Linguistics - Benyami 2001 (NaturalKindTerms)

The Semantics of Kind Terms
Author(s): Hanoch Ben-Yami

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 102, No. 2 (Jan., 2001), pp. 155-184
Published by: Springer
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HANOCH BEN-YAMI
THE SEMANTICS OF KIND TERMS
(Received in revised form 3 April 1999)
The theory of the semantics of natural kind terms presented by

Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1970, 1975) ('the KPT' below) is
accepted, in this or that variation, by most philosophers nowadays.
This is somewhat surprising, as several good criticisms of it exist in
the literature (e.g., Zemach, 1976; Dupre, 1981; Donnellan, 1983),
to which neither the original authors nor any of their followers
have satisfactorily replied. The persisting popularity may be partly
explained by the facts that, firstly, Kripke and Putnam have made
effective criticisms of the previous dominant theory, the one that
took natural kind terms to be covert descriptions of some sort; and,
secondly, that some of the semantical features of these terms, which
no other available theory was able to explain, were explained by
their alternative theory. The lack of a better theory made many philo-
sophers hold on to the best one around, sometimes turning a blind
eye to its flaws.
In this paper, I shall argue that the KPT is false and that a better
theory is available. The first section presents various versions of the
description theory of the semantics of natural kind terms. Although
these theories are flawed, I don't find their existing criticisms suf-
ficient, for reasons explained below; I shall therefore propose some
additional criticisms, which I find more conclusive. However, I shall
also try to show that more can be retained of these theories than is
usually believed.
In the second section I shall argue against the KPT and in the
third and final section I shall propose a new theory of the semantics
of kind terms.
La Philosophical Studies 102: 155-184, 2001.

O 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
156 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
1. PROBLEMS OF DESCRIPTION THEORIES OF NATURAL KIND

TERMS
The theory of the meaning of natural kind terms that was prev
before Kripke's and Putnam's work was published maintained that
to say of something that it belongs to this or that natural kind is to
say that it has certain properties. Ernest Nagel, for instance, wrote
(1960, p. 31) that "the statement that something is water implicitly
asserts that a number of properties (a certain state of aggregation, a
certain color, a certain freezing and boiling point, certain affinities
for entