GLOBAL ETHICS:

SEMINAL ESSAYS

Edited by

Thomas Pogge &

Keith Horton
 Common Introduction to the Two-Volume Collection

For centuries, moral reflection on international relations was focused on matters of

war and peace. These issues are still important and much discussed. Since World War
II, however, other themes have become more prominent due to increasing global
interdependence and an erosion of sovereignty. The United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights reflect efforts to establish globally uniform minimum
standards for the treatment of citizens within their own countries. The Bretton Woods
institutions and later the World Trade Organization powerfully shape the economic
prospects of countries and their citizens. Global and regional organizations, most
notably the UN Security Council and the European Union, have acquired political
functions and powers that were traditionally thought to belong to national
governments.

These developments are in part a response to the horrors of World War II. But they are
also fueled by technological innovations that limit the control governments can exert
within their jurisdictions. Thus, industrialization has massive transnational effects that
no country can avoid—effects on culture and expectations, on biodiversity, climate,
oceans and atmosphere. New communications technologies make it much harder to
control the information available to a national population. And many of the goods
demanded by more affluent consumers everywhere require ingredients imported from
many foreign lands. The traditional concerns with the just internal organization of
societies and the moral rules governing warfare leave out some highly consequential
features of the modern world.

After some delay, academic moral reflection has responded to these developments.
Beginning in the early 1970s, philosophers and others have asked probing questions
about how the emergence of a post-Westphalian world modifies and enlarges the
moral responsibilities of governments, corporations, and individuals. These debates
were driven also by the realization that world poverty has overtaken war as the
greatest source of avoidable human misery. Many more people—some 300 million—
have died from hunger and remediable diseases in peacetime in the 17 years since the
end of the Cold War than have perished from wars, civil wars, and government
repression over the entire 20th century. And poverty continues unabated, with some
830 million human beings chronically undernourished, 1100 million lacking access to
safe water, and 2600 million lacking access to basic sanitation; 1 2000 million lacking
access to essential drugs;2 1000 million lacking adequate shelter and 2000 million
lacking electricity;3 781 million adults being illiterate,4 and 218 million children
between 5 and 14 doing wage work outside their household. 5 Such severe deficits in

1
UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human Development Report 2006
(Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 33 and 174. Also at
hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2006.
2
See www.fic.nih.gov/about/plan/exec_summary.htm.
3
UNDP, Human Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press
1998), 49, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1998/en/pdf/hdr_1998_ch3.pdf.
4
See www.uis.unesco.org.
5
See www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/stats/4stt.htm.
the fulfillment of social and economic human rights also bring further deficits in civil
and political human rights in their wake. Very poor people—often physically and
mentally stunted due to malnutrition in infancy, illiterate due to lack of schooling, and
much preoccupied with their family’s survival—can cause little harm or benefit to the
politicians and officials who rule them. Such rulers have far greater incentive to attend
to the interests of agents more capable of reciprocation: the interests of affluent
compatriots and foreigners, of domestic and multinational corporations, and of foreign
governments.

The great catastrophe of human poverty is ongoing, as is the annual toll of 18 million
deaths from poverty-related causes, roughly one third of all human deaths. 6 Three
facts make such poverty deeply problematic, morally. First, it occurs in the context of
unprecedented global affluence that is easily sufficient to eradicate all life-threatening
poverty. Although 2533 million human beings are reported to be living below the
World Bank’s $2/day poverty line,7 and 41 percent below it on average,8 their
collective shortfall from this line amounts to less than one percent of the national
incomes of the high-income countries with their one billion people. 9 A shift in the
global income distribution involving only 0.7 percent of global income would wholly
eradicate the severe poverty that currently blights the lives of over 40 percent of the
human population. While the income inequality between the top and bottom tenth of
the human population is a staggering 320:1,10 the wealth inequality is nine times
greater still. In 2000 the bottom 50 percent of the world’s adults together had 1.1
percent of global wealth with the bottom 10 percent having only 0.03 percent, while
the top 10 percent had 85.1 percent and the top 1 percent had 39.9 percent. 11 Severe

6
See WHO (World Health Organisation), The World Health Report 2004 (Geneva:
WHO Publications 2004), 120-25. Also at www.who.int/whr/2004.
7
See iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp.
8
Ibid., dividing the poverty gap index by the headcount index.
9
To count as poor by the $2/day standard, a person in the US must in 2007 live on
less that $1120. (This figure is based on the official definition of the poverty line in
terms of the purchasing power that $2.15 had in the US in 1993 as updated via the US
consumer price index at www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm). Ascribing much greater
purchasing power to the currencies of poor countries than market exchange rates
would suggest, the World Bank assumes that about one quarter of this amount, $280
per person per year, is sufficient to escape poverty in typical poor countries. The 2735
million global poor live, then, on approximately $444 billion annually and lack
roughly $322 billion annually relative to the $2/day poverty line. This $322 billion is
less than one percent of the gross national incomes of the high-income countries
which, in 2005, summed to $35,529 billion. See World Bank, World Development
Report 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 289.
10
Branko Milanovic, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2005), 108.
11
James B. Davies, Susanna Sandstrom, Anthony Shorrocks, and Edward N. Wolff,
The World Distribution of Household Wealth, World Institute for Development
Economics Research (WIDER), December 5, 2006
(www.wider.unu.edu/research/2006-2007/2006-2007-1/wider-wdhw-launch-5-12-
2006/wider-wdhw-report-5-12-2006.pdf), Table 10a.
poverty today is avoidable at a cost that is tiny in relation to the incomes and fortunes
of the affluent—very much smaller, for instance, than the Allies’ sacrifice in blood
and treasure for victory in World War II.

Second, the enormous global inequalities just described are increasing relentlessly.
Branko Milanovic reports that real incomes of the poorest 5 percent of world
population declined 20 percent in the 1988-93 period and another 23 percent during
1993-98, while real global per capita income increased by 5.2 percent and 4.8 percent
respectively.12 For the 1988-98 period he finds that, assessed in terms of purchasing
power parities (PPPs), the Gini measure of inequality among persons worldwide
increased from 62.2 to 64.1, and the Theil from 72.7 to 78.9. 13 We can confirm and
update his findings with other, more intuitive data. The World Bank reports that, in the
high-income OECD countries, household final consumption expenditure per capita
(constant 2000 US Dollars) rose 56.3 percent in real terms over the 1984-2004
globalization period: from $11,582 in 1984 to $18,103 in 2004.14 World Bank
interactive software can be used to calculate how the poorer half of humankind have
fared, in terms of their real (inflation/PPP adjusted) consumption expenditure, during
this same period.15 Here are the gains for various percentiles of world population
labeled from the bottom up:

48.62% gain for the 50th percentile (median)

47.18% gain for the 40th percentile
42.20% gain for the 30th percentile
36.16% gain for the 20th percentile
33.72% gain for the 15th percentile
32.61% gain for the 10th percentile
31.92% gain for the 7th percentile
30.86% gain for the 5th percentile
30.44% gain for the 3rd percentile
22.87% gain for the 2nd percentile
9.64% gain for the 1st percentile

Because economic inequality is increasing also within the high-income countries—in

the US, for example, households in the top one percent of the income hierarchy have
expanded their share of national pre-tax income from 9% to 16% since 1979 16—we
can conclude that global inequality is rising across the entire income spectrum. The
shares of the most affluent percentiles of the human population are growing faster
than the average, the shares of poorer percentiles are growing slower, and the shares
of the poorest percentiles are growing the least.
12
Milanovic, Worlds Apart, 108.
13
Milanovic, Worlds Apart, 108.
14
See devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline; last accessed 10 June 2007
15
See iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. Full calculations are on file
with the author. Unfortunately, this database excludes the populations of the high-
income countries and therefore permits no similarly detailed calculations for the top
half of the human population.
16
David Leonhardt: “Larry Summers’s Evolution,” New York Times Magazine, 10
July 2007.
Third, conditions of life anywhere on earth are today deeply affected by international
interactions of many kinds and by the rules that shape such interactions. In the
modern world, the traffic of international and even intranational economic
transactions is profoundly influenced by an elaborate system of treaties and
conventions about trade, investments, loans, patents, copyrights, trademarks, double
taxation, labor standards, environmental protection, use of seabed resources and much
else. Insofar as we participate in this system and share some responsibility for its
design, we are morally implicated in any contribution it makes to ever-increasing
global economic inequality and to the consequent persistence of severe poverty.

