Porter's 5 Forces Analysis

1. Threat of New Entrants. The average entrepreneur can't come along and start a large
insurance company. The threat of new entrants lies within the insurance industry itself.
Some companies have carved out niche areas in which they underwrite insurance. These
insurance companies are fearful of being squeezed out by the big players. Another threat
for many insurance companies is other financial services companies entering the market.
What would it take for a bank or investment bank to start offering insurance products? In
some countries, only regulations that prevent banks and other financial firms from
entering the industry. If those barriers were ever broken down, like they were in the U.S.
with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, you can be sure that the floodgates will open.
2. Power of Suppliers. The suppliers of capital might not pose a big threat, but the threat of
suppliers luring away human capital does. If a talented insurance underwriter is working
for a smaller insurance company (or one in a niche industry), there is the chance that
person will be enticed away by larger companies looking to move into a particular
market.
3. Power of Buyers. The individual doesn't pose much of a threat to the insurance industry.
Large corporate clients have a lot more bargaining power with insurance companies.
Large corporate clients like airlines and pharmaceutical companies pay millions of
dollars a year in premiums. Insurance companies try extremely hard to get high-margin
corporate clients.
4. Availability of Substitutes. This one is pretty straight forward, for there are plenty of
substitutes in the insurance industry. Most large insurance companies offer similar suites
of services. Whether it is auto, home, commercial, health or life insurance, chances are
there are competitors that can offer similar services. In some areas of insurance, however,
the availability of substitutes are few and far between. Companies focusing on niche
areas usually have a competitive advantage, but this advantage depends entirely on the
size of the niche and on whether there are any barriers preventing other firms from
entering.
5. Competitive Rivalry. The insurance industry is becoming highly competitive. The
difference between one insurance company and another is usually not that great. As a
result, insurance has become more like a commodity - an area in which the insurance
company with the low cost structure, greater efficiency and better customer service will
beat out competitors. Insurance companies also use higher investment returns and a
variety of insurance investment products to try to lure in customers. In the long run, we're
likely to see more consolidation in the insurance industry. Larger companies prefer to
take over or merge with other companies rather than spend the money to market and
advertise to people.
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Improving Corporate Governance: A
blueprint for preventing future scams like
Satyam Computers
By Atim Kabra , Singapore, Hardnews special

Why are we so surprised at Satyam Computer blowing up?

Probably not because there were accounting shenanigans, not because Raju placed himself
before shareholders, not the fact that auditors were probably hand in gloves with the
management and conveniently turning a blind eye to the fraud being perpetrated at the company,
certainly not the fact that the so called independents were dwarfed by Raju, his charm, his
wealth, his connections or were just plain incompetent and beholden to Raju for inducting them
as independent directors in the first place. We are surprised by the sheer scale of the fraudulent
activities which went on unchecked by reputed auditors and the numerous corporate governance
awards which multiple organizations vied to bestow on Satyam. Well, it speaks volumes for
these organizations but that is a matter for another debate. I wonder whether we are more
shocked at the events that unfolded at Satyam or shocked by the fact that Raju had to own up to
the going ons at Satyam. That such a well connected man with assets of gigantic size had to own
up to mischiefs and scams, gives rise to innumerable conspiracy theories ranging from blackmail
to jail in India being preferred over jails in the USA by Raju.

I have had the opportunity to discuss this issue in details with many fund managers based in
India as well as overseas and I am attempting to detail a few steps which might help in
preventing such scams in the future. I acknowledge that greed and hubris is an integral part of
human nature. History of mankind and the scams perpetrated by humans on unsuspecting fellow
humans make for an interesting reading. I believe that no amount of regulation can eliminate
completely the possibility of recurrence of such scams. However, we certainly can make efforts
towards minimizing the probability of scams and their size, by utilizing the twin tools of
enhanced scrutiny and deterrent punishment.  It is critical to work towards increasing the
probability of discovering nascent scams early enough if we were to minimize damage to trust
and transparency which combined together form the underpinnings of any financial system.  The
interesting part if that most of these suggestions are already being applied in parts in India with
quite positive results. So we are not reinventing the wheel but just suggesting extending the
existing format for wider coverage. While I do believe in self regulation, I also believe in strong
industry regulators who can ‘police the police'. Without further ado, here is a prescription sheet
which if implemented can probably control the spread of the disease.

Make the watchdogs accountable for the theft: punishment should be substantial

We hope that the truth about the role played by Satyam's auditors will come out after an
extensive investigation. When questioned about the investment decision, the common refrain is
that the investors relied on certifications by Price Waterhouse, the reputed auditors of Satyam. If
these so called savvy and professional watchdogs could not detect the fraud at Satyam, then how
can we expect the due diligence done by investors to throw up the mischief?  I am not in a
position to conclude conclusively whether the auditors were misled and were negligent in the
conduct of their duties or they willfully colluded with the management at Satyam in perpetrating
the fraudulent events. In any event, the impact of their role cannot be underestimated.

In both the scenarios, they failed their duties miserably. I would not be alone in calling for an
exemplary punishment to be meted out to these auditors, a punishment which would raise the
stake for others who may have been knowingly or unknowingly aiding or turning a blind eye to
similar events at other firms.

SEBI had passed strictures against some prominent foreign banks some time back due to their
role in activities considered undesirable. I am told that this action by SEBI had indeed led to a
greater due diligence by their risk management and compliance departments and certainly has
led to a salutatory effect on these and other foreign banks in respecting the laws of the land. Do
not get me wrong. Deterrent punishment is not the panacea for all ills. However, it does serve its
purpose in raising the stakes for players abusing the system. I must mention here that while SEC
in the USA prosecuted more than 600 companies for wrongdoing in 2008, it still was unable to
prevent Madoff from ripping off more than $50bn from investors.

Rotate the Watchdogs : fixed, finite and rotating tenure

Auditors and Independent directors are the first line of defense against abuse for ordinary
investors. The best strategy would be to have one watchdog watch the other. I suggest a fixed
tenure for auditors for a finite period of three years. At the end of his tenure the auditor will have
to hand over his assignment to a new auditor. The new auditor will take a signoff from the
previous auditor and it would be reasonably difficult for any auditor to assist in perpetuating
wrongdoings if there is a more than reasonable chance of being discovered by the new incoming
auditors. This could be a simple and effective deterrent against wrongdoing.

A similar system is already in place for the Indian banking sector where auditors are appointed in
rotation for a fixed tenure of three years.

Make Independent directors truly independent with a finite tenure

A lot of hopes have been pinned on the role of Independent Directors on the Board of Directors
in recent times. However, their impact has been hollowed by giving the managements the
prerogative of choosing the Independent directors. This in itself is a contradiction with directors
being called independent. More often than not, the Independent directors chosen by the
management are chosen because of their proximity to the controlling management and are
beholden to the management for choosing them to the Board of their companies. This raises
serious conflicts of interest in impartial discharge of their duties. Many of the independent
directors are not technically and professionally qualified to head the committees they chair in the
companies.
I recommend that the Independent Directors be chosen from a pool of qualified professionals
who are known for their expertise and integrity. Further, like the auditors they should be chosen
for a fixed tenure of three years after which they should be replaced by other set of independent
directors from the identified pool of independent directors.

A small note on identifying this pool of watchdogs (auditors and independent directors) would be
appropriate at this juncture. SEBI is quite suitable for implementing this scheme.

There should be clear guidelines for eligibility for admission to the proposed pool of auditors and
independent directors. A thorough and open vetting process at the selection stage itself is critical
for this initiative to succeed. Internet as a medium can be used effectively for this. The list of
eligible candidates and their resumes and qualifications should be posted on the internet and
public feedback invited. The feedback so received should be considered on due merit. My guess
is that the rotten apples amongst the eligible candidates would be exposed by empowering the
masses in this manner. The watchdogs should be divided into various categories depending on
their size and experience in the case of auditors and experience and qualifications in the case of
independent directors. An appropriate match between experience, size and qualifications of these
watchdogs and the size of the companies where they are to be appointed should be made. The
companies should be given a slate of eligible Independent Directors from the pool from which
they can choose the directors. A 360 degree feedback system could be used to monitor the
performance of the watchdogs and keep the pool fresh with movement between the various
categories depending on skill sets and feedback A market driven compensation guideline for the
watchdogs should be disclosed. The compensation should be reviewed every three years to keep
it in line with market requirements.

 Subsidiaries over a certain size to have different auditors than the parent company

The business conducted in subsidiary companies is normally not scrutinized in the same details
as the parent company and is open to abuse. Subsidiary companies which cross a certain size
relative to the size of the parent company should not be audited by the same set of auditors
auditing the parent company. This combined with a rotating tenure for auditors would ensure
transparency and further minimize the possibility of conflicts of interest.

Institutional nominees on the Board

Pension Funds, Mutual Funds and FIIs today own a bigger chunk of equity than the promoters in
many of our large companies. They owe it to their own shareholders and stake holders to work
towards protecting their business interests and underlying investments. The same pool of
independent directors which I spoke about earlier could be utilized to have them nominate their
directors on the Boards of various companies.

To finish off, there is another significant player in the curious cast of characters who has been the
first one to cry foul but this play of events could not have been as intriguing and melodramatic as
it has been now without them. We would be erring if to the cast of Raju brothers, their
‘independent directors', the infamous auditors, the bestowers of corporate governance awards, we
forget to add the collective conscience of the ‘fund managers and brokers' who, in my opinion,
had a fair inking of not all being well at Satyam. Any broker or fund manager worth his salt
would have heard not only of the huge real estate parcels said to be owned by the Rajus but also
of their extremely close political connections. They would have known of the phoenix like rise of
Maytas and the lucrative contracts housed in these ‘Satyam Group Companies'. They would have
had an understanding of the nature of real estate transactions in India and the significant cash
component which accompanies these transactions. Yet, they chose to turn a blind eye to the
shenanigan, invested and traded in Satyam Computers, contributed to the enhancement of its
market capitalization and ironically now profess shock at the lack of corporate governance at
Satyam. While the financial community needs to introspect at its own doing and the propensity
to turn a blind eye to the going ons in Corporate India, I believe that collectively, the financial
community can be one of the most significant agents of change.  However, I worry that by the
time change is implemented and percolates down the system, the same Satyam story might have
been repeated in many companies in India and Satyam most certainly would not the last one to
hit the can due to accounting fraud.