Political Law Cases - Part2

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a) Concept and basis

b) Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause
c) Test
2. Free exercise clause
3. Tests
a) Clear and Present Danger Test
b) Compelling State Interest Test
c) Conscientious Objector Test
I. Liberty of abode and freedom of movement
Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)

Justo Lukban, as Manila City's Mayor, together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 without their consent and knowledge and
shipped them to Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. Villavicencio thus filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
The SC granted the petition, reasoning that public officials, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the
act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse.
Lorenzo v. Dir. of Health (1927)

pals political law reviewer
In accordance with the Revised Administrative Code, Lorenzo was confined for having leprosy. He filed a
petition for habeas corpus alleging that his right to abode and freedom of movement was infringed. The
SC denied the petition. The Director of Health was empowered to order lepers’ confinement in order to
secure public health.
1. Limitations
2. Right to travel
Rubi v. Provincial Board, supra.

The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.
Manotoc v. CA (1986)
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was not allowed to depart for the States pending a case filed with the SEC. He was
later charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Even though released on bail, he was
not allowed to leave the country. He thus filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the prior orders
and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad, alleging that his right to travel
had been violated.
The SC held that it had not. The court has power to prohibit persons admitted to bail from leaving the
country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel.
a) Watch-list and hold departure orders
3. Return to one’s country
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Marcos v. Manglapus, supra.

The right to return to one’s country is separate from the right to travel and to abode. As such, it may be
suspended by the President in the exercise of residual powers.
J. Right to information
1. Limitations
Valmonte v. Belmonte, supra.

While the people have the right to information, including court records, and they may access the said
records, they cannot compel judicial officers or custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern
2. Publication of laws and regulations
Tañada v. Tuvera, supra.
3. Access to court records
Baldora v. Dimaano (1976)

In a verified letter-complaint, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo
B. Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. The Court ruled that Judge Dimaano
(respondent) did not act arbitrarily since he allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books
of the respondent under certain conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been
shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.
4. Right to information relative to:
a) Government contract negotiations
b) Diplomatic negotiations
Akbayan v. Aquino, supra.

The right to information does not include the records of diplomatic negotiations.
K. Right of association
People v. Ferrer (1972)

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act
of 1957 a bill of attainder. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 outlawed the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party as an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. It declared that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines.
The SC upheld the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination with a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites
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must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups, 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and
reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations
having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not the person.
Membership of these organizations to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired with the intent
to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. Thus it is the element of membership with
knowledge that is punishable. Further, the statute is prospective in nature.
PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.

A demonstration against the abuses of police is protected as an exercise of the right to peaceably
assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances.
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (1983)

JBL Reyes, in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park
until the front gate of the US embassy. Manila Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. The mayor claimed
that there had been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He thus issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within a 500-meter
radius of the US embassy.
The SC struck down the ordinance. While under international law, the receiving state is tasked with the
protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element, and while the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, the same cannot prevail over the
Constitutional rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble.
L. Eminent domain
People v. Fajardo (1958)

Fajardo was convicted for violating an ordinance which penalized the construction of a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza. The SC struck down the ordinance, ruling that it is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; thus, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property
without just compensation.
Republic v. PLDT (1969)

The BOT is a government arm engaged in the operation of telecommunication services in the country by
utilizing such facilities as may be available in the area. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT. BOT entered into an agreement
with RCA Communications (a telecommunications company in the US with a domestic station in the
Philippines), associate of PLDT, for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas
calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it violated their agreement
since the trunk lines were used not only for the use of government offices but even to serve the general
public in competition with the business of PLDT. When plaintiff failed to reply, PLDT disconnected the
lines rented by plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT to execute a contract for the use of
the facilities of PLDT's telephones system under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable.
The SC held that: The state, may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of just compensation; there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
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Republic v. Castellvi (1974)

The Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) leased the property of respondent Castellvi near
Basa airbase on a yearly basis. In 1956, the respondent decided to terminate the lease contract and asked
the petitioner to vacate the place. The petitioner did not comply, so the respondent filed an ejectment suit
against petitioner. The respondent however filed expropriation proceedings warranting the dismissal of
the ejectment suit. For the other respondent Gozun, her land was also being expropriated but there was
no prior lease agreement with petitioner unlike in the case of Castellvi.
The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property with a
permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not
also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when
they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession with a permanent character when
the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 – 4.00 per sq meters and the
fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
De Knecht v. Bautista (1980)

Aquino, as the Minister of Public Highways, made a plan for the extension of EDSA. The original plan was
that the extension would cut through Cuneta Avenue. He changed this plan to a new one, wherein the
extension would cut through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Petitioner De Knecht is a resident that
will be affected by the new plan. She went to Pasay CFI to file a case, in order to enjoin Aquino and the
Republic from going through with the new plan. Respondent Judge Bautista issued a writ of possession in
favor of the Republic. The SC set aside the writ. To justify its decision, the SC used the recommendations
of the Human Settlements Commission as basis. The Commission said that although the original plan was
more expensive, it was a better choice, taking into consideration the progress and development of the
country.
Republic v. De Knecht (1990)

Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard and also construct an outfall for flood waters. Along
the planned extension route is De Knecht’s property. De Knecht does not want to sell her property. De
Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. The Court cited the social impact
factor making expropriation of the land arbitrary. In 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP340
expropriating the said property. The lower court granted petitioner’s (Republic) plea of denying the
motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding citing said law. The SC affirmed said ruling stating that since
residents have already moved, the social impact factor which was the basis in De Knecht v. Bautista has
already disappeared, making the expropriation proceedings no longer arbitrary. The court also said that
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with
the land owner but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
1. Concept
2. Expansive concept of “public use”
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Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform (1989)

These are consolidated cases which involve common legal issues, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The SC ruled that agrarian reform under the Constitution is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What
is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain
Sumulong v. Guerrero (1987)

NHA filed an expropriation complaint for petitioners’ land, which was granted by Buenaventura.
Petitioners said that “socialized housing” was not “public use,” and that PD 1224, the law which the NHA
used, was unconstitutional. The SC held that the expanded notion of public use, supported by
Constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform, include the concept of socialized housing.
They also held that eminent domain cannot be restricted just because the property is small. Individual
interests must be subordinated to state or public interest. However, SC said that just compensation must
take into account all factors, and the NHA’s valuations did not take into account individual factors. Also, to
deny petitioners the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the valuations of just compensation is a
denial of due process. The SC remanded the case back to the court of origin in order to determine the
proper compensation.
City Government v. Judge Ericta (1983)

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “An ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and
operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of Quezon City and
providing penalties for the violation thereof”. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
3. Just compensation
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EPZA v. Dulay (1989)

The case concerns the land where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) was to be
constructed. San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to SADC would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by
the assessor, whichever is lower.
The SC ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The
method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogative. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to
them for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts’ own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.
Reyes v. NHA (2003)

The NHA expropriated the Reyes’ land, for the purpose of relocating squatters from Metro Manila.
However, it instead planned to build low cost housing units. Reyes thus challenged the expropriation,
claiming that the judgment of expropriation was forfeited when the NHA used the land for another
purpose.
The SC ruled that Reyes could not insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes.
The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"
"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. The Constitution itself allows the State
to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of
private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of
social justice.
a) Determination
Ansaldo v. CA (1990)
Ansaldo’s land was taken by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication.
Twenty-six years later, Ansaldo asked to be compensated for the taking. The SC held that the
determination of the value should be determined at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the
suit.
b) Effect of delay
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4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase

5. Miscellaneous application
M. Contract clause
Rutter v. Esteban (1953)

Esteban bought 2 pieces of land on Aug. 20, 1941. He was able to pay the first 2 installments, but was not
able to pay the next 2 installments, leading Rutter to file a suit to recover a sum of money. Esteban
claimed that the enforcement of the payment was barred by RA 342, Sec. 2 of which provides that all
debts and obligations contracted before Dec. 8, 1941 shall not be due and demandable for 8 years after
settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission. The next
section provided that if Sec. 2 was made void and unenforceable, then the moratoriums would be revived
and continue.
The SC struck down the RA and the related moratorium for impairing contracts. The determination of the
constitutionality of the moratorium statute is the determination of a period for the suspension of the
remedy. Further, laws altering contracts impair the obligation thereof when they are unreasonable in
light of the circumstances. Finally, impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive
right.
Here, the RA, in effect, gives 12 years before creditors could enforce their obligations. This is
unreasonable and oppressive under the circumstances.
Ortigas v. Bel-Air (1991)

Jupiter Street was reclassified into a commercial zone from its former designation as a residential zone.
Presley, who leases the property owned by the Almendrases in Jupiter street, operates a pandesal store in
that address. Bel-Air Village Association asked them to shut it down pursuant to their agreement
annotated in the TCT that the property would be used for residential purposes only. The SC, pursuant to
its ruling in the Sangalang case, held that although the contract is binding between the parties, this may
be impaired by a lawful exercise of police power—in this case, the reclassification of Jupiter into a
commercial zone.
Ortigas v. Feati (1979)

Ortigas sold two lots in a subdivision along EDSA to Emma Chavez. These lots were supposed to only be
used for residential purposes, and this stipulation was annotated on the TCT. Chavez sold the lots to
Feati, who wanted to use the lots for commercial purposes. Their basis was Mandaluyong Municipal
Council’s Resolution 27, classifying that area as commercial/industrial. The SC said that the non-
impairment clause must be balanced with the proper exercise of police power, and that the stipulations
should be subordinate to the resolution. If the exercise of police power is done properly, the individual
interests must be subordinate to the general welfare.
1. Contemporary application of the contract clause

