India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism

Author(s): Ashutosh Varshney

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 11 (Nov., 1991), pp. 997-1019
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INDIA,PAKISTAN,AND KASHMIR
Antinomies
of Nationalism

AshutoshVarshney

Ethnic, religious,and nationalistpassions have re-

turnedto the agenda of world politics. The hope of intellectualsand
statesmenat theturnof the 1950swas thata risingtideof rationality and
modernization, in both liberaland Marxistvariants,would sweep away
these ascriptiveidentitiesthat had led to such violence,bloodshed,and
ruin. However,theirexpectederosiondid not take place; rather,these
passionshave persistedand,it wouldbe fairto say,have now gonebeyond
all expectations.Today, severalsocieties-mostdramatically, the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia-seem to be on the vergeof ethnicdisintegration,
dependingon how theirpoliticsand institutions are restructured.Serious
ethnicassertionalso marksa good deal of EasternEurope, the Middle
East, Africa,and South Asia.
Whyare so manypeoplein theworlddefining themselvesin ethnicand
religiousterms?Althoughtheproblemis notfullyunderstood, somemini-
mal comparativeobservationscan, nonetheless, be offeredon the ethnic
and nationalistrevivalof today,and it can be markedby at least four
factors-twoold, tworelatively new. First,manyethnicgroupscutacross
internationalboundariesthathave been constructed to representjuridical
statehood,or theyare spreadacrossregionalboundarieswithina nation-

Ashutosh Varshneyis AssistantProfessorof Governmentand

FacultyAssociate,CenterforInternationalAffairs,Harvard University, Cambridge. The
authorwould like to acknowledgethatthe fieldresearchin India upon whichthisarticleis
based was fundedby the Departmentof Government,Harvard University.The author
would also like to note that researchin an area of insurgency is not possiblewithoutthe
generoussupportof activists,politicalleaders,journalists,officials,
and theKashmiripeople,
who sharedemotionsand thoughtsin countlessconversations.Thanks is also extendedto
BashiruddinAhmed,HouchangChehabi,Ashok Jaitley, JayaJaitley,SunderViswalingam,
MyronWeiner,severalPakistanistudentsat Brownand Harvarduniversities forcomments
and suggestions, and Nisha Kumar foradmirableresearchassistance. The authoris solely
responsibleforthe analysis.
? 1991 by The Regentsof the University
of California

997
 998 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
state. Such groups(Kurds, Tamils,and Muslimsin South Asia, several
nationalitiesin Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) seem eitherto
demonstrate themostvirulentformofnationalismor are objectsofa terri-
ble nationalistrepression.Second, partisanintellectualsand leadersare
reconstructing nationalhistorieswitha litanyofinterethnic charges,either
withtales of brokenpromisesor storiesof ethnicingratitude.Through
selectiveretrieval,tales of betrayalare threateningto push out a shared
heritageof communalcoexistencefromcollectivememories.Hindu na-
tionalistspreferto recallBabar and Aurangzeb,theintolerant Moghulrul-
ers, ratherthan Akbar, the tolerantone. Sikh militantspoint to the
betrayalof Hindus in 1951 whentheygave up theirmothertongue,Pun-
jabi; fewreferto thefactthatit was once commonfortwosonsin thesame
familyto be a Sikhand a Hindu. Sinhalanationalists speakofhowTamils
corruptedtheiroriginalBuddhistland; centuriesofSri Lankanhistoryare,
however,fullof Sinhala-Tamilcoexistence.
Two new factorsare givingmarkedvirulenceto thesetraditionalattri-
butesofethnicstruggle.Deadly weaponsare plentifully availablein many
partsoftheworld,makingethnicity-andtheresponseto it-more brutal
in unprecedented ways. The violenceraisesseriousconcernsofcivilrights
in some circlesand equally seriousconsiderations of orderand national
integrityin thedecision-making realms. Secondly,thespreadof informa-
tiontechnology-television and videos-impartsa newemotionalintensity
thatis notthesame as readingor hearingaboutone's own community on
an insurgency path or in watchingsecurity forcesroll it back. Kashmiri
militantsshow videos of the paramilitary crackdown;Hindu nationalists
filmthe police firingon activiststryingto "liberate"Lord Ram's birth-
place and thenthefilmis commercially released.Withtoday'stechnology,
'imagined communities,"to borrow Benedict Anderson's evocative
phrase,have come to existmoreeasilythanbeforeand withgreaterinten-
sity.
The Kashmirproblem,which goes back to the partitionof India in
1947,sharestheseproperties of thenew ethnicity.Kashmiris a disputed
territorybetweenIndia and Pakistanwithone-third oftheoriginalstateof
Jammuand Kashmir(J&K) nowwithPakistanand two-thirds withIndia.
Kashmirhas twicein thepast led India and Pakistanto war,in 1947 and
1965,respectively.An armedinsurgency in 1990 once again broughtthe
two traditionalfoesveryclose to war,and mostIndian,if not Pakistani,
observerswould arguethata low-intensity war has been underwaysince
December 1989 in the Kashmirvalley. Moreover,eventshave come full
circle;in August 1947,Kashmir,a Muslim-majority state,refusedto join
Pakistan. In October 1947 followingHindu-Muslimviolencein Poonch
Districtat the border,thousandsof well-armedPathan tribalsfromthe
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 999
NorthwestFrontierProvince(NWFP) decidedto "liberate"Kashmirby
force. To save his embattledprincelystate,the maharaja of Kashmir
signeda treatyof accessionwithIndia, and the NationalConference, the
mostpopularpoliticalorganization in Kashmir,supportedthatdecisionto
accede to India and resistedtheinvaders.India's armypushedtheinvad-
ers back.
Four decades later,theequationsin Kashmirhave changeddrastically.
For the firsttime since 1947, an armed insurgencyhas eruptedin the
Kashmirvalley. To India's embarrassment, Kashmirisare now fighting
India's securityforces,not Pakistan-backed invaders. In a place known
foritsquietist,syncretisticIslam,militantIslamicfundamentalism has ac-
quired a foothold.A valleyso exquisiteas to be "almostabove human
desire,"as Nehrudescribedit,has oflate beenburning,itsbeautycharred
by a savage destructionof life and property.The fireof nationalism,
ethnicity,and religionhas consumedover 2,000 lives.
This articledeals withtwo setsof issuesabout Kashmir. First,whydo
India and Pakistanalwaysfightover Kashmir? What do theywantand
whycan't theyunderstand thattheKashmiris,bothHindusand Muslims,
are grievouslysuffering? Secondly,what explainsthe transformation of
battlein Kashmir-from1947 (and again in 1965) whentheIndian army
and KashmirisjointlyfoughtPakistan-to now whenKashmirisfightthe
Indian armedforces?

The Argument: Antinomies

of Nationalism
At its core,the Kashmirproblemis a resultof threeforces:religiousna-
tionalismrepresentedby Pakistan,secularnationalismepitomizedby In-
dia, and ethnicnationalismembodiedin what Kashmiriscall Kashmiriat
(being a Kashmiri). Each side accuses the otherof duplicity;however,
internal inconsistencies,contradictions,and paradoxes mark all three.
Religiousnationalism. Pakistanwas bornwiththeargumentthatHindus
and Muslimswerenot onlytwo different religiouscommunitiesbut also
two separatenations. Kashmir,beinga Muslimmajoritystate,Pakistan
believed,shouldhave come to it at the timeof partition.Two paradoxes
have createdproblemsforPakistan. First,itsfounder,M. A. Jinnah,had
arguedthattherulersoftheprincelystates,notthemassesruledby them,
would decide whichof the two new nation-states theywouldjoin. How-
ever,neitherthemaharajaof Kashmirnor theNationalConference(that
amongotherthingswas fighting the maharaja'srule),optedforPakistan.
Many KashmirisfoughtPakistanvigorously.SheikhAbdullah and the
NationalConference rejectedthetwo-nation theoryunequivocally:"I and
 1000 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
myorganizationneverbelievedin the formulathatMuslimsand Hindus
formseparatenations.We did notbelievein thetwo-nation
theory,notin
communalism or communalism itself ... We believed that religion had
no place in politics."1
Secondly,65 millionMuslimsjoined thetwowingsofPakistanin 1947,
but 35 millionwere leftbehindin India. This numberhas grownto be
almost100 millionbynow,whereasthenumberofMuslimsin thestateof
Jammuand Kashmir is a mere 4 million. If Pakistantriesto liberate
Kashmir,or ifKashmirbreaksaway withits help,Pakistanrunstherisk
of endangering the welfareof 100 millionMuslimsin India. If political
and civilrightswerealwaysviewedas individualrights,a Muslimoutside
Kashmirshouldnotbe affected by whatKashmiriMuslimsdo. Unfortu-
nately,rightsare also viewedby the populace as groupentitlements, not
onlyin India but also elsewhere.Willynilly, because of the way Pakistan
was carvedout of India to representa Muslimhomeland,IndianMuslims
became implicatedin Pakistan'sactions. If popularperceptionsmatched
theliberalnotionofrights,thatwouldnotbe true. An inevitablenational-
ist cry,however,is: how manytimeswill India be partitioned due to the
so-calledMuslimQuestion? Muslimsof pre-1947India alreadyhave two
homelands,Pakistanand Bangladesh. Would Kashmirbe a third?Ulti-
mately,the breakupof nation-states is not a rationalquestion. Reason
collapses on the bedrockof emotions. Nation-statesget embodied;to
manypeople,theirbreakup,therefore, feelslike a limbtearingapart.
Severalnon-KashmiriIndian Muslimsmade explicitargumentsabout
theimplications ofPakistan'sactionsin Kashmir. In a memorandum sub-
mittedto theUnitedNationsas farback as 1951, 14 distinguished Indian
Muslimsargued:
Pakistanhas made our positionweakerby drivingout Hindus fromWestern
Pakistanin utterdisregardof the consequencesof such a policyto us and our
welfare.... Such a policymustinevitably, as thepasthas alreadyshown,result
in the uprootingof Muslimsin thiscountry....
It is a strangecommentaryon politicalbeliefsthattheMuslimsofPakistanwho
would like theMuslimsof Kashmirtojoin theminvadedtheState,in October
1947.... In its oft-proclaimedanxietyto rescuethe 3 millionMuslimsfrom
what it describesas the tyrannyof a handfulof Hindus in the (Jammuand
Kashmir) State,Pakistanevidentlyis preparedto sacrificethe interestsof 40
millionMuslimsin India-a strangeexhibitionof concernforthe welfareof
fellowMuslims. Our misguidedbrothersin Pakistando notrealizethatifMus-
lims in Pakistancan wage a war againstHindus in Kashmir,whyshould not
Hindus,sooneror later,retaliateagainstMuslimsin India? . ..

1. SheikhAbdullah's statementto the SecurityCouncil, officialrecords,3rd year,nos.

16-35, 241stmeeting,3rd item,pp. 16-27, February6, 1948.
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1001
Does Pakistanseriouslythinkthatit could give us any help if such an emer-
gencyarose? It is incapableofprovidingroomand livelihoodto the40 million
MuslimsofIndia shouldtheymigrateto Pakistan.Yet, itspolicyand action...
may well produce[that]result.2
Althoughonlyanticipatedin 1951by theseMuslimintellectuals, a Hindu
nationalistupsurgeis a politicalrealitytoday. Moreover,thosewho left
India forPakistanin 1947 are called muhajirs(refugees)in Pakistan. Ar-
guingthat theyare discriminated againstin the countrytheyliberated,
theyhave organizedas a separatepartyin Pakistan. In a veryreal sense
thereis no place leftfor India's Muslims in Pakistan. Kashmir thus
threatensto make 100 millionMuslimspoliticallyand emotionally home-
less. It should not be surprisingthat Indian MuslimsoutsideKashmir
have not supportedthe insurgency in Kashmiror thatImam Bukhari,a
prominentreligiousleader of Muslimsin India, has publiclystatedthat
Kashmiris an integralpartofIndia.3 For Pakistan,thus,Kashmircontin-
ues to representthe unfinishedbusinessof partition.Since East Pakistan
has alreadybrokenaway,gettingKashmirback cannotbut restorepride.
Pakistan supportsa plebiscitein Kashmir but not Kashmir's indepen-
dence, even if Kashmiriswant it. The only alternativesofferedto the
Kashmirisare: eitherIndia or Pakistan.
Secular nationalism. Led by the CongressParty,India's nationalmove-
mentneveracceptedthetwo-nation theory.Hindusand Muslimshad sep-
aratereligionsbut theywerenot distinctnations. Muslimswereas much
citizensof India as the Hindus. The secularnationalismof the Congress
notonlyfacedan ideologicaladversaryin Muslimnationalismbut also an
intrapartyrivalin Hindu nationalism.Hindunationalists did notobjectto
Muslimslivingin India butratherarguedthattheMuslimswouldhave to
demonstrate theirloyaltyto India and also recognizethatIndia was pri-
marilya Hindu civilization.The Hindu nationalistfactionwas powerful
but not powerfulenoughto subduethe secularideologyof the Congress.
It could not winthebattleforstateformation.Hindu nationalistsalways
lurkedin the background,waitingforthe opportunity to take controlof

2. This memorandum was submitted to Dr. FrankGraham,U.N. representativein Kash-

mir,on August 14, 1951. The signatoriesincludedDr. Zakir Husain (thenvice chancellor,
AligarhUniversity; laterpresidentof India); Sir SultanAhmed(formermemberoftheGov-
ernorGeneral'sExecutiveCouncil); Sir M. A. S. Khan (formeractinggovernorof United
Provincesand primeministerof the princelystateof Hyderabad);Sir MohammedUsman
Sir Iqbal Ahmed(formerchiefjustice,AllahabadHigh
(vice chancellor,Madras University);
Court),and nineotherrespectedand highlyplaced Muslims.
3. "PreacherPolitician,"India Today,July31, 1990. The onlyMuslimpoliticalleaderof
some standingto have disagreedwiththispositionis Syed Shahabuddin.Cf. MuslimIndia,
June1990.
 1002 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
the Indian state. The voluntarydecisionof Muslim-majorityKashmirto
join India bolsteredthe secularargument.Once partof India, however,
Kashmir'sdecisionto breakaway,iftakenor successful, threatensto em-
powerHindunationalism forit legitimates
itsmainargumentthatMuslims
are essentiallydisloyalto the country.The inevitablecry again is how
manytimeswould India be dividedbecause of the MuslimQuestion?
Thus, thebattlebetweensecularand Hindu nationalismafterindepen-
dencecame to be embodiedin Kashmir,whichled to a seriouscontradic-
tionin thepositiontakenby Nehruand his followers.Nehruarguedthat
in orderto maintainsecularismin India and keep Hindu nationalismat
bay, Kashmirmuststayin India-if necessary,by force:
Wehavealwaysregarded theKashmir problem as symbolicforus,as ithasfar-
reachingconsequences in India. Kashmiris symbolic as it illustrates
thatwe
area secularstate.... Kashmirhasconsequences bothin IndiaandPakistan
becauseifwedisposedofKashmir on thebasisofthetwo-nation theory,obvi-
ouslymillionsof peoplein India and millionsin East Pakistanwill be
powerfullyaffected. Manyof thewoundsthathad healedmightopenout
again.4
Nehruhad in mindthe woundsof partition, accompaniedas it was by a
quarter-to a half-million deathsand over 15 millionmigrations fromei-
therside of theborder.
Nehru'sfears,however,werenot imaginary.In 1952,Hindu national-
istsled a popularmovementin JammuagainstKashmir'svacillationson
full integrationwith India, and the wounds were reopenedin the late
1980s. Nurturedby a widespreadfeelingamongtheHindu middleclasses
thatIndia's secularstatehas gonetoo farin appeasingminorities (Sikhsin
Punjaband Muslimsin Kashmirand Muslimsin general),Hindunational-
ism has gained remarkablestrengthin recentyears. The attackon the
mosquein Ayodhyain October1990 and theriseof theBharatiyaJanata
Partyare examplesofa deepeningpoliticaltrend,includingthemostwide-
spreadHindu-Muslimriotingsince 1947. Kashmirinationalismmay not
entirelyaccountforthe riseof Hindu nationalismbut,because of its his-
toryand context,substantially contributes to it and makesit difficult for
theIndianstateto deal withit generously.If Kashmirwithdraws fromthe
Indian unionand a secondpartitionof India takesplace, themainbenefi-
ciarieswill be Hindu nationalists.
Moreover,and thisis thesecondcontradiction, India's secularnational-
ism functions in a liberaldemocraticframework.Commitment to liberal
principleswas the reason Nehru offereda plebisciteto Kashmirisas a
methodof confirming a provisionalaccession. But nationalismsoon de-

