they were nationality based republics, Latvia and Estonia,
along with Lithuania were considered the most helpful for the new government’s agenda of
reform. And initially, this was the case. However, as time went on, organizations within these
republics began demanding the right to self-determination of nation and sovereignty for
themselves. The late 1980s saw the Baltic republics experience a reawakening of nationalism
which changed the social, political and economic life of the regions. This paper will look at the
specific examples of Latvia and Estonia to understand the factors that led to the rise of
nationalism in these republics, and the manifestation of this nationalism.

Latvia:
Latvia, formerly known as Livonia, was won in battle with the Swedes by Peter the
Great. It was subsequently integrated into the Russian empire. However, it was given significant
local autonomy, rather than being completely assimilated into the Russian empire. The cries of a
separate nation began to emerge in high numbers at the end of the first World War and the
Russian Revolution, which saw the collapse of the Russian empire and rule under the Tsar.
During the war, Latvia was captured by the German army, leading many to flee to the Russian
mainland. As the tsarist regime fell in March of 1917, temporary Soviet governments were seen
in parts of Latvia, which collapsed at the end of the Soviet-German peace negotiations. The
military end of Germany in 1918 November saw the formation of the Latvian National Council
in Riga. They proclaimed the independence of Latvia. Janis Čakste and Karlis Ulmanis won the
election the president and prime minister of the country respectively. In 1918, Soviet forces
advanced into Latvian territory, claiming the capital Riga by January 1919. The Latvian
government sought help from the Germans, who fought the Soviets in an effort to maintain
Latvia in their sphere of influence. In return for their assistance, the Ulmanis government agreed
to give German soldiers Latvian citizenship. However, the Germans were defeated and were
forced to retreat. By the summer of 1919, the allied powers came to an agreement that the
Bolsheviks posed less of a threat to the Baltics than the Germans. After the Germans tried to
launch an offensive towards Latvia, Latvian troops defeated the German forces with the help of
the French artillery. Latvia was given de jure recognition by the Allied powers in January of
1921. Latvia remained an independent republic between 1920 to 1940. 57.2% of the population
of Latvia was Lutheran Protestant, and just under 25% was Roman Catholic. 72.6% of the
Latvian population was Latvian, where 27.4% comprised of ethnic minorities (Smith, pp.52,
1996). Latvia saw the rise of paramilitary organizations in the 20s and 30s. The Fire Cross
Ugunkrusts in 1933, who were renamed the Thunder Cross Perkonkrusts had a slogan similar to
other groups “Latvia for the Latvians”. These organizations allowed for there to be a new
nationalist mood. The government of Ulmanis came to be on highly nationalist principles. The
government saw their own Nazi-esque Socialist Workers’ Support League in 1927 and anti-Left
politics. This led to a brief period of emergency in 1934. However, Latvia saw constitutional
provisions for minorities. Diplomatic negotiations between Latvia and USSR seemed to spell the
end of Latvian independence and sovereignty. German advancement in Latvia as part of
Operation Barbarossa in 1941 saw several vicious Pogroms carried out throughout the country.
Latvia was now under the Nazi regime, which led to several Latvian Jews being killed. The
Soviet Red Army fought back and eventually reclaimed Latvia as part of the Soviet Union,
bringing to an end their independence.

