Rule 110 All 40 Cases

EN BANC
G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Hector B. Almeyda for
Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO
OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully
begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that
the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from
the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. — Where paragraph (b) of the section does
speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious
reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it is
clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. — Under Section 9 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting
a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether
or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. — This interpretation is in consonance with
Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT.
— The Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not
allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint
is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a
rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
Rule110 compiled cases 1|Page S.V.Villanueva

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On
appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following cases:
x x x
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x
SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint
or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided,
however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before
the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the
Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged
commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of
criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer
for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the
complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Officer of the Provincial
Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with
the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October
1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,"
which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation
to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence
they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need
of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when
it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of
the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section
1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation
of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089
in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO, RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA,
FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY and SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,1 dated 20 August 1998,
rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from
taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondent corporation Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and
members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco
Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. In the same
Decision of the appellate court, all the proceedings taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC Omnibus Orders of
25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995, were declared void.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB).
Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc.
(GEHI),2 which would own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement also stipulates
that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-
generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of
the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.3
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of
real estate property in Makati. Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall
extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI.4
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile
transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. Upon
the advice of the SEC, the IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994.5
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that
some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16 August 1994,
the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement with
GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges
Department (BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts.6
In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies
of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the SEC
on 22 August 1994 to explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material information as required under the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts.7
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in
connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition,
the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of
Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.8
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded by an Amended Omnibus Motion, filed
on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A,9 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents also claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it
ordered that the respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should
be imposed on them," and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their cases tried
jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding the alleged violation committed by the respondents.10
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994, wherein they moved for discontinuance of
the investigations and the proceedings before the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the investigating officials had
become reasonably free from prejudice and public pressure.11
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions, but on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued an
Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this wise:12
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the Commission resolves and hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in accordance with the Rules of Practice
and Procedure Before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED), Securities and Exchange Commission, to
be composed of Attys. James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino
(Brokers and Exchanges Department), which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the case by conducting
continuous hearings, if possible.
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why
no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 13 questioning the creation of the special investigating panel
to hear the case and the denial of the Motion for Continuance. The SEC denied reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30
March 1995.14
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, questioning the Omnibus Orders
dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995.15 During the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a
Supplemental Motion16 dated 16 May 1995, wherein they prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the SEC and its agents from investigating and proceeding with the hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5 May
1995, the Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively enjoined the SEC
from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against the respondents herein.17
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the case may be investigated by the
PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose creation the SEC had
earlier ordered.18
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision19 on 20 August 1998. It determined that there were no implementing rules and
regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents
allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit
for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal protection. It
further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the
sole purpose of re-filing the same case against the respondents.20
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990,
did not comply with the statutory requirements contained in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the Rules of
Practice and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the right to be present but without the right to cross-examine witnesses
presented against him, in violation of Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code. 21
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals ruled that22:
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC's] Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders is hereby DENIED. The petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is GRANTED. Consequently, all proceedings taken against [herein
respondents] in this case, including the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30, 1995 are declared null and
void. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent and, accordingly, [SEC] is hereby prohibited from
taking cognizance or initiating any action, be they civil, criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with respect
to Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30 (Insider's duty to disclose when trading) and 36 (Directors, Officers and
Principal Stockholders) in relation to Sections 46 (Administrative sanctions) 56 (Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling
persons) and 45 (Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the Revised Securities Act and Section 144
(Violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.)
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution23 issued on 30 September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following grounds 24:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO QUASH THE ASSAILED SEC
OMNIBUS ORDERS DATED JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30, 1995.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR
PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT
CORPORATION AND ITS DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN
TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND
THE SICD RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS25 ARE INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY
WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted that while this case was pending in this Court, Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended, which created the PED, was already repealed as provided for in Section 76 of the Securities Regulation Code:
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause. - The Revised Securities Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 178), as amended, in its entirety, and
Sections 2, 4 and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, are hereby repealed. All other laws, orders, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities Regulation Code has taken the place of the Revised
Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present case.
I. Sctions 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules to make them binding
and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, no civil,
criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents without violating their right to due process and
equal protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.26 This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act,
this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity.
Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents
and purposes.27 The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal,28 this Court ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground
of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be
declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which
it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,29 the Court underlined the importance of the presumption of validity of laws and the careful
consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of
lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying details of management.30 To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. 31 It is
well established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute
and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute
as well as purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot
assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. 32 Moreover, where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there
should be no impediment to its implementation.
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins33 shows a glaring error. In the cited case, this Court found
unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the board of supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on laundries located
in buildings that were not made of brick and stone, because it violated the equal protection clause and was highly discriminatory
and hostile to Chinese residents and not because the standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, such that the acts
proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:
Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. - (a) It shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the
issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or the security that is not generally available,
unless (1) the insider proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to the transaction (or his agent)
is identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows it, or (b) that other party in fact knows it from the insider
or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to
a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns
such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders as defined in this subsection, with knowledge that the person from whom
he learns the fact is such an insider.

(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to being material it would be likely, on being made generally
available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) a reasonable person would consider it
especially important under the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such factors as the
degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference from information generally available previously, and its nature and
reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in subsection (b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact
of special significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of
illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret
information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party
or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone; and second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.34
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain has been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly
officers, directors, or controlling stockholders, but that definition has since been expanded. 35The term "insiders" now includes
persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave them access to a fact of special significance about
the issuer or the security that is not generally available, and one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the person
from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the duty to disclose material facts which are known to them by
virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. In some cases, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of material
information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer's decision not to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a
violation of insider trading. At the same time, the undisclosed information should not be improperly used for non-corporate
purposes, particularly to disadvantage other persons with whom an insider might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain
from entering into transactions involving such securities.36
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act, the SEC still needed to define the following
terms: "material fact," "reasonable person," "nature and reliability" and "generally available." 37 In determining whether or
not these terms are vague, these terms must be evaluated in the context of Section 30 of the Revised Securties Act. To fully
understand how the terms were used in the aforementioned provision, a discussion of what the law recognizes as a fact of special
significance is required, since the duty to disclose such fact or to abstain from any transaction is imposed on the insider only in
connection with a fact of special significance.
Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of "special significance" which may be (a) a material fact which would
be likely, on being made generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) one which a
reasonable person would consider especially important in determining his course of action with regard to the shares of stock.
(a) Material Fact - The concept of a "material fact" is not a new one. As early as 1973, the Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material
Facts by Corporations Whose Securities Are Listed In Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under the Securities Act, issued
by the SEC on 29 January 1973, explained that "[a] fact is material if it induces or tends to induce or otherwise affect the sale or
purchase of its securities." Thus, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act provides that if a fact affects the sale or purchase of
securities, as well as its price, then the insider would be required to disclose such information to the other party to the transaction
involving the securities. This is the first definition given to a "fact of special significance."
(b.1) Reasonable Person - The second definition given to a fact of special significance involves the judgment of a "reasonable
person." Contrary to the allegations of the respondents, a "reasonable person" is not a problematic legal concept that needs to
be clarified for the purpose of giving effect to a statute; rather, it is the standard on which most of our legal doctrines stand. The
doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the "reasonable man" as the standard. 38 A purchaser in good faith must also take
into account facts which put a "reasonable man" on his guard.39 In addition, it is the belief of the reasonable and prudent man
that an offense was committed that sets the criteria for probable cause for a warrant of arrest.40 This Court, in such cases,
differentiated the reasonable and prudent man from "a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge," and
identified him as "the average man on the street," who weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have in abundance.41 In the same vein, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly determined its standards by the actual
significance in the deliberations of a "reasonable investor," when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 42 that the
determination of materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given
set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him."
(b.2) Nature and Reliability - The factors affecting the second definition of a "fact of special significance," which is of such
importance that it is expected to affect the judgment of a reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a test of materiality
pronounced in the case In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc.43:

Among the factors to be considered in determining whether information is material under this test are the degree of
its specificity, the extent to which it differs from information previously publicly disseminated, and its reliability in light
of its nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the "nature and reliability" of a significant fact in determining the course of action a
reasonable person takes regarding securities must be clearly viewed in connection with the particular circumstances of a case.
To enumerate all circumstances that would render the "nature and reliability" of a fact to be of special significance is close to
impossible. Nevertheless, the proper adjudicative body would undoubtedly be able to determine if facts of a certain "nature and
reliability" can influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, sell or buy securities, and thereafter explain and justify its
factual findings in its decision.
(c) Materiality Concept - A discussion of the "materiality concept" would be relevant to both a material fact which would affect
the market price of a security to a significant extent and/or a fact which a reasonable person would consider in determining his
or her cause of action with regard to the shares of stock. Significantly, what is referred to in our laws as a fact of special
significance is referred to in the U.S. as the "materiality concept" and the latter is similarly not provided with a precise definition.
In Basic v. Levinson,44 the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against confining materiality to a rigid formula, stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the
circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Act and
Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.
Moreover, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." 45 In drafting the Securities Act of
1934, the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the limitations to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have absolute certainty in the application of the
materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in
nature and it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The Committee's advice to the [SEC] is to avoid
this quest for certainty and to continue consideration of materiality on a case-by-case basis as disclosure problems
are identified." House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (Comm.Print 1977).
(Emphasis provided.)46
(d) Generally Available - Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act allows the insider the defense that in a transaction of securities,
where the insider is in possession of facts of special significance, such information is "generally available" to the public. Whether
information found in a newspaper, a specialized magazine, or any cyberspace media be sufficient for the term "generally
available" is a matter which may be adjudged given the particular circumstances of the case. The standards cannot remain at a
standstill. A medium, which is widely used today was, at some previous point in time, inaccessible to most. Furthermore, it would
be difficult to approximate how the rules may be applied to the instant case, where investigation has not even been started.
Respondents failed to allege that the negotiations of their agreement with GHB were made known to the public through any form
of media for there to be a proper appreciation of the issue presented.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act, respondents claim that the term "beneficial ownership" is vague and that
it requires implementing rules to give effect to the law. Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward provision
that imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director or any
officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer's securities
and such changes in his or her ownership thereof. The said provision reads:
Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders. - (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than ten per centum of any [class] of any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who
is [a] director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a
securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes such a
beneficial owner, director or officer, a statement with the Commission and, if such security is registered on a securities
exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such
ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission, and if such security is registered on a securities exchange,
shall also file with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 36(a) refers to the "beneficial owner." Beneficial owner has been defined in the following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer
to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the
corporation's books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership, which is the
enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to property. 47
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would not affect respondents' case, where the respondents
are directors and/or officers of the corporation, who are specifically required to comply with the reportorial requirements under
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.48
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent
unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public.
No individual would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate insiders. Such reaction would
stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities market. To avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the Revised
Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities transactions, while Section 36 allowed the SEC to
monitor the transactions entered into by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of their companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor's Management Co.,49 it was cautioned that "the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions,"
which include the provisions on insider trading, should not be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications." The
ambit of anti-fraud provisions is necessarily broad so as to embrace the infinite variety of deceptive conduct.50
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy,51 this Court brushed aside a contention, similar to that made by the respondents
in this case, that certain words or phrases used in a statute do not set determinate standards, declaring that:
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A.
No. 8180 as they do not set determinate and determinable standards. This stubborn submission deserves scant
consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. x x x. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run
riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other
cases.
Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid standards were "simplicity and dignity," 52 "public interest,"53 and
"interests of law and order."54
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full Disclosure Rules were promulgated by the
SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act. It is already
unequivocal that the Revised Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full Disclosure Rules were issued to make the
enforcement of the law more consistent, efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable to state that the disclosure forms later
provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance was required before the forms were provided. The effectivity
of a statute which imposes reportorial requirements cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially where
compliance therewith may be made even without such forms. The forms merely made more efficient the processing of
requirements already identified by the statute.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative actions
can possibly be had against the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the
absence of implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their requirements are
specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In particular, Section 8 55 of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the particular matters which need to be
reported in the registration statement thereof. The Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the
respondent IRC from such requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these provisions. Thus,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation
of Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and cannot be demanded during investigative proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals pronounced that the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure was
invalid since Section 8, Rule V56 thereof failed to provide for the parties' right to cross-examination, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, categorically stated that the proceedings before the PED are
summary in nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings - Subject to the requirements of due process, proceedings before the "PED" shall be
summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in the courts of
law. The Rules of Court may apply in said proceedings in suppletory character whenever practicable.
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further specified that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents - During the preliminary conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter, the
Hearing Officer may require the parties to simultaneously submit their respective verified position papers accompanied
by all supporting documents and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any which shall take the place of their direct
testimony. The parties shall furnish each other with copies of the position papers together with the supporting affidavits
and documents submitted by them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. - Immediately after the submission by the parties of their position
papers and supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall determine whether there is a need for a formal hearing. At
this stage, he may, in his discretion, and for the purpose of making such determination, elicit pertinent facts or
information, including documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness to complete, as far as possible, the facts
of the case. Facts or information so elicited may serve as basis for his clarification or simplifications of the issues in the
case. Admissions and stipulation of facts to abbreviate the proceedings shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. If the Hearing Officer finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have
submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall so inform the parties stating the reasons therefor
and shall ask them to acknowledge the fact that they were so informed by signing the minutes of the hearing and the
case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the parties to submit their respective verified position
papers, together with all supporting documents and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing was not mandatory; it was within
the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there was a need for a formal hearing. Since, according to the
foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED is discretionary, then the right to cross-examination could not have been
demanded by either party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, entitled "Adjudication," does not affect the
investigatory functions of the agencies. The law creating the PED, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, defines
the authority granted to the PED, thus:
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to the Commission's control and
supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of
Directors/Trustees of corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders, officers or
partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission; to file and prosecute in accordance with law and rules and regulations
issued by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding criminal or civil case before the Commission or
the proper court or body upon prima facie finding of violation of any laws or rules and regulations administered and
enforced by the Commission; and to perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by law or duly
delegated to it by the Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file and
prosecute such cases. It fails to mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus, the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly Section
12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,57 this Court sets out the distinction between investigative and adjudicative functions,
thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely; inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into" xx to subject to an official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of an investigation, of course is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; xx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter
or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x
x."
In a legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with
adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
There is no merit to the respondent's averment that the sections under Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, do not
distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory functions. Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is unequivocally
entitled "Adjudication."
Rule110 compiled cases 10 | P a g e

S.V.Villanueva
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions, as enumerated under Section 1(h) and (j), Rule II; and Section
2(4), Rule VII of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the
following:
xxxx
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in accordance with these Rules, the franchise or certificate of
registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the following grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do or is doing to the great prejudice of or damage to the
general public;
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the Commission restraining commission of acts which would
amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
xxxx
(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is authorized to collect;
xxxx
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer shall have the following powers:
xxxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect contempt in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court.
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED, in the instant case, exercised its investigative powers; thus,
respondents do not have the requisite standing to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication. A valid source of a statute or a
rule can only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.58 In the instant case, respondents
are only being investigated by the PED for their alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions
entered into by its directors involving IRC shares. The respondents have not shown themselves to be under any imminent danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the exercise of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are not being or about to
be subjected by the PED to charges, fees or fines; to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of their certificate of registration
under Section 1(h), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise over the respondents were investigative in nature, to wit:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the
following:
xxxx
b. Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships or persons, their books, records and other properties
and assets, involving their business transactions, in coordination with the operating department involved;
xxxx
e. Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the Commission and other courts of justice involving violations of
laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder;
f. Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of corporations and partnerships, commercial paper issuers or
persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1(b), (e), and (f), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, need not
comply with Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code, which affects only the adjudicatory functions of
administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be able to investigate the respondents under its rules for their alleged failure to
disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing adjudicative functions are required to strictly comply with the
requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code, particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should be noted
that under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on 7 October 1992, abbreviated proceedings are prescribed in the
disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies are hereby directed to adopt and include in their respective
Rules of Procedure the following provisions:
xxxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special laws and without prejudice to Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987, the mandatory use of affidavits in lieu of direct testimonies and the preferred use
of depositions whenever practicable and convenient.

S.V.Villanueva
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations Commission
and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence. 59 In fact, the hearings before such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.60 Thus, it is not necessary
for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require
otherwise would negate the summary nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.61 In Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr.,62 this Court stated that:
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that
findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is required, among other things, is that every litigant be given
reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor.63
III. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act since said provisions were
reenacted in the new law.
The Securities Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law generally
deprives a court of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal, an exception
to this rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. The Court, in Benedicto
v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such instances:64
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving the court of its authority to punish a person
charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes
a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists
and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion
of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions.
Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized
under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute
books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to
the accused. (Emphasis provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents despite the repeal, since Sections
8, 65 12,66 26,67 2768 and 2369 of the Securities Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act.
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously provided for the registration of securities and the information that needs
to be included in the registration statements, was expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8 of the Securities
Regulations Code. Further details of the information required to be disclosed by the registrant are explained in the Amended
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulations Code, issued on 30 December 2003, particularly Sections 8 and
12 thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted as Section 27 of the Securities Regulations Code, still penalizing an
insider's misuse of material and non-public information about the issuer, for the purpose of protecting public investors. Section
26 of the Securities Regulations Code even widens the coverage of punishable acts, which intend to defraud public investors
through various devices, misinformation and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulations Code was practically lifted from Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. Both
provisions impose upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director or any
officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer's securities
and such changes in his or her ownership thereof.
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their authority to punish a person charged with violation of the
old law that was repealed; in this case, the Revised Securities Act.
IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the Securities
Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations
enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the
SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.70 Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.71
In Morato v. Court of Appeals,72 the cases therein were still pending before the PED for investigation and the SEC for resolution
when the Securities Regulations Code was enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject
matter of the other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and violations of pertinent rules and laws of the

S.V.Villanueva
company's board of directors. The enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not result in the dismissal of the cases;
rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and the SEC to continue with the investigation
of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already commenced the investigative proceedings
against respondents as early as 1994. Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose
pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already made initial findings that respondents
failed to make timely disclosures of their negotiations with GHB, ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The
investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals, which
became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated 20 August 1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case,
the Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive
SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may later be filed
against the respondents.
V. The instant case has not yet prescribed.
Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed against
them resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. 73 They point out that the prescription period
applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years under Section
1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Act."74 Since the offense was
committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. Such position, however,
is incongruent with the factual circumstances of this case, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period. 75 A preliminary investigation is
essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused to
have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed or whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.76
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding that a person has violated the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan,77 this Court enunciated that a criminal
complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the existence of probable cause, before a preliminary investigation can be
commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it
should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of the Securities Regulations Code, wherein the
procedure for criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act. 78 This Court affirmed the
dismissal, which it explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule
administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it
should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ
did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred
to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will
not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise
of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC
shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier
quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal
complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's
complaint.

S.V.Villanueva
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a criminal
case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated before the
SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation
effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil, or administrative case
against the respondents herein.79 Thereafter, on 20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP.
No. 37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC from taking cognizance of and
initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC was bound to comply with the aforementioned writ of preliminary
injunction and writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the investigation of respondents
for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive writs would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the
SEC takes in defiance of such orders will be considered void for having been taken against an order issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the injunctive writs
issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,80 the DOJ itself could not have taken
cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without a prior determination of probable cause by the SEC.
Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a preliminary investigation, any
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since the SEC had only started with its
investigation when respondents themselves applied for and were granted an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary investigation or filed a criminal case against the respondents during
the time that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals declared the aforementioned statutory and
regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed against the respondents for violations
thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no statutory provision which respondents could be accused of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August 1998
that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable cause in accordance with the doctrine
pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.81 In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation since the
SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation. Such a situation leaves the prosecution of the case
at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first place,
sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to break the impasse was to have the
Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during
which the SEC was prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be counted against it. The law on the prescription
period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed
way beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be barred from investigating
and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal
cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation
conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of
the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by
the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would
surely interrupt the prescription period.
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified in denying SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders dated 23 October 1995.
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied its Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, dated 23
October 1995, in the light of its admission that the PED had the sole authority to investigate the present case. On this matter, this
Court cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, since it found
other issues that were more important than whether or not the PED was the proper body to investigate the matter. Its refusal
was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed against the respondents under
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, the
validity of the PED Rules on Practice and Procedure was also raised as an issue. The Court of Appeals, thus, reasoned that if the
quashal of the orders was granted, then it would be deprived of the opportunity to determine the validity of the aforementioned

S.V.Villanueva
rules and statutory provisions. In addition, the SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of Appeals having
determined whether or not it may do so in accordance with due process requirements. Absent a determination of whether the
SEC may file a case against the respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised Securities Act, it would have been
improper for the Court of Appeals to grant the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders.
In all, this Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act; nor was the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior to the enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for failure
to provide parties with the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented against them. Thus, the respondents may be
investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations
of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.82
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 20 August 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent injunction issued pursuant thereto.
This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act may be undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168662 February 19, 2008
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner, vs.
EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as ORIGNAMURA TRADING, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 746602 and
its resolution3 denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of various animated characters such as "Hello
Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and "Zashikibuta" among others. 4 While it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).5
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics,
Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.6 These local entities were allowed to manufacture certain products (bearing
petitioner's copyrighted animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market
research. The research's objective was to identify those factories, department stores and retail outlets manufacturing and/or
selling fake Sanrio items.7 After conducting several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that respondent's
Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila was selling imitations of petitioner's products.8
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A. Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan executed a joint affidavit attesting to the
aforementioned facts.9 IPMA forwarded the said affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant in the office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.10
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive judge issued a search warrant on May 30, 2000. 11 On the same
day, agents of the NBI searched the premises of Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they were able to seize various Sanrio
products.12
On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm, filed a complaint-
affidavit13 with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) against respondent
for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 17714 and 17815) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by provisions of Part IV of this Act or
aiding or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to One
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the amount of fine, the court shall consider the value
of the infringing materials that the defendant has produced or manufactured and the damage that the copyright owner
has suffered by reason of infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work has in his possession an article which
he knows, or ought to know, to be an infringing copy of the work for the purpose of:

S.V.Villanueva
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or any other purpose to an extent that will prejudice the
rights of the copyright of the owner in the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to
imprisonment and fine as above mentioned. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit16 that he committed no violation of the provisions of the IPC because he was only a
retailer.17 Respondent neither reproduced nor manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did not transgress the
economic rights of petitioner.18 Moreover, he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of petitioner's
products.19
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his merchandise from legitimate sources, as shown by official
receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.
In fact, in her letter dated May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S. Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper
Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation are authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While
it appears that some of the items seized during the search are not among those products which [GGI] authorized
these establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent bought these from the abovecited legitimate
sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing that respondent relied on the representations of these manufacturers and
distributors that the items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not incumbent upon respondent to verify from these
sources what items [GGI] only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, the items in his
possession are not infringing copies of the original [petitioner's] products. (emphasis supplied)20
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22 Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August 29, 2003,24 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed the TAPP
resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground of prescription. It based its action on Act 3326 which states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d)
after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason,
which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
may not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the commission of the alleged violation, the
offense had already prescribed.25
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
review.26 To be criminally liable for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent knew that the merchandise he sold was counterfeit.
Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show that he obtained these goods from legitimate sources. 27
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in concluding that the alleged violations of the IPC had prescribed. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. 28 Moreover,
the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. Respondent is liable
for copyright infringement (even if he obtained his merchandise from legitimate sources) because he sold counterfeit goods. 29
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny the petition.
Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled The Prescriptive Period

S.V.Villanueva
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI
searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in
court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the prescriptive period for the prosecution of
the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The Factual Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will Not Be
Disturbed
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.34 Because a public prosecutor is the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the existence of probable
cause.35 Consequently, the decision to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint depends on his sound
discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. For
this reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency
of evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent. 37 By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against respondent for violation of the IPC. They
were in the best position to determine whether or not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at their findings after
carefully evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner ,vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP
No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January
1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment
for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June
1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation
of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and
pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the
same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had
claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

S.V.Villanueva
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the
case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during
the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held that
the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22
shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20
January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus,
considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the
order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that
the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared
that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file
three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed
an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,
ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal
Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes,
Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings,
and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of
non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of
Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim
that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.

S.V.Villanueva
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules,
the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency
in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach
a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition
before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which
was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring
that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this
case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do
not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926
at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the
peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription
of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing
of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao
and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding
which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try
the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate
the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48and hence, the prescriptive
period should be interrupted.

S.V.Villanueva
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that
the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation
and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within
the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution,
an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping
resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control,
like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there
is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168380 February 8, 2007
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, Petitioner, vs.
ESPERANZA PAGLINAWAN, in her capacity as Department of Justice State Prosecutor; LEAH C. TANODRA-ARMAMENTO, In
her capacity as Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Chairwoman of Task Force on Business Scam; JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, in his
capacity as Department of Justice Chief State Prosecutor; STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, PAUL SIMON MORRIS, AJAY
KANWAL, SRIDHAR RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA REYES, MARIA ELLEN VICTOR, and ZENAIDA
IGLESIAS, Respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 170602 February 8, 2007
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, Petitioner, vs.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, BRYAN K. SANDERSON, THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD STEWARTBY, EVAN MERVYN DAVIES,
MICHAEL BERNARD DENOMA, CHRISTOPHER AVEDIS KELJIK, RICHARD HENRY MEDDINGS, KAI NARGOLWALA, PETER
ALEXANDER SANDS, RONNIE CHI CHUNG CHAN, SIR CK CHOW, BARRY CLARE, HO KWON PING, RUDOLPH HAROLD PETER
ARKHAM, DAVID GEORGE MOIR, HIGH EDWARD NORTON, SIR RALPH HARRY ROBINS, ANTHONY WILLIAM PAUL STENHAM
(Standard Chartered Bank Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Members of the Board), SHERAZAM MAZARI (Group Regional
Head for Consumer Banking), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL, SRIDHAR RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA REYES,
ELLEN VICTOR, RAMONA H. BERNAD, DOMINGO CARBONELL, JR., and ZENAIDA IGLESIAS (Standard Chartered Bank-
Philippines Branch Heads/Officers), Respondents.

S.V.Villanueva
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
873281 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.2
The common factual antecedents of these cases as shown by the records are:
Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the HR Service Delivery and Industrial Relations of Standard
Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein respondents. SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to engage in
banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to Resolution No. 1142 dated December 3, 1992 of the
Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB’s business in this jurisdiction is subject to the
following conditions:
1. At the end of a one-year period from the date the SCB starts its trust functions, at least 25% of its trust accounts must
be for the account of non-residents of the Philippines and that actual foreign exchange had been remitted into the
Philippines to fund such accounts or that the establishment of such accounts had reduced the indebtedness of residents
(individuals or corporations or government agencies) of the Philippines to non-residents. At the end of the second year,
the above ratio shall be 50%, which ratio must be observed continuously thereafter;
2. The trust operations of SCB shall be subject to all existing laws, rules and regulations applicable to trust services,
particularly the creation of a Trust Committee; and
3. The bank shall inform the appropriate supervising and examining department of the BSP at the start of its operations.
Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above conditions. Instead, as early as 1996, it acted as a stock broker, soliciting from
local residents foreign securities called "GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS" (GTPMF), denominated in US dollars. These
securities were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These were then remitted outwardly to SCB-
Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore.
SCB’s counsel, Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc and Delos Angeles Law Office, advised the bank to proceed with the selling
of the foreign securities although unregistered with the SEC, under the guise of a "custodianship agreement;" and should it be
questioned, it shall invoke Section 723 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.337).4 In sum, SCB was able to sell GTPMF
securities worth around ₱6 billion to some 645 investors.
However, SCB’s operations did not remain unchallenged. On July 18, 1997, the Investment Capital Association of the Philippines
(ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised Securities Act, 5particularly the provision prohibiting
the selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the local mutual
fund industry.
In its answer, SCB denied offering and selling securities, contending that it has been performing a "purely informational function"
without solicitations for any of its investment outlets abroad; that it has a trust license and the services it renders under the
"Custodianship Agreement" for offshore investments are authorized by Section 72 6 of the General Banking Act; that its clients
were the ones who took the initiative to invest in securities; and it has been acting merely as an agent or "passive order taker"
for them.
On September 2, 1997, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB, holding that its services violated Sections 4(a) 7 and
198 of the Revised Securities Act.
Meantime, the SEC indorsed ICAP’s complaint and its supporting documents to the BSP.
On October 31, 1997, the SEC informed the Secretary of Finance that it withdrew GTPMF securities from the market and that it
will not sell the same without the necessary clearances from the regulatory authorities.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 1998, the BSP directed SCB not to include investments in global mutual funds issued abroad in its trust
investments portfolio without prior registration with the SEC.
On August 31, 1998, SCB sent a letter to the BSP confirming that it will withdraw third-party fund products which could be directly
purchased by investors.
However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this country.
This prompted petitioner to enter into an Investment Trust Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased US$8,000.00 worth of
securities upon the bank’s promise of 40% return on his investment and a guarantee that his money is safe. After six (6) months,
however, petitioner learned that the value of his investment went down to US$7,000.00. He tried to withdraw his investment
but was persuaded by Antonette de los Reyes of SCB to hold on to it for another six (6) months in view of the possibility that the
market would pick up.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, the BSP found that SCB failed to comply with its directive of August 17, 1998. Consequently,
it was fined in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
The trend in the securities market, however, was bearish and the worth of petitioner’s investment went down further to only
US$3,000.00.