Debates,3:34, p. 3,995.
4. Speech to Lok Sabha, September17, 1953,Parliamentary
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1003
finedthelimitsofliberalism.If liberalismmeansfreedomto organizeand
speak,does it also meanfreedomto secede? Essentially, liberalismhas no
way of resolvingthisproblem.If it does notlet peoplesecedeevenwhere
thereis a demandforsecession,it meanspeople in the disputedarea are
notfreeto choosetheirrulers.If it concedesfreedomto secede,itbecomes
a loftybut bloodlessprincipleforpeople outsidethe area of secession.
Human beingsare not simplydisembodiedindividualsbut also peopleat-
tachedto soil,a history,and a nationalpride. Whatgood is liberalismifit
cannoteven protectthe nationalboundariesand integrity because of the
freedomsit offers?There is no escape fromthisquestion. A liberalde-
mocracyfunctions wellwhena nationhas alreadybeenconstructed; Kash-
mirexemplifies the helplessnessof liberalismagainstnationalism.
KeepingKashmirin India, thus,mayhave led to a tragedy,but letting
Kashmirgo, however,meansa tragedyof greatermagnitude-a possible
Hindu-Muslimbloodbathand an invigoratedattackon secularism.The
prospectof ensuingnationwideviolencefrightens India's secular politi-
cians and intellectuals.Not onlyis Kashmira prisonerof thelargercon-
text;eventhosewantingcommunalpeace in India havebecomea prisoner
of Kashmir. A dreadfulbut real symbiosisis in operationhere.
Ethnicnationalism. A complexof emotionshas markedKashmir'srela-
tionswithIndia and Pakistan,and it is clearlydominatedtodaybya desire
forindependence.Kashmirinationalism,5 however,has runintotwo ob-
jectionsabout its consistency.First,ifsome of Kashmir'sleadersdid not
choose Pakistandespitereligiousaffinity but optedto staywithIndia on
groundsof secularism,shouldit notalso meanthatKashmirinationalism
is a subsetof Indian nationalismand, therefore,Kashmir,withstate-level
autonomy,is partoftheIndianfederation?Whatjustification mightthere
be foran independent Kashmirexceptbad faithand opportunism-Kash-
mir,afterall, was saved fromPakistan'soccupationby India's armyin
1947-48 and 1965? On theotherhand,and thisis thesecondproblem,if
the argumentis that Kashmirinationalismis incompatiblewith Indian
nationalism,thenhowcan twootherethnically partsoftheKash-
different
mirstatego withKashmir? Whatis generallycalled Kashmirhappensto
be thestateJammuand Kashmir. J&K has threeethnically separablegeo-
graphicalregions-a Dogra Hindu-majority Jammu,a Muslim-majority

5. For wantofa morepreciseterm,"Kashmirinationalism"is beingused hereto analyze

thefeelingsand politicsof Muslimsin the valley. Muslimsin Jammuand "Azad Kashmir"
are also called Kashmiris,but my argumentsapply to valleyMuslims,wherethe Indo-Pak
battlehas beenthemostintense.Kashmiriathas,on thewhole,beenbothethnicand secular.
it is theethnic
However,sinceit has triedto separateitselffromIndia's secularnationalism,
aspect ofKashmiriatthathas becomeits distinctive mark.
 1004 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
Kashmir,and a TibetanBuddhist-majority Ladakh. If Kashmirinational-
ismis notbasedon religionbuton Kashmiriat, a separateKashmiriethnic-
ity,thenit has to be realizedthatethnicallythe Buddhistsin Ladakh are
Tibetans,the Hindus of Jammuare Dogras, and the Muslimsof Jammu
are Punjabis. Moreover,Jammuis only a shade smallerthan Kashmir,
both nearlyconstituting two halvesof the J&K state(Ladakh is tiny,in
populationterms,at least). An ethnicnotionofindependent Kashmircan-
notcarrytheentirestatewithoutbeinginternally inconsistent,
particularly
ifnon-Kashmiri groupsdo not wishto join such a state.
From 1947 untilhis deathin 1982,SheikhAbdullah,themostnotable
of Kashmir'sleaders,embodiedin his persontheironiesof Kashmir. He
fluctuatedbetweenaccession to India and independence.As already
noted,he explicitlyrejectedthetwo-nation theory.Even moreimportant,
Abdullah recognizedthe linkbetweenKashmir'saccessionto India and
India's secularism:
Certaintendencieshavebeenasserting themselvesin India,whichmayin the
futureconvertitintoa religious
statewherein theinterests
ofMuslimswillbe
jeopardised.Thiswouldhappenifa communal organisationhad a dominant
handintheGovernment, andCongress idealsoftheequalityofallcommunities
weremadeto givewayto religious intolerance.Thecontinued accessionof
KashmirtoIndia should,however, helpin defeating thistendency. Frommy
ofthelastfouryears,
experience itis myconsidered judgment thatthepresence
ofKashmir in theUnionofIndiahasbeenthemajorfactor in stabilising
rela-
tionsbetween theHindusandMuslimsofIndia.6
Havingseenthislink,however,Abdullahlaterdithered.He asked,should
Hindu nationaliststriumphin the strugglefor power in Delhi, would
Kashmirbe securein India? "Many Kashmirisare apprehensiveas to
what will happen to themand theirpositionif,forinstance,something
happensto . . . Nehru. . . . If thereis a resurgenceof communalismin
India,how are we to convincetheMuslimsofKashmirthatIndia does not
intendto swallowup Kashmir?"7
It is hard to see whyAbdullahand secularistsin Delhi wereso afraid
of Hindu nationalism,because it is clear in retrospectthat,if anything,
Hindu nationalism, afterthefratricidalviolenceof 1947and theassassina-
tionof Gandhiin 1948,declinedin the 1950s. It is onlyin the 1980sthat
Hindu nationalism and strength.An ex-post
has risento politicalvisibility
perspectiveis, however,misleading,amountingto readinghistoryback-
ward. Those whoparticipated in politicsin the 1940sand saw thecommu-
nal madness accompanyingIndia's partitioncould not fullydistance