For much of their time under the Soviet regime, Latvia didn’t pose much of a threat. By
the 1980s however, Latvia, along with the other Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania saw a
reawakening of nationalist sentiment. With Moscow preoccupied in trying to restructure its idea
of a nation to be able to keep a hold of their Soviet rule, Latvia was changing. Pre-Soviet Latvia
had a rich history of national symbols rooted in its deep national culture. These national symbols
came to the forefront in this national reawakening, showing that the desire to reconnect with its
pre-Soviet past was not forgotten. These symbols struck a chord with many Latvians, although
each carried a different meaning for different sub-groups depending on their situations. Second,
the republic of Latvia, being an urban and educated society, had a promising cultural
intelligentsia, with writers, poets, teachers and journalists who were subscribers to the tradition
of intellectual and formal dissent which allowed the addressing of the loss of their national
culture and language under the lack of freedom given under the Soviet rule. Third and finally, the
period leading up to the 1980s saw an accumulation of grievances against the Soviet rule, from
cultural disintegration to interference in local political autonomy. “By complementing ethnic and
territorial interests and divisions, such grievances imparted a distinctive emotional edge, easily
translatable into national grievances, with the potential to be effectively utilised as ammunition
to forward the cause of national self-determination” (Smith, pp. 122, 1996). However, in the
previous decades, Latvian nationalism had not created any major cause for concern for the Soviet
regime. This was due to a multitude of reasons. The authoritative nature of the regime forced the
Soviets to suppress any attempt at the propagation of nationalism in the region could be
considered the primary reason. Nationalism in Latvia was on the fringes in the political sphere.
This was aided by the fact that the centre wished to maintain Latvia in its current state, rather
than trying to incorporate social and economic reform, keeping the state in a condition of
political stasis, controlling those groups that had the most potential to disrupt and cause problems
for Moscow. Brezhnev’s rule reflected this, with the introduction central practices reminiscent of
corporatist politics. The Soviet regime had no reason to fear the political leaders of Latvia, who
showed no autonomous nature which had been seen earlier in the 50s. These leaders were either
from native Russia or from Latvia but had spent an extended period of time living outside Latvia.
By the late 1980s, Latvians held 63.1% of the administrative positions in the region, as part of
the indigenisation of local party-state personnel. This reflected the highly educated nature of
members of Latvian societies, but this did not quell the dissatisfaction with the under-
representation within the state’s Communist parties. In Latvia, the percentage of people claiming
Latvian as their native language reduced from 98.4% in 1959 to 97.80% by 1979, with the
percentage of people holding knowledge of Russian as second language grew from 45.35% in
1970 to 58.3% in 1979. The corporatist politics hid certain tensions which were becoming harder
to manage due to the static nature of the regime. Firstly, local Latvian production was being
harmed by the centralised production system and its ignorance to the negative economic and
environmental consequences of its decisions in the country. The centre’s policy initiative to build
more heavy industries in Latvia despite the fact that the region had a lack of a raw material base.
Secondly, there was concern focused on the migration policy which led to more Russians and
members from other countries coming to Latvia and competing with the locals for jobs in the
regional job market. This was based on the centre’s lack of empathy towards the labour market
and the underestimating of the locals to provide adequate services and shelter. Latvia actually
saw Russian migration account for a greater percentage of population growth than Latvia’s
already meagre level of natural population growth. Latvia saw their share in the population
falling from 77% in 1939 to 52% to 1989. Russians in Latvia increased from 1/10th in pre-war
Latvia to 1/3rd in Soviet Latvia. In the late 1970s, the centre began implementing policies
structured towards a cultural homogenization. Fluency in Russian was made more important in
local jobs and teaching of Russian in lowest levels of educational institutions. This led to more
frustration in Latvia increasing dissent in the 80s. The living standards in Latvia had seen
deterioration during the Russian regime, especially under the Brezhnev years. However, the
nationalist movement was only able to emerge due to the desire for reform at the centre to
address the falling level of governance and economy under the soviet regime.

