Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011

FACTS: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands
to farmers and farm workers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita owned and/or controlled
by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group of Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO). Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can
be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure
its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the
FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita
Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by
TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farm workers. This was contested by two groups
representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. They claimed that they haven’t actually
received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and
rationale of the SDOA. The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the
Resolution 89-12-2.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a
mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution
is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657.

RULING: NO. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity.
It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter.

Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lismota/cause of the action of this case. Before the SC, the lismota of the
petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to
the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lismota is the non-compliance of the HLI with
the SDP so that the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.

Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not
been met in this case.

ATTY. ELIAS OMAR A. SANA, vs. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD

G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011

FACTS: On May 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 883 which granted Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) rank
to eligible lawyers in the executive branch, and a related administrative issuance with Masters in Public Safety Administration (MPSA)
and Masters in National Security Administration (MNSA).

On June 2010, the CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal impediment for the President to vest CESO rank to executive
officials during the periods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight appointment and statutory ban on pre-election
appointment. CESB Resolution No. 870 reasoned:

1. In its legal sense, appointment to a position pertains to selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office.

2. Appointment to a CES rank cannot properly be deemed synonymous to an appointment to a position in the legal sense for it is
merely a completion of a previous appointment and does not entail the conferment of an authority to exercise the functions of an
office.

3. In the CES concept, the word ‘appoint’ means a step in the bestowal of a CES rank, to which one is entitled after having complied
with all the requirements prescribed by the CESB.

On August 2010, petitioner Atty. Sana filed that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive officials to CESO rank
are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section 15, Article VII. Petitioner submits that CESB
Resolution No. 870 circumvents Section 15, Article VII by distinguishing the terms "appoint" and "appointment." He contends that CESB
Resolution No. 870 cannot give new meaning to presidential issuances, laws, and the Constitution.

ISSUE: Does the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing EO 883 present a justiciable controversy?

RULING: NO. The factors are not obtained here. The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official
amounts to an “appointment” for purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds no
certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban period under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution. Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883.
He was not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking by President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that no conferment of CESO rank
was ever made by Arroyo in relation to EO 883.‖

Hence, for the Court to nevertheless reach the merits of this petition and determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned repeal and the absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioner‘s rights is to depart
from its constitutional role of settling “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”.

Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves

G.R. No. 176579

FACTS: Petitioner Gamboa, a minor stock holder of PLDT, questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) to
First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%.

The House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good Government conducted a public hearing on the particulars of the then
impending sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondents Department of Finance Secretary Teves and Sevilla were among those who
attended the public hearing. It was concluded that: (a) the auction of the governments 111,415 PTIC shares bore due diligence,
transparency and conformity with existing legal procedures; and (b) First Pacifics intended acquisition of the governments 111,415
PTIC shares resulting in First Pacifics 100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a
public utility since PTIC holds only 13.847 percent of the total outstanding common shares of PLDT.

The petitioner contends that this violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility which limits foreign ownership of
the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. They seek to enjoin and/or nullify the sale by respondents of the 111,415 PTIC
shares to First Pacific or assignee.

ISSUE: W/N the court has jurisdiction.

RULING: NO. This Court is not a trier of facts. Factual questions such as those raised by petitioner, which indisputably demand a
thorough examination of the evidence of the parties, are generally beyond this Court’s jurisdiction. Adhering to this well-settled
principle, the Court shall confine the resolution of the instant controversy solely on the threshold and purely legal issue of whether the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital
stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility.

At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies petitioner seeks, only the petition for prohibition is
within the original jurisdiction of this court, which however is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals. The actions for declaratory relief, injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.

However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
has far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus.Article VIII – Judicial Department: Section 1 – Judicial Power

Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal v DOJ

Facts:
 Petitioner petitioned for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
 Consuelo (President of Madrigal Transport, Inc.) filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint – affidavit
charging Celestino Palma (VP of Far East Bank and Trust Company – FEBTC) with crime of estafa.
 Consuelo applied and was granted a loan of US$10.5 million from FEBTC to finance MTI’s acquisition of feeder vessel,
pursuant to a Joint Venture between MTI and Lapanday Holdings Inc.
 FEBTC sent her various documents, signed them and sent them back without the material entries for the US$10.5 million
loan. According to the accounts officer of FEBTC (Helen Chua), FEBTC could only grant US$10 million loan due to lower
valuation of the feeder vessel. So Consuelo reapplied for the reduced amount and signed a second set of loan
documents.
 Petitioner noticed that Palma was imposing upon MTI additional obligations that were not originally contemplated. After
referring to MTI’s lawyers, she was surprised that Palma was insisting that Consuelo was personally liable under the 1st loan
she signed (US$10.5 M) despite the fact that all documents pertaining to the said loan had all been “abandoned and torn”.
 As a result of the fraudulent act of imputing to her a “legally inexistent” obligation, she was allegedly compelled to
disburse from her personal funds the total amount of P5.90 million which was paid to FEBTC, to protect her reputation.
 On the other hand, Palma averred that MTI had applied for US$11 million loan. To secure the immediate release, petitioner
agreed that she would execute personal undertakings – Comprehensive Surety agreements.

 (**) Assistant City Prosecutor (approved by City Prosecutor) issued resolution against respondents (Palma and Chua) for
the crime of estafa under par.1 (c) Art.315 of RPC.
 Respondents filed motion to suspend arraignment and further proceedings in view of their appeal before the DOJ. RTC
granted the motion.
 (#) DOJ Secretary Tuqueroissued a resolution upholding the resolution (**) with the modification that charge should be for
estafa under par. 3 ©. Respondents moved for reconsideration.
 (^) DOJ USEC Gutierrez reversed and set aside the resolution (#)
 Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration. Pursuant to resolution (^) by USEC Gutierrez, Assistant City Prosecutor filed for
a Motion to Withdraw the Information with the RTC.
 (@) Petition for Motion for Reconsideration was Denied.
 Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with CA – Petitioner alleged that DOJ Useccommitted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside resolution (#).
 CA dismissed petition and affirmed the assailed resolution (^) (@) by DOJ.

ISSUE:
  Whether or not Undersecretary have the authority/ power to overrun a resolution of her superior (Secretary).
RULING:
 YES.
 When USEC issued 1st resolution, Secretary was no longer DOJ Secretary. And at the time she issued the resolution, she was
acting for the Secretary who was then Sec. Datumanong.
 The discretion exercised by former alter-ego cannot tie the hands of their successors in office, since cabinet secretaries
are mere projections of the Chief Executive himself.
 In fine, “[c]ourts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice, save only when it was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, we find no abuse, much
less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Secretary of Justice, [acting through Usec. Gutierrez], as to warrant a
reversal of the CA Decision.”

Article VIII – Section 2 : Role of Congress

Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
 Mantruste (MSI) seeks annulment of the decision of the CA in the consolidated cases of "Makati Agro-Trading, Inc., et al.
vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 13929) and "Asset Privatization Trust vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." –
which set aside the writ of preliminary injuction issued by Judge Madayag of RTC of Manila ("Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines, Asset Privatization Trust, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina UyGongco
Corporation").
 MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel
for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
 The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently
transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim
lease agreement to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of
30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.
 However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the
agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that
MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12
Million.
 APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but MSI did not participate.
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina UyGongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85
Million.
 MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted,
but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative
agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition
of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to
prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
 The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that it continues to be
operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not bee n
deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable
advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does
not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said property.

Issue:
 Whether or not the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction by the TC.
Ruling:
 No. Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent
power of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
 Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and
the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

 There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a
citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

Article VIII, Section 2 : Role of Congress

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R.Penachos, Jr., et.al.

Facts:
This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the government. The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for
the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and JosieleenNajarro, respectively doing
business under the name of B. E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock
in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occena submitted his own PRE-Cl on December 5, 1988. All three of them were
not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cutoff
time of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and
personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PREC 1 on time, the PBAC refused without just
cause to accept them. Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and
awarding the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that; the Court was prohibited from
issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions
by P.D. 1818

Held:
NO. The ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that
ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. The prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by
courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues definitely
outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the project. First,
PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior notice to
prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book
forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimated project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC
has not denied that these forms were issued only an December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December
12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve
merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict
observance. P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as
the anomalies above described, Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and
the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.

LUPO L. LUPANGCO et al. petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts
of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand -out, review
material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institution during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on
October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Re gional
Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the
case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The petition
was granted.

Issue: W/N courts of general jurisdiction have authority over administrative agencies.

Ruling: NO, That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond
question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts.

RADIOWEALTH, INC., petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL AGREGADO, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, CASIMIRO L. DACANAY, MARIANO VASQUEZ, and
FERNANDO DIZON, as chairman and members respectively of the Property Requisition Committee of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, respondents.

Facts: Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for 585 php and installed in the 2 nd and 3rd floor of the
Malacangan Annex which houses the Supreme Court. However the Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee(who are
appointed by the president) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market
purchases.
Petitioners contend that Judicial functions do not include purchase of property, Radiowealth, Inc is now requesting that
the payment be approved however, the Auditor of the Supreme Court refused to countersign the warrant for payment.

Issue: W/N the Judicial Department can make purchases without prior approval of the Executive.

Ruling, Yes, Court stated that they are co-equal and co-important in the exercise of special functions. Judiciary has the power to
maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the
administration of justice. They are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of fixtures, equipments and supplies.
Bengzon vs. Drilon

208 SCRA 133 15 April 1992

FACTS:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under
R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President
Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino,
however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the
Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).

Issue:Whether or not the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary.

Ruling:Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in
the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy.Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of
the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed

FORTICH vs. CORONA | GR 131457 | ART. VIII, Sec. 4, par. 3

FACTS: In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to the
Supreme Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration were resolved by a vote of two-two,
but the required number to carry a decision is three votes which was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be
decided by the Supreme Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the supreme court decides on the case if the required number cannot be obtained in a division of three?

RULING: With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision
whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of
case and not matter. The reason is simple. The Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie
in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a
case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must s tand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results
in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such
was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

People v. Dy, 395 SCRA 256

Jan 16, 2003

Doctrine: SC DIVISION and EN BANC

This was a Resolution made by the Supreme Court, following the decision that found both Dy and Bernardino guilty of rape and acts
of lasciviousness. Accused-appellant Dy and Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the SC’s Decision which
affirmed the judgment of the RTC Baguio finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. In his motion, Dy argued that SC’s
decision should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution which
provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher Moreover, Dy contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be
within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision.

Issue: Are divisions separate and distinct courts?

Held: No. Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of
three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in
effect, by the same Tribunal.The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the
same court.

11.10 People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004

FACTS:Gerry Ebio was a convicted rapist who abused his own daughter, Dory Ebio. On April 2000, Dory Ebio was preparing to sleep in
the “sala”, then Gerry who was at that time drunk, approached her and told her to transfer to the bedroom because they were
already crowded in the “sala”. Armed with a six inch blade-like instrument, Gerry ordered her to undress and threatened to kill her if
she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and panty. Gerry also took off his shorts, mounted her and had
carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and cried the whole time. The private complainant was silent during the sexual assault
because of the threat to her life. After the assault she put on her panty and shorts lay down and continued crying inside the room.
On 14 October 2002, Gerry Ebio was convicted by the Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer death penalty.
The PAO moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court lacked quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that
the decision was only decided between seven justices. In a Resolution on September 7, 2004, the Supreme Court granted the motion
for reconsideration, ruling that there is no question that the Court’s decision in the case was concurred in majority of the members
and the punishment was in fact unanimously decided upon.

ISSUE:Whether or not the seven concurring justices constituted a quorum of a 14-member court?

RULING:Yes. (The constitution does not expressly state the number of justices required to present to constitute a quorum of the court
en banc) BUT in case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the punishment imposed is death penalty, THE DOUBT SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the Court en banc.

MAIN POINT:Since it was a capital criminal case, the court ruled that there should be eight justices (not 7 or merely half of the 14
justices).

Firestone Ceramics v. CA

Facts:

A motion was filed by petitioner Republic to refer to the Court En Banc the motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court affecting the validity of titles of 99 hectares of land adjudicated to private individuals. It was
alleged that the decision failed to state the classification of the subject lands, claimed by the government, and that the court has no
jurisdiction. The first motion was denied by the division in a vote of 4-1, while the motion for reconsideration was unacted upon.

On March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of
the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under
the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En
Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention."

Issue: W/N these consolidated casescan be considered and treated as en banc cases.

Ruling: YES. Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted
to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering
that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is
decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition
of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en
banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a
reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide petitioner’s
motions for reconsideration.

Note:

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989 was amended by Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993 A list of what
the court may consider as en banc cases.

Tano v. Socrates

Facts:

On Dec 15, 1992, the SangguniangPanglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a
several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Alfredo Tano, et al. filed a petition (captioning it as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) to this Court [Supreme Court] to declare as unconstitutional the Ordinance No. 15-92, Office Order No.
23, and Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, and restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming
jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order, on the grounds that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. The
petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme court has jurisdiction over the case/ Whether or not the Supreme court should take cognizance of
the case.

Ruling: NO. There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case.The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to
prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they
allegedly violated shall have been resolved.

As to the first set of petitioners, [SC stated that] this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a
lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to
quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It
must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a
cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby
to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And even where in an exceptional circumstance such
denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court
concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
circumstances.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the
Ordinances in question are a nullity for being unconstitutional. As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that the Court merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.

Thereis here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us [SC] should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with
Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v.
Cuaresma:

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom
of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established polic y. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts
must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower
court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.

Shotgun:

Petitioners fileda petition that theycaptioned as one for Certiorari, directlyto the Supreme Court, to declare Ordinance No. 15-92,
Office Order No. 23, and Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 as unconstitutional, and restrain respondent courts from assuming
jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

Held: There is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to the Supreme Court should be allowed.Supreme Court reiterated the judicial
policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Petitioners do not have unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

Lina v. Purisima
82 SCRA 344

Facts:

Petition in this case is for the writ of mandamus to compel respondents 'to restore petitioner (Lualhati L. Lina) to the position she was
excluded/ dismissed from' in the Philippine Veterans Bank. From the facts given, the Court does not find the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance to justify the process of requiring respondents to answer the petition pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, and was dismissed. She amended the petition, but it was also dismissed.

It appears from the annexes of the amended petition that petitioner was dismissed by respondent president of the Philippine
Veterans Bank pursuant to Letters of Instruction No. 14 and No. 19-A, for being notoriously undesirable. This being the case, petitioner
had a right to appeal from her dismissal, and the venue of the appeal is the Office of the President. She did appeal. But the appeal
was denied. The aforesaid letter from the Office of the President in effect affirmed the position taken by respondent Cabanos in
dismissing petitioner pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 14-A. Since the removal of petitioner is pursuant to a Letter of Instruction
issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the co urts to
review, much less modify or reverse, whether by means of the writ of certiorari and/or mandamus, or any other court process. This is
one of the express hesitations upon the power of Courts imposed by General Order No.3 issued by the President on September 22,
1972 (martial law). Petition was therefore dismissed on the grounds that the relief prayed for therein is for the present beyond the
power of the Court to extend.

Petition for certiorari and mandamus (filed to the SC) to annul the two successive orders of dismissal for supposed lack of jurisdiction,
of petitioner's complaint in Special Civil Action No. 94986 of the Court of First Instance of Manila issued by respondent judge and to
command said respondent to try and decide the said case on the merits.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may decide on the case in the place of the respondent court.
Ruling:YES.

The Supreme Courtunder certain conditions may, at its option, dispense with theusual procedure of remanding a case to the lower
court for trial onthe merits and, instead, render final judgment thereon.

If in any case elevated to this Court for the correction of any supposed procedural error of any lower court (such as in this case,
respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 is nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no
judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing), it
should be found that indeed there has been a mistake, and it further appears that all the facts needed for a complete
determination of the whole controversy are already before the Court, the SC may at its option dispense with the usual procedure of
remanding and instead resolve the pertinent issues and render final judgments on the merits.The obvious reason for such an
extension in the exercise of the Court's pervasive power is that any other procedure would amount to an unnecessary rigmarole
which can only augment the expenses, efforts and anxieties of the parties and uselessly delay the administration of justice, no other
result for all concerned being anyway perceptible.

J os e A . A n g ar a vs Th e El ec t or al Com m i s s i o n , e t . a l

62 PH I L 1 3 9 J ul y 15 , 1 9 36
J . L a u re l

F AC T S :
I n t he e l e c t i o ns o f S e p te mb e r 1 7, 1 9 3 5 , p e t i t io ne r J o s e A. An g a ra , a nd r e s p o nd e n ts Pe d ro Y ns ua ,
M ig ue l C a s t il l o , a nd D io n is i o M ay o r, w e r e c a nd i d a te s fo r t he p o s i t io n o f t he N a t io na l As s e mb l y fo r t he f i rs t
d is t r ic t o f th e P ro v inc e o f T a y a b a s .
Pe t i t io ne r An g a ra wa s p r o c l a i me d me mb e r -e l e c t o f t he N a t io na l As s e mb l y , ha v i ng re c e i v e d th e
mo s t nu mb e r o f vo te s . H e s ub s e q ue n tl y to o k h is o a t h o f o ff i c e .
O n De c e mb e r 8, re s p o nd e n t Pe d ro Yns ua f il e d b e f o re t he E l e c to ra l C o m m is s i o n a M o t i o n o f P ro te s t
a g a ins t p e t i t i o ne r. T he f o l l o w i ng d a y , t he E l e c to ra l C o m m is s io n is s ue d a re s o l u t i o n d e c l a r i ng D e c . 9 a s t he
l a s t fo r f il i ng o f e l e c t i o n p ro te s ts .

ISSUEs:
a. WO N t he S up re m e Co u r t ha s j u ris d ic t i o n o v e r t h e E l e c to ra l C o m m is s io n a n d t he s ub je c t ma t te r
b. WON the electoral acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

R UL I N G :
a. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. In our case, the nature
of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution.
b. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua. The resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Petition is denied.

