Zacarias Villavicencio, et al.

, petitioners,
vs. Justo Lukban, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919
Malcolm, J.

Facts:
In 1918, the then Mayor of the City of Manila, Justo Lukban, ordered the deportation of
170 prostitutes to Davao. He believes that he is doing it for the best in order to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses
from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats
bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to
another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women
being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton
Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a
writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the
170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out
that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly
assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's
deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

Issue/s:
Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.

Held:
Clearly, we are a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by
deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials that are not
expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should
not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it
does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without
even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting
to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.
Shigenori Kuroda, petitioner,
vs. Major General Rafael Jalandoni, Brigadier General Calixto Duque, Colonel Margarito
Toralba, Colonel Ireneo Buenconsejo, Colonel Pedro Tabuena, Major Federico Aranas,
Melville S. Hussey And Robert Port, respondents.
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Moran, C.J.

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda is formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during Second World
War. He was charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as
such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against non-
combatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war. The said military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive
Order 68 of the President of the Philippines.
Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows (1)
Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our
constitutional law but also our local laws, (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him
for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore,
he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or international, and (3) Hussey and Port
have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice law in
the Philippines in accordance with our Rules of Court and the appointment of said attorneys as
prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our constitutional law

Held:
No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law. The
tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. This executive order is in accordance with Article 2 Sec 3,
of Constitution. It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law
including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan,
preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules
and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan). Furthermore, the
Philippine Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
Leovillo C. Agustin, petitioner,
vs. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, Hon. Alfredo L. Juinio, And Hon: Baltazar Aquino, respondents.
G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979
Fernando, J.

Facts:
President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 on December 2, 1974, directing
that all owners, users, or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles
at least one pair of early warning device (EWD). Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition
assailing the constitutionality of the Letters of Instructions. He alleged that it clearly violate the
following provisions and delegation of police power: (1) It is arbitrary because it is harsh, cruel
and unconscionable to the motoring public. (2) It is illegal and immoral because it will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled
to buy a set of early warning device. And (3) they are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society being compulsory and confiscatory on
the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device,
or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 is unconstitutional

Held:
The letter of Instruction No. 229 is intended to promote public safety. While petitioner’s
statistics is not backed up by demonstrable date on record, the President had in his possession
the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued the letter of instruction No.
229, as such cannot be defeated by mere naked assertion that early EWD are not too vital to
the prevention of night time vehicular accidents. The alleged infringement of the fundamental
principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal
doctrines.

Furthermore Vienna Convention recognized the hazards posed by such obstructions to

traffic. Since Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, it cannot reject its commitment to be concerned with traffic safety.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed and the restraining order is lifted.
Lao H. Ichong, petitioner,
vs. Jaime Hernandez, and Marcelino Sarmiento, respondents.
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
Labrador, J.

Facts:
RA 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”–nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: “(1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines and against associations, partnerships and corporations, the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade … (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.”
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain
a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law and that it violates international treaties.
In answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international
obligations are infringed.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the enactment falls within the scope of the police power of the state.

Held:
Yes. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its
security and future.
Ramon A. Gonzales, petitioner,
vs. Rufino G. Hechanova, Macario Peralta, Jr., Pedro Gimenez, Cornelio Balmaceda, and
Salvador Marino, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963
Concepcion, J.

Facts:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased
from private sources. Ramon Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation
because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn “by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.”
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other
government agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3542 indicates
that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constituted valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that
in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the
conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

Issue/s:
Whether or not an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Held:
Yes. The Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Section 2 Article 8 states that judicial review is vested with the Supreme Court. The
alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not
render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering
into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions
prescribed in said Act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with
the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still
be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
In re: Petition Of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the
examination.
August 15, 1961
Barrera, J.

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among
others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid
where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and
thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions
of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain,
he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine
Bar.

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic
Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the
applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended
to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the
contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Tranquilino Lagman, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-45892, July 13, 1938
Avanceña, J.

Facts:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that
these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, will
fully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April
of said year, even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly
notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still
did not register up to the date of the filing of the information. Appellants argue that they did
not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to
support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish
to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day
of imprisonment, with the costs.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was
constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that: Sec. 2. The
defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfilment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

Held:
Yes, decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State; and, that a person may be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army
of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. What justifies compulsory
military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it
more effective, in case of need. The circumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from
their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).
Meyer v. State of Nebraska
No. 325
Argued February 23, 1923, Decided June 4, 1923
262 U.S. 390

Facts:
The state of Nebraska (Respondent), made it illegal to teach any class in a non-English
language, to teach any non-English language to a pupil prior to the ninth grade and set fines
and jail time for any individual violating the statute.
Meyer, a teacher in Zion Parochial School, had unlawfully taught the subject of reading
in the German language to a 10-year-old child, Raymond Parpart who had not attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade. He (Meyer) was convicted of violating the Nebraska law
which says "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the State of Nebraska,"
which follows:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,
parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language other than
the English language.
Section. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only
after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced
by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in
which the child resides.
Section. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than
twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in
the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
Section. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its
passage and approval.

Issue/s:
May the State of Nebraska outlaw foreign-language instruction?

Held:
No. the court rules that “mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably
regarded as harmful.” As such, it is difficult to ascertain why the Respondent should so
influence the educational opportunities of the children of the State and interfere with parental
choice of educational experiences. The child is not a mere creature of the State and the parents
have the natural right and duty of rearing their children for civic efficiency. The judgment of the
court before must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Walter Pierce and Isaac H. Van Winkle, plaintiffs / appellants
vs Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary Hill Military Academy, defendant /
appellee
268 U.S. 510 | June 1, 1925
McReynolds, J.

Facts:
On November 7, 1922, the voters in Oregon passed a Compulsory Education Act
initiative, effective September 1, 1926. It was aimed at creating a common American culture by
filtering views that may negatively influence the established norms of American society. That is
why all children between the ages of eight and sixteen were required to attend public school.
Meanwhile, children who were mentally disabled, lived three miles from the nearest road and
had already completed the eighth grade were excluded from attending school. Incompliance of
the parents entails a fine and 30-day stay in jail. The initiative also targeted parochial schools,
specifically Catholic schools, because the thought was that such parochial schools hindered
assimilation.
The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to care
for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and
acquire necessary real and personal property. Since the Society worked mostly with bereaved
and disadvantaged children they challenged the fairness of the Act.
Provisions of the Compulsory Education Act was conflicting with the right of parents to
choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the
right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, and the right of schools and
teachers to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void. Furthermore, if not acted upon, the corporation's business operations
and property value will be impaired and diminished, respectively.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Act unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control

Held:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. A state law that requires all children in the first eight grades
to attend public rather than private or parochial schools violates the 14th Amendment due
process guarantee of "personal liberty." Implicit in this liberty is the right of parents to choose
the kind of education they want for their children (Witt, Elder)
“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”
While the court noted that, as corporations, the appellees could “not claim for
themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,” they still had business
and property that was entitled to protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful
interference.
The court affirmed the order enjoining appellant public officials from enforcing an act
that required children to attend public schools in appellee private primary schools' actions
contesting the constitutionality of the law. The legislation unreasonably interfered with
parental rights and appellees' business interests. An injunction was an appropriate remedy to
prevent the present threat of irreparable harm to appellees.