Magno vs Comelec

Post under Disqualification from office , Moral Turpitude , Political Law Case Digests

Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty
candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that
the latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.

COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position
of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has beendeclared by competent

authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of his sentence on
March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his five-yeardisqualification will end
only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.

Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he
claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
is the law applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the
COMELEC. Said provision reads:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence.
xxx

Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he
was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-yeardisqualification period
imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he
was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.

Issue: Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude

Held: Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this case, by applying for probation,
Magno in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;

3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does
not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which
it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing
an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.

Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the
trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of
right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Issue: What law should apply in the case?

Held: The Local Government Code.

The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local Government Code became
a law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of
legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the
legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.

Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations
and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance
therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of the OEC.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely
encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local
positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of
the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner
nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA
7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 2000. (G.R. No. 147904, October
4, 2002)

Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R.

No. L-28196, November 9,
1967
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions which
aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First
Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without
forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA
4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution
proposed by the Congress in the First and Third Resolutions.

Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit
of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
COMELEC from implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the
constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate the spirit
of the Constitution – NO.

RATIO:

1. RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are
sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals
for amendment to the people except under certain conditions.

2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate the spirit
of the Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the
provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full
details may enlighten themselves by reading copies of the amendments readily available in the
polling places. On the matter of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain
their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.

NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional but they did
not reach specific number of votes to invalidate these congressional acts under the 1935
Constitution, which is two-thirds of the Supreme Court.