Professional Documents
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Abalos vs. Macatangay, JR
Abalos vs. Macatangay, JR
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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contract and upon the price. However, ownership of the thing sold shall not
be transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the
property.
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consent, and vise versa.—Under the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to
him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not
entitled as of right to joint administration.
Same; Same; The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.—It has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate,
and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each
spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
Same; Same; The sale by the husband of property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife when there is no
showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio because it is in
contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil
Code.—We ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife when there is no
showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio because it is in
contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil
Code. Since Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife
before the husband may alienate or
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encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts
or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Same; Same; As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal
property without the wife’s consent if such sale is necessary to answer for
conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil Code.—
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the
wife’s consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities
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TINGA, J.:
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to respondent. The trial court also noted that the check issued by
respondent to cover the earnest money was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds and while it was replaced with another check
by respondent, there is no showing that the second check was issued
as payment for the earnest money on the property.
On appeal taken by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of
Arturo, assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction
between Esther and respondent. The appellate court ratiocinated that
it was by virtue of the SPA executed by Esther, in favor of her sister,
that the sale of the property to respondent was effected. On the other
hand, the appellate court considered the RMOA executed by Arturo
in favor of respondent valid to effect the sale of Arturo’s conjugal
share in the property.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court’s disposition of the case,
petitioner seeks a reversal of its decision alleging that:
I.
The Court of Appeals committed serious and manifest error when it decided
on the appeal without affording petitioner his right to due process.
II.
III.
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2 Heirs of Elias Lorilla v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 638; 330 SCRA 429 (2000).
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658
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Even conceding for the nonce that respondent had accepted the
offer within the period stated and, as a consequence, a bilateral
contract of purchase and sale was perfected, the outcome would be
the same. To benefit from such situation, respondent would have to
pay or at least make a valid tender of payment of the price for only
then could
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he exact compliance with the undertaking of the other
party. This respondent failed to do. By his own admission, he
merely informed respondent spouses of his readiness and
willingness to pay. The fact that he had set aside a check in the
amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P1,290,000.00) representing the balance of the purchase price could
not help his cause. Settled is the rule that tender of payment must be
made in legal tender. A check is not legal 15
tender, and therefore
cannot constitute a valid tender of payment. Not having
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12 Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948.
13 150-A Phil. 714; 45 SCRA 368 (1972).
14 Article 1191, CIVIL CODE.
15 Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 844; 316
SCRA 488 [1999]; Far East Bank & Trust Com
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pany v. Diaz Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 38588, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 659.
16 San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Huang, 391 Phil. 636; 336 SCRA 737
(2000).
17 Article 166, CIVIL CODE.
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constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen
into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse
is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber
ganancial) resulting from the 27 liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
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which can
be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
In not a few cases, we ruled that the sale by the husband of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent
of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated
is void ab initio because it is in contravention 29
of the mandatory
requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code. Since Article 166 of
the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband
may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against this
mandatory provision
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are void except when the law itself authorizes
their validity.
Quite recently, in31San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that neither spouse could alienate in
favor of another, his or her interest in the partnership or in any
property belonging to it, or ask for partition of the properties before
the partnership itself had been
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27 Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713 (1916); Manuel v. Losano, 41 Phil. 855
(1918).
28 Quintos de Ansaldo v. Sheriff of Manila, 64 Phil. 115 (1937).
29 Nicolas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37631, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 635;
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 215 Phil. 380; 130 SCRA 433 (1984); Tolentino v.
Cardenas, 123 Phil. 517; 16 SCRA 720 (1966).
30 ART. 5, CIVIL CODE.
31 357 Phil. 631; 296 SCRA 631 (1998).
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32 ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and
it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.
In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property
by the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property
may also be ordered by the court, according to the provisions of Articles 167 and 178,
No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been
entered against the guilty or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the
husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of
any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Articles 214 and
215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated
in Articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
33 ART. 214. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his
or her own separate estate, without the consent of the other. All earnings from any
profession, business or industry shall likewise belong to each spouse.
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(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she
may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge
upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and
wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
ART. 162. The value of what is donated or promised to the common children by
the husband, only for securing their future or the finishing of a career, or by both
spouses through a common agreement shall also be charged to the conjugal
partnership, when they have not stipulated that it is to be satisfied from the property
of one of them, in whole or in part.
35 No. L- 45418, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 619.
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taking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. However, the power of administration
does not include the power to dispose 36
or encumber property
belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present
law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or
authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property
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without which, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.
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sent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent. (Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa,
374 SCRA 498 [2002])
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