S.V.Villanueva
On October 26, 2001, petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal and Compliance Department, that the
latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint demanding
compensation for his lost investment. But SCB denied his demand on the ground that his investment is "regular."
On July 15, 2003, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), represented herein by its prosecutors, public respondents,
a complaint charging the above-named officers and members of the SCB Board of Directors and other SCB officials, private
respondents, with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059.
For their part, private respondents filed the following as counter-charges against petitioner: (1) blackmail and extortion, docketed
as I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; and blackmail and perjury, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278.
On September 29, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for perjury against private respondents Paul Simon Morris and Marivel
Gonzales, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB restraining it from further offering, soliciting, or
otherwise selling its securities to the public until these have been registered with the SEC.
Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable settlement.1awphi1.net
On January 20, 2004, the SEC lifted its Cease and Desist Order and approved the ₱7 million settlement offered by SCB. Thereupon,
SCB made a commitment not to offer or sell securities without prior compliance with the requirements of the SEC.
On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section 8.1 9 of the Securities Regulation Code
against private respondents, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-229.
On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its Joint Resolution 10 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for syndicated estafa in I.S. No.
2003-1059; private respondents’ complaint for blackmail and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; private respondents’ complaint
for blackmail and perjury in I.S. No. 2003-1278; and petitioner’s complaint for perjury against private respondents Morris and
Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
Meanwhile, in a Resolution11 dated April 4, 2004, the DOJ dismissed petitioner’s complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of
Securities Regulation Code), holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.
Petitioner’s motions to dismiss his complaints were denied by the DOJ. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85078. He alleged that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa.
He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing I.S. No. 2004-229
for violation of the Securities Regulation Code. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87328. Petitioner claimed that the
DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the complaint should have
been filed with the SEC.
On January 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition.1avvphi1.net It sustained the ruling of
the DOJ that the case should have been filed initially with the SEC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated May 27, 2005.
Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078 (involving petitioner’s
charges and respondents’ counter charges) dismissing the petition on the ground that the purpose of a petition for certiorari is
not to evaluate and weigh the parties’ evidence but to determine whether the assailed Resolution of the DOJ was issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Again, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution of November 22, 2005.
Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari.
For our resolution is the fundamental issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation Code and his
complaint in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa.
G.R. No 168380
Re: I.S. No. 2004-229
For violation of the Securities Regulation Code
Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses.–
53. 1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether any person
has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of an Exchange,
registered securities association, clearing agency, other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to file
with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances
concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish information concerning any such violations and to
investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code relates: Provided, however, That any person

S.V.Villanueva
requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the
purpose of such investigation: Provided, further, That all criminal complaints for violations of this Code and the implementing
rules and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred to the Department of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in instances where the law
allows independent civil or criminal proceedings of violations arising from the act, the Commission shall take appropriate action
to implement the same: Provided, finally; That the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by
the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to
the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion
in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine
a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.12 The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in
the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the
SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint
directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
G.R. No. 170602
Re: I.S. No. 2003-1059 for
Syndicated Estafa
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that all criminal actions, commenced by either
a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. This mandate is
founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very
sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution of the offense.13 This
representative of the State is the public prosecutor, whom this Court described in the old case of Suarez v. Platon,14 as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers.
Concomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested with
the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie case exists or not.15 This is done through a preliminary investigation
designed to secure the respondent from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is essentially
an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is probable cause that the accused is
guilty thereof.16 In Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman,17probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. It is the public prosecutor who determines during the preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists.
Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor.
Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the investigating prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction is that courts will not
interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender.18 Courts are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.19 Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or
not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s
findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have
been made with grave abuse of discretion.20
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which
is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 21
In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion, it is expedient to know if the findings of factof herein
public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

S.V.Villanueva
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause for syndicated estafa. There is no
showing from the record that private respondents herein did induce petitioner by false representations to invest in the GTPMF
securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather, they invested it in
accordance with his written instructions. That he lost his investment is not their fault since it was highly speculative.
Records show that public respondents examined petitioner’s evidence with care, well aware of their duty to prevent material
damage to his constitutional right to liberty and fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that a public
prosecutor’s duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons where the complainant’s
evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on the other hand, he is likewise duty-bound to protect
innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution. 22
Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for review against private respondents and in
concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On petitioner’s complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation Code, suffice it to state that, as aptly declared by the Court of
Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the DOJ. Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint, the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions and AFFIRM the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328 and in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85078. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila and
dismissing the criminal case for slight physical injuries against respondent on the ground that the offense charged had already
prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private
complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached.
The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries
against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong
issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the
date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day
period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC
ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition and concurred with the
opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that,
indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on
August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the
proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on the resolution
is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was
filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the language of
Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)"
for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already
prescribed when filed with the court on June 20, 2000. x x x3 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:

S.V.Villanueva
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR,
entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, -versus- Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista, Accused," is ordered DISMISSED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course to the
petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before the
filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive
period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in this case is whether
the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal
information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an
information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule
that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. 6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint
was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not
unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition considering
that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after
the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the information. The Court will
not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted
on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the
circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action against the
erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is
hereby REINSTATED. Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein Decision for appropriate action
against the erring officials. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC
MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO
ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES,
JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO,
OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA.
GILDA HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C.
BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners,vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. DAWIS, SERGIO
APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents.
DECISION

S.V.Villanueva
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently
enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding informations for this
offense has been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19,
1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and
Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos had ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic (p.
396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition
may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent
dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization
(ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended,
the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having
invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original,
duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original informations filed
recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka,
et al. (quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs. Col. Julian
Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly bizarre when we consider that as early
as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone informing
counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of this petition will be brought before the
Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning counsel
informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the
office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received by any of the panel of three
assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00
P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of complainants
against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito
Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no
charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M.
to bring the detained persons today — I am only the custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian
when the charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the said charges were never
coursed through the Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and hatched the nefarious
scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances which are the subject
of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter
of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative
of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa
kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they be given 7 days within which
said counsel may confer with their clients — the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals demanded that
said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the
grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention,

S.V.Villanueva
albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made
by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their
release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo
Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
January 28, 1985. They were charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146, paragraph 3
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional
Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail of
P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the
accused filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the respondent
colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' **
under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our
resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the
accused had already been released, four of them on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless,
argued that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under
an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same
act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a
single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor,
further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka,
et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are
however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25,
1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs.
Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in
Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga
vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
(Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

S.V.Villanueva
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had become a case
of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before their release on
orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985
(upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro
Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also
is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of
the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable"
(par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith
and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with
the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the
time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however, believe
that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or manipulate
the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with
the Solicitor General's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information,
We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing.
Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear
signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could
be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations
for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was
ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may not be set aside to
satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-
59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case
where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham
preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with
the cases subject of the petition. No costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE
RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO
APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this
Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a
member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September
6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and
injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila.
Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday

S.V.Villanueva
party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his
wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V.
Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General
Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers,
Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American
lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of
Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother,
Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor
did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The
second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo
did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various
bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col.
Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely:
Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military
Council was called for October 6, 1980.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the
American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next
twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by
Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered himself to be a
"state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where
he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer
showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the
petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver,
et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without
windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he was transferred
and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed
"under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the
time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated Republic
Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The
inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo
comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save
his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at
Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with shrapnel and
pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his
aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has
scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's
physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.

S.V.Villanueva
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero
Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700, as amended
by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution
presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col.
Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of
an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. It is
the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an
information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish
a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory
in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court when
it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest
dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.
The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions when a
petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be
denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition,
the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his
motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also
recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of
"more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30,
1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a
democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the
record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved
and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When
arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this
Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian
Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time
of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but
the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding
that a prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.
In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial
disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifies the
favorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least
38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt against each
and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge for subversion. The prosecution's star
witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of
terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of international news
dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the
petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be made to testify when the

S.V.Villanueva
charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in
the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the questioned resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, by then, is
not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of this case, at what
cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition
it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The question
raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or
uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino
Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United
States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any
of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather
against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they
met together with Renato Tañada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting
with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures
taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means
the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn
statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal knowledge on his part. When
asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an
organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:
A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your
Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator
Salonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext of
to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of
subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
-has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115
SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by the court, there was
no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely,
the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the
information.
Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made before
Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a
prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both
included in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his counsel and
cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella.
After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution
witness.
According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:
36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?
A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where somebody
would come to contact me and give the materials needed in the execution of my mission.
I thought this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and
instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito Salonga as often as I can and
someone will meet me there to give the materials I needed to accomplish my mission
37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?
A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr. Johnny
Chua, husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my
mother and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila.
38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by Psinakis?
A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21, and the
last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the

S.V.Villanueva
phone about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an attache
case from somebody which will be delivered to your house," for which Sen. Salonga
replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang attache case para sa iyo." However,
if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him my number. On my second visit,
Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4 P.M." On that
date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at Salonga's place
for the appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.
39. Q. What happened then?
A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined
me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to give me the
attache case but did not tell me the name.
40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to
deliver your materials?
A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of Raul
Daza in setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at Norfolk,
Virginia. I told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk with
Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. He also asked about Raul
Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition group activities but it seems he is well
informed.
41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?
A. About thirty (30) minutes.
41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?
A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Tañada Jovy Salonga
was the one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si Tañada nung
dumating. They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not hear what they
talked about. After their whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at this time Atty.
"Nits" Tañada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse."
43. Q. Were the materials given to you?
A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty.
"Nits" Tañadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum
where before I alighted, Atty. Tañada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the
materials I needed.
xxx xxx xxx
45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces
electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " length,
nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic
packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight each.
However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which was also
offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar as the petitioner's
participation was concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?
A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila Hotel or
the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I would need. I
disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is
close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga.
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he was
out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an appointment
t• see him. I went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if
someone had given him an attache case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I made three
calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me again on the 31st of August. I did not
call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my
arrival Atty. Renato Tañada arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he (Atty.
Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the materials I needed in his

S.V.Villanueva
car. These materials were given to me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway
Centrum. (Emphasis supplied)
During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the latter
mentioned in his sworn statement:
Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G"
about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday party
of Raul Daza wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as
alleged by you already formulated?
WITNESS:
A. Not to my knowledge.
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?
A. Raul Daza, your Honor.
Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.
A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.
Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any
political action taken as a result of the party?
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).
Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of petitioner, he really
implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground. In
sustaining the objection, the Court said:
Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, you are
widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this witness
about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the house of Mr.
Salonga which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the bombings. Now these
words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p.
67)
Respondent judge further said:
COURT:
As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the witness
coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there
is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't
know why it concerns this cross-examination.
ATTY. YAP:
Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.
COURT:
According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here, but
Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the
question is also to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems to be
the thrust of the questions.
COURT:
In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question, the
focus on Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the
first time that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the
formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up
although you are only cross-examining for Salonga as if his (Lovely's) activities in the
United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74).
Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation"
in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Tañada, which
was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of
petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:
On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To
the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely
should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.

S.V.Villanueva
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for a
finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is
undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being
(sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it has linked itself
with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens for its supporters and
financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is not only
inexplicable but without foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism.
There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons-
(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by
President Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to
conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some
plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The
right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tañada could
not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a
Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978. Senator
Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from
week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a
guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed
with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the
matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves
nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of
all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a
birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive,
much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even
if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution
evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed
activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already
testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of
members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner
about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the
same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his
thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than
substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate
of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of
thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for
political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon
mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot
be the basis of criminal indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for violent
action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal
threats and constitutionally protected speech.

S.V.Villanueva
It stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term.
For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The language of the political arena, like the
language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his
only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or a
conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent
struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or
unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg
v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the
best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech
and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie
evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan
or enterprise thereof.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any
subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza's birthday
party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government
through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows either
advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.
Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing incident that
occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July
8, 1981). He further testified that:
WITNESS:
Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My
bombing mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus
family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].
Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to have been
commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer charged in the first
place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you
implicate Jovito Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a prosecution
witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his
intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since
Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the petitioner and the
bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against
the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA
439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the bombings even if it
ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his
detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about the
bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by the
respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

S.V.Villanueva
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The
right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See
People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to
relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima
facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See
La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the
hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating
for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the same
acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is not completely
academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the
individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the
totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore,
constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his
escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language
clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative
powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino
culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released
from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal
possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic
function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie
case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or
leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate
the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner
found in the records. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. SO ORDERED.

S.V.Villanueva
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City),
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the
Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's
petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates
Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos
Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely
represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s
allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding
criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and
raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion
with the RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition 10 and
comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause
to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred
enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the
trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer
enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a
fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable
cause to hold the respondents for trial.16
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had
already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2,
2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased
or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil
had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s
motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by
Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s
motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate
that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2)
that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief.
Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the
respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22

S.V.Villanueva
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have
the public prosecutor’s conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely
reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the
motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the
right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him. 27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to
the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8,
2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to
file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal
personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also
held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the
respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that
followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant
and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil
has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to
prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the
authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65
petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 33Interest means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the
OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings
pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.

S.V.Villanueva
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf 39 (as
when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect
his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the
respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. 40
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the
court.41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.42
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28,
2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO
BARTIDO, petitioners, vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan.
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc.
Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quimbo for petitioners Librado Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido.
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for
respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for
respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused
(petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with
the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from
notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding
with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and
thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the
petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the
nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the oft-
reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the case should he remanded
to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused
with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection
to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties
shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court
may deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent
Judge and objected to the remand of this case.

S.V.Villanueva
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the
private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable
Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to
adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General
and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene
independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in
its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings
that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor
General.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3the prosecuting
officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."
Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the
court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps
and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer
and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the
state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the
direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for
the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. 5 Thus, "an offended party may
intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the
instance of the offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly
reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that
he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the
prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official.
" 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests
are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law reserves
to the injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal
action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As explained in People v. Orais: 11
... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor
fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution,
or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the
proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal
proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there
is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the
continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the
proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks
the competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal
thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the
commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the

S.V.Villanueva
principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of
the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding
once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor
fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton
of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an
order overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the
promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To
permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order
dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the
promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and
control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section
107 of General Orders, No. 58.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings
pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and
Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute
the law office of the Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is the party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any
matter, action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines
the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent
with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not without
any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the
subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated:
In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners assert that:
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection
with the decision of the two cases against petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received,
through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle
of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after which the latter received
from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky"
and which allegedly contained "something else inside";
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum of the prosecution
which was literally copied in said decision although with some corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his already prepared
decision in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the
double murder charge against the petitioners to the death penalty.
The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by
Gerardo A. Makinano Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition).
The truth of the charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant

S.V.Villanueva
petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into
acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his
decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of
respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the
grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed.
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial of the alleged bribery of
respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when
it cannot appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite
conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps
precede the making of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for new trial were not free from
suspicion of bias and prejudice (See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and
the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge appeared to have been
heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt
or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring
opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ...
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to
persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should
strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and,
consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be obvious, therefore, that
while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.
It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should
be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear
anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special
pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
June 30, 1987
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist
on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa
against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon)
'77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing
of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August
18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul
from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court

S.V.Villanueva
of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with
the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as
suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the
Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a
pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but
on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due
process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and
therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January
23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a
resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and
set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of
petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the
respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed
by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through
counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the
resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief
reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss
the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may
or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether
the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution
by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law,
not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal
duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish
a prima faciecase. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.
It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to
order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence
has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently

S.V.Villanueva
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand,
neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice
who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case,
which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting
the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the
filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding
and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already
been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for
the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary
of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by
the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the
fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the
evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998

S.V.Villanueva
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners, vs.
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT
and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment2 in this special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the
deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT
WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING
THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID
PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO
SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE
OF THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED
WAS MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol
in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a
certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a
preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin
B. David of the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao
submitted his counter affidavit.3
On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution 4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof.
His findings of fact and conclusions were as follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago "Docsay"
Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol,
Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring
about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the purpose of
inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to
reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding, stopped and
parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended from the truck
and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in]
the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and]
were even offered coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the
Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the son of
Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: "What did you do to my father?!"

S.V.Villanueva
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died; and
before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut as the one
responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to go on board the
truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to accused John Doe
Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he
did.
Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses
presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder was
committed and that the accused in conspiring and confederating with one another are probably guilty
thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut,
Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato
Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.
However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police authorities
to furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing the needed warrant
of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file their
counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived
the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic]
straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth, human nature and [the]
natural course of things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared
to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty,
and the court's previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire records of the case
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with the bodies of
accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga.5 (emphasis
supplied)
In a sworn statement,6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of
bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's
uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut
told Virgilio to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul
heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabut's companions. Peter
Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter
Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
It his Sinumpaang Salaysay,8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol, Pampanga,
declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the polite station, three men approached
him and asked for directions to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet
Malabanan of Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three returned to ask
whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home. The group left on board a
military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call at
the police station reporting that someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is not
clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut,
Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits
before the MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the
assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed
was only homicide, not murder. In support of such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:

S.V.Villanueva
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to
constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the employment of the [sic] means of
execution were give [sic] the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted . . . .
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence, such that the
attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected as to render him no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter
Paul Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According to the said witness, the victim was
already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and immediately
thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the assailant did not consciously adopt
the position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came
so sudden as to afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act
of Mayor Yabut in giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not
concert the means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would have been no
necessity for him to give the order to the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the
assailant at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and
consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably believe[d] to
have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago,
Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one John
Doe aliasDanny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino
Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye,
Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.
Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.
The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions were
propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution
of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF
ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR
AFFORD IMPUNITY;
(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A
PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A
DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING"
WAS RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION;
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO
YAMBAO BY RULING OUT CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST
FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY
TO MURDER.
To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that the
meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the victim at the height of a
typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung
ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the
stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the deceased that the latter was

S.V.Villanueva
being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano
Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck."
In view of that enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accused's resolve to kill
the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him,
while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan
ninyo," (That's enough, move quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and without exerting any effort to
arrest the gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.
On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering the release of accused Evelino
David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of
Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996."
On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against
the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of
the information read as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3
Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A.
Dimatulac on his abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound which
cause[d] the death of the said victim.
All contrary to law.
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on "2/27/96", i.e., a day
before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in
the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest. 13
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with
the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All Accuseds14 [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer
Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was
grounded on the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the motion. Judge
Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili. 17
On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to Defer
Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court and were bound by the condition therein to "surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek
permission from the court should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before
the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court had to consider their right to a speedy
trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v.
Mogul 19 and Balgos v. Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer the
filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an
order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in court.
In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need
for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accused's right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because
the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and
convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery;
and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy trial was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory
motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all
the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason
therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any
indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the
accused on 12 April 1996. 23
It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings since,
on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a

S.V.Villanueva
petition for certiorari questioning the order of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26,
1996." Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on the ground
that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b)
prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the
case into Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with the trial court wherein he
opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in the record . . . which shows that the subject
killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he "will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle
the prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.
On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided
over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 29
On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with their Motion to Defer
Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense committed
was murder, not homicide. The documents which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the
following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Case No.
95-360, containing the testimony of:
a. Peter Paul Dimatulac
b. Vladimir D. Yumul
c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao
h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.
i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
j. Sketch
k. Unscaled Sketch
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution 31directing respondent
therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ
of preliminary injunction should be issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on
the prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was] submitted."
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of the
aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in
"Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals . . . as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals."
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. 33 On the latter date, the
YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment, 35 citing
the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which,inter alia, deferred resolution on the
application for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that
the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the
unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and asserted that a number of Supreme Court
decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.
In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the
DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to

S.V.Villanueva
murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary
Guingona read as follows:
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac.
Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The attack was unexpected
as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to
speak. From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by
the respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The admission of respondent
Malabanan is replete with details on how the principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the
assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime.
According to him, while they were on their way to the victim's house, Mayor Yabut already instructed
Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This
explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the victim's house armed with a handgun, such
positioning was precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor
Yabut ordered nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was
very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1)
employment of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230
SCRA 281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are present as established from the foregoing
discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed herein is
murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient
evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be gleaned from the
sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go
with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying
to fix the gun which was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his
presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining
circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut to provide
transportation to the assailant. There being an actual danger to his life then, and having acted under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be freed from criminal liability. 38
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the
DOJ." 40
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention to the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996,
petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the
Manifestation and Motion 43 of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest of justice, [the]
Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said prayer, the Solicitor
General argued:
2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would find their
Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be directed to upgrade the
Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would thereby have
been avoided.
3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the issuance of a
writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in holding the arraignment of the accused,
pending resolution of the Appeals with the Secretary of Justice.
44
The YABUTs opposed petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been
arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor — not the private
prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case.

S.V.Villanueva
In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set aside his
order to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by
the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned on May
20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of the court order dated
May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered
moot and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended
Information.46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused.
In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4, DOJ
Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for
reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did
not violate the accused's right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder
and did not reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 that holding
accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended that in proceeding with
the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised
no argument which had not yet been resolved. 51
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, 52 which the trial court
granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private
respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in
the trial court's rulings. 54
In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners' motion to set aside
arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the
control of the public prosecutor, whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various
motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallari's motion for reconsideration moot
and academic. 56
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the petition therein
for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the
dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by the Supreme
Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously
presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already
inhibited himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this Court to
reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private
respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved;
and order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private respondents tricked the
victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an
orchestrated effort on the part of [private respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in
view of evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the following events or circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime
committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a motion for reinvestigation
filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and
went into hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged was downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the Secretary of Justice and request
to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor
from further participating in the case.

S.V.Villanueva
(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that
there was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners'
appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.
(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting himself and the
order regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon
set the case for arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the
accused on the information for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the
petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the arraignment nor
take any action to prevent further proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the
pendency of the appeal.
(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the
Secretary of Justice directing the amendment of the information to charge the crime of
murder.
Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment.
Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the
proceedings just the same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment
despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private
respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February
1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing,
only to resurface when the charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of
private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment,
the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice
once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused, since by
submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private respondents'
arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 may 1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with
the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date,
the DOJ had not yet resolved petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite
the fact that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days prior to private respondents'
arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to
Defer, opting instead for Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals, it was but proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondent, to
which the public and private prosecutors did not object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of discretionary
powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been
to the President. While as regards petitioners' plea that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide
to murder, private respondents submit thatmandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what offense was committed
is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed only if the
complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused
can appeal. Hence, petitioners' appeal was improper.
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the
private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied because:
(a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice
shall be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under
Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause shall not hold
the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners by initially deferring arraignment
pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining
order, arraignment was properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not
been arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending resolution of their
petitions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

S.V.Villanueva
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that something had gone
awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly
the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary liberty.
However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender.
Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or
upon motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have
done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this difference
of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as
she had no other option under the circumstance, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs
and all other accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her
magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the
YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the
lesser offense of homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused "Danny," despite the fact that
they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having avoided service of the warrant
of arrest issued by the MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could not have
been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending
the killing, and that the private prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of
the Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-
Reyes.
Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It is
interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only
on 27 February 1996. This simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information.
No undue prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact,
they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was extremely generous to
the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting
for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for
instructions. Clearly, under the circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not even bother
to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and
had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established
by the evidence before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did not even
have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This
amounted to defiance of the DOJ's power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate
on. Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce
that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" simply because the
private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here
had not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they
had the right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph
of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city
fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the
complaint or information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended party or the accused.
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:

S.V.Villanueva
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and
City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; . . . .
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which
read:
Sec. 3. . . .
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform such other duties as may be
assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau,
office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the
proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof,
or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office,
division or service.
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in
administrative law as follows:
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should
be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions
in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof
provides, thus:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing
from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding
that only homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for
murder. Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress
of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated what unquestionably
appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the
offended parties are allowed only in cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112,
Rules of Court would be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section 1 of DOJ Department
Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold

S.V.Villanueva
the filing of the information. As stated above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision
reads:
Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned.
If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu
proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the
filing of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in Marcelo
v. Court of
63 64 65
Appeals, that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, forecloses the power of
authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already
having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant
of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject
to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or
authority of the Secretary of Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court" which is quoted above.
Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide,
depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March
l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the accused who are out on
bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown
any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic,
supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as the accused
were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a
prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second
motion, Judge Roura was fully aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23
February 1996. In fact, he must have taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12 April
1996, and on that date, after denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he
further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a petition for certiorari to
question his denial of the motion to defer and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom
suggested that, at the very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that if
the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to inhibit Judge
Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to
transfer the case to the branch presided by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the records of the case on 30
April 1996. From that time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch,
Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused
the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone who has just taken over a new case, he could not have
helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within
which to file a petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the
resolution of the Court of Appeals directing respondents to comment on the petition and show cause why the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted and deferring resolution of the application for a temporary restraining
order until after the required comment was filed, which indicated a prima facie showing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit
Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's
subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996 supporting a
charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly , the pending appeal with the DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge
Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he
had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, 68 his
judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his

S.V.Villanueva
own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he
could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of
circumstances, Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo 69 that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect
for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending
before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs
on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a manner
consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon
and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be
punished 70 and judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e.,
not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to
suffer. 71
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the representatives not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As such,
they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the public
action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from
improper methods designed to secure a wrongful conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent
facts at the judge's disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the
evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's innocence or guilt.
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice
is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies
of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence
reposed in him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. 78
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of
society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and
the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross, grave and
palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said
judges, such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto,
thereby nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of
the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation before the
onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman
v. Sandiganbayan: 80
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified.
The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason
to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention of
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to process
each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our democratic society under a rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder was
committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information
that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the
Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's

S.V.Villanueva
inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins
of omission or commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed
was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should
have courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking "mistakes" so far committed
and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly,
joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel,
the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter alia, even asking the trial court
to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case,
and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of arraignment,
considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended
with grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked
by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case
as above discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to Defer
Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the
orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996
denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not
guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July
1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice
of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall
proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163797 April 24, 2007
WILSON CHUA, RENITA CHUA, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF LUCENA CITY, Petitioners, vs.
RODRIGO PADILLO and MARIETTA PADILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
May 15, 2003 reversing its Decision2 dated January 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401, entitled "Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta
Padillo, Complainants-Petitioners, versus The Secretary of Justice, et al., Respondents."
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money lending
business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua,
brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.
One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications for approval by respondents. Once a loan
application had been approved, respondents would authorize the release of a check signed by them or their authorized signatory,
a certain Mila Manalo.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of
the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were
spurious. Marissa’s modus operandi was to alter the name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another name as an
alternative payee. This alternative payee would then personally encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts
received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate encashment,
Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees
included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount embezzled reached ₱7 million.