The nationalist movement would not have been possible without the period of national
reawakening from 1986-88. Due to the emergence of glasnost, implemented by Mikhail
Gorbachev, allowed for the Latvian people to get in touch with their culture and history, to be
reacquainted with their long standing national views and properly assess the reality of ethnic
inequalities. The local media started to have a greater role in discussing the issues which allowed
there to be a greater focus on issues in a national context to bring to attention of people the
concerns surrounding the issues. The second phase from 1988-90 entailed a period of political
activism and the actual establishment of primary level social movements. By 1989, the Latvian’s
began to demand independence from the Soviet Union. The biggest symbol for the call for
independence was a human chain formed all the way from Tallinn in Estonia to Vilnius in
Lithuania, uniting 2 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians on August 23, 1989, the 50-year
anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Latvian independence plea was
headed by two groups: The Latvian national Independence Movement (LNNK) and the Popular
Front of Latvia (LTF). The former was created in June of 1988 and was the hub for radical
nationalists and vocalized cries for an extreme approach to independence, rather than autonomy.
The LTF formed in October of 1988 and became the largest group with near about 110,000
members. LNNK was considered the first major national mass movement and the LTF was seen
as Latvia’s largest movement towards democracy. The LTF had more moderate intellectual and
reformist members of the Communist Party, contributing to the LTF’s umbrella nature. The
Popular Front was not created to oppose the LNNK but acted as a link between the radical and
moderates. The head of the LTF was Dainis Īvāns, a journalist who was involved in a leading
role during the environmental protests in Latvia. The umbrella party status of the LTF allowed
for the interaction of contradictory definitions of nation in 1989. The main medium of discourse
for the Popular Front was its weekly publication, Awakening. While the Popular Front made an
effort to appear as more inclusive, the cultural and ethnic nationalism was quite clear. The
naming of the publication itself, the LTF attempted to appeal to forgotten symbols of the national
culture, referencing the desire to awaken the Latvian people, who were earlier part of the Russian
empire. The ethnic symbolism of the Popular Front shone through even on the front page, which
said that the Popular Front appealed to “All inhabitants of Latvia” rather than all Latvians. The
goal of the Popular Front was to “create an awareness among the people, to foster its political
culture and civic activity…which will secure the right to an alternative thinking”. “This opening
invitation of the LTF revealed the interaction between civic and ethnic definitions of the nation,
appealing to universal solidarity and democracy while at the same time calling for protection of
the titular nation. This fluidity between the ethnic and civic nation is further evidenced by the
fact that the call for ethnic rights—that is, the guaranteeing of cultural autonomy—could also
have been a reminder of the policies of the independent republic of Latvia (1918–1940), which
included, for example, state support of minority schools” (Lazda, pp. 525, 2009). The LTF’s
multi-ethnic ties allowed the group to reach out to various communities. The use of nationalist
resources came into prominence as it became more and more clear that the goal of the Popular
Front was independent statehood for Latvia. The most important national resource was the
challenging of the historicised myth that Latvia voluntarily agreed to join the Soviet Union. This
helped the separatist cause because the narrative had transformed into their struggle for
independence being a lawful one, a struggle against occupation by the Soviet Union. The second
resource was the favouring of economic self-determination and the positives that would come
from it. There was a big emphasis laid on the importance of reorganizing the structure of Latvia,
after the disproportionate and unnecessary importance was given to industrialization during the
Soviet regime. The failure of the centre to create economic harmony and success in Latvia was a
big factor in their desire for independent statehood. “However, the attempt by Moscow to claim
the moral high ground in arguing that post-war economic rehabilitation of the republics had been
assisted by the entire Soviet federation probably did more to fuel than dampen the nationalist
resolve” (Smith, pp. 134, 1996). The third nationalist resource, which was perhaps the cause of
most debate, was that of cultural preservation. The idea behind this was that self-rule would be
the simplest way to protect the domestic culture.