N. Legal assistance and free access to courts
O. Rights of suspects
1. Availability
2. Requisites
3. Waiver
P. Rights of the accused
1. Criminal due process
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Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Former President Joseph Estrada was charged with plunder under RA 7080, the Plunder Law. He
challenged the provision that “For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” The SC held
that, while not every act needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, there is no violation of criminal
due process, as it must still be proven that there is an unlawful scheme or conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.
US v. Ling Su Fan (1910)

Ling Su Fan was convicted of exporting Philippine silver coins, pursuant to Act 1411. Ling Su Fan
challenged the said act for being violative of due process. The SC upheld the Act, laying down the ff.
requirements for due process of statutes:
First: That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government;
Second: That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third: That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth: That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
2. Bail
3. Presumption of innocence
4. Right to be heard
5. Assistance of counsel
People v. Espiritu (1999)

Espiritu made an extra-judicial confession, assisted by Atty. Mangallay, whom he did not retain
personally, but who was retained by his uncle. He thus challenged the validity of the confession. The SC
upheld the confession. The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own
counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting on behalf
of the person under investigation, or appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by
someone on his behalf.
People v. Continente (2000)

The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the
confessions of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence,
since they were not informed of their constitutional right.
The written statements contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with the participation of the
accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement
obtained from the accused might be used against them in court. They contained advice that the accused
might engage the service of a lawyer of their own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a
lawyer, they would be provided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they
intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the
accused. The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation. The accused were informed
of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confessions are thus admissible in
evidence.
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People v. Obrero (2000)

At Obrero’s custodial investigation, he was assigned a lawyer who was the station commander of another
precinct. The SC held that his right to counsel was infringed upon, as the said lawyer could not be
considered independent.
6. Right to be informed
Pecho v. People (1996)

Pecho was convicted of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. The
decision was assailed on the ground that the accused may not be convicted of that crime because the
information was for a violation of RA 3019. He thus alleged violation of his right to be informed of this
charge against him in the filing of the information.
The SC upheld the conviction. The objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the crime of which he is charged are as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. The
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the
one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is
considered as charging for two offenses, which the counsel of the accused failed to object to. Therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
8. Right of confrontation
9. Compulsory process
10. Trials in absentia
Q. Writ of habeas corpus
Lansang v. Garcia, supra.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has 2 requisites:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is. The
absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
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R. Writs of amparo, habeas data, and kalikasan
S. Self-incrimination clause
Chavez v. CA (1968)
Chavez was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During the trial, Fiscal Grecia asked Chavez to
be the first witness. Counsel for the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez)
will only be an ordinary witness and not a state witness. Counsel for the accused averred that it will only
incriminate his client. The testimony was permitted.
The SC ruled that Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional
right to remain silent. It could not be said that he waived his right for he did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness.
Beltran v. Samson and Jose (1929)

Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as
ordered by the respondent Judge, claiming a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination
because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have
procured in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.
The SC agreed, ruling that writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention
and in the case at bar, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. For purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, supra.

The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of
them.
Galman v. Pamaran (1985)

Galman was made to testify before the Agrava board following the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. He
invoked his right against self-incrimination. The SC held that it applied even in non-criminal proceedings,
as the word “criminal” had been deleted from the Constitutional provision.
Villaflor v. Summers (1920)

In a criminal case before the CFI of Manila, Villaflor was charged with adultery. Upon petition by the
fiscal, the court ordered Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused, claiming that it amounted to self-incrimination.
The SC disagreed. The Court laid down the rule that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing
and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The
proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided.
1. Scope and coverage

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a) Foreign laws
2. Application
3. Immunity statutes
T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners
US v. Pompeya (1915)
An ordinance was passed, in accordance with Act 1309, requiring every able-bodied male resident of the
municipality of Iloilo to render service on patrol duty. Pompeya was convicted for refusing to render such
service. The SC upheld Act 1309 and the ordinance, holding that the power exercised under the
provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully
authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the
rights of the persons affected thereby, in accordance with the time-honored obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.
U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishments
People v. Echegaray (1996) and Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice (1999)

Echegaray was sentenced to death. The imposition of the death penalty was challenged on the ground
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The SC ruled that the imposition of the death penalty,
per se, is not cruel and unusual punishment. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
People v. Dionisio (1968)

Dionisio was fined for taking bets on a horse race without authority. He complained that the imposition of
the fine was excessive, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous,
or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does
mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
V. Non-imprisonment for debts
Lozano v. Martinez (1986)

The constitutionality of BP 22 was challenged, as it was alleged that it violated the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The SC upheld the law, ruling that the law
punishes the act of issuing unfunded checks, not the non-payment of the debts which they represent.
Serafin v. Lindayag (1975)

Serafin failed to pay a simple indebtedness of P1500. Thus, a case was filed against her, which was
admitted by the court. Serafin filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and for
issuing a warrant of arrest, as the debt she owed falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since
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elements of estafa are not present. Furthermore, she contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
The court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Serafin did not commit any offense as
her debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. Under the Constitution she is
protected from imprisonment.
W. Double jeopardy
1. Requisites
People v. Obsania (1968)

Obsania was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao. His counsel moved
for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege lewd designs in the information. Said motion was
granted. From this order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed.
The SC held that there was no double jeopardy in this case. In order that the accused may invoke double
jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution
a) valid complaint,
b) competent court,
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Here, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Court judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” does not apply when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant. The dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
People v. Relova (1987)

The People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an
information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Opulencia was charged under a Batangas ordinance for installing
illegal electric wiring devices. The case was dismissed. Two months later, he was charged for theft of
electricity under the Revised Penal Code. The Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of double
jeopardy.
The SC held that double jeopardy had attached in this case. The Bill of Rights gives two instances or kinds
of double jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act.” In the case at bar, it was evident
that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the second kind or definition of double jeopardy
wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the Revised Penal Code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other, thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals

3. Dismissal with consent of accused
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X. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
Republic v. Fernandez (1956)

Fernandez was assessed war profits taxes. He challenged the tax for being an ex post facto law. However,
the SC ruled that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to tax statutes.
People v. Ferrer, supra.

The Anti-Subversive Act is not a bill of attainder. It was prospective in application, and does not single out
persons, but conduct.

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VIII. CITIZENSHIP
A. Who Are Filipino Citizens
B. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
C. Naturalization and Denaturalization
D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
E. Loss and Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
Coquilla v. Comelec (2002)
Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and resided. In 1965, he
joined the US Navy and was subsequently naturalized as a US citizen. On November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently after his application for repatriation was approved. On
November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On February
27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

This led Alvarez, incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, to seek the cancellation of
the COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court ruled that Coquilla was still an alien. A person loses Philippine citizenship and
domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a
requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. The person may only be said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he
repatriates or by an act of Congress, but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the
residency requirement for elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has
obtained an immigrant visa and has waived his status as a non-resident.
a. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

b. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. General Principles
Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. The Public Service Commission (1940)
Petitioner, in questioning an unfavourable decision of the PSC, raised the issue that Section 1 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 454 which granted PSC its powers is not a valid delegation of legislative power.
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The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent disposition. However, the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or
delegate potestas non potest delegari is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
court.
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc. et al. (1932)
In question is the validity of Section 11 of Act No. 1446 which provided that members of the Supreme
Court shall sit as a board of arbitrators in cases where any franchise or right of way is granted to any
person or corporation other than an original grantee.
The members of the Supreme Court cannot sit as a board of arbitrators to resolve disputes between
public utilities. The issue is not whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a
court but rather whether or not the members of the Supreme Court have the legal right to sit as a board
of arbitrators and act in such capacity.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Noblejas v. Teehankee (1968)
Commissioner of Land Registration Noblejas asserted that the Secretary of Justice has no disciplinary
powers over him as RA No. 1151 entitled the Commissioner of Land Registration to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of Court of First Instance and thus, he may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court.
To adopt Noblejas’ theory would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and
disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment
by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed
under the President's supervision and control. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature
to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of judicial duties.
The court was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial
power only and can have no jurisdiction except over cases and controversies falling within the classes
enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
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In re Rodolfo Manzano (1988)
RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice
created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856. He sought the Supreme Court’s permission to
accept the appointment.
The Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions

are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
C. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) powers
Non-delegation doctrine
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (1916)

Pursuant to Act No. 2307, the Board required Compania to present annually a detailed report of finances
and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippines, in the
form and containing the matters prescribed by the Board.
Act No. 2307 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board to require what it wants, thereby delegating to the latter all its powers over a given
subject matter in a manner almost absolute. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when
it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the
delegate, so that, in its form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
People v. Vera (1937)
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is being assailed for the reason that it unduly delegates legislative
power in that the provincial boards were given the power to decide whether the law would be effective
within their territory or not.
The efficiency of an act as a declaration of legislative will must come from Congress although the
ascertainment of the contingency upon which the act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it
may designate.
Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)
The President, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities. Section 68 was assailed to be an undue delegation of
legislative power.
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The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details of the execution of the law. For such
to be valid, the law must be complete in itself and it must fix a standard to which such delegate must
conform in the performance of his duties.
Edu v. Ericta (1970)
The Reflector Law and the administrative order issued to implement it were assailed as an undue
delegation of legislative power.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope of his authority is.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determined matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment (1981)
FTWU alleged that the delegation to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