S.V.Villanueva
Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena
City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation,
docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and 98-1605.
In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo A. Datu (now retired), disposed of the complaints as follows:
WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of a prima facie case of Estafa Thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, let an Information be filed against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, and
several John Does, the same to be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla Correa, Giovani Guia, Emmanuel Garcia, Zenaida Nantes, Cherrylyn
Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando Loreto, Cesar Salamat, Antonio Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva, Alexander Asiado,
Peter Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano Evaso, Edgar Sebastian, Crisencio Asi, Roberto Ong and Gregorio Flancia is provisionally dismissed.
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, docketed therein as Criminal Cse No. 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59.
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution dated January 3, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The City Prosecution Office of Lucena City is hereby directed to file the
Information of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents defined and penalized under Article
315 par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58 counts) against respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal
of the Information of estafa through falsification of commercial documents against respondents Wilson Chua and Renita Chua.
Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the commission of the crime was not clearly established
by the evidence. There was no showing that he abused the trust and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the questioned
checks were deposited in his bank account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her
and Marissa.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that
in issuing the Resolution dated January 3, 2000 directing the Prosecutor’s Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding
Information only against Marissa, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court of
Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several
Informations against petitioners.
On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that there was no conspiracy
among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Revisiting its Decision, the Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2003,
promulgated its Amended Decision granting respondents’ motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Court orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor,
Lucena City to include Wilson Chua and Renita Chua as accused in the said case.
SO ORDERED.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, would
establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent
practice of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2)
considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and
(3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. This is supported by the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated
November 26, 1998.
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied
the same on May 28, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include
in the Information Wilson and Renita.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The
rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a
representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution thereof.3 In Suarez v. Platon,4 this Court described the
prosecuting officer as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

S.V.Villanueva
Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases, the public prosecutor, in the exercise of his
functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a prima facie case exists;5 (b) decide which of the conflicting
testimonies should be believed free from the interference or control of the offended party; 6 and (c) subject only to the right
against self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in court. 7Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor
cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the evidence before him would warrant the filing of
an action in court. For while he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to complainant’s evidence, are
shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious
prosecution.8
We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice
may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even
be reversed or modified by the Office of the President.9
Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.10
Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only Marissa should be charged.
We agree.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.11 We
have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no
probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As found by the
Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s practice
of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson
and Marissa are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the other;
and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal
activities.
Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou,12 not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule is
where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as in this case.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor of Lucena City to include Wilson and Renita Chua in the
Information for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171643 August 8, 2010
FILEMON A. VERZANO, JR., Petitioner, vs.
FRANCIS VICTOR D. PARO, JANET A FLORENCIO, HON. REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, and HON. CITY PROSECUTOR OF
BACOLOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 28, 2005
Decision2 and the February 7, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 14, 2002, petitioner Filemon A. Verzano, Jr., former District Manager of Wyeth Philippines, Inc. (Wyeth) for the islands
of Panay and Negros, was dismissed from service upon an administrative complaint filed against him. Among the individuals who
filed the complaint against petitioner were respondents Francis Victor D. Paro (Paro) and Janet A. Florencio (Florencio) who were
territory managers under the supervision of petitioner.
The complaint was founded on petitioner’s alleged violation of company policy on prohibited sale of drug samples given for free
to doctors and for the unauthorized act of "channeling," or the transfer of stocks within the same area falsely creating an
impression that there was a sale. After conducting its own investigation and giving petitioner an opportunity to explain his side,
Wyeth resolved to dismiss petitioner tendering him a Notice of Termination.4
Aggrieved by his termination, petitioner filed a Complaint5 for illegal dismissal with the Regional Labor Arbitration Board, National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City against Wyeth. For its part, Wyeth filed its Position Paper to rebut the charges
of petitioner. Attached to the position paper of Wyeth were the affidavits6 of respondents Paro and Florencio.

S.V.Villanueva
It was on account of the said affidavits that petitioner filed a criminal complaint7 against respondents for perjury, false testimony
and incriminatory machination. In said complaint, petitioner argued that the affidavits of respondents contained falsehoods
against him, particularly on the material date of the alleged sale and the fact that he sold products which are to be given free to
doctors. He also argued that the alleged acts of "channeling" by him are false and unfounded.
Subpoenas were issued by the City Prosecutor against respondents for the submission of their respective counter-affidavits;
however, the return of the subpoenas showed that respondents could not be located at their given addresses.
In a Resolution8 dated March 3, 2004, notwithstanding that no counter-affidavits were submitted by respondents, the City
Prosecutor resolved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause, all the charges are hereby recommended dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.9
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was, however, denied by the City Prosecutor in a Resolution 11 dated
June 11, 2004.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor via a petition for review.12 On
July 30, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued a Resolution13 finding merit in petitioner’s appeal, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, your Resolution dated March 3, 2004 is hereby reversed and you are hereby directed to file the appropriate
information for Perjury against Francis Victor D. [Paro] and Janet A. Florencio within (5) days from receipt hereof, furnishing this
Office with proof of compliance within the same period. 14
Aggrieved, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. 15 In a Resolution16 dated August 25, 2004, the Regional State
Prosecutor denied respondents’ motion.
On September 20, 2004 two Informations for perjury were filed against respondents in the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities
(MTCC), Bacolod City. The Information against respondent Florencio was docketed as Criminal Case No. 049-8479, whereas, the
Information against respondent Paro was docketed as Criminal Case No. 049-8480.
On the same day, September 20, 2004, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the Resolutions of the
Regional State Prosecutor which reversed the earlier Resolution of the City Prosecutor. Respondents likewise prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the CA.
On October 7, 2004, the MTCC issued Warrants of Arrest against respondents. On the same day, respondent Florencio posted
bail. Respondent Paro followed suit on October 8, 2004.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 2004, a TRO was issued by the CA, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
In order not to render moot and academic the instant petition, a temporary restraining order (TRO) is hereby issued temporarily
enjoining the public respondent Chief Prosecutor from acting on the assailed Order issued by the public respondent Regional
State Prosecutor for a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.17
In light of the issuance of a TRO by the CA, respondents filed with the MTCC a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings18 on November 2, 2004.
On November 10, 2004, the MTCC issued an Order,19 granting respondent’s motion to suspend the proceedings.
On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision,20 ruling in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated July 30, 2004
and August 25, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.21
In ruling against petitioner, the CA ruled, among others, that the Regional State Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion
when he directed the filing of the Informations for perjury on the simple reason that no counter-affidavits were submitted by
respondents. In addition, the CA held that even though the Informations had already been filed in the MTCC, the same did not
bar the CA from reviewing and correcting acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 22dated February
7, 2006.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
I.
THE PETITION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY
THE FILING OF THE CASES IN COURT.
II.
THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE RESOLUTION OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR.
III.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY.23

S.V.Villanueva
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that the filing of the informations in the MTCC had already removed the cases from the
power and authority of the prosecution to dismiss the same in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v.
Mogul24 (Crespo), to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.25
In addition, petitioner points out that warrants of arrest were already issued by the MTCC and that respondents had already
individually posted bail. Petitioner thus concludes, that the issue of whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion when he directed the filing of Informations for perjury against respondents had already become moot
and academic.
Petitioner is not entirely correct. As discussed in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals 26 (Ledesma), Crespo does not foreclose an appeal
made to the resolution of a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause notwithstanding that informations had already
been filed in court, to wit:
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that Crespo did not foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice
to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action of the investigating
fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice.
The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. x x x 27
In the case at bar, while it is generally the Secretary of Justice who has the authority to review the decisions of the prosecutors,
this Court agrees with the CA that the same precedential principles apply in full force and effect to the authority of the CA to
correct the acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutorial officers notwithstanding the filing of the informations
before the MTCC.28 The authority of the CA is bolstered by the fact that the petition filed before it was one under Rule 65,
therefore it has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Ledesma29 adds that where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an Information has been filed, trial
courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. On this note, the MTCC was
thus correct when it suspended the proceedings in view of the appeal taken by respondents to the resolution of the Regional
State Prosecutor. As observed by the CA, the suspension of the proceedings by the MTCC was done in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, to wit:
To a certain extent, the respondents’ asseverations are correct when they say by the operative act of filing of the informations
before it, the MTCC has acquired jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings against petitioners. Indeed, the suspension of said
proceedings is one such exercise of jurisdiction, and therefore, respondents’ worries of the MTCC being divested of jurisdiction
or competence over the proceedings are at best, speculative and illusory.30
Anent the second issue raised by petitioner, the same is without merit. Petitioner argues that the Regional State Prosecutor did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the finding of the city prosecutor that no probable cause existed to warrant
the filing of the Informations against respondents.
In finding grave abuse of discretion, the CA opined that the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the finding of the City Prosecutor
on the simple reason that respondents failed to submit counter-affidavits. The CA ruled that it would have been different had the
Regional State Prosecutor reversed the resolutions of his subordinate upon a positive finding of probable cause.
The pertinent portions of the July 30, 2004 Resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
Perusal of the affidavits executed by Francis Victor D. [Paro] and Janet A. Florencio reveals the following:
a) The material matter contained in these affidavits refer to the act of selling by Filemon Verzano, Jr. of Tazocin products
intended to be distributed as free samples in violation of company policy. The date when the sale was made is not a
material issue.
b) The affidavits of the respondent were executed before a Labor Arbiter and a Notary Public who are persons
authorized to administer oaths.
c) There is also no question that these affidavits are required by law as they were attached as part of the position paper
submitted with the Labor Arbiter handling the labor case.

S.V.Villanueva
d) Although there is yet no clear evidence that there was an apparent willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on
their part, the respondents by their failure to file or submit their respective counter-affidavit for their defense, are
deemed to have waived the same and in effect, the allegations in the complaint remain uncontroverted.
The case record will show that your Office, in the determination of probable cause vis-à-vis the attending set of facts and
circumstances, failed to consider the application of the procedure laid down under Section 3 paragraph (d) of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure which provides:
If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)-day period,
the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Only a counter-affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the respondent before the Public Prosecutor can dispute or put at issue the
allegations in the complaint thus, a respondent who fails to submit his counter-affidavit within the required period is deemed not
to have controverted the complainant’s evidence.31
Contrary to the claim of petitioner that the Regional State Prosecutor found probable cause, the July 30, 2004 Resolution does
not show that the latter actually made an independent assessment of the evidence presented in the investigation. As a matter of
fact, the clear import of the July 30, 2004 Resolution is that the mere failure of respondents to submit counter-affidavits
automatically warrants a finding of probable cause against them.ten.lihpwal The fallacy in such theory is very apparent and the
CA is thus correct when it observed that:
To follow the public respondent Regional State Prosecutor’s skewed premise that only counter-affidavits can dispute or
controvert allegations in the Complaint, would be to perpetuate an absurdity wherein a criminal complaint should automatically
be resolved in favor of the complainant in the absence of counter-affidavits. x x x32
It is not disputed that the Regional State Prosecutor has the authority to reverse the findings of the existence of probable cause
on review. However, a perusal of the July 30, 2004 Resolution would show that little attempt was made by the Regional State
Prosecutor to discuss the existence or non-existence of probable cause and that much reliance was made on a flawed
interpretation of Section 3, paragraph (d) of the Revised Rules of Procedure.1avvphi1
What makes matters worse is that in his August 25, 2004 Resolution which dealt with respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration,
the Regional State Prosecutor stuck with his theory and even relied on another flawed interpretation of Section 3, paragraph (b)
of Rule 112, to wit:
x x x It would have been a different scenario if it falls within the scope of Rule 112, Section 3, paragraph (b) which provides:
b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.
In the instant case, the Investigating Prosecutor found ground to continue with the inquiry which is why he issued subpoenas to
the respondents to submit their counter affidavit within the 10-day period, since he could have dismissed it initially if indeed
there was really no evidence to serve as a ground for continuing with the inquiry. For failure of the respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits, they are deemed to have forfeited their right to preliminary investigation as due process only
requires that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavit, if he is so minded. x x x33
The clear import of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Rule 112 is that the Investigating Prosecutor may issue subpoenas if he finds
grounds to continue with the investigation. However, the continuance of the investigation does not necessarily mean that the
result will be an automatic conclusion of a finding of probable cause. To subscribe to such a theory would defeat the very purpose
of a counter-affidavit which is to honor due process and to provide respondents an opportunity to refute the allegations made
against them. Again, the conclusion reached by the Regional State Prosecutor is manifestly wrong as the CA was correct when it
observed that the issuance of a subpoena would become unceremoniously clothed with the untoward implication that probable
cause is necessarily extant.34
Based on the foregoing, because of the manner by which the Regional State Prosecutor resolved the case, this Court finds that
the same constitutes grave abuse of discretion, as his interpretation and appreciation of the Rules of Court have no legal bases.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the petition for certiorari filed by respondents with the CA was the wrong remedy, considering that
the proper procedure was to appeal to the Secretary of Justice under Department Circular No. 70,35 otherwise known as the
"2000 NPS Rule on Appeal."
The same deserves scant consideration.
Time and again, this Court has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception. Based
on the previous discussion, the actions of the Regional State Prosecutor, being patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the same constitutes an exception to the rule on administrative remedies.36
Finally, what is damning to petitioner’s cause is the fact that the MTCC had already withdrawn the two Informations filed against
respondents. As previously stated, the MTCC suspended the proceedings before it in view of the petition filed by the respondents
with the CA. In Ledesma,37 this Court stated that such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court
is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a

S.V.Villanueva
resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.38 Since the Informations for perjury had
already been filed in the MTCC, any subsequent action must be addressed to the said court’s discretion.
In the case at bar, the CA found that the Regional State Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the City
Prosecutor to file the Informations for perjury against respondents. It was because of the CA Decision that the City Prosecutor
eventually filed two Motions for Leave to Withdraw Informations39 with the MTCC. On August 30, 2005, the MTCC issued an
Order40 granting the motion, to wit:
Acting on the Motion for Leave to Withdraw Informations filed by the prosecution, through 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Arlene
Catherine A. Dato, and finding it to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby Granted.
Accordingly, the information against accused Janet Florencio in the above-entitled case is hereby Withdrawn.
SO ORDERED.41
The court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to
the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. 42 The dismissal of the two informations
against respondents were subject to the MTCC’s jurisdiction and discretion in view of the circumstances of the case at bar. Such
dismissal ultimately renders the case moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2005 Decision and the February 7, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173637 April 21, 2009
DANTE T. TAN, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision1 dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution2 dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan."
The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the trial court due to an alleged violation of
petitioner Dante T. Tan’s right to speedy trial.lawphil.net The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Inhibit.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the Philippines
(People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."
Criminal Case No. 1198303 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World
Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases No. 1198314 and No. 1198325involve the alleged failure
of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW
shares.
In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the
Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that
Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No.
119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153,
presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same court.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.6
On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the first date of trial on 27 February
2001.7
Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the direct control and supervision of Public
Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid
Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva
later on took over as lawyers for the People.

S.V.Villanueva
The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No.
119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection
to its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On 18 September 2001, the
prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within
thirty days.
After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for
Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.8
On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute.
Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting
his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially
prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal
Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each
of the five cases involved were to be done separately. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832,
however, were done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks
proscribed under Rule 36(a)-19 in relation to Sections 32(a)-110and 5611 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as the
"Revised Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b),12 in relation to Section 56 of
said act.
On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings
of petitioner’s case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioner’s
right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered13 the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be meritorious, the Court hereby orders
Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED.1avvphi1
On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials of the BW cases, with
petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In
an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
The RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, with the People contending that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO.
119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES.
Setting aside the trial court’s order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22
February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22, 2003 and January 20, 2004 are set aside.
Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately.14
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.
On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.
Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL
ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN’S RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF
VIOLATION OF TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We first resolve the preliminary issues.
In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached
to the People’s appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the
cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

S.V.Villanueva
Petitioner’s argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas
Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari before said court. It must be stressed that
the certification against forum shopping is required to be executed by the plaintiff.15 Although the complaint-affidavit was signed
by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal
Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Section 2, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases. Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative
Code, the DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders
and administer the probation and correction system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute
criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines. 16 Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses,
including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the
government agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or
related case has been filed or is pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the
head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830, which
was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to discuss the main issues.
At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial.
Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068. The appellate court
determined that he "impliedly agreed" that Case No. 119830 would not be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832, which finding was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual issues are beyond the province of this Court in a petition
for review, for it is not our function to review evidence all over again.17 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions
of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.18 The reason is that the Court is not a trier of
facts.19 However, the rule is subject to several exceptions.20 Under these exceptions, the Court may delve into and resolve factual
issues, such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd, contrary to the evidence on
record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of facts.
In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting
with those of the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on record. We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the
jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case differently.
An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of
the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
"salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.21 Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy
trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy
trial.22
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial
Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. 23 Aware of
problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98,
which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119. 24
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,25 the Court had occasion to state –
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to
a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be
definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it
must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:

S.V.Villanueva
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four
factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. x x x.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned
to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.26
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused’s right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this
right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right
or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.27
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases
No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal
Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence
for Criminal Case No. 119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the
four-factor test previously mentioned.
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is clearly insufficient,28 and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The
Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the
structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes
of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure
of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,31 the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy
disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Administrator,32 the Court, considering also the complexity of the
cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830
is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during
the initial hearing.33 Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the
prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to
object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence
of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.34 In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is
evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on
27 February 2001, herein quoted below:
COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first, your Honor, before we continue presenting
our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to two (2) of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of
Dante Tan x x x.
xxxx
COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange Commission, your Honor. We are presenting
this witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership case…
COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in presenting your first witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?
COURT: Show it to counsel.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised
Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such
fact.35
During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?

S.V.Villanueva
Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the
witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x. 36
The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante
Tan were being prosecuted:
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:
Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness in the
stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the witness. . .
xxxx
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of this case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly
[is] on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a clarification made by the parties and counsels after the
witness had testified that the hearing in these cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges, involving different
documents, your Honor. That is why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by Atty. Fortun,
because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I understand that the testimony of
this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your Honor.
ATTY. MARANAN:
We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already cross, it is clear that the direct examination dealt
exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.
PROS. LAZARO:
Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.37
Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not absolute. Where periods have been set, certain
exclusions are allowed by law.38 After all, this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not
exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence
continues to adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.39
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the
witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon
the prosecution.40 Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden
to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 41
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at
the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. 42 More importantly, in failing to interpose
a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after
the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.
For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s
right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.
There is also no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 is a violation of
his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article
III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

S.V.Villanueva
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.43
Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal
of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the
accused in double jeopardy.44 This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the
right to speedy trial.45 While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830, the
dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy
should the same charges be revived. Petitioner’s situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been
violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.
Following this Court’s ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,46 as petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this
exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused – was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly
capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.47
As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,48 reiterated in People v. Leviste,49 where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial
court predicated on the right to speedy trial –
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent
to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these
dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. x x x.
From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by
the Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to
speedy trial.
The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for
a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement
that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy trial and disposition of cases.50 Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone.51
Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring
that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Criminal Case No. 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the
BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and
to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the
workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.52
Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons.
Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and
no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
119830 with reasonable dispatch. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
RAUL NUÑEZ y REVILLEZA, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C.
No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba,

S.V.Villanueva
Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.3
On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
The Information reads:
That at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the 24th day of April 2001 4 at Brgy. San Antonio, Municipality of Los Ba[ñ]os,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law,
and in a search conducted at his residence as stated above, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody thirty[-]one (31) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total weight of 233.93 grams in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The facts are as follows:
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baños Police
Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession. The
group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano,
PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and
Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, Mundin called on
appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2
Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained
in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil
with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing ₱4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in
exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of Orderly
Search7which appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under the law. Accused is ordered to
pay the fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on May 2, 2006, pursuant
to our ruling in People v. Mateo.9 On January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellant’s conviction.
The appellate court dismissed appellant’s defense of frame-up and upheld the credibility of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It
observed that the inconsistencies in their testimony were minor at best, and did not relate to the elements of the crime.
The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba,
Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
From the appellate court’s decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to submit
supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellant manifested that
they are adopting their briefs before the appellate court.
In his brief, appellant contends that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE. 11
Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Regulated Drugs under the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out variances in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which cast doubt on his culpability: first, SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the barangay officials before going
to appellant’s house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod Joaquin was already with them when they left the police station;
second, while SPO1 Ilagan confirmed the presence of the accused during the search, PO2 Ortega related otherwise. More
importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and

S.V.Villanueva
street of his residence. He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room.
Finally, appellant questions why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the
search.
Conversely, the OSG argues that appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It agrees with the trial court that
appellant failed to overcome the presumption that the law enforcement agents regularly performed their duties. Further, the
OSG brands the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as self-serving, absent ill-motives ascribed to the search team.
It brushes aside appellant’s protest, on the validity of the search warrant, for having been belatedly made.
After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case, we are in agreement that appellant’s
petition lacks merit.
Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended which provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.12 All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is
commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases.13 In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.14
In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellant’s room; but appellant retorts that it was planted. The latter’s daughter, Liezel
Nuñez, testified on the alleged planting of evidence as follows:
xxxx
Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have you notice anything which catches your
attention?
A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.
Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?
A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man took out from his bag and placed the same
underneath your parents’ bed?
A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.
Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take from his bag?
A: Only one, sir.15 [Emphasis supplied.]
xxxx
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellant’s bed, appellant had not advanced any reason to
account for the thirty-one (31) packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily
signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither did appellant’s daughter identify the police
officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.16
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the barangay officials
who purportedly observed the search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the
trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the
right to choose whom he would present as witness.17 It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part
of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify
thereon.
Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the search in contrast to PO2 Ortega’s account.
The records, however, disclose otherwise. On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:
FISCAL:
Q: What did you do next?
WITNESS:
A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul Nuñez, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuñez who went inside?

S.V.Villanueva
A: It was Raul Nuñez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near the door along with Brgy. Capt. Mundin and
Chief Tanod who were looking at what was going on, sir.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:
xxxx
Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuñez?
A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuñez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt. Mundin, sir.19 [Emphasis supplied.]
Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby was deemed
waived when no objection was raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.20
As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to whether they picked up Chief Tanod Joaquin
at the barangay hall, the same is inconsequential. After all, the witnesses’ testimonies need only corroborate one another on
material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime.21
Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and consistent on material points: appellant was shown
the search warrant; the search was conducted in the latter’s presence; and SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellant’s dresser. It has
been ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative
testimony. Records show that appellant and the police officers were strangers to each other. Hence, there is no reason to suggest
that the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant.22
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. 23 In the case at bar,
Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only.
By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless
there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference.25
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder,
camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by
the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police
officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant’s residence they believed were
"proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible. 26
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the
things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.27 Accordingly, the objects
taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.1avvphi1
Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court proper. Under Section 20(3) 28 of Rep. Act
No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, possession of 200 grams or more of shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride)
renders the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, which is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to ₱10,000,000.
In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu. Hence there being no modifying circumstance
proven, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and ₱2,000,000 fine which the Court of Appeals meted on
appellant is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420 is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the official custodian of the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated drugs or
drug paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to appellant. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61323-24 June 29, 1984
RICHARD C. HOEY, petitioner, vs.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Carlos Vergabera and Richard C. Hoey, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:

S.V.Villanueva
In October 1980 and November 1980, petitioner Richard C. Hoey filed complaints with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
against Raul Leveriza, Jr., and Henry Unson, Jr., officers of Manotoc Securities, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Check Law. After preliminary investigation, the investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed the
informations in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549.
Accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration in both cases with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, after a
reinvestigation of the two (2) cases was made, corresponding Motions to Dismiss, dated June 7, 1982, were presented in court
for the reason that —
xxx xxx xxx
4. After analyzing all the allegations of the accused in the Motion for Reconsideration and the oppositions
filed thereto by the offended party, the undersigned finds that the subject matter in this case is a guarantee
check and as such is not covered by Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, hence the Information filed in this case does
not charge an offense and should therefore be dismissed, a copy of the Resolution of the undersigned dated
May 31, 1982 duly approved by Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo recommending for the dismissal of this case
is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
5. Although it was only accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. who filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration since the
Information filed in this case does not charge an offense the Information should be dismissed not only against
Raul Leveriza, Jr. but also against his co-accused Enrique Unson, Jr. (p. 24, Rollo)
Petitioner Richard C. Hoey, complainant in the two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549, opposed the Motion to Dismiss,
stating among others that —
Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson. Jr. were officers of Manotoc Securities Inc. That Raul Leveriza, Jr. had
diverted and converted the public funds entrusted to the corporation by the public as Manotoc Securities
was engaged in the business of soliciting money from the public to finance client accounts in their stockmarket
operations who wanted to buy or margin viable securities. That through his position as Executive Vice-
President, he was able to divert those funds to the amount of P10,422,573.00 to finance his own, his family's
and friends/projects and or corporations to the prejudice and damage of the public investors such as RICHARD
C. HOEY the complainant herein.
That as part of his scheme he and accused Henry Unson caused to issue and signed two (2) checks to the
order of the complainant herein which bounced due to a "closed account."
That IBAA Check No. HO-01293423 dated 6 November 1979 for the amount of P59,508.00 bounced due to a
closed account as well as IBAA Check No.
HO-01293422 dated November 14, 1979 for the amount of P82,634.20.
The signatories were Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson, Jr. for both checks files as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548
and 44549.
Though the accused Raul Leveriza Jr. suddenly moved out of his known residence at Marbella I Condominium,
Roxas Blvd., without leaving a forwarding address in order not to be found, his lawyers were furnished copies
as to the Rejoinder- Affidavits of the complainant during the preliminary investigation. The accused Raul
Leveriza, Jr. chose to remain unrepresented in that proceeding
Upon termination of the preliminary investigation and after the filing of the information, in order to delay
proceedings, his lawyers suddenly appeared and filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted.
That there were two issues raised in the re-investigation namely:
1. Whether or not a crossed check is a check;
2. Whether or not a check issued for guarantee is punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (pp. 30-30-A.
Rollo)
Before the lower court could act on the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Richard C. Hoey filed this petition with prayer that a writ of
mandamus with prohibition be issued ordering the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to prosecute the two cases for violation of
the Bouncing Check Law and to desist from pursuing or "to withdraw the two Motions to Dismiss thereby preventing the dismissal
of the cases and causing the continuation of the trial on the merits. " (p. 5, Rollo)
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides that "all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." Thus, it is clear that the question of instituting
a criminal charge in court is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal; and, the assumption is, the
information he lodges in court is supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. On the other hand, this Court has
ruled in Alberto vs. de la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406, that "a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof. Although this power and
prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person
committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be

S.V.Villanueva
compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence
to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's
decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor."
However, in cases where informations have already been filed in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over them. Otherwise
stated, the jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the information and, once acquired, its jurisdiction continues
until the termination of the case.
In the two (2) criminal cases in question, it is a fact that the informations have already been filed in court. It should therefore
dispose of them, one way or the other, resolving all motions brought before it including the Motions to Dismiss, dated June 7,
1982, filed by the Fiscal, or deciding the cases on the merit. The prosecuting fiscal has no more control over said cases, the same
having been transferred to the court. We have a situation where, akin to the pronouncement made by the present Chief Justice
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 452, whenever a formal complaint is presented in court against an individual, the court steps in
and takes control thereof until the same is finally disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113930 March 5, 1996
PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS LORENZO, SR., LUIS LORENZO, JR., AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N.
FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B. PALANNUAYAN, and WONG FONG FUI, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON. APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, and HON. PHILIP A.
AGUINALDO, in their capacities as Members of the Department of Justice "349" Committee, and the CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
J. ROBERT DELGADO, petitioner-Intervenor.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
We are urged in this petition to set aside (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No.
31226,1 which dismissed the petition therein on the ground that it has been "mooted with the release by the Department of
Justice of its decision . . . dismissing petitioners' petition for review"; (b) the resolution of the said court of 9 February
19942 denying the petitioners' motion to reconsider the decision; (c) the order of 17 May 19933 of respondent Judge Maximiano
C. Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 denying petitioners'
motion to suspend proceedings and to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the public prosecutor's motion
to defer arraignment; and (d) the resolutions of 23 July 1993 and 3 February 19944 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing
petitioners' petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City and denying the motion
to reconsider the dismissal, respectively.
The petitioners rely on the following grounds for the grant of the reliefs prayed for in this petition:
I
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the arrest of the petitioners without
examining the record of the preliminary investigation and in determining for himself on the basis thereof the
existence of probable cause.
II
The Department of Justice "349" Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refused to review
the City Prosecutor's Joint Resolution and dismissed petitioner's appeal therefrom.
III
The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the subject order directing the
issuance of the warrants of arrest without assessing for itself whether based on such records there is probable
cause against petitioners.
IV
The facts on record do not establish prima facie probable cause and Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 should
have been dismissed.5
The antecedents of this petition are not disputed.
Several thousand holders6 of "349" Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.'s (PEPSI's) Number Fever
Promotion7 filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the petitioner's in their respective
capacities as Presidents or Chief Executive Officers, Chairman of the Board, Vice-Chairman of the Board, and Directors of PEPSI,
and also against other officials of PEPSI. The complaints respectively accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the
following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines; (c) violation
of E.O. No. 913;8 and (d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled "An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements,"
as amended by Act No. 3740.9

