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Conleste Regional Planning in Rio de Jan PDF
Conleste Regional Planning in Rio de Jan PDF
Guapimirim
Silva Jardim
Magé
COMPERJ
São Gonçalo
Maricá
Niterói
Atlantic Ocean
Rio de Janeiro City
Map 1: CONLESTE municipalities in relation to Comperj site and the city of Rio de Janerio.
This report details the work of a Spring 2011 Advanced Urban Planning Studio at Columbia University. Running between
January – May 2011, students examined the challenges of regional planning for the inter-municipal Consortium of Leste
Fluminense (CONLESTE) in response to Petrobras’ Rio de Janeiro Petrochemical Complex (Comperj). Comperj is a mega-
development project whose physical size and projected economic and social impacts are unprecedented in the region and
in Latin America as a whole.
The studio course included collaboration with the multiple stakeholders active in the project, including national, state and
municipal government actors, Petrobras and other members of the private sector as well as international organizations and
academic institutions. The studio’s engagement in the project joined the work of these actors, most of whom have been
involved since the announcement of Comperj in 2006.
This report offers recommendations to the different stakeholders for improving collaboration in regional planning for the re-
shaping of space and socio-economic dynamics in the region in manners that leverage Comperj as a catalyst to bring about
greater environmental sustainability, social equity, and regional prosperity.
INTRODUCTION 4
METHODOLOGY 7
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 8
REGIONAL OVERVIEW 10
MUNICIPAL OVERVIEW 12
RECOMMENDATIONS 26
CONCLUSIONS 35
4
Map 2: CONLESTE region in relation to Brazil and the state of Rio de Janeiro.
GH¿FLWV DV WKH EXON RI WKHLU RSHUDWLQJ EXGJHW FRQVLVWV RI GH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD7DNLQJDGYDQWDJHRIWKH
government transfers. Federal programs and pledged positive political and economic conditions of the country,
funds from Petrobras represent the current unutilized major this would be a crucial time to address social ills before they
sources of funding available to CONLESTE for regionally become more deeply entrenched.
directed improvements.
PETROBRAS AND COMPERJ
BRAZIL TODAY Petrobras is a publicly-traded Brazilian oil company
Brazil is the largest country in South America with VSHFLDOL]LQJ LQ WKH H[SORUDWLRQ SURGXFWLRQ UH¿QLQJ
vast amounts of natural resources and a unique national selling and transportation of oil, natural gas and their by-
character. For much of modern history, Brazil has been products. It is also a world leader in the development of
characterized as the “Sleeping Giant” poised on the brink advanced technology for deep-water and ultra-deep water
of arriving on the global economic stage but held back oil production. Petrobras is the largest company in Latin
E\ HFRQRPLF LQVWDELOLW\ DQG VHYHUH VRFLDO VWUDWL¿FDWLRQ America and the sixth largest oil company in the world, with
However, with the recent discovery of oil reserves equaling a market value higher than Microsoft and whose operations
millions of barrels, the award of both the 2014 World span 27 countries. The company’s historical evolution goes
Cup and the 2016 Olympics (among other important hand in hand with the discovery of oil in Brazil. President
international events), an up to 5% annual growth rate and Getulio Vargas announced the creation of Petrobras in 1953
strong leadership, Brazil has arguably shifted from its past to perform activities of research, exploration, development
RI PLOLWDU\ GLFWDWRUVKLS LQÀDWLRQ ERRPDQGEXVW F\FOHV and production of oil and gas in Brazil. At that time, the country
and unstable regimes into a new era of global power. was involved in an import-substitution industrialization
Importantly, this transition brings a new shift in relations program, and was looking for a way to decrease reliance
between property capital and civil society. Goldman Sachs on oil imports. The company was also charged with the role
recently announced Brazil’s economy as on par with of implementing and regulating national oil policy. Petrobras
Russia, India, and China. Dubbed the BRIC group, these held a monopoly in the Brazilian oil industry between 1953
countries are rapidly developing and entering into a new era and 1997 due to the protectionist policies in place, as well as
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOLQÀXHQFH,QRI¿FHUHQWDOSULFHVLQ5LR its role as a governor of the industry. Today, the government
de Janeiro were the fourth highest globally and exceeded owns 56% of the company’s shares.
those in midtown Manhattan (Packard, 2011). These spaces This opening up of the oil industry in Brazil led to its
share the city with hundreds of informal settlements. Often, expansion of exploration of oil and participation in other oil
precarious housing is adjacent to luxury condo complexes, markets. During the past ten years, the company doubled
illustrating the pervasive issue of income and spatial its oil production and increased its oil reserves by 75%. In
inequality prevalent in Brazil. Human Development Index 2006, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that
scores of neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro span the range %UD]LO ZDV QRZ VHOIVXI¿FLHQW LQ RLO SURGXFWLRQ EXW QRW
of those between Sweden and Serbia (Instituto Brasileiro UH¿QLQJ DFWLYLHV 7KLV SHULRG OHG 3HWUREUDV WR LWV VWURQJ
5
global position today and its efforts in expanding programs US$8.4 billion and 8 years to complete (2008-2016). The
of corporate social responsibility. Brazil is still dependent goal is to increase domestic production of processed heavy
on importing processed oil since the country’s capacity oil and derivatives by approximately 165,000 barrels a day,
for processing the domestically produced heavy crude oil reducing the country’s reliance on imported processed oil.
LVORZ3HWUREUDVLVQRZIRFXVLQJRQH[SDQGLQJLWVUH¿QLQJ The anticipated annual revenue from the activities at the
capacity to reduce the dependency on imported processed complex is US$5.8 billion.
oil and increase the autonomy of the Brazilian oil industry. The complex is located in the municipality of Itaboraí,
In 2006, Petrobras announced the Comperj project, a major one of CONLESTE’s municipalities. This location was
LQYHVWPHQW LQ RLO UH¿QLQJ IRU 3HWUREUDV DQG %UD]LO 7KLV chosen because of its proximity to regional transportation
petrochemical complex will be the largest in Brazil, covering infrastructure connecting the plant to docking terminals as
a land area of 45 million square meters (the equivalent well as for the development opportunities in the historically
RI URXJKO\ 1RUWK $PHULFDQ IRRWEDOO ¿HOGV FRVWLQJ marginalized region.
Photo 1: Oil rig in the Guanabara Bay (All photos by Jeffery Yuen).
6
METHODOLOGY
We conducted our Studio work during Columbia visits gave us a deeper understanding of the regional urban
University’s 2011 Spring Semester, from January 2011 to context and the issues that surround economic variance,
May 2011. We collaborated with members of UFF, UN- social disparities, and environmental degradation.
Habitat ROLAC, Petrobras, and CONLESTE. Our work
was segmented into three phases, each described at length 3. Information Exchanges with various entities provided
below. us with knowledge of urban planning and urban design
practices and proposals for the affected areas. Discussions
were held with university professors and students, UN-
SCOPE AND ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM +DELWDW RI¿FLDOV PXQLFLSDO XUEDQ SODQQLQJ RI¿FLDOV ORFDO
To understand the complex issues and NGOs, community members, employees of Petrobras, and
developmental challenges of CONLESTE, it was necessary the General Director of CONLESTE.
WR ¿UVW XQGHUVWDQG WKH VRFLRSROLWLFDO DQG KLVWRULF FRQWH[W
within Brazil and the Leste Fluminense region. This was 4. Brainstorming of strategic proposals to improve
accomplished through literature review and analyses institutional strength and planning practices in Niterói,
focused on Brazilian history, Brazilian housing policies São Gonçalo, Maricá, and Itaboraí was conducted during
and programs, case studies of large industrial projects in a three-day workshop with the professors and students of
Brazil, and studies of housing and infrastructural conditions UFF, UN-Habitat ROLAC, and members of CONLESTE
in Leste Fluminense. In addition, weekly guest speakers and the Secretary of Regional Development (Secretaría
presented their expertise on issues that pertained to de Desenvolvimento Regional). Divided in three groups,
the studio.3 Through this collaborative participation we we focused on improving housing, transportation, and
gained insight into the monitoring of Comperj’s spurred sanitation infrastructure.
development through the Millennium Development Goals,
the role of Petrobras in Brazilian society, Brazilian strategies 5. Presentations of Policy Directives, held after the three-
for planning affordable housing, and the contemporary day workshop. These presentations served as potential
context of real estate development in the state of Rio de proposals to promote equitable and viable development for
Janeiro, among other pertinent issues. This information was affected sites within CONLESTE.
synthesized into the mid-term presentation: CONLESTE, The trip to Brazil gave us a more holistic view of
Realizing the Potential of Regional Planning in Leste the obstacles and barriers that CONLESTE and the region
)OXPLQHQVHFRPSOHWHGLQSUHSDUDWLRQIRU¿HOGUHVHDUFKLQ faced. Through these transnational dialogues we were given
Brazil. feedback on our work up to mid March, and were provided
indispensible information and understanding of the region
to continue making progress in our work.
FIELD RESEARCH
%XLOGLQJ XSRQ WKH ¿UVW SKDVH RI UHVHDUFK ZH
continued extensive dialogues with members of UN-
HABITAT
RECOMMENDATIONS
ROLAC, CONLESTE, and UFF in Rio de Janeiro, from AND POLICY PROPOSALS
March 15th to March 25th. We also worked in tandem with 8SRQRXUUHWXUQWR1HZ<RUNZHUH¿QHGRXUDQDO\VHV
urban planning and architecture students from UFF. The of the studied sites to propose improvements upon urban
main goal was to jointly debate and propose solutions for policies, programs, and plans. The end goal was to promote
the development of CONLESTE. more equitable and sustainable development of the region,
)LHOGUHVHDUFKZDVDSSURDFKHGLQ¿YHVWHSV while bolstering CONLESTE’s power as a regional body.
1. Initial Presentations of Rio de Janeiro’s current We maintained partnerships and dialogues with the above
socio-economic conditions, recent trends of Leste DFWRUV WR UH¿QH WKH ZRUN DQG XOWLPDWHO\ WR SUHVHQW D OLVW
Fluminense’s urban development, and planning of policy recommendations to our client, CONLESTE. We
initiatives in the state of Rio de Janeiro. These SUHSDUHGDQGGHOLYHUHGRXU¿QDOSUHVHQWDWLRQWR&ROXPELD
presentations set the context for the proceeding University’s Urban Planning Program on April 21, 2011.
and the various entities involved in the region’s planning.
3 Guest speakers included both experts in Brazil (via Skype) and in
person in New York City.
7
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
In addition to the previously described CONLESTE MDGs. UFF is currently monitoring the MDGs alongside
and Petrobras, the studio collaborated with four major UN HABITAT-ROLAC to evaluate three questions: 1. What
stakeholders on this project that are detailed below. changes are occurring in CONLESTE in relation to housing
and the environment? 2. How are these changes linked,
directly or indirectly, to Comperj? 3. What innovations
UN HABITAT-ROLAC are being realized in terms of institutional corporation,
81 +$%,7$752/$& 5HJLRQDO 2I¿FH IRU /DWLQ emergence of new organizations and new scales of planning
America and the Caribbean) has a formal relationship with WRPDQDJHFRQÀLFWLQJHIIHFWVRIXUEDQL]DWLRQ"
Petrobras and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Additionally, UFF is working with three CONLESTE
The main objective of this partnership is to monitor the UN municipalities to develop their housing plans in anticipation
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the region to learn of Comperj’s operational impact.
about the impacts of Comperj. A strong focus of the MDGs is
on poverty reduction, health, gender equality, education, and
environmental sustainability. Central to Comperj are MDGs STATE GOVERNMENT
7 and 94, which focus on environmental sustainability and In 2006, Rio de Janeiro State (RJS) founded
accelerating local development while reducing inequality Comperj Forum as an institutional platform to discuss, plan,
respectively. The indicators for the MDGs were developed and implement public policies regarding Comperj. However,
in an extensive participatory process in the region, and thus this body has proven to be somewhat ineffective. The full
provide a consensual framework from which to monitor and extent of the role of the state government as it relates
guide the effects of Comperj. to Comperj is still unclear, though it has created some
channels for municipal funding. It administers funds for the
Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC) that supports infrastructure
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL FLUMINENSE projects in municipalities. The state is also embarking
(UFF) on a Solid-Waste Management Research and Plan in
In 2007, University Federal Fluminense became collaboration with the National Development Bank of Brazil
involved in analyzing the effects of Comperj developments (BNDES). Finally, the state’s Ministry of Environment is
through the solicitation of UN HABITAT-ROLAC. The participating in the Agenda 21 initiative led by Petrobras. It is
public university is federally and has a commitment to also starting several initiatives indirectly related to Comperj,
equitable social development in the region. Furthermore, such as the Arco Metropolitano Regional Plan, which is a
multidisciplinary professionals and researchers at UFF developmental plan within the municipalities containing the
provide expertise in the varied focus areas covered by the new highway linkng the largest port in RJS to Comperj.
