GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR.
, issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants
PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO
SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES,
PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989
FACTS:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of
land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally
cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of
Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs),
instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then
Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional
Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then
defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other
Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued
in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead
lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative
defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent
motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in
litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being
to their homes and to the things necessary for their
filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations
16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now
Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII)
rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the
motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the
Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their
opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the
aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a
reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated
June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same
was sustained.
ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are
covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
HELD: NO
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage
of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land
they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked
to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece
of land where he may build a modest house for himself and
family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for
the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become
human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare
of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA
45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects
the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights
of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian
reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly
promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso
supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by
homestead patents like those of the property in question,
reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. …
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.'
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
225 SCRA 278 (1993)
Facts:
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 125.0078-ha
land set aside by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 (1979)
as townsite area for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the
developer of the area, was granted preliminary approval
and locational clearances by the then Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) for the establishment of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision therein. In November 1990, a
Notice of Coverage was issued by DAR on the undeveloped
portion of the landholding. The developer filed its
objections and filed this case imputing grave abuse of
discretion to respondent DAR for including the
undeveloped portions of its landholding within the
coverage of CARP.
Issue:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or
industrial use, and approved by HLURB and its precursor
agencies prior to 15 June 1988, covered by RA 6657?
Held:
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 states that the CARL covers "regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private and agricultural lands" and as per the
transcripts of the Constitutional Commission, "agricultural
lands" covered by agrarian reform refers only to those
which are "arable and suitable lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands." The land
subject of the controversy has been set aside for the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation by Proclamation No. 1637
prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 and in effect converted
these lands into residential use. Since the Natalia lands
were converted prior to 15 June 1988, DAR is bound by such
conversion, and thus it was an error to include these within
the coverage of CARL.
Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657,
insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock
(and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial,
livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the
just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing
plan mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from
the production of such lands are distributed within sixty
(60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality
of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as
the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage
HELD:
Said provisions are unconstitutional.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner
Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa
kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising"
in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the
State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner,
vs
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTONSOLIMAN and HARRY T.
SUTTON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate,
inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987,
pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of
the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell
(VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain
incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its
coverage farm used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that lands
devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in
the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising
and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and
found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR
the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the
supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.
Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of
1993, which provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be
excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz:
1:1 animalland ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of
animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of
1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21
heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the
operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary
and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine,
their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL.
Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No.
9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land
for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares
for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents landholding to be segregated and placed
under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that
their entire landholding should b exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the
President. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President
affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled
that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the
Luz Farms case as the A.O. Provided the guidelines to
determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for
cattleraising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of
the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the
courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for
being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land
reform program of the government.
ISSUE: W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes
a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional.
HELD: NO.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid
as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage
of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention
limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz
Farms case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It
is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion
of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures
and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, antipollution equipment like biogas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds,
deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers,
and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock
farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from
the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power
in issuing the assailed A.O.
Central Mindanao University vs DARAB
FACTS:
CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the
school was the answer to the crying need for training
people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the
island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the
school had a vision as to the future development of that
part of the Philippines.
Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the
future campus of what is now the CMU.
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's
petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of
agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural
communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of
certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal
reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what
was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced
from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program"
under which the land resources of the University were
leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was
covered by a written contract. Under this program the
faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five
members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how,
practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland
rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also
a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits
participants and their hired workers to establish houses or
live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a
collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated
that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the
CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular
program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied
research extension and productivity program to utilize
available land, train people in modern agricultural
technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff
opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to
earn additional income to augment their salaries.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of
the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business
Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred
while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel,
among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when
this project was discontinued.
Another project was launched o develop unutilized land
resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance,
provide socio-economic and technical training in actual
field project implementation and augment the income of
the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the
Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision
that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.
The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the
rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
DARAB found that the private respondents were not
tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the
CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the
segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in
the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants
of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a
part or portion of the CMU.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU,
hence, beneficiaries of CARP
Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide
Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP
HELD:
First Issue:
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are
not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement
signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood
program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was
expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff
(participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any
share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the
participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service
fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the
kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU.
Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the
CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed, and that the participants are not share
croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the
produce of the participants' labor.
Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was
Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible
position was separated from the service on account of
certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director
of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice.
Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but
they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of
origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show
that they are landless peasants.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being
tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify
as beneficiaries under the CARP.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased
long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the
Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a
Management and Development Agreement, a joint
undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing
Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research
program, with the direct participation of faculty and
students. Said projects were directly connected to the
purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational
institution.
Second Issue:
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated
by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP
because:
1. It is not alienable and disposable land of the public
domain;
2. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific
limits as determined by Congress;
3. It is private land registered and titled in the name of its
lawful owner, the CMU;
4. It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A.
6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations for educational
purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research
and pilot production centers
Third Issue:
DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10
of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the
implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving
lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for,
among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting
up experimental farm stations, research and pilot
production centers, etc
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants
are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it
ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and
contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less",
from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR
Regional Director to implement its order of segregation.
Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute
for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim
as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share
tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400
hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority.
DAR vs DECS
Facts: In controversy are 2 lots consisting of an aggregate
area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe,
Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay,
Negros Occidental. These lands were donated by the
late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS.
Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name
of respondent DECS DECS leased the lands to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation Eugenio Alpar and several others,
claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the
subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage with MARO MARO sent
a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the
subject lands are now covered by CARP DAR Regional
Director approved MARO’s recommendation DECS
appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. DECS’
contention: Respondent DECS sought exemption from
CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived
from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural
Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes, such as for the repairs and
renovations of schools in the nearby locality. DAR’s
contention: Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued
that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the
CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as
they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.
Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per
se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt
from the coverage of CARP
Held: No. The general policy under CARL is to cover as
much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. Section 4
of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. It states
that the program shall “cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands xxx including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture.” The records
of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late
Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.
From that time until they were leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be
agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of
the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.[12] Moreover, there is no legislative or
presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A.
No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the
subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the
public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
Clearly, a reading of par c, Sec 10 of CARL shows that, in
order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be
“actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated
by public or private schools for educational purposes.”
The importance of the phrase “actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary” cannot be
understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to
do by not taking the words in their literal and technical
definitions. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous. Thus, the “plain meaning rule” or verba
legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs.DAMBA-NSFW and DAR
FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the
registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the
Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took
over legislativepower from the President. This Congress
passed Republic Act No.6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act wassigned by the
President onJune 10, 1988 andtook effect on June 15, 1988.
Before thelaws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas &Co.]
filed with respondent DAR avoluntary offer to sell [VOS]
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O.No.
229. Haciendas Palico and Baniladwere later placed under
compulsory acquisition by DAR inaccordance with the CARL.
On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent
aletter to theSecretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural tonon-agricultural As
a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was
applying forconversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub onthe
interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads:
DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND
TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE ANDTHE MUNICIPALITY OF
NASUGBU IN BATANGAS ASA TOURISTZONE, AND
FOROTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its
application forconversion of its three haciendas from
agricultural tonon-agricultural on the assumption that the
issuance of PP 1520which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as
atourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses.
Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in
the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was
issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the
subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co.filed with the DAR
anapplication forexemption from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
1988on the basis ofPP 1520 and ofDAR Administrative
Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all
landsalready classified as commercial, industrial,
orresidential before the effectivity of CARP no longerneed
conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES: Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975all lands inthe
Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone tonon-
agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.s threehaciendas in
Nasugbu from CARP coverage
RULING: PP 1520 DID NOTAUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THETHREE MUNICIPALITIES
INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL
LANDS.Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520declared the
three municipalities as eachconstituting a tourism zone,
reclassified all landstherein to tourism and, therefore,
converted their use tonon-agricultural purposes.The
perambulatory clauses of PP 1520identified only "certain
areas in thesector comprising the [three Municipalities
that] havepotential tourism value" and mandated the
conduct of"necessary studies" and the segregation of
"specific geographic areas"toachieve its purpose. Which
iswhy the PP directed the PhilippineTourism Authority
(PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If
all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly
converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been
noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those
"specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of
Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9the Court made it clearthat the "power
to determine whetherHaciendas Palico,Banilad and
Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage ofthe [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies
withthe [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this
Court." TheDAR, an administrative body of special
competence, denied, byOrder, the application for CARP
exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not
automatically reclassify all the lands in theaffected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that
thePTA had not yet, atthat time, identified the "specific
geographic areas" for tourism development and had
nopending tourism development projects in the areas.
Further, report fromthe Center forLand Use Policy Planning
andImplementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areaswere
planted with sugar caneand other crops.11Relatedly, the
DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series
of2004,12came up with clarificatory guidelines andtherein
decreed thatB. Proclamations declaring general areas such
aswhole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or
peninsulas astourist zones that merely:(1) recognize certain
still unidentified areas withinthe covered provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulasto be with
potentialtourism value and charge the PhilippineTourism
Authority with the task to identify/delineate
specificgeographic areas within the zonewith potential
tourism value and tocoordinate said areas development;
or(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots
located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e.
x x x x)and direct the PhilippineTourism Authority to
coordinate said areas development;could not be regarded
as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of
the landarea declared as tourist zone. Thisis sobecause
"reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation intosome
specific use and "providing forthe manner of their
utilizationand disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code)
or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land
useplan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the
potential tourism value of certain areaswithin the general
area declaredas tourist zone clearly does
notallocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of theland area
of thezone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said
proclamation direct thatotherwise CARPable lands within
the zone shallalready be used for purposesother than
agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation
as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire
provinces, municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas
would beunreasonable as it amounts to anautomatic and
sweeping exemption from CARP in thename of tourism
development. The same would alsoundermine the land use
reclassification powers vested inlocal governmentunits in
conjunction with pertinent agencies ofgovernment.C. There
being noreclassification, it is clear that said
proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect
before June 15, 1988,could not supply abasis for exemption
of the entirety ofthe lands embraced therein from CARP
coverageD. The DARs reading intothese general
proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost
consideration, more especially in thepresent petitions
which involve vast tracts of agricultural land.To reiterate, PP
1520 merely recognized the "potentialtourism value" of
certain areas within the general area declared as tourism
zones. It did notreclassify the areas to non-agricultural
use.A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use since
there is still that process of conversion before one
ispermitted to use it forother purposes
Aninao vs Asturias
FACTS:
Subject of this case are several parcels of land situated in
Brgys. Baha and Talibayog, Calatagan, Batangas, and
formerly owned by Ceferino Ascue (Ascue).
Emancipation patents (EPs) covering the disputed lands
were issued to 323 agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant
to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 27 and/or Executive Order (EO) No. 228
MARO sent a ‘Final Notification’ letter to the heirs of Ascue
relative to the payment of their land transfer claim
DAR Region IV Office requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of Ascue
in an amount corresponding to the valuation of his
agricultural property.
The heirs of Ascue, with the approval of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Balayan, Batangas handling the settlement
his estate (sic), sold to Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc.
(“Asturias”) the 807 hectares of land referred to at the
outset.
Years later, Asturias was disturbed by the initial activities
undertaken by the DAR to place its remaining landholding
under CARP
Asturias made it known that its Calatagan landholding could
no longer be considered for CARP coverage, it having
“already been declared as mineral land pursuant to a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (‘MPSA’) between
the government and Asturias” and that “an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) [has already been] issued …for
the establishment of a cement plant within the area”
DAR Regional Director issued a certificate of exemption
over the remaining 284.9323 hectares of land of Ascue, now
owned by Asturias. The exemption order was based on the
findings that “only fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are
planted with crops such as upland rice, bananas, corn and
coconut while the rest, with an area of 284.9323 hectares,
are undeveloped, slopes of more than 18%, rocky, swampy,
and/ or mangrove areas and therefore not suitable for
agricultural purposes.”
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) issued Res. No. 02 urging the Registry of Deeds
– Nasugbu, Batangas to cancel/consider null and void the
land transaction between Ascue and Asturias if proven that
it was concluded in violation of existing laws.
PARO of Batangas formed the Task Force o ascertain if the
standard operating procedures were followed in
accordance with the policies and guidelines of PD 27 and
CARL; to determine whether the property was planted to
rice /corn as of 1972 and to verify the existence of tenancy
relationship.
Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of portions of
its Calatagan property and the threatened cancellation of
its titles . . . . The grounds cited for the protest fall under
these headings: (1) “The Asturias Landholding is NOT AND
NEVER WAS a RICE and CORN farm”; and (2) The issuance
of the alleged 818 EPs and the coverage of the Asturias
property under PD # 27 is ERRONEOUSAND WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS.”
DAR sustained the protest of Asturias and recalled/nullified
the coverage of the property in question under OLT. The
ruling was predicated on the following premises: (a) the
landholding is not primarily devoted to rice/corn
production; (b) the existence of tenancy relations has not
been clearly established; and (c) the property had long
ceased to be agricultural: it has become mineral land.
Subsequently, two (2) groups, each claiming to be farmer- reversible error in the appealed dismissal action of the
beneficiaries, separately moved for reconsideration. These appellate court. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
were denied the requirements on the filing of a certification against
forum shopping should be strictly complied with. It bears
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for
stressing that a petition involving two or more petitioners
review for “being insufficient in form for failing to comply
must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum
with the requirements under Section 3, Rule 46 and Section
shopping accomplished by all petitioners, or by one who is
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.”
authorized to represent them; otherwise, the petition shall
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are farmer-beneficiaries be considered as defective and, under the terms of Section
of the subject property 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, may be dismissed.
HELD:
No.
As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian
reform beneficiaries or successors-in–interests pursuant to
the OLT program under P.D. No. 27. To come within the
coverage of the OLT, there must be showing that the land is
devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system
of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein when P.D.
No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972.[18] If either
requisite is absent, exclusion from the OLT coverage lies and
EPs, if issued, may be recalled.
In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined
by OP and, before it, by the DAR, acting on investigations
reports of its provincial (Batangas) office, as reviewed and
validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the
disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established
that the lands covered are not primarily devoted to rice and
corn and that the tenancy relationship has not been clearly
established. Absent palpable error by both agencies, of
which this Court finds none, their determination as to the
use of the property and/or to the dubious status of
petitioners as de jure tenants is controlling.
In the matter of petitioners’ non-compliance with the
procedural requirement on forum shopping, we find no