ESSO Standard vs.

Acting Commissioner of Customs

ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. vs. ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

18 SCRA 488

GR No. L-21841, October 28, 1966

"Exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority."

FACTS: Petitioner, engaged in the industry of processing gasoline, oils etc., claims for the refund of
special import taxes paid pursuant to the provision of RA 1394 which imposed a special import tax "on
all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the Philippines." Exempt from this tax, by
express mandate of Section 6 of the same law are "machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare parts,
for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers". Petitioner argued that the
importation it made of gas pumps used by their gasoline station operators should fall under such
exemptions, being directly used in its industry. The Collector of Customs of Manila rejected the claim,
and so as the Court on Tax Appeals. The CTA noted that the pumps imported were not used in the
processing of gasoline and other oil products but by the gasoline stations, owned by the petitioner, for
pumping out, from underground barrels, gasoline sold on retail to customers.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? Does the subject imports fall into the exemptions?

HELD: No. The contention runs smack against the familiar rules that exemption from taxation is not
favored, and that exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Which are but statements in
adherence to the ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tested by this precept, we cannot indulge in
expansive construction and write into the law an exemption not therein set forth. Rather, we go by the
reasonable assumption that where the State has granted in express terms certain exemptions, those are
the exemptions to be considered, and no more. Since the law states that, to be tax-exempt, equipment
and spare parts should be "for the use of industries", the coverage herein should not be enlarged to
include equipment and spare parts for use in dispensing gasoline at retail.
Socorro Ramirez v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. 93833 September 25

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant
petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law)
is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication”
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Part 2
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
FACTS  Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,
with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and
damages filed by Lacap against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two
other contractors were pre-qualified
 Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and
thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount
it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
 DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due
to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the
Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a
contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or
declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994
recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment
was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against petitioner before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
 Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not
appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an
Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay
Lacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of
the suit
 CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
RULING A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not
exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts
to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a
supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the
license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in
obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning
rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of
R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by
a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment
of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such
payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

PETITIONER: GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION

(GMCR)
RESPONDENT: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC) and IMELDA SALAZAR (private respondent)
PONENTIA: Justice Romero
Nature of the case: Regarding the alleged Illegal Dismissal of SALAZAR
Doctrine according to the Syllabus: VERBA LEGIS
FACTS OF THE CASE
Parties Involved/Characters:
Imelda Salazar – General System Analyst of GMCR
Delfin Saldivar – Manager for Technical Operations’ support of
GMCR
Agustin Maramara – Company’s Internal Auditor
Richard Yambao – Owner and Manager of Elecon Engineering
which is a supplier of GMCR
Story:
It is alleged that Salazar and Saldivar are very close. It is also
mentioned that they share an apartment.
1984, reports shows that the company equipment and sare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing. A report
prepared by Maramara indicated that:
- Saldivar entered into a partnership with Yambao
- Saldivar recommended Elecon
- The missing aircon was used by Saldivar for personal use
(recovered by replevin)
- Salazar (respondent) got involved because she is a signed witness
of the Articles of Partnership of the two
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZAR
Case Digest
2
- She knows where the missing aircon is, failed to report it.
(1984) Because of those, Salazar was suspended and was given time
to explain herself (for 30 days/one month). After 3 days she already filed a
complaint against GMCR for illegal dismissal (illegal suspension at first
then it escalated to that).
(1985) Heared by Labor Arbiter – in favor of Imelda Salazar, awarded
her reinstatement, backwages and other benefits plus moral damages.
(1987) NLRC – affirmed Labor Arbiter decision but backwages of 2
years only; no moral damages
Thus this petition by GMCR before SC
Issue
Is she illegally dismissed based on the Labor Code and Constitutional
guarantee?
Held
She was illegally dismissed.
The Court pointed out Art 279 of the Labor Code, which talks about
the Security of tenure for regular employees which states that:
xxx An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent xxx
Corollary to it is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code (IRR) stating that employer cannot terminate regular
employees without just cause or authorized by laws 1 and if such
employeed get illegally dismissed, he or she will be entitled to be back in
his/her position or be reinstated without loss of seniority rights plus
backwages2
1 IRR of Labor Code, Sec. 2
2 IRR of Labor Code, Sec. 3
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZAR
Case Digest
3
The priority is clearly leaned towards the employee or to labor.The
Court pointed out the opening paragraph on Labor and the 1973
Constitution on Article 2 which enshrines “full protection” to labor. In the
1986 ConCom, they have designed Social Justice an Human rights to
reduce social, economic and political inequalities.
Court held that the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous.
Under statcon, if the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be applied literally [Verba Legis]
(Additional, away from statcon, she is not in a fiduciary position so she
can be reinstated because “strained relations” aren’t relevant in her position)
Disposition
NLRC decision AFFIRMED
Reinstated Imelda, backwaged of 2 years.

Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]

15 Aug

Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him
and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec.
3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.” The claim
was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the
ground that while petitioner’s presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the
deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law,
there was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty.” Petitioner brought this petition for
review on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.

HELD: NO. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

RATIO:

Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

To say then that an accused has been “unjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for
having been the victim of an “unjust conviction.” If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not,
on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

JMM v NLRC (1993)

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Ulpiano
L. De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency,
made the following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)
2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the petitioner
to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The decision being
appealed involved a monetary award.
3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond,
and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According to
Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. On
the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.
4. Sec. 6 reads:
“In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted bonds
of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?
Held:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of 350,000
because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that overseas
employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more care on the
part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care
should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court found
that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17 Rule 2,
Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award. Also, it is
possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and the money placed in
escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a dilemma, an appeal
bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

Duncano vs Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015)

Duncano vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a
criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking
public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his
assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides
Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the
1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which
are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The
decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and
P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4,
Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249,
and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not
among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be
under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect.
The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the
whole of the statute – its every word.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II
with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to
the reliefs prayed for.

Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
15 Aug

Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.

FACTS:

[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is “An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative
district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars,
Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution
No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par.
(d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of
Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the
aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.

HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO:

Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory
note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far
as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to
open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is
its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.

The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not
having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large
in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the
full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS vs.Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her parents, the Enciso
spouses. The petitioners mortgaged the property twice, the latest done on December4, 1975 in favor
of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
Petitioners failed to pay and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the
public auction on February 27, 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 12, 1983.

RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners opposed.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of appeals made a similar
decision.

On November 17, 1983 and on on August 31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and
maintained that they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, which states that,
 Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five
years from the date of the conveyance.

The Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs of the subject
property since petitioners acquired the said property through inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.

HELD:

Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being legal heirs,
had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not yet proscribed. The
Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was
evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the
issuance of the Final deed in 1983.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

"military members exempted from the right to bail”

Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of
War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various
Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning
the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the
appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right
to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional
liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents
that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal
before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure
of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that
mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners
was reversed.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]
15 Aug

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA
project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and
emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits
under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly
extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-
INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed”.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must
be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez [G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981]
15 Aug

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949,
fixed the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed “an annual
additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property
tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centrum. That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of
fixing the realty tax at three percent. [B]y means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on
December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional
one-half percent realty tax.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest and later filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of it. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is
not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827). After hearing, the trial court
declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax.
The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court) with the ruling of Judge Gomez brought about the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the additional one-half percent realty tax is legal and valid.

HELD:

YES. By necessary implication.

RATIO:

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction and sustained the
City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax was sanctioned by the
provision in Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of implications means that “that
which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed”.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal
corporations. Inferentially, that law (the ordinance) fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue
to a city or municipality. Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property
Tax Code (later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorized the augmentation
by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]

15 Aug

Ponente: REGALA, J.

FACTS:

[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg
applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information
against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was
raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for
trial on the merits.

RATIO:

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal
in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there
has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public
policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of
Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not
covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of
the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of
expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al. [G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978]
15 Aug

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a
parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that
sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative
defenses in the answer of Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing
be held on those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and
enjoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova.

HELD:

NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.

RATIO:

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil
Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no
longer open to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated
again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.

G.R. No. 210164 – Political Law – Election Law – Republic Act No. 9225 – Qualifications of Local
Elective Candidates – Citizenship Requirements – Dual Allegiance

Remedial Law – Formal Offer of Evidence – Evidence not Offered

Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.

On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.

A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the ground that
Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such
act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and that is a ground for disqualification under the
Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that Arnado remained a US citizen.

In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for elective
public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the elective office they desire, and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships – which must be done before the
filing of the COC.

Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not
know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when he received said Philippine
passport, he used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an
Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a notary public.

Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and in March
2010.

Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared
another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
195649).

Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival
candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No. 195649.
While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 elections as he even acquired 84% of the votes cast
for mayor in Kauswagan.

Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections and his
declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan
voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.

HELD: No.

1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements set by law.
The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot override the constitutional
and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless.

2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines and
renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted
or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.

In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January 2010 and
March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for public office.

What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again
(for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the
2013 elections too.

Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is
still disqualified.

Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when he again made
a second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of
Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of the original. Under the Best
Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the original must be presented unless the
same is lost. In this case, the original was never alleged to have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was
being used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”