Photo 2: Professor Clara Irazábal with representatives from UN HABITAT-ROLAC, UFF and CONLESTE.
4 For more on the process required to establish Goal 9. see the “Policies
and Political Structure” section of this report.
8
Photos 3-6 (From top left corner): +HDWKHUDW3HWUREUDV·5(3/$1UHÀQHU\8))FDPSXVLQ1LWHUyL&UHDWLQJUHJLRQDOSODQVDWWKH
8))ZRUNVKRS&RPSHUMVLWH
COMPERJ FORUM
The purpose of Comperj forum is to facilitate Councils and committees are expected to implement items
democratic discussions regarding Comperj. Its aim discussed at each meeting, yet participants complain of
is to encourage coordinated communication among political fragmentation hindering this process. There is no
stakeholders and to minimize the inequities that exist at evaluation or monitoring mechanism to ensure that this
a regional and state level. Ideally, Comperj forum should KDSSHQV0HPEHUVFRPSODLQDERXWWKHWKHLQHI¿FLHQF\RIWKH
help plan and implement projects related to 8 key areas: Forum, citing examples such as representatives returning
Housing, Infrastructure, Water, Education, Environmental to their sectors and passing the ideas off as their own.
Sustainability, Economic Development, Social Policy and This is not only frustrating, it also diminishes the strength
Public Safety. and legitimacy of Comperj Forum. Moreover, there is a
Comperj Forum was created in 2006 when Comperj lack of incentives amongst the representatives to actively
was announced;; however, members have met infrequently participate in the meetings and abide by their decisions. In
once since its founding. The Forum consists of state this way, political fragmentation presents a large barrier to
representatives (including the Governor of Rio de Janeiro development. Lilian Yuresevich, representative of the state
State) and the technical-managerial group (Grupo Técnico- government in the GTG, voiced this issue stating that “there
Gestor, GTG). Organizations represented in the GTG aren’t different hierarchical levels within Comperj Forum,
include publicly-owned banks (Caixa, BNDES, Banco do but different egos” (Personal Communication, March 24,
Brasil), Petrobras and CONLESTE. Structurally, the Forum 2011).
is to meet monthly to keep abreast of issues in the region,
\HWPHPEHUVKDYHIRXQGWKLVGLI¿FXOWWRFRRUGLQDWH
9
REGIONAL OVERIVEW
Though CONLESTE was founded in 2002 on issues In 2010 the CONLESTE region had a population
of water quality in the region, the group expanded and of 2.3 million people, largely concentrated in the urbanized
UHGH¿QHGLWVHOIXSRQWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRI&RPSHUMLQ core of São Gonçalo and Niterói. The regional population
Due to the dynamic state of membership in CONLESTE, has grown at a higher rate than the national rate in the
this study examines CONLESTE as the following 11 past decade, at 14.2% and11.2% respectively. (Instituto
member municipalities: Cachoeiras de Macacu, Casimiro %UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD&RQWUDGLFWLQJ
de Abreu, Guapimirim, Itaboraí, Maricá, Magé, Niterói, the boom in population, the region has experienced a lower
Rio Bonito, São Gonçalo, Silva Jardim, and Tanguá (see rate of economic growth than both the state and the nation.
Map 1). These municipalities comprised CONLESTE at the GDP per capita has increased in the region by 12.6% from
beginning of this study and will henceforth be referenced as 2000-2008, compared to 27.1% for the state and 25.3% for
the ‘CONLESTE region’. Currently, CONLESTE has grown the nation (Amaral et al., 2010). In 2008, GDP per capita for
to include Araurama and Teresópolis with the potential for the CONLESTE region stood at US$6,865, far lower than the
adding municipalities in the near future. state’s at US$12,853 and the nation’s at US$9,259 (Ibid.).
The CONLESTE region spans an area of 1,884 7KH&21/(67(UHJLRQKDVVHHQVLJQL¿FDQWLPSURYHPHQWV
VTXDUHPLOHV,QVWLWXWR%UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD in Human Development Index (HDI), a more nuanced
2010), which approximately the size of the state of Delaware metric of wellbeing that considers health, education and
or six times larger than New York City. Situated within Leste living standards. In 1991, the region sported an average
Fluminense, the CONLESTE region has historically been +',RI,QVWLWXWR%UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD
politically and economically marginalized and given its 2010), comparable to the national score of 0.70. By 2000,
secondary status to neighboring Rio de Janeiro City. The the CONLESTE region and the national average improved
region’s tenuous position was exacerbated in the 1960s to 0.77. The HDI of Rio de Janeiro State is consistently
when the nation’s capital city was moved from Rio de higher than both the CONLESTE region and the national
Janeiro to Brasilia. As the prominence of Rio de Janeiro DYHUDJHGXHWRWKHLQÀXHQFHRI5LRGH-DQHLUR&LW\5LRGH
weakened on a national scale, so too did the livelihoods of Janeiro State saw an improvement of HDI from 0.75 in 1991
those living within Leste Fluminense. to 0.81 in 2000.
Map 3: CONLESTE region with orange dots representing the informal settlements throughout the region.
10
HOUSING
Improvements in HDI belie ongoing problems in
basic housing provision. The region has long suffered
from a chronic shortfall of housing supply with concomitant
expansion of the informal housing sector. Today the area
RI¿FLDOO\FRQWDLQVVRPHLQIRUPDOVHWWOHPHQWVKRXVLQJ
RYHU IDPLOLHV $PDUDO HW DO 7KLV RI¿FLDO
number is likely to be much lower than the actual reality on
the ground. According to a recent study by the Ministry of
Cities (2011), the CONLESTE region has a current housing
GH¿FLWRIXQLWVDQGDQDGGLWLRQDOVXEQRUPDO
and precarious units. The entire regional housing stock is
currently comprised of 578,469 units. However, by 2023,
housing unit demand is projected to double to 1,026,835
units (see Annex 1). The size and speed of Comperj-related
growth is expected to exacerbate the growing housing
GH¿FLW DQG LQFUHDVH VRFLDO DQG VSDWLDO LQHTXDOLWLHV XQOHVV
effective regional action can be realized.
More than just a physical structure, housing should
be understood as a bundle of rights including access to Photo 7: Improvised electrical wiring in a favela outside São
the essential infrastructure and services that accompany Gonçalo .
full citizenship. In Brazil, there is a strong legal foundation
for such a progressive approach to housing. The ‘right
to housing’ is guaranteed by the 1988 Brazilian Federal
Constitution and is reinforced in the 2001 City Statute only reaches 52% of the population, while the sewage
with its call for the ‘social function of property’. From this network serves a mere 22% of residents and over 262,000
perspective, the proliferation of precarious settlements is KRXVHKROGVLQWKHUHJLRQVXIIHUIURPGH¿FLHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
troubling, represents an unrealized set of habitation rights, (Amaral et al., 2010). In some municipalities, like Itaboraí,
and raises concerns over social, spatial and environmental WKHUHLVQRVHZDJHV\VWHPDQGUDZVHZDJHÀRZVGLUHFWO\
equity. through regional water bodies and into the Guanabara Bay.
While the process of informality has been Beyond infrastructure, the tenuous legal status of informal
appreciated as an expression of adaptability and resilience, settlements is also problematic for regular public service
such practices in the housing sector are fundamentally GHOLYHU\ DQG RI¿FLDO UHVLGHQF\ UHFRJQLWLRQ 'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
responses to inadequate and tenuous habitation conditions. based on formal residency requirements is frequent and
Our Studio was concerned with the conditions that OLPLW DFFHVV WR HPSOR\PHQW HGXFDWLRQ DQG ¿QDQFLDO
produce informality as it relates to patterns of incomplete opportunities. The locations of informal settlements lack
urbanization and its detrimental impacts on residents. The proper infrastructure to promote adequate mobility and
FRQWLQXHG GH¿FLW RI KRXVLQJ HVSHFLDOO\ EHORZ PDUNHW UDWH accessibility. In this context transportation infrastructure
housing, has fuelled the growth of informal settlements. needs to go beyond merely supporting industrial modes of
7KHVHVHWWOHPHQWVRIWHQODFNVXI¿FLHQWEDVLFLQIUDVWUXFWXUH production. Rather it should be integrated into economic,
provisions, including water, roads, sewage, and solid waste environmental, and housing policy and focus on maximizing
collection, resulting in unsanitary conditions and increased use value for residents.
health risks. In the CONLESTE municipalities, water service The market has proven unable or unwilling to
supply housing below a certain price point, a situation
that is worsening given the increasing strains of demand.
Speculation in land markets has resulted in chaotic and
sprawling patterns of urbanization. Some parcels with full
access to urban infrastructure are left vacant while informal
settlements are pushed into marginalized, underserviced
areas. The market logic of land allocation often pushes
informal settlements to precarious and environmentally
sensitive areas. This phenomenon is highlighted at Morro
do Bumba, a small informal settlement in Niteroí. Morro do
%XPEDZDVEXLOWRQDQXQFDSSHGODQG¿OOZKHUHVWHHSVORSHV
and unstable soils combined to create extremely hazardous
urbanization conditions. In April 2010, heavy rains triggered
a series of landslides that destroyed 60 homes and killed
200 people (Brooks, 2010). The situation gets worse by the
Figure 1:&XUUHQWDQGSURMHFWHGKRXVLQJGHÀFHWIRU&21/(67( day as rate of growth in the region has outpaced the rates
region. (Source: See Annex 1). of improvement of infrastructure.
11
MUNICIPAL OVERVIEW
While the CONLESTE region generally suffers from
a number of pressing issues, particularly in housing and
infrastructure, there are a great variety of conditions and
patterns found between municipalities. The 11 municipalities
exhibit sharp differences in social, economic and
environmental conditions that need to be considered in both
local and regional plans. In an effort to better understand the
variety of conditions and priorities found in the CONLESTE
region, we selected a group of 4 municipalities for further
exploration—Itaboraí, São Gonçalo, Niterói and Maricá.
Focusing on the differing regional conditions illuminated the
most salient challenges facing CONLESTE.
SÃO GONÇALO
2010 Population: 999,901
GDP Per Capita (US$): $4,477
Area: 95 Square Miles
HDI Rank: 1014 (of 5507)
São Gonçalo began as a suburb of Niterói, and
became its own municipality in 1929. Since the 1940s,
manufacturing and industrial works have been the backbone
of the city’s economy, earning it the nickname of Manchester
Fluminense. São Gonçalo’s position on Guanabara Bay
presented an advantage to these industries. São Gonçalo
is the now second most populous city in the Rio de Janeiro
State, with nearly 1 million residents resulting in a dense,
ITABORAÍ highly urbanized landscape. Despite the high density,
2010 Population: 218,090 São Gonçalo continues growing and had the highest rate
GDP Per Capita (US$): $4,062 of informal housing growth from 2000-2008 in the region
Area: 166 Square Miles (Amaral et al., 2010). The city is struggling to maintain its
HDI Rank: 2248 (of 5507)5 VKDUHRILQGXVWULDO¿UPVMXVWDVVHUYLFHLQGXVWULHVDUHJDLQLQJ
The Comperj complex is located in the municipality a presence. São Gonçalo is also considered to be a bedroom
of Itaboraí. This relatively poor city was once a major community for Niterói and Rio de Janeiro and suffers from
DJULFXOWXUDOSURGXFHU¿UVWRIVXJDUFDQHDQGODWHURUDQJHV RQJRLQJLVVXHVRIGH¿FLHQWVDQLWDWLRQDQGVHZDJHGHOLYHU\
By the 1930s, agriculture shifted to other regions The current administration is very concerned with the public
and the city has been in economic decline since. The SUR¿OH RI WKH FLW\ DQG LV DFWLYHO\ ZRUNLQJ WR EXLOG D PRUH
opening of the Rio-Niterói Bridge in 1974 accelerated SRVLWLYH SHUFHSWLRQ DPRQJ FLWL]HQV DQG ¿UPV )RU 6mR
the urbanization process in Itaboraí and transformed the Gonçalo, the impacts that Petrobras represents go beyond
town into a bedroom community to the cities of Niterói Comperj. In 2009, the Integration Center, a training and
and Rio de Janeiro. The former orange plantations were education center developed in conjunction with Comperj,
rapidly converted into scattered housing developments opened in the city. Also, São Gonçalo is in negotiations with
that lack urban infrastructure, creating serious social and Petrobras to be the site of a new port.
environmental issues. Until recently, Itaboraí has had few
employment industries with most residents commuting to
Niterói or Rio de Janeiro for formal employment. However,
the construction of the Comperj complex could reshape this
regional dynamic.
5$OOVWDWLVWLFVLQWKLVVHFWLRQDUHIURPWKH,QVWLWXWR%UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿D
e Estatística, 2010.
12
NITERÓI MARICÁ
2010 Population: 487,327 2010 Population: 127,519
GDP Per Capita (US$): $10,385 GDP Per Capita (US$): $4,270
Area: 54 Square Miles Area: 140 Square Miles
HDI Rank: 3 (of 5507) HDI Rank: 917 (of 5507)
Niterói served as the capital of Rio de Janeiro 0DULFiLVDVPDOOFRDVWDO¿VKLQJWRZQORFDWHGLQWKH
State from 1830s-1975. Due to its administrative role and picturesque Lakes District, about an hour east of Rio de
port location, Niterói grew into an important shipping and Janeiro City proper. The natural beauty of its lagoons and
manufacturing hub. Niterói enjoys good infrastructure due beaches has recently attracted considerable international
to its legacy as a state capital. Basic sanitation metrics are investment and the city has branded itself as a domestic
the best in the metropolitan region and according to the and international tourist destination. This strategy has
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), Niterói is one produced very rapid growth in the past decade. Despite
of the best-structured and best run municipalities in the the increasing development of resorts, condos, and second
country with a long history of urban planning dating back to homes, most of the municipality is relatively poor and still
the 1940s.The proposal to form CONLESTE actually came lacks basic water and sewage infrastructure. Further, the
from the municipality of Niterói with the idea that the sharing SUHVVXUHV RI JURZWK KDYH RIWHQWLPHV EHHQ LQ FRQÀLFW ZLWK
of information and resources could help development in the the environmentally sensitive wetlands and beaches that
whole region. Niterói has vested interest in the success of GH¿QH WKH UHJLRQ ,Q 0DULFi WKH FKDOOHQJHV RI EDODQFLQJ
regional development: It has a large number of informal development and environmental sustainability are very
settlements, and if other municipalities in the region get pressing and apparent.
better equipped to respond to the growing developmental
pressures due to Comperj within their own municipalities,
Niterói would be better equipped to control and serve its
own development. Today Niterói’s economy is based on
the service and commercial sector that employs many
residents from neighboring municipalities. It also serves
as a bedroom community for Rio de Janeiro. Every day
over 200,000 people commute between Rio and Niterói via
EULGJHDQGIHUU\7RXULVPDOVRSOD\VDVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQWKH
local economy, with its proximity to Rio de Janeiro (towards
which it offers splendid views), its beaches, and the works
of renowned architect Oscar Niemeyer playing important
roles. One of Rio’s most recognizable images is Niemeyer’s
Niterói Contemporary Art Museum.
13
Map 4: CONLESTE region with study municipalities highlighted.
14
e Estatística, 2010). The proposal for a regional consortium
actually came from Niterói as a way to share their planning
information and resources with smaller municipalities
to improve overall regional development (City of Niterói
Website, 2011).
LAND USE PATTERNS
5HÀHFWLQJ LWV VKDUH RI WKH UHJLRQDO SRSXODWLRQ
São Gonçalo accounts for 40% of the housing stock
in the CONLESTE region. In total, the four case study
municipalities combine for 80% of the existing housing
supply. The informal housing sector is similarly skewed,
and predominantly clusters around northern Niterói and
São Gonçalo. Niterói has the highest number of informal
settlements with 108 of the 233 regional favelas (Amaral
et al., 2010). Further, there are variations in the housing
markets within each municipality. For example, more
than 25% of the formal housing in Maricá is occasional
Figure 2: CONLESTE region poverty iincidence by percentage
use housing compared to the regional average of 5.6%
of population.
,QVWLWXWR%UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD7KLV
(Source: ,QVWLWXWR%UDVLOHLURGH*HRJUD¿DH(VWDWtVWLFD
¿JXUHUHÀHFWVWKHFRQVLGHUDEOHUROHRIWRXULVPDQGVHFRQG
homes in the Maricá economy. This pattern is projected to
VLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVHZLWKWKHFRPSOHWLRQRI&RPSHUM be considered. In São Gonçalo, recent efforts to build civic
Water service delivery is very diverse in the pride and reposition the city in a more positive light will have
region. Niterói enjoys excellent water access, as 84% of regional implications. According to local stakeholders, São
formal housing units have access to water networks. Other Gonçalo hopes to capture a large share of regional high-
municipalities have far lower rates such as Maricá with 15% end development that will cater to Comperj managers and
water provision, while the regional average sits at merely executives. However, other municipalities such as Niterói
52% (Amaral et al., 2010). Sewer provision is even more and Maricá are also in a position to capitalize on luxury
inequitably distributed. NIterói has a very high rate at nearly development. The diversity of municipal political positions
85%, while São Gonçalo, Maricá, and Itaboraí are at 4%, is also seen within the CONLESTE executive council
2%, and 0% respectively (Amaral et al., 2010). Several structure. In the most recent council election, the mayor of
municipalities in the region, such as Itaboraí, do not have São Gonçalo was anticipating to secure the CONLESTE
any separate sewer network. In these municipalities, raw presidency, and thus have greater access and visibility vis-
VHZDJH ÀRZV WKURXJK GUDLQDJH V\VWHPV DQG LV GXPSHG à-vis Petrobras and higher levels of government. However,
directly into regional water bodies. the smaller, rural municipalities formed an oppositional
Given the sharp differences in economic, coalition and elected the mayor of Tangua instead. As a
environmental and social conditions, municipalities have result, São Gonçalo’s representatives have not been as
developed differing agendas and political priorities that must
willing to engage in regional discussions since.
15
POLICIES & POLITICAL STRUCTURE
INTERNATIONAL SCALE
The size and scope of Comperj continues to generate the Compact only enforces reporting on the ten principals,
global interest and investment. As a result, many of the it does little to incentivize the development of innovative
institutions active in the process of planning for Comperj SURJUDPV DGGUHVVLQJ VSHFL¿F SUREOHPV LQ ZKLFK WKH
have an international presence. Petrobras is one of the principles are situated.
PRVW ¿QDQFLDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ LQÀXHQWLDO VWDNHKROGHUV LQ
the project. The partially state owned has many foreign Comperj’s Agenda 21. The Agenda 21 program emerged as
investors, compelling experts to predict Petrobras to a result of the United Nations Conference on Environment
surpass ExxonMobil in the near future (Seeking Alpha, and Development held in Rio in 1992. The framework
2011). Colloquially referred to as the “second state,” includes 21 principles detailing sustainability, economic
Petrobras utilizes its large investment base to be both HI¿FLHQF\ VRFLDO MXVWLFH DQG FRQVHUYDWLRQ FULWHULD LQ WKH
an economic as well as social developer for Brazil. The process of sustainable development. Agenda 21 creates
company shapes projects and channels resources for these a common language for states, corporations, and civil
efforts through partnerships with other major multilateral society to work together for the sustainable and equitable
LQVWLWXWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODUWKH81DQGDI¿OLDWHG81+$%,7$7 development of their regions and cities. The program
ROLAC. These partnerships have resulted in three major ERWK GH¿QHV JRDOV DQG DGGUHVVHV LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ YLD
initiatives directly and indirectly related to Comperj;; The UN coordination on the global, regional, and local scales. A key
Global Compact, Agenda 21 Comperj and the Monitoring facet of Agenda 21 is the establishment of partnerships for
Millennium Development Goals and Establishment sustainable development. In partnership with the Ministries
of Millennium Development Goal 9: Accelerate Local of Environment at the national and state level, Petrobras
Development and Reduce Inequality in the CONLESTE is using the Agenda 21 process and principals as tools for
Region. The opportunities and limitations of the efforts on ensuring that the local development in each CONLESTE
the international scale are important facets of the operating municipality is well planned, sustainable, and equitable.
landscape addressing the regional impacts of Comperj. 7KH ¿UVW VWHS RI WKH SURFHVV ZDV WKH FUHDWLRQ RI
Local Agenda 21 Forums in each municipality. Each forum
UN Global Compact. The UN Global Compact is “a strategic LVFRPSULVHGRIPHPEHUVIURPWKHSXEOLFSULYDWHQRQSUR¿W
policy initiative for businesses that are committed to and community sectors. The forums provide a platform to
aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally dialogue on how to develop their city sustainably. To May
accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, 2011, 13,000 citizens had participated in the process through
environment and anti-corruption” (UN Global Compact, 360 meetings and over 30 workshops. Each CONLESTE
2011). The Compact operates as a voluntary commitment municipality has produced a participatory budget,
for businesses, which participate by signing the agreement community diagnosis, and rudimentary plan addressing the
and producing annual “Communications on Progress” on anticipated impacts of Comperj. Agenda 21 has only been
each of the ten principals. Petrobras signed the Compact completed in São Gonçalo;; the other municipalities are
in 2003, formalizing its commitment to globally articulated H[SHFWHGWREHFRPSOHWHGLQ6XPPHU2QFH¿QLVKHG
principals of economic development that is both sustainable the cities are handed a copy of a document with solutions to
and equitable. Much of the focus of the Compact is on WKHLGHQWL¿HGLVVXHVEXWWKHUHLVQRPHWKRGRORJ\LQSODFH
proper reporting practices. Combined with heightened for how to proceed with the actions.
public awareness and demand for corporate social
responsibility practices, Petrobras’ commitment to the Monitoring Millennium Development Goals and
Compact has primarily materialized in publications detailing Establishment of Goal 9. The Millennium Development
the company’s annual carbon reduction and charitable Goals (MDGs), adopted by the UN in 2000, address the
giving. Extensive reporting requirements hold Petrobras dimensions of poverty and their effects on people’s lives.
accountable for its commitment to social responsibility by They focus on poverty reduction, health, gender equality,
requiring communication on the progress of social initiatives education, and environmental sustainability. The MDGs
XQGHUWDNHQE\WKHFRPSDQ\6SHFL¿FH[DPSOHVLQFOXGHWKH were primarily created with consideration of the African rural
PROVER Social Empowerment program, which promotes context, hence the need to expand the MDGs to include
sustainable development through job training for local conditions and indicators that are relevant to the urban
UHVLGHQWV%\WUDLQLQJORFDOVWR¿OOWKHMREVFUHDWHGE\DQHZ context and geographic areas beyond Africa. In the interest
3HWUREUDV UH¿QHU\ 3529(5 DLPV WR PLWLJDWH PLJUDWLRQ of mitigating potential negative impacts in CONLESTE
ÀRZV DQG ERRVW WKH HFRQRP\ RI WKH DUHD 3HWUREUDV region, Petrobras contracted UN HABITAT-ROLAC and
expects to train over 30,000 COLESTE residents to work UFF in 2008 to monitor the progress of the MDGs within the
at Comperj in the recently constructed Regional Integration region during the construction of Comperj. This effort began
and Training Center in São Gonçalo. Importantly, because as a means of preventing a repeat of the negative impacts
16
on the city of Macaé after the construction of a Petrobras the most important issues of MDG 9 for the region are to
UH¿QHU\LQWRZQ7KHFLW\H[SHULHQFHGUDSLGDQGKDSKD]DUG monitor regional economic growth, job and labor markets,
development resulting in the crowding and detriment of production specialization, development of local industries,
the municipality and surrounding region. As this debacle entrepreneurship, energy supply, healthcare systems,
tarnished Petrobras’ reputation, the company entered the LQGLFDWRUV RI UHJLRQDO YLROHQFH DQG PXQLFLSDOLWLHV¶ ¿VFDO
current initiative to prevent this outcome with Comperj. UN condition. In addition to Goal 9, UFF and UN HABITAT are
HABITAT-ROLAC partnered with UFF to jointly carry out the focused on monitoring issues related to Goal 7: ‘Ensure
research and reporting efforts in recognition of the federally Environmental Sustainability’. The target of this goal is to
funded university’s commitment to community service and integrate the principles of sustainable development into
expertise in the areas of urban research and development. country policies and programs, while reversing the loss
This partnership is currently still underway and producing of environmental resources. By 2012, they want to have
substantial knowledge about the region. For example, reduced the number of homes without access to public
researchers collected data on the amount, distribution, water and sewer systems by 20%. The last target of Goal
and condition patterns of informal settlements throughout 7 is to improve the quality of life for inhabitants of informal
WKH HQWLUH UHJLRQ 7KHLU HIIRUWV ¿OOHG WKLV DQG RWKHU YRLGV settlements living in the CONLESTE Municipalities at least
in the socioeconomic and land use data available in each 10% by 2012.
municipality. Adopting the MDGs as framework has it strengths
In a groundbreaking effort, the partnership between and weaknesses. The knowledge and data generated from
the three institutions created a ninth MDG goal explicitly this process contributes to comprehensive master plans
focused on the projected impacts of Comperj. UFF and (planos diretores) and legitimizes project-based funding,
UN HABITAT-ROLAC solicited the world headquarters both of which lead to well-managed development. Access
of the UNDP in Nairobi for the establishment of this goal, to monetary funds is increased for local activities conducted
which was granted. This represents a major development by NGOs and communities that address MDG goals. The
in the evolution of the MDGs. The aim of Goal 9 is to setting of targets and indicators provides a framework for
‘Accelerate Local Development and Reduce Inequality DFFRXQWDELOLW\ $V D UHVXOW VSHFL¿F GLVSDULWLHV DQG IRUPV
in the CONLESTE Region’. Among its 12 objectives, of marginalization can be addressed and an integrated
17
framework for development through the inter-relationships integrated urban development. Within the National Housing
between goals is provided. However, implementation may Policy is the long-term National Housing Plan (PlanHab)
EH D GLI¿FXOW WDVN DV JOREDO QDWLRQDO DQG VXEQDWLRQDO articulated in 2007 and based on principles of transparency,
concerns must be linked via the same set of goals. As a decentralization, and participatory planning. Its primary goal
result communication between the various actors may be is likewise to promote universal access to housing. PlanHab
arduous and may lack transparency. Moreover, monitoring also seeks to promote institutional strengthening among the
efforts will be the responsibility of member municipalities YDULRXV OHYHOV RI JRYHUQPHQW 7KH ¿QDQFLQJ QHFHVVDU\ WR
after Comperj opens. Given the current weak state of implement housing programs is generally disseminated
technical capacity of most municipal governments within through either Caixa, which is the primary public savings
CONLESTE, this valuable form of data collection could be and loan agency in Brazil, or the Brazilian Development
terminated or be unequally performed at a time when it is Bank (BNDES), which focuses on funding for infrastructure
critically needed. projects.
18
the bottom-up with citizens electing to emancipate to
form a new entity (Spink, 2005). Since the beginning of
the 20th century, and especially since the 1950s, Brazil
experienced a major shift in population consolidation.
Case Study: Metropolitan Regions
Under the growth-fueled watch of the military The Metropolitan Region of Salvador in the state
dictatorship, economic organization was restructured of Bahia provides a relevant case study for oil-
around the process of industrialization and the policy
of import substitution. Such reorganization triggered driven regional action. In metropolitan regions,
spatial transformations manifest in massive rural to WKHUHDUHQRPHFKDQLVPVRIÀVFDOHTXDOL]DWLRQ
urban migrations and explosive growth in metropolitan
conurbations. This concentration and centralization of among municipalities. Salvador, the region’s core
the means of production and the means of consumption municipality with over 2,000,000 inhabitants, has a
took the form of the enormous and complex spatial
unit known as metropolitan areas (Castells, 1983). per capita revenue ten times lower than that of one
Metropolitanization in Brazil was made possible by of the region’s smallest municipality, São Francisco
“massive migration, unbalanced regional growth, spatial
mismatching between existing physical stock and need do Conde, with a population of around 24,000. The
for housing and facilities” (Fernandes, 1992: 23). The reason for this discrepancy is that São Francisco do
impetus for the creation of metropolitan regions came
during the 1960s-70s as explosive urban population &RQGHLVKRPHWRDQRLOUHÀQHU\IURPZKLFKWKHEXON
growth was met with limited institutional capacity to of its revenue is accrued. Salvador has the burden of
manage the growing needs for the city-regions. The
problem of intense inter-municipal competition was providing services and infrastructure for the majority
compounded by intraregional inequality. of the region’s population. Such discrepancy in
Metropolitan Regions Under the Dictatorship. The legal PXQLFLSDOÀQDQFHVLVGLUHFWO\UHOHYDQWLQWKH&RPSHUM
origination of the Metropolitan Region comes from Article setting.
157 of the 1967 Constitution with the goal of “promoting
urban planning and the provision of common services
of metropolitan interest.” In 1975, Complementary law
no. 20 created Rio de Janeiro’s Metropolitan Region.6
The power to create metropolitan regions was vested were of interest to the dictatorship with little input from
exclusively in the president and cooperation was mandatory metropolitan agencies or the affected municipalities. This
on the part of the municipalities (Fernandes, 1992;; Spink, LV SDUWO\ GXH WR WKH XQFOHDU GH¿QLWLRQ RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHG
2005). Such authoritative control broke from the long tradition µFRPPRQ VHUYLFHV¶ DQG WKH GH¿QLWLRQ ZDV FRQYHQLHQWO\
of municipal autonomy. The administration of these regions extended to meet the ends of the military rule. Metropolitan
was controlled by two entities, a Deliberative Council and regions were merely acting puppets for the military regime
a Consultative Council, both of which were controlled by and came to be inextricably associated with the military’s
the governor and had almost no municipal representation. drive for centralized power, authoritarian rule, and social
The municipalities, who had no choice opt-out of regional exclusion (Fernandes, 1992). Given these circumstances,
membership, had a minor voice in matters. Further, the the metropolitan regions served to exacerbate problems
metropolitan regions were completely dominated by the RI LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO FRQÀLFW DW WKH VXEQDWLRQDO OHYHO DW
military dictatorship, frequently serving as a conduit for remain somewhat stigmatized due to their connection to the
authoritarian and centralized federal power. Metropolitan dictatorship era.
Regions were strategically chosen as, “national security
areas” where free elections were forbidden. Rather, mayors Metropolitan Regions Under the 1988 Constitution. Chronic
and governors in these areas were hand-placed by the issues of urban spatial organization remained unresolved
military regime and effectively served as federal outposts by 1984 as deliberation on the new constitution begun.
of power (Souza, 2005). Financial support was provided Further, many of the framers of the new constitution at the
through the federal government to fund the projects that National Constitutional Assembly in 1988 were mayors,
governors, and social movement leaders from the cities who
endured heavy-handed federal control via the metropolitan
regions. The calculated avoidance of the Regional Scope
6 The 1967 Constitutions also declared that “the Union, through a
Complementary Law, will be able to establish Metropolitan Regions in the new constitution is an example of path-dependency
which, aiming at the accomplishment of common services, are composed DQGWKHUHVXOWRIDµPHQWDOFRQVWUXFW¶WKDWFRQÀDWHVUHJLRQDO
of municipalities that constitute the same socio-economic community, planning with authoritarian control. The 1988 Constitution
regardless of their administrative links”. The same constitution also
GHOLEHUDWHO\ FRQIHUUHG PXFK DGPLQLVWUDWLYH DQG ¿VFDO
ensures the role of the municipality as a “formal political governmental
OHYHOZLWKFRQGLWLRQVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG¿QDQFLDODXWRQRP\´,Q power back to the municipality as part of a commitment
&RPSOHPHQWDU\/DZQRRI¿FLDOO\FUHDWHGWKH0HWURSROLWDQ5HJLRQVRI to decentralization. The power to create new metropolitan
São Paulo, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Salvador, Belêm, Recife, Belo Horizonte, regions was given to the state and while the metropolitan
and Porto Alegre.
19
region was still acknowledged, no mechanism for inter-
PXQLFLSDO ¿VFDO HTXDOL]LQJ ZDV SURYLGHG ,QFHQWLYHV
for intergovernmental cooperation are crucial for metro
governance but this issue was not part of the urban
Case Study: Public Consortia
reform (Souza, 2005). While this wasn’t quite the end The most-often cited model of public consortia
for the metropolitan region, it left them with very few is the Greater ABC Intermunicipal Consortium
resources to achieve any meaningful action.
in São Paulo. The area is known as the Detroit
Metropolitan Regions Today. Throughout the 1990s, of São Paulo and has historically specialized in
metropolitan regions existed in an institutional,
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SROLWLFDO DQG ¿VFDO YDFXXP )HGHUDO manufacturing, automobiles, and petrochemicals.
VRXUFHV RI IXQGLQJ GULHG XS GXH WR ¿VFDO DXVWHULW\ In the 1990s, the area was subject to the
Lacking mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation
and redistribution, metropolitan issues were either macroeconomic forces of decentralization
ignored or handled at the state and municipal scales and capital mobility and the region went into
(Souza, 2005). Recently, however, metropolitan regions
have re-emerged into the discourse as globalization economic decline. The ABC consortium was set-
pressures have exacerbated regional problems (Pires, up with the goal of economic development. It
2010). Today there are 26 metro regions and problems
at the metropolitan scale are more salient than ever. has been reasonably successful at organizing
³7KHKRXVLQJGH¿FLWSUHVHQWVLWVHOIDVWKHPRVWLQFLVLYH civic participation, but its emphasis on economic
challenge of the urban crisis in the country’s metropolis
with 78% of favela inhabitants living inside 11 of these development left issues of marginalization off the
regions” (Pires, 2010: 174). There is tentative academic agenda (De Souza, 2010). The ABC consortium
interest in a return to regional planning, but the popular
agenda is more focused on issues of local community LV¿QDQFHGE\HDFKFLW\LQSURSRUWLRQWRPXQLFLSDO
decision-making such as community councils and revenue. The consortium staff is partly hired
participatory budgeting (Souza, 2005).
directly by the consortium and partly collaborators
The Regional Alternative: Public Consortiums. Since from member municipalities. The board of mayors
the 1988 Constitution, federal and the state government
have tended to avoid metropolitan issues and passed meets monthly to discuss common issues and
responsibility onto municipalities in hopes that they coordinate plans. A citizen forum was also set-up
can reach some kind of collaborative agreement
(Pires, 2010). Public consortiums grew out of this as an exercise in participatory visioning. Finally, a
need for intermunicipal coordination and economies regional chamber was enacted to allow for greater
of scale. They are very simple, low-commitment and
ÀH[LEOH DJUHHPHQWV 7KHLU FUHDWLRQ LV µERWWRPXS¶ DQG participation of businesses.
spontaneous, with municipalities held together simply by
common interest rather than a bureaucratic framework.
“They exist because they work and the moment they
stop working, they stop existing” (Spink, 2005: 11).