The regulations made to implement a legislative policy should be germane to the purpose of the law and
the regulation should not be in contradiction with it, but conforms to the standards that the law
prescribes. The strict non-delegation rule enunciated in People vs. Vera may be considered too rigid and
inflexible, especially for the social and economic legislation needed by the times.
PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz (1989)
NTC which was granted by EO 19 with the jurisdiction, control and regulation over PHILCOMSAT reduced
PHILCOMSAT’s rates by 15%.
In the delegation of rate-fixing power of the legislature, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. EO 546 which created the NTC limited it by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
valid delegation of legislative power.
Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)
RA 6735 gave the President the power to merge the regions that did not opt to join the ARMM. Thus,
through an Executive Order, the President reorganized the cities and the provinces which did not opt to
join the ARMM, into new regions. The law was assailed to be an undue delegation of legislative power
because it does not provide a standard for the exercise of any power delegated.
A legislative standard need not be express. It may simply be gathered or implied, and may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. The standard for the power to
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merge existing regions is also to be found in RA 5345 giving the President the power to reorganize the
Executive department “to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency” in the government.
ABAKADA v. Ermita (2005)
A proviso in the VAT Reform Act states that “the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%” is at issue on the
ground that it constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers to the President.
The proviso is constitutional. There is only a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement/administration of the 12% increase is contingent. While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement/administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.
Permissible delegation
a. Ascertainment of fact
Lovina v. Moreno (1963)
RA 2056 was assailed to be unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues
of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts.
RA 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works.
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
b. Filling in of details
Alegre v. Collector of Customs (1920)
Act 3263 which created and empowered the Fiber Standardization Board to determine the official grades
of Philippine fibers, and which imposed a limit on exports of fibers without certification by the Fiber
Standardization Board was assailed to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was an invalid delegation
of legislative power.
The power delegated to the board was merely to enforce the intent and purpose of the law. The
legislature itself could not grade, inspect, and bale the hemp, and so the Fiber Standardization Board was
properly vested with the administrative power to do so and embody the purpose and intent of the law.
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Limits on Rule-Making Power
Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese (1922)
Collector of Internal Revenue issued AO 35 pursuant to the rule-making power granted it Act 2613 and
required that cigars for export be long-filler as such was the product of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva
Vizcaya.
The authority of the Collector to make any rules and regulations must be founded upon some legislative
act, and that they must follow and be within the purview of the act.
Syman v. Jacinto (1953)
A memorandum order issued by the Insular Collector of Customs provided that seizure cases, whether
appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector; that such decisions and their supporting
papers should be submitted to his office; and that pending action by him on such decisions, final disposal
of the goods shall not be made.
The Memorandum Order is invalid for failing to comply with Section 551 of the Revised Administrative
Code that forms and regulations must be approved by the Department Head and published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated to become effective.
People v. Maceren (1977)

5 accused used an electrocuting device to catch fish through electric current and were charged with
having violated the Fisheries Administration Order No. 84-1.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing the AO. The
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro-fishing. Rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it had been enacted. The legislature
cannot delegate the power to declare what shall constitute a crime and how its hall be punished, which is
a power vested exclusively in it.
Toledo v. CSC (1991)
Toledo was appointed to a position in COMELEC when he was 57 years old. However, Section 22, Rule III
of the Civil Service on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) prohibits the appointment of persons 57
years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the CSC.
The statute creating the CSC contained no provision limiting persons in the public service by age. This
prohibition was purely a creation of the CSC and thus cannot be valid, having no basis in the law which it
was meant to implement. The administrative rules must be germane to the purpose of the law which it
was meant to implement.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA (1995)
ROH’s request to avail of the one-time tax amnesty granted by EO 41 was denied since Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87 implementing the EO construed the amnesty coverage to include only
assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the EO.
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Issuances must remain consistent with the law. EO 41 was very explicit, requiring nothing more than a
simple application of its provisions.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995)
DAR issued an administrative order permitting the opening of trust accounts or the earmarking of a sum
by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or LBP bonds in an accessible bank designated by DAR the
compensation for the land taken under RA 6657.
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 explicitly provided that the deposit must be made in cash or through LBP
bonds. Compensation cannot be made through earmarking or the establishment of a trust fund. The
power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this, administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. Settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in the harmony with the provisions of the law.
GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications (1997)
NTC is a collegiate body, requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order
to validly decide a case. Corollarily, pronouncements issued solely by the Chairman/Commissioner are
contrary to law. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were intended
to implement. They must not restrict, expand, diminish, supplant or modify the law.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority (1998)
PCA issued a resolution declaring that it is withdrawing from all regulation of the coconut processing
industry in that its regulation would only be limited to monitoring. PCA was charged to carry out the
State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and palm oil
industry. PCA’s resolution disregards such legislative purpose. Any change in the policy must be made by
the legislative department of the government. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.
Ople v. Torres (1998)
Administrative Order 308 (Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System) is null
and void for being unconstitutional as it does not merely implement the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code but establishes a computerized reference system which requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies. An administrative order may not unilaterally impose a
new legislative policy.
Philippine Bank of Communications v. CIR ( 1999)
Memorandum circulars are in the nature of administrative rulings, and while given great weight, are not
conclusive and may in fact be ignored if they are erroneous. The State cannot be estopped by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
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China Banking Co. v. Board of Trustees of HDMF (1999)
The rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Publication and effectivity
People v. Que Po Lay
Que Po Lay was convicted under the penal provision of Central Bank Circular No. 20 for failing to sell
foreign exchange a day after he acquired it.
The law was published only after the act was committed. Circulars which prescribe a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective for the people to be officially informed. Before
the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and penalties.
Tañada v. Tuvera (1980)
All laws must be published in full, except issuances which are internal in nature, letters of instruction
concerning guidelines to be followed by subordinates, or municipal ordinances (covered by LGC). Article
2 of the Civil Code requires publication to be made in the Official Gazette and the clause “unless otherwise
provided,” refers to the date of effectivity, not the requirement of publication. Publication is
indispensable, and to omit it would offend due process, denying public knowledge of the laws. Section 6
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution recognizes “the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern” which applies especially to legislative enactments.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres (1992)
DOLE issued DO 16 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers bound for HK and the POEA issued Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37 in relation to
said DO. These issuances were alleged to have not met the publication requirement as they were not filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).
The issuances are invalid for lack of publication as required in Art. 2 Civil Code (Official Gazette), Art. 5
Labor Code (circulars published in newspapers of general circulation), and Section 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code (filing with UP Law Center). Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Republic v. Express Telecom Co. (2002)
The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation, thus, they
did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in accordance with
Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative act that gives
rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office
of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies
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specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required
before laws can take effect.
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008)
Although the circulars were issued before the 1987 Administrative Code was enacted, such circulars
were not exempt from the publication requirement because the Administrative Code required that
existing rules must be registered within 3 months from the date of the Administrative Code’s effectivity.
Publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules intended to enforce
or implement existing laws, may have binding force and effect. Such requirements were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of the lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to
due process and to information on matters of public concern.
Board of Trustees of GSIS v. Velasco (2011)
The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was no need
to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines,
“interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public” need not be filed with the center.
Interpretative Rules

Hilado v. Collector (1956)
While the Collector had the authority under the NIRC to issue circulars as an interpretation or
interpretative regulation of the code, the Secretary of Finance is empowered to revoke, repeal, or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings if such were based on an incorrect construction of a statute. There
are no vested rights to be taken from a wrong interpretation of the law. An administrative officer cannot
change a law enacted by Congress.
Victorias Co. vs. Social Security Commission (1962)
Rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency are binding on courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with its innate wisdom. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Peralta v. CSC (1992)
When an administrative agency or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Administrative construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts. However, action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
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Examples of Rule-making in various agencies
Bureau of Forestry
Director of Forestry v. Munoz
Piadeco’s Spanish title cannot be used to register under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2. This AO
has the force and effect of law, it was promulgated pursuant to Section 1817 of the Administrative Code
which empowered the Bureau of Forestry “to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure
the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of
valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the
forests and forest reserves, to the same end.” When Congress authorized the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement laws, all that is required is that it be germane to the
purpose of the law and that it conforms to the standards set by the same.
Board of Examiners of Nurses
Sand v. Abad Santos Educational Institution (1974)
Article VIII, Rule 69, Section 5 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Examiners for Nurses
provided for periodic inspection of nursing schools, and barred graduates of such schools that do not
comply with the minimum requirements and standards from admission to the nurses’ examination or
registration as a nurse.
The rule is valid and applicable to all nursing schools. Statutory authority exists for the Board to conduct
periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions
vested in it under the Philippine Nursing Act.
Philippine Patent Office
American Tobacco v. Director of Patents (1975)
Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in trademark cases allowing
the Director of Patents to delegate the hearing of proceedings to other officers, with the proviso that all
judgements must be prepared by the Director, is assailed because the law states that the Director must
hear all cases.
The rule is valid. The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order
to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provision of the act or by implication it has been withheld.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis
of which the officer makes his decision.
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Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA
POEA issuances are being assailed as invalid because POEA allegedly has no authority to fix rates
affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels.
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated through is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced. Congress may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies because the legislature may find it impracticable, if not impossible,
to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect.
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
Soriano v. Laguardia
MTRCB suspended the show of Ang Dating Daan because the host made offensive remarks against a
person from another sect. The power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV
programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation
of the law sought to be enforced.