The two forms of nationalism that were witnessed in Latvia were ethnic and civic
nationalism. The former being that the people of Latvia had a blood relation to the republic, and
wanted to have an autonomous state for the Latvians who had descended from Latvia. This was
seen when the Popular Front was critical of the Russians living in Latvia, describing them as
badly qualified and uncultured people who were a threat to the culture and land of Latvian
people. Civic nationalism placed more of an emphasis on the individual and their rights. It
showed tolerance to other ethnic groups and propounded citizenship for all. “It was an
inclusionary conception of community, designed to mobilise all those who lived and worked
within the territories of the republics, to identify with and feel that they had a stake in national
self-determination” (Smith, pp.135, 1996). However, civic nationalism did little to bring ease to
the Russians living in Latvia. The rise of ethnic nationalism led to a reaction from the minorities
in Latvia, in the formation of the Interfront. The LTF often attacked the Interfront, creating an
anti-democratic rhetoric around it. They argued that the Interfront was using very undemocratic
and secretive methods to spread their message, contrasting it with their own, seemingly
democratic and open message.

The threat of becoming second class citizens didn’t, however, deter the Russians and
other ethnic minorities living in Latvia, with about one third of Russians supporting independent
statehood in the referendum held in 1991 March. For many, it seemed as though becoming part
of a nation adopting a westernized form of economy was deemed more beneficial than remaining
part of the Soviet Union, which had shown its inability to guarantee employment, housing and
other necessary services. The elections held in 1990 saw most of the candidates backed by the
Popular Front winning seats. The split in the Latvian Communist Party from Moscow led to
further yearning for independent statehood, with a small section of the party believing that the
status quo should be upheld. While the Soviet bloc was hesitant to grant the Baltic republics their
independence, going so far as to impose sanctions on Lithuania when they declared their
independence, they had no choice but to grant them their independence after a coup was
launched against Gorbachev’s government.

Estonia
Similar to Latvia, Estonia was conquered by Peter the Great and won from the Swedish,
subsequently becoming a part of the Russian empire. It was given a significant degree of local
autonomy, rather than becoming entirely subservient to the Russian empire. The fall of the
Russian empire in 1917, Estonia was able to become its own administrative unit, as decreed by
the Provisional Government. However, Estonia saw the establishment of a soviet government
after the Bolshevik revolution, which was short-lived and ended with the breakdown of Soviet-
German peace negotiations. After that Estonia was established as its own nation, but faced
invasion from German forces until the German army collapsed in November of 1918. Following
which, Estonia regained independence, and Konstantin Päts returned from German custody and
resumed his post as the premier, which he had acquired before the German invasion. Estonia was
given de jure recognition by the Allied powers in January of 1921. Estonia had a democratic set
up, with the majority electing the government, and constitutional amendment requiring the
consent of the citizens with voting rights. The Estonian government eventually held a
referendum in 1933, which found a massive majority of the population to be in favour of a
presidential government which saw a president be appointed through popular vote for the first
time, elected for 5 years at a time. Konstantin Päts launched a military coup in 1934, after facing
a threat from the Estonian Freedom Fighters, who had won the 1934 elections. He imposed an
emergency, and declared that people involved in the army cannot hold office. Estonia’s fate
would be determined in the inter-war years by the German-Soviet pact of non-aggression, in
which they decided that Estonia fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. However, on the brink
of German occupation, Estonia signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, albeit
due to coercion from the latter. This allowed Soviet troops to enter Estonia, and eventually led to
the occupation and absorption of Estonia into the Soviet Union.

Estonia’s nationalism was not a disturbance to the Soviet regime throughout their tenure
until the 1980s. However, by the 1980s, much like Latvia, saw a nationalist reawakening in
Estonia. Similarly, the re-emergence of national pre-Soviet symbols allowed for a desire for
independent statehood in Estonia. Additionally, the abundance of cultural intelligentsia who were
well versed with the tradition of peaceful cultural and academic dissent were concerned with the
erosion of culture, the colloquial tongue and freedoms under the Soviet regime came to the
forefront. The failures of the Soviet regime added to the rise of the feeling of nationalism and the
desire for autonomous rule, complemented by the ethnic and territorial desires by the people, and
adding an emotional edge to the movement. The period prior to the 80s was very quest for
nationalism in Estonia, similar to the other Baltic republics. Nationalism was not a central part of
the political sphere in Estonia. Add to this that the central government had done everything in
their power to squash out any rising nationalist uprising and Brezhnev’s motivation to practice
corporatist politics across the Baltic republics. The centre faced no threat from the local leaders
of Estonia, who showed no such nationalist tendencies. Primarily because these leaders were of
Russian descent or were Estonian but had spent a large period of time outside of the Estonian
republic, therefore felt no loyalty towards Estonia. During Brezhnev’s regime, the Soviet Union
attempted to implement a policy of higher trust in the local spheres. While the indigenous groups
were still vastly under-represented within the Communist party, a large chunk of the state
apparatus was controlled by indigenous people. By the 1980s, Estonians were holding 82.2% of
the administrative positions (which made up of 61.5% of the overall population). This increase of
representation in local administration indicated the high level of education in the Estonian
society, and did satisfy local ambitions, but the fact of under-representation in the Communist
party meant that this increase in representation was taken with a grain of salt. Over 99% of
people claimed Estonian as their native language in 1959, but by 1989, that number had dropped
to 98.61%. Conversely, 27.55% of Estonians claimed knowledge of Russian as a second
language in 1970, but this number grew to 33.57% by 1989 (Smith, pp. 125, 1996). The
challenges created by the centralised production system were similar to those faced by Latvia,
with local professionals facing difficulty in practicing their trade, and economic and
environmental consequences of an extended effort to establish large industries in Estonia, when
there was a lack of a mineral base. The migration policy implemented by the centre was a cause
for concern to the Estonians. Many Russians were able to enter Estonia and create, in the eyes of
Estonian natives, unnecessary competition for them in the urban job market. There was a belief
among Estonians that the Russians didn’t understand the local labour market, and more so they
underestimated the local bodies to be able to provide the proper service. Estonia was heavily
affected by this immigration policy, with the share of native Estonians in the population dropping
from 90% in 1939 to 61% in 1989 (Smith, pp.127, 1996). There was a push from the centre to
implement policies favoured towards cultural standardisation in the late 1970s. This included a
push for requirement of greater Russian fluency in offices of public administration, increasing
the level of education for Russian, introducing it at all academic levels (kindergarten, schools
and universities. Many of these policies led to discontentment amongst the local Estonians and
created concern for the future of the colloquial tongue and the cultures, reflected by dissident
activities in the 1980s regarding the push of Russian as a language. With the lack of any serious
economic reform, living standards, which had been improved due to the implementation of
certain policies introduced during Brezhnev’s regime were falling. This was perhaps the biggest
cause for concern for many Estonian, given that the central government was highly geared
toward economic performance. These are some of the many factors that created the desire for
autonomous rule within Estonia, which led to the push for the same, through nationalist politics
and practices seen in the late 80s and early 90s.

With Gorbachev coming to power, there was an attempt by the Soviet regime to try and
improve conditions through economic, political and social restructuring. However, this
restructuring led to a resurgence of nationalism throughout Estonia. However, Estonia did not
desire independent statehood, but this was brought about through phases. The first phase was the
reawakening of nationalism. As previously mentioned, the implementation of glasnost by
Gorbachev was a huge help to nationalism in Estonia, as it allowed for there to be a rediscovery
nationalism through debate. Ethnic inequalities were discussed and re-examined. The role of the
media cannot be understated, which helped narrow the discourse and make it more focused on
the issues that faced Estonia, in a more national context, and made the people more aware.
Gorbachev was not oblivious to the dissatisfaction amongst the Baltic republics, and the decrease
the legitimacy of his government saw. His attempt at restructuring the government, through
Perestroika was to be able to legitimize his own government and create an improved economic
environment for the Soviet Union, along with centralize control of the same, which he felt would
allow for greater control of local control in these republics. The biggest blow to his attempts was
perhaps the Chernobyl incident of 1986, which was an accident that took place at nuclear power
plant. It created great consequences for the surrounding environment and the people living in the
nearby vicinity. The Chernobyl disaster created a turning point in Soviet politics, and expanded
his reform efforts. “This was an important step towards a totally new political culture in both
Estonia and in the Soviet Union as a whole” (Virkkunnen, pp. 88, 1999). It led to the
implementation of glasnost. The emergence of new groups and initiatives in Estonia allowed for
the birth of the Estonian independence movement, supported greatly by the Estonian
independence movement. The intelligentsia of Estonia which took the most advantage of
glasnost to revitalise their nationalist agenda.