P ol i ce G en er al L e vy M ac as i a n o vs N a ti o n al Ho u s i n g A u th o r i ty , e t . al

22 4 S CR A 23 6 J ul y 1, 19 9 3

FACTS:

Petitioner Levy Macasiano seeks to declare Sections 28 and 44 of R.A. 7279 otherwise known as the Urban Development
Housing Act of 1992. Sec. 28 discourages the eviction or demotion practice except in certain cases, While Sec. 44 provides for a
moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three
(3) years from the effectivety of the Act.

Petitioner establishes his legal standing as a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways pursuant to a
pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
and his being a taxpayer.The respondent commented that Sec. 28 merely provides for a humanitarian approach towards the less
privileged citizens, while Sec. 44 only covers program beneficiaries.

ISSUEs: WON the court may exercise its judicial power of review

RULING: The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.

In this case, the petitioner lacks the first two requisites. In reality, his petition is one for declaratory relief as he
prays therein that "his rights as well as those of private landowners be clearly defined and his duties under the Constitution and the
pertinent laws be clearly stated with respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands." Nor is petitioner the
proper party in this case. His position as a Consultant does not require him to do the demolishment himself. He does not likewise claim
to own one of the properties that will affected by the challenged provisions in RA 7279. Although petitioner anchors his locus standi
on the fact that he is a taxpayer, "as far as a taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained."

Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Eugene A. Tan vs Diosdado P. Macapagal

FACTS:

A five-page petition was filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene Tan et. al for declaratory relief as taxpayers, and allegedly
suing in behalf of the Filipino people. The petition assails the validity of a resolution (called the Laurel-Leido resolution) dealing with
the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Petitioners would like this court to declare that the Convention is
without power to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the then 1935 constitution. This, petitioners seek
although the convention was merely empowered to propose improvements. The court issued on October 8, 1971 a resolution
dismissing the petition. On the last day of the month, a 32-page motion for reconsideration was filed.

ISSUEs:

a. WON Petitioners have the requisite standing to sue

b. WON the court may exercise its judicial power of review

RULING:

a. No. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds,’ which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Petitioners in the
present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category.
b. No. The matter has yet to be ripe for adjudication. Petitioners assail the resolution alone. “The doctrine of separation
of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. It is a prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture. Specifically stated, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. “
Hence, because the assailed resolution has not yet been enacted upon, and since the petitioners has no standing to sue,
the judiciary may not exercise judicial review on this case.

PACU vs Secretary

Facts:

Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well
as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty
to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on
the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate
and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.

Issue:

Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court

Decision:

Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of
that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to
the decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw
the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.

In re JBC v. Judge Quitain (Art. 8 Sec. 7)

JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Facts: Cultural Center of the Philippines was created by virtue of E.O. 30and was entrusted with the task to construct a national
theatre, a national music hall, an arts building and facilities. The Board of Trustees of which was to be appointed by the President. It
was alleged that the Board of Trustees accepted donations from the private sector and secured from the Chemical Bank of New
York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from
President Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center
building.
A suit for prohibition filed by petitioner (who alleged the illegality of the issuance) which JudgeJose G. Bautista dismissed, ruling that
the funds administered by the Center as coming from donations and contributions, with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and
the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the
general public.

Respondents to filed a motion to dismiss this appeal by certiorari, and was granted. Such a pleading was submitted to this Court
twelve days later, where it was contended that Executive Order No. 30 represented the legitimate exercise of executive power,
there being no invasion of the legislative domain and that it was supplementary to rather than a disregard of Republic Act No. 4165
creating the National Commission on Culture. The point was likewise raised that petitioner did not have the requisite personality to
contest as a taxpayer the validity of the executive order in question, as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations
and contributions, not one centavo being raised by taxation.

Issue: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the said case.

Held: Yes. Paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article 8 of the Constitution states that:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court my provide, final judgements and
orders of lower courts in:

A.) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against FulgencioFactoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parenspatriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”

HELD:: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

JOYA, et al v. PCGG

ART. 8, SEC 5 Judicial Review

Facts:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, through the authority granted by then Corazon Aquino, signed a Consignment
Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off Old Master Paintings and 18 th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part
of the ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order sought to
enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that, as
Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and that
the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to view a nd enjoy of great
works of art alleging they have been deprived of their right to public property without the due process of law, they have the legal
personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.

Issue:

WON the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over the case.

Ruling:

No. Petitioners failed to show that they have legal standing because they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverware or that
the valued pieces have become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by Museum of Manila Foundation, and the
silver wares were in fact gift to Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary.

The Mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally
infirmed not because they are after of the fulfilment of a positive duty required of respondent officials, which is the only ground for a
writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayer’s suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from private
sources and not with public money.

Summary:

The PCGG sought to sell at public auction numerous paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of Marcos. Petitioners as taxpayers, filed a petition for and mandamus, sought to enjoin the PCGG to preserve and protect
the country’s ill-gotten wealth.

Issue: WON petitioners had standing

Ruling: No. petitioners failed to show that they have personal and substantial interest in the case such that they have susta ined or
would have sustained direct injury as a result of the sale.

KILOS BAYAN v. MORATO

ART. 5, SEC. 5 Judicial Review

Facts:

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming Management Corp (PGMC) signed and Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO.

KILOSBAYAN sent an open-letter to Pres. Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the online lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. At the meeting of the Committee of Games and Amusements of the Senate, KILOSBAYAN
reiterated its vigorous opposition to the online lottery on account of its immorality and illegality.

The media reported that despite the opposition,”Malacañang will push through with the operation of an online lottery system
nationwide and that it is actually the respondent PCSO which will operate the lottery while the winning corporate bidders are merely
lessors.

Petitioners, in the capacity of taxpayers, concerned citizenfiled a special civil action for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit the implementation of the Contract of Lease between
PCSO and PGMC in connection with the online lottery system of “lotto”.

Issue:

WON the petitioners have standing in filing the petition.

Ruling:

No. Petitioner’s right to sue as taxpayers and concerned citizens cannot be sustained because no specific injury suffered by them is
alleged. The petitioners was not able to show that he has sustained or is in an immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.

Summary:

Petitioners, in the capacity of taxpayers, concerned citizen filed a special civil action for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit the implementation of the Contract of Lease between
PCSO and PGMC in connection with the online lottery system of “lotto”on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.

Issue: WON the petitioners have standing in filing the petition.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner’s right to sue as taxpayers and concerned citizens cannot be sustained because no specific injury suffered by them is
alleged.

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILPPINES v. SAN JUAN

ART. 8, SEC 5 Justice Review

Facts:

President Marcos issued PD 674, establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. It directed the board to provide funds for the
purchase of a site and the structure of necessary structures thereon. The Province was able to negotiate with Ortigas& Co., for the
acquisition of 4 parcels of land. The project was never materialized because of the decimation of the Provinces resources brought
about by the creation of the Metro Manila Commission.

Lying idle, the property was eventually sold to Valley View Realty Development Corporation for P700 per sq meter or a total of P134,
523,900, of which 30 million was given as down payment.

Ortigas filed at the RTC of Pasig for rescission of contract plus damages against the Province as the latter violated the con tract by
selling the subject which was intended to be utilized solely as a site for construction of Rizal Technological Colleges. Another case
was filed by the new Board of the province as the consideration was exceedingly low. The two cases were dismissed s there were
compromise agreement where the province returned the P30 million downpayment and the property was reconveyed to Ortigas at
P2, 250 per sq meter or a total of P432, 398, 250 or higher than market value.

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, a self-confessed non-governmental, non-stock profit organization, which was
constituted to protect the interest of the Philippines against abuses of public officials and employees, filed an instant petition for
certiorari (a taxpayer’s suit)seeking the nullification of the compromise agreement and the decision of the judge approving the
same.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has standing to sue.

Ruling:

No. Taxpayer’s suit requires: (1) Public funds are disbursed by political parties and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularities is
committed; (2) The petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultravires act.

Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on alleged fraudulent
reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing market value of neighboring lots.

Undeniably, as a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. When no unlawful
spending has been shown, petitioner, even as a tax payer cannot question the transaction validly executed since he is not the party
to the contract.

Summary:

Pres. Marcos issued PD 674 establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. It made the Provincial Board purchases 4 parcels of land
from Ortigas& Co., The land remained unused for a long period of time, so, the Board passed Resolution 87-205, allowing the
governor to sell the land. It was then sold to Valleyview Realty Development Corp for P700 per sq meter. The new Provincial Board
issued Resolution 88-65 rescinding the sale between the Province and Valleyview because of the low sales price. Ortigas filed at the
RTC of Pasig for rescission of contract plus damages against the Province as the latter violated the contractby selling the subject
which was intended to be utilized solely as a site for construction of Rizal Technological Colleges. The two cases were dismissed as
there were compromise agreement. Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippinesfiled an instant petition for certiorari (a taxpayer’s
suit) seeking the nullification of the compromise agreement and the decision of the judge approving the same.

