People v.

Isla

G.R. No. 199875 November 21, 2012

FACTS:

Evidence for the Prosecution

According to AAA’s account, on July 21, 1997, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she was
inside her rented house together with her two children, aged 1 ½ years old and 9 months old. She
noticed that accused Edwin Isla standing by the door of her kitchen. After 15 minutes, she was
startled when he suddenly poked a knife on her neck and pulled her inside the bedroom. Isla
placed himself on top of her and had carnal knowledge with her.

When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the knife he was holding was already
bloodstained. At this point, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife.

Isla scampered out of the house through the backdoor.

Evidence for the Defense

Isla never denied that he raped AAA. Invoking the defense of insanity, he testified that before the
incident, he and AAA had an illicit relationship for about two months until they broke up. After
raping her, he admitted stabbing AAA twice “for reason he cannot understand.”

For the defense, two psychiatric doctors who examined him were presented as witnesses.

Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder with psychotic
features; that he manifested psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor impulse control,
poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that he exhibited such behavioral pattern
immediately prior to being jailed.

After a thorough interview and psychiatric testing on Isla, Dr. Gomez likewise observed that Isla
was suffering from a major depressive disorder which impaired his mental faculties.
The RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder. It did not give credence to
his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed the crimes charged during a lucid
interval.

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE

COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

RULING:

This Court is not convinced with Isla’s defense.

Article 12 of the RPC provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt one from
criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an
accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused
invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty
because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused’s insanity must, however, relate to the
time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity.

The respective testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert
witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the mental examination
on Isla taken four to six years after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that it
could not be concluded with certainty that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes.

The expert witnesses themselves opined that their findings were not conclusive as to whether Isla
was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination was made on said day or for
lack of information during that time.
This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Isla acted
with discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during and after the commission of the
crimes with which he was charged.

People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Medina

G.R No. 113691

Facts:
June – October 1982, Medina was confined in the National Mental Hospital for
schizophreniform disorder, where he was subsequently released. Relatives say that his condition
did not seem to improve. He was referred to Dr. Adigue for further examinations. May 20, 1991,
11 pm, a party was attended by both Dalisay and Medina, as well as Larry Andal, where the
both Dalisay and Medina danced the chacha together. Afterwards, Dalisay invited Andal to go
home, with Dalisay walking in front of Larry. They were waylaid by Medina who stabbed Dalisay.
Dalisay fell down and the two grappled on the ground. Dalisay was able to run away but he was
chased and once more stabbed repeatedly by Medina. Andal was so stunned that he wasn’t
able to help Dalisay, who was brought DOA to the hospital.
The Trial Court convicted Medina of murder & said that his defense of insanity is not
meritorious since Dr. Adigue was not qualified as an expert witness, that his sister’s testimony
didn’t constitute sufficient proof of insanity, and that he was actually mentally agile during trial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not medina was insane therefore exempt from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating Medina’s voluntary surrender

Rulings:

1. No. The decision was not based on the qualifications of Dr. Adigue as a doctor but as
a witness. What mattered was the failure of Dr. Adigue’s testimony to establish the legal insanity
of Medina as shown in the results of the tests she conducted which merely says that Medina has
a mild depression and emotional disturbances. The testimony also did not establish the
complete deprivation of reason on Medina’s part. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be
deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be
complete absence of the power to discern. The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil
Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is
presumed to be of sound mind. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost his reason or
was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will always
presume that he was in a normal state of mind. Care must be taken to distinguish between
insanity or lack of reason and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger or
passion. Moral insanity or mere mental depravity – results not from the disease of the mind but
from a perverted condition of the moral system; person is sane and is not exempted from the
criminal liability.
2. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor
of the appellant. The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier
given himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an
hour after the stabbing incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City
Police Station. Hence, the evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender,
namely: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person
in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.
 JERWIN DORADO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 216671, 2016-10-03
Facts:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends
Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group)
along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a
sumpak, and his friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw
stones and bottles at Ronald's group.Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the
talipapa and hid inside to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles. When Ronald thought
that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came out of hiding. Dorado's group,
however, was out there waiting for them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group
resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his
sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious for about ten (10)
minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was brought to the Rizal
Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan.
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.[8]
Ruling:
Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully appreciated by the Court
as there was enough evidence to support them; that he was at his home at the time of the
incident; that defense witness Ofelia testified that he was not the one who shot Ronald; and
that the barangay officials did not find the sumpak in his possession.
The Court finds merit in the petition.Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at
the time of the commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against
him consistently stated his minority.[11] For said reason, he must benefit from the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended.
Even though the said law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be
retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in
criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).[12]
T... o recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years
but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted
from criminal responsibility.
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the
records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial."
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an
effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at
the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply stated that a privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be appreciated as it was proven
that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on
whether Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald.
Discernment is different from intent.
The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.[25] Thus:
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
"discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct
thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former
refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person
ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware
of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in
.negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that
since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he
intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to
shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court
cannot rule with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there
can be no presumption of discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence of such
determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment.
Principles:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the
records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial."
 People vs Ancajas
People of The Philippines vs. Vergel Ancajas And Allain Ancajas
[G.R. No. 199270 | 2015-10-21]

Facts:

AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva.
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1998, she asked permission from her employers
to go to her parents' house. AAA's house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo, Cebu, the
same barangay where her employers' house is situated. On her way to her parents' house, she
met appellants Vergel and Allain who wanted to go with her but she refused. They suddenly
held her hands but she was able to get free from their hold. She then decided to return to her
employers' house but when she thought about her parents' need for the money, she just stayed
and waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go away.
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her parents' house but
appellants reappeared and held her hands again. She shouted for help and struggled to be
freed from their hold but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant
Vergel punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness.
At about 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her consciousness and she
noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her
side. She felt' pain all over her body. Her vagina hurt and it was covered with blood. Her panty
and maong pants were also stained with blood. She went back to her employers' house and told
them that she was raped by appellants.
At around 9 o'clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was accompanied by the Spouses
Cuevas to the police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape incident. The rape incident was
contained in a police blotter and AAA was later instructed to undergo a physical examination
which she did.
On March 28, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicted the accused. The accused
appealed to the CA. On April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC
decision.

Issue/s:

Whether or not there is a presence of conspiracy between the appellants in this case.

Ruling:

We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made
by evidence of a chain of circumstances.

The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and when she tried to shout,
appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the
abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that
there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were
present in this case.
 PEOPLE v. MANUEL MACAL Y BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, 2016-01-13
Facts:
Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got married in
March 2000 and that out of their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that, at
the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house located in V & G
Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by her brother,
Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada.Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in
the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin
were walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with
them so that they could all feast on the leftover food prepared for the fiesta that was
celebrated the previous day. Along the way, Angeles and her group met Auria's husband,
the accused appellant. The latter joined them in walking back to their house.When they
arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the
accused-appellant who went straight to their bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the
living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria shouting, "mother help me
I am going to be killed."[6] Upon hearing Auria's plea for help, Angeles and the rest of her
companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of the room locked. Arvin
kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of
the room. Next to Auria was the accused-appellant who was then trying to stab himself with
the use of an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a
hospital, on board a vehicle owned by a neighbor, but was pronounced dead on arrival.
Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped over the fence and managed to
escape before the policemen could reach the crime scene.
Issues:
The principal issue before the Court is whether the court a quo erred in finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
Ruling:
All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the
ProsecutionParricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused.[13]Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is the most crucial.[14] This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of
parricide from homicide.[15] In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship
between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate.[16] Oral evidence may also be
considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not
contested.[17]In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-
appellant is beyond dispute. As previously stated, the defense already admitted that Auria
was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such
admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case.
Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which
the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original.[18] Hence,
the key element that qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily demonstrated in this
case.Just like the marital relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant, the fact of
Auria's death is incontestable. Witnesses, from both the prosecution and defense, were in
agreement that Auria expired on February 12, 2003. As additional proof of her demise, the
prosecution presented Auria's Certificate of Death which was admitted by the RTC and the
defense did not object to its admissibility.
Principles:
TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158057
September 24, 2004

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming on
appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82
convicting the petitioner of homicide.

On September 16, 1995, Noe Toledo y Tamboong (Noe) went to a black-smith who made
the design of his bolo. When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the
afternoon, he saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte
drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. His house is
about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte.

He requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise and proceeded inside
his house and went to sleep. Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived
at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food. Eliza prepared dinner for him and after
Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky. Gerardo’s home is about 12
meters away from the Guarte home. Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex
and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they
heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky
rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw Noe stoning their house. Ricky went out of
the house and proceeded to Noe’s house. Ricky asked Noe, his uncle, why he was stoning their
house. Noe did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and, without any warning,
stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing
that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help. Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed
outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his
hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who
stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was Noe who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at
the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the
Romblon Provincial Hospital.

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night.
Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being
operated on. Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the injuries sustained by
Ricky wherein there is a stab wound on the left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration
measuring 6 cms. long, irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating.

RTC rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA
also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that
the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense.
 The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal,
the decision of the RTC is correct.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in
not finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that
he be acquitted of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the
evidence on record.

HELD:

YES, he is guilty of homicide. The contention of the petitioner Noe has no

merit.

Petitioner Noe testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally.

He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the
death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

The petitioner also avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of
complete self-defense.

The essential requisites of self-defense are:

1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
2) reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal. The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he
adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the
victim in complete self-defense. He relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he
killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is
justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo
accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the
said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in
the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He
is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is
the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity,
and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and
ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is
in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law
and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.

On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not
commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no
criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free
will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence.The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident,
without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear
and convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance
under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz:
1) A person is performing a lawful act;
2) With due care;
3) He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4) Without fault or intention of causing it.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. It presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.
 People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his
father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter
was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel
Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter
pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife,
Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel,
Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus
told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his
son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husbands
shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel
on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was
brought to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police
but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim.

Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted
that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun.
Jesus grabbed Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees.
Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus then
rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he went back to the
dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea.

Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally
liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only

Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril
(un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights
(bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la integridad
corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It is indispensable that the state
of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same.

The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of
the RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused
acted under a state of necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the
victim at close range on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in a
state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
 3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.

There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery,
two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the
confluence of the abovementioned conditions.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Ty vs People

G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004

Facts:

This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty
before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital
to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino several post-dated checks. The said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for “Account Closed” and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors
Hospital the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury.” She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release of her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would not discharge
unless the hospital bills are paid.

The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and
reiterated her defense that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.” The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos
P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability?

Held: No.

Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the

following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If
the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this defense is not applicable

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a
real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is
not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced
him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

Speculative fear

The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mother’s health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother
might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.