WR KDYH YHU\ ORZ ¿VFDO FDSDFLW\ DQG ZHDN LQVWLWXWLRQDO
However, the highly competitive nature of federalist politics
UHFRJQLWLRQ LQ WKH JUHDWHU SROLWLFDO IUDPHZRUN $ ¿QDO
makes inter-municipal consortiums tenuous relationships
barrier to public consortiums is the lack of clear avenues
(Souza, 2005). About 50% of 5,561 Brazilian municipalities
for citizen engagement. Consortiums tend to be vehicles
participate in at least one public consortium. These
for coordination across municipal governments and often
consortiums cover a broad range of issues: 1,969 are
lack direct citizen voice. Presumably, such citizen action
related to health, 669 to equipment, 241 to education, 64
would be channeled through municipal governments (e.g.,
to housing, 161 to sewer, 87 to water, 216 to solid waste
municipal master plans are required to be participatory) but
and 88 to data processing. Public consortiums offer an
the current reality is disconnected from this ideal structure.
alternative to metropolitan regions and are more sensitive to
Despite such constraints, public consortiums have proven
the particularities of the Brazilian municipal legal structure.
moderately effective for intermunicipal coordination and with
However, they are not without their challenges. One of the
large potential, especially when compared to the failures of
major barriers to public consortiums is the political will for
metropolitan regions.
cooperation. There tends to be a lack of local leadership
to start consortiums and share in decision-making
power. Often, competing municipalities engage in what is MUNICIPAL TOOLS
perceived as a zero-sum power game. There is currently As noted earlier, the Federal Constitution of 1988
a lack of proper incentives and disincentives to encourage devolved the responsibility of urban policy to municipalities.
the formation of consortiums. Further, consortiums tend Consequently in 2001, the City Statute was federally enacted
20
to help bolster the instruments by which municipalities Compulsory Parcelling, Building, or Use;; is a means
could improve the quality of life for all urban residents, to oblige owners to use underutilized, abandoned, or
while stressing the need to actively engage local citizens vacant land for public purposes primarily to reduce land
in planning. As an overarching goal of the City Statute, speculation.
municipalities need to ensure the social function of property, Usucapião, Sometimes referred to as urban adverse
requiring a balance between development pressures and possession rights for urban property, usucapião
social and environmental justice. The Statute also stresses establishes the process by which residents of informal
the need for planning to actively engage local citizens housing can gain legal ownership of their land and/or
through a participatory process. The Statute requires that dwelling. Any person or collective community who has
all cities over 20,000 residents complete a master plan lived in their property (of up to 250 square meters) for
(plano diretor) and to update it at least every 10 years. Each 5 years can gain full possession rights. Additionally, the
ORFDOPDVWHUSODQPXVWUHÀHFWDJLYHQPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VGHVLUHG City Statute enables free legal counsel within attaining
development strategy that addresses local challenges and usucapião through the judicial system for better, more
goals. The master plan is the main instrument through which equitable access to tenure regularization.
municipal planning can direct urban development policies
at the local level and ensure the balancing of interests. It Collectively, these instruments can be used as powerful
DOVR TXDOL¿HV PXQLFLSDOLWLHV IRU IXQGLQJ IRU KRXVLQJ DQG options for municipalities to inhibit development pressures
infrastructure programs that is available at the national and land speculation, while protecting residents’ access
level. Different municipalities, however, have had different to land for housing. Additionally, they can be utilized to
capacities, priorities, and methodologies for formulating EHQH¿FLDOO\GLUHFWGHYHORSPHQWDQGSURPRWHVRFLDOKRXVLQJ
these master plans. While progressive in many respects, 7KHWRROVUHSUHVHQWDVLJQL¿FDQWRSSRUWXQLW\WR&21/(67(
the 1988 Constitution and the 2001 City Statute have from the municipal level.
unintentionally encouraged the formation of a fragmented As the strongest level of government with the
patchwork of mismatching municipal master plans—when most autonomy, municipalities have the ability to mobilize
they exist—with few provisions for coordination of land uses community resources. Municipalities are also the most
or macro-scale visioning. familiar with local needs and issues, which they can
The City Statute articulates an inventory of actions vocalize to CONLESTE when addressing the region, and
that municipalities can use within their master plans to then municipalities can garner community support for
ensure fair access to housing and infrastructure, while CONLESTE’s initiatives. Innovative planning legislation at
promoting social and economic growth. Notably these tools the local level, such as ZEIS, usucapião, and compulsory
PXVW EH VSHFL¿HG ZLWKLQ WKH ORFDO PDVWHU SODQ LQ RUGHU WR parceling can be used by CONLESTE to promote access to
be employed. Among them, a few stand out as particularly housing and land for low-income people as well as to channel
relevant for municipalities to utilize: development within a regional framework. CONLESTE can
serve to offset the weaknesses and disparate needs of
Special Social Interest Zones (ZEIS) are the most municipalities through its collective, coordinated strength.
important tool that the master plan can enact with Along with the enormous power given to the municipalities,
the objective to safeguard the right to housing. The they have a plethora of responsibilities to execute at the
zones establish special land use standards in order to local level. Not every municipality is able to respond to
allocate for social housing provisions, favela upgrading them equally, lacking resources, technical capacity, and
processes, and land regularization procedures. In personnel. Additionally, each municipality is faced with
order to promote low-income housing, ZEIS can restrict its own set of pressing, divergent urban issues, such as
high-income real estate projects. They also encourage informal settlements, over-development and inadequate
vacant areas to be converted into social housing. infrastructure.
Photo 9: The juxtaposition of old and new architecture is a hallmark of Rio de Janeiro’s physical landscape.
21
ANALYSIS & DIAGNOSIS
POLITICAL SYSTEM OVERVIEW subsidized mortgages to private homeowners. Another
Confronting Comperj solicits a coordinated regional program with the intention of increasing services to low-
approach to prepare for and ensure sustainable and equitable income Brazilians is the Accelerated Growth Program
management of the anticipated impacts. But currently, the (PAC), which concentrates on large-scale infrastructure
Brazilian political structure bypasses a regional scale of development projects. However, these programs are issued
governance, raising the question as to where CONLESTE RQDSURMHFWE\SURMHFWEDVLVZLWKH[WUHPHO\VSHFL¿FDLPV
can situate itself within the existing political and institutional Municipalities are responsible for completing applications
network to best achieve its vision. To understand this for funding from these programs, whilst few have the
issue in context, it is important to recognize the Brazilian technical capacity, staff, or information needed to complete
governmental structure as a decentralized system of power such tasks, which is an obvious barrier to access funding for
in which federal policy engenders home rule at the level of development initiatives. Thus far, these programs have had
the municipality. This system tends to bypass the state and limited success in the delivery of housing and development.
regional scales, neglecting opportunities for larger-scale A recent article published in O Fluminense, quotes a
coordination and inter-municipal cooperation. Although 3HWUREUDVRI¿FLDODVVD\LQJ³RIWKHSURMHFWVRI>3$&@LQ
responsibility was relegated to the local level, control of the region, 101 were suspended by the Ministry of Cities or
funding programs was not. Within the municipal level, by federal banks for lack of documentation” (Onofre, 2011:
there exists a hierarchy of plans, which, if implemented para. 4). This alludes to the poor implementation capacity
effectively, should help allocate funding and development to at the municipal level to administer programs, but more
LGHQWL¿HGDUHDV7KHPDVWHUSODQSODQRGLUHWRULVWKHPDLQ broadly to complex political dynamics and power relations.
planning tool, which all cities with a population over 20,000 Up until 2010, the programs didn’t require
DUHUHTXLUHGWRKDYH7KLVSODQLQIRUPVDOOVSHFL¿HGVXEVHW municipalities to have specialized plans in place, which
plans, such as the housing plan (plano de habitação) and diminished the incentive for municipalities to develop or
sanitation plans (plano de saneamento), both of which are enact such plans. In order to address the issues inherent
optional. in this system, there are now deadlines in place for
The weak technical capacity of many municipalities municipalities to complete housing and infrastructure plans
and lapses of communication between actors have lead in order to be eligible for funding. This adds another layer
to a general duplication of efforts and ultimately, wasted of complexity for municipalities that don’t have the technical
time and resources. In response to these issues, several capacity to complete the plans within this time frame, and can
national funding lines were created to promote local eventually increase inter-municipal inequities. Oftentimes
KRXVLQJDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUH6SHFL¿FDOO\0LQKD&DVD0LQKD the resulting intra-municipal systems contain various plans
Vida (MCMV), an initiative begot by Caixa, the largest that are disconnected and development occurs uninformed
publicly owned bank in Latin America. MCMV uses private E\WKHLQWHQWLRQVRUVSHFL¿FDWLRQVRIWKHSODQV
developers to construct social housing and also provides
22
Figure 4: Diagram illustrating stakeholders on global, national, state and regional levels and the exisiting coordination between
each.
COMPERJ POLITICAL LANDSCAPE is evident that the municipalities within Conleste are in
A myriad of stakeholders with varied lines of collaboration with entities at various scales. But it is unclear
communication with other actors currently exist within the as to whether they are in collaboration with each other.
operating landscape of Comperj. As evident Figure 6, players +RZHYHUDIWHULQWHUYLHZVZLWKSXEOLFRI¿FLDOVDQGDQDO\VLV
are engaged within multiple levels {insert megan’s chart}. of formal contracts and agreements we can see that
Their complex interactions with programs and plans, which there are virtually no formal direct lines of communication
will be detailed within this section, result in a fragmented linking the municipalities, suggesting that the discourse at
and quite complicated network. This diagram helps to this level is almost non-existent. For instance, there have
understand and synthesize the connections between the been several attempts at the municipal level to prepare for
actors, programs, and outcomes. By overlaying this map the development of Comperj, discernable from the varied
with the current policies, programs, and projects in place, housing and infrastructure-related planning processes,
we were able to obtain a holistic understanding of how these plans, and projects owned by each city. But while formulating
WRROVXQIROGLQUHDOLW\)URPWKLVZHLGHQWL¿HGWZRJHQHUDO these plans/projects, municipalities have not made initiatives
areas that a strengthened CONLESTE can address: a lack to consult neighboring municipalities, indicating that the
of coordination and weak technical capacity. municipalities aren’t thinking and acting regionally yet. This
fragmentation has inhibited municipalities from coordinating
key plans that should be addressed on a regional scale. It is
LACK OF COORDINATIO N also notable that the housing plans, many of which are still
Political Fragmentation. The absence of in development, have no clear connection to each other.
coordination between municipalities has presented two However, the development of social housing will spans
issues at the regional scale, political fragmentation and municipal borders and has been pinpointed to occur along
duplication of efforts. Observing the regional arena, it transportation routes. As housing is an issue that transcends
23
municipal boundaries, these needs should accordingly (PEHGGHG ZLWKLQ WKLV SURFHVV LV WKH LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RI NH\
be coordinated, or at least addressed, at a larger scale. social, physical, and environmental issues to suggest
Additionally, Itaboraí and Maricá are developing disparate solutions and potential actions for addressing these issues.
sanitation plans that also share no connection. Regional The local Agenda 21s were the products of extensive
coordination of infrastructure can minimize costs and community outreach and contain valuable information that
environmental impacts of infrastructure provision, yet these could have served as input for local and regional planning,
plans constrain the delivery of this service to the municipal but have no connection to the multiple existing municipal
OHYHO7KLVV\VWHPLVQRWRQO\LQHI¿FLHQWDQGPRUHFRVWO\EXW level plans. Even though the municipalities were revisiting
also spurs competition between the municipalities for funding their local master plans to account for Comperj concurrent
for these initiatives when they should be collaborating and to the development of the local Agenda 21s, the revisions
synchronizing efforts. didn’t incorporate the Agenda 21 input. Municipalities could
coordinate with Petrobras to share resources and cut down
on the time and money spent on this process. A formal venue
DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS of communication would be ideal to enable these processes
These lapses in communication, at both municipal to inform each other. To address these issues of overlap,
and regional levels, have led to another issue amongst the Comperj Forum was developed as an attempt at a venue
Comperj stakeholders, duplication. A general overlap in enabling roundtable discussion amongst stakeholders with
planning efforts has been spurred by the involvement of YDU\LQJ LQÀXHQFH DQG UROHV UHODWHG WR WKH PHJD SURMHFW
independent and external actors. Subsequently, several But, this platform has proved to be ineffective in promoting
municipalities own different plans that ultimately strive collaboration or information sharing because of the inherent
towards the same ends of improvement in the provision YROXQWDU\ VWUXFWXUH $FFRUGLQJ WR 3HWUREUDV RI¿FLDOV WKLV
of housing and sanitation but that bear no relationship to is due to the lack of political will from the majority of the
each other. These dual processes occur in isolation of members to participate. This entity also lacks presence of
each other, often leading to similar results but waste time academic institutions or community groups at the monthly
and resources. For instance, Petrobras launched a local meetings.
Agenda 21 initiative, with backing from major actors in
each Conleste municipality to articulate community visions.
24
Photo 12: Disparate development along the coast of Niterói.
WEAK TECHNICAL CAPACITY made, they are not implemented. Meanwhile, projects are
Although some programs exist to provide funding for happening uninformed by plans. For example, Maricá does
housing and infrastructure projects, the municipal attempts not have a master plan in place and just recently began
to effectively utilize these resources have been hindered by developing a housing plan, but they have already received
their lack of trained staff or workforce to formulate plans and funding for and implemented housing projects, indicating
projects. Without plans and projects, municipalities cannot that this development is occurring in isolation of a plan and
opt for funding. For example, Petrobras contracted UFF potentially in contradiction to it.
and UN HABITAT to monitor progress on the Millennium 7KHVH SROLWLFDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO ÀDZV GLFWDWH WKH
Development Goals within each municipality in 2006. need for a regional coordinating body to facilitate the
7KLV H[WHQVLYH GDWD FROOHFWLRQ ¿OOV LQ JDSV QHFHVVDU\ planning process. CONLESTE has been recognized as
for understanding existing conditions in the region and WKHLQVWLWXWLRQZLWKWKHPRVWSRWHQWLDOWRIXO¿OOWKLVUROH%XW
areas vulnerable to the rapid development instigated by CONLESTE is extremely weak and disconnected from
Comperj. The data from this effort would also be helpful in LWV LQVWLWXWLRQDO ODQGVFDSH (YHQ DIWHU ¿YH \HDUV VLQFH WKH
the formulation of development plans. Although UFF and creation of this consortium, all connections remain informal.
UN HABITAT have shared this data with CONLESTE since Most notable is the absence of connections to Petrobras
the beginning of the partnership, a lack of coordination and and the state. As it stands currently, CONLESTE holds a
capacity to process the data has created barriers for some weak and informal voice to lobby with the state or federal
municipalities to incorporate this data into their plans. Along governments for the policy reforms needed. Yet, all funding
the same lines, Niterói and Itaboraí have completed their programs for the region are handled through the federal or
master plans but these plans have not been put into action. state levels. Without this fundamental power, CONLESTE
Agenda 21 has been recently completed in São Gonçalo, remains very powerless to channel development or
but the gap between completion and implementation of the negotiate with municipalities.
recommendations highlights the absence of methodology, This analysis can be embodied by the words of
technical capacity, and funding for enacting the solutions Regina Bienenstein, professor at UFF, who described
generated from the extensive participatory study. Brazilian policy as “sheets in the wind,” referring to the poor
Additionally, there is a general disconnect between implementation of the progressive policies and programs
plans that are “in process” and the projects that are being to which the country is committed. CONLESTE offers the
built. The fragmentation of plans is such that development potential to address this core issue by both strengthening
mainly occurs separately from formalized plans. This municipalities to better actualize projects in a systematic
disconnect has led to haphazard, opportunistic development manner, and coordinate development at a regional level to
and poor understanding of priority areas. If plans have been ensure equitable distribution of opportunities and costs.
25
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO STRENGTHEN CONLESTE
Our research evolved into a comprehensive set of the third phase targets ways in which CONLESTE can
recommendations for CONLESTE to adequetly address transform itself into a self-sustaining organization- meaning
the projected impacts of Comperj. The recommendations they are mainly focused on the establishment of independent
DUHGHVJLQHGWREHLPSOHPHQWHGLQWKUHHSKDVHV7KH¿UVW funding sources for CONLESTE. The phasing of these
is designed to bolster CONLESTE’s institutional capacity, recommendations is for time and resource management
The second phase provides suggestions for CONLESTE to purposes, yet there is some overlap between each group.
utilize this new strength as a leader in the implementation of Figure 7 illustrates the recommendations in their entierty
housing and infrastructure projects for the region. Finally, and their intended relationship to one another.
Figure 5: Diagram illustrating the studio’s recommendations and their intended phasing scheme.
26
PHASE 1 successive presidencies will set a common agenda led by
the current “head” president, which will continue the work
of the previous presidential head. It will then be furthered
by the future presidential head. The council would guide
1. ROTATING PRESIDENCY the political agenda of the Deliberative Council, facilitate
Issues addressed: Lack of communication and political will compromise, and administer council agendas. This system
amongst CONLESTE’s voting board, intermunicipal political will promote collaboration rather than competition within
tensions, varying political agendas. the council and will allow previous presidents to pass
their experience to new council members. Ideally, political
transitions will be made smoother and decision-making will
be more effective.
27
sources like BNDES. The opportunities for project-fund
matching through CONLESTE meetings would be both
indirect (communication between CONLESTE and funding
VRXUFHVZLOOEHVWUHQJWKHQHG DQGGLUHFWVSHFL¿FSURMHFWV
discussed at meetings may be eligible for funding).
Funding applications for regional projects would become
streamlined. CONLESTE can actively work toward public-
private partnerships through the private members of its
Advisory Council. This can help to overcome the barriers
implementation that many projects face. CONLESTE’s
Executive Council has the authority to add members to
the Advisory Council, which it can wield to include local
developers.
,,$I¿UP3XEOLF3DUWLFLSDWLRQDWWKH5HJLRQDO/HYHO
3XEOLF SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DW WKH UHJLRQDO VFDOH LV GLI¿FXOW WR
structure and ensure. The Advisory Council includes
neighborhood association representatives. By enforcing
a routine meeting schedule, CONLESTE can institute a Figure 7: Actors within the combined CONLESTE / Comperj
robust and reliable venue for public participation, allowing Forum.
community feedback into the regional discussion of issues
to promote sustainable and equitable development.
staff should be completed through examination of pertinent
III. Establish State Relations technical skill or capability for learning such skills, not
Although no state departments are currently through political appointment. Hiring of core staff employees
members, CONLESTE can utilize its Advisory Council as FRXOG DOVR LQYROYH WKH DGYLVLQJ RI QRQSROLWLFDOO\ DI¿OLDWHG
a means of political legitimization through securing state partners, such as UFF, to further de-politicize the core staff.
membership. Not only would this strengthen CONLESTE, These efforts are also necessary to prevent corruption
it would also build a relationship that could foster project within these positions. Creating a core staff for CONLESTE
funding. Brazilian municipalities currently do not have fosters opportunities for the following three goals:
the revenue base that is proportionate to the amount of
responsibility they carry since devolution of power in 1988. I. Developing Regional Databases
Rio de Janeiro State, however, has revenue to allocate The core staff would include data technicians who
towards improvements that CONLESTE’s meetings could would be responsible for systematizing the regional data
help distribute. collected through different sources. These employees would
SXUVXHYHUL¿FDWLRQRIH[LVWLQJGDWDXSGDWHVDQGFROOHFWLRQ
IV. Establish a Position of Leverage with Petrobras of new data, and creation, maintenance, and management
Currently, CONLESTE and Petrobras have minimal of databases. In Leste Fluminense currently, different actors
communication with each other. CONLESTE has the are collecting data for different purposes, such as the state
opportunity to gain political capital through a relationship for its Arco Metropolitano Plan, individual municipalities
with the state that could pressure Petrobras into participating for their own master plans, UN Habitat-ROLAC and UFF
in a discussion with CONLESTE. This would strengthen for monitoring MDGs, and Petrobras for Agenda 21. It is
the company’s accountability to the regional communities, imperative to gather those data, make them compatible
which is currently tenuous, and secure a role for the region with each other, and analyze them side-by-side to inform
in Petrobras’ decision-making. strategies for improvements. For example, current drainage
channels and road infrastructure need to be compared
3. CREATE A CORE STAFF WITHIN CONLESTE in order to move forward with further road planning, and
Issues addressed: Lack of workforce to plan regionally, the community’s feedback needs to be understood in
communication barriers between municipalities, political order to set planning objectives. Identifying the gaps in
motivations for not moving forward, access to data. the information will also convey where the next efforts of
$VDUHVSRQVHWR&RPSHUM&21/(67(GH¿QHGWKH data collection need to be performed. Regional access to
11, previously menitoned, priority areas for the consortium data would be key to mitigate political resistance to change
to address. Though they are well thought-out, progress on within the region. With expanded access to data and data
the 11 issues for CONLESTE are to be accomplished by analysis, municipalities can be pressured to participate in
municipal employees who already have a full-time workload planning for improvements and can be held accountable for
in municipal functions. This internal structure of planning action or inaction.
is not sustainable. Once funding is secured to support
CONLESTE, a core staff should be created. This staff would II. Intergovernmental Liaisons
be employed, not elected. This is an important means for CONLESTE’s core staff would also bridge the
shielding CONLESTE from political change. The hiring of communication gaps between CONLESTE and municipal
28
employees. During our visit, it became clear that although encourage business growth. For example, a new industrial
a municipality may be active in CONLESTE, employees plant brings additional revenues to the host municipality,
involved in planning within the municipality are often not while the cost of such growth such as roads and health and
aware of CONLESTE’s actions. In order for the regional and safety services-spills over into neighboring communities.
municipal master plans to be aligned and efforts on both 7RFRPEDWWKHVHLQHI¿FLHQWLQFHQWLYHVDUHJLRQDOWD[VKDUH
levels to be effective, this communication is imperative. This program would decrease intermunicipal competition and
would ensure that efforts are not duplicated. Effective plan avoid the race-to-the-bottom-situation (Luce, 1997). It also
implementation hinges on this communication. would encourage regional business growth rather than
intraregional shifting of business (Pammer and Dustin,
III. Staff Responsibility for Coordinating Priority Efforts 1993).
Municipal employees of the region cannot sustain The sharing of taxes can also address equity
the additional workload of CONLESTE functions. The concerns. Currently, each municipality has an incentive
coordination of efforts toward CONLESTE’s focus areas to encourage (through policy) high-end residential
should be shifted away from municipal assignments to GHYHORSPHQW $V WKH EHQH¿WV RI VXFK DFWLRQV²LQFUHDVHG
CONLESTE’s core staff. One employee per focus area property value—accrue to the existing residents of the
should be responsible for implementation oversight. An municipality, the costs of such policy are borne by those
additional staff position of Technical Director would be low-income families who are unable to locate in these
responsible for project management in the implementation developments or nearby due to the high costs of housing.
phase. This will often involve coordinating efforts of the These ‘externalities’ are often ignored. Further, every
member municipal departmental secretaries. Since so municipality has the same set of incentives resulting in the
much of these 11 positions would entail cross-municipal regional underproduction of low-income and moderate-
work, these employees would naturally also provide much income housing. A regional tax-share fund would decrease
of the intergovernmental liaison function. the incentives of high-end development and could be
combined with a distributive mechanism that incentivizes the
4. MAINTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH ACADEMIC production and maintenance of low and moderate income
INSTITUTIONS housing. Precedent for regional tax-sharing has been
Issues addressed: Incomplete data for analysis of implemented in Minneapolis-St. Paul, USA since 1971. This
conditions, lack of experience in interpreting data, lack of study proposes an expanded version that considers both
workforce to harness regional planning, inexperience in business and property tax.
regional planning. Starting from a benchmark year of 2012, each
Partnerships with UN Habitat-ROLAC and UFF have municipality in CONLESTE region would contribute 40%
resulted in a massive amount of data collection, analysis, of the increase in its commercial-industrial and residential
and visual representation facilitated to municipalities and property tax base into a regional pool. The funds would then
CONLESTE. It has also established a regional dialogue. be allocated in three ways. First, a portion of revenues could
CONLESTE also actively pursues an understanding of be used to support the daily operations of CONLESTE by
international approaches to regional issues and planning. providing a consistent and self-sustaining funding stream.