S.V.Villanueva
After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, Ramon M. Gerona, released on 23 March 1993 a Joint
Resolution10 where he recommended the filing of an information against the petitioners and others for the violation of Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code and the dismissal of the complaints for the violation of Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code;
R.A. No. 7394; Act No. 2333, as amended by Act No. 3740; and E.O. No. 913. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. The attached information be filed against respondents Paul G. Roberts, Jr., Rodolfo C. Salazar, Rosemarie
R. Vera, Luis F. Lorenzo, Sr., Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr., J. Roberto Delgado, Amaury R. Gutierrez, Bayani N. Fabic, Jose
Yulo, Jr., Esteban B. Pacannuayan, Jr., Wong Fong Fui, Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. and Chito V. Gutierrez for estafa
under Article 318, Revised Penal Code, while the complaint for violation of Article 315, 2(d), Revised Penal
Code against same respondents Juanito R. Ignacio, R. Sobong, R.O. Sinsuan, M.P. Zarsadias, L.G. Dabao, Jr.,
R.L. Domingo, N.N. Bacsal, Jesus M. Manalastas, Janette P. Pio de Roda, Joaquin W. Sampaico, Winefreda O.
Madarang, Jack Gravey, Les G. Ham, Corazon Pineda, Edward S. Serapio, Alex O. Caballes, Sandy Sytangco,
Jorge W. Drysdale, Richard Blossom, Pablo de Borja, Edmundo L. Tan, Joseph T. Cohen, Delfin Dator, Zosimo
B. San Juan, Joaquin Franco, Primitivo S. Javier, Jr., Luisito Guevarra, Asif H. Adil, Eugenio Muniosguren, James
Ditkoff and Timothy Lane be dismissed;
2. The complaints against all respondents for violation of R.A. 7394 otherwise known as the Consumer Act of
the Philippines and violation of Act 2333 as amended by Act 3740 and E.O. 913 be also dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, and
3. I.S. Nos. 92-7833; 92-8710 and 92-P-1065 involving Crowns Nos. 173; 401; and 117, 425, 703 and 373,
respectively, alleged to be likewise winning ones be further investigated to afford respondents a chance to
submit their counter-evidence.11
On 6 April 1993, City Prosecutor Candido V. Rivera approved the recommendation with the modification that Rosemarie Vera,
Quintin Gomez, Jr., and Chito Gonzales be excluded from the charge on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 12
The information for estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was approved (on 7 April 1993) by Ismael P. Casabar, Chief of the
Prosecution Division, upon authority of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, and was filed with the RTC of Quezon City on 12 April
1993. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.13 The information reads as follows:
The undersigned 1st Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR. RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS F.
LORENZO, SR., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR., J. ROBERTO DELGADO, AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE
YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B. PACANNUAYAN, JR. and WONG FONG FUI, of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as
follows:
That in the month of February, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, the above-named
accused —
Paul G. Roberts, Jr. ) being then the Presidents
Rodolfo G. Salazar ) and Executive Officers
Luis F. Lorenzo, Sr. ) being then the Chairman
of the Board of Directors
Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. ) being then the Vice
Chairman of the Board
J. Roberto Delgado )
Amaury R. Gutierrez ) being then Members of
Bayani N. Fabic ) the Board
Jose Yulo, Jr. )
Esteban B. Pacannuayan, )
Jr. and
Wong Fong Fui )
OF THE PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSPIRING with one another, with intent of gain, by
means of deceit, fraudulent acts or false pretenses, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the private complainants whose
names with their prizes claimed appear in the attached lists marked as Annexes "A" to "A-46"; "B" to "-33";
"C" to "C-281"; "D" to "D-238"; "E" to "E-30" and "F" to "F-244" in the following manner: on the date and in
the place aforementioned, said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, launched the Pepsi Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. "Number Fever Promotion" from February 17 to May 8, 1992 later extended to May 11-June
12, 1992 and announced and advertised in the media that "all holders of crowns and/or caps of Pepsi, Mirinda,
Mountain Dew and Seven-up bearing the winning 3-digit number will win the full amount of the prize printed

S.V.Villanueva
on the crowns/caps which are marked with a seven-digit security code as a measure against tampering or
faking of crowns and each and every number has its own unique matching security code", enticing the public
to buy Pepsi softdrinks with aforestated alluring and attractive advertisements to become millionaires, and
by virtue of such representations made by the accused, the said complainants bought Pepsi softdrinks, but,
the said accused after their TV announcement on May 25, 1992 that the winning number for the next day
was "349", in violation of their aforecited mechanics, refused as they still refuse to redeem/pay the said Pepsi
crowns and/or caps presented to them by the complainants, who, among others, were able to buy Pepsi
softdrinks with crowns/caps bearing number "349" with security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ, despite
repeated demands made by the complainants, to their damage and prejudice to the extent of the amount of
the prizes respectively due them from their winning "349" crowns/caps, together with such amounts they
spent in going to and from the Office of Pepsi to claim their prizes and such other amounts used in buying
Pepsi softdrinks which the complainants normally would not have done were it not for the false, fraudulent
and deceitful posters of Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 14 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution14 alleging therein that (a) there was neither fraud in the Number Fever Promotion nor deviation from or modification
of the promotional rules approved by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), for from the start of the promotion, it had
always been clearly explained to the public that for one to be entitled to the cash prize his crown must bear both the winning
number and the correct security code as they appear in the DTI list; (b) the complainants failed to allege, much less prove
with prima facie evidence, the specific overt criminal acts or omissions purportedly committed by each of the petitioners; (c) the
compromise agreement entered into by PEPSI is not an admission of guilt; and (d) the evidence establishes that the promo was
carried out with utmost good faith and without malicious intent.
On 15 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review 15 wherein, for the same grounds adduced in the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the Joint Resolution be reversed and the complaints dismissed.
They further stated that the approval of the Joint Resolution by the City Prosecutor was not the result of a careful scrutiny and
independent evaluation of the relevant facts and the applicable law but of the grave threats, intimidation, and actual violence
which the complainants had inflicted on him and his assistant prosecutors.
On that same date, the petitioners filed in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they had filed the aforesaid Petition for Review. 16
On 21 April 1993, acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. de Guia issued a 1st Indorsement, 17 directing
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to move
in court for the deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the case, for the case
is being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Department Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990.
On 22 April 1993, Criminal Case No. Q-93-41398 was raffle to Branch 104 of the RTC of Quezon City.18
In the morning of 27 April 1993, private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest. 19
In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner Paul Roberts, Jr., filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings.20 He stressed that the DOJ had taken cognizance of the Petition for Review by
directing the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of I.S. No. P-4401 and its related cases and asserted that the petition for
review was an essential part of the petitioners' right to a preliminary investigation.
The next day, respondent Judge Asuncion, Presiding Judge of Branch 104 of the RTC of Quezon City, issued an order advising the
parties that his court would "be guided by the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462 and not by the resolution of the Department of Justice on the petition for review undertaken by the accused." 21
On 30 April 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed with the trial court a Motion to Defer Arraignment wherein he
also prayed that "further proceedings be held in abeyance pending final disposition by the Department of Justice." 22
On 4 May 1993, Gavero filed an Amended Information, 23 accompanied by a corresponding motion 24 to admit it. The
amendments merely consist in the statement that the complainants therein were only "among others" who were defrauded by
the accused and that the damage or prejudice caused amounted "to several billions of pesos, representing the amounts due them
from their winning '349' crowns/caps." The trial court admitted the amended information on the same date.25
Later, the attorneys for the different private complainants filed, respectively, an Opposition to Motion to Defer
Arraignment,26 and Objection and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest.27
On 14 May 1993, the petitioners filed a Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest.28
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying the petitioners' Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment

S.V.Villanueva
and (2) directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest "after June 1993" and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.29 Pertinent
portions of the order read as follows:
In the Motion filed by the accused, it is alleged that on April 15, 1993, they filed a petition for review seeking
the reversal of the resolution of City Prosecutor of Quezon City approving the filing of the case against the
accused, claiming that:
1. The resolution constituting [sic] force and duress;
2. There was no fraud or deceit therefore there can be no estafa;
3. No criminal overt acts by respondents were proved;
4. Pepsi nor the accused herein made no admission of guilt before the Department of
Trade and Industry;
5. The evidence presented clearly showed no malicious intent on the part of the accused.
Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero in his Motion to Defer Arraignment averred that there is a pending petition
for review with the Department of Justice filed by the accused and the Office of the City Prosecutor was
directed, among other things, to cause for the deferment of further proceedings pending final disposition of
said Petition by the Department of Justice.
The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are hereby DENIED.
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may
have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable
of administering justice.
The Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul (SCRA 151, pp. 471-472) stated as follows:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, let warrant of arrest be issued after June 21, 1993, and arraignment be set on June 28, 1993, at
9:30 in the morning.
On 7 June 1993, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application
for a temporary restraining order,30 which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31226. They contended therein that respondent Judge
Asuncion had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned order of
17 May 1993 because
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE RECORD OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE
ORDERING THE ARREST OF PETITIONERS.
II. THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONERS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR ESTAFA, OTHER DECEITS,
OR ANY OTHER OFFENSE.
III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE'S
RESOLUTION OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL, AND
IV. THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.
On 15 June 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo.31 In view thereof;
respondent Judge Asuncion issued an order on 28 June 199332 postponing indefinitely the arraignment of the petitioners which
was earlier scheduled on that date.
On 28 June 1993, the Court of Appeals heard the petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction, granted the motion
for leave to intervene filed by J. Roberto Delgado, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City to elevate the
original records of Criminal Case No. 4-93-43198.33
Upon receipt of the original records of the criminal case, the Court of Appeals found that a copy of the Joint Resolution had in
fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, which fact belied the petitioners' claim that the
respondent Judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. It ruled that the Joint Resolution "was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing
himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest"; and that the "mere
silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration" in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not
give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duty. The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution34 denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On 8 June 1993, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider35 the aforesaid resolution. The Court of Appeals required the
respondents therein to comment on the said motion.36

S.V.Villanueva
On 3 August 1993, the counsel for the private complainants filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a Manifestation3 7informing the court
that the petitioners' petition for review filed with the DOJ was dismissed in a resolution dated 23 July 1993. A copy 38 of the
resolution was attached to the Manifestation.
On 21 September 1993, the public respondents filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a motion to dismiss the petition39 on the ground
that it has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petitioners' petition to review the Joint
Resolution. The dismissal by the DOJ is founded on the following exposition:
You questioned the said order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals and prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the Trial Judge from issuing any warrant of arrest and from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused. The appellate court in a resolution dated July 1, 1993, denied your
petition.
In view of the said developments, it would be an exercise in futility to continue reviewing the instant cases
for any further action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
The denial by the said court of the motion to defer arraignment filed at our instance was clearly an exercise
of its discretion. With the issuance of the order dated May 17, 1993, Trial Court was in effect sending a signal
to this Department that "the determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence."
The rule is that ". . . once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to dismissal
or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court,
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. . . ." (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462).40
On 28 September 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 41 dismissing the petition because it had been "mooted with
the release by the Department of Justice of its decision . . . dismissing petitioners' petition for review by inerrantly upholding the
criminal court's exclusive and unsupplantable authority to control the entire course of the case brought against petitioners,
reiterating with approval the dictum laid down in the 'Crespo' case."
The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the DOJ's dismissal of the petition citing therein its resolutions in other similar cases
which were favorable to the petitioners and adverse to other "349" Pepsi crowns holders.
In its resolution of 3 February 1994, the DOJ, through its "349" Committee, denied the motion and stated: "The instant petition
is different from the other petitions resolved by this Department in similar cases from
the provinces. In the latter petitions, the complaints against herein respondents [sic]42 were dismissed inasmuch as the
informations have not yet been filed or even if already filed in court, the proceedings have been suspended by the courts to await
the outcome of the appeal pending with this Department."43
The petitioners likewise filed a motion to reconsider44 the aforesaid Court of Appeals' decision, which the said court denied in its
resolution 45 of 9 February 1994. Hence, the instant petition.
The First Division of this Court denied due course to this petition in its resolution of 19 September 1994. 46
On 7 October 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the
reconsideration 4 7 of the aforesaid resolution. Acting thereon, the First Division required the respondents to comment thereon.
Later, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration48 and a motion to refer this case to the Court en banc. 49 In
its resolution of 14 November 1994,50 the First Division granted the latter motion and required the respondents to comment on
the supplemental motion for reconsideration.
In the resolution of 24 November 1994, the Court en banc accepted the referral.
On 10 October 1995, after deliberating on the motion for reconsideration and the subsequent pleadings in relation thereto, the
Court en banc granted the motion for reconsideration; reconsidered and set aside the resolution of 19 September 1994; and
reinstated the petition. It then considered the case submitted for decision, "since the parties have exhaustively discussed the
issues in their pleadings, the original records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and of CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 had been elevated to
this Court, and both the petitioners and the Office of the Solicitor General pray, in effect, that this Court resolve the issue of
probable cause on the basis thereof."
The pleadings of the parties suggest for this Court's resolution the following key issues:
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
2. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
3. Whether the DOJ, through its "349" Committee, gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for
review on the following bases: (a) the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals denying the

S.V.Villanueva
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) of public respondent Asuncion's denial of the
abovementioned motions.
4. Whether public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in denying the motion
for a writ of preliminary injunction solely on the ground that public respondent Asuncion had already before
him the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor when he ordered the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness since the DOJ had dismissed
the petition for review.
5. Whether this Court may determine in this proceedings the existence of probable cause either for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
We resolve the first four issues in the affirmative and the fifth, in the negative.
I.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul51 which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way 'of a petition for review,
by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court." More specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should, be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.52
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,53 this Court explicitly declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after
the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court54 which recognizes the authority of the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on appeals from resolutions in preliminary
investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor,
the governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990. Section 2 thereof provided that only resolutions dismissing a
criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Its Section 4, 55however, provided an exception, thus allowing,
upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable cause, provided that
the accused has not been arraigned.
The DOJ gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 7.
Meanwhile, the DOJ promulgated on 30 June 1993 Department Order No. 22356 which superseded Circular No. 7. This Order,
however, retained the provisions of Section 1 of the Circular on appealable cases and Section 4 on the non-appealable cases and
the exceptions thereto.
There is nothing in Department Order No. 223 which would warrant a recall of the previous action of the DOJ giving due course
to the petitioners' petition for review. But whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings
and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may
have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable
of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of his court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions at that
stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the
petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Before that time, the following pronouncement
in Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or applicable:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and

S.V.Villanueva
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.57
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of
subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative. This Court pertinently stated so
in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals:58
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion
required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence
in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment
of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept
the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits
of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge
relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the
Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber
stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.
II.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except those in the National
Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive
original jurisdiction;59 in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when required; 60 and
in cases filed with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs);61 and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the
National Capital Region (MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary investigations
conducted by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs.62
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant
and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar 63 that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and the witnesses, but
[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof; issue
a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.64
Sound policy supports this procedure, "otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts."
It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they
must evaluate the report and the supporting document. In this sense, the aforementioned requirement has modified
paragraph 4(a) of Circular No. 12 issued by this Court on 30 June 1987 prescribing the Guidelines on Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provided in part as follows:
4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge,
following established doctrine and procedure, may either:
(a) Rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause whether or not
the case is cognizable only by the Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. . . .
This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting documents was
further explained in People vs. Inting,65 where this Court specified what the documents may consist of, viz., "the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination" of probable cause. Thus:

S.V.Villanueva
We emphasize the important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III,
Section 2, Constitution).
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make
the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.
By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
In adverting to a statement in People vs. Delgado66 that the judge may rely on the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted
the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, this Court stressed in Lim vs. Felix67 that
Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either
the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or
resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on
the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
And noting that judges still suffer from the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this
Court found it necessary to restate the rule "in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms." It then proceeded to do so,
thus:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the
taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's
bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances
of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should
be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge
by the Constitution. It can be as brief as or detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should
call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
This Court then set aside for being null and void the challenged order of respondent Judge Felix directing the issuance
of the warrants of arrest against petitioners Lim, et al., solely on the basis of the prosecutor's certification in the
informations that there existed probable cause "without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause."
In Allado vs. Diokno,68 this Court also ruled that "before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof."
In the recent case of Webb vs. De Leon,69 this Court rejected the thesis of the petitioners of absence of probable cause and
sustained the investigating panel's and the respondent Judge's findings of probable cause. After quoting extensively from Soliven
vs. Makasiar,70 this Court explicitly pointed out:
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law repudiate the submission of petitioners
that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants
of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest
before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to
a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn statements
of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer as well as the counter-affidavits of the
petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again,
we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of the guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot

S.V.Villanueva
be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours
to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. (emphasis supplied)
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutor's
certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in
the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the
trial court. As found by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 July 1993, a copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and
received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification71 of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula,
Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or
other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 as of 19 May 1993.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance
of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have
the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding
of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest "after June 21, 1993." It may, however, be argued that
the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection
of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
III.
As earlier stated, per its 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993, the DOJ gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review pursuant
to the exception provided for in Section 4 of Circular No. 7, and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
forward to the Department the records of the cases and to file in court a motion for the deferment of the proceedings. At the
time it issued the indorsement, the DOJ already knew that the information had been filed in court, for which reason it directed
the City Prosecutor to inform the Department whether the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move
to defer further proceedings. It must have been fully aware that, pursuant to Crespo vs. Mogul, a motion to dismiss a case filed
by the prosecution either as a consequence of a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice after a review of
the records of the investigation is addressed to the trial court, which has the option to grant or to deny it. Also, it must have been
still fresh in its mind that a few months back it had dismissed for lack of probable cause other similar complaints of holders of
"349" Pepsi crowns.72 Thus, its decision to give due course to the petition must have been prompted by nothing less than an
honest conviction that a review of the Joint Resolution was necessary in the highest interest of justice in the light of the special
circumstances of the case. That decision was permissible within the "as far as practicable" criterion in Crespo.
Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed on 23 July 1993 a unilateral volte-face, which was even
unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same end, by dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition
simply because it thought that a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in that any further action on the
part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the latter's denial of the motion to
defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the
Department that the determination of the case is within the court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity becomes
more pronounced because the reason adduced by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to suspend proceedings
and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.
IV.
If the only issue before the Court of Appeals were the denial of the petitioners' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment, which were both based on
the pendency before the DOJ of the petition for the review of the Joint Resolution, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 on the
basis of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petition for review might have been correct. However, the petition likewise involved the
issue of whether respondent Judge Asuncion gravely abused his discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest despite
want of basis. The DOJ's dismissal of the petition for review did not render moot and academic the latter issue.
In denying in its resolution of 1 July 1993 the petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent
Judge Asuncion from issuing warrants of arrest, the Court of Appeals justified its action in this wise:
The Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent judge in convincing
himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest.
The mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration in the questioned Order of May 17,
1993 as to where the respondent Judge based his finding of probable cause does not give rise to any adverse
inference on his part. The fact remains that the Joint Resolution was at respondent Judge's disposal at the

S.V.Villanueva
time he issued the Order for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. After all, respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official actuations. And this presumption prevails
until it is overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption, and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful it
should be construed to be lawful. (31 C.J.S., 808-810. See also Mahilum, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA
482; People vs. Cortez, 21 SCRA 1228; Government of the P.I. vs. Galarosa, 36 Phil. 338).
We are unable to agree with this disquisition, for it merely assumes at least two things: (1) that respondent Judge Asuncion had
read and relied on the Joint Resolution and (2) he was convinced that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners. Nothing in the records provides reasonable basis for these assumptions. In his assailed order, the
respondent Judge made no mention of the Joint Resolution, which was attached to the records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198
on 22 April 1993. Neither did he state that he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. And, for an undivinable
reason, he directed the issuance of warrants of arrest only "after June 21, 1993." If he did read the Joint Resolution and, in so
reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no reason at all to delay for more than one month the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The most probable explanation for such delay could be that the respondent Judge had actually wanted to wait for a
little while for the DOJ to resolve the petition for review.
It is, nevertheless, contended in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno that whatever doubts may have lingered
on the issue of probable cause was dissolved when no less than the Court of Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause
made by the respondent Judge after an evaluation of the Joint Resolution. We are not persuaded with that opinion. It is anchored
on erroneous premises. In its 1 July 1993 resolution, the Court of Appeals does not at all state that it either sustained respondent
Judge Asuncion's finding of probable cause, or found by itself probable cause. As discussed above, it merely presumed that Judge
Asuncion might have read the Joint Resolution and found probable cause from a reading thereof. Then too, that statement in the
dissenting opinion erroneously assumes that the Joint Resolution can validly serve as sufficient basis for determining probable
cause. As stated above, it is not.
V.
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a judicial prerogative. In People
vs. Inting,73 this Court aptly stated:
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one
and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable
cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether
or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.
....
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with
the judge. . . .
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the
issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile74 as follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
(Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383,
May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Oil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

S.V.Villanueva
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25,
1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J.
[1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal,
L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent to threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953). (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation, as it did in Salonga vs. Paño,75 Allado, and Webb.
There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and several
thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly situated as the former for being holders of "349" Pepsi crowns,
any affirmative holding of probable cause in the said case may cause or provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners, the filing of
several thousand cases in various courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the petitioners would be exposed to the harassments
of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to huge expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for travels from one court
to another throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such cases. Worse, the filing
of these staggering number of cases would necessarily affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of
their attention, time, and energy, which they could devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a frightful scenario
would seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions — a situation already
long conceded by this Court to be an exception to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction.76
We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43298. For, as earlier stated, the respondent Judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause
exists, and if he did he did not have the basis therefor as mandated by Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and even Webb. Moreover,
the records of the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 are not with this Court. They were forwarded by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial
court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the following are hereby SET ASIDE:
(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February 1994 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31226;
(b) The Resolutions of the "349" Committee of the Department of Justice of 23 July 1993 dismissing the
petitioners' petition for review and of 3 February 1994 denying the motion to reconsider the dismissal; and
(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.
The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits, within sixty (60) days from notice of this decision, the petitioners'
petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Ramon Gerona and thereafter to file the appropriate
motion or pleading in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, which respondent Judge Asuncion shall then resolve in light of Crespo vs.
Mogul, Soliven vs. Makasiar, People vs. Inting, Lim vs. Felix,Allado vs. Diokno, and Webb vs. De Leon.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. Q-
93-43198 and to defer the issuances of warrants of arrest against the petitioners. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National
Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER
MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular
way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of

S.V.Villanueva
mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of
mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case
No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus.2
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio
Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the
Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26,
2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more
than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against
petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the
venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue.7 However, on
December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation
regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. 8 Later on,
additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial
pursuant to the resolution of the Court.9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was arraigned on January
5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in
relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of
Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009.14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.15 On September 7, 2010, the QC
RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag
had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request
twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-
124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial
in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777. At the close
of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18, 2011,25 respondents questioned the propriety of
the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the RTC in Manila granted on March
21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ,
requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena.28 Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the subpoena on April
15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011; 30 petitioner an opposition on
May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for
mandamus.34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues

S.V.Villanueva
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY
DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN
LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND
THE QC RTC; and,
2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION
AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING
ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION. 35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are
to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. 36
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not
to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of
Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying
the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the
joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag
be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However,
his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of
Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of
which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge
from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for
admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge
of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting
him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with their
consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial
court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in
support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied
with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most
guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the
State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever
the following circumstances are present:

S.V.Villanueva
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent
under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant
to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies
with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as
a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules are essentially the same.
Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may
also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No.
6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one
charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar
to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.40 The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may be
utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, 42 such discretion is not absolute and may not
be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice.43 Anent the requisite that there must be an
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of
and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than
the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to
become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs
to establish his case,44 as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused
is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as
one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness
under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal
information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial
court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the
certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness.46 The
Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was
warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the
conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the
Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that
was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in
the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in
accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action,
but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,48or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. 49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled
to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied
the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case
No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

S.V.Villanueva
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188217 July 3, 2013
FERNANDO M. ESPINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated 24 February 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31106, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos.02-01226 to 31 convicting the accused of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a); and the CA Resolution3 dated 25 May 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
the accused in the same case.
The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:
The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc.
(KN lnc.).4 His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators.5
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal’s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the company’s import coordinators. 6
During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the endorsements of the payee on six checks were
forged,7 and that the checks were rediscounted by the accused’s aunt-in-law.8 She later testified to her participation in the
rediscounting and encashment of the checks.9
The accused testified for himself, claiming that what precipitated the charges was his employer’s discontent after he had allegedly
lost an account for the company.10 He was eventually forced to resign and asked to settle some special arrangements with
complainant.11 Alongside being made to submit the resignation, he was also asked to sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers
written on it.12 He complied with these demands under duress, as pressure was exerted upon him by complainants.13 Later on,
he filed a case for illegal dismissal,14 in which he denied having forged the signature of Mr. Banaag at the dorsal portion of the
checks.15
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of the aunt-in-law of the accused, to prove that the accused had called her
to ask if she could rediscount some checks, and that she agreed to do so upon his assurance that he knew the owner of those
checks.16
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a). 17 In response, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,18 arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which
was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence
to support his conviction.19 Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated.20
In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and character of the crime charged are
determined by the facts alleged in the information, and not by a reference to any particular section of the law. 21 Subsequently,
the RTC denied the Motion.22
The accused then elevated the case to the CA23 on the same grounds that he cited in his Motion, but it denied his appeal,24 stating
that the alleged facts sufficiently comprise the elements of estafa as enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a).25 His subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
The accused thus filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process. 26 Specifically, he claims that he was denied due process when
he was convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).27 He argues that the elements constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that this
difference should be reflected in the Information.28 According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b) would not merit a conviction
under paragraph 2(a).29 Thus, he emphasizes the alleged failure to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.30
The issue that must be determined is whether a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally
permissible.
Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him" in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however,
to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in People v. Manalili:
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that "what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law." x x x. (Emphasis supplied)31
This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained
to the charge and conviction for estafa.