These plain facts about the contemporary world render obsolete the traditional sharp
distinction between intranational and international relations. Until the 20th century,
these were seen as constituting distinct worlds, the former inhabited by persons,
households, corporations and associations within one territorially bounded society, the
latter inhabited by a small number of actors: sovereign states. National governments
provided the link between these two worlds. On the inside such a government was a
uniquely important actor within the state, interacting with persons, households,
corporations and associations, and dominating these other actors by virtue of its
special power and authority—its internal sovereignty. On the outside, the government
was the state, recognized as entitled to act in its name, to make binding agreements on
its behalf, and so on—its external sovereignty. Though linked in this way, the two
worlds were seen as separate, and normative assessments unquestioningly took this
separation for granted, sharply distinguishing two separate domains of moral
theorizing.

Today, very much more is happening across national borders than merely interactions
and relations among governments. For one thing, there are many additional important
actors on the international scene: international agencies, such as the United Nations,
the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund, as well as multinational corporations and international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Interactions and relations among states and
these new actors are structured through highly complex systems of rules and
practices, some with associated adjudication and enforcement mechanisms. Those
actors and these rules powerfully influence the domestic life of national societies:
through their impact on pollution and climate change, invasive diseases, culture and
information, technology, and (most profoundly) through market forces that condition
access to capital and raw materials, export opportunities, domestic tax bases and tax
rates, prices, wages, labor standards, and much else.

This double transformation of the traditional realm of international relations—the

proliferation of transnational actors and the profound influence of the systematic
activities of these actors deep into the domestic life of national societies—is part of
what is often meant by the vague term globalization. It helps explain why “global” is
displacing “international” in both explanatory and moral theorizing. This
terminological shift reflects that much more is happening across national borders than
merely interactions and relations among states. It also reflects that the very distinction
between the national and international realms is dissolving. With national borders
losing their causal and explanatory significance, it appears increasingly incongruous
and dogmatic to insist on their traditional role as moral watersheds.
To complete the picture, let us now attend to the distinction that underlies the division
of this work into two volumes. There are distinct ways of looking at the events of our
social world. On the one hand, we can see such events interactionally: as actions, and
effects of actions performed by individual and collective agents. On the other hand,
we can see them institutionally: as effects of how our social world is structured and
organized—of our laws and conventions, practices and social institutions. These two
ways of viewing entail different descriptions and explanations of social phenomena,
and they also lead to two distinct kinds of moral analysis or moral diagnostics.

Take some morally salient event, for example the fact that some particular child
suffers from malnutrition, that some woman is unemployed, or that a man was hurt in
a traffic accident. We can causally trace such events back to the conduct of individual
and collective agents, including the person who is suffering the harm. Doing so
involves making counterfactual statements about how things would or might have
gone differently if this or that agent had acted in some other way. We can then sort
through these counterfactual statements in order to determine whether any of the
causally relevant agents ought to have acted differently and thus is partly or wholly at
fault for the regrettable event. This will involve us in examining whether any such
agents could have foreseen that their conduct would lead to the regrettable event and
could also reasonably have averted the harm without causing substantial costs to
themselves or third parties. Inquiries of this kind might be referred to as interactional
moral analysis or interactional moral diagnostics.

Often, regrettable events can also be traced back to standing features of the social
system in which they occur: to its culture, for example, or to its institutional order. In
this vein, one might causally trace child malnutrition back to high import duties on
foodstuffs, unemployment to a restrictive monetary policy, and traffic accidents to the
lack of regular motor vehicle safety inspections. Doing so involves making
counterfactual statements about how things would or might have gone differently if
this or that set of social rules had been different. We can then sort through these
counterfactual statements in order to determine whether the causally relevant rules
ought to have been different and whether anyone is responsible for defects in these
rules that are partly or wholly to blame for the regrettable events. This will involve us
in examining whether those responsible for the design of the relevant rules—for
instance, members of parliament—could have foreseen that they would lead to harm
and could reasonably have reformulated the rules without causing substantial harm
elsewhere. We might refer to inquiries of this kind as institutional moral analysis or
institutional moral diagnostics.

Interactional moral analysis emerged quite early in the evolution of moral thought.
Institutional moral analysis is more demanding, presupposing an understanding of the
conventional (rather than natural or divine) nature of social rules as well as of their,
often statistical, comparative effects. Even a mere eighty years ago, the poor and
unemployed were still often seen as lazy and delinquent merely on the ground that
others of equally humble origins had risen from dishwasher to millionaire. Many
people then did not understand the structural constraints on social mobility: that the
pathways to riches are limited and that the structure of prevailing markets for capital
and labor unavoidably produce certain basic rates of (“structural”) unemployment and
poverty. Nor did they understand that existing rates of unemployment and poverty
could be influenced through intelligent redesign of the rules. Today, after Keynes, the
US New Deal, and various similar national transformations, these matters are well
understood, and governments are held responsible for their decisions regarding
institutional design and for the effects of such decisions on the fulfillment or
frustration of human needs. This understanding has been—belatedly, yet very
admirably—articulated in philosophy through John Rawls’s classic A Theory of
Justice. Through this grand work, Rawls has firmly established social institutions as a
distinct domain of moral assessment and has marked this domain terminologically by
associating it with the term (social) justice. This terminological innovation has taken
hold, by and large, at least in Anglophone philosophy. So the term justice is now
predominant in the moral assessment of social rules (laws, practices, social
conventions and institutions) and used only rarely in the moral assessment of the
conduct and character of individual and collective agents. In the wake of Rawls the
distinction between institutional and interactional moral analysis has come to be
marked as a distinction between justice and ethics.

We are quite familiar today with the focus of Rawls’s book: with institutional moral
analysis applied to the internal organization of one state. Still in its infancy, however,
is institutional moral analysis applied beyond the state. This time lag is hardly
surprising, seeing that the realm of international relations is traditionally conceived as
so much smaller and more surveyable than the vast and highly complex inner
workings of a modern national society. We don’t need institutional moral analysis, it
seems, for a world of a few dozen relevant actors in which, when bad things happen,
it is usually pretty clear whose conduct is at fault. And Rawls himself, in his late work
The Law of Peoples, explicitly shunned such analysis and confined himself to
developing and defending a set of rules of good conduct for states.

The phenomena of globalization, described above, show such an account to be deeply

inadequate to the world in which we live. It ignores the increasingly important
transnational actors other than states as well as the increasingly profound effects
transnational rules, practices, and actors have on the domestic life of national
societies. Shaping the environment (e.g., global markets) in which national societies
exists, such transnational rules and practices deeply shape these societies themselves:
how they govern and tax themselves, how they organize education, health care,
agriculture, and defense, and how they regulate foreign investment, intellectual
property rights, foreign trade. Some of this influence is due to competitive pressures
and transnational bargaining. Some of it works by affecting domestic incentives and
power distributions: International rules that recognize any person or group exercising
effective power in a less developed country as entitled to sell its natural resources, to
borrow, and to import weapons in its name make it extremely tempting in resource-
rich such countries to attempt to take power by force. These countries are therefore
very likely to experience coup attempts, civil wars, and repressive (often military)
rule. Such foreseeable effects of transnational institutional arrangements are surely
relevant to their moral assessment, but other factors may be relevant as well: the way
such arrangements were created or emerged, for example, and the judgments and
interests of present participants in these institutional arrangements. The discourse
about global justice is about this question, how to assess transnational institutional
arrangements.
Justice assessment of transnational institutional arrangements can have important
implications for the conduct of individual and collective actors participating in such
arrangements: for governments, corporations, associations, and individuals. Insofar as
transnational arrangements are just, their participants have moral reason to support
them and to comply with them. Insofar as such arrangements are unjust, their
participants have moral reason to seek their reform and possibly also to help protect
some of their victims. Such duties must, however, be integrated into a larger account
of moral responsibilities. Victims of unjust transnational arrangements in which we
are participants are not the only ones who have a claim to our moral attention as
individuals. We also face victims of natural calamities, victims of historical or
contemporary wrongs (wrongs of colonialism, slavery, and genocide, some perhaps
committed by our own country), and victims of domestic injustice (associated with
race, gender, ethnic identity, religion or social class). We confront global threats and
dangers (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, new infectious
diseases) as well as personal responsibilities toward our family, friends, and
professional associates. And we have projects, ambitions, needs and desires of our
own which militate against devoting our whole lives to our various moral
responsibilities. The situation of collective agents is characterized by a similarly
diverse and confusing array of conflicting claims. Governments must balance their
special responsibilities toward their own citizens against their general responsibilities
toward foreign nationals who may need refuge, protection, or assistance. A
corporation must analogously balance its special responsibilities toward its
shareholders, customers, and those who work for it directly or indirectly against its
more general responsibilites toward the communities in which it operates and toward
outsiders who may be affected by its activities in multifarious ways. Religious
organizations and NGOs must similarly integrate such more general and increasingly
global responsibilities with their special responsibilities toward members and
contributors as well as with their defining missions. For all these actors, gaining a
clear moral orientation is becoming more difficult as the world in which they operate
becomes larger and more interdependent. The discourse about global ethics is about
how such actors should take into account and fulfill their increasingly complex and
increasingly transnational moral responsibilities.

The two-volume collection before you brings together a representative sampling of

the most significant, most original, most influential writings moral thinkers have
composed on these issues in the three decades following 1971. These essays are of
continuing importance because they have developed the terms in which these issues
are debated today. These essays have sharpened the concepts that dominate our
current discussions, have created the fault lines dividing present intellectual camps,
and have inspired or revolted thousands of later writers, students, and ordinary
citizens.

To be sure, there is other work from these three decades that could plausibly have
been included, as additions or substitutions. But we wanted a manageable and
affordable collection of uncut essays and have worked hard to put together a set of
writings that, together, optimally reflect the formative debates. The division of the
essays into two volumes follows the distinction just drawn between the two moral
responsibilities of governments, corporations, and individuals. The Global Justice
volume features essays about their political responsibilities relating to institutional
design. The Global Ethics volume features essays about their ethical responsibilities
within the context of the international order as it is. Evidently, not all the selected
writings fall squarely on one or the other side of this divide. In hard cases, we were
guided by the aim of making each volume as unified and self-contained as possible.

After much experimentation, we concluded that, within each volume, the essays are
best presented in straight chronological order of their first publication. This ordering
causes thematic leaps occasionally, but the essays do not display sufficient
uniformities of scope to sustain any other arrangement. Moreover, a chronological
reading is surprisingly illuminating about how the moral debate about international
relations gradually took on its present shape and structure. In any case, readers and
teachers will find their own selection and ordering of the materials.

From the beginning, it has been a central concern of the editors to make these texts
available at an affordable price. We want our collection to be widely accessible—not
merely in the affluent regions, but especially also to students in the poorer countries
who are hugely interested in these issues and all too often lack electronic access to
journals. It has not been easy. But in the end we have achieved an incredibly low sales
price for volumes of this size. For this, the editors and readers have to thank, first and
foremost, the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics which, funded by the
Australian Research Council, spans three institutions: Charles Sturt University, the
University of Melbourne, and the Australian National University. CAPPE has
absorbed all the permission fees as an ethical and highly cost-effective way of
promoting its own mission and has also funded the crucial assistance we received
from David Mollica, Matt Peterson, Tamara Shanley, and Ling Tong who competently
and cheerfully converted our tables of contents into two neatly formatted volumes of
text with introductory summaries and index. We must further thank Gordon Anderson
and Rosemary Yokoi of Paragon Press who were ready to share our vision and to
work with us while other publishers declared the project economically unviable.
While some publishers have made extortionate demands for their copyrights, forcing
us to make substitutions for some essays (though not authors), most copyright holders
have been willing to waive, or greatly to reduce, their usual commercial reprinting
rates. We have gratefully received cost-free permissions from Bilingual Press, from
Mary Malin (Elsevier), from the Journal of Philosophy with authors Charles Beitz,
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, from the New York Review of Books, from Erica
Wetter (New York University Press), from Peter Ohlin (Oxford University Press, US),
from Dennis Moran (Review of Politics), from Richard Rorty, from Springer, from the
United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research
(UNU-WIDER), and from Utah University Press. To underscore the non-commercial
character of this collection, the editors have assigned all royalties to Oxfam.

New York, 13 June 2007 Thomas Pogge

 GLOBAL ETHICS: SEMINAL ESSAYS
(Present Volume)

1. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs
1(3) (Spring 1972): 229-43.

2. Garrett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor”
Psychology Today 8(4) (September 1974): 38, 40-43, 123-124, 126; expanded
as “Living in a Lifeboat” Bioscience, 24(10) (October 1974): 561-68.

3. David Luban, “Just War and Human Rights” Philosophy and Public Affairs
9(2) (Winter 1980): 160-81.

4. Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics”

Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(3) (Spring 1980): 209-29.

5. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I”

Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3) (Summer 1983): 205-35.

6. Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment” The Journal

of Philosophy 80(10) Part 1: Eightieth Annual Meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (October 1983): 591-600.

7. Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism A Virtue? (The Lindley Lecture at the

University of Kansas) Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984.

8. Onora O’Neill, “Rights, Obligations and World Hunger” in Poverty and Social
Justice: Critical Perspectives: A Pilgrimage Toward Our Own Humanity, ed.
Francisco Jiménez (Tempe, AZ: Bilingual Press 1987), 86-100.

9. Amartya Sen, “The Concept of Development” in Handbook of Development

Economics Volume 1, ed. Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (Amsterdam:
North Holland 1988), 9-26.

10. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination” The Journal
of Philosophy 87(9) (September 1990): 439-61.

11. Henry Shue, “Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions” Law and Policy
15(1) (January 1993): 39-59.

12. Susan Moller Okin, “Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences” Political
Theory 22(1) (February 1994): 5-24.

13. Amartya Sen, “Population: Delusion and Reality” New York Review of Books
41(15) (September 22, 1994): 62-71.

14. Samuel Scheffler, “Individual Responsibility in a Global Age” Social

Philosophy and Policy 12(1) (Winter 1995): 219-36.

15. Richard Rorty, “Who Are We?: Moral Universalism and Economic Triage”
Diogenes 44(173) (Spring 1996): 5-15.
16. Peter Unger, sections 1-3 of chapter 1 and chapter 2 from his Living High and
Letting Die (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), 3-13, 24-61.

17. Thomas Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality” in The Morality of

Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Oxford University Press
1997), 139-57.

18. Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in

The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel
A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 124-44.

19. John Rawls, §15 and §16 from his The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1999), 105-120.

20. Stephen M. Gardiner, “The Real Tragedy of the Commons” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 30(4) (Autumn 2001): 387-416.

21. David Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities” Journal of Political Philosophy

9(4) (December 2001): 453-71.

22. Richard W. Miller, “Moral Closeness and World Community” in The Ethics of
Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 101-122.

23. Thomas Pogge, “‘Assisting’ the Global Poor” in The Ethics of Assistance:
Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2004), 260-88.

24. Alison M. Jaggar, “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and
Intercultural Dialogue” in Real World Justice, ed. Andreas Follesdal and
Thomas Pogge (Dordrecht: Springer 2005), 37-63.