These efforts are illustrated by relationships with the Weitz The remaining funds should be redistributed to municipalities
Center in Israel, Columbia University in the U.S., and plans in two ways. 50% of the funds should be allocated based
for an exploration of planning policies in Sweden. These on the participatory budgeting of regional councils. These
relationships provide opportunities for capacity sharing and councils are vehicles for direct citizen engagement in
understanding regional approaches that would further help regional decision-making. The 50% remaining funds should
GH¿QHDQGHQDEOH&21/(67(¶VSODQQLQJVWUDWHJLHV7KH\ be redistributed to municipalities based on a formula
need to be nurtured to support an ongoing discussion about that considers 1) total market value of property/capita;; 2)
regional planning. capacity to raise revenue;; and 3) expenditure needs. Such
progressive redistributive metrics will ensure that funding
ZLOOÀRZIURPKLJKFDSDFLW\ORZQHHGDUHDVWRORZFDSDFLW\
5. REGIONAL TAX SHARING high need areas.
Issues addressed: Capacity building, municipal funding,
lack of workforce to plan regionally, communication barriers
between municipalities, political motivations for not moving 6. INTERNATIONAL SEED GRANTS
forward, access to data. Issues addressed: external funding opportunities, establish
CONLESTE should be the platform for the creation CONLESTE’s core staff.
of a progressive regional tax-sharing fund to bring about Brazil has had a history of reaching out to
HI¿FLHQF\DQGHTXLW\EHQH¿WVIRUWKHUHJLRQ)LVFDOGLVSDULW\ international partners. These international partnerships
between local governments can lead to competitive politics, have been received with mixed reviews. Nevertheless,
which are counterproductive to the welfare of the region if CONLESTE is to legitimize itself as a key player within
3DPPHUDQG'XVWLQ)URPDQHI¿FLHQF\SHUVSHFWLYH Brazil’s political and developmental landscapes, it is
DWD[VKDULQJSURJUDPZRXOGGHFUHDVHWKH¿VFDOLQFHQWLYHV imperative to obtain the necessary resources to advance
for municipalities to subsidize businesses to locate in its agenda. CONLESTE needs to demonstrate that it is
their city. Municipalities currently have great incentive to HI¿FLHQW ZLWK WKH WLPH DQG PRQH\ JLYHQ E\ LWV PHPEHUV
29
the public, and relevant institutions (Bailey, 1999).
Achieving overall effectiveness depends on improving staff PHASE 2
and management systems;; ultimately, this will develop
institutional competence (Bailey, 1999). CONLESTE should 7. MUNICIPAL STAFFING
VHHN VWURQJ HFRQRPLF DQG ¿QDQFLDO WLHV ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO Issues addressed: Capacity building, municipal funding,
RUJDQL]DWLRQV VSHFL¿FDOO\ ZLWK RUJDQL]DWLRQV WKDW SURYLGH lack of workforce to plan regionally, communication barriers
seed money or grants. Rather than working with the ‘usual between municipalities, political motivations for not moving
suspects’ of the World Bank and International Monetary forward, access to data.
Fund, which have a tainted record in the region, CONLESTE 7KH ¿UVW WKLQJ WKDW D VWUHQJWKHQHG &21/(67(
should explore funding opportunities with the following Latin VKRXOG GR LV LGHQWLI\ JDSV LQ VWDI¿QJ DW HDFK PXQLFLSDOLW\
American organizations that are involved in advancing new This would be done using the model developed by the studio
regional institutions and promoting processes of equitable of 12 core staff members and departments for CONLESTE.
development in the area: Banco del Sur and the Bolivarian CONLESTE could then coordinate an application to receive
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Both can help PMAT (Program for the Modernization of Municipality
CONLESTE with projects to improve basic infrastructure Management) funding to pay for the initial hiring and training
and combat asymmetries and inequalities while developing of these new municipality staff members where required.
the region. 30$7LVDIXQGLQJVRXUFHIURP%1'(6VSHFL¿FDOO\IRUWD[
administration, modernization, and management of basic
Banco Del Sur. Banco del Sur stemmed from South social sectors. In this context, CONLESTE would secure
$PHULFD¶V JURZLQJ ¿QDQFLDO VWUHQJWK DQG VHUYHV DV RQH such funding to bolster the individual municipality capacity,
of Latin America’s main efforts to promote and advance ZKLFKLVDQLPSHUDWLYH¿UVWVWHSWRUHJLRQDOFRRUGLQDWLRQDQG
development projects (Landsburg, 2009). This bank strives collaboration.
to centralize the savings of its member countries to promote
regional development (Strautman, 2008). By promoting 8. REGIONAL COUNCILS
UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF XQLW\ ZKLOH UHGXFLQJ µFDSLWDO ÀLJKW¶ Issues addressed: Capacity building, municipal funding,
Banco del Sur functions as a regional development bank lack of workforce to plan regionally, communication barriers
and a regional central bank (Marshall, 2009). As a regional between municipalities, political motivations for not moving
development bank, under its proposed scheme, it acts as forward, access to data, knowledge sharing.
a center to distribute pooled regional funds. In this manner, Once CONLESTE has bolstered capacity across
intraregional infrastructure projects are funded through the region, its role would become that of coordinator
national development or state-owned commercial banks that and regional spokesperson. When we visited Niteroi’s
perform a portion of a project in the corresponding country SODQQLQJ RI¿FH WKH\ H[SUHVVHG WKH GHVLUH WR ZRUN ZLWK
(Marshall, 2009). Joseph Stiglitz, former economist of the the other municipalities, but were frustrated at the lack
World Bank, states that Banco del Sur is a useful alternative of a communication structure that they could follow to
WR RWKHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHQGLQJ EDQNV DQG ZLOO EHQH¿W /DWLQ start a regional dialogue. This condition informes our
American development and lending (Carroll, 2007). next recommendation. CONLESTE should then instigate
a meeting structure for intermunicipal coordination and
ALBA. The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas aims collaboration.
to create new regional public enterprises, formed through The CONLESTE secretaries of the priority areas
agreements by national state enterprises and joint state would coordinate with the matching secretaries from each
collaborations to support social projects as well as municipality into councils, such as a housing council and
multilateral cooperation agreements among its members a sanitation council. All CONLESTE staff members would
(Janicke, 2008;; Bendana, 2008). ALBA’s vision of a broader attend these meetings to allow for all of the 11 focus areas
Latin American and Caribbean process of transformation to be considered in the discussions. There would need to
DQG LQWHJUDWLRQ UHSUHVHQWV WKH ¿UVW DWWHPSW DW UHJLRQDO be community representation within these councils. There
integration based on new visions of social welfare and are currently strong city councils, which provide a good
equity, rather than trade liberalization (Harris and Azzi, precedent for community inclusion of in such institutions.
2006). ALBA’s emphasis on public ownership, domestic These include both municipal secretaries and civil
orientation, political solidarity, and social mobilization society in the form of elected community leaders. We are
demonstrate how a state can promote regional institutions recommending that within these city councils, community
and provide a framework to achieve political goals via leaders would be elected to represent the community in
collective action. To this point, however, ALBA still faces each of the regional councils. The individual municipal
JDSVLQLWVDELOLW\WR¿QDQFHVSHFL¿FSURMHFWVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV secretaries and community leaders would bring community
ALBA remains dependent on the decisions of participating concerns to the discussion. This process in itself will be
countries presidents, social advisory councils maintain building capacity at the community level, strengthening civil
a marginal role in decision making, and critics state society and its involvement in the regional decision making
that ALBA’s top down approach does not leave room for process.
participatory discussion on how ALBA should implement its Horizontal communication across issues is also
projects (Landsburg, 2009). important. CONLESTE coordinators would debrief with the
other coordinators highlighting the various important action
30
points of the council meetings. It would be the coordinators’
role, in partnership with the CONLESTE Technical Director PHASE 3
to incorporate any other CONLESTE staff into council
discussions when necessary to allow for broader discussion. 9. PROPERTY TAX REFORM
For example, the Housing Coordinator may invite the Water Issues addressed: municipal funding, access to data,
Coordinator to his or her council meeting to address their
knowledge sharing.
common concerns. The Brazilian property tax IPTU, Imposto sobre
As a result, the CONLESTE regional council a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana, is a direct tax
structure can also act as a forum for managing and
paid to a municipality based on an estimation of fair market
prioritizing regional projects. At the moment there are many
value. While the property tax is the internationally preferred
disparate projects across the region requiring funding WRRO IRU ¿QDQFLQJ XUEDQ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG VHUYLFHV LW KDV
to be implemented. Through the proposed councils, seen limited effectiveness in the Brazilian context (De
CONLESTE can combine these projects into prioritized Cesare, 2010). In more than half of Brazilian municipalities,
coordinated proposals that can be taken to the state and
IPTU revenues accounts for less than US$5 per capita
federal governments to secure funding. This process can
(Domingos, 2011). A major source of lost revenue and tax
be aided by the incorporation of the Comperj Forum players injustice is the use of outdated land appraisals for IPTU.
within CONLESTE, which enables direct discussions with IPTU reform is an important step for increasing social
the funding sources such as BNDES and CAIXA, and the HTXLW\ PXQLFLSDO DXWRQRP\ DQG VWUHQJWKHQLQJ WKH ¿VFDO
players from the private sector, streamlining the process for
condition of CONLESTE municipalities. Historically, much
the municipalities. of the revenue potential of IPTU was lost due to the failure
There are two key funding sources that CONLESTE RI ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV WR LPSOHPHQW WKH WD[ LQ DQ HI¿FLHQW
can apply for with their proposals: PAC and MCMV. PAC
manner. Complicating the issue was the legislative process
LV WKH $FFHOHUDWHG *URZWK 3URJUDP VSHFL¿FDOO\ XVHG IRU needed to update property tax valuations. Municipal law was
infrastructure development projects. This funding comes required each time the property valuations were updated,
from BNDES. MCMV is the My Home My Life program, and each law was accompanied by an ever-increasing
which is funding from Caixa to deliver social housing
set of loopholes and exemptions (Domingos, 2011). As a
projects, through private developers. By prioritizing and
result of this chaotic political process, IPTU gradually lost
consolidating projects into regional proposals, CONLESTE prominence to the ISS, Imposto Sobre Serviços, as the
can streamline funding applications and leverage its primary municipal revenue generator. The ISS is an indirect
relationships to funding sources to aid implementation. tax on services that tends to be regressive.
The accelerated growth of the Brazilian economy
has increased urban land prices
in many municipalities. Resultant
expansion in the real estate
markets highlighted the widening
disparity between the IPTU tax
potential and realized revenue.
Compounding the issue was loss
of alternate sources of revenues
due to the 2008 global economic
decline. In December 2009, the
Ministry of Cities published a new
law Resolution Act No. 511 that
provided municipalities with a
standard instrument on which to
base their property tax valuations.
The Resolution Act asserts
that property assessment is a
technical process to be carried
out according to guidelines from
the Brazilian Technical Standards
$VVRFLDWLRQ$%17 WR UHÀHFW IDLU
market value. Given this new
tool, some municipalities have
enacted tax reform measures with
resulting in a more progressive
tax system, increasing justice and
municipal autonomy (Domingos,
2011).
Figure 8: Composition of proposed regional councils. Given the explosive
31
minimize the requirements of technical skill
DQG HYDOXDWRU GLVFUHWLRQ $ VLPSOL¿HG \HW
comprehensive cadastral map will greatly
EHQH¿WWKHSULYDWHDQGSXEOLFVHFWRU
The reform process needs to
democratic and collective, and will take time
to communicate with communities. A public
information campaign should be pursued to
FRPPXQLFDWHWKHEHQH¿WVDQGGUDZEDFNV
of tax reform to avoid misunderstandings
and public resistance. It will be important
to make the redistributive and equity
GULYHQ EHQH¿WV RI UHIRUP FRQFUHWH DQG
visible to the public. Municipalities should
consider designating a press agent to deal
with inevitable criticism and a technical
advisor who understands the nuances of
tax law (Domingos, 2011). Such reforms
will improve the municipality’s ability to
generate revenue, increase tax equity,
Figure 9: $QWLFLSDWHGEHQHÀWVRISURSRVHGWD[UHIRUP and leverage equitable development
patterns. However, such reform must be
growth that is occurring in the CONLESTE region, institutionalized to ensure regular property
municipalities should initiate the process of property assessment updates based on technical ABNT standards.
assessment reform immediately. Updating the assessments Informal settlement residents should also be
RISURSHUWLHVWRUHÀHFWFXUUHQWYDOXHVZLOOLQFUHDVHUHYHQXHV included to the property tax rolls. Tenure regularization
to municipalities, and decrease the role of speculation (De offers the ability to collect tax revenue while increasing
Cesare, 2010). Further, a reformed tax tool could utilize formalization and security of tenure for residents. However,
WD[LQFHQWLYHVIRUVRFLDOO\EHQH¿FLDODFWLRQVVXFKDVFLWL]HQ property taxes need to be properly phased to protect
participation in social, health, education, and economic informal residents from sudden changes and unreasonable
development programs (Domingos, 2011). IPTU tax reform ¿QDQFLDOEXUGHQ)DLOXUHWRGRVRZRXOGLQFUHDVHLQIRUPDOLW\
ZRXOG DOVR EH EHQH¿FLDO WR WKH SULYDWH UHDO HVWDWH VHFWRU 7 spatial and economic inequities, and potentially displace
Political opposition could be minimized by emphasizing the already vulnerable citizens.
JHQHUDOEHQH¿WVWRDOOVWDNHKROGHUV
A precedent case in Belo Horizonte found that 10. IMPACT FEES
IPTU tax reform was able to realize an 18% increase in Issues addressed: Regional funding, housing provision,
WD[ UHYHQXH LQ WKH ¿UVW \HDU 7KLV LPSUHVVLYH JDLQ RQO\ regional infrastructure, economic development.
represents 50% of the increased assessments, the result Impact fees are a second funding source that would
of a phased implementation plan (Domingos, 2011). capture the increased economic development spurred by
Such impressive increases should not be expected in the CONLESTE to deliver public projects such as sewer and
CONLESTE municipalities as Belo Horizonte employs a water systems, electricity infrastructure, and social housing.
more complete and advanced system for tracking property. This further reduces the reliance on external funding and
Many smaller municipalities, like the ones in CONLESTE, provides an alternative source of infrastructure revenue
lack adequate cadastral maps to even begin IPTU reform. WKDW GRHV QRW UHO\ RQ WKH SURSHUW\ WD[ ,W PRUH HI¿FLHQWO\
7KXVWKH¿UVWVWHSVKRXOGEHWRXSGDWHDQGFRPSOHWHVXFK internalizes the costs of development by shifting the burden
maps. of associated off-site infrastructure onto the property
The process of evaluating the market value of a developer (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2002). Such fees
property based on visible characteristics requires a high GHFUHDVH WKH ¿QDQFLDO EXUGHQ RI QHZ GHYHORSPHQW IRU
level of skill and training (Dillinger, 1989). However, a major existing residents. Impact fees can also approximate user
problem in the CONLESTE region is the lack of technical IHHVDQGWKXVUHSUHVHQWVDPRUHHTXLWDEOH¿QDQFLQJVFKHPH
capacity to carry out such complex tasks on a large scale. In WKDQ SURSHUW\ WD[ EDVHG ¿QDQFLQJ 6XFK IHHV DVVRFLDWHG
VXFKDFRQWH[WDVLPSOL¿HGIRUPRIPDVVYDOXDWLRQVEDVHG ZLWKQHZGHYHORSPHQWFDQEHXVHGWR¿QDQFHDZLGHUDQJH
RQ D IHZ HDVLO\ LGHQWL¿HG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV FDQ EH XVHG WR of infrastructure and public services such as roads, parks,
and education facilities (Bunnell, 1993).
Impact fees exist in Leste Fluminense, but they
7 Fluctuations in property tax assessment create uneven and chaotic are poorly administered and extracted, and they are done
ODQGXVHSDWWHUQVWKDWGLVUXSWORFDWLRQDOHI¿FLHQF\8QHYHQSURSHUW\WD[ within, not across, municipalities. They are triggered by
assessments also contribute to general uncertainty in land title a major certain project types, but there is often weak political will to
issue in the Brazilian real estate market. Given this uncertainty, land title
LQVXUDQFHEHFRPHVDGLI¿FXOWSURFHVVWKDWDGGVWLPHDQGFRVWWRUHDO
levy the fees as individual municipalities want to promote
estate transactions. development in their cities. The real estate market dominates,
32
especially in the State of Rio de Janeiro where development CONLESTE should lobby the federal government to
is so rapid. The state has been referred to as the ‘state of reform the system for oil royalty allocation to include regional
exceptions’ (Vainer, 2010), where development is promoted bodies. Under the current system, 40% of oil revenues
over all other considerations, making ‘exceptions’ the rule. currently go to Brazil’s federal government and 45% to the
The solution to this is to incentivize the municipalities producing states. The remaining 15% is divided between
to effectively levy these fees, and using the revenue to the non-producing states and municipalities (Barrionuevo,
deliver the necessary projects that mitigate the impacts 2010a). The oil royalty was conceived to achieve two
of the developments in question. Our recommendation goals. First, it serves to compensate federative entities
is that CONLESTE could incentivize the municipalities to that suffer environmental damage. Second, royalties are
effectively administer impact fees through a disincentive to intended for investments in infrastructure, to support social
the non-conforming municipalities in the form of exclusion costs such as health, education, security and transport.
from the redistributed tax revenue. (Fiatikoski, 2010). Rio’s leaders cite the additional function
:LWK WKH QHZ VWDI¿QJ VWUXFWXUHV DQG FRRUGLQDWLRQ of oil royalties in balancing out its relatively small share of
across the municipalities, over time it would be expected federal tax transfers, which are targeted more heavily to
WKDW WKHUH ZLOO EH PRUH GDWD DYDLODEOH DORQJ ZLWK VWDI¿QJ the poorer north-eastern states (The Americas: Raining on
capacity to accurately calculate impact fees that may cross Rio’s parade;; oil policy in Brazil, 2010)
ERUGHUV7KLVLPSURYHPHQWLQHI¿FLHQF\RIDQH[LVWLQJWRRO Given the goals of the oil royalty program, there is
will promote infrastructure development in a regionally a cogent case to be made for a regional allocation of royalty
planned way. With the anticipated development impacts of funds. First, the impacts resulting from the processing and
&RPSHUM WKH HI¿FLHQW DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI LPSDFW IHHV FRXOG transportation of oil products tend to be regional in scale.
have a profound impact on the region’s ability to deliver Negative impacts do not stop at the boundary of municipal
the key services that it currently cannot. An innovative jurisdictions. Further, investments in infrastructure,
expansion of the use of impact fees in the region could be environment remediation, and public goods should be
to use them to provide affordable housing alongside MCMV FRRUGLQDWHG DW D UHJLRQDO OHYHO WR PD[LPL]H HI¿FLHQF\
funding. A feasible new use of the fee would be to offset any Additionally, a case can be made that regional allocation
new demands on the existing housing stock produced by of public goods and infrastructure tends to oversupply in
the arrival of new companies. low-demand areas and undersupply in high-demand areas
OHDGLQJWRDQLQHI¿FLHQWRXWFRPH
11. OIL ROYALTY REFORM The oil royalty program is currently under
Issues addressed: Regional funding, municipal funding. national scrutiny. The Ibsen Amendment proposes 52.5%
of royalties to be distributed among all of Brazil’s 26
33
states and the Federal District, 40% to go to the federal explicit goal of the oil royalty program as conceived by the
government, and the oil producing states and cities that Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum.
currently receive 30% will get the other 7.5% (Tinar, 2010). The oil-royalty issue is particularly salient as the
The lower house approved the proposal 369-72 but has massive pre-salt oil reserves are beginning to be extracted.
been held up by presidential veto (Barrionuevo, 2010b). Petrobras is reported to have plans to invest $224 billion
The studio recommends that CONLESTE take a strong within the next four years to the development of pre-salt oil
stance in opposition to the Ibsen Amendment responsible ¿HOGV RIIVKRUH ZKLFK DUH EHOLHYHG WR KROG RYHU ELOOLRQ
for these reforms. Given the purported goals of the oil barrels of high-quality crude oil (Tinar, 2010). It should
royalty program—mitigating externalities and investing be acknowledged that oil-royalties are not without their
in infrastructure and human capital—a wider distribution inherent problems. Some research has found evidence
WR DOO PXQLFLSDOLWLHV ZRXOG QRW EH HI¿FLHQW ³6RPH SRLQW of the so-called ‘resource curse’, where high resource
out that it is local regions, not the entire Federation, that dependence tends to negatively impact economic growth or
bears the brunt of associated management as well as the GLYHUVL¿FDWLRQ3RVWDOL
environmental costs of oil production and therefore deserve
to keep the income” (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2010).
Further, changes should be phased over time to prevent
economic upheaval in local governments that are heavily
dependent on royalty revenues. In Rio de Janeiro State,
the Ibsen Amendment will decrease royalties from around
$4.1 billion a year to just $130m” (The Americas: Raining
on Rio’s parade;; oil policy in Brazil, 2010). The Ibsen
$PHQGPHQWFDQRQO\EHMXVWL¿HGRQWKHJURXQGVRIQDWLRQDO
redistribution of income. However, redistribution is not an
34
CONCLUSIONS
Evident in the recommendations and their phasing, LW UHFRJQL]HV QHHG VSHFL¿F UHJLRQDO SODQV WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
CONLESTE’s means of action include: infrastructure, water resources, tourism, and modernization
of municipal and regional management. For the other focus
Planning: Using an understanding of regional conditions to areas, including housing, CONLESTE can continue to align
plan toward equitably and sustainable development. municipal policy, support a discourse of solutions across
municipal boundaries, and pursue project funding and
Policy-Making: Coordinating municipal agendas and plans implementation.
WKURXJKDXQL¿HGSROLF\ Concentrating on planning, policy-making, and
projects would require enduring work. They necessitate
Projects: )DFLOLWDWLQJ VSHFL¿F SURMHFW IXQGLQJ DQG monitoring and evaluation, and continuing updating. A
implementation to address developmental issues. Regional Master Plan formatted as a policy document
KDVWKHDGYDQWDJHRIÀH[LELOLW\WRIDFLOLWDWHSODQQLQJDVDQ
Our recommended strategic plans are set up in phases in RQJRLQJSURFHVV:HKDYHLGHQWL¿HGWKDW&21/(67(FDQ
order to move CONLESTE from addressing issues toward have a critical role in mitigating the impacts of Comperj,
equitably and sustainable regional planning. CONLESTE and addressing issues within the region. We envision
has created a framework for a regional plan. Objectives, CONLESTE as moving beyond a reactive role, toward the
WDUJHWV VSHFL¿F SURMHFWV DQG D FRUUHVSRQGLQJ SURMHFWHG empowered function of planning. Our recommendations
budget will be, or already are enumerated for each of the 11 aim to strengthen CONLESTE so that it sustainably and
IRFXVDUHDV&21/(67(KDVDOUHDG\LGHQWL¿HGDUHDVWKDW equitably affects change in the region.
35
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38
ANNEX 1:
3301900 RJ Itaboraí 218,090 RM Rio de Janeiro 50,471 0 3,922 3,922 7.77% 4,545 125,369
3302502 RJ Magé 228,150 RM Rio de Janeiro 55,358 4,708 7,280 11,988 21.66% 5,798 114,496
3302700 RJ Maricá 127,519 19,873 0 3,201 3,201 16.11% 1,794 106,129
3303302 RJ Niterói 487,327 RM Rio de Janeiro 143,924 14,173 7,298 21,471 14.92% 10,004 173,037
3304300 RJ Rio Bonito 55,586 9,268 0 452 452 4.88% 1,144 19,984
3304904 RJ São Gonçalo 999,901 RM Rio de Janeiro 262,890 58 30,149 30,207 11.49% 21,111 395,147
3305604 RJ Silva Jardim 21,360 3,923 0 252 252 6.42% 612** 9,857
3305752 RJ Tanguá 30,731 RM Rio de Janeiro 6,321 0 2,773 2,773 43.87% 676 13,592
IN THE CONLESTE REGION (MINISTRY OF CITIES, 2011)
Fonte: MCidades\SNH\DICT; MCidades\SNH\FJP 2007; MCidades\SNH\CEM-CEBRAP 2007; MCidades\SNH\CEDEPLAR 2009; IBGE 2000/2007/2010.
* Município não contemplado pelo Estudo "Assentamentos Precários no Brasil Urbano".
** Estimado por metodologia que oferece apenas a ordem de grandeza e não o total preciso em números absolutos de domicílios,
uma vez que o déficit destes municípios não foi calculado pela Fundação João Pinheiro.
*** Demanda Futura Por Moradias, desconsiderada a implantação do COMPERJ.
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