S.V.Villanueva
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling words of the Information are found in
its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the
Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts
alleged in the information. The Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts
stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be
tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. (Emphases supplied)32
Clearly, the fiscal’s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC,33 did not bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement
never limited the RTC’s discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. The Court further explains the
rationale behind this discretion in this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable
the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set
forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the
information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested,
are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to
him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended.
For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name
of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named x
x x. (Emphases supplied)34
Any doubt regarding the matter should end with the Court’s conclusion:
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which states
that petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed
estafa under Article 318) and the absence of the words "fraud" or "deceit" in the Information, the Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their
purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general committed through the offense of falsification of
public document. As the Sandiganbayan correctly held:
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the
definition and the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and
for him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. It is not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language of the statute. What is important is that the crime
is described in intelligible and reasonable certainty. (Emphasis supplied)35
Moreover, the Court declared that in an information for estafa, the use of certain technical and legal words such as "fraud" or
"deceit," is not necessary to make a proper allegation thereof.36
Thus, the only important question left to be answered is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of
which the accused was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting him of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) instead of paragraph 1(b)? The answer to this question, however, requires further reflection.
The crime charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Its elements are as follows: (1) that
money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.37
However, the crime the accused was convicted of was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a). The elements of this crime are as
follows: (1) that there is a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means is made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party

S.V.Villanueva
relies on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he is induced to part with his money or property because
of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 38
The six Informations are all similar in content except in the amounts and the check numbers. One of them reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of July, 2000, in the City of Paranaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein
represented by Honesto Raquipiso, tasked with liasoning with the import coordinators of the complainant’s various clients
including the delivery of their commissions, said accused received in trust from the complainant Metrobank check no.
1640443816 in the amount of ₱12,675.00 payable to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay, with the obligation to
deliver the same but said accused failed to deliver said check in the amount of ₱12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the
same, forged the signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check rediscounted and far from complying with his obligation, despite
demands to account and/or remit the same, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds thereof to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of ₱12,675.00.39
Are the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a) present in the above-quoted Information? Arguably so, because the accused
represented to the injured party that he would be delivering the commission to Mr. Banaag; and because of this representation,
KN Inc. turned over checks payable to Mr. Banaag to the accused. In turn, the accused rediscounted the checks for money, to the
detriment of both Mr. Banaag and KN Inc. However, this set of facts seems to miss the precision required of a criminal conviction.
Estafa under paragraph 2(a) is swindling by means of false pretense, and the words of the law bear this out:
Article 315.
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. x x x.
In this case, there was no use of a fictitious name, or a false pretense of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
or business. At the most, the situation could be likened to an imaginary transaction, although the accused was already trusted
with the authority to deliver commissions to Mr. Banaag. The pretense was in representing to the injured party that there was a
deliverable commission to Mr. Banaag, when in fact there was none.1âwphi1
Instead of unduly stretching this point, the Court deems it wiser to give the offense its true, formal name – that of estafa through
abuse of confidence under paragraph 1(b).
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This at least, is very clearly shown
by the factual allegations of the Informations.
First, personal property in the form of the checks was received by the offender in trust or on commission, with the duty to deliver
it to Mr. Banaag. Even though the accused misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was
obliged by KN Inc., the injured party, to deliver the check and account for it. Second, the accused rediscounted the checks to his
aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not the payee and
therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this wrongful encashment prejudiced KN Inc., which lost the proceeds of the
check. When accounting was demanded from the accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse. His series of acts precisely
constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b).
Nevertheless, this Court need not make such a detailed and narrow analysis. In llagan v. Court of Appeals, it stated that estafa
can be committed by means of both modes of commission in the following way:
x x x Estafa can be committed with the attendance of both modes of commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed
against the same victim and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the landowner the real
position of the prospective buyer of the land in order to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent
sold the land for the higher amount which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely
misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was committed under both modes and he could be charged under either.
(Emphases supplied)40
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with
both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that
one act can give rise to two offenses,41 all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present
Petition cannot withstand the tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the
circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason for this Court to review the

S.V.Villanueva
findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower
courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 24 February 2009 and
Resolution dated 25 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184536 August 14, 2013
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, Petitioner,
vs.
LEILA F. GIRON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision1 dated 30 June 2008 and Resolution2 dated 18 September 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Department
of Justice (DOJ), which dismissed respondent Leila F. Giron’s complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against
petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa.
On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and
several John Does. Respondent alleged that sometime on December 2005, she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos)
filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo
and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions.
Respondent averred that since the filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to
pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion,
slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.
Respondent recalled that on 17 July 2006, she received a call from an alleged messenger of her counsel who requested for a
meeting at Harrison Plaza Mall in Manila. She asked Marcos to accompany her. While respondent and Marcos were on their way
to Harrison Plaza Mall, they noticed a black Pajero car parked in front of the Package B Building inside the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) compound, the place where both of them work. When they reached the mall, they went inside the SM
Department Store to buy a few things. They then noticed two men following them. Respondent immediately called a close friend
and reported the incident. Thereafter, respondent and Marcos went out of the department store and stood near the food stalls
to make another phone call. Respondent suddenly felt a man’s gun being pushed against the right side of her body. She panicked
and her mind went blank. Respondent and Marcos were taken at gunpoint and pushed inside a black Pajero. 3
While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and gagged. They were taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors
into withdrawing the case against petitioner. When her blindfold was loosened, respondent was able to take a good look at her
surroundings. She noticed that the car was parked in a warehouse with concrete walls and high roof. She also saw four vehicles
parked outside. She finally saw three men wearing bonnets over their faces: the first one, seated beside her; the second one,
seated in front; and the third one, was standing near the parked vehicles.4
Before respondent and Marcos were released, they were once again threatened by a man who said: "pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay
Hasegawa, may paglalagyan na kayo, walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin
kayo." They were released at around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006 and dropped off in Susana Heights in Muntinlupa. 5
In a separate Affidavit, Marcos corroborated respondent’s account of the alleged kidnapping. Marcos added that while she was
in captivity, her blindfold was loosened and she was able to see petitioner inside one of the vehicles parked nearby, talking to
one of their abductors, whom she noticed to be wearing bonnets. 6
Petitioner, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied the accusation of kidnapping and serious illegal detention against him. Petitioner
categorically stated that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping; that he was neither the "brains" nor a "participant" in the
alleged crimes; that he did not know the alleged kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside one of the vehicles talking with
one of the abductors at the place alleged by Marcos.7
Petitioner also pointed out several supposed inconsistencies and improbabilities in the complaint, such as:
1. Respondent and Marcos claim that petitioner has continuously warned them about withdrawing the complaint since
its filing on December 2005 but petitioner only came to know about the complaint on 8 May 2006;
2. After being set free by their alleged abductors, respondent and Marcos did not immediately report the matter to the
police either in Manila or Muntinlupa;
3. It is strange that respondent and Marcos did not know who their lawyer’s messenger is and did not find it unusual
that their lawyer would call for a meeting in Harrison Plaza Mall instead of at his office;
4. Petitioner wondered how respondent and Marcos could remember and distinguish the alleged black Pajero used by
their captors to be the same black Pajero they saw in the parking lot of LRTA Package B Building;

S.V.Villanueva
5. It is incredible that the two alleged abductors were able to enter SM Department Store with guns in their possession;
6. It is an act contrary to human nature that upon noticing two men following them, respondent and Marcos went
outside the department store to make a phone call, instead of staying inside the department store;
7. Marcos never mentioned that respondent’s mobile phone was ringing while they were inside the vehicle;
8. The alleged statements made by the kidnappers demanding withdrawal of complaint against petitioner are hearsay;
9. It is unimaginable that petitioner was supposedly allowed to text and Marcos was allowed to call someone on her
mobile phone;
10. It was very convenient for Marcos to mention that she saw petitioner inside one of the vehicles talking to one of
the abductors. If indeed petitioner is involved in the kidnapping, he would never allow his identity to be exposed;
11. Respondent and Marcos did not report to the Philippine National Police what had happened to them. Only
respondent wrote a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), two weeks later, detailing her ordeal. And only
respondent filed the instant case two months later; and
12. Respondent and Marcos continued to work after their alleged kidnapping.8
Petitioner asserted that respondent and Marcos are extorting money from him because the instant case was filed right after the
negotiations to settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.9
Petitioner’s personal driver, Edamar Valentino, corroborated petitioner’s statement that on 17 and 18 July 2006, he drove
petitioner at 7:30 a.m. and brought him home after work as was his usual schedule.10
In a Resolution11 dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause.
Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing her complaint. In her Petition for Review before the
DOJ, respondent claimed that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the dismissal of the case against
petitioner despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause. She thus prayed for the reversal of the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor.
Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed
the petition on 11 April 2007.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the DOJ, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and
ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner. The Court of Appeals found
that "the Secretary of Justice arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for
pieces of evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited to a trial proper."12 The appellate court went on to state
that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when she "overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not
of ordinary prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere ‘reasonable belief’ and probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits,
where rules on admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply."13
The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution14 dated 18 September
2008. Hence, the instant petition attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THAT NO
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
RAISING QUESTIONS OF FACT AND BEING UNMERITORIOUS.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS THE
PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.15
Petitioner insists that there was no showing that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that no
probable cause exists to indict him for the crimes charged. Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently
explained the reasons why no probable cause exists in this case. Petitioner faults the appellate court for also having done what
it has charged the Secretary of Justice of doing, i.e., deliberating point by point the issues and arguments raised by the parties in
its Decision. Petitioner also faults the appellate court for overlooking the fact that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
charges are but the fourth in a series of successive cases filed by respondent against petitioner, all of which were dismissed by
the BID, NLRC and MeTC of Pasay City. Petitioner argues that a review of facts and evidence made by the appellate court is not
the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the appellate court should have dismissed
outright respondent’s petition for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the wrong mode of
appeal.

S.V.Villanueva
We had initially denied this petition, but upon motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, we decided to reconsider said denial
and to give it due course.16
Directed to file her Comment, respondent counters that in preliminary investigation cases, such as that done in this case, there
is, as yet no occasion for the parties to display their full and exhaustive evidence, as a mere finding that the kidnapping might
have been committed by petitioner is already sufficient.
The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.17
The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
lack of probable cause.
The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination
of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether to
prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding
information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In
sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are
patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.18 We find such reason for judicial review here present. We
sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.19
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by
the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.20
It must be mentioned, though, that in order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. 21
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. the offender is a private individual;
2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, female, or a public officer.
All elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend
were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether
or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
The findings of the Investigating Prosecutor rest on lack of prima facie evidence against petitioner.1âwphi1 That the kidnapping
and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication was based on the Investigating Prosecutor’s observations, as follows:
First, no law enforcement agency has investigated the complaint and indorsed the same to the prosecution office for preliminary
investigation as is the usual procedure for grave offenses. Second, the other victim, Marcos, did not file a case against petitioner.
Third, respondent continued to report to work at the LRTA compound where the supposed mastermind also works. Fourth, there
was the unexplained absence of report of the alleged incident to any police or law enforcement agencies which taints the

S.V.Villanueva
trustworthiness of respondent’s allegations. Fifth, respondents’ theory on the motive for her kidnapping has been shown to be
fallacious. Sixth, respondent’s propensity to file a string of cases against petitioner supports the contention that all these are part
of her corrupt scheme to extort money from petitioner. And seventh, vital witnesses for the respondent such as the NBI agent
assigned to her complaint and her other officemates who could have corroborated her story were not presented.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent
had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed
upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The
issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary
stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The validity
and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.22 By taking into consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the
Investigating Prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case. As aptly stated by the appellate court:
That the NBI or other prosecutor agencies of the government neglected to act on the petitioner’s complaint can hardly constitute
evidence that the incident did not in fact happen, or was merely fabricated or invented to extort money from the private
respondent. Instead of faulting the complainants and questioning their motivations, the strong arm of the State might be better
off investigating non-feasance in public office.
In any event, the perceived inconsistencies are more imaginary than real, delving as it does on minor, ambiguous and
inconsequential matters that may yet be properly addressed in a full-dress court hearing. We thus agree with the petitioner’s
assertion on the lack of any legal or factual basis for the public respondent’s refusal to apply the rule that a positive declaration
is superior to a negative averment. It is well to recall that the nullity of a resolution may be shown not only by what patently
appears on its face, but also by the documentary and the testimonial evidence found in the records of the case, upon which such
ruling is based.
True, discretion lies with the investigator to believe more the respondent’s alibi, or to shoot down the credibility of the
complainant as well as the testimony of her witnesses. Still, she may not, as here, turn a blind eye to evidence upon formidable
evidence mounting to show the acts complained of. Such cavalier disregard of the complainants’ documents and attestations
may otherwise be the "arbitrary, whimsical and capricious" emotion described in the term, "grave abuse."
It may not even matter that the respondent presented his own counter-arguments in avoidance of the complaints, assuming he
also did so adeptly, convincingly; far crucial is discerning that the task transcended mere discovery of the likelihood or the
"probability" that a crime was committed, but ventured into weighing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. Indeed, the
respondent Secretary arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for pieces of
evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited to a trial proper.23
Thus, did the Court of Appeals detail why the holding that there is no probable cause to indict petitioner amounted to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. Resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and the grant thereof by
the Court of Appeals is correct.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The 30 June 2008 Decision and the 18
September 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152259 July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea and trial, however they may be named
or identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of
justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed
waived and can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly,
in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government." This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad,"
because it can easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal
statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the "overbreadth" and the "void-for-vagueness" doctrines, which apply only to
free-speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November 20, 20012 and the
March 1, 20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:

S.V.Villanueva
"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The arraignment of the accused and the pre-
trial of the case shall proceed as scheduled."4
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12,
1989 an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No.
3019,5 as amended. The Information reads:
'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree,
did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-
interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures,
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the
Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the
amount of P5,000,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that
no valid preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could
be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having been undertaken by a biased and partial
investigative body.
"On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order giving the accused fifteen days to
file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
"[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that
[the Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
"On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested that the
prosecution had already concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case.
Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation. However, Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
"Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second 'MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
"On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
"On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a 'MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS'. On June 29, 2001, the
[Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
"The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
'I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND
'B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED
'III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
'IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION'" 6
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the third one, had already been raised by him
and passed upon in its previous Resolutions.7 In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the
1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been
committed on or about 1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him.8

S.V.Villanueva
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised.
It ruled that his right to a preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation. 9 It further
held that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the
Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.10
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess
of jurisdiction –
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness violates the due process right
of an individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the due process right of an
individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him was violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated during the preliminary
investigation stage in the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No. 13736; and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial investigator.
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune from criminal
prosecution.
And
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to equal protection of the laws." 12
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the
Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article
VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was
this Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to quash. 13 We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us
challenges the denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner could have filed a motion for reconsideration of
the denial. Had reconsideration been turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for certiorari14 -
- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- which should be filed within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;15 or (2) to proceed
to trial without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same questions before the proper
appellate court.16 But instead of availing himself of these remedies, he filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a "motion to dismiss." Both pray for an identical relief, which
is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding
to trial. A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the
nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use the
term "motion to quash" in criminal,17 and "motion to dismiss" in civil, proceedings.18
In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the "Motion to Dismiss" are anchored on basically the same
grounds and pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise
issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to
preliminary objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and

S.V.Villanueva
unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally
deemed waived.19 Petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" violates this rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed outright. However, given the importance of this
case in curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges
the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is allegedly
vague and "impermissibly broad."
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth20 and the vagueness21 doctrines have special application only to free-speech
cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as
follows:
"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling
effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that '[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with
no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
xxxxxxxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be
made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"22(underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." 23 While
mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction.
In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection
clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec25 decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec26 held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v.
Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:27
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative
and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case
that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. 28
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only "as applied" to the defendant, herein
petitioner, and should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
"Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or
affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the

S.V.Villanueva
President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any
person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already
dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of
which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity
or in the exercise of a profession."
Petitioner also claims that the phrase "to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with
the Government" is vague and violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.29 He further
complains that the provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right
to be presumed innocent.30 We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.31 On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.32 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.33 To doubt
is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,34 the rationale for the presumption of
constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted."35
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption. This Court has previously laid down the test
for determining whether a statute is vague, as follows:
"x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
species of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
"A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.36 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations
that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be 'saved' by
proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.37 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
"The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 38 It must be
stressed, however, that the 'vagueness' doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will
not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes."39
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,40 in which the Court said that there was nothing vague about a penal law that
adequately answered the basic query "What is the violation?"41 Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary
matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case.42
The question "What is the violation?" is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA 3019, as follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the President of
the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
government.

S.V.Villanueva
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioner's claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word
can easily be understood through simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute
will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function of
construction.43 Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
"x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;44 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act x x x.
"x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,45 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.46 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed."47
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to "to come between." 48Criminally liable
is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance
details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded.
Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any event, the "overbreath" and "void for
vagueness" doctrines are not applicable to this case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further contends that the Information itself is also
unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.49 Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion
for a bill of particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and
the details desired."
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what
they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. 51 The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information.52
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the information, 53 matters of evidence -- as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances
must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.55
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been
stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him
to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the
Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation when he questioned before this Court in GR No.
128317 the Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.56 Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,57 he undauntedly averred that he was deprived
of his right to a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as complainant and as investigator.58
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter
could not do so with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence
and subsequently filed the complaint.59 On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and
directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG
initiated the present Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was

S.V.Villanueva
accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The
procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,60 which held that the failure to conduct a valid
preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been filed, the proper
procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or
completed.61
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October
8, 1999.62 Such issue should be disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the
60-day period for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that
raises the same issue and the same arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according
to the Information, the offense was committed "during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975." He argues that when the
Information was filed on July 12, 1989,63 prescription had already set in, because the prescriptive period for a violation of Republic
Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the time the offense was allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive period to
fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195. 64
Act No. 3326, as amended,65 governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not
be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019
(committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.66 In Republic v. Desierto, the Court
explained:
"This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of
the Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover
the so-called 'Behest Loans', where the Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and
entities connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court
ruled that:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired with the 'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
xxx xxx xxx
'People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of things, acts
made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason,
the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription
begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or
acts.' (Italics supplied)
"There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one which lead us to apply the
ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both
were 'discovered' only after the government created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both
involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings
that the respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden from
public scrutiny.
"This Court's pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant and instructive as to the date
when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the

S.V.Villanueva
transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The alleged anomalous
transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original
respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would
have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive
period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February
1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.'"67
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general rule that prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the crime cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved
party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged intervention was made. The accused is the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos' brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the majority stocks
of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question the legality of the sale or would even have
thought of investigating petitioner's alleged involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation 68of PCGG69 and its
exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint
against former President Marcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing
of the Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically,
as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos.70 He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
which we quote:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts
done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
"x x x xxx x x x"
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment
became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,71 this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its
applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be
used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of
petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious
acts of public officials and their close relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands on the same footing as any other trespasser."
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.72 On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the submission
of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder
filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the
Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

S.V.Villanueva
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to
respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for
petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder
Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and
his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial
and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner
prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also
prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why
He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The
court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND
SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by
accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from
custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED.
Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition
for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the
accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion
and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not
guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the
equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with
whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious -
results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection
of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the
case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder
as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio

S.V.Villanueva
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACYwith his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00],
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial
of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3)
parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in
general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and
state the names of the accused who committed each act.

S.V.Villanueva
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Informationwhich is of "receiving
or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling
in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in
conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the
phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080.
For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning,
the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act
in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge him
with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way
below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution
of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious collection of
protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact
that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor,
jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan"
of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was delivered to
petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is
specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte,
demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof,
channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x." 15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against
him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued
a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of
probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing
with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." 16 Thus, he posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one who is
clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused
is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may
have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the
courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act
or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended
Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he
bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the
second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from
that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section
2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a

S.V.Villanueva
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal liability
is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a)
but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator
of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the provisions of R.A. No.
7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The
first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays
down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the
crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged
in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged
the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-
paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from
the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former
President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and
deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under
item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d),
thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Informationis worded, however, it is not certain whether
the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each otherto enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten
wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with
the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d).
We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph
(a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass
ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of
R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder
Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President
Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude
of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing
laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically
the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:

S.V.Villanueva
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high
office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period
of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and
graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to
the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made
up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale,
nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual
acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or
for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the
so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President
Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy,
i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of
conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the
innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine
law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished
as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.
In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of
conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or
some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to
commit the underlying substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy27 – conspiracy to
commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or
to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for
such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to
prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the
United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the
place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his
lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."

S.V.Villanueva
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to
defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the United States" refers to an
act made a crime by federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of
U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency,
copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of
federal regulation.32Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of
conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense, 33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money. It also
covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that
are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal
or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law on howconspiracy should
be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes,
in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a
bill of particulars.37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward
which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. 38 To allege that the
defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their
conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and
where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases
where such object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases
challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or
causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it
may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet
the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary
to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. 46 The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth
in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war,
two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them
aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government
of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons
come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and
(4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the
information.

S.V.Villanueva
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes
the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for
the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike
the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied
by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the
act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own
participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces
a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that
the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character
of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement
of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language
of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or
that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such
an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement
to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by
the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an
offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or
design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 55 A statement of this
evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed
the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these
words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.

S.V.Villanueva
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this Court,
petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that
he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of
detention.1âwphi1 The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr.
Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier
filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said
court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated December 20,
2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis."57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio,
the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of
the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when
the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the
defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution
to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted
by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception
of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that
evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of
petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88044 January 23, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN CAGADAS, JR., MACARIO BARBERO, ROMY TULIO, CORITO PIASIDAD, RENE BALONG, ROBERTO CULTURA and
TATOR SALVADOR, appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appelle.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This case was elevated to this Court on appeal as the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon the appellants.
On June 6, 1973, at around 6:30 in the morning, Rex Ballena and his sister, Lucia Ballena-Tabo, left their residences at
Longganapan, San Vicente, Davao, bound for the capital town of Tagum, to withdraw some money with which to pay their farm
laborers. In order to reach their destination, they had to pass through Sitio Rizal in Binancian, Municipality of Asuncion, Davao,
to take a jeepney ride to Tagum. While waiting inside the jeep at the Sitio Rizal Terminal, some members of the Integrated Civil
Home Defense Force (ICHDF), including the accused, approached them and asked where they were bound for and why. Rex
Ballena naively informed them that they were on their way to Tagum to withdraw money from the bank with which to pay his

S.V.Villanueva
farmhands. When asked if they would be returning to Longganapan that day, Lucia replied that only her brother, Rex, would do
so. One of the ICHDF members who approached them was identified by Lucia Tabo as Martin Cagadas, Jr.
Rex and Lucia arrived in Tagum at nearly noon. After withdrawing P800 from his Family Savings Bank Account No. 1517020387,
Rex purchased some necessities for his family, reserving P500 for his workers' wages. He returned to Longganapan the following
day, leaving his sister Lucia in Tagum.
Rex was able to pass Sitio Rizal unmolested. In fact, he met Santiago Vercede, his neighbor in Longganapan, while travelling on
Dalisay Road at around 3:30 that afternoon, proceeding toward Sangab.
The following day, Lucia returned to Longganapan and discovered that her brother never arrived home and was missing.
On June 9, 1983, at around 8:30 in the morning, Lucia informed their barangay councilman, Jose Magunot, who was also the
deacon of the Iglesia ni Kristo Church, that she was looking for her brother Rex. Together with other farmers living near the
Bontiqui/Lapatigan Creek, they searched for Rex. On their way to Rizal, they met members of the ICHDF namely, Miguel Daub,
Martin Cagadas, Jr., Macario Barbero, Romy Tulio, Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong, Roberto Cultura and Tator Salvador, who inquired
about their mission and dissuaded them from continuing their search for Rex. They were advised to report the matter to the
barangay officials in Binansian Asuncion, which they did. However, no action was taken by the said barangay officials.
In the evening of June 10, 1983, due to the very strong stench emitting therefrom, the decomposed body of Rex Ballena was
found lying face down in a deep ravine below the mouth of the Macjum River about one-half kilometer away from the Bontiqui
Creek. His body bore multiple stab wounds in the chest and stomach, with the intestines protruding, his throat slashed, and head
smashed with a hard and heavy object. His mouth was still gagged with a red handkerchief and his hands bound with boracan
vines behind his back. His money was gone but his Savings Account passbook was found beside the decaying corpse. Without
waiting for the Municipal Health Officer's post-mortem necropsy examination or the Municipal judge's Inquest Report, his
remains were laid to rest the next day.
On November 8, 1984, or more than a year later, an Information for murder was filed against the armed ICHDF members, namely:
Miguel Daub, the ICHDF team leader, Martin Cagadas, Jr., Macario Barbers, Romy Tulio, Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong, Jose
"Roberto" Cultura and Saturnino "Tator" Salvador, who had been seen by eyewitnesses leading Rex, with hands hogtied behind
his back and his mouth gagged by a red handkerchief, towards the deep gully where his decomposing body was found. The ICHDF
was a para-military group organized by local units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and composed of selected civilians in
the locality to assist the Army in its peace-keeping duties.
The amended information, filed on December 3, 1984, reads:
The undersigned accuses MIGUEL DAUB, MARTIN CAGADAS, JR., MACARIO BARBERO, ROMY TULIO, CORITO PIASIDAD,
RENE BALONG, JOSE CULTURA and TATOR SALVADOR of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1983, in the Municipality of San Vicente, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with guns and bladed weapons, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one Rex Ballena, thereby inflicting
upon him wounds which caused his death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs
of the victim.
That in the commission of the foregoing offense all the abovenamed accused took advantage of their public position as
members of the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force and their superior strength which circumstances aggravate their
crime. (p. 3, Trial Court's decision; p. 24, Rollo.)
The accused were arraigned on December 14, 1984. Each entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution
presented five witnesses and the defense, thirteen. Two prosecution witnesses, Ramos Magunot and Jose Magunot, testified that
they saw on June 6, 1983 at around 4 p.m., from their farm huts situated along Bontiqui Creek in Sitio Rizal, Rex Ballena, hogtied
and being led by the accused toward the Macjum River, where his corpse was later discovered. Leading the way was Martin
Cagadas, Jr.; on the left side of Rex was Romy Tulio who held the vine tied around Rex's hands; on the right was Tator Salvador,
and directly behind was Macario Barbero, who held a gun against the victim's back, followed by Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong,
"Jose" Cultura and ICHDF team leader Miguel Daub. Jose Magunot testified that he was summoned by the ICHDF team the same
evening because their leader (Daub) caught him (Jose) watching when they hogtied Rex. He was warned not to tell on them at
the risk of his own life. There was, however, no eyewitness to the actual killing.
All the accused put up the defense of alibi, claiming that they could not possibly have committed the heinous crime imputed to
them, for they were not in the place pointed to by the prosecution witnesses, having either worked in another ICHDF detachment
center or in some other place.
On August 24, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao (Branch 1) rendered a decision finding all of the accused, excluding
Miguel Daub (who died during the trial) "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the widow, Aquila

S.V.Villanueva
Ballena, and the heirs of Rex Ballena P12,000 as compensatory damages, plus Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos, as and in the
concept of moral damages, the filing fees thereof to stand as lien to the full and complete execution for the satisfaction of the
awards." (p. 50, RTC decision; p. 137, Rollo.)
The defendants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on them. They allege that the lower court erred:
1. in convicting them of murder despite the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. in giving credence to the improbable and ill-motivated testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ramos and Jose
Magunot;
3. in convicting the appellants of the crime charged based on purely circumstantial evidence;
4. in disregarding their defense of alibi;
5. in convicting Roberto Cultura even if he was not one of the charged in the information; and
6. in finding that the aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of public position, (b) superior strength, (c)
evident premeditation, and (d) treachery were present in the commission of the crime.
The appeal has no merit.
While it is true that no eyewitnesses to the actual killing were available or brave enough to come forward and testify against the
accused, direct evidence is not the only basis upon which their guilt may be predicated. Their guilt may be, as it was, established
through circumstantial evidence which suffices for conviction if the following requisites are present, namely: (1) there must be
more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 5, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court; People vs.
Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783).
The following facts or circumstances were proven:
1. that Rex was seen by the prosecution witnesses, Ramos Magunot and Jose Magunot, hogtied and gagged with a red
handkerchief in his mouth;
2. that he was being led on foot toward the Macjum river by the appellants;
3. that his body, bearing stab wounds and other injuries, was found at the Macjum river;
4. that the appellants advised Magunot not to report what he had seen; and
5. that the victim did not have his money on his person when his body was found.
The inferences to be derived from those facts are:
(1) that Rex was gagged and hogtied by the appellants;
(2) that he was killed by the appellants, and, (3) that he was robbed by the appellants.
The web of circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable conclusion that the
appellants detained the victim while he was on his way to Sangab that fateful afternoon of June 6, 1983. They hogtied and gagged
him, led him to the gully, and as the decomposed corpse later revealed, stabbed him to death with multiple knife thrusts. Their
individual participation need not be specified for they were all co-conspirators in the commission of the crime, hence, the guilt
of one or some was the guilt of all. (People vs. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427; People vs. Newman, 163 SCRA 496; People vs. Salvador,
163 SCRA 574.)
The trial court did not err in giving full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses for they were disinterested
witnesses, not related at all to the victim. Their testimonies were spontaneous, unrehearsed and unchallenged even during cross-
examination. Their initial reluctance to testify does not affect their credibility (People vs. Aliocod, 167 SCRA 665) for the killers
were notorious for their lawlessness and barbarity.
The trial court properly rejected the appellants' defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses especially in the absence of
proof that it would have been physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime (People vs. Masangkay, 157
SCRA 320). Moreover, the testimonies of the defense witnesses are not only replete with material inconsistencies but are also
incompatible with one another. The Certification signed by the barangay and purok officials on September 27, 1984, attesting to
the presence of the accused in a detachment center in Davao is highly unreliable, as it was not based on personal knowledge of
the affiants but on unconfirmed reports or hearsay.
Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura for he was not one of those indicted in the
information but "Jose" Cultura (his father's name), has no merit. The erroneous designation of his name in the information will
not vitiate it, as it was clearly proven that the accused, Roberto Cultura, was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and killed
the victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise this question of his identity during the arraignment. His acquiescence to be tried under
the name "Jose" at that stage of the case is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise the question of his identity as one of the
accused for the first time on appeal (People vs. Maravilla, 165 SCRA 392; People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702).
All the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by the
circumstance of taking advantage of their public positions. There was treachery in the commission of the offense for the victim
was gagged and his hands were tied before he was slain, thereby rendering him completely helpless. Furthermore, the appellants

S.V.Villanueva
abused their office as Civil Home Defense members, who are supposed to be peace officers tasked with maintaining law and
order and of protecting life and property in their community. They instead turned out to be murderers and brigands.
The penalty of murder under the 1987 Constitution is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua(People vs.
Alpetche, 168 SCRA 670). Appellants cannot avail of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering the penalty actually imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo, being in full accord with the evidence and the law, is hereby affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the
trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from
the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18,
1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal
allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials
with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended
informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices
Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

S.V.Villanueva
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the
filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel
C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal
accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February 5,
1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon.
Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting
opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T.
Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact,
no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended
Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the
said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues
that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of
the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due
process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and
7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-
title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to
have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon
it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their
right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan,
which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days
from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case

S.V.Villanueva
Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section
4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the
invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following
laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D.
No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial

S.V.Villanueva
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders
of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated
to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

S.V.Villanueva
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or
higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment,
resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27,"
or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein
are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused
under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain
cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items
(a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee32holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3)
the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of
the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses
or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite
to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because
its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35

S.V.Villanueva
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A.
8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties
had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case
involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of
a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is
stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during
the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature
is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion
of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A
8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was
separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the
head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the
two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post factolaw is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant.43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of
a person to his disadvantage.44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
a amnesty.45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975,
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which

S.V.Villanueva
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode
of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter
the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage.54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the
removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of
innocence has been convincing overcome.56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is
placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
"expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to
be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title57is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should
be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the
title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606,
as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word "define"
in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body
to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
the trial.62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249.
Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4
thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of
the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations."66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.68

S.V.Villanueva
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.
In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO
M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official
positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG
committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged
herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely
representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation
to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-
the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-
above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of
the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended

S.V.Villanueva
information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly
conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the
amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City."
How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official
functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation
in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient.
That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we
ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and
not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established
a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where
his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person
without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in
line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive
in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the
sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose
they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not
appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
cases.1âSO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149368 April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.

