Blackout in Italy – on September 28, 2003

Q.1 What were the major causes and issues for blackout?
Ans: There are following reasons for the blackout:
1) Because of high loads huge phase angle difference was created and the protective device
started its work and they gets opened, and failed to reconnect or reclose the LUKMANIER
(METTLEN – LAVORGO) line.
2) The protective devices were not fast enough to sense the urgency, and the countermeasures
were also not enough. Operators didn’t know that overloading was allowable just for 15 minutes.
After the tripping of first line ETRANS took 10 minutes to inform and within next 10 minutes
the imports were decreased up to 300MW.
3) The angle of stability was disturbed and the voltage dropped down drastically.
4) The way of maintaining the power system was not proper, the national regulation didn’t
maintain safe clearances regarding flashover during tree cutting. Tree flashover was one of the
major reason. The inspection and the way of maintenance badly affected the transmission
system. As the load increased the sag was also increased which was more than the estimated one.

Q.2 Which type of faults occurred during the event?

Ans: The type of fault was Single line to ground fault, the tree came in touch with the main
importing line from Switzerland - the so-called "Lukmanier" line (380 kV) which caused the
damage to the entire power system.

Q.3 Discuss the sequence of events that occurred during fault?

Ans: The events occurred as follows:
The main Swiss line tripped at at 03:01 caused by tree flashover, many attempts to automatically
reclose the line went in vain. The manual failed attempt to reclose the line was also made at 03:08, as
the line tripped the load was transferred to the other lines the other Swiss line Sils-Sozza was
overloaded which was allowed for only 15 minutes so that operator can take some remedial measures,
at 03.11 the conservation took place between Swiss coordination Centre of ETRANS in Laufenburg and
the GRTN control Centre in Rome; to request them to reduce the Italian load by 300MW,the total load
became 6400MW which was 300MW more than the scheduled. It came in effect within 10 minutes i.e.
at 03.21, At 03:25, the Sils-Soazza line also tripped due to another tree flashover but this flashover
was probably caused by the sag in the line, which was due to overheating of the conductors. Now the
two major lines were disconnected from the Italy which caused unbearable overloading on the
remaining lines, by this automatic tripping of the remaining interconnection towards Italy, Italy
system was separated from the European network about 12 seconds after the loss of the line Slis-
Soza. In this 12 seconds the instability occurred in the system which affected the major parts of the
power system and caused low voltage level in northern Italy and consequently led to tripping of
several generation plants. The frequency was drastically down and temporally stopped at 49Hz by
primary frequency control and the auto load shedding process also took place. And due to turbine
tripping, under frequency relay operation, high temperature of exhaust gases, loss of excitation, etc.
the other generating units were also tripped. Despite all this the frequency kept decreasing and
reached at 47.5 Hz. The restoration process was started right after the occurrence of blackout, the
system of Italy was energized before 08:00, the central part at 12:00 and the remaining parts at
17:00. And finally system was fully energized at 21:40.

Q.4 Explain How these faults affected the stability of an interconnected

system?
Ans: As the lines started tripping one by one the load kept shifting on the other remaining lines
and the overloading occurred at the other remaining lines due to overloading the synchronized
was disturbed and the stability was also affected as the frequency and the voltage dropped down.

Q.5 Explain how reliability of system was lost?

Ans: The reliability was lost as the other remaining lines were not able enough to sustain or
bear the load for more than 15 minutes, and the supply was cut from the Swiss to the Italy which
was not reliable.

Q.6 Being an Electrical Engineer provide your suggestions how this blackout
could be prevented and Stability of system could be maintained?
Ans: Being an electrical engineer I would provide the following future recommendations to
prevent this incident form happing again.
I would ask the regulation authority to keep checking the air clearance of the lines.
Maintain the process of tree cutting, especially of the nearest ones.
Protective devices should be fast enough to sense the fault and the computer should be fast
enough to take the remedial action which was supposed to be taken at that time.
the Italian operators were unable to solve this problem they should be provided with handbook as
how they can control the Swiss line by directly sitting here.
The blockage of On Load Tap Changing Transformer should come into act during the voltage
dropping process.