Several groups emerged during this period in Estonia. The National Heritage Society was
established as the primary legal opposition movement within the new semi-independent structure
of Estonia in December of 1987. The Estonian Green Movement was initiated to battle the
Phosphorite Crisis which began in 1987. “This was a political campaign against the centrally-
planned foundation of a new phosphorite mine in the ecologically violated and demographically
modified North-eastern Estonia” (Virkkunnen, pp.88, 1999). The emergence of the popular front
in Estonia in 1988 allowed for the realization that home rule was possible. The nationalist
resources played an important part in the independence movement of Estonia. The historical
myth of voluntary accession to the Soviet Union was broken, and now people of the Baltic
republics felt that they had a genuine and legitimate claim to independence. They considered
their struggle a lawful practice against a foreign power’s occupation of their native land. The
second national resource was focused on the possibility and benefits of economic autonomy.
Given the recent sluggish nature of the economy under the Soviet regime, Estonia made an
argument that economic independence would be beneficial for them and the people living in
Estonia. The third, most controversial nationalist resource focused on the idea of cultural
preservation. The idea behind it was that the national culture could be protected through
autonomous rule. The Estonian Popular Front’s founding principle was defending the national
culture and putting an end to cultural assimilation. The rise of ethnic nationalism, which focused
on the natural homeland of Estonians and its clash with civic nationalism, which focused on the
rights of every individual caused for there to be concern within the minorities of the state. At the
founding of the counter movement in Estonia, Interdvizhenie, in 1989, many complained that
Soviet Estonia was facing Estonianisation, especially with regards to the language and
citizenship laws, which they felt marginalised the minority communities.
 Estonia declared their intention to once again become an independent state on 30th March
1990. Similar to Latvia, Estonia’s Communist Party saw a split from the Soviet Union, leading to
the influence of the centre on the republics reducing drastically. Despite the Soviet Union’s best
efforts to keep hold of the republic of Estonia, the coup proved to be the final nail in their coffin,
and allowed Estonia to re-establish themselves as an independent state.

Conclusion

The study of the above two Baltic republics has shown us the power nationalism holds
when it comes to mobilising people towards a certain cause, in this case, the demand for an
independent state. There were several factors that allowed for nationalism to rise in these
republics, such as the poor treatment dished out to them at the hands of the central Soviet
government, the nature of their accession to the Soviet Union, the traditions held sacred by the
intelligentsia of the republics, the population composition, and the formation of new groups that
could be the voice of dissent. The manifestation of nationalism in these two nations was
remarkably similar, with the native citizens of the Baltic republics believing that they are owed
their homeland and that it was taken from them using immoral means. Perhaps questions can be
raised about the success of these nationalist movements. Firstly, would these nationalist
sentiments have re-emerged into the public sphere had it not been for the dissatisfaction the
people of the republics felt towards the Soviet regime? Secondly, could civic nationalism, rather
than the ethnic nationalism we saw in Estonia and Latvia, have yielded similar, if not better
results, by unifying all the ethnic minorities with the majority in these nations? Third and finally,
is the divisive nature of ethnic nationalism not a concern for nation building? The rise of ethnic
nationalism in Estonia and Latvia is a good example of the extent to which nationalism allows
for mass mobilization and accomplishment of group targets. The manifestation of ethnic
nationalism in these nations allowed for their respective independence movements to find great
success.

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