S.V.Villanueva
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case provisionally dismissed), accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 45,283-
2000 convicting appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death.
Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot y Ibarra were indicted for murder in an information that read:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 2000, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and stabbed one Rosemarie B. Tallada with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused her death.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case against appellant’s co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him
with certainty.
Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1,
2001 and trial ensued thereafter.
To establish appellant’s guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Charlita Tallada, the victim’s mother; Patricia
Turlao, the victim’s aunt; appellant Dacillo’s neighbors, Jovelyn Dagmil, Augusto Cesar Arara, Roche Abregon, Resna Abregon,
Allan Castanares, Jupiter Campaner; police officers SPO2 Rodolfo Taburda and SPO1 Avelino Alcobus, and medico-legal officer
Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
The facts, as established by the prosecution witnesses’ collective testimonies, follow.
The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at dusk on February 6, 2000, on the bridge
near appellant’s house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
Around 7:45 p.m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with her aunt in the house adjacent to
appellant’s, was looking for her cousin when she saw the victim Rosemarie on the bridge. Because it was drizzling, she
invited Rosemarie inside their house but the latter declined and told her she was waiting for someone.3
After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellant’s house calling "Psst, psst . . ." Thinking the call was meant for her, she turned
but instead saw Rosemarie walking towards and entering appellant’s house.4
Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein. Witnesses Roche and Resna Abregon, who were
in the adjacent house singing with a karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the other side
of the wall. The houses were built on stilts above the seashore, adjoining one another with mere wooden partitions in between.
Roche Abregon peeped through a hole on the wall and saw appellant and another man grappling with a woman who was gagged
with a handkerchief.5 When Roche saw appellant choking the woman, she informed her aunt about the commotion in appellant’s
house but the aunt brushed it aside as a simple family quarrel.6 For a while they heard the sound of a woman being beaten up.
Then everything became quiet. Later that evening, they saw appellant leaving his house.7
The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a.m., appellant was seen entering his house carrying lumber and screen.8 He
was observed going in and out of his house several times, each time carefully locking the gate as he left. 9 At around 9:00 a.m.,
appellant was seen with ready-mixed cement in a plastic pail and, when asked what he was going to do with the cement, replied
that it was for the sink he was constructing.10
Later, appellant entrusted a bag of woman’s personal belongings to barangay tanod Allan Castañares and told the latter that it
belonged to his woman companion. He allegedly could not bring it home because his wife might see them.11
By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemarie’s already decomposing body. 12
At 5:00 p.m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering seashells under appellant’s house when they saw
droplets of blood and pus dripping from appellant’s comfort room. They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn
instructed her husband to get a stick and poke the sacks covering the comfort room. However, the husband instead climbed up
the house and was greeted by the stink emanating from the corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately
reported the matter to barangay officials who called the police.13
At about 10:00 p.m., policemen arrived at appellant’s house, accompanied by his wife, and forcibly opened the lock. They
proceeded to where the tomb was located.

S.V.Villanueva
When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a woman.14
The corpse was brought to the Rivera Funeral Parlor where it was identified by the victim’s mother Charlita Tallada and aunt
Patricia Turlao as that of Rosemarie, through the keloid scar on her forearm.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma conducted an autopsy on Rosemarie’s remains. His necropsy report revealed that Rosemarie died from a stab
wound in the abdomen. The report further disclosed that she suffered contusions in the anterior chest wall and her right hand;
an incised wound on her left middle finger; a stab wound on the left side of the face and fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th
and 7th ribs on her side.15
Dr. Ledesma testified that the wounds suffered by Rosemarie indicated that she put up a struggle and the wounds were inflicted
before her death.16
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant alleged that he only held
down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as Joselito
Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his
girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night. He offered his brother’s house which was under his care. In the evening of February
6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned to the house with the bottle
of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot was
strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant
that he was going to be implicated just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the
woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."17
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant
told him it was low tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave appellant ₱500.
Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and
cast the dead body in cement. After finishing the job in the afternoon of that day, appellant reported for work at DUCC.
When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the
next day, February 12, 2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and imposed upon him the supreme
penalty of death:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby
sentenced to the extreme penalty of DEATH,
He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of ₱50,000.00, plus the sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
His immediate confinement to the national penitentiary is hereby ordered.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.18
Thus, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE HEIRS OF THE OFFENDED PARTY THE AMOUNT OF
PHP50,000.00, WHICH APPEARS AS PAYMENT FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES.19
Appellant admitted that he had a hand in the killing of Rosemarie but attempted to downgrade his participation in the crime by
claiming he only held Rosemarie’s legs as Pacot was strangulating her. The rule is that any admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never
any such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellant’s self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed
to his guilt. His declaration faltered in the face of the testimonies of eyewitnesses positively identifying him as one of the two
men who were with Rosemarie when she was killed. Witness Roche Abregon pointed to appellant as the one who strangled
Rosemarie. He was established to be inside the house at the time the witnesses heard a woman being battered. Thus, assuming

S.V.Villanueva
for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellant’s admission that he participated in its commission by holding
Rosemarie’s legs made him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following
requisites are present:
1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.20
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they
were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of
the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to
the same objective.21
The prosecution was able to prove appellant’s participation in the criminal resolve by his own admission that, right after he was
told by Pacot to close the door, he held down Rosemarie’s legs. He was pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He
admitted that they only stopped when they were sure that Rosemarie was already dead. The two men planned how to dispose
of the victim’s body; it was in fact appellant’s idea to pour concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacot’s suggestion to just dump
the body into the sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in cement and made sure that there were no leaks from
which foul odor could emanate. He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or not he himself did the strangling or the
stabbing, he was also liable for the acts of the other accused.
It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity
of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. 22 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior
agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design. 23
We are convinced beyond doubt of the joint and concerted effort between appellant and the man he identified as Pacot in the
killing of Rosemarie.
Appellant likewise contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength qualified the killing to murder. He contends that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
not specifically alleged in the information. Nothing can be farther from the truth. A cursory reading of the information reveals
that appellant was sufficiently informed of the charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the hapless
and defenseless female victim.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing of the relative disparity in the physical
characteristics of the aggressor and the victim such as age, gender, physical size and strength. We agree with the trial court that
the killing of Rosemarie was committed with abuse of superior strength. As found by the court a quo, two grown-up men against
a young fragile woman whose ability to defend herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of physical
strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution and could not have possibly defended herself from her stronger
assailants.24 Such disparity was manifest in the contusions in the chest and hands, wounds on the fingers, a stab wound on the
left side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the victim. 25 The abuse of superior strength was obvious in the way
Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a pulp.
The killing of Rosemarie was thus correctly qualified to murder by the abuse of superior strength, a circumstance specifically
pleaded in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during
re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a
recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty
from reclusion perpetua to death.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach
certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the accused.26 This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against
appellant. Hence the imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Regarding the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, appellant claims that said amount was awarded by
the trial court as payment for actual damages. This claim is misleading. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the amount
was granted by the trial court by way of indemnity ex delicto to compensate for the death of the victim which prevailing

S.V.Villanueva
jurisprudence fixes at ₱50,000.27 The award of such indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim and the
accused’s responsibility therefor.28
The award of ₱50,000 as moral damages is proper, supported as it was by the testimony of Charlita Tallada, the victim’s mother,
that Rosemarie’s death caused her immeasurable pain. 29
In addition, the Court awards ₱25,000 in temperate damages, said amount being awarded in homicide or murder cases when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.30
With regard to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example of correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall
be paid to the offended party.
In People vs. Catubig,31 we explained that:
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as
it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended
for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code
in order to set an example for the public good.32 For this purpose, we believe that the amount of ₱25,000 may be appropriately
awarded.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy is declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Rosemarie Tallada the sum of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as temperate damages and ₱25,000
as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 140311 March 30, 2001
DENNIS T. GABIONZA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May an Information be amended to change the material dates of the commission of the offense after the accused had been
arraigned?
DENNIS T. GABIONZA seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49098-SP1dismissing his petition for
certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. Q-93-505522which allowed the amendment of the
Information charging him with violation of RA 1161 (The Social Security Law) as amended.1âwphi1.nêt
On 9 November 1993 an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of violating Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to
Sec. 28, par. (e), of RA 1161. It alleged that "in and about or during the period from January 1991 to May 1993" petitioner,
President of the Manila City Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered employer under RA 1161, willfully and unlawfully failed,
neglected and refused to remit to the Social Security System (SSS) contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation
(EC) amounting to P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty imposed thereon in the amount of P541,417.87. 3
Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10 February 1998 or about four (4) years after he was arraigned, the public
prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information from

S.V.Villanueva
"January 1991 to May 1993" to January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed
amendment was substantial in nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and
nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise available to him.
On 31 March 1998 the trial court granted the motion and allowed amendment of the Information, ruling that the amendment
pertained only to matters of form. It further ruled that the amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused as the
theory of the prosecution remained the same.4 On 2 September 1998 petitioner's motion to reconsider the order was denied.
Petitioner elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the order of the
trial court. On 9 June 1999 respondent Court of Appeals upheld the amendment and dismissed the petition. It held that the
amendment "cannot be deemed an amendment in substance, as it will in no wise or manner impair whatever defense or defenses
the accused could or might have interposed in the original information, even as it will not render unavailable or inapplicable in
the amended information, whatever evidence the accused might or could have adduced or presented in the original
information."5 Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
-
Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court at
any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused x x x x
After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no
prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint
or the Information as amended.6
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form
that can be made at any time.7 Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: (a) it does not deprive the accused
of the right to invoke prescription;8 (b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged; 9 (c) it does not
involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material change or
modification in his defense;10 (d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty;11 and, (5) it
does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. 12
In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of substance. The allegation of time when an
offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in
the Information the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor.13 It is sufficient that the act is alleged
to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or
Information will permit.14
Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to see how his original defenses would
be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to
adduce any evidence in support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his rights.
Petitioner invokes Wong v. Yatco,15 People v. Opemia16 and People v. Reyes17 in support of his cause. However, we hold that
the ratio decidendi of the three (3) cases does not apply in the present case.
In Wong the prosecution amended the Information of a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 104 to change the dates of the
violation from "May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954" to "between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955." The Court disallowed the
amendment because in 1954, the law punishing the act had not been published yet, therefore there was no crime in legal
contemplation, The Court said that since an amended Information retroacted to the time of the original one, the proper course
would have been not to amend the previous Information but to file another one. This crucial fact is not involved here.
In Opemia the Court held, "the period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one
may be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them
in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend , themselves."
In Reyes, this Court held that "the disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the
commission of one and the same offense."
The last two (2) cases involved changes in dates which were so far removed from each other that substituting one for the other
would clearly work to the detriment of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against
him. This is not so in the present case. For one, a comparison of the amended Information (January 1991 to May 1992) and the
original one (January 1991 to May 1993) shows that the period stated in the former is even shorter than and is included within
the latter. Also, the averment "in or about and during the period" gives a sufficient approximation of the date of the commission

S.V.Villanueva
of the offense. Therefore, the first Information had adequately informed petitioner of the period of time when the crime was
committed. No surprise, ergo, no violation of rights, could spring from merely replacing the original period, more so with one
that is shorter and included within the same.
Moreover, the imposable penalty will not increase as a result of the amendment. A reading of Sec. 28, par. (e), RA 1611, shows
that it penalizes, among others, the failure or refusal of a compulsorily-covered employer from remitting compulsory
contributions to the SSS. Neither time nor duration of the offense charged is a material ingredient of the offense. In fact, the
penalty imposed for this violation is constant at six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, regardless of the number of
infractions.
Petitioner contends that because of the lapse of time between the filing of the Information and the amendment laches had set
in.
We find no merit in this argument. "Laches" is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that a party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.18 As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, the principle of laches is inapplicable in this case. The provision in Sec.
14, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that amendments as to form may still be made after arraignment or
during trial. Since the questioned amendment was made "during trial," the same was made seasonably notwithstanding the lapse
of four (4) years.
It may also be noted that even before the prosecution had the chance to present its principal evidence petitioner moved for the
suspension of trial because he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the denial of his motion to
dismiss. Pre-trial was held only on 11 November 1997. As can be seen from the records, the prosecution did not unnecessary
waste time in filing the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information. Again, before the prosecution had the opportunity to
present evidence, trial was suspended because of the filing of the instant case. This, coupled with the many postponements and
resettings requested by petitioner, satisfactorily explains the reasonable delay in the amendment of the Information. Certainly,
the prosecution cannot be faulted for not filing the amendment earlier since trial was suspended during the pendency of
petitioner's recourse to the Court of Appeals and to this Court. Petitioner should not then bewail the delay in the amendment
because such delay was principally upon his own behest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49098-SP affirming that of the
trial court which allowed the amendment of the Information charging petitioner with violation of RA No. 1161, as amended,
is AFFIRMED.
Considering the delay already incurred in the process, the trial court should immediately act on this case with deliberate dispatch
upon its remand, which this Court DIRECTS. Costs against petitioner.1âSO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, finding accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of P60,000.00
as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs to the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado. 2
The Information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different
parts of the body, to wit:
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the supra sternal area;
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward 5 cm. above the left
nipple area the level of midclavicular line;
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left
nipple area, midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.53 cm. in depth, directed medially downward,
located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left
nipple;

S.V.Villanueva
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward,
located, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located 2
cm. medial to the left nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth directed downward, located at
the xiphoid area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4 cm.
below the left nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of the small intestine;
Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.
That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred actual and moral damages which may be awarded
under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after which he pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:
Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins, their fathers being brothers. The victim's
father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada, suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City
and spend the remainder of his days there. The victim accompanied her father to the Philippines. They eventually settled in a
house in Barangay Tanque, Roxas City, where they lived on the financial support of the victim's sister Asuncion, who continued
to live in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who continued to live in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who lived in
Manila.
Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He helped care for the victim's father, for
which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.6
In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that
the victim had committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico
Arrojado, went with accused-appellant to the house in Barangay Tanwue where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was
bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a rosary and a
cruifix. Near her was a knife (Exh. C).7 Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric
fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were closed except the window on the east side which was slightly open. As
he went to the other room, where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be
suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death.8
The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened." The police
saw no signs of forcible entry.9 They made a sketch of the victim's position in relation to the whole house (Exh. D) 10 and took
pictures of her (Exhs. E-E-3).11
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem examination of the victim at 1:30 p.m. of
June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim sustained the following stab wounds:
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the supra sternal area;
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area
the level of midclavicular line;
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple area,
midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.53 cm. in depth, directed medially downward, located
3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located,
12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial
to the left nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid
area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the
left nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of the small intestine; 12

S.V.Villanueva
Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996 from wound nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10, which she deemed
fatal.13 Thus, in the victim's death certificate (Exb. B),14 she listed "HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victim's immediate cause of
death and "multiple stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and accused-appellant had been strained as the
victim constantly picked on accused-appellant even for the slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim
gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the loss of keys. Accused-appellant was badly hurt by the victim's tonguelashing,
according to Erlinda, and complained to the victim, "You're too much." Erlinda said she offered to take the victim in her house,
but the latter refused, saying that her place was with her father. The victim entrusted, however, her jewelry and bank book with
signed withdrawal slips to Erlinda. Three days later, on May 30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told the victim that she
should no be afraid of accused-appellant because he was taking care of both her (the victim) and her father. Erlinda said she again
met the victim on May 31, 1996 when she reminded the latter of their agreement to go out the following day, June 1, 1996. On
that day, however, the victim was found dead.15
Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlinda's testimony. The father of Thelma's
husband, Roque Arrojado, is a brother of the victim's father and that of accused-appellant. Thelma said that she and her husband
lived at one time with the victim, and she knew the latter to be a snob ("suplada") and overly strict. Because they did not get
along with the victim, Thelma and her husband eventually left. She testified that accused-appellant was angry at the victim and
in fact passed by her store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996), complaining to her of the victim's maltreatment of him. 16
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, 1996, at around 6:00 a.m., Alberto Arrojado asked him
for food, so accused-appellant went to the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared breakfast. When accused-
appellant found that the victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the victim
lying on her bed, bloodied. He thought that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told him that she felt tied
down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be better that my father and I commit suicide." Accused-
appellant said that the victim scolded him only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage. 17 He said that the victim was the
one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often found fault with her. When presented with the knife found on
the victim's bed (Exh. C), accused-appellant admitted he was familiar with the knife as he saw the victim using it in
kitchen.1âwphi1.nêt
On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and declares accused Salvador Arrojado GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of murder, defined and penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there being no aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to
imprisonment of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnity the heirs of the deceased Mary Ann Arrojado
in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral damages of P80,000.00, and pay the costs of this action.
In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a detention prisoner and not
otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under preventive imprisonment, provided
he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art.
29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
The trial court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant for the victim's death. In its
decision, the trial court said:
The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong motive to eliminate from earthly existence the
deceased, who had no known enemies, as he could no longer endure the verbal abuse to which he was frequently
subjected, even on trivial matters, by the deceased whom he must have perceived as his evil tormetor. Being older
[but] every now and then scolded, insulted, and humiliated, he must have felt that the deceased had no respect for him
as a person and elder cousin. Suicide being physically impossible and there being no shared of evidence showing that
an intruder could have surreptitiously entered the house as all doors and windows were securely closed, the killing
could have been done only by someone who was already inside the house. Certainly it could not have been the
deceased's old and invalid father who could not stand on his own, much less walk from his room to the kitchen, get the
fatal weapon, the kitchen knife, from where it was placed therein, walk to his daughter's room, and then stab her. As
there were only the three of them inside the house, that leaves no one else, by the process of elimination, who could
have perpetrated the dastardly act but the accused who had the only motive to do it and who was inside the house at
the time of the commission of the crime. Reinforcing this conclusion is the admission of the accused that when he
peeped into the room of the deceased and allegedly saw for the first time the lifeless body of the victim, he was already
sure, even without going near or touching her body and asking aloud what happened to her, that she was already dead
because he stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5) mortal wounds. And he had the gall to
attribute his cousin's untimely death to suivide because he could not concoct any other reason to save himself. 19

S.V.Villanueva
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as allegedly having been committed by the trial court:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO WAS STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE OF MARY ANN RROJADO WAS TOTALLY CLOSED AND
LOCKED AGAINST INTRUDERS.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ABUSED AND OPPRESSED BY MARY
ANN ARROJADO THAT LED ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO KILL MARY ANN ARROJADO.20
First. Accused-appellant claims that most of the victim's wounds were inflicted after she had already committed suicide to make
it appear that she was murdered. He says that he saw only one wound in the victim's stomach,21while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo
said she saw only two wounds, one on the victim's neck and the other in her abdomen. These are wound nos. 1 and 10 in the
postmortem examination.22 Of these two, the stomach wound was fatal, according to Dr. Roldan. 23 accused-appellant says that
the other wounds may have been inflicted on the victim between the time the body was brought out of the house in the morning
and the time Dr. Roldan examined the same at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon og June 1, 1996 at the De Jesus funeral
parlor.24
Accused-appellant's contention has no merit. That accused-appellant only saw one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two one
wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two wounds on the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted
upon the victim afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In accused-appellant's case, it may be
because he did not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a distance. 25 On the other hand, while Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo went near the victim's chest because the latter was dressed.26 But Dr. Roldan, who conducted a postmortem
examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten wounds. Between the cursory examination of the victim by accused-
appellant and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Dr. Roldan's exhaustive examination, there is no doubt that the latter's findings
are entitled to credence.
Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound nos. 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9 (10 cm., 10.5 cm., 5.5 cm., and 4 cm.) despite
the fact that they had the same surface length of 3 cm. could only mean that after the victim was found dead, she was again
stabbed with a knife or knives other than the one (Exh. C) found beside her. 27
The contention is without merit. The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that more than one weapon was used. As has
been stated:
[I]t is not possible to determine the depth of penetration of a stab wound with any degree of accuracy,
inasmuch as effusion of blood into the tissues, changes in the position of the viscera, or numerous other
circumstances may alter the conditions existing at the time when the wound was inflicted. Consequently, the
depth of the track at autopsy may be different from the actual penetration of the instrument at the time of
the stabbing. Moreover, it is not always possible to correlate the depth of the wound with the blade of the
stabbing instrument. For example, a short blade of two inches can penetrate four inches into a soft area like
the thigh or through the anterior abdominal wall because the force of the thrust may dent the tissues
appreciably and thus deepen the wound. Conversely, a long blade may not be thrust into its full length, and
the wound may be shorter than the blade. For these reasons attempts to correlate the depth of the track and
the length of the weapon should be made with caution.28
Dr. Roldan in fact testified that the kitchen knife, marked as Exh. C, could have caused all the wounds sustained by the
victim.29 She also testified that the stab wounds could have all been inflicted in the span of one minute. 30Having examined no
less than 100 victims of violence,31 Dr. Roldan's conclusions should be given credence.
Moreover, with the exception of wound no. 10, all the wounds were described by Dr. Roldan as "gaping." As stated in Forensic
Medicine:
… An ante-mortem wound gapes; there is eversion of the edges; a large amount of blood is present, this is coagulated
and infiltrating the wound; and there is swelling and signs of inflammation and repair. In a post-mortem wound there
is no gaping. The bleeding is slight, if any, and it does not infiltrate the wound.32
This belies accused-appellant's theory that the victim committed suicide and that it was only after she was found dead that she
was again stabbed to make it appear that she had been killed.
Nor were the bloodsstains which PO2 Orly Baril33 and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo34 found on the victim's hands necessarily
evidence of the victim's suicide. The bloodstains could have come from the wounds sustained by her rather than from her attempt
to kill herself.
Accused-appellant also insists the victim committed suicide because she was feeling respondent over her remaining single, her
lack of regular employment which made her dependent on the support of her siblings, and the responsibility of taking care of her
father who had become an invalid. He cites Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo's testimony that the victim entrusted her jewelry and
bankbook to her four days before she died.35

S.V.Villanueva
Erlinda, however, testified that the victim did this because she had a premonition that accused-appellant might harm her, and
not became of any intimation that she (the victim) would kill herself.36
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant that the victim was a depressed person with a low sense of self-worth, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo described the victim as "a jolly person" who had many friends who go to her house. Moreover, according to Erlindam,
the victim, while not earning a fixed income, was not without means of livelihood. The victim was good at cooking and took orders
from neighbors. Erlinda also disclosed that on the very day the victim was found dead, she and the victim had plans to go out for
relaxation.37 This negates any theory that the victim committed suicide.
Second. Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim was a suicide, accused-appellant disputes the trial court's
conclusion that only one of those residing in the house could have killed the victim because the police found not sign of a break-
in. Accused-appellant says that in the morning of June 1, 1996, he found that the kitchen door leading outside was open.38
Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur to him that an intruder was in the
house in the evening of May 31, 1996 because "No person could get inside because the windows were closed and besides the
doors were closed."39
Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant also said that no person could get inside the house
because the doors and the windows were closed.40 Accused-appellant never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that
morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not possible that somebody would enter the house as the doors were securely
locked… with additional barrel bolts, and the windows have grills."41
Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojado's testimony does not deserve consideration because, by her own
admission,42 the victim's sister Asuncion asked her to testify on accused-appellant's complaints against the victim's treatment of
him. He also claims that it was inconsistent for Erlinda to testify, on the one hand, that the victim was "loving friendly, and
reasonable" and, on the other to say that she was strict and domineering. Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the victim's
brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel with accused-appellant.43
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could have affected the outcome of case. This is
because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment during the trial.44 In this case, accused-appellant's contention that the testimonies of Thelma Arrojado and Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo are incredible is without merit. Thelma Arrojado's admission that the victim's sister Asuncion had asked her
to testify does not impair her credibility. Thelma was can did enough to say that at first she was hesitant to testify because
accused-appellant is also her relative. But she denied having been coached on what to say, stating that she only testified as to
"what Salvador Arrojado said to me" which is that he could not bear the victim's maltreatment.45
As for Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, she said that she suspected accused-appellant but she did not want to say anything until she
had proof.46 She testified also that so far as she knew, only accused-appellant harbored a grudge against the victim, and that
accused-appellant himdelf told her so.47 With regard to Erlinda's seemingly inconsistent description of the victim, suffice it to say
that the victim's treatment of accused-appellant does not necessarily reflect her attitude and behavior toward other people.
Anent the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the victim denied having any quarrel with accused-
appellant when he called her up two weeks before her death,48 it is possible that the victim did not want to bother her brother
who was after all too far (since he lived in Manila) to be of much help. It is only to be expected that Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo
and Thelma Arrojdo, who lived near accused-appellant and the victim, have a much more accurate assessment of the real
relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado testified that it was Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo
who told him of the alleged quarrel between the victim and accused-appellant.49
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:
1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones living in the house in which the crime was
committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.50
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the windows had grills. 51
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the bedroom doors were left unlocked so that the
victim could check on her father’s condition during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the
victim’s father.52
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house. 53 As the Solicitor General
observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with the intent to kill the victim, he would have
brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of his purpose.54
5. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the crime was not gain but
revenge.55
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were fatal), 56 the killer felt deep-
seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.57

S.V.Villanueva
7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.58
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in the morning of June 1, 1996 was
inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a person he claims to get along with, dead. 59 By
his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He
also did not inform his neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he
go to the police.60
Under Rule 133, §4 of the Rules on Evidence, cricumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have been established
in this case.
Fourt. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant. To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked np opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the
means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.61 Both requisites have been established in this case.
Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was not in a position to fight the assailant and
that she might have been stabbed while she was asleep.62 As regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds
sustained by the victim lead to no other conclusion thatn that accused-appellant employed means in killong the victim which
tended directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense so many wounds, a total 10,
half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack. 63 Abuse of superior strength also attended
the killing since accused-appellant, a man and armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and dfenseless
woman.64 However, since abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately as an
independent aggravating circumstance.65
The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the requisites thereor, to wit, (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequence of his act,66 have not been established in this case.
Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against accused-appellant since the latter and the victim
lived in the same house.67
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist,
it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused
some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a means of facilitating the
commission of the crim, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belied that the former would not abuse said
confidence.68 In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted her jewelry
and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her
personal effects from Erlinda.69Thinking that accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first
cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked. 70
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for
murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances.71 This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."72 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not
having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to
death.1âwphi1.nêt
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Lucas73 that the penalty of reclusion perpetua remains indivisible notwithstanding the
fixing of its duration from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, 74 the trial court erred in imposing on accused-
appellant the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua. In the with the ruling in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire
extent of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.75
Consistent with current case law,76 the civil indemnity for the crime of murder should be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00,
while the award of moral damages in the amount of P80,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and to its full extent.