Telecom vs. COMELEC

Bayan vs. Executive Secretary

Automotive Industry Workers vs. Executive Secretary

White Light Corp v. City of Manila

Gonzales vs. Narvasa

Sandoval v. PAGCOR

Chavez vs. PCGG

IBP vs. Zamora

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

De Agbayani v PNB

38 SCRA 429 (1971)

Facts:

In 1939, Francisco Serrano Agbayani borrowed P450 from defendant bank secured by a realty mortgage duly registered covering property described in
TCT No 11275 of the province of Pangasinan. In 1949, the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at this time of the war. In 1945, Executive Order
No. 32 or the Debt Moratarium Law was issued which suspended the payment of loans for 4 years due to the ravages of war.The law
was extended for another eight years following the creation of RA 342. In 1953, however, the Supreme Court declared RA 342 as
unconstitutional.

Issue:
 Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the same were
declared invalid tolled the period of prescription.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that an unconstitutional act confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords
no protection whatsoever. Instead, the court has adopted the view that before an act is declared unconstitutional it is an “operative
fact”which can be the source of rights and duties.

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an
operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, the Court has made clear its view in a series of cases
impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342
were in force, prescription did not run.

David v Arroyo
489 SCRA 162
Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 1017.

Held:

Yes. As Stated in Article 8, Section 5 (1), the Supreme Court can review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgements and orders of Lower Courts in: (a) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question.

People V. Mateo
433 SCRA 540
FACTS:

The Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac Branch 1, found Efren Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and
to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages.
“That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness, did then and the re
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their
house against her consent."

Imelda was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icab and Rosemarie Capulong. Capulong and appellant
started to live together without the benefit of marriage when private complainant was two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother
and appellant in a house in BuenavistaTarlac and adopted the surname of appellant when she started schooling.

Mateo then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the Trial Court6 and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

HELD:

Yes. Section 5 of Article VIII authorizes the supreme court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death. However, the constitution has not proscribed an intermediate review. But to ensure utmost circumspection
before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua of life imprisonment is imposed, the rule now is that such cases must be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals before they are elevated to the Supreme Court.Note: (Victim is 15 year old)

Article 8. Section 5

Mariano v COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
 FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, TeresitaTibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, TeresitaAbang, Valentina Pitalvero, RufinoCaldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba.
Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of IbayoUsusan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of
R.A. No. 7854.

HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Article 8. Section 5

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC95 SCRA 392, Jan. 22, 1980

FACTS: A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed to enjoin respondent form implementing
certain provisions of BP 51, 52 and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner Dumlao questions Sec. 4 of BP 51 as discriminatory and
contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Meanwhile, Petitioners IgotandSalapantan, Jr
questions the accreditation of some political parties by respondent as contrary to the constitution that provides that a bona fide
candidate shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filed petition is an actual case or controversy subject to judicial review. Whether or not petitioners have
legal standing on the case at bar.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners fell short of the necessity that the case bean actual controversy. Dumlao has not
been adversely affected by the application of BP52 nor is any party seeking for his disqualification. The question he poses is in
theabstract and a hypothetical issue.Whether or not petitioners are the proper party to submit the petition, the Supreme Courtheld in
the case of Igot and Salapatan, neither of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of the s tatutory
provisions they assail as unconstitutional. What they have is only generated grievance as contrasted to a direct injury creating a
substantial interest in the case. Without a litigate interest, they cannot claim any locus standi. However, due to the impelling public
interest involved and the proximity of the elections, the strict procedure for judicial relaxed. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4 of BP
51was not discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. The equal protection
clause of the constitution does not forbid all legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized the purpose of such classification was to allow emergence of younger blood in local
governments. Regarding the accreditation of Comelec in pursuance to BP 52, it was held that charges for committing any act of
disloyalty to the state should not be a basis to disqualify a candidate. An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Therefore, the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the first paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP52 while the second paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP 52 as null and
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to the accused.

Article 8. Section 5

Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority

Cruz, 1991

FACTS:

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled that (1) the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree
nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confisc ation
by police authorities of driver's licenses and removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among
those that may be imposed under PD 1605. The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it
was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and the ordinances
because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance
was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not
permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic viola tions in
Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE & HELD:

WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)

RATIO:

The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity
of the exercise of such delegated power.

A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, to impose such sanctions

Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.The measures in question do not merely add to
the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.There is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by thechallenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.

Kalipunan ng DamayangMahihirap vs. Jessie Robredo

Gov. Villafuerte. Jr v. Hon. Robredo

UDK-15143

Republic of the Philippines v. Transunion Corporation

hilippine National Bank vs Asuncion

FACTS:

PNB granted Fabar credit accommodations. The said credit accommodations had an outstanding balance of
P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977. All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose
Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo, and Thomas L. Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands, so PNB filed a case for collection. Before the case could be decided, M anuel
Barredo died. In view of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is for a money claim
which does not survive the death of said defendant pursuant to Sec 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. PNB filed motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the cases against all the respondents, saying that only Manuel Barredo’s case should be dismissed.
The Court denied it for lack of meritorious grounds. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the motion to reconsider.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against
the surviving solidary debtor. Article 1216, of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. The said provision gives the
creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Section 6, Rules 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Art. 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the
latter, substantive. Moreover, no less than the Constitution of the Philippines, in Sec. 5, Art. 8, provides that rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Santero v CFI of Cavite

153 SCRA 728 September 14, 1987

FACTS:

In 1981, respondents, through their guardian Anselma, filed a Motion for Allowance for educational expenses, clothing and medical
necessities, and it was granted. In 1982, respondents again filed a Motion for Allowance citing the same grounds.

The petitioners opposed and contended that the respondents are no longer schooling and they are not minors anymore to be under
guardianship. Petitioners also allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the allowance.

In reply to the opposition, Anselma admitted that some of her children are of age and not enrolled due to lack of funds, but will be
enrolled as soon as they are granted allowances. She cited Art. 290 of the Civil Code and Sec 3 of Rule 83, Rules of Court. C FI Cavite
granted the allowance to respondents. (2k each)

While the case was pending in the SC, respondents filed another motion for allowance to include Juanita, Estelita, and Pedro
Santero as children of Pablo with Anselma. They prayed for 6k each for the 7 children. The CFI granted again.

Petitioners argue that the respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they already attained majority, two are employed
and one is married as provided for under Sec 3 of Rule 83, Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance.

RULING:

No. The provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during
the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule.
Note: Princesita Santos-Morales, FredericoSantero, and Willie Santero (petitioners) are children of the late Pablo Santero with
FelixbertaParcusa (not married w PS). Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel Santero (respondents) are children of Pablo Santero
with Anselma Diaz (also not married w PS).

DAMASCO v Laqui
166 SCRA 214

FACTS:

Atty. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats. Respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish
the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay
a fine of P100.00 and the costs.

Petitioner filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositive part of Respondent Judge contending that he cannot be convicted
of light threats necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information as the lighter offense prescribed in the information
filed.

The crime was committed on July 8, 1987, it was filed on September 17, 1987. Light threats prescribe 2 months which meant 60 days.
The complaint was filed after 71 days.

Respondent Judge denied the "Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the Dispositive Portion of the Decision" apparently with the
misimpression that what was being questioned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense charged, ratiocinating that jurisdiction,
once acquired, cannot be lost.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offense of light threats already prescribed.

RULING:

Yes, the Petition is granted. Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the state of its
rights to prosecute an act prohibited or punishable by law. Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash
pleading is deemed to waive all objections but thus rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription,

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied
only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the
right to speedy trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only
appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.

The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the
accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a
vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and
solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule
is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for
to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State
and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

A petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court from a decision of theNLRC on an illegal dismissal complaint. The Court ruled
that all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, and that such petitions should initially be filed with the Court of
Appeals.

St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC

FACTS: The owner of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. is AmelitaMalabed. Prior to January 1996, Amelita’s mother managed
the funeral parlor; respondent Aricayos, on the other hand, was formerly an overseas contract worker who was granted financial
assistance by Amelita’s mother. Respondent extended assistance to Amelita’s mother in managing St. Martin without compensatio n.
There was no written employment contract between Amelita’s mother and respondent Aricayos; furthermore, respondent Aricayos
was not even listed as an employee in the Company’s payroll.

Amelita took over as manager of St. Martin when her mother died. She found out that St. Martin had arrearages in the payment of
BIR taxes and other fees owing to the government, but company records tended to show that payments were made thereon. As a
result, she removed the authority from respondent Aricayos and his wife from taking part in managing St. Martin’s operations.
Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos accused St. Martin of his illegal dismissal as Operations Manager of the company. He believed that
the cause of his termination was Amelita’s suspicion that he pocketed PhP 38,000.00 which was set aside for payment to the BIR of St.
Martin’s valued added taxes.

On October 25, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of petitioner declaring that his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.

Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos appealed the Labor Arbiter’s adverse ruling to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC issued a
Resolution annulling the Arbiter’s Decision and remanded the case to him for appropriate proceedings, to determine the factual
issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties.This case was later brought to CA

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter made a determination of the presence of an employer-employee relationship between St.
Martin and respondent Aricayos based on the evidence on record.

Ruling:No. In the case at bar, there are certain admissions by petitioner St. Martin that should have prodded the Labor Arbiter to
conduct a hearing for a more in-depth examination of the contrasting positions of the parties, namely; that respondent helped
Amelita’s mother manage the funeral parlor business by running errands for her, overseeing the business from 1995 up to January
1996 when the mother died, and that after Amelita made changes in the business operation, private respondent and his wife were
no longer allowed to participate in the management of St. Martin.

These facts, as admitted by the petitioner and the affidavits of St. Martin’s witnesses, could have been examined more in detail by
the Labor Arbiter in a hearing to convince himself that there was indeed no employment relationship between the parties as he
originally found.

Thus, in this case the Labor Arbiter failed to comply with the phrase “shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights” of Article 8 Section 5(5) by not conducting a hearing in the case.

PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.
On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were burned in the same place, which destroyed various houses and
killed of an old woman.
Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17
private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
“confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or
caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.”
Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.
Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the
criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-
mentioned administrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses
for reason of security and personal safety.
The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative
Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious
disposalof the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was
to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done
right at the very inception of these cases.
RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the dispo sition of
criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to
the circuit courts.
In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court,the prosecution resorted to the SC for writs
of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the
CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order merely authorized the
court below, but did not require or command it.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer the case to the Circuit Criminal Court.

RULING:

YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the
Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases
should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impend ing, in
view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.
This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a
site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is
to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such jud icial
power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts
“can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of government”.

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank
in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands.

Thus, the SC held:

1. That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to
transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
2. That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts,
possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred
to another CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and
weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair
and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
3. That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said
criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and
justice
In Re Cunanan

Facts:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al
petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as
the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”

Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains general average of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any
subject , although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the
bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no.12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it.

Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed
bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to
public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.

Issue: W/N Congress may pass a law lowering the passing mark and declaring the same candidates as having passed

Ruling: No. The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are
members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the
separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the
rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit.

In Re Cunanan

Shotgun digest

Facts: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks: 1946-1951: 70% ; 1952:71% ; 1953:72% ; 1954:73% ; 1955:74% . Provided however, that
the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”

Issue: W/N Congress may pass a law lowering the passing mark and declaring the same candidates as having passed

Ruling: No. This would amount to not just amending the rules but reversing the Court’s application of an existing rule.
Echeragay v Secretary of Justice

Facts:

Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethalinjection (RA 8177) The Supreme Court issued a
temporaryrestraining order restraining the execution of said party. Saidexecution was setfor Jan. 4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his
VeryUrgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. TheCourt wasin recess at the time but a Special Session was called
to deliberate onsaid matters. Furthermore,Congress was a new one with about 130new members whose views on capital punishment
werestillunexpressed. The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes certainthat no repeal or
modification of thelaw is going to be made). It was alleged that sine it is already finalandexecutory; the Supreme Court has lost its
jurisdiction with thecase.

Issue:

Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone beyondits jurisdiction since the case isalready
final.

Ruling:

No. It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. What the SC could not do is alter thedecision. In the case at
hand, the SCdid nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor thecase. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even
after the judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to executeand enforce it. There is adifference between the
jurisdiction of thecourt to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify oralter the same. The former continues even after
the judgment hasbecome final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latterterminates when the judgment becomes final.
For after the judgmenthas become final, facts and circumstances may transpire which canrender the execution unjust orimpossible.

Bustos v Lucero

Facts:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the
court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony,
on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject
matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the
accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him
of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection
was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the
justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record to the court of orgin?

Ruling:

Yes. It is not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore
is also procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to
the court has the right to be informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and also to be informed of the testimony and
evidence presented against him, and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or evidence for him if he so desires," are not
rules of evidence; and in the second place, it is evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive laws that define,
create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing out
of reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts." (State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that weighing of
evidence and the rules of practice with respect thereto form part of the law of procedure, but the classification of proofs is sometime
determined by the substantive law. Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not only for
the reason just stated, but because our contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with and
cross-examine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear
down said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the
defendant asks the court to recall the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his presence, and to allow the former
to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under obligation to grant the request.

Main Point: The power of the Supreme court to promulgate rules and rule-making is limited only to procedural matters and cannot be
used to modify substantive rights. In the case at bar, the constitutional guarantee to cross-examine witness, regardless the
confrontation happens during a preliminary investigation which the court in the said case do away, is a substantive right. Supreme
Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. B.M.
No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS:
On 4 February 1992, Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction
of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. In a judgment
dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report
to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this
Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. –MAIN FUCKING
POINT --

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the
practice of law. He averred that his probation period was terminated. We note that his probation period did not last for more than
ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993.
ISSUE:
W/N Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
No. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good
moral character. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up
for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice
hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
ART 8. SEC 5(5). THE SC SHALL HAVE THE FF POWERS: PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, THE
INTEGRATED BAR…

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents. G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public
respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved
private respondent from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director,
Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). - Not really important but still helpful.
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the
Office of the Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED. Later,
misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually
filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and
Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The case later led to an
appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor
of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private respondents from the administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial
of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: W/N Section 27 of RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1998) is valid.

HELD:
NO. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance
implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
HI! One page langdapat to perokasihindikotalaga gets yung case so please read nalangyungsa baba kasi it mentioned sec 5 of art
8 which is san ako assigned perohindiyanyung ruling. Thank you!

“Petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as
provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved."
Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase
this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then
what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has
allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court.”

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR
EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners, vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents. A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003
FACTS:
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws. Later on, the
outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago sent a letter requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the
election of Regional Governors at least one month prior (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the
outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the
IBP By Laws.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution. On May 26, 2003, after the IBP
national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before
the IBP Board seeking (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao
Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003.The board that, with respect to the
disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been
made for the election of IBP regional governor.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners
filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from
proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP
presidency.8 The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation
rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the
region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.9

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and
national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude

ISSUE:whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Regionassuming that petitioners have
a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature

HELD:
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition, this Court is one with the IBP Board in its
position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for
the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members
of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can
always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His
place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last
paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of
governor of Eastern Mindanao. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the
IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can
run for IBP governorship.

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao
in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

ART 8 SEC 5(5): THE SC HAS THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, THE
INTEGRATED BAR….

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR
EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners, vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents. A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003
FACTS:
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws. Later on, the
outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago sent a letter requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the
election of Regional Governors at least one month prior (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the
outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the
IBP By Laws.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution. On May 26, 2003, after the IBP
national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before
the IBP Board seeking (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao
Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003.The board that, with respect to the
disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been
made for the election of IBP regional governor.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners
filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from
proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP
presidency.8 The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation
rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the
region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.9

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and
national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude
ISSUE:whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Regionassuming that petitioners have
a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature

HELD:
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition, this Court is one with the IBP Board in its
position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for
the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members
of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can
always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His
place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitio ners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last
paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of
governor of Eastern Mindanao. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the
IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can
run for IBP governorship.

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao
in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

ART 8 SEC 5(5): THE SC HAS THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, THE
INTEGRATED BAR….
Baguio Markets Vendor v Judge

Republic v Gingoyo

Maniago v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102549 Aug. 10, 1992

Erwin B. Javellana, petitioner, v. Department of the Internal and Local Government, et al.

FACTS:
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an Administrative Case against petitioner, Atty. Erwin B. Javellana, an incumbent member
of the SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession. Divinagracia alleged that on July 8, 1989, petitioner, in
violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38, appeared as counsel in several cases in the city, without prior authority of the
DILG Regional Director. DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81, which set guidelines for the practice of
profession by local elective officials.

Javellana filed a motion to dismiss the administrative case him on the grounds that DILG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81
of the are unconstitutional, stating that only the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
His motion to dismiss was denied, and his motion for reconsideration was also denied. On Oct. 10, 1991, RA No. 7160 (Local Gov’t
Code) was signed into law.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari praying that Memorandum Circulars No.80-38 and 90-81 and Sec. 90 of RA 7160 be declared
unconstitutional for violating Sec. 5(5) of Art. 8 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 90 of RA 7160 is an infringement of the power of Court to provide rules for pleading, practice, and procedure and
the practice of law.

HELD: No. It does not trench upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. Sec. 90 of RA
7160 simply prescribed rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of their public duties
and private practice of their profession. Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

NOTES:
Section 90. Practice of Profession. – (I only kept the parts that are related to the case.)

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours:
Provided, Thatsanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office.

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and

(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
government.

SHOTGUN VERSION:

FACTS:

 Petitioner Erwin B. Javellana is an incumbent member of the SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession.
 City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia alleged that petitioner appeared as counsel in several criminal cases, and that he
practiced his profession as a lawyer without prior authority of the DILG Regional Director.
 Javellana alleged that Memorandum Circ. Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 is unconstitutional because only SC can regulate the
practice of law.
 RA 7160 was signed into law. Petitioner alleged that Sec. 90 of the law violates Sec. 5(5), Art. 8 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 90 of RA 7160 is an infringement of the power of Court to provide rules for pleading, practice, and procedure and
the practice of law.

HELD: No. Sec. 90 of RA 7160 is not a rule on the practice of law, but a rule on the conduct of public officials in order to avoid conflict
of interest.

Bar Matter No. 1222 Feb. 4, 2004

Re: 2003 Bar Examinations

FACTS:
On Sept. 21, 2003, the 3rd Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in Commercial Law was held in De la Salle
University(DLSU), Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar since 1995.
The following day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage of the said examination; which prompted Justice Jose C.
Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examination Committee to report the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and
recommended that the examination in Mercantile law be cancelled, that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.

The Court acted on the recommendation and nullified the examination and resolved to hold another examination in that subject.
However, because of numerous protests, on the recommendation of the OBC, the Court cancelled the scheduled examination and
allocated the 15% points among the 7 bar examination subjects.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court may nullify results of the Bar examination.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court may nullify the results of the Bar exam. Sec. 5(5), Art. 8 of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court
has the power and authority to regulate the admission to the practice of law. Nullifying the results of the Bar examination upon
discovery that the Bar questions had been leaked is a valid exercise of such authority.

NOTES:

This case has no petitioner or respondent.

OBC – Office of the Bar Confidant

The Court also designated 3 retired Associated Justices of the SC to compose the Investigating Committee tasked to conduct an
investigation of the leakage.

Investigating Committee Composition:

Chairman – Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino

Members – Justice Jose A. R. Melo
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza

SHOTGUN VERSION:

FACTS:

 There was a leakage of Bar questions for the 2003 Bar Exam in Mercantile Law.
 Justice Jose C. Vitug (Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee) reported the matter to CJ HilarioDavide, Jr. And
recommended that the examination for Mercantile Law be cancelled, that a formal investigation of the leakage be
undertaken.
 SC nullified the results of the bar exam in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination for the subject. Due to
protests, the SC cancelled the scheduled examination and allocated the 15 percentage among the 7 bar examination
subjects.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court may nullify results of the Bar examination.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court may nullify the results of the Bar exam. Sec. 5(5), Art. 8 of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court
has the power and authority to regulate the admission to the practice of law. Nullifying the results of the Bar examination upon
discovery that the Bar questions had been leaked is a valid exercise of such authority.

A.C. No. 6593

Maelotisea S. Garrido, petitioner
v.
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner MaelotiseaGarrido is the wife of herein respondent, Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of their marriage on June 23, 1962. She
filed for the disbarment of respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia before the IBP Committee on Discipline,
charging them with gross immorality. She discovered that respondent Garrido married respondent Valencia in Hong Kong sometime
in 1978 and had a child with the latter.

Respondent Garrido denies the charges, stating that petitioner is not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
when he married Maelotisea, and that all his marriages were contracted before he became a lawyer. His children with petitioner
were also born before he became a lawyer. His third marriage was contracted after Constancia’s death.

Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report and recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment. The
IBP-BOG approved and adopted the recommendation but with modification, dismissing the case against Atty. Valencia for lack of
merit. Respondent Garrido argues that he did not commit and gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment, and that the
offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP Rules.

Respondent Garrido argues that he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment and that the offenses
charge have prescribed under the IBP Rules. Respondents filed for a motion to dismiss proceedings but was denied, and later
Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children, but IBP Commission on Bar Discipline dismissed her motion.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court has disciplinary authority over the Bar.

HELD:
Yes. Sec. 5(5), Art. 8 of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be incidental
to the Court’s exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. The desistance of petitioner does not strip the Court of
jurisdiction because this is a matter of public interest and concern.
NOTES:

IBP – Integrated Bar of the Philippines

BOG – Board of Governors

SHOTGUN VERSION:

FACTS:

 Petitioner MaelotiseaGarrido and Respondent Atty. Angel E. Garrido got married on June 23, 1962 and have 6 children.
She found out he married respondent Atty. Romana Valencia in Hong Kong some time in 1978.
 Respondents contend that petitioner is not his legal wife because he was aleady married to Constancia David when he
married Maelotisea. He contracted his third marriage after Constancia’s death.
 Petitioner filed a disbarment case against respondents for gross immorality.
 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss proceedings, and Petitioner later filed a motion to dismiss. However the IBP-CBP
denied both motions.

ISSUE: WON the SC has disciplinary authority over the Bar.

HELD:
Yes. Sec. 5(5), Art. 8 of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be incidental
to the Court’s exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. The desistance of petitioner does not strip the Court of
jurisdiction because this is a matter of public interest and concern.

In re letter of the UP Law Facult

Maceda v Vasquez

Caoibes v Ombudsman

Escalona vs. Padillo (Art. 8 Sec. 6)

AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010

Facts: Complainant Lourdes Escalona claimed that she approached Respondent ConsolacionPadilloto help her file a case (against
a certain Loresette Dalit).

Padillo received the P20,000 as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to take
an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, the Prosecutors Office
showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money, but this was
not fulfilled. Hence, this complaint.

Escalonalater withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance alleging that Padillo already returned to her
the P20,000. This notwithstanding, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock sent two notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her
comment to the complaint of Escalona. Padillo failed to comment on the complaint. This Court then required Padillo to explain why
she should not be administratively dealt with for her failure to submit the required comment and reiterated the directive on Padillo to
submit her comment to Escalona’s complaint. A copy of the resolution sent to Padillo returned unserved.

The Court Administrator found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct for soliciting money from Escalona in exchange for facilitating the
filing of a case against Dalit. Padillos act of soliciting money from Escalona is an offense which merited the grave penalty of dismissal
from the service. However, Padillo already tendered her resignation a month after the complaint was filed

Issue: W/N Respondent’s resignation render the complaint against her moot.

Ruling: No. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court
employee is facing administrative sanction

No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and
decide complaints against erring officials and employees of the judiciary. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the
complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of
the courts. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainants whims. To rule otherwise would
undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel.

Shotgun

Facts: Complainant Escalona claimed that she approached Respondent Padillo to help her file a case against Dalit).

Padillo received the P20,000 as payment for the prosecutor. However, the Prosecutors Office showed no record of a case filed.
Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money, but this was not fulfilled. Hence, this complaint.

Escalonalater withdrew her complaint against Padillo alleging that Padillo already returned to her the P20,000. This notwithstanding,
then Court Administrator notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her comment to the complaint of Escalona. Padillo failed to
comment. This Court then required Padillo to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with. A copy of the resolution sent
to Padillo returned unserved.

The Court Administrator found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct. Padillos act of soliciting money from Escalona is an offense which
merited the grave penalty of dismissal from the service. However, Padillo already tendered her resignation a month after the
complaint was filed.
Issue: W/N Respondent’s resignation render the complaint against her moot.
Ruling: No. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court
employee is facing administrative sanction

No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and
decide complaints against erring officials and employees of the judiciary. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the
complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of
the courts. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainants whims. To rule otherwise would
undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel.

In re JBC v. Judge Quitain (Art. 8 Sec 7)

JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Facts: Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City.
Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal
charges were filed against Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), as a
result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order No. 183.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), Quitain declared that there were five criminal
cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Qutain in his
PDS.

NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent was indeed
dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of
his claim for reimbursement of expenses.

Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof
only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an
official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

Thus, the OCA recommended that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits.

Issue: W/N respondent should be dismissed from the Judiciary.

Held: Yes. It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on
his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct per A.O. No. 183 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. It did not matter that he resigned from office and
that his administrative case had become moot and academic.

Kilosbayan v. Ermita (Art. 8 Sec. 7)

GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Facts: Respondent Executive Secretary announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. It is said that the
appointment was temporarilysuspended by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S.
Ong.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth
certificate reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Petitioners
invoke Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents claim that Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department
of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship; That when respondent Ong was
eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were
included in the naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is
a natural-born Filipino citizen, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Issue: W/N Respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.

Ruling: No. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby
became a Filipino citizen.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent
Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court
stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

The chain of evidence would have to show that DyGuiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what
still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court
as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
Nitafan v CIR

Vargas v Rilloraza

De La Llana v Alba

Facts:

In 1981, Batas PambansaBlg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”,
was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges
that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. Also he averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT
the Congress, that there was an undue delegation of powers to the President.

Issue:

1. W/N there was a violation of security of tenure guaranteed in the constitution?

2. W/N there was an undue delegation of powers to the president?

Ruling:

1. No, it was done in good faith, legislature's authority to abolish courts inferior to SC is undeniable. This act is designed to remedy
monumental problems in the judiciary which exists. Legislature can decide what solutions to adopt.

2. No, the court pointed out that the law was complete in itself and there were clear standards for implementation by the President.

People v Gacott

Facts:

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against
respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case. The prosecution filed an opposition
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.

Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion and held that the City Prosecutor has no power or
authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.

For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge EustaquioGacott Jr dismissing a criminal case
was annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross
ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. W/N disciplinary cases be heard by the SC en banc? Is this applicable in this case?

Ruling:

1. Yes, section 11 yields the reading that the decisions on disciplinary cases must all be arrived at en banc. No, in this case
however ruled on the contrary to the inclusive language of the text. Saying that the decision en banc is needed only
when the penalty to be imposed is dismissal of a judge, disbarment of lawyer, suspension of either for more than 1 year
and a fine exceeding 10k. Judge Gacott here only was sanctioned with a reprimand and 10k fine. Thus not subject to the
decision en banc. This ruling was also justified by the recollection of Justice Regalado of his conversation with former CJ
Concepcion. But was not able to provide records to support his recollection. Saying however that to require more would
contravene to the desire of consti to provide speedy disposition of cases.

In re Judge Manzano

Facts:

Judge Manzano was designated member of the IlocosNorte Provincial Committee on justice by the Provincial Governor. The
function of the committee is to receive complaints and make recommendations towards speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those who are poor.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the

promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislatureor such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of itsexistence Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courtsestablished by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicialor administrative functions (Section
12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

 Committee on Justice, which discharges an administrative function, will be in

violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Issue: W/N Judge Manzano may accept such designation?

Ruling: No, because that committee performs an administrative function which is contrary to sec 12 saying that "Members of SC
or other courts not be designated to an agency performing administrative functions."

DR. AND MRS. MERLIN CONSING, PETITIONERS

VS
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CARIDAD SANTOS, REPONDENTS
GR NO. 78272, AUGUST 29, 1989

FACTS:

Merlin Consing, the petitioner is the registered owner of 9,643 sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 312970 located in barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Consing caused the subdivision of said parcel of land into 38 lots and
submitted a subdivision plan to Land Registration Commission which was approved and further filed for the issuance of separate
certificate of titles. Consing also voluntarily grants the right of ways in some lots.

Consing sold lots 25 and 26 to respondent, Caridad Santos containing 295 sq. m. Provided in their contract of sale were
particular terms of payment for installment and interest. The respondent defaulted in her payment and Consing demanded and
planned to resort to court litigation. The respondent will settle her obligation upon the condition that Consing will comply with all the
laws and regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages in the use of a portion of her lot as subdivision road. The
petitioner then submitted a revised subdivision plan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not non-compliance with the certification requirement violates Art VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution.

HELD:
Yes. The certification is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation
of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in division
before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing.

The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached
in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of
duty is presumed [Sec, 5(m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court.]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as
evidence of failure to observe certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to
account thereof. Such absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.

PP v Escober

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death; GR No 69564 is the automatic review of the death sentence while GR No.
69658 is a petition for review on certiorari.

On December 9, 1982, Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe and Juan Doe were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the RTC of Quezon City. On March 2, 1983, he
entered a plea of “Not Guilty” with the assistance of Counsel Atty. Hipolito De Peralta upon arraignment. On March 29, 1983, the
information was amended to include accused-appellant MacarioPunzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. On April 22, 1983,
Punzalan also pleaded “Not Guilty” during the arraignment, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Mariano, who at the time had
replaced Atty. De Peralta as council de parte for Juan Escober.

Escober was a security guard assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce ST., Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. He
took over the duty when Domingo Rocero left. After Rocero had left his point, Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffanoy. On their way, he saw appellant Escober
at his point. At the office, the two children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom watch a
television program. On the other hand, Mrs. Lina B Chua left their residence to join her husband and two children. She saw the
appellant Punzalan standing at the pedestrian gate which was opened. Mr. Chua heard the gunshot and saw that son Irvin and
daughter Tiffany mortally wounded who later on died. Both of the accused made testimonies to defend themselves. Prosecution
evidence were also used a sub-exhibits. Escober was acquitted but Guevarra was found guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court’s decision is valid pursuant to Article VIII, Section 14.

RULING:
Yes. The Court adheres to the constitutional mandate stated in Art. VIII, Section 14. Every decision of a court of record shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.

AIR FRANCE, petitioner

VS
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
FACTS:
Rafael Carrascoso, the respondent and a Civil Engineer was part of the group of 48 Filipino pilgrims leaving for Lourdes on March 30,
1958 who was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France, though Philippine Air Lines, Inc. from Manila to Rome. During his trip
from Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a “white man” has a “better right” for the seat. However, the respondent
refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager that caused nervousness to many of the Filipino passengers. Later,
Carrascoso gave up his seat after his fellow passengers pacified him.

When he returned to Philippines, the respondent filed a complaint. On the other hand, the petitioner asserts that the ticket does not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issued first class ticket did not guarantee a first
class ride

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court’s decision is valid pursuant to Article VIII, Section 14.

RULING:
Yes. The Court adheres to the constitutional mandate stated in Art. VIII, Section 14 that, “No decision shall be rendered by any Court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” This was echoed in the statutory demand
that a judgment determining the case shall state “clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and that “Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it.

PeopleVs Bravo

Facts:

Mario Bravo convicted for murder after he killed his mother-in-law; Elena Sta. Maria however denies it saying that she died due to an
accident. Now, he asks the court to reverse the decision on the ground that he is innocent. Separate testimonies were pieced
together from 6 witnesses, leading up to him, being guilty still, such as the he and Elena always quarreling and that even his own
daughter Mary Joy testified that he told her to go to her room and not mind what she hears but then she rushed to the kitchen after
hearing a scream then saw her father’s hands on her grandmothers head.

Bravo maintained that the injuries were from a fall in the kitchen but the cross examination conducted and reported that Elena’s
death could not have been cause by a fall nor from an earlier accident since her fractures were fresh. Judge Dizon then after
assessing evidence found for the prosecution and disposes Mario Bravo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. Bravo
challenged the decision that it did not contain the “facts of the case for or against and only selected facts in favor of a p arty” to be
unconstitutional (against sec 14 art. 8).

Issue:

Whether or not the decision rendered was in violation of Sec 14, Art 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

NO, it is for the judge to determine from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant and the assertions by the parties, truthful or not,
what actually happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this when he made what the appellant calls a “selective finding of
facts.”It had to be selective. It is how a trial judge extracts the truth and determines the basis of the decision he will make.

Article 8 Sec 14

Hernandez, Danilo Vs CA

208 SCRA 429 (1993)

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under seekingto set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 which
was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases on 9 informationswhere the petitioner
Danilo Hernandez purchased jewelries but checks issued to pay for them were either drawn against insufficient funds or drawn
against a closed account, this charged the petitioner with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the conviction of petitioner was affirmed as to 8 Criminal Cases and reversed as to 1Criminal Case.

Petitioner questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor General in the
appellee’sbrief as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based.
[“The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee’s Brief are as follows:” and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the
Solicitor General (adopting the statement of facts]. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own “independent
judicial opinion.” In effect, the Court of Appeals said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported
by the evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated of sec 14 of Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

NO, The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no prescription
against the court’s adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in
its own words.
Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of fact in
the course of its discussion of the assignment of errors.

Article 8 Sec 14

Nicos Industrial Corp.Vs CA

206 SCRA 127 (1992)

Facts:

In connection with an order of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the evidence to an order has been affirmed by the respondent
Court of Appeals. The said order was filed by Victorino Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation “wherein a Sheriff’s
Auction sale to a mortgage on two parcels of land to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their comment/opposition and
it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff’s Auction Sale was appropriately held and conducted.
And it appearing from the allegations in the Plaintiff’s pleading and from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco’s own testimony that his cause is
actually against the other officers and stockholders of petitioner...”

Before the order, the Petitioner obtained a loan from United Coconut Planters Bank to secure payment to the land for sale but was
foreclosed for non-payment and without re-publication of the required notices the for the auction was changed without the
knowledge or consent of petitioner.

The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial
court and assail that is violates the constitutional requirement. Petitioners also stress that because notices thereof were published in a
newspaper that did not have general circulation and that the original date of the sheriff’s sale had been changed without its
consent, the sheriff’s sale was irregular

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court is in conformity with Article 8 Sec 14 of the Constitution.

Ruling:

NO, the decision does not clearly and distinctly states the facts and the law on which it is based. The standard expected is that the
decision rendered makes it clear why either prevailed under the law applicable to the facts established. The questioned order is an
oversimplification of the issues and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.

Art. 8 Sec. 14: Contents of Decision; Petiton for Review; Motion for Reconsideration

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (CA) and SAMSON LAO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82273. June 1, 1990

FACTS: Borromeo filed a complaint for damages against the Third Division’s Clerk and Assitant Clerk of Court; and the Chief of the
Judicial Records of the Supreme Court for issuing alleged biased and unconstitutional resolutions and entry of judgement. He further
alleged that the acts of personalities in his complaint failed to comply with requirement of Section 14, Article 8 of the Constitution. His
complaint stemmed from the disposition of his 4 cases which he separately appealed to the Supreme Court were resolved by Minute
Resolutions. In his petition, he claimed that the resolutions did not state the facts and the law on which their decisions were based
and were signed only by the Clerk of Court and therefore, unconstitional, null and void.

The Supreme Court, thorugh its 3rd Division disposed of his petition in a four-page resolution which more than adequately complies
with the constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may dispose of a case through minute resolution is substantive complaince of Sec. 14 of Art. 8 of
the Constitution.

HELD: YES. The Court disposes of the bulk of the cases by minute resolution decrees them as final and executory as where:

1. a case is patently without merit

2. the issues raised ae factual in nature
3. the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the
applicable laws.
4. It is clear from the records that the petition is filed to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and /or
minute resoltutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on the evaluation of the case. This is the only way whereby it can act
on all cases filed before it and accordingly, discharge its constitutional function.
 When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions
decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the res pondent
court’s decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliancewith the constitutional
requirement.

Art. 8 Sec. 14: Contents of Decision; Petiton for Review; Motion for Reconsideration

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. WINAI PERMSKUL, and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G. R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989

FACTS: Francisco, the pertitioner, filed a petition seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals as it violates Article 8
section 14 of the constitution. The Petitioner leased his appartment to Permskul, the private respondent. Both agreed on the terms of
lease at a lease rate of 3000.00 per month. The private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer
for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. The private
respondent vacated the property after a year. He requested the refund of his deposit less of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the
additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner refused to give the deposit and instead said
that the respondent still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting
of the apartment to restore it to its original condition. The private respondent filed a case at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and won
the case. The petitioner was ordered to pay the private respondent the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the
deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges, including the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees in favour of the
respondent. He appealed the decision all the way to the Court of appeals and lost. Both, The RTC and the CA, took cognizance of
his appeal and in their decisions, they relied on the well-written decision of the MTC. The CA incorporated the memorandum decision
of the RTC in its decision. Hence, his petition citing that the Memorandum Decision of the CA failed to comply with the provision of
the constitution that state that:

Art. 7 Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.

ISSUE: Whether or not such incorporation by reference of Memorandum Decision was a valid act by the RTC that effectively
elevated the decision of the MTC for examination by the CA, in line with Sec. 14 Article 8 of the Constitution.

HELD: YES. The Court finds the action of CA valid. The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision
should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind
of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinarily collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

The Court said that the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. It is
expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision
was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision
being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its
violation.

“It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if he were a mere researcher. He is
an innovator, not an echo.

The appellate judge should prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the
lower court. He must use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less
importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should also guard against torpidity lest
his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on the values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will
help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not
have to be a bore.”

The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court rendering the decision actually studied
the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more substantial reasons.

1. For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate
what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
2. For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to
accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal.
 3. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those
coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references;
4. and even as precedents (STARE DECISIS) in the resolution of future controversies.
Art. 8 Sec. 14: Contents of Decision; Petiton for Review; Motion for Reconsideration

Brother MARIANO “MIKE” Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), respondent.
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004

FACTS: Petition for review questioning a decision rendered by the RTC that the petitioner believed to have not conformed to the
form and substance required by Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. The Social Justice System partylist filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the RTC of Manila against the alleged political endorsements of religious organizations, such as the Roman Catholic
Church, Iglesiani Cristo, El Shaddai and Ang Dating Daan, to political personalities. They assailed that such act of the religious groups
constitute a violation of the Art 2, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. They seek to have section 6 of Article 2 interpreted by the RTC. The RTC
issued a long legal essay and rendered a decision. However, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision did not state what its decision
is except that it states “So Ordered”. The petitioner brought the said RTC decision to the Supreme Court as they are in quandary as to
what exactly did the RTC order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Decision conform to the Form and Substance required by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The Constitution commands that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.”

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:
“Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.—A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is ba sed, signed
by him and filed with the clerk of court.”

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

“Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments.—The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

“x xx xxx xxx.”

Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as
void.

Petition Granted. The assailed decision of the RTC is declared null and void and set aside.

Edano v Asdala
Art. 8 sect 15

Carmen filed a complaint for support with prayer for support pendent lite in behalf of her two children against George, who denies
paternity of the child. The pairing judge, Judge Teodoro Bay, directed George to provide support pendent lite in the amount of
P5,000.00 per month to be given to complainant within the first five days; a writ of execution was also issued for the rental payments
of several apartments which George manages. Due to the failure of George to comply with the order, Carmen filed a motion to cite
him in contempt.

On November 23, 2004, Judge Fatima Asdala found George guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced him to four months
imprisonment and a P30,000.00 fine. She also issued a Bench Warrant against George. Fatima Asdala, after a private meeting with
George, issued an order to the effect that George pleaded that his contempt fine be reduced to P5,000.00 and his Bench Warrant
recalled, which according to Judge Asdala she will take under advisement. Judge Asdala then issued an ex-parts order setting aside
the indirect contempt order, setting aside the imprisonment, and reducing the fine to P5,000.00. On March 22, 2005, Judge Asdala
dismissed the complaint against George.

Carmen thus filed an administrative complaint against Judge Asdala and Myrla. According to her, Judge Asdala’s meeting with
George without any notice to her or to her counsel to discuss the indirect contempt citation resulted in the decrease of the fine and
the setting aside of the imprisonment. She also alleged that she was given P1,000.00 by Judge Asdala to file an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rowena Alejandria for alleged neglect of duty and advised her to maintain her silence. Allegedly, Judge
Asdala bore a grudge against her lawyer. She also faults her for requiring George to pay the support before the Office of the Clerk of
Court instead of directly to her. which payment was in turn used to pay George’s fine for indirect contempt. She also questioned the
dismissal of the case for support based on George’s testimony which was already stricken off the record as early as 2001.

With respect to Myrla, Carmen’s complaint revolved on the alleged subtraction of certain amounts from the P10,000.00 given by
Cristy, George’s daughter as support, allegedly given to respondents; and her discharge of the functions of the OIC Branch Clerk of
Court when the Office of the Court Adinistrator did not designate her as such. In her defense, Judge Asdala averred that the matter
of the lifting of the imprisonment and reduction of fine were matters of judicial discretion and made when George manifested his
inability to pay the original fine; the appointment of Myrla was made with the approval of the Executive Judge, and the Myrla had
her trust and confidence; the remedy of Carmen to assail the dismissal was for her to appeal the decision, not to file an
administrative complaint against her. Myrla defended herself on the other hand by saying he did not demand money from Carmen;
it was Carmen in fact who owed money to court staff, even Judge Asdala; she did not perform the function of OIC Branch Clerk of
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the judge done is within his judicial discretion
Held:

Yes. As stated in the Investigation Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the act of a judge done within his
judicial discretion, such as the reduction of fine for indirect contempt, should not be subject to disciplinary action. In the instant
complaint, however, the exercise of discretion by the respondent is not impugned. Rather, it is the conduct of respondent Judge
Asdala in meeting with defendant Butler without notice or knowledge, much less the presence, of the complainant or her
representative that is assailed. The meeting was not an innocuous one for it resulted in the cancellation of the bench warrant, the
revocation of the order of imprisonment and the significant reduction in the amount of fine from P30,000.00 to P5,000.00. Respondent
Judge Asdala does not deny the private meeting, much less explain its circumstances. As rightly observed by the Investigating
Justice, the private meeting was improper, to say the least. It deprived the complainant of her right to be heard on matters affecting
her vital interests. The secret meeting cannot but invite suspicion, for no minutes or stenographic notes of the meeting have been
presented, if any existed. Respondent judge cannot feign ignorance of the fact that our courts are courts of record.
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.The New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality,
as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal
demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
In July 2000, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to the SC a resolution asking for the Court to conduct an inquiry into the
causes of delay in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases before the Sandiganbayan. This resolution was
prompted by numerous complaints from IBP members about serious delays by the said trial court in their disposition of cases.
In August 2000, the SC required Sandiganbayan PJ Garchitorena to commenton the issue and submit a list of their pending matters.
In September 2000, the SC received Sandiganbayan’s compliance report showing a total of 415 cases that have remained
undecided long beyond the reglementary period.
In November 2000, the SC directed Court Administrator Benipayo to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan.
In January 2001, OCA Benipayo submitted his report stating the various reasons for the Sandiganbayan’s delays such as non-
submission of reinvestigation reports, filing of numerous motions, suspensions due to certiorari and prohibitions, unloading of cases,
and even plain neglect by the trial court. On the basis of this report, OCA Benipayo considered ex meromotu the IBP Resolution as an
administrative complaint against PJ Garchitorena for incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?

HELD:
The periods to decide cases as provided in the Constitution refers to regular courts. The Sandiganbayan, however, is a special court.
It is of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial
court.
The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure. However, on March 30, 1995, Congress
repealed the Sandiganbayan’s power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the SC held that to decide cases, the 3-month period (and not the 12-month period), applies to the Sandiganbayan.

The ratio decidendi in the aforecited cases applies

mutatis mutandis (with the necessary changes) to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan ought to be the first to observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, or except a case from its operation.

Sesbreno v CA GR 117438

FACTS:
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and backwages imploring
Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid
30% as attorney’s fees and 20% as expenses taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered
the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and
ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979. The former employees waived
their right to reinstatement among others. The Province of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty.
Sesbreno as “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.” The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and gratuity pay due to
the employees.

Ten employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken
only from their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders, with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release P10,000.00 to
each of the ten private respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00 released
to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed the attorney’s fees a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial
court modified the award after noting that petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been
only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was even further reduced
to 20%.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to petitioner Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by private respondents
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the parties 6 authorized petitioner to take a
total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The trial court, however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all monies to be
awarded to private respondents. Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the provincial government,
according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the contract of professional services.
What a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyer’s
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawy er may
be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in
this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s fees
are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is
used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court averred that in
balancing the allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52
clients, is too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a commercial venture, rather than a noble
profession. It would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the
total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a fair settlement.

Petition is DENIED