6. Openingaddressto theJammuand KashmirConstituent Assembly,November5, 1951.

the Timesof India, April 12, 1952.
7. Speech in Ranbirsinghpura,
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1005
themselves fromtheirpoliticalsocialization.If we wishto reconstruct the
universeof how leaders behaved, an ex-anteperspectivewould make
greatersensein whichcase thefactthatHindu nationalismdeclinedin the
1950s is less importantthan the factthatpoliticalleaderswere afraidit
wouldrearup again. To fightHindunationalism, secularistslikeNehruin
Delhi neededAbdullah'sunqualified support.In theend,a cripplingpara-
dox emerged.Abdullahwas not sure of the longevityof secularism;his
unequivocalfaithwas, however,requiredforimparting longevity to secu-
larism. Kashmirhas stillnotemergedfromthedarkshadowofthispara-
dox.
Uncertainty aboutthefutureofsecularismis nottheonlywayto explain
Abdullah'svacillations.It has oftenbeen arguedthatAbdullahwas aim-
ingat independencewiththehelp of theBritishand Americans.Secular-
ists oftendismissedthis propositionas a fantasyof the paranoidHindu
mind, but some declassifieddocumentsof the State Departmentgive
credenceto the Hindu nationalistclaim. Loy Henderson,U.S. ambassa-
dor in Delhi, wroteto the U.S. Secretaryof Stateon September29, 1950:
Whilein Kashmir,I had twosecretdiscussionswithSheikhAbdullah. . . at his
thatin his opinion[Kashmir]should
request.... He was vigorousin restating
be independent;thatan overwhelming majoritypopulationdesiredthisindepen-
dence;and thathe had reasonto believethatsome Azad Kashmirleaders. . .
wouldbe willingto cooperate.... Kashmiripeoplecould notunderstandwhy
the UN consistently ignoredindependenceas one of the possiblesolutionsfor
Kashmir....
WhenI asked Abdullahifhe thoughtKashmircould remaina stableindepen-
dentcountrywithout[the]friendly support[of]India and Pakistan,he replied
negative.In his opinionKashmircould existonlyin case boththesecountries
had friendlyrelationswitheach other;and in [the]case [ifthe] U.S. through
[the]UN ... wouldenableit,by investments or othereconomicassistance....
Therewereso manyareas of India in urgentneed of economicdevelopment he
was convincedKashmirwould get relativelylittleattention.Nevertheless, it
would be preferableforKashmirto go to India thanto Pakistan. It would be
disastrousforKashmiristo be broughtundercontrolof [a] government with[a]
medievalKoranic outlook.8
Abdullah'sdisapprovalof Pakistanis, thus,consistent.But how does
one interprethis equivocationbetweenindependenceand integration?
PossiblyAbdullahwas speakingthe languageof integration to Delhi and
independence to Washington-preciselythekindofduplicitythat,accord-
was mindlesslyignoredivyNehru. These texts
ing to Hindu nationalists,
should,however,be readwithcare. Did Abdullahditheron a fullintegra-

D.C.: Departmentof State,

8. ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,vol. 5 (Washington,
1978), pp. 1,433-1,435.
 1006 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991

TABLE 1 PopulationofJammuand KashmirState,1981*

% ofState
Population % Muslims % Hindus % Other
Kashmirvalley 3,134,904 94.96 4.59 0.05
(52.36%)
Jammu 2,718,113 29.60 66.25 4.15
(45.39%)
Ladakh 134,372 46.04 2.66 51.30**
(2.24%)
Total State 5,987,389 64.19 32.24 3.57
(100%)
SOURCE: Census 1981,Government of India.
NOTE: Percentagesfor1951 weredifferent respect.The numberof
in onlyone significant
Muslimsin Ladakh was muchlowerin the late 1940s.
* 1991 censusfigureare not yetavailable.
** Buddhist.

tion because he was unsureof Indian secularismor because of his hope

thatthe Americanswould supportindependenceat some laterdate,and
forthe moment,he, therefore,had to positionhimself?
TheJammufactorand Kashmirinationalism. The tripartite characterof
J&K (see Table 1) exposedAbdullah'scontradictions even moresharply.
Of thethreeparts,Jammuwas theregionin question.Jammuhad nearly
45% of the state population,but in contrastto Kashmir valley,where
Muslimswere95%, the Hindus in Jammuwerenearlytwo-thirds of the
populationwiththeMuslimsconstituting roughlytheotherthird.Abdulb
lah had a solid popularbase in the valleybut not in Jammu.The Dogra
Hindus in Jammuare ethnicallydifferent fromKashmiriHindus in the
valley,and themaharajacame froma Dogra family.Similarly,the Mus-
limsin Jammuare ethnicallydifferent fromthe valleyMuslimswho,like
the Hindus in Jammu,are more Punjabi than Kashmiri. Abdullah was
not popularamongtheJammuMuslimseither.Anotherpoliticalorgani-
zation,theMuslimConference, represented JammuMuslims. Most lead-
ers of this organizationhad migratedto the Pakistaniside of Kashmir
afterthe partition.
When SheikhAbdullahbecamethehead of theJ&K government upon
the departureof the maharaja,powershiftedfromJammuto the valley.
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1007
Thus emergedthe Jammufactorin Kashmirpolitics,a factornot fully
circles,butone thatcomplicatedthe
recognized,especiallyin international
issues in Kashmirimmeasurably.Jammu'spoliticalleadershad an une-
quivocalstandon therelationship withIndia: theywantedfulland uncon-
ditionalintegration.On a basic issue, then,the two major areas of the
stateranintoa conflict.Abdullahcould nothaveJammuand subjectit to
Kashmirihegemony whilemakingan argument aboutDelhi notappreciat-
ing Kashmiriaspirations.This contradiction remainsunresolvedin 1991.

HistoricalEvolutionof the
KashmirProblem
Phase 1: FatefulOriginsin Ambiguity, 1947-53
The earliestdevelopments are wellknownand can be briefly narratedhere.
At thetimeofpartition, Jammuand Kashmirwas a princelystate. When
theBritishdecidedto leavein 1947,theprincelystateswereadvisedbythe
Britishto opt fora mergerwithIndia or Pakistan,althoughtheoretically
the optionof independencewas available. In decidingwhichcountryto
choose, two principleswere recommended:geographicalcontiguity and
thereligionofthemajoritycommunity in thestate. All exceptthreeofthe
princelystates-Hyderabad,Junagarh, and J&K-decided tojoin India or
Pakistan. From the perspectiveof religion,thesethreehad a ruler-ruled
paradox. Hyderabadand Junagarhhad Muslimrulersbuta Hindumajor-
ity. Moreover,neitherwas contiguousto Pakistan. India settledtheirac-
cessionby a combinationof forceand diplomacy. J&K had a Muslim
majorityand a Hindu rulerbut threeadditionalfeatures.First,despiteits
Muslim majority,J&K had threeverydifferent areas mergedinto one
state-Kashmir, Jammu,and Ladakh. Secondly,unlikeHyderabadand
Junagarh, itwas contiguousto Pakistan.Thirdly,a popularmovement led
by SheikhAbdullahhad developedagainsttheautocraticruleofthemaha-
raja. Because of its secular character,encompassingHindus, Muslims,
and Sikhs,Abdullah'smovementwas ardentlysupportedby Gandhi and
Nehru and, equally strongly, opposed by the Muslim League underJin-
nah's leadership.Whenthemaharajadid notjoin eitherIndia or Pakistan,
Pathan tribesmen, latersupportedby the Pakistaniarmy,invadedKash-
mir. To obtainthe help of India's armedforces,the maharajasigneda
treatyof accessionwithDelhi. When a cease-firewas called in January
1949,theinvaders,thoughbeatenback,werestillin controlofone-third of
Jammuand Kashmir;thecease-fire line,slightlyredefined in 1973,holds
today.
Incorporatedintothe Indian Constitution as Article370, the treatyof
accessionmade Delhi responsiblefordefense,foreignaffairs, and commu-
 1008 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
nications;otherwise,J&K was autonomous. Moreover,Prime Minister
Nehruoffered thatKashmir'saccessionto India wouldbe submittedto a
popularreferendum later. The promiseof the plebiscite,however,would
soon beginto hauntIndia.
It is, in retrospect,
ironicalthat India took the lead in bringingthe
Kashmirissueto theU.N. on December31, 1947. Nehru'spurposewas to
get theSecurityCouncil to censure"Pakistan'srole in participatingin or
assistingthe invasion."9To beginwith,Pakistandeniedofficialinvolve-
ment,arguingthat the tribalshad undertakenthe invasionthemselves.
Pakistanalso arguedthatIndia was carrying out a genocideagainstJ&K's
Muslims,thatit had securedtheaccessionof Kashmirby fraud,and sug-
gestedthat,sincea pro-Indiagovernment existedin Kashmir,a plebiscite
in Kashmir should take place under U.N. supervision.10Representing
Kashmir,Abdullahcalled Pakistanan aggressorin the SecurityCouncil.
India gottheJ&K government's supportbutnotthatofBritainand the
UnitedStates. A U.N. CommissionforIndia and Pakistan(UNCIP) was
appointedto carryout the U.N. mandatein Kashmir. The commission
reportedon August 13, 1948,to theU.N. that"the presenceof troopsof
Pakistanin the territory of Jammuand Kashmirconstitutesa material
changein thesituationsinceit was last represented by theGovernment of
PakistanbeforetheSecurityCouncil."11Beforea plebiscitecould be con-
ducted,a two-partprioractionwas necessary,accordingto the UNCIP.
In thefirstpart,Pakistanshould"securethewithdrawalfromthestateof
Jammuand Kashmirof tribesmenand Pakistannationalsnot normally
residentthereinwho have enteredthestatesolelyforthepurposeof fight-
ing." In thesecondpart,after"the tribesmen and Pakistaninationals...
have withdrawn... [the]Governmentof India [will]beginto withdraw
thebulk of its forcesfromthatstatein stagesagreedupon withtheCom-
mission." Once both withdrawalswerecompleted,a plebiscitewould be
held. The August 13, 1948,UNCIP resolutionremainedthe bedrockof
the UN's positionon Kashmir for the next threedecades. However,
neitherIndia norPakistanwithdrew theirforces,India claimingthatPaki-
stanhad to pullback firstand Pakistancontending thattherewas no guar-
antee India would withdrawits forces.
Meanwhile,by 1951-52, the tripartitecharacterof the Jammuand
Kashmirstatemade thesituationwithinit explosive.In November1951,

9. SecurityCouncil documents,S/628, Indian complaint,January2, 1948.

10. Sir ZafarullahKhan's replyon behalfof Pakistan,U.N. documents,S/PV 228-29,
January16-17, 1948,pp. 36-96.
11. UNCIP resolutions, S/1430,December1949 (textsof theAugust13, 1948,and Janu-
ary 5, 1949,resolutions).The January5 resolutionmaintaineda similarpositionregarding
Pakistantroops. The citationsbelow come fromthe text.
 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY 1009

J&K's Constituent Assemblywas electedbut eithertheelectionpapersof

politiciansopposed to the National Conferencewere foundtechnically
faultyor theoppositionpartiesboycottedtheelection.The purposeofthe
ConstituentAssemblywas interalia, to debate and politicallysettlethe
questionof accessionto India, ratifythe land reformprogram(Abdullah
had announceda radicalone thatwoulddispossessthelandlordswithout
compensation),and devisea constitution forthe governanceof the state.
To Abdullah'slack of a politicalbase in Jammu,threespecificsourcesof
discontentwere added between1950-52. First,his five-member cabinet
had onlyone representative fromJammu,whilein theConstituent Assem-
bly,Jammuhad only29 out of75 seatsand thevalleyhad 44. Second,the
land reform program,evenifintendedbyAbdullahto be entirely socioeco-
nomic,was viewedin communalterms.The reasonsimplywas thatmost
landlordsin KashmirwereHindusand mostpeasantsMuslim. Third,sus-
picions about Abdullah's intentionswere deepenedby the emergingre-
ports that in his dealingswith the Westernpowers,he had expressed
preference forJammuand Kashmiras a sovereignindependent state,not
as a statefullyacceded to India.12
By themiddleof 1952,a popularmovementemergedin Jammuagainst
Abdullahled bythePraja Parishad,a Hindu regionalparty,andjoinedby
the Jan Sangh, the Hindu nationalistpartyin Delhi. S. P. Mookerjee,
presidentof the Jan Sangh, took a personalinterestin the movement.
AfraidthatJammuwouldforcibly come underKashmiridomination,the
Hindu nationalistsarguedfora fulland irrevocableintegration of theen-
tire state with India. They questionedSheikh Abdullah's motivesby
pointingto "inconsistencies" in his logic: if SheikhAbdullah hated the
two-nation theoryand his principleswerethesame as thoseof Indianpol-
ity,thenwherewas the groundfornot acceptinga fullaccession? Where
was theneedfora stateconstitution as distinctfroma nationalone? Why
should Abdullah retainthe title of primeministerfromthe royal dy-
nasty-if he had foughttheprincelysystemand alreadyunseatedthema-
haraja, otherheads of stategovernments all over India werecalled chief
ministers, and withthe titleprimeministerreservedonlyforthe head of
thenationalgovernment in Delhi? Whatwas therationaleforcontinuing
to have a separatestateflag(as in theprincelytimes)insteadofa national
flag,whichall otherIndian stateshad? Why should Article370, giving
the statea special status,existeven thoughotherprincelystateshad ac-
ceded fullywithoutany specialprovisions?Indeed,wasn'tAbdullah'sar-
gumentaboutlimitedaccessiontantamount to sayingthattherewerethree

12. Cf. Karan Singh,Autobiography,

1931-1967 (New Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress,
1989), p. 121.
 1010 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
nationsin India-Hindus, Muslims,and Kashmiris?Mobilizationforthe
viewwas conductedthroughthehighlysymbolicand emotionalslogan: ek
Pradhan,ek Nishan,and ek Vidhan(one primeminister, one flag,and one
constitution).
Soon thereafter, mattersslippedbeyondthecontrolof bothNehruand
Abdullah. DissentagainstAbdullahin his partyand cabinetwas brewing.
His positionon India was eventuallydisownedby threeof the fourother
membersof his cabinetwho wanteda fullerintegrationwithIndia,which
essentiallymeantsupportforthe Parishad'sstandtoo. Abdullahrefused
to resignand the orderwentout forhis arrest. Abdullah remainedin
prisonwithfewexceptionsuntil1968.13It was a remarkable twistoffate;
in a matterof six years,Nehru'slongtimefriendand Delhi's trustedlieu-
tenantin Kashmir,a Muslimwho had attackedtheveryfoundingprinci-
ples of Pakistanin the UnitedNationsand supportedIndia's secularism,
languishedin Indian jails. Delhi's embarrassment
could not have been
deeper.

Phase 2: ImprisonedEthnicNationalism,
EmasculatedReligiousNationalism,and the
Triumphof Secular Nationalism,1953-83
SheikhAbdullah'sarrestremovedthe mostpowerfulexponentof Kash-
mirinationalismfromthepoliticalscene. His supporters formeda Plebi-
scite Front but it could not pose a serious challengeto Abdullah's
successor,Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed. Even thoughhe was a leading
memberoftheNationalConference, Bakshiwas an advocateofa complete
union withIndia. Delhi and Srinagarresumeda normalrelationship at
the governmental level,and to sootheany possiblesense of injuryin the
valley,the government of India startedpouringin developmentalfunds
thatwould build roads,hospitals,schools,and bringin electricity.Over
time,a combination of internaland externaldevelopmentsbeganto freeze
theexistingdivisionof Kashmir. The thirdofJ&K underPakistan'scon-
trol at the timeof cease-fire,was broughtincreasinglyunderPakistan's
political control,whereas the Indian side of Kashmir went througha simi-
lar logic underIndian tutelage.
Externally,the insertionof the subcontinent into the Cold War was
mostsignificant.In effect,it made the UNCIP resolutionirrelevant.In
1954-55 on groundsthat Pakistan was on the peripheryof the Soviet
Union in theMiddle East, theU.S. offereda securityallianceto Pakistan.
Pakistanacceptedthedeal, despiteIndia's proteststhatthearmssupplied

13. In a politicalcareerlastingover50 years,Abdullahwas jailed ninetimes,six timesby

the maharajaof Kashmirbeforethe partitionof India and threetimesafterthat.
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1011
by the U.S. would be used againstIndia, not the SovietUnion. Rather
thanpullingout troopsfromKashmir,NehruarguedthatPakistanwould
actuallybolsteritsarmedforcesin Kashmir. The SovietUnionseizedthe
opportunity.AbstainingfromtheearlierKashmirdebatesin theSecurity
Council,it begansupporting India's standin theU.N. and,as a permanent
memberof theSecurityCouncil,could vetoany resolutionpassed against
India. On theotherhand,Pakistan,who was receivingU.S. support,also
did nothave to pull out of Kashmir. The SecurityCouncilbecameirrele-
vantto a peacefulresolutionoftheKashmirproblem.A plebiscitedid not
take place because its priorconditionscould not,and would not,be met.
Internally,theJ&K Constituent Assemblyapproveda mergerwithIn-
dia in early1956. On March 29, Nehruwithdrewtheofferof a plebiscite
on the threegroundsthat (1) fora plebisciteto take place underU.N.
terms,Pakistanhad firstto withdrawits forcesfromJ&K; (2) Kashmir's
Constituent Assemblyhad approvedthe mergerwithIndia and accepted
India's constitution;and (3) the insertionof the subcontinent into Cold
War securityallianceshad changedtheobjectivesituationdrastically, for
it reflectedPakistan'sdesireto seekmilitary solutions,something intolera-
ble and a signofbad faith,accordingto Nehru.14 The secondpointrepre-
senteda changein his position.To showhis liberalcredentials, Nehruin
theearly1950shad rejectedAbdullah'sproposalthattheConstituent As-
semblyshouldbe takenas representing popularwishes,and itsdecisionon
therelationship withIndia shouldbe deemeda legitimate substitute.For-
tifiedby Sovietsupportin the SecurityCouncil and provideda reasonby
Pakistan'ssecurityalliancewiththe U.S., Nehru'snationalismedged out
his liberalism.
Nehru'sthirdpointabout Pakistan'smilitaryintentions towardKash-
mirturnedout to be prophetic.Persuadedby the Britishand Americans
to resumenegotiations withPakistanon Kashmir,he did briefly trydiplo-
maticsolutionsbeforehis deathin 1964. He securedthereleaseofAbdul-
lah fromjail, and askedhimto go to Pakistanto talkto PresidentAyub.15

14. Nehru'sspeechin theLowerHouse ofParliament, March29, 1956,also publishedas a

pamphlet,"KashmirMein LokmatNahin" (No plebiscitein Kashmir)(Srinagar:Lala Rukh
Publications,undated). In a resolutionpassed on December2, 1957, the SecurityCouncil
commentedthattheKashmirConstituent Assemblycould notoverruletheU.N. resolution.
15. In thelasttwoto threeyearsofhis life,Nehruexperimented withtheidea ofa confed-
erationas a solutionto the Kashmirproblem,whichwould eventuallylead the way to an
Indo-Pakistanconfederation.For details,see S. Gopal, Nehru,vol. 3 (Oxford: OxfordUni-
versityPress, 1980), pp. 261-64, and Y. D. Gundevia,Outsidethe Archives,pp. 311-39.
Abdullahconveyedthisidea to PresidentAyub,who "vehemently denounced"theproposal,
forit "would encouragethe forcesof disintegration, not only in Pakistanbut more so in
India" (in Y. D. Gundevia,SheikhAbdullah'sTestament[Dehra Dun and Delhi: Palit and
Palit, 1974],p. 82).
 1012 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
By then,however,too much acrimonyand distrustsurroundedSheikh
Abdullah. Moreover,India had just been mauledand humiliatedon the
battlefieldby China. ThinkingIndia was weakerthaneverbefore,Paki-
stanwas in no mood to compromise.In theevent,no breakthroughs were
made. In 1965 Abdullahwas arrestedon suspicionof anti-Indiaactivities
and, upon Pakistan'sconfident movesin Kashmirin thatautumn,a sec-
ond Indo-Pakwar brokeout.
Strategically,thewar was an inconclusivedraw,butpolitically, it was a
gravemiscalculation on Pakistan'spart. Afternearly15 yearswhenIndia
had been on the defensivein the internationalforums,the situation
changed. Apparently,Pakistan's calculationwas that, with Pakistan's
support,Kashmiriswould risein revoltagainstIndia, somethingthatIn-
dia's armed forces,batteredin the war againstChina only threeyears
back, would not be able to quell. For this reason,severalhundred-by
some calculations,nearly7,00016-armymen and paramilitary personnel
in civilianguise were sent into the valleyto generatean uprising.The
uprisingdid notcome about,buta war,nonetheless, tookplace as mostof
Pakistan's"infiltrators"in the valleywere turnedin by the Kashmiris.
Pakistancontendedthatthe people capturedby India werenot Pakistani
"infiltrators"butKashmirifreedomfighters openlyin revoltagainstIndia.
IndependentWesternobserverscould getno evidenceofit. Once again,it
seemed clear that whateverthe state of theirrelationshipwith India,
Kashmirisdid not wishto embracePakistan.
A Kashmiriuprisingalong withan Indo-Pakwar would,indeed,have
put India's armedforces,onlymarginally strongerafterthebattering suf-
feredat theChinesehands,to a severetest. Speakingpurelystrategically,
ifthe 1989 Kashmiriuprisinghad takenplace in 1965,Pakistan'smilitary
chancesin Kashmirwould have been strong.India's armedforcescould
deal with Pakistan's militaryin 1965 but would have been terribly
stretchedif bothan invasionand an uprisinghad takenplace simultane-
ously. Anotherwar eruptedsix yearslaterin 1971. While the bone of
contentionthen was East Pakistan,not Kashmir,it had seriousconse-
quencesforthe latter.Pakistanwas bifurcated,East Pakistanisclaiming
that theywere Bengali Muslims and not simplyMuslims,decimating,
thereby, thetwo-nation theorybased on a priority of religionoverethnic-
ity. Moreover,the war was a severeblow to Pakistan'sarmed forces.
Both ideologicallyand militarily,it was a catastropheforPakistan.

16. For an accountof Pakistan'splan froma Pakistanigeneralinvolvedin the war, see

MohammedMusa, My Version(Lahore: WajidalisLtd., 1983). GeneralMusa had not rec-
ommendedinfiltration in Kashmir,code namedOperationGibraltar.His objectionswere,
however,overruledby Z. A. Bhutto,thenforeignminister,Aziz Ahmed,defensesecretary,
and ultimatelyby PresidentAyub.
 ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1013
The war was an awfulmomentfor Kashmirinationalistsalso. They
mighthave opposed Pakistan,but since theyhad a troubledrelationship
withIndia-often seekinga divorcefromwhat theyviewedas a forced
marriage-theyended up gettingan ally in Pakistan. For Pakistan,the
best-casescenariowas Kashmir'saccession. Kashmir'srupturefromIn-
dia, whateverit meantforPakistan,was second best but betterthanthe
worse-casescenarioof Kashmir'sintegration withIndia. The 1971defeat
of PakistanweakenedKashmirinationalists;a plea fordivorcehad to be
turnedintoa compromise.SheikhAbdullahfinallymade his peace with
India: "our disputewiththe Governmentof India," he told the Times
(London) in an interview, "is notaboutaccessionbutit is aboutthequan-
tumofautonomy." 17 This was thefirstpublicadmissionofa changein his
position,somethingthe Indian government was willingto deal withas it
could be easilyaccommodatedin a federalframework.
On its part,Delhi proceededat two levels,externaland internal.After
its defeat,Pakistancame to a peace agreementwithIndia. For India, it
was also an opportunity to extractconcessionsconcerningKashmir. In
the event,on July2, 1972, an agreementsignedby Indira Gandhi and
ZulfiqarAli Bhutto,knownas the Simla Accord,proposed: "In Jammu
and Kashmir,thelineofcontrolresulting fromthecease-fireofDecember
17, 1971,shall be respectedby bothsides withoutprejudiceto the recog-
nizedpositionofeitherside. Neitherside shallseekto alterit unilaterally,
irrespectiveofmutualdifferences and legalinterpretations.
Bothsidesfur-
therundertaketo refrainfromthethreator theuse offorcein violationof
thisline."18
Internally,Delhi reopenednegotiationswith Sheikh Abdullah who
signedan agreement withDelhi in February1975,acceptingthatKashmir
was "a constituent unitof theUnion of India" and that"no law made by
the Legislatureof the Stateof Jammuand Kashmir,seekingto makeany
changein ... theconstitution oftheStateofJammuand Kashmir... shall
take effectunless the Bill . . . receives [the presidentof India's] assent."19
Moreover,India's Parliamentwould "continueto have power to make
laws relatingto the prevention
of activitiesdirectedtowardsdisclaiming,
questioning,or disrupting
thesovereignty ... ofIndia ... or causinginsult
to theIndianNationalFlag, theIndianNationalAnthem,and theConsti-
tution." In return,Article370 was keptalive, whichgave,as originally
intendedin 1950,moreautonomyto J&K thanto anyotherstatein India

17. Interviewgivento correspondent PeterHezelhurst,the Times,March 10, 1972.

18. From the textof the Simla Accord releasedby bothgovernments on July2, 1975.
19. From the textof the KashmirAccord,signedin November13, 1974,and announced
in Parliamenton February25, 1975. The othercitationsin thisparagraphare also fromthis
text.
 1014 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. II, NOVEMBER1991
on "welfaremeasures,culturalmatters,social security, personallaw, and
procedurallaws in a mannersuitedto thespecialconditionsof thestate."
Also, the Congresschiefminister, Syed Mir Qasim, was asked to resign,
and SheikhAbdullahsucceededhim. Abdullah'scompromise did notlead
to any significantprotestin the valley. The Jamaat-i-Islami,
a partythat
has always arguedforKashmir'sintegration withPakistanon religious
grounds,organizeda small demonstration thatdid not go veryfar.
Abdullah's leadershipwas later electorallylegitimated.Electionsin
1977 demonstrated overwhelming supportforhim. It is widelybelieved
that the 1977 electionswere the firstfairones in the state,as the three
earlierelectionshad been riggedby the rulingcoalition. Abdullahruled
till he died in 1982. Kashmir became quiet-and beautifulas ever; it
seemedas thoughthe problemhad been solved. From the perspective of
Delhi, it was a goldenphase,boththerulersin Kashmirand thepopulace
seemedcontentas ifa marriagehad beenmade.20Ironically,nothingsym-
bolized thisbetterthan the Sheikh'sfuneralprocession.The dead body
drapedin an Indian flagwas carried12 km fromthepolo groundsin Sri-
nagarto theburialgroundnear the Hazratbalmosque. Observersof the
funeralheard a familiarchant: "Sher-e-Kashmir ka kya irshad? Hindu,
Muslim,Sikh Ittehad" (What was the messageof the lion of Kashmir?
FriendshipbetweenHindu,Muslim,and Sikhs"). This had been the slo-
gan of the late 1940s, when the Sheikh'spartymen and Indian forces
foughtthe tribalinvaders. "The Government of Pakistan,"noteda keen
observerof Kashmir,"had no commentto offeron the death of Sheikh
Abdullah."21

Phase 3: AbusiveSecular Nationalism,Islamic

Resurgence,and a RekindlingofKashmiri
Nationalism,1983-91
SheikhAbdullahwas succeededbyhis son,Farooq Abdullah. A yearlater
in 1983,Farooq won thestateelectionand emergedas a leaderin his own
right. The National Conferenceunderhis leadershipwon handsomely,
beatingtheCongressPartyin thestate. IndiraGandhiherselfcampaigned
fortheCongressagainsttheNationalConference.Expressinghersympa-
thywiththeHindusof Jammuwho,accordingto her,livedin a Muslim-
majoritystate,she used blatantlycommunalmessagesin searchof votes,a

20. Speculativelyin retrospect,Delhi misseda goldenopportunity duringSheikh'srule.

Withhis supportbehindIndia at longlast,Delhi wouldhave,in all probability, won a plebi-
scitein Kashmir,but it is easy to be wise afterthe event. No one foresawa returnof the
Kashmirproblem.
21. M. J. Akbar,The Siege Within,p. 275.
 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY 1015

trendthatwas to deepenlaterin Congress'selectoralpolitics. This was

also the time of Indira Gandhi's well-documented centralizingpolitical
driveas she soughtto undermineseveralstategovernments ruledby non-
Congressparties. These partiesbegan to come together, and Farooq be-
came partof theemerging"oppositionconclave." Faced withopposition
unity,Indira Gandhi used defectionsand her controlover gubernatorial
appointments to dislodgedulyelectedstategovernments runbyopposition
parties,and J&K was given a governorknown to be close to her,
Jagmohan.One of his firstgubernatorial acts was to dismissthe Farooq
government on thegroundthatit had lost majoritysupportin theassem-
bly. GovernorJagmohandid not givethe chiefministera chanceto test
his majorityin theLower House, whichwas standardprocedure.Farooq
was simplygivena listof legislatorswho,accordingto thegovernor,had
defectedfromhis party.
In thisawkwarddisplayofpower,Delhi thusviolatedthefederalprinci-
ple and had a pliantchiefminister imposedon Kashmir. Farooq received
considerablegrass-roots supportbut thatwas not enoughto undo Delhi
and its allies in the state. Most observersagree that Farooq's dismissal
was the beginningof a new phase of alienationin the valley. Old fears
were revived. These fearscould have been channeledwithina federal
framework ifFarooq had continuedto fighton thatprinciplewiththesup-
portof otheroppositionparties. However,in a surprising volteface and
defyingthebasic logic of Kashmiripolitics,in 1986 afterIndiraGandhi's
death,Farooq ended up signinga deal withthe Congressunderwhich
Rajiv Gandhi'sCongressand Farooq's NationalConferenceundertookto
contestthe 1987 stateelectionstogetherand formthe government ifthey
won. When a similarproposalhad been made by Congressforthe 1983
elections,Farooq had "discussedthe matterwithseniorcolleagues.. . .
[It] becameclear to us thatifwe agreedto an alliancewiththeCongress,
theNationalConference would ... graduallybe wipedout." These words
would turnout to be prophetic;Farooq now admitsthatit was a horrible
mistake.22
In the electionsthatfollowedin 1987,Kashmiriatwas mobilizedby a
coalitionof Islamic groups,knownas the MuslimUnitedFront(MUF).
This development was as unexpectedas Farooq's alliancewithCongress.
In KashmirtheorthodoxIslamicpartieshad beenelectorally insignificant.
The Jamaat-i-Islami had won a merefiveseatsin the 1972 stateelections,
only one in 1977 and none whatsoeverin 1983. Of these,the 1977 and
1983 electionsare widelyviewedas theonlytwofairelectionsin thestate.
AbsorbingseveralpracticesfromHinduismand Buddhism,KashmiriIs-

22. Farooq Abdullah,My Dismissal(Delhi: Vikas PublishingHouse, 1985), p. 21.

 1016 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1991

lam is well knownforitssyncretism, and supportforan orthodoxIslamic

politicalplatformgrew.
Watchingthesurgein MUF support,theConference-Congress alliance
riggedthe 1987 elections.Withthebenefitof hindsight, one can say that
supportfor the MUF, while considerableand surprisingin a land of
quietisticIslam, would not have been enough to oust Abdullah. Even
thoughhe was less popularthanbefore,Abdullah'ssupportbase was still
not wipedout. In thevalleywhereno partyexceptthe NationalConfer-
ence had any hold, the emergenceof a partycapable of gettingeven a
pluralityof vote,let alone a majority,alarmedthe Conference-Congress
alliance. Not onlywas thevoterigged,reportsindicatethatseveralelecto-
ral candidatesof theMUF werebeatenup. Those who weremanhandled
crossedtheever-porous Indo-Pakborderand joined theextremist groups.
The leadershipoftheinsurgency twoyearslaterwouldcomefromsomeof
these contestants.Later that year, riots against Farooq's government
broke out; Muslim fundamentalists burnedthe Indian flag,and called
Farooq a traitorto theKashmiricause. As peoplewerekilledin riots,the
anti-Farooqsentiment intensified.Farooq and the Congressmanagedto
geta hugemajority, buttheyruledwithoutlegitimacy.The sanctityofthe
electoralprocessand Kashmiritrustin Farooq, alreadydecliningafterthe
agreement withCongress,collapsedaftertheseelections.In 1953,Abdul-
lah's imprisonment did not lead to an uprisingbecause Kashmirdid not
have a substantialmiddleclass at thatpoint. But by 1989,a strongmiddle
class had emerged,disaffected and large,and provideda muchmorefertile
groundforan uprising.
This was also the timeof Pakistan'smilitaryrevival. Ruled by a mili-
tary-ledgovernment, the Afghanistancrisisrestoreda frayedPakistan-
U.S. relationship.Once again the beneficiary of Americanarms,Paki-
stan'smilitary shookofftheeffects ofits 1971debacle. More importantly,
PresidentZia, thenewleader,begana processof Islamizationin Pakistan.
As troublein Kashmirbrewed,Kashmirinationalismonce againfoundan
ally in Pakistan. By 1987, two kinds of Kashmirimilitantgroupshad
startedoperatingfromPakistan-Islamic groupslike the Hizbul Muja-
hideen and the more secular Jammuand Kashmir LiberationFront
(JKLF). The Hizbul Mujahideen,a fighting wingof theJamaat-i-Islami,
want Kashmirto join Pakistanon groundsof religionwhile the JKLF
wantsan independent Kashmiron groundsof ethnicity.
It is widelybelievedthatIslamic groupshave receivedgreatersupport
fromPakistan. The Pakistangovernment acceptsthatit providespolitical
 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY 1017
supportto the militantsbut deniessupplyingarms.23Many believe,in-
cludingtheU.S. government, thatPakistanhas also providedarmedsup-
port, primarilyto the Islamic militants. While it is difficultfor a
researcherto confirmthiswidelyheldbelief,it is knownthatthanksto the
Afghanistanwar, weapons of deadly potentialare so easily available in
Pakistanthatthe government does not have to supplyweaponsin order
forthe militantsto get them. A veritablearmsbazaar exists. Kashmiri
militantshave not only taken on India's paramilitaryforces with
Kalashnikovsand grenades,theyhave also engagedthe armyconvoysin
pitchedbattlesfor eight to ten hours. Weapons meant for war have
reachedthe handsof insurgents.However,Islamicmilitantsare evento-
day not the most populargroupin the valley. While the Hizbul Muja-
hideen are organizationally
the strongest, the JKLF, a secular militant
group,maybe the morepopular. Supportforthe JKLF is open and ex-
plicit,whereasfortheHizb it is confinedto pocketsand, moreoftenthan
not,not openlyexpressed.

Dimensionsof a Tragedy
India's responsehas beenmorebrutalthaneverbefore.The government's
effortsto rollback theinsurgency and themilitants'armedresolveto "lib-
erate" Kashmirhave produceddaily deaths. The Muslimsconstitutea
majorityof those killed,primarilyby India's armed forcesbut also by
armedMuslimmilitants silencingdissentersin theirowncommunity.The
numberof Hinduskilledwouldhave beengreaterifmostofthemhad not
migratedto camps in Jammuand Delhi. Some leftafterlosingkithand
kinto Islamicmilitants, othersafterreceivingdeaththreats,but mostde-
partedin utterpanic betweenJanuaryand March 1990-simply to pre-
emptdeath. Of the morethan 150,000Hindus,onlya feware leftin the
valley,theirnumbersat best in threedigits.
A typicalsocial scienceexercise,burdenedwithrationalconceptsand
disembodiedlanguage,cannotcapturetherealdimensionsoftheKashmir
tragedy.It is necessaryto understandthenatureof thepain beingexper-
ienced,partlybecauseno solutionof theKashmirsituationwill last ifthe
emotionaltruthsare ignored.People willmakea compromisebutnotany
compromise.The Congress-Conference alliance,whateverits rationality,
founderedon the rockof mistrustand betrayal.Thereare two storiesto
tell,one fromthevalley,theotherfromthemigrantcamps. Bothtalesare
markedby a deep senseofloss,bitterness, completelack of
and a virtually
trustin government.The difference, however,is thatKashmiriMuslims

PakistanHigh Commission,New
23. Interview,ShafghatKakakhel,minister-councillor,
Delhi, August 13, 1990.
 1018 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1991

feelmutilatedand defiledby thesecurityforceswhiletheHindu migrants

feeluprootedand betrayedbythegovernment, thoughclearlyseveralhave
also been defiledby the Hizbul Mujahideen. To KashmiriMuslims,the
securityforcesare theuglyfaceof "India"; to Jammumigrants, theHizb
are the despicableface of Islam. Betweenthe two agonies,the tolerant
religiousmiddleas wellas themoderatesecularcenterhave collapsed. So-
beror rationalthinkingliesburiedunderunceasingemotionsand angeron
bothsides. Implicationsfora solutionare such thatthemutilationin the
valleywill not go away unlesstheparamilitary forcesare withdrawn,and
the displacementof the Hindus will not abate unlessthe Hizbul Muja-
hideenlose theirstrength.The JKLF, committedto an independent but
secularKashmir,is willingto take the Hindusback. However,whilethe
JKLF may be the mostpopularorganization,the Hizb continueto be a
substantialpresenceand are opposedto the returnof Hindus.24

ConcludingRemarks
The logic of Kashmiripoliticscan be culled fromthe discussionabove.
Kashmirhas not been a problemwhen(a) its leadershave acted autono-
mouslybut withoutgoingto the pointof secession,(b) the searchforau-
tonomyhas not been crushedby Delhi but ratheraccommodatedin a
federalframework, and (c) Pakistanhas been militarilyweak. At this
point,shouldit try,Delhi can, in principle,have controloverthe second
elementonly;a stalemate,therefore, continues.
How longwill thestalematelast? Two factorsgo againstthemilitants'
cause. First,beyondPakistan,Kashmirimilitants havelittlegovernmental
support. In a dramaticchange,the U.S. government currently supports
India's positionthata resolutionoftheKashmirproblemshouldbe sought
withinthebilateralframework oftheSimlaAgreement.The secondfactor
is domestic. Unlike Punjab, wherethe insurgency does not destroyeco-
nomicactivityin thevillageswheremostPunjabislive,Kashmiris a one-
crop, one-seasoneconomy. Tourismis the lifebloodof Kashmir'secon-
omy,and the countryside, in addition,is dependenton horticulture, the
exportof apples and peaches. Both activitiesare essentiallyconductedin
the summer,stretching a littlebit intothe fall. A civilwar killstourism,
and sincebanksand transport are essentialto the exportof fruitsbut are
closed due to the insurgency, it also takesaway the main sourceof rural
incomes. Anothersummeror two withouttouristsand exportswilllikely
bringgraveeconomicmisery.

24. Interviewgivenby one of the area commandersof Hizbul Mujahideento Observer

News Channel(Delhi), December 1990.
 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY 1019
Since the moderatecenterhas collapsed and the militantgroupsare
popular,no solutionis possiblewithoutthe militants.When asked how
long theywill supportthemilitantsin viewof the economicimplications,
Kashnmiris resentthe questionin groupsettingsbut admitto a possible
economiccatastrophein private.Militants,of course,say theywill fight
tillthe veryend. It is unlikely,however,thatthe militantscan providea
substitute fortheseactivities.In all probability, mass supportforthemili-
tantswill declinein such a situation.At thatpoint,two thingscan hap-
pen. Fearfulof losingsupport,theremaybe a greaterwillingness on the
part of militantsto compromise.If not, an even biggertragedyawaits
Kashmir,giventhatIndia will not give up its claims forall the reasons
outlinedabove.
Can militantsagreeto negotiatea solutionwithIndia? Withoutan un-
derstanding betweenIndia and Pakistan,it is unclearwhythe militants
would come to the table. Pakistanmay not be strongenough-militarily
or diplomatically-toforcea solutionon India, but neitheris it so weak
thatit wouldhaveto cease supporting themilitants out offear. So longas
Pakistan'ssupportis available,at least the pro-Pakistanmilitantgroups
can continueto operatewithor withoutpopularsupportwithinthevalley.
An agreementbetweenIndia and Pakistan,thus,is a necessarycondition
forthesolutionof theproblem.To believe,as Hindu nationalists do, that
a fullassertionofstateauthority is all thatis neededto defeatthemilitants
is to be bothinsensitiveto Kashmiriagonyand farfromrealistic.At the
veryleast, committed
militants to Kashmir'sintegration withPakistanwill
not negotiatewithDelhi, even if the independence-minded militantsdo.
And ifthelatteragreeto negotiate, theyfacethepossibility ofextinction in
an internecine warfare.So long as armscontinueto come to the Islamic
groupsand Pakistansupportsthem,no agreementwill stick. The agree-
mentin Punjab withthe moderatescollapseddue to the exclusionof the
hardliners, who ultimately killedthemoderatearchitectoftheagreement.
In orderforKashmirto havepeace,India and Pakistanneedto compro-
mise. The shapeofcompromisecannotbe predicted, butitslack willonly
prolongthe tale of sorrow-to the misfortune of Kashmirisand the sad-
ness of outsiderslookingformeetingpointsin theseparallelacts of defi-
ance and brutality.Midnight'schildrenmustbeginto growup; will their
leadersbecomestatesmen?