S.V.Villanueva
Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the
further sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 153979 February 6, 2006
REGINO SY CATIIS, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division), REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ,LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ and THE BUREAU
OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI CITY JAIL, THROUGH ITS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE
WARDEN, CHIEF INSP. ISAGANI M. GAMINO,Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Regino Sy Catiis (petitioner) seeking to nullify the Decision 1dated June 14,
2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order dated December 18, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City,2 allowing private respondents to post bail and the Order dated December 21, 2001 of the Executive Judge of the
same court3 approving the surety bond posted by respondents and their release.
Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez,
Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for violation of
Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related
offenses. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 01-10686. Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint counter-
affidavits denying the charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution4 finding the existence of a probable
cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution was approved by
City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents and Tafalla before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and raffled off to Branch 96, which reads:
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ, LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ and MARGIELYN TAFALLA, of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revise Penal Code in relation to P.D. 1689, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another
in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by means of fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or
representing, in a transaction or series of transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in general to the
effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the
following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin
Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said persons gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, the accused knowing fully well that the above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those
unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such
manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general
by such corporations/associations.5
On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all the accused and approved the
recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.6
A return7 on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all other accused were already
detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on November 20,
2001. Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file
their comment/opposition on private respondents’ motion to fix bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the
conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio.8

S.V.Villanueva
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that
the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail, Judge Bersamin made the following disquisitions:
xxx
In order to impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, the estafa or swindling must be
committed by a syndicate. The law plainly states that a syndicate consists of five or more persons formed with the intention of
carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise, or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation
of money or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Herein, only four persons are actually charged. Consequently, the estafa charged has no relation to the crime punished with life
imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689.
The allegation of the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or
more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign
entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme" cannot change the juridical
nature of the offense charged. If the Government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the obvious reason is
that only the persons actually charged were involved in the commission of the offense. As such, there was no syndicate.
In all likelihood, the allegation of "in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons" is made herein solely for having
bail denied. Whether that is true or not is beside the point, but the Court cannot now lend itself to such a likelihood which,
according to the foregoing disquisition, lacks legal basis. For that matter, the Court must recant its approval of the
recommendation to deny bail.
The Prosecution represents that the Supreme Court has affirmed in People vs. Romero a conviction under Presidential Decree
No.1689 "even if the accused charged is only less than five (5) accused."
Such representation is grossly misleading. Far to the contrary, in People v. Romero, where two accused were actually charged
but only one was ultimately penalized due to the death of the other accused during the pendency of the case, the Supreme Court
did not impose the higher penalty of life imprisonment to death because the Prosecution "failed to clearly establish that the
corporation was a syndicate, as defined under the law," holding, instead, that, since the crime was not committed by a syndicate,
the proper penalty is that provided in the second paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, to wit:
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if
the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000.00 pesos.
Yet, one should ask: Where, as here, the amount alleged in the information clearly "exceeds 100,000.00 pesos" such that the
second paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, is applicable, is the offense still bailable considering that the range of the imposable
penalty is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information should aver, among others, the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances of the offense "in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment."
A perusal of the information discloses that no aggravating circumstance has been alleged in the information. The omission
consequently precludes the State from proving any aggravating circumstance which will raise the penalty to its maximum period
of reclusion perpetua. The Court itself is also prohibited from imposing reclusion perpetua, since the requirement of complete
allegations of the particulars in the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the
charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As stated in People v. Romero, supra, the penalty under the second paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, when there is neither
mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant, is the medium period of reclusion temporal, that is from sixteen (16) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Hence, the offense charged is unquestionably bailable.9
On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction10 assailing the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to post bail.
On the same day, then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr.,11 Justice on Duty Per Office Memorandum of Presiding Justice,
issued a Resolution12 granting petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, thus, private respondents
and all those acting for and in their behalf were temporarily restrained from enforcing and implementing the Order of Judge
Bersamin and from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 01-105430.
However, unknown to petitioner, private respondents had already filed or posted their surety bonds on December 21, 2001 with
the Office of Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa13 who approved the same on the same day and ordered the immediate release
of private respondents unless held for other lawful cause.14 Petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the CA on January 14,
2002 assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa in issuing the Order dated December 21, 2001.

S.V.Villanueva
On June 14, 2002, the CA issued its assailed decision denying due course to the petition and dismissed the same after it found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Bersamin and Judge Zenarosa in issuing the assailed orders.
Hence, the instant petition filed by petitioner raising the following issues, to wit:
A
Whether or not the issuance of the questioned Decision promulgated June 14, 2002 by the 17th Division of the Court
of Appeals sustaining the validity of the 1st assailed Order dated December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P.
Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ruling that there should be at least five (5) persons
that must be charged under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689 is not in accordance with law or with applicable
decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
B
Whether or not the questioned Decision sanctioning the grant of bail in the 1st assailed Order dated December 18,
2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section
7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and actually departed from the accepted and usual course in the
determination of bailability of criminal offenses.
C
Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of release in the 2nd assailed Order dated December 21
of Hon. Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section 17, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure15
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, the term "any person" must be understood and
read in its singular meaning so that even only one person can be indicted for committing "estafa or other forms of swindling" in
relation to P.D. No. 1689 citing the case of People v. Romero; that Judge Bersamin erred when he already computed the possible
penalty in case of private respondents’ conviction; that the capital nature of an offense for the purpose of bailability is determined
by the penalty prescribed by law, not by penalty which may actually be imposed since the latter requires a consideration of the
evidence on trial; that since no evidence had yet been presented by both prosecution and defense, Judge Bersamin has again
shown bias by already computing the imposable penalty just to stretch the application of the law and questionably grant bail in
favor of private Respondents.
We are not persuaded.
The CA found that the assailed order of Judge Bersamin cannot be characterized as one issued with grave abuse of discretion for
he correctly determined that the Information did not charge a syndicated Estafa; that with only four charged in the information,
it could not be considered as committed by a syndicate which must consist of five or more persons and he cannot be faulted for
that.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa, provides:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a
syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if
the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount involved, provided that a
syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as "consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the second paragraph, it is provided
that if the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but
they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than ₱100,000.00.
Petitioner’s interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be
indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. It bears stressing that the law must be considered as a whole,
just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning. 16 It is a dangerous practice to base
construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other portion. 17 In fact, there is no need for
any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a requirement is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.18
In this case, the Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any other person who had participated in
the commission of the crime charged, thus, based on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not
committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible error committed by the CA when it upheld the ruling of Judge Bersamin that

S.V.Villanueva
with only four persons actually charged, the estafa charged has no relation to the crime punished with life imprisonment to death
under section 1 of P. D. No. 1689.
The wordings in the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or
more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign
entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme" is not sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. It bears stressing that the first paragraph of the accusatory
portion of the Information charges only four persons. To repeat, P.D. No. 1689 has provided for the definition of a syndicate and
it is controlling. As correctly found by the trial court, if the government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the
obvious reason is that only the persons actually charged were involved in the commission of the offense, thus, there was no
syndicate.1avvphil.net
Petitioner’s reliance in People v. Romero to support his argument is misleading. First, the issue of whether only one person can
be indicted for syndicated estafa was not an issue in the Romero case. Secondly, the Court did not impose the penalty of life
imprisonment to death on the accused since the prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate as
defined under the law. There is no other way of establishing a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to the
definition provided by law.
Since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death
cannot be imposed on private Respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private respondents could only be
punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds ₱100,000.00.
The next question is, whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable despite that the imposable
penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged
in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment, even, if they are
subsequently proved during trial.19 A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case
of conviction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody
shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
be admitted to bail as a matter of right. Since the imposable penalty on private respondents, in case of conviction, is reclusion
temporal, they are entitled to bail as a matter of right. Notably, Judge Bersamin issued his Order finding the crime charge bailable
and fixed the amount of ₱150,000.00 each for the provisional liberty of private respondents only after petitioner had submitted
their comment/opposition to petitioner’s motion to fix bail.
Petitioner claims that the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to post bail already prejudged the case; that he
summarily decided the eventual and imminent dismissal of the criminal case without even the reception of evidence; that such
prejudgment came from a ruling on a mere issue of bail.
Such argument is baseless. The Order was issued on the basis that the allegations in the Information do not establish that the
crime charged was committed by a syndicate as defined under the law where the penalty of life imprisonment to death could be
imposed. Nowhere in the Order did Judge Bersamin state that the act complained of is not punishable at all.
Petitioner next contends that private respondents’ filing of bail with Executive Judge Monina Zenarosa, other than Branch 96
where the case is pending, is questionable and not in accordance with Section 17, Rule 114 20 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure; that the records show that when private respondents filed their bail with Judge Zenarosa, Branch 96 was open and
available as private respondents through their representative were able to pay for the issuance of the certifications on the
Information and the Order dated December 18, 2001; that petitioner’s counsel and the Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur
Malabaguio had personally received their respective copies of the Order dated December 18, 2001 inside the staff room of Branch
96 and they even attested that Judge Bersamin was physically present on December 21, 2002, the day private respondents filed

S.V.Villanueva
their bail bond with Judge Zenarosa; that despite these circumstances, Judge Zenarosa still exercised jurisdiction over the bail
filed by private respondents and issued the Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the surety bonds and ordering the release
of private respondents; that the CA’s justification that Judge Zenarosa accepted the bail bond due to the fact that Judge Bersamin
was momentarily out of his office or premises at the time of posting of the bond was not borne by the records.
We are not persuaded.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within
the province or city. While Branch 96 is open and available on the day private respondents posted their bail with Judge Zenarosa,
it does not necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin was available at that precise moment. Although it is alleged in the supplemental
petition prepared by petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Rodeo Nuñez, with the conformity of Prosecutor Malabaguio filed before the CA
that both of them saw Judge Bersamin discharging his function on that day, it is not under oath. Moreover, it is not specifically
stated in the supplemental petition that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge Bersamin was available. Thus,
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that official duty had been regularly performed21 by Judge Zenarosa under the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 2002
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG
OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in December 1973
and started its actual operations in 1976. Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, the AFP-RSBS was
designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as provided
for in Republic Act No. 340.1 Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional
appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the
system; and (3) all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.2 AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as "The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002." It is
administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management Group.3 Its funds are in the nature of
public funds.4
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of
the Province of South Cotabato, filed a "Complaint-Affidavit"5 with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that
anomalous real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer
taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to
investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-RSBS,6 together with twenty-seven
(27) other persons7 for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in
capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.8
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24)
separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations
was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to
25133.9 All were similarly worded, except for the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the offense, and
the property involved. Representative of the said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the inculpatory portion of
which reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the
President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while
in the performance of their official duties, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in
relation to their offices, conspiring together and confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private

S.V.Villanueva
individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally execute and/or cause the execution of a falsified
Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the
purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS
at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, that
the same was sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00,
respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other taxes should have been P524,475.00
and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing undue injury to the government through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents, defined
and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to
25145.11 Save with respect to the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies, and the property
involved in each case, the Informations were, likewise, similarly worded, representative of which is that in Criminal Case No.
25134. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being
then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-
RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense
in relation to their offices, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK
GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent, did, there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally falsify a public document by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-
sq. m. property particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and stating therein a purchase price of
only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00)
PESOS when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot
is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction.13 He, likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings 14 on
February 16, 1999, because of the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor opposed the said motions.15
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice of
Appearance"16 as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc.
(AGFOI)17 on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired
Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof.
In a Resolution18 dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty.20
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending
that the charges brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus,
no civil liability had arisen.21 He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "an offended party may be
allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense
charged."22 He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby be
proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI
and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members-contributors, they "have been disadvantaged or deprived of their
lawful investments and residual interest at the AFP-RSBS" through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited
that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in collaboration with the Office of the
Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.23
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal cases involved.
He posited that AGFOI was neither a member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly

S.V.Villanueva
by the national government and individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a single centavo to
the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the
individual members who compose it.24 Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI are or have been members and
beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation"25 with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his
arraignment deferred pending the resolution of the reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate its evidence and to do whatever is
appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May
28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and
recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the prosecution to evaluate its
evidence and take such appropriate action as regards accused Ramiscal’s subject motion shall also include the case
regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.26
In the meantime, in a Resolution27 dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioner’s opposition and
denied his plea for the denial of the appearance of the law firm.28 In justifying its resolution, the Sandiganbayan declared as
follows:
Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and their right
may be affected by the action of the Court resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal
presumption that their appearance should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is subject to the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor.29
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration30 of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was opposed31 by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution32 denying the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and
October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court, and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL
LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES. 33
In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure was improper since the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not final; hence, the
remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also argues
that the petition is premature because the reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition,
he posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases. He further
alleged that the appearance of the private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was proper.
The Ruling of the Court
The Assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an
interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals34 as follows:
… A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order
that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.
Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which, among others, may

S.V.Villanueva
consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course,
to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term,
"final and executory."35
…
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory," e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting
or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final"
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in this case. 36
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single
appeal.37
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.38
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private
prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI, represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who were, likewise,
investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the offended party whose rights may be affected by the prosecution of the criminal and
civil aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their merits, more specifically, the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the
Ombudsman would maintain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and,
thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest,
the graft court would then have to proceed to trial, receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis thereof.
The petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial, and, if convicted, file a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal
on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure,
not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Consequently, in the interest of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil action on certiorari. 39 As we
held in Salinas v. NLRC,40 a petition which should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on
the merits.41
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner made the following averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared
the AGFOI to be the offended party despite the plain language of the Informations and the nature of the crimes charged; and
that the graft court blatantly violated basic procedural rules, thereby eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases.
He, likewise, averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the entry of a party, through a private prosecutor, which
has no right to the civil liabilities of the accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil liabilities at all
based on the nature of said crimes. The petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition thereto, in gross
violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify
the petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v. Court of Appeals:42
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess
of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as
determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 43
Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties, like the private respondents herein, may, likewise,
enter their appearance as offended parties and participate in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of the Law Firm Albano & Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:

S.V.Villanueva
Atty. Antonio Albano
Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have been
disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful investments and residual interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System,
AFP because of alleged plunder of the System’s Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)
(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)44
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank officers
claiming to have residual interests in or to be investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of the Informations against
the petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the records that the Board of Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage
the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above cases. Neither is there any resolution
on record issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the
services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law firm is the
counsel of Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to criminal liabilities
in favor of any private party. He asserts that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation
of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government because based on the deeds of sale executed in favor
of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of capital gains and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, do not contain any allegation that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused by the said falsifications.
The petitioner further argues that absent any civil liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be
considered the offended party entitled to participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner,
this view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.— Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it
would not sustain a direct and material damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would
open the floodgates to any person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and
inexpensive disposition of the cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right to intervene, considering that such intervention would
enable the members of AGFOI to assert their rights to information and access to the official records, documents, and papers, a
right granted by no less than paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are
impressed with public character because the government provided for its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary
contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the
offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 11045 of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage
or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted 46 and
the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior
to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.47 The prosecution of offenses is a public function. 48 Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal

S.V.Villanueva
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor
for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action
for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.49 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 50 Under Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code
includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his
appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.51
The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local governments or government-owned or
controlled corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or
funds, reparation, or indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 52 of the Revised
Penal Code, frauds under Article 21353 of the Revised Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No.
705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused. For
violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,54 any party, including the government, may be the offended party if such party
sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public
prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose
person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused,55 or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive
law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of
the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party.56
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not
have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such
members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the
funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS
over its funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality
separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-
RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said
transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said
cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification
of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of
falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very
least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third
person.57
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to
conceal the correct amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the
government, the offenders thereby commit two crimes – (a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil

S.V.Villanueva
liability to the government as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of
public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner
and his co-accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then
the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government
Corporate Counsel.58
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143591 November 23, 2007
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN
DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners, vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago
City, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon,
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s
fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was
raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of
agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were
the following documents: 1) a letter5 dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar
Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned letter 6 dated December 7, 1994 addressed to
Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter7 dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn
G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum8 dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an
attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually
affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. 11 Worse, petitioners
introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
In a Resolution12 dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4)
counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated
that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the
signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used
by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial
Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding Informations14were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the
warrants15 for the arrest of the petitioners.
On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure
on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to
submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted
by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the
warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of
probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being
threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

S.V.Villanueva
In an Order17 dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary
investigation was not available in the instant case --- which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld
the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners
could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved
in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the
court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion. 18 They, likewise,
questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant
of arrest.
On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.19 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the
complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis
for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not
the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?20
On August 2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in
any manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until
further orders of, this Court.
With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to resolve the issues raised.
Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and academic when the petitioners posted bail and were
arraigned.
We do not agree.
It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid
embarrassment being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal
to enter a plea, the court entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest has already
been superseded by Section 26,22 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.23
Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation,
on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their
right to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of the arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, obviously
because the issue of the legality of the information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the Court. This notwithstanding, the
court entered a plea of "Not Guilty." From these circumstances, we cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the
petitioners, as to preclude them from raising the issue of the validity of the arrest before the CA and eventually before this Court.
In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a TRO to restrain the MTCC from proceeding with the criminal cases
(which the Court eventually issued on August 2, 2000). Thus, we confront the question of whether a criminal prosecution can be
restrained, to which we answer in the affirmative.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal
prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have been recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford

S.V.Villanueva
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6)
when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10)
when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. 25
Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the information and warrant of arrest, and considering further
that no waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier discussed, we issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the
Court the opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is allowed to continue. The nature of the crime and the
penalty involved (which is less than 4 years of imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the suspension of the case below in order to
prevent the controversy from being mooted.
We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of
the denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging
the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly issued; and 3) whether this Court can, itself,
determine probable cause.
As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary investigation. Still, petitioners insist
that they were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit counter-affidavits which would have aided
the court in determining the existence of probable cause.26 Petitioners also claim that the respondent’s complaint-affidavit was
not based on the latter’s personal knowledge; hence, it should not have been used by the court as basis in its finding of probable
cause.27 Moreover, petitioners aver that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime. Specifically, it was
not established that the documents in question were falsified; that petitioners were the ones who presented the documents as
evidence; and that petitioners knew that the documents were indeed falsified.28 Petitioners likewise assert that at the time of
the filing of the complaint-affidavit, they had not yet formally offered the documents as evidence; hence, they could not have
"introduced" the same in court.29 Considering the foregoing, petitioners pray that this Court, itself, determine whether or not
probable cause exists.30
The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,31 namely, Sections 1, 3 (a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, are relevant to
the resolution of the aforesaid issues:
SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.32
SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the
official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.33
SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
–
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in
Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant.34
Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 35 of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and
preliminary investigation is not mandatory.36
Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-affidavit of the respondent and did not require the petitioners
to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this course of action, because it is sanctioned
by the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the
prosecutor shall take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. It means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with
the case, or file the information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-
affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the
complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

S.V.Villanueva
On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause.
Again, the petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant of arrest without affording them their right to submit
their counter-affidavits.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination
of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.37
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing wrong with the
procedure adopted by the trial judge --- he relied on the resolution of the prosecutor, as well as the supporting documents
submitted by the respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits
mandatory before the judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for
the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary.1âwphi1
However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals
that the Informations should not have been filed and the warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of
probable cause.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.38 It is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted.39 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. 40
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.41
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not
interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review
the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.42 In the same way, the general rule is that this Court does not review the factual
findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 43 It is only
in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of
probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice.44 The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a Judicial
Proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.45
The falsity of the document and the defendant’s knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. 46
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the complaint-affidavit of the
respondent, together with the following attached documents: the motion to dismiss and answer filed by the petitioners in Civil
Case No. 754; petitioners’ pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged falsified documents; a copy of the minutes of the regular meeting
of ISC during the election of the board; and the list of stockholders of ISC.47 On the basis of these documents and on the strength
of the affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and
documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.
Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and attachments
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the respondent failed to sufficiently establish prima facie that
the alleged documents were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of the documents, the private respondent stated in his

S.V.Villanueva
complaint-affidavit that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not
actually affix their signatures; and that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. 48 He further claimed that Enrique
Montilla’s signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged. 49 These are mere assertions,
insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants)
personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures of Ponce, Abad, Ong and Montilla were falsified does
not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution
of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion
that the signatories were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the
corporation. At the very least, the affidavit was based on respondent’s "personal belief" and not "personal
knowledge."50 Considering the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the respondent, he could have submitted the affidavit
of other persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity of the signatures appearing in the questioned documents. One cannot
just claim that a certain document is falsified without further stating the basis for such claim, i.e., that he was present at the time
of the execution of the document or he is familiar with the signatures in question. Otherwise, this could lead to abuse and
malicious prosecution. This is actually the reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge
of the affiant. The requirement assumes added importance in the instant case where the accused were not made to rebut the
complainant’s allegation through counter-affidavits.
Neither can the respondent find support in the documents attached to his complaint-affidavit. The minutes of the regular
meeting, as well as the list of stockholders, could have possibly shown that the signatories were not officers or stockholders of
the corporation. However, they did not at all show that the questioned documents were falsified. In the letter allegedly signed
by Ponce and Abad, there was no representation that they were the president and corporate secretary of ISCI. Besides, the mere
fact that they were not officers or stockholders of ISCI does not necessarily mean that their signatures were falsified. They still
could have affixed their signatures as authorized representatives of the corporation.
True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.51 While probable cause
should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a
potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the
burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless
charges.52 It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through
a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. 53
Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim that the documents were falsified, it
follows that the introduction of the questioned documents in Civil Case No. 754 is not an offense punished by any provision of
the Revised Penal Code or any other law. The petitioners should not be burdened with court proceedings, more particularly a
criminal proceeding, if in the first place, there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was
committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner, vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to nullify the order 1 of
respondent judge admitting the amended information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when petitioner refused
to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to nullify the appointment of a
counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential
scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to compel respondent judge to order preliminary
investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed as
follows:

S.V.Villanueva
That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds,
which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which prevented her death.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to file an amended information
and to admit said amended information. The amended information, 4 filed on October 31, 1991, reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who
was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen
Hultman.
Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial
court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of
a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered
for petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner's counsel manifested that he
would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent
herein petitioner.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
(a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted;
(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an accused who is
represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial
of due process and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and
(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and preferentially scheduled
for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially older, criminal cases. 8
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition. It appearing from
a further review of the record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this case are sufficiently presented in
the petition and the annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of petitioner and respondents, the Court has
decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate needless delay in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein underscored, that the accused ". . . did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman . .
." constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to
consummated murder. Petitioner further submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish that the same mortal wounds, which
were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and able medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could
have been caused by a supervening act or fact which is not imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there being a
substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different
offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another
preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,

S.V.Villanueva
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the
defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change
from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with
leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea
of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to
the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim
double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a
substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that
initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an
attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter. 10
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence
the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for
murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed
for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute
the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What
is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the
same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman
constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous
and untenable.
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time
before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1)
new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of

S.V.Villanueva
defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such
as his right to invoke prescription. 14
We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form andprovided that
no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. 15 The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form
and not of substance. 16
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the
nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact
of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the
accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question
that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the
amended information for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for
murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the
requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and
obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we
have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17
We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner whose counsel of record
refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as
baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the
case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced,
the scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to him, the
extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1382 November 16, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. 00-888-MTJ)
MARIO W. CHILAGAN, SR. complainant, vs.
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE EMELINA L. CATTILING, 3rd MCTC Alfonso Lista-Aguinaldo, Mayoyao, Ifugao,respondent.
RESOLUTION
BUENA, J.:
In his Sworn Letter-Complaint dated 1 May 2000 and Letter-Complaint dated 16 July 2000, with enclosures, complainant charges
respondent Acting Judge Emelina L. Cattiling with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to the
following cases, to wit:
1.) In Civil Case No. III-00-91 entitled, "Jessie C. Domingo vs. Oliver Pavo, et al.," for Forcible Entry with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages, complainant, one of the defendants therein, alleges that a day after the case
was filed, respondent issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) without notice and hearing. Complainant claims that summons
and copy of the complaint were not served on the defendants and there was no application for TRO in the complaint. Complainant
further alleges that respondent issued a preliminary injunction without the order fixing the amount of bond required; that she
merely relied on the allegation that the amount of P50,000.00 was deposited with the Clerk of Court and which amount was
reduced to P40,000.00; that inquiry revealed that no such amount was deposited and that the amount was missing.
Complainant alleges in his Supplemental Affidavit Complaint dated 12 December 2000, that on 8 September 2000, respondent
Judge rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. On 21 September 2000, complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal.
Allegedly, despite receipt of the notice of appeal and the Urgent Opposition to the Motion for Execution, respondent issued a
Writ of Execution on 3 October 2000. Complainant also avers that despite the perfection of appeal and payment of appeal fee,
respondent ordered the demolition of the structures built by occupants of the land subject matter of the case.
2.) In Criminal Case No. III-96-353, entitled "People vs. Ruben Pagatpatan," for Murder, complainant claims that he is a relative
of the victim, a six-year old boy who was twice run-over by the motorcycle of the accused. Complainant alleges that a criminal