2. Quasi-Judicial (adjudicatory) functions
Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt
Evangelista v. Jarencio (1975)
Manalastas was subpoenaed by the PARGO in connection with investigations regarding corrupt
transactions in the Manila city government. Under its enabling law, the PARGO enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. This power is not limited to PARGO’s
exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising
and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more
specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what, if anything, should be done.
A subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is: (1) within the authority of the
agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
Guevara v. COMELEC (1958)
Comelec ordered Guevara to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having
published an article which allegedly tended to influence the Comelec in the adjudication of a controversy
regarding contracts to manufacture ballot boxes. Comelec has no power or authority to submit Guevarra
to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article. In
proceeding on the preparation of ballot boxes, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise
any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
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postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. The exercise of that power
by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
Catura v. CIR (1971)
CIR, in connection with a complaint filed for unauthorized disbursement of union funds, issued an order
requiring and directing the petitioners who were union officers, “to deliver and deposit to the Court “all
the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and
other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition x x x”. The
Court recognized the power of the administrative agency to issue subpoenas even if there was no explicit
statutory grant because it was necessary to assure the effective administration of the statute involved.
Tolentino v. Inciong (1979)
NLRC Chairman Inciong issued subpoenas requiring Tolentino and CFI Judge de los Angeles to appear
before NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use “old society tactics” to
prevent union election duly ordered by the NLRC under PD 21.
The subpoenas were beyond Inciong’s power to issue. The concern of Inciong that the objectives of the
law should be attained did not warrant his exercise of a power which was not conferred. The competence
"to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply” certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of
first instance.
Warrants of arrest, administrative searches
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (1963)
Deportation Board issued warrants of arrest against Qua Chee Gan and 6 others, all aliens, who were
charged with the unauthorized purchase/remittance of U.S. dollars, as well as attempted bribery of a
Central Bank official and a U.S. Air Force captain to evade prosecution.
The President’s power to investigate may be delegated, so the Board may conduct the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President. But it was not clear whether the President’s authority carries with it
the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of. Assuming that the President possesses such a
power, he cannot validly delegate it because the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or
not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. Official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment may not be delegated.
Vivo v. Montesa (1968)
Immigration issued warrants of arrest against 7 persons for the purpose of bringing them before the
Commissioner to show cause why they should not be deported for fraudulently entering the country.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest by the Immigration Commissioner and the arrest pursuant to such
administrative warrant are in conflict with Bill of Rights as warrants may only be issued by a judge. The
arrest of a foreigner necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
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power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable
that the alien be arrested.
Santos v. Commissioner (1976)
Santos was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration while his deportation case was pending. The Qua Chee Gan ruling was applied. The
Commissioner cannot issue a warrant of arrest for purposes of investigation. But the Commissioner can
issue it if there already was a deportation order.
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago (1988)
Petitioners were charged for committing acts of “pedophilia.” A warrant of arrest was issued by the judge
and they were apprehended. They however questioned the authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation to arrest and detain them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. It is summary and nature and therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary court proceedings. What is essential is that there be a specific charge against
the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired. The charge must be substantiated by competent evidence, hearsay evidence may even
be admitted.
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag (1989)

Lucien, a French national was arrested without a warrant. He contended that the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation had no power, authority, or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because it was
made in violation of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Although the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not extend to deportation
proceedings, there should still be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported;
a fair hearing should be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired; and the charge should be
substantiated by competent evidence.
Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)
Petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment. Law enforcers went to her residence where it was
discovered that she was operating a dance studio. Documents and other personal property were seized.
The warrant was not issued by a judge, but by the Secretary of Labor; and, assuming that the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to issue warrants, the same is invalid for being “general”.
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa (1991)
28 years after Gatchalian was admitted as a Filipino citizen, the Board of Commissioners issued a mission
order/ warrant of arrest against him so he could be investigated for violating the Immigration Act.
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The Board cannot issue warrants of arrest for investigative purposes. In implementing the Immigration
Act, the Commissioner of Immigration could issue warrants of arrest only after the Board determined the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
Imposition of Fines and Penalties
Civil Aeronautics Board v. PAL (1975)
PAL’s flight from Tuguegarao to Manila made a flagstop in Baguio City to pick up 20 passengers who
could not be accommodated in its regular flight. This was done without the prior approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The CAB issued a resolution imposing a fine.
CAB was fully authorized by law [R.A. 776 – Civil Aeronautics Act] to impose fines in the nature of civil or
administrative penalties for violation of its rules and regulations, but not to impose fines in the nature of
criminal penalty, which can only be done by courts of justice.
Scoty’s Dept. Store v. Micaller (1956)
Scoty’s Dept. Store was found by the CIR to have committed unfair labor practice and ordered to reinstate
Micaller, pay backwages and pay a fine.
CIR could not impose fines or other penal sanctions because it did not have jurisdiction over criminal
cases, as giving it such jurisdiction would be in contravention of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
RCPI v. Board of Communications (1977)
Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio separately filed complaints against RCPI before the Board of
Communications (BOC) alleging that RCPI is liable to them for damages for its failure to deliver certain
telegrams meant to inform them of the deaths of their close relatives. The BOC imposed a fine on RCPI
pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act.
RCPI cannot be made to pay the said fine because a fine can only be imposed on a public service that
violates the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the
Commission. If the Morales and Inocencio suffered injury allegedly due to RCPI’s contractual breach, their
recourse should have been in the courts.
Perez v. LPG Refillers (2006)
A circular issued by the DOE implementing BP33 which provided penalties for enumerated acts therein
was being assailed for not being in conformity with the law it seeks to implement.
Circular is valid. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum
products and sets the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers,
marketers, and dealers.
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Public Hearing Committee v. SM Prime (2010)
LLDA inspected the wastewater of SM City Manila and found that in did not conform with the effluent
standards imposed by law. LLDA imposed a fine of P1,000 a day.
LLDA had the authority to impose fines and penalties since the law clothed the LLDA not only with the
express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are
necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions.
Administrative Procedure
Due Process
While administrative agencies may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, this does not mean that they can entirely disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process.
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (1950)
Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged unfair labor practice.

Even though the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) There must be something to support a finding or conclusion;
(4) The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of the subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
Asprec v. Itchon (1966)
Petitioner claims denial of due process because he was not present during the hearings. Despite the
quasi-judicial nature of the administrative agency, the Board was right to proceed notwithstanding
petitioner’s absence during the proceedings. He had opportunity to defend himself, which he waived
when he or his counsel did not appear during the last day of hearing.
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Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC (1998)
In a case for illegal dismissal, POEA rendered a decision without conducting a full-blown trial. Vinta
alleged that is was deprived of due process because no trial was done. While administrative agencies
must observe due process, such does not require a trial. Due process in administrative proceedings only
requires that the parties are given the opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied if the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers.
Bachrach Motor Co. v. CIR (1978)
Bachrach’s lone witness, Kaplin, after his testimony, later went abroad, rendering the RTEA unable to
cross-examine him. CIR struck Kaplin’s testimony off the records and dismissed Bachrach’s petition. The
right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
fundamental right which is part of due process.
U.P. Board of Regents v. CA (1999)
Arokiaswamy was charged with plagiarism but the disciplinary proceedings against her were not
finalized until after she had received her Ph.D. After a showing of overwhelming evidence of intellectual
dishonesty, the UP Board of Regents resolved to withdraw her degree.
She was afforded due process which in administrative proceedings is essentially the opportunity to
explain one's side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. UP has a constitutional right to academic freedom which included its determination of whom it can
confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If such conferment was obtained through fraud, it
has the right to revoke or withdraw it.
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. CA (1979)
The Director of Mines dismissed petitioner’s petition to mining claims. While the case was on appeal at
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, said director became its Secretary and dismissed
petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner was denied due process. The director acted with grave abuse of discretion.
He should have inhibited and asked the Undersecretary to decide on the appeal, otherwise it would be a
biased review. A decision cannot be reviewed on appeal by the same officer who decided it a quo.
Rivera v. CSC and Landbank of the Philippines (1995)
The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review. Otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. Such would be a denial of due
process.
Pefianco v. Moral (2000)
A respondent in an administrative case is NOT entitled to be informed of the findings and

recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings
of the investigation committee.
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Napolcom National Appellate Board and PNP v. Bernabe (2000)
Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He
submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the
decision of the PNP Chief dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and
submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his
side.
Shoppes Manila v. NLRC (2004)
Shoppes alleged that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion for deciding the case without
conducting a hearing. Formal hearing is not mandatory and is dependent on the discretion of the labor
arbiter. Under Sec. 5, Rule V of New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the LA has the authority to
determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings. It is discretionary and is
something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. The requirements of due process are
satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit the respective position papers.
Autencio v. Manara (2005)
Autencio was charged with dishonesty and misconduct in office for changing the payroll of employees.
She was informed of the charges, gave her Answer, presented affidavits and was assisted by counsel in a
pre-hearing conference. After she was found guilty, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission and
claimed that she was tricked into waiving her right to present evidence and thus she was not afforded
due process
In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of
ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which technical rules applicable to
judicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal
or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be
cured.
Samalio v. CA (2005)
The due process requirement is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. In line with jurisprudence, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration, which Samalio admits he had filed with the BID and the CSC.
Domingo v. Rayala (2008)
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following –
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a. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;
b. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records, or made known to the parties affected.
A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President (2010)
Due process does not always require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of an MR.
Gannapao v. CSC (2011)
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. In this
case, petitioner availed of all legal remedies available to him and was allowed to present evidence to
defend himself, thus there was no denial of due process.
Notice and Hearing
When required
National Development Corp. v. Collector (1963) – When required by law
Pursuant to a charge of violation of the Tariff and Customs Act, C.F. Sharp & Company, was imposed a
fine. Its request that the case be set for investigation and hearing was denied by the Collector of Customs.
Collector committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing the fine without the benefit of an investigation
or hearing, as requested. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, in order that an imported article or
merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested, it must first be so established,
because there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law.
And even if customs authorities have claimed that an article or merchandise is NOT within the exception,
it does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner, or its
operator be given a chance to show otherwise
Bautista v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission (1979) – When making quasi-judicial decisions
Bautista’s claim was dismissed by the Department of Labor’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission due
to his and his counsel’s repeated non-appearance at 3 scheduled hearings of the case. Bautista was
deprived of due process by the hearing officer. It was proven that he and his counsel were not duly
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notified—either they were not notified at all, or they received notice too late, only after the scheduled
dates of hearing. The Commission’s rules require giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party
interested, which is done by serving upon him, personally or by registered mail, a copy of the notice,
either at his last known post office address or through his counsel. The purpose is to ensure observance
and protection of an interested party’s right to a hearing. The actions of the hearing officer and the
Commission are a foul blow to the Constitution’s social justice clause and injunction for the State to afford
full protection to labor. The government, especially labor agencies, has an obligation to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man.
Equitable Banking Corp. v. NLRC (1997) – When terminating employment
Sadac, VP of Equitable Bank’s Legal Department was accused of abusive conduct, inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, mismanagement and decisiveness. Bank Chairman sent him a memo stating that instead
of conducting a formal hearing, the bank would instead wait for his voluntary resignation. Sadac filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. He was denied due process. Bank ignored the procedural requirements for
terminating employment (notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and another notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss
him). The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side.
But meetings in the nature of consultation or conferences are NOT valid substitutes for the proper
observance of notice and hearing.
Felix Uy v. CoA (2000) – When making quasi-judicial decisions

The COA’s finding of bad faith, and thus personal liability on Governor Paredes’ part, was based solely on
the MSPB’s decision, which did not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of
good faith. The COA’s power to decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit, which means that proceedings before it must
comply with the fundamental requirements of procedural due process. These were not complied with,
since Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.
It would be unfair for the COA to hold him personally liable for petitioners’ claims, amounting to millions
of pesos, without giving him an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in his defence.
When not required
Suntay v. People (1957) – When the basis for making the quasi-judicial decision is clear
A verified complaint was filed against Suntay for taking Alicia Nubla, a 16-year old minor, from her school
with lewd design and having carnal knowledge of her. Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by
the DFA, and he left for the U.S. shortly after. DFA Secretary Garcia instructed the Philippine Ambassador
to the U.S. to cancel Suntay’s passport and compel him to return to the Philippines. Suntay sought to
enjoin Secretary Garcia from cancelling his passport without previous hearing.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. Hearing would have been proper and
necessary if the reason for withdrawal or cancellation of Suntay’s passport were unclear and doubtful.
But when discretion is exercised by an officer (Secretary Garcia) vested with it upon an undisputed fact
(the filing of a charge of seduction against Suntay), hearing may be dispensed with as a prerequisite to
action (cancellation of Suntay’s passport).
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Bisschop v. Galang (1963) – When deciding applications for extension of stay of aliens
Bisschop, an American citizen, applied for extension of stay in the Philippines. Commissioner Galang
advised Bisschop that his application had been denied by the Board of Commissioners and that he should
depart within 5 days. Bisschop’s counsel requested a copy of the Board’s decision, but was told that in
such cases, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision was promulgated.
First, Commissioners of Immigration are not required to conduct formal hearings on applications for
extension of stay of aliens. Since the law is silent as to the procedure in such cases, courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting
formal hearings therein. A day in court is NOT a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain
administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
Commissioner Galang’s letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality and far from
final. The requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party
that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. Second,
Commissioners of Immigration are NOT required to promulgate written decisions in cases involving
extension of stay of aliens. There is nothing in immigration laws which require the Board to render
written decisions in such cases.
Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA (1991) – When public interest so requires
Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile Finishing Corporation to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations, which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in certain situations, wherein the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests through the exercise of police power. In the case at bar, the ex parte Order was proper because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive wastes into Philippine waters should not wait until
protracted litigation over the correctness of such orders has run its full course. Industrial establishments
are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their costs/expenses and increase their profits by putting the
public interest at risk by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions. Solar may contest the correctness of the ex parte order in a public hearing before the Board,
where it would have the opportunity to controvert the basis of such order. That such an opportunity is
subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like the case at bar.
Form and Promulgation of Judgment
Indias v. Phil. Iron Mines (1957)
Indias filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Phil. Iron Mines. Hearings were conducted by a
hearing examiner, after which, the examiner rendered his report stating that the charge was
unsubstantiated by evidence, and recommended its dismissal. The Court of Industrial Relations issued
and order dismissing the complaint saying “After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no
sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and, consequently,
this case is hereby dismissed.” Indias challenges the order saying that it made without stating the facts
and law in support of the order.
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While the order does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, such is not
necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner which already contains a full discussion
of the evidence and the findings of fact. The situation would be different if the court disagrees with the
report, in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. When the CIR refers a case to a
commissioner for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were
given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process is satisfied.
Serrano v. PSC (1968)
The Public Service Commission (PSC) made a joint decision passing on the claim of 99 applicants for
certificates of public convenience to operate a taxicab service. It granted certificates to 60 applicants, as
listed in the decision. With regard to the remaining applicants, the decision stated "the applications not
included in the list of those granted are either [dismissed] for lack of interest or failure to prosecute or
[denied] for failure to qualify". Serrano challenged the PSC decision on the ground that the decision does
not clearly state the facts as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability of the applicant
and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application.
The Constitutional provision which mandates that “a decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based” only applies to courts and not to administrative agencies. However, the
non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the Constitutional provision does not
warrant the summary disposition of Serrano's application. In Ang Tibay, it was held that an
administrative tribunal must not disregard the requirement of due process, and that as a matter of due
process, the administrative tribunal must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
Solid Homes v. Laserna (2008)
Laserna filed a complaint against Solid Homes for delivery of title and execution of deed of sale before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). HLURB arbiter rendered a decision which was
appealed to the HLURB Board and subsequently to the Office of the President. The Office of the President,
in its decision, merely adopted by reference the findings of the Board.
The Constitutional mandate that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based” does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco vs. Permskul, the Court laid down the conditions to make a
memorandum decision valid:
1) it should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision; and
2) it is resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
The Constitutional mandate need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in
this case; it applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. The rights of parties in
administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has
been satisfied as laid down in Ang Tibay. There is no requirement that the decision must express clearly
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and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is
grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and
legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
Department of Health v. Camposano (2005)
An administrative charge was filed against Camposano, et al., employees of the DOH, for Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct in connection with an alleged anomalous purchase of certain medicines. PCAGC issued
a resolution finding Camposano, et al. guilty, and recommending their dismissal. Relying on the
recommendation by the PCAGC, the DOH Secretary, issued an order dismissing Camposano, et al.
PCAGC does not have the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly; its authority is limited
to conducting investigations, and preparing findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, which is the DOH Secretary, who had to observe due
process prior to imposing penalties. The Secretary's decision in this case, did not comply with the 6th
requisite stated in the Ang Tibay case. The actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative
requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with results in an
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.
American Tobacco v. Director of Patents (1975)
Petitioners challenge the validity of the amendment of Rule 168 of the Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office, which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of the
office to hear inter partes proceedings, because under the law, the Director of Patents must personally
hear and decide the cases.
The power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue such regulations as may be deemed
necessary in order to carry out its purposes is an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless it is withheld by express provisions of the law. It could hardly be expected, in view of the
magnitude of the Director's responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending
in his office. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency or officer vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision
of the administrative agency or officer will be made. It is sufficient that the judgment an discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Albert v. Gangan (2001)
It is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law
on which the decision is based. COA’s decision merely stated conclusions of law while facts and
circumstance regarding the disallowance were missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. There has to be factual
basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.
Arocha v. Vivo (1967)
When the BOC first acted on the case of Gatchalian, its members acted independently, as shown by the
different dates they have expressed their votes. They did not actually meet to discuss, and vote on the
case. Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual
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members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present.
Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration (1968)
“Promulgation” means "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". Based
on the Immigration Rules and Regulations, promulgation takes place even before the decision is written,
and a copy is served on the alien. The date of promulgation is the date when the BSI voted and resolved to
admit an alien, and this date can be ascertained from the minutes of the proceedings of the BSI.
Realty Exchange Venture Corp. v. Sendino (1994)
Sendino filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against REVI with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. HLURB rendered judgment in favor of Sendino.
REVI contended, among others, that the decision cannot stand because it was not rendered by the Board
of Commissioners en banc.
The Board is specifically mandated by its governing law to “adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its
business and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of its above mentioned
functions."There is nothing in the provisions of the EOs defining the powers and duties of the Board
which denies or withholds the power to delegate adjudicatory functions to divisions for the purpose of
effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers.
Jurisdiction
Go Tek v. Deportation Board (1977)
Go Tek was arrested during a raid of a suspected guerilla unit. Fake dollar checks were also found in his
possession, causing him to be charged with illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit under Art. 168, RPC. A case for his deportation proceeded simultaneously
before the Deportation Board.
Deportation Board had jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek despite the fact that he has yet to be convicted
of the criminal charge against him and despite the fact that his alleged acts do not fall under the
enumeration of the grounds for deportation in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law. Under the law,
deportation may be effected either by order of the President after his or his agents’ due investigation or
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or his designated officer after the Board of
Commissioners’ determination of the existence of a ground for deportation. Section 69 does not
enumerate grounds for deportation. It merely provides that the Deportation Board is authorized to
conduct investigations on possibly deportable aliens and forward its recommendations to the President.
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation
of aliens. An executive order of deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction. Conviction or
acquittal of a criminal charge does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
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Guy v. Ignacio (2010)
Atty. Ignacio filed a complaint for blacklisting and deportation against two sisters on the basis that they
were Canadian citizens illegally working in the Philippines. They refused to comply with a subpoena
causing them to be charged with violating the Philippine Immigration Act.
The general rule is that courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical
and intricate matters of fact. However, this case falls under one of the exceptions to the rule, namely:
where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there is reasonable ground to believe that the claim is
correct. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should be recognized and courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
Go v. Ramos (2009)
The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation reversed an earlier decision
of an Associate Commissioner which dismissed a complaint against Go for being an illegal and
undesirable alien. Pursuant to this reversal, a charge sheet was filed against Go for violating the
Immigration Act. Thus, Go filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC questioning the
jurisdiction of the Board to continue the deportation proceedings.
The Board had the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the
process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. The exception where judicial
determination was allowed was when the courts themselves believe that there was a substantial claim of
citizenship, and the evidence submitted was conclusive of such citizenship. The courts could in these
cases review and even enjoin the proceedings. The Board’s jurisdiction was not divested by mere claim of
citizenship. Of course, the Board’s decision was not final, but subject to judicial review. Here, the facts
were not such that the Court was convinced that the Board’s jurisdiction should be ousted.
De la Fuente v. De Veyra (1983)
The Philippine Coast Guard caught a vessel unloading cargo to small watercrafts. The captain of the
vessel was not able to present the appropriate documents for the cargo so he and his crew were arrested
for smuggling. The Customs of Sual-Dagupan issued a warrant of seizure and detention.
The exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a
CFI from assuming cognizance over such cases. Congress conferred jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases to the customs authorities. The law affords the Collector of Customs sufficient latitude in
determining whether or not a certain article is subject to seizure or forfeiture and his decision on the
matter is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs and then to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the CFI,
which may not interfere with the Commissioner’s decisions. There may only be further judicial review in
appropriate cases via a certiorari proceeding.
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights (1991)
800 public school teachers undertook concerted mass actions on account of the failure of public
authorities to heed their grievances. A return-to-work order was issued but they continued the mass
actions. As a result, the teachers were administratively charged and preventively suspended. After an
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investigation, they were dismissed. The DECS Secretary affirmed the dismissal. The teachers submitted
sworn statements to the CHR impugning their dismissal.
The CHR has no power to exercise adjudicatory power. The most that can be conceded to the CHR, under
the Constitution is the power to investigate “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.” However, fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. Hence, merely having the power to
investigate, the CHR should not try and resolve the matter involving the public school teachers’ alleged
dismissal without due process. The issues involved in the controversy are clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education as provided for by the Civil Service Law and also within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Simon v. CHR (1994)
A “Demolition Notice” was sent to the North EDSA Vendors Association, Inc. from the Office of the Quezon
City Mayor. The squatters-vendors filed a letter-complaint with the CHR asking the latter to enjoin the QC
Mayor from pushing through with the demolition, which the CHR did.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Cariño v. CHR that it is only the first of the CHR’s constitutionally
enumerated powers that bears resemblance with adjudication - but that resemblance does not equate to
adjudication. It was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to make the CHR a quasi-judicial
body.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA (1994)
The Caloocan City Government was operating a dumpsite which was polluting the nearby creek/tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA issued a cease and desist order against it. On the other hand, the RTC of
Caloocan issued a cease and desist order against the LLDA. The controversy was brought before the CA,
which held that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
operation of the dumpsite.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board, except
in cases where a special law provides for another forum. The LLDA, is specifically mandated under RA
4850 to carry out the national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces with due regard for “...the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.” Under such a broad grant of power, the
LLDA’s jurisdiction was correctly invoked in this case. The LLDA must also be deemed to possess the
power to issue cease and desist orders. While it is true that it was not expressly conferred such a power,
its enabling laws granted it the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution".
Union Bank v. HLURB (1992)
A condominium buyer purchased a unit without knowing that the whole condominium project had been
mortgaged to Union Bank. The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold to Far East Bank at
public auction. The buyer filed a complaint for annulment of Far East’s title to the unit. Union Bank and
Far East Bank alleged that the HLURB had no jurisdiction.
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HLURB has jurisdiction. The relevant laws in this case include: PD 957, which gave the NHA exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business; PD 1344, which gave the NHA the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices; and EO 648, which
transferred the above-mentioned functions to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (later
became the HLURB). The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage,
of a condominium unit .
Mateo v. CA (1995)
Several Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees filed a complaint against their general manager
Edgar Sta. Maria. The MOWAD board members conducted an investigation and placed Edgar under
preventive suspension. Eventually, Edgar was dismissed causing him to file a special civil action for quo
warranto and mandamus before the RTC.
The RTC does not have jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198.
The SC has previously held that employees of GOCC’s with original charters, such as MOWAD, fall under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under PD 807, EO 292 and Memorandum Circular No. 44
(1990) of the CSC, the party aggrieved by an action of the government involving termination of services
may appeal to the Commission within 15 days of the action. Thereafter, the final resolution of the CSC
may be appealed to the CA. The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service. Thus, RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board (1997)
Grandair applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) with the CAB and
requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL opposed the application alleging that the CAB
had no jurisdiction to hear the application since Grandair did not have a franchise to operate from
Congress. CAB denied the opposition and approved the issuance of the TOP.
The CAB has jurisdiction. The CAB is expressly authorized under RA 776 to issue a TOP or a CPCN “upon
its own initiative.” Nothing in the said law negates the power to issue the said permit before the
completion of the applicant’s evidence and that of the oppositor’s in the main petition. There is also
nothing in the law or the Constitution which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable
requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although the Constitution
recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility,
Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their
respective areas of public service. A reading of RA 776 reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the
authority to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services to the CAB.
Eristingcol v. CA (1999)
Eristingcol was building a house in Urdaneta Village but the homeowners’ association meted a P400,000
penalty against her for violating certain provisions in the associations Construction Rules and
Regulations. Eristingcol filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of these rules before the RTC but the
Association alleged that RTC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint.
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The RTC does not have jurisdiction. A scrutiny of Eristingcol’s allegations reveals that the nature of the
controversy only superficially delves into the validity of the Construction Rules. The crux of the complaint
is actually the association’s supposed arbitrary implementation of the Construction Rules against her. EO
535, which created the HIGC, transferred to it the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC. Upon the enactment of RA 8763, the powers
and functions of the HIGC with respect to homeowners’ associations were again transferred - this time to
the HLURB. Thus, based on the allegations of the complaint, it is the HLURB - not the RTC - which has
jurisdiction over this case.
Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato (2000)
Deltaventures filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC reiterating the same allegations in a third
party claim in a case pending before the NLRC. RTC held that it cannot issue an injunction against the
NLRC and that the NLRC retains the authority over all proceedings in relation to the execution of its
decisions.
Deltaventures should have filed its third party claim before the LA. The NLRC’s Manual on Execution of
Judgment provides the mechanism for a third-party claimant to assert his claim over a property levied by
a sheriff on account of a labor judgment. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
under the Labor Code should be deemed to vest in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in
connection with or relating to labor disputes, to the exclusion of other courts. Moreover, the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits the issuance of any injunction or restraining order in any case involving labor
disputes by any court or other entity.
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil (2002)
The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) received several complaints from certain members of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of
DARBCI (respondents). Before the respondents could file an answer, the CDA ordered the funds of
DARBCI to be frozen prompting the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC primarily
questioning CDA’s jurisdiction to resolve the complaints.
Sec. 3 of RA 6939 enumerates the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA. It can be gleaned
from this provision that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions.
Nowhere in the law is CDA expressly granted the authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. A review
of the deliberations by both chambers of Congress prior to the enactment of RA 6939 shows that the
intent of the legislature was not to vest quasi-judicial authority upon CDA. Thus, the CDA is devoid of any
quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as
regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives.
De Jesus v. COA (2003)
An auditing team from the Commission on Audit (COA) audited the accounts of the Catbalogan Water
District (CWD) and discovered that members of CWD's board granted themselves certain benefits. The
COA issued notices disallowing the payment of the allowances and bonuses granted to the members of
the board, on the ground that the payments run counter to PD 198, or the Provincial Water Utilities Act.
The members of the board question the jurisdiction of COA to disallow the payments.
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The Constitution mandates the COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. A water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a
special charter since it is created pursuant to PD 198. Thus, CWD is subject to the jurisdiction of COA. COA
did not usurp the functions of the LWUA. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation where the board of
an administrative agency, by the mere act of issuing a resolution, can put to naught the broad and
extensive powers granted to the COA by the Constitution.
CSC v. Alfonso (2009)
A complaint was filed against Alfonso, the director of the human resources department of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), charging him with violation of the Civil Service Law. He allegedly
included himself in a special order for overnight services which allowed him to make considerable
earnings for allegedly working for 24 hours straight daily, for 3 weeks. The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) issued a resolution formally charging Alfonso with Grave Misconduct, and imposing a 90-day
preventive suspension on him. Alfonso argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction because the PUP Board of
Regents has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance
of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. All PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to
the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public
servants. While there are laws which allow the creation of disciplinary committees in different agencies
of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and
employees, such cannot be interpreted as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline government employees. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which
the CSC was established, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
Shell v. Jalos (2010)
Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered into a service contract for the exploration and extraction
of petroleum. As a consequence of which, Shell constructed a pipeline from its production platform to its
processing plant. Jalos, et al. filed a complaint for damages against Shell with the RTC, alleging that they
are fishermen, and that Shell's construction of the pipeline adversely affected their livelihood. Shell
argued that the case is a pollution case, thus the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary
jurisdiction over the controversy.
While the complaint did not use the term “pollution”, the acts it alleged constitute pollution as defined in
the law (PD 984). In determining Jalos, et al.'s complaint for damages, the proper tribunal must
determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters' properties
and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such
issue lies with the PAB. The definition of the “pollution" connotes the need for specialized knowledge and
skills in determining the presence, cause, and effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not
within the competence of ordinary courts. Resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency
possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters.
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Machado v. Gatdula (2010)
The Machados allegedly blocked the right of way of Gatdula's property. Gatdula asked the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to settle the controversy between the parties. COSLAP assumed
jurisdiction, and the parties participated in the proceedings.
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the controversy. It may only assume jurisdiction in the cases
enumerated under the law which created it. The present controversy does not fall under those
enumerated circumstances. The Machados cannot be held in estoppel for having participated in the
COSLAP proceedings, as jurisdiction is conferred by law, and not by the parties. COSLAP having no
jurisdiction, its decision is null and void. As such, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation, and all
acts pursuant to it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final, and any writ of
execution based on it is void.
Vda. Herrera v. Bernardo (2011)
The Bernardos filed a complaint before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
against Herrera for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion
of a parcel of land.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. The present case does not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in EO 561, the law which created COSLAP, when COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions. The Bernardos' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of
ownership over the subject property, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Courts. Since COSLAP
had no jurisdiction, all the proceedings therein are null and void. Herrera is not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP. Estoppel by laches as a bar to question jurisdiction is the
exception, and not the rule. For a party to be estopped from questioning a tribunal's jurisdiction, the issue
of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the same Facts
Galang v. CA (1961)
Tee Hook Chun arrived in the Philippines with a Philippine passport. Galang, the Commissioner of
Immigration, ordered the exclusion of Tee as he was not entitled to use a Philippine passport. A criminal
case was filed against Tee for violation of the immigration law. He was found guilty. On appeal to the CA,
the appellate court ordered his release upon filing of bail. The Commissioner did not release Tee because
of the exclusion order previously issued. Upon petition by Tee, the CA issued a writ of habeas corpus. It
said that the filing of the criminal action is a waiver of the administrative proceeding to exclude THC.
Although the criminal action and the administrative proceeding for his exclusion arise from the same set
of facts, one does not bar the action in the other. The institution of the criminal action is not a waiver of
the authority to institute administrative action. Although arising from the same facts, the criminal and
administrative actions were done pursuant to different provisions of the immigration act.
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Co San v. Director of Patents (1961)
Co San was acquitted in an unfair competition case filed by Jose Ong Lian Bio in the CA. In another case,
Co San filed a petition with the Philippine Patent Office for cancellation of letters of patent issued to Ong
Lian Bio over two designs for luggages. Co San's petition was dismissed. Co San contends that the
Director of Patents should have accepted the findings of fact of the CA that Co San was the prior user of
the design in issue and that the designs in the Letter Patents issued to Jose Ong Lian Bio are not new and
original.
The Director of Patents in the administrative case is not bound by the findings arrived at by the CA in the
criminal case. The question in the cancellation proceedings refers to the validity of the design patents
issued to Ong Lian Bio; while the inquiry in the criminal case is whether Co San unfairly competed against
the luggage of Ong Lian Bio protected by the design patent. The first is within the cognizance of the Patent
Office; the second under the jurisdiction of the CFI. The acquittal of Co San by the CA was not based on the
cancellation of a patent but on the opinion that he had not deceived Jose Ong Lian Bio.
Villanos v. Subido (1972)
Villanos, a public school teacher, wrote a letter jointly addressed to her co-teachers, containing libelous
remarks against the said co-teachers. A criminal action for libel was instituted against Villanos. She was
convicted, and her conviction was affirmed by the CA. The co-teachers also filed an administrative
complaint against Villanos for gross discourtesy to them, and for using disgraceful language.

A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a
decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are
material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. The finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal case is not conclusive on the administrative case. There are
defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not
admissible in the trial of the criminal cases. Even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a
ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex-proprio vigore
(by its own force) justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such conviction.
PNR v. Domingo (1971)
Mafe, a mechanic employed by the Philippine national Railways (PNR), was charged with qualified theft
for stealing a brass bearing from PNR. He was acquitted by the trial court on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. After the promulgation of judgment,
Mafe filed a motion to amend the decision alleging that he was dismissed by the PNR. He argued that
since he was acquitted of the crime for which he was dismissed, he should be reinstated. Judge Domingo
of the trial court ordered the reinstatement, and payment of backwages of Mafe.
The trial court, in the criminal case, has no authority to order the payment of backwages in the event of
an acquittal of the accused employee. An acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean that he is not
civilly liable. The exception to this is if the acquittal was for absolute lack of evidence which amounted to
a judicial declaration that the accused was innocent and did not commit the act charged. Such exception
is not applicable in this case because Mafe was acquitted merely on reasonable doubt. Such an acquittal
could not overturn the verdict of guilty in the administrative case, by virtue of which Mafe had already
been dismissed. While an accused who had been acquitted may, in appropriate cases, claim payment of
backwages or reinstatement, his relief lies not in the same criminal case but in the proper administrative
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civil action prescribed by law. Generally, acquittal in a criminal case does not carry with it relief from
administrative liability. The administrative case may proceed independently of the criminal action for the
same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt.
Tan v. COMELEC (1994)
Tan, as the City Prosecutor of Davao, was designated by the COMELEC as the Vice-Chairman of the City
Board of Canvasser of Davao City. Garcia won the mayoralty elections, and his rival candidate, Alterado,
filed a number of cases questioning the validity of Garcia's proclamation. The electoral protests were
eventually dismissed. Alterado filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public
Documents against Tan. Alterado also filed with the COMELEC an administrative complaint against Tan.
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint in the COMELEC on several grounds, among which is
forum-shopping.
Dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is untenable. The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the
COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or
vice versa.
Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman (2000)
An administrative case for serious misconduct and/or fraud or wilful breach of trust was filed against
Ocampo with the Ombudsman. He did not file his counter-affidavit, and was later dismissed. On his MR,
he alleged, through a manifestation that his criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was
dismissed by the RTC.
Dismissal of the criminal complaint only means that there was failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt on the part of the accused. The quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding
(substantial evidence) is different from that in a criminal proceeding (proof beyond reasonable doubt).
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, procedure followed and sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions of one body should not necessarily
be binding on the other.
Millares v. Go (2001)
An administrative complaint for grave misconduct based on the charge of double homicide resulted to
Millares’ dismissal from service. However, the criminal case for homicide that was filed against Millares
based on the same facts was dismissed.
Factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive upon the Court. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
Ferrer was charged with a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.The Office of the President absolved him of
administrative liability, but the Sandiganbayan’s second division refused to grant any of the reliefs he
sought including a motion for reinvestigation, motions for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari, and a
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motion for re-evaluation of a finding of probable cause. The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of
the administrative complaint.
Acuzar v. Journal (2010)
Jorolan filed an administrative case against Acuzar before the People’s Law Enforcement Board, charging
Acuzar of grave misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolan’s minor daughter. He
also filed a criminal case against Azucar for violation of the Child Abuse Act. PLEB found Acuzar guilty
and ordered him dismissed from the PNP.
Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from one another. Criminal cases require
proof beyond reasonable doubt, while administrative cases only require substantial evidence. They could
proceed independently of each other. The PLEB correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case, it being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring PNP members.
Rules of Evidence
Philippine Movie Picture Workers Association v. Premier Production (1953)
The company filed a petition with the CIR seeking authority to lay off 44 of its workers. The CIR
conducted an ocular inspection of the studios and its premises, and on the strength of its findings,
authorized the lay-off of the workers.
The workers were still entitled to hearing. Ocular inspection is not equivalent to a trial or presentation of
evidence, as it is only an auxiliary remedy. Nevertheless, conducting an ocular inspection in order to
resolve an issue is not expressly prohibited.
Estate of Florenciano Buan v. Pambusco (1956)
Buan applied for a certificate of public convenience with PSC. PSC ordered a survey of passenger traffic to
determine the necessity of such CPC. It stationed at two strategic places two of its checkers who
determined the number of passengers for one week. The checkers later submitted their findings. PSC
then denied Buan’s application.
The sending of checkers for purposes of observation was justified. An administrative agency may act on
its own and use methods which will enable it to obtain substantial evidence. The court is not required to
examine the proof relied upon by agencies in their decisions de novo.
Rizal Light Co. v. Municipality of Rizal (1968)
On the basis of the evidence adduced from an inspection made by PSC’s engineers on Rizal Light’s electric
plant, and after the latter’s failure to appear in hearings and to submit evidence, PSC revoked Rizal Light’s
CPC and granted one for Morong Electric.
The Court is not required to examine the proof anew, and the revocation made by PSC was valid. When
prosecuting and investigating duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body such as the PSC,
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said body may make steps it believes appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the
manner of informing itself whether there is probable violation of law and/or its rules and regulations. It
may initiate an investigation, file a complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as the
respondent is given a day in court, there can be no denial of due process, and objections to said procedure
cannot be sustained.
Borja v. Moreno (1964)
Borja allegedly closed the Matlaue, a public river located in his private land, in violation of a law. He was
subjected to an administrative complaint by the DPWC which ruled against him. Later, the trial court
granted Borja’s request and declared null and void DPWC’s decision.
There was substantial evidence to support that it was indeed a public navigable river, and if there is
substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within its
competence, the courts are bound to look no further - not even to consider evidence of a preponderant
nature. The court, however, did not overturn the trial court’s decision because the investigation wherein
the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of due process.
Maceda v. Energy Regulation Board (1991)
In line with the hearing regarding the provisional increase in oil prices, ERB prescribed that testimonies
were to be in affidavit form and that Caltex’s cross-examination be deferred to allow other applicants for
the increase to present their evidence first. Maceda objected to this order alleging that it resulted in a
violation of his right to due process.
The exercise of this discretion in the order of testimony out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper, because such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies. In the broad
interest of justice, the administrative body may, in any particular manner, except itself from technical
rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote its objectives.
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottles Phils. Inc (2003)
62 Coke employees filed a complaint for ULP but failed to attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or
to submit their affidavits so the claims of 52 of them were dismissed. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering reinstatement and full backwages. However, the CA ruled that the affidavit of 7 out of
the remaining 10 should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents
thereof and undergo cross-examination.
It was proper to ascribe evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure to affirm their contents and
undergo cross-examination. The NLRC is not bound by technicalities of law and procedure. It was
conferred by law the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Trial-type hearings
are not even required. Rules of evidence are also not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
Note: This decision seems contrary to the Administrative Code which, in Sec. 12, (3) provides that “every
party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal
evidence”. However, it must be remembered that Art. 221 of the Labor Code explicitly states that “the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members shall use every and all reasonable means to
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ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process.”
Civil Service Commission v. Colangco (2008)
Colangco took and passed the professional board examination for teachers and was later appointed as a
teacher. Thereafter, CSC made an investigation and found Colangco guilty of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because it was not him who applied for and took the exam.
CA ruled that photocopied documents used by CSC should have been authenticated and that only
documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified could be presented in evidence without
further proof.
CSC cases do not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence, so it validly considered the
admissibility of such evidence. Moreover, CSC ensured that Colangco was accorded due process during
the investigation and that there was substantial evidence supporting the finding that he was guilty.
3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate-fixing powers
Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices
Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)

Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order to
compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to
the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to Phil.
Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so, because the
PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will be just and reasonable.
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia (1994)
The authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the
authorized existing fare is an undue delegation of legislative authority. LTFRB is only authorized under
EO 202 to determine, prescribe, approve, review and adjust fare rates relative to the operation of public
land transportation services.
Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner (1922)
When a public utility entered the public service, the control and operation of its property was subject to
reasonable rules and regulation by the public. To that extent, it was a taking of private property. When
the taking was not full, final or complete, but in the nature of continuous taking and appropriation, it
follows that there would be a fluctuation in the market value of the property in public service. Thus, in
fixing just rates, it must be founded upon conditions fair and reasonable both to the owner and the public.
Vigan Electric v. PSC (1964)
In making findings of fact, PSC performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing, otherwise, the order is null and void. As a
98
general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspan Corp. (2004)
MIAA is an attached agency of the DOTC and as such, Section 9, Chapter 2, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code applies to it, which provides that no rule or final order involving the fixing of rates
shall be valid unless the proposed rates have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two weeks before the first hearing thereon.
Licensing Function
Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank (1976)
A license is not a contract between the sovereign and the licensee and it is not a form of property to
which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A
license is a special privilege of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.
D. Judicial Recourse and Review

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort
General Principles
• If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of a court. (Industrial Enterprises v. CA, (1990))
• The doctrine applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view” (Industrial Enterprises v. CA, supra.)
• It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to
proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
• Just to be clear, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not mean that cases (which are
under the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agencies) brought to the courts should
be dismissed outright. Rather, where primary jurisdiction comes to play in a case, “the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view.” (Industrial Enterprises vs. CA, supra.)
• The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. (Viadad v. RTC Negros, (1993))
99
Philippine Global Communications v. Relova (1980)
Phil. Global Communications was granted authority to establish a station in Cebu City. Other
telecommunications companies opposed the grant. They filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
CFI, arguing that PGC’s legislative franchise restricted where and how it could establish stations in the
Philippines. PGC moved to dismiss the petition, but the motion was denied, so it went to the Supreme
Court. It argued that the primary jurisdiction rested with the NTC, which had yet to resolve the other
telecommunications companies motion for reconsideration.
Since there was a legitimate legal question regarding the scope of PGC’s legislative franchise, the courts
could properly have jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would only operate if it could be
proved that the administrative agency in question did have authority to act. There being doubts
regarding the NTC’s power in this case, the judicial remedy sought by the other telecommunications
companies’ was proper.
Vidad v. RTC Negros Occidental (1993)
A group of public school teachers held a mass action/strike demanding that their salaries be released.
The DECS Regional Office issued a return to work order, but the teachers did not accede. This led to the
filing of administrative complaints. In response, the teachers filed a complaint for injunction, prohibition
and damages against the officials, and a TRO was granted. The DECS officials filed an MTD. Both motions
were denied, leading to a certiorari to the SC.

The OSG could properly represent the officials, and the MTDs were correctly denied. As to the latter, the
Court held that if the bad faith on the part of the officials is proven, damages are in order, and so the
complaints could be dismissed. However, in the interest of good order, the court cases should be
suspended until a final determination in the administrative proceedings.
Industrial Enterprises v. CA (1990)
IEI filed an action for rescission of the MOA it executed with MMIC. RTC rescinded the MOA. CA reversed.
IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks, which properly falls within the domain of BED. Moreover, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction finds application in this case but does not warrant its dismissal. It should only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION: The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of court.
Conrad v. CA (1995)
Fitrite and its sister company Victoria are engaged in biscuits and cookies business bearing the
trademark “Sunshine”, which trademark was registered with the BPTTT. The companies found out that
another company, Conrad, was designated as exclusive dealer of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., an American
company. Fitrite and Victoria sought to enjoin Conrad from continuing its business as its acts allegedly
100
constitute infringement and unfair competition under the Trademark Law. On motion by Conrad, the RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the BPTTT has jurisdiction considering the American company had
already filed a cancellation case against Fitrite and Victoria with the BPTTT.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable in this case. The issue involved in the administrative
case is different from that of the issue before the RTC. In the administrative case, the issue is whether the
trademark of Fitrite/ Victoria is subject to cancellation. In the case before the RTC, the issue is whether
Conrad's acts constitute infringement of Fitrite's trademark.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)
Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a
petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on the
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable
to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans’ petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the
RTC correctly dismissed the case.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies
General Principles
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. (Estrada et al. vs. CA, (2004))
 Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal/reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum
(Paredes v. CA; Lopez v. City of Manila, (1999); Garcia v. CA (2001))
 Only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Smart v. NTC (2003))
 The Court in Smart v. NTC defined quasi-legislative or rule-making power as the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation and separation of powers. On the other hand,
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power was defined as the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Exceptions to the doctrine:

a. Issue involved is purely a legal question
b. Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
c. There is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency involved
d. There is irreparable injury

Political Law Cases - Part2

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51

a) Concept and basis

Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)

Lorenzo v. Dir. of Health (1927)

Rubi v. Provincial Board, supra.

Marcos v. Manglapus, supra.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, supra.

2. Publication of laws and regulations

Tañada v. Tuvera, supra.

3. Access to court records

Baldora v. Dimaano (1976)

4. Right to information relative to:

a) Government contract negotiations

Akbayan v. Aquino, supra.

People v. Ferrer (1972)

PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (1983)

People v. Fajardo (1958)

Republic v. PLDT (1969)

Republic v. Castellvi (1974)

De Knecht v. Bautista (1980)

Republic v. De Knecht (1990)

Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform (1989)

Sumulong v. Guerrero (1987)

City Government v. Judge Ericta (1983)

EPZA v. Dulay (1989)

Reyes v. NHA (2003)

4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase

Rutter v. Esteban (1953)

Ortigas v. Bel-Air (1991)

Ortigas v. Feati (1979)

1. Contemporary application of the contract clause

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

US v. Ling Su Fan (1910)

People v. Espiritu (1999)

People v. Continente (2000)

People v. Obrero (2000)

Pecho v. People (1996)

7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

10. Trials in absentia

Q. Writ of habeas corpus

Lansang v. Garcia, supra.

R. Writs of amparo, habeas data, and kalikasan

Beltran v. Samson and Jose (1929)

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, supra.

Galman v. Pamaran (1985)

Villaflor v. Summers (1920)

1. Scope and coverage

T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners

U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishments

People v. Echegaray (1996) and Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice (1999)

People v. Dionisio (1968)

V. Non-imprisonment for debts

Lozano v. Martinez (1986)

Serafin v. Lindayag (1975)

People v. Obsania (1968)

People v. Relova (1987)

2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals

X. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

Republic v. Fernandez (1956)

People v. Ferrer, supra.

pals political law reviewer

A. Who Are Filipino Citizens