S.V.Villanueva
complaint for Murder against the accused was filed by the police. Complainant avers that respondent took it upon herself to
investigate the case despite the presence of Assistant Prosecutor Joseph Baguilat and recommended that the offense to be
charged against the accused should only be homicide through reckless imprudence. Respondent allegedly recommended bail of
P5,000.00 and later released the accused. Complainant states that when the case was investigated by the Provincial Prosecutor
of Ifugao, the crime charged was elevated to murder.
3.) In Civil Case No. III-98-74 entitled "Thomas Bastian vs. Corazon Apagan, et al.," for tender of Payment, Consignation,
Redemption and Damages With prayer for Preliminary Injunction, complainant alleges that without issuing a notice of hearing,
respondent issued a restraining order dated 11 January 1999, and ordered the plaintiff to put up a bond in the amount of
P20,000.00. Complainant avers that on 12 December, prior to the issuance of the restraining order, plaintiff offered the property
in dispute, land covered by TD No. 93-140 of the property rolls of Aguinaldo, Ifugao, as injunction bond. On 15 June 1999,
respondent allegedly approved the said bond and issued the preliminary injunction without the necessary hearing. Complainant
suspects that respondent is in cahoots with plaintiff's counsel regarding the irregular issuance of several orders. Complainant also
notes that the P20,000.00 is missing.
On 1 September 2000, the Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator, received an undated and unsigned comment consisting
of 4 pages and enclosures, which apparently came from respondent Judge Cattiling.
Anent Civil Case No. III-00-91, respondent Judge explains that complainant is one of the 29 defendants in the civil case and
enumerates the series of events that transpired as follows: The Court received the complaint on 13 March 2000. The following
day, an ex-parte urgent motion for immediate hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was filed.
On 15 March 2000, the last day of the month for respondent to report at MCTC, Alfonso Lista, a TRO was issued to all persons
named as defendants in the complaint in compliance with BP Blg. 224, the rule on the issuance of TRO. The Court set the hearing
of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction on 3 April 2000. A copy of the order and summons were served to all the
defendants including herein complainant whose copy was sent through the PNP Warrant Officer of Mayoyao, Ifugao on 16 March
2000, and received by said Warrant Officer on 29 March 2000. On 3 April 2000, the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was heard with only three of the 29 defendants appearing through counsel. Evidences for both sides were presented.
On the same day, the Court issued an order for the issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and plaintiff was ordered
to put up a bond of P40,000.00 with the Clerk of Court. On 10 April 2000, the Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction after plaintiff posted an injunction bond. The writ was served on the defendants on 11 April 2000.
On the supplemental complaint (regarding Civil Case No. III-00-91), respondent states in her Comment thereto that MCTC Alfonso
Lista already lost jurisdiction of the case on 9 October 2000 when the court directed that the records be transmitted to the
Regional Trial Court. Thus, she could no longer have issued any order relative to the case; more so the alleged order of demolition
complained of. Respondent also states that complainant ought to have attached the questioned order to prove his allegation. As
to the implementation of the order of demolition, respondent claims to have no knowledge of the fact of demolition because no
order was ever issued.
Anent Criminal Case No. III-96-353, respondent claims that she conducted the preliminary investigation because the complaint
was received by and filed with the MCTC, Alfonso Lista. She avers that as a Municipal Judge, she is authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Except for respondent's act of downgrading the crime charged from murder to homicide through reckless imprudence, the other
charges are devoid of merit.
The issue raised relative to the issuance of the TRO and preliminary injunction is belied by the narration of the series of events
that transpired in Civil Case No. III-00-91. Complainant failed to prove that the issuance of the TRO and the preliminary injunction
is attended with irregularity. As to the charge that respondent issued writ of execution despite the perfection of appeal,
complainant failed to adduce evidence that he filed the necessary bond and deposited the reasonable compensation to stay
execution, pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. In the absence of proof that he complied with
the requirements of the said Rule, there is no reason to hold that the execution of the judgment pending appeal was irregular.
With regard to Crim. Case No. III-96-353, on the allegation that respondent has no authority to conduct preliminary investigation
because of the presence of the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor in the area, we find respondent's act to be in accordance with Section
2, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
We, however, find respondent in error when she reduced the charge of Murder to Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. The
Court in a number of cases has declared that a municipal judge has no authority to determine the character or designation of the
crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima facie the allegations of facts contained in
the complaint.1 The power to amend a complaint at any time before the accused pleads, both in form and substance, without
leave of court, is lodged in the prosecuting officer and not in the trial judge.2

S.V.Villanueva
Respondent failed to submit her comment on the allegations relative to Civil Case No. III-98-74. Nevertheless, no valid ground is
found to hold her liable for the charges therein. Besides being unsubstantiated, the allegations as presented by complainant are
quite hazy. Moreover, complainant does not appear to be a party to the case. No further investigation on the matter is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Emelina L. Cattiling is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for amending the
criminal charge from murder to homicide through reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. III-96-353 and the other charges
against respondent are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165751. April 12, 2005
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioners, vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting the Amended Information2 and denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration,3 dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004, respectively.
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib
A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim,
Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotabato City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID MATALAM, a high ranking public official, HABIB A. BAJUNAID,
ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-ranking public officials, committing the offense while in the
performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to several employees of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, cotabato City, thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by illegally and
unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR employees namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E.
ZAILON, ESMAEL A. EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the
period of January 1998 to June 1999 amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos. 982027 and
990415 in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials
and other benefits.4
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit.5
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information Deleting the
Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam" 6 to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the
Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam. 7Thereafter, the public prosecutor
filed his Reply8 to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.
The Amended Information reads:
That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cotabato City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused a public officer being then the ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary DAR,
committing the offense while in the performance of his official duties and thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality did there
and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service complaining DAR-
Maguindanao employees, cotabato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil, to their damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the
period when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other benefits.9
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action. The corpus
delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission,
but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. He insists that the amended
information charging a separate and entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of
due process of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being charged for
the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.
On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information Deleting the
Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P. Matalam. It admitted the Amended Information charging solely petitioner for
Violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The court a quo ruled:

S.V.Villanueva
What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and are
considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the Amended Information is admitted, there would be no need to require the
Public Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation in the observance of the rights of the accused to due process. On
the other hand, if the amendment would be substantial, necessarily, another preliminary investigation should be accorded to the
accused. Distinction of the two is thus imperative.
...
The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the original Information which is a Violation
of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically, therefore, the amendment is a matter of form only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended Information is very much noticeable. As
correctly pointed out by accused Matalam, the corpus delicti in the original Information was the alleged willful and confederated
refusal of the accused to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. The corpus delicti in the Amended Information is now
altered into the alleged illegal dismissal of the complainants from their service by accused Matalam. Certainly, the two causes of
action differ differently from each other.
Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the amendments seem to be substantial considering
that the main defense of all the accused in the original information – the lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment
of the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses – would not, in itself alone, stands [sic] as a defense for accused Matalam
in the Amended Information anymore. In the same manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would have to present in the
original Information, had it not been found to be without prima facie evidence, will not be equally available to bail him out in the
Amended Information anymore. And further, although the nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of the case
as against accused Matalam is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action now varies and therefore, he
would have to formulate another defense again.
However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence obtaining on record, this Court agrees with
the findings and recommendation of the Public Prosecutor that the real and exact issue in this case is actually the alleged illegal
dismissal of the complaining witnesses. The issue of non-payment of their backwages is merely incidental because had it not been
for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand for monetary claims should have not arisen. Put in another perspective, the
surrounding circumstances that brought about the issue of the alleged illegal dismissal were actually the ones that spewed the
issue of unpaid backwages.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of the cause of action does not conceivably
come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his counter-affidavit submitted before the Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam
already took the occasion to elaborate his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the alleged illegal
dismissal of the complaining witnesses. And these chain of circumstances, actually, were the very preceding circumstances as to
why the complaining witnesses had suffered their alleged injury. The need for another preliminary investigation is therefore not
necessary.
Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any way prejudiced because an inquiry to
the allegations in the original cause of action would certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of
the allegations in the new cause of action contained in the Amended Information.
To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time considering that accused, in his counter-
affidavit, had already explained extensively his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to
be admitted. And definitely, his projected defense would be the same assuming that another preliminary investigation be
conducted and that he would be required to submit another counter-affidavit again.10
On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 which the prosecution opposed.12 On 03 November 2004,
the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.13 It explained:
While it is true that accused-movant’s defense in the original information could not by itself stand alone as his defense to the
amended one, however, the same would still be available for the latter because although the two questioned causes of action
literally varied, they are nonetheless interrelated with each other. The essential ingredients of the amended information are
actually identical with those constituting the original, such that, the inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would reveal. And since these two causes of action had emanated from the same set of factual settings,
the evidence that accused-movant might have under the original information would still be available and applicable to the
amended one.
Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury they suffered as a consequence of the
alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them of their backwages. And notably, based on the affidavit that the accused-
movant had submitted, his defense to this was due to the lack of funds appropriated for the said purpose. But why was there no
appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private complainants were illegally dismissed from their service and as a result thereof,
their names were subsequently stricken off from the roster of employees in the government agency where they were connected.

S.V.Villanueva
Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the private complainants would therefore be
their alleged illegal dismissal from the service. Otherwise, their names would not have been stricken off from the roster of
employees in the agency which they were connected with and the appropriation for the payment of their salaries would have
been continuously made.
Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action (from non-payment of backwages into
illegal dismissal), the amendment of the information did not however affect or alter the nature of the offense that was originally
charged. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution since this remained to be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019
on account of the alleged injury caused to the private complainants. And even if the prosecution’s theory would now be premised
on the new cause of action (illegal dismissal), this would not however cause surprise to the accused-movant nor would require
him to undergo a material change or modification in his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to commence
from the very same set of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And evidently, this is the reason why in the
affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions therein consisted not only of his defense to the original
information but also included an extensive discussion regarding his defense to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording the accused-movant a new preliminary
investigation did not amount to a violation of his rights. To afford him another process of preliminary investigation would no
longer serve him and this court any better considering that he had already explained in the said affidavit his defense to the
amended information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit another one, he is likely to elaborate again the very same arguments
that he had already invoked in his previous affidavit.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 admitting the
Amended Information charging a new offense without conducting a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process of law
when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation.
Firstly, petitioner maintains that a new preliminary investigation should have been ordered because the corpus delicti in the
Amended Information is the termination of services of the complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the Original
Information is the alleged refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. In other words, there being a new and
distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new preliminary investigation. Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when
the Sandiganbayan ruled that if "he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to elaborate again the very
same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit" considering that he would have pointed out certain facts not
contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that "the theory of the case against
him changed because the cause of action varies, and that he would have to formulate another defense," the Sandiganbayan did
not remand the case to the public prosecutor for preliminary investigation because it was a waste of time since he had already
explained extensively in his counter-affidavit his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information. Thirdly,
he asserts he was not given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the
dismissal of the seven employees inasmuch as there are other factors and circumstances that would support his posture.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor, stated that the admission of the
Amended Information without another preliminary investigation would not violate petitioner’s right to due process on the ground
that the amendment is merely formal, and to require another preliminary investigation would not be in obedience to, but in
disregard of, the prime purpose for which a preliminary investigation is ordained by law and jurisprudence. It maintains that
petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in illegally terminating the complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.14
The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the Information?
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without
leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the
accused.15

S.V.Villanueva
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court. All other matters are merely of form.16
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case
so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused;17 (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness
in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.18
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. 19
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely
altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal
to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary
claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be amended in
substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary
investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge.20
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary
investigation. However, if the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new
preliminary investigation is not required.
The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a new preliminary investigation because
the charges in the original information and amended information are related and the latter has already presented his defense on
the amended charge. Further, remanding the case to the Public Prosecutor for another preliminary investigation would be a
waste of time considering that petitioner had already explained extensively his defense on the new allegations contained in the
Amended Information, that is, the accused already elaborated his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about
the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses. It added that the change in the recital of the cause of action will not come as
a surprise to the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless interrelated, and that the rights of the
accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit
substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information.
On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation because he was not, among other things,
given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the private
complainants.
While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e., an inquiry into one would have elicited
substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that an inquiry into the other would have brought into light, 21 this fact should not
necessarily deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary investigation. As above-stated, the rule is that a new preliminary
investigation is needed if there is a substantial amendment. The exception, i.e., charge is related or included in the original
information, should not be applied automatically. The circumstances in every case must be taken into consideration before the
accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference to such parties.22
The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in committing the prohibited act. Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal contained in the amended charge gave rise
to the original charge of failure to pay the monetary claims of private complainants. It cannot be disputed that petitioner already
discussed circumstances surrounding the termination of services of the private complainants in his counter-affidavit. However,

S.V.Villanueva
we find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched the issue of evident bad faith or manifest partiality. As can
be gathered from the counter-affidavit, there were arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad faith, manifest
partiality or gross inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay the monetary claims and not to
the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation stemmed from the other, the court a quo and the public prosecutor cannot
say the element of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence is the same in both. This being an element
of the offense charged, petitioner should be given the opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced
because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right
to due process.23
Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale24 and Lava v. Gonzales25 where no new preliminary investigation was given because
the charges in the amended informations were related to, or included in, the original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The
factual milieu in those cases is different from the case before us.
In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for illegal possession of iron brand,
and making or ordering the making thereof. In the notices sent to the accused in connection with the preliminary investigation
of the complaint, the accused was informed not of one but of both. He was given the chance, and was placed on guard, to defend
himself for both charges. Moreover, the right of the accused to have another preliminary investigation was waived when he went
forward with the trial.
In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later amended to Simple Rebellion. This court held
that a new preliminary investigation was not necessary there being no change in the nature of the crime charged, and that
accused failed to ask for a reinvestigation upon learning of the amended information.
In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of Section 3(e), Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was
not given the opportunity to submit his evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to
the illegal dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his right to a new preliminary investigation and, instead, is asking for one.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is
the function of the prosecution.26
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under the Rules. This Court is not determining
if petitioner should or should not be brought to trial. What we are looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that petitioner was not given the
chance to fully present his evidence on the amended information which contained a substantial amendment, a new preliminary
investigation is in order.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be merely a waste of time, it must
be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the
accused may be afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should
never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
Finally, as to petitioner’s prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed, the same cannot be ordered. The
absence27 or incompleteness28 of a preliminary investigation does not warrant the quashal or dismissal of the information. Neither
does it affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case or impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The
court shall hold in abeyance the proceedings on such information and order the remand of the case for preliminary investigation
or completion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent court’s resolutions dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to order the Office of
the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended Information filed
against petitioner. It is further directed to suspend the proceedings in the said case pending termination of the preliminary
investigation, and thereafter to take such action on petitioner’s case as may be warranted by the results of said preliminary
investigation. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

S.V.Villanueva
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS
ALAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007
Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the trial court’s Orders
of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12,
2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo
Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at the
Makati Medical Center.5
After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he was released from detention, and his arraignment
was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter
alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari
and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public
prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs,
or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial
determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer
action on the admission of the Amended Information.11
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted the Amended
Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 200714 which set the
arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court.
The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH
REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S AMENDED
INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE
VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION
AND ILLEGAL AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED
ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED
DURING THE REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A HEARING
FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the original omitted)
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused to plead,
drawing the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela16 which
the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007, 17 it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime
of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount of ₱300,000 for his provisional liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended
Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the
pendency of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioner’s
application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot since the presentation
of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded.18

S.V.Villanueva
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the present case, petitioner did
not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission
to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him,
the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he
vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea
since the issues he raised were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of
"not guilty" for him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right
to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible.20
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him from
obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation, the OSG
offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioner’s participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily
and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present
petition.21
Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s availment of remedies against the trial court’s Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner
to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary
relinquishment of petitioner’s principal prayer. The non-issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did
not preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the case took its course.
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of judgment.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.24
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder operates as a supervening event
that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground25 to annul the finding of probable cause for murder, there is no
practical use or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying the case under the original Information for homicide
just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner
been convicted of murder, for proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been
established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the legal issues in
order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. 26 In the present case, there is compelling reason to
clarify the remedies available before and after the filing of an information in cases subject of inquest.
After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of
the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial court Orders.
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases
when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to
the accused.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed
by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.

S.V.Villanueva
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine.28 As an exception, the rules provide that there is no
need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant29 involving such type of offense, so long as an
inquest, where available, has been conducted.30
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons
arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said
persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.31
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private complainant during the
brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or information
in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating with the
arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to
avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the
proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the
private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires
the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to the arrested
person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with
either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person.33Notably, the rules on inquest
do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.34
Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not
immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party under such rules as the
Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, 36 Section
1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/
reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through the regular course
of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to ask for
a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest
are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case,
a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself,
ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case. 38 Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to
intervene by counsel in the criminal action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel and
with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must "examine the Information vis-à-vis
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the
information is sufficient in form and substance."41
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the
records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically
it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it
required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore,
that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

S.V.Villanueva
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility
is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. 43
The prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.44 The standing principle is that once an information is filed in
court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Interestingly,
petitioner supports this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose
his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may
deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxxx
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent
of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or
otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.46 (underscoring supplied)
While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein
recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case
pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority
of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped
with discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval of the resulting
proposed course of action.
Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case, the Court’s
holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11,
Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made
without leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it
does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused.50
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information
which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. 51 An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction
upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.52
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without leave of court at any time
before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification53 of the
charge – is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of
action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes
of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court.

S.V.Villanueva
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law
demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related
to or is included in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations
which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he
has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential
for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of
his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended
Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one of substance with
very serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and
material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely
clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form
but the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the caption of the
Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were
already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide already
alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly
the same as those already alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the
present case.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case
was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction
between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 60 What is essential is that petitioner was
placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as
early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge.
Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with
extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a condition sine
qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made
and an opportunity to controvert the complainant’s evidence was accorded him.62
In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC Orders despite the
pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two trial court Orders allowing a
reinvestigation.

S.V.Villanueva
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary retraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.63 The appellate court, by Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied
petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek
injunctive reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court thus did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it proceeded with the case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction
order from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that
was available after the reinvestigation and which could have suspended the arraignment. 661avvphi1
Regarding petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an
indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains
as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be
relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.68
There is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s sudden designation of Senior State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case69 and the latter’s conformity to the motion for
reinvestigation.
In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will conduct the reinvestigation or
preliminary investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the
Secretary of Justice71 who is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor to
handle a particular case, which broad power of control has been recognized by jurisprudence. 72
As for the trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to the media which aired his opinion that if the
assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed — the DOJ Secretary reportedly
uttered that "the filing of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I told you to watch over that case…
there should be a report about the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then that’s not a complete investigation, that’s why you
should use that as a ground" — no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable
cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic investigative reports to support a
finding of probable cause. The original Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot be
determined based on the evidence obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es
[is/]are presented in evidence[.]"74
The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin test and ballistic
examination, and the handling of physical evidence," 75 as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient
circumstances that require further inquiry.
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the prior determination
of probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to
deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal
case.76
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the
reinvestigation.
Petitioner’s argument is specious.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is
one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.77
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be

S.V.Villanueva
forced to issue the arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be
followed by the RTC.
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion,
the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the
task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.80
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination
of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.81(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's]
examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judge’s examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion
as the circumstances of the case require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the
presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable cause is made ex
parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of
probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances exist that would qualify the crime
from homicide to murder.
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces of evidence are not
prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or evidence was presented during the
reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation
of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to
review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted.85
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review on
certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue of
the absence or presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual review. 86
In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope.
It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The court’s duty in the pertinent case is confined to determining whether the
executive and judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Although it is possible that error may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render the act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.88
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187174 August 28, 2013
FELY Y. YALONG, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCILA C. YLAGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated August 1, 20082 and March 10, 20093 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C A-G.R. SP No. 104075 which dismissed petitioner Fely Y. Yalong's (Yalong) Petition for Review4 dated June 26,
2008 (subject petition for review), finding the same to be the improper mode of appeal.
The Facts

S.V.Villanueva
Stemming from a complaint tiled by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan (Ylagan ), an information was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Batangas City, Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414, charging Yalong for the crime of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 225 (BP 22) as follows:
That on or about April 2, 2002 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna Branch, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Major Lucila Ylagan, Export and Industry Bank Check No.
0002578833 dated May 3, 2002 in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱450,000.00), Philippine Currency,
to apply on account or for value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee bank, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of "Account Closed," which in effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency
of funds, despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with
the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Major Lucila Ylagan, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general
and of Major Lucila Ylagan in particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge. Hence, the case was set for pre-trial and thereafter, trial
ensued.7
During trial, Ylagan testified that sometime on April 2, 2002, Yalong borrowed from her the amount of ₱450,000.00 with a verbal
agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated check
dated May 3, 2002 in the similar amount of ₱450,000.00 (subject check). However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for
payment on August 27, 2002, it was dishonored and returned to her for the reason "Account Closed." As verbal and written
demands made on Yalong to pay her loan proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant criminal case.8
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the
same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not
covered by sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.9
The MTCC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
On August 24, 2006, the MTCC rendered its Judgment10 (MTCC Decision), finding Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of BP 22 and accordingly sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of one year and
ordered her to pay Ylagan the amount of ₱450,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from October 10, 2002, including
₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.11
The MTCC found all the elements of the crime charged to have been duly established. It did not give credence to Yalong’s defense
that she did not own the checking account and that she was not the one who issued the subject check. On this score, it cited the
case of Ruiz v. People12 wherein it was held that "BP 22 is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the making and issuing
of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for
payment."13 Further, it observed that Yalong failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has completely paid the
loan and thus, such defense must likewise fail.14
Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of Arrest 15 dated October 15, 2006 which the
MTCC treated as an original motion for reconsideration. The said motion was, however, denied in an Order16 dated December
5, 2006.
Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal 17 dated January 2, 2007 which was denied due course in an Order18dated January
19, 2007, considering that the judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence.
Dissatisfied, Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of Appeal19 which was dismissed in an Order20dated July 25,
2007 on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her under the law when she: (a) failed to appear without
justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the MTCC Decision; (b) did not surrender within 15 days from the date of
such promulgation; (c) did not file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law; and (d) remained at large.
Yalong moved for reconsideration21 which was, however, denied in an Order22 dated October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition), docketed as Civil Case No. 8278, before the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City, Branch 7 (RTC).23
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution24 dated April 2, 2008 (RTC Resolution), the RTC denied Yalong’s certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of
the MTCC Decision in absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation on October 6, 2006
and yet failed to appear thereat.25 Furthermore, the RTC observed that Yalong did not make any effort to surrender within the
time allowed by the rules and thus, lost the remedies available to her under the law.26
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 200827 which was eventually denied in an Order28 dated May 27, 2008. As
such, on June 26, 2008, she filed the subject petition for review before the CA.29
The CA Ruling

S.V.Villanueva
In a Resolution30 dated August 1, 2008, the CA dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground that the "Order of the RTC
was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – where appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC – and not a petition
for review is the proper remedy."
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 20, 200831 which was, however, denied in a Resolution32dated March
10, 2009. Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of
improper appeal.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required
notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a
petition for review),33 Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. The said provision reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed
and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and that the latter court rendered a
Resolution dated April 2, 2008 dismissing the same. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original action 34 and, as
such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. Hence, based on the above-cited rule, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition
for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary
period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong’s contention that a petition for review may be treated as a notice of appeal
since the contents of the former already include the required contents of the latter cannot be given credence since these modes
of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with
one another. For one, a notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final
order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment
or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong’s filing of the subject petition for review cannot be
simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final
and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid
unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to
controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on
the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on
equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case.35 As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong
remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong’s appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter
alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. 36 Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed
in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored.37
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan
presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor.38 As such,
the MTCC correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same.
In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

S.V.Villanueva
As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the present petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other
ancillary issues in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated August 1, 2008 and March 10, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104075 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164938. August 22, 2005
VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, Petitioners, vs.
HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3;
ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Victor C. Agustin which, in turn, assailed the Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, denying the motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-
R, for libel.
On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four separate Informations2 charging the petitioner, a
Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel. The inculpatory portion of that in Criminal Case No. 17892-R is quoted infra, as
follows:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the
character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general manager of the Baguio Country
Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community and with malicious intent of exposing the (sic)
Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there
willfully, maliciously and criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write in his column "Cocktails" and publish in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines, wherein in said column the said
accused did then and there defame the complainant Anthony De Leon by branding and imputing upon him the following
defamatory and libelous statements, to wit:
"The trysting place between the President Marcos and Hollywood actress Dovie Beams is not the subject of a high level tax evasion
investigation ordered by no less than the new BIR Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.
That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily changed hands in the last two years, and had supposedly been sold to, first
Anthony De Leon, the acting general manager of the exclusive Baguio Country Club, who in turn disposed of it to an unwitting
Chinoy couple.
According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr. De Leon is already spurious since the cook De Leon had been missing
and had gone ‘TNT’ in New York more than eight years ago. The spurious sale to the male De Leon who is not related to the cook,
was necessary to make it appear that it had been an intra-family transfer.
Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it appear that he and his family had been using the house himself, but the BIR
had now gotten a certification from the Greenhills homeowners’ association that the said bungalow has all these years been
rented to third parties, the last of which was an ADB executive.
The most damaging of the findings was the supposed transfer price of the bungalow between the De Leons and how much the
bungalow was later palmed off to the Chinese-Filipino couple.
We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to announce himself, that, if he could overcome the tremendous and well-
oiled lobbying efforts by De Leon’s principals.
Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed best friend of Lenny ‘Dragon Lady’ de Jesus."
which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements have been read by the personnel of the Baguio Country
Club, by the residents of the City of Baguio, and by the public in the other parts of the country, and that those libelous and
defamatory words and statements aforementioned are untrue, false and malicious tending to impeach the character, integrity,
virtue and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, thus, placing and
causing said Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit and ridicule which acts are serious and insulting in
nature, to the damage and prejudice of the said Anthony De Leon.3
Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as the dates of the commission of the crimes charged therein, the three other
Informations are similarly worded.
Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. 4
Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses
charged. He pointed out that the said Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party, Anthony de Leon, was

S.V.Villanueva
actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Baguio City.
Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging that he was a bona fide resident of the Baguio
Country Club located at the Country Club Road, Baguio City; he was also the acting general manager of the club at the time the
alleged libelous article was published. He emphasized that the Informations alleged that he was of good standing and reputation
in the community, and that the word "community" meant Baguio City, where he was residing. Moreover, Agustin was estopped
from assailing the court’s lack of jurisdiction since he was arraigned before he filed his motion to quash the Information. Even if
it may be assumed that there was some ambiguity in the Informations as to whether he was an actual resident of Baguio City,
amending them would suffice; based on the entirety of the context and applying the doctrine of necessary implication, there can
be no other conclusion than that he was a resident of Baguio City.
By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the allegations in the Informations (that the private complainant was the acting general
manager of the Baguio Country Club and was a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community) do not
constitute an allegation that the private complainant was an actual resident of Baguio City. He insisted that to construe the word
"community" in the Informations to mean the community in Baguio City would be to unduly strain the limits of a fair
interpretation; there must be clear and positive allegations in the Informations that the private complainant actually resided in
Baguio City. He argued that he was not estopped from assailing the court’s jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his
arraignment because lack of jurisdiction is a matter which can be dealt with at any time.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an Order5 denying the motion to quash, holding that in the light of the petitioner’s
admission that the private complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, "it was reasonable to infer
therefrom that the private complainant was actually a resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were
published."
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, insisting that the mere fact that the private complainant was the General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club did not necessarily mean that the latter was actually residing in Baguio City, as it was also
possible that he was actually residing in a place nearby. The trial court, however, denied the motion on April 1, 2002.
Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a plea for an injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals
(CA), claiming that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his
Motion to Quash.
On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It disagreed with Agustin, and held that the trial court
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in so ruling. According to the CA, while the
Informations filed by the prosecution did not contain allegations that the complainant was actually a resident of Baguio City at
the time the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published, and that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published in Baguio City, such defects were merely of form and not of substance. Thus, there is no need to quash the Informations,
as they may merely be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
that "an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge, and
thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court."6 The CA further ruled that any amendment that would be made to
conform to the private complainant’s residency requirements would not place the accused at a disadvantage.
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied for lack of merit.7
Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari and prohibition, it appearing that the
trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Informations, as well as his motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying the same.
The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the private respondent was actually
residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City as mandated by Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He asserts that the amendments of
the Informations would likewise be improper, considering that the defects of the Informations were not merely of form but of
substance. The petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and mandatory; hence, conformably with the
decisions of the Court in Lopez v. City Judge,8 and Agbayani v. Sayo,9 the Informations must be quashed.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the failure of the Informations to allege
that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio City (where the Informations were filed) is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserts
that the averment in the Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the jurisdiction of the trial court in Baguio
City, taken in conjunction with the other allegations therein, are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the subject cases in the RTC
of Baguio City.
For his part, the private complainant reiterated his arguments in the RTC and in the CA in his Comment on the Petition.
The threshold issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses
charged in the four Informations on the premise that the Informations are defective; and (2) whether the Informations may be
amended to cure the said defects.

S.V.Villanueva
The petition is meritorious.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. 10 The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.11
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides –
ART. 360. Persons responsible.— Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance or the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action
shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided,
finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions
may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be
brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.12
Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of
the criminal action in a remote or distant places.13 To obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from written
defamation, the complaint or Information should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual at the time the offense was committed, and where he was actually residing at that time; whenever possible,
the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.14
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the
commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot even be
inferred from the allegation "the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing
and reputation in the community" that the private respondent (complainant) was actually residing in Baguio City.
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence
must be more than temporary.15 The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to
be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein.16 To create a residence in a particular place, two
fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of
remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time.17 While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually
residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been
actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render

S.V.Villanueva
such person a resident therein.18 Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the
meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue. 19
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any
allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were
allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court
cannot be allowed.20
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629
are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Informations and DISMISS
the cases against petitioner Victor C. Agustin in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R. SO ORDERED.

S.V.Villanueva

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.

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Rule110 compiled cases 38 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 39 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 40 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 41 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 42 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 43 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 44 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 45 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 46 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 47 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 48 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 49 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 50 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 51 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 52 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 53 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 54 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 55 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 56 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 57 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 58 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 59 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 60 | P a g e

Rule110 compiled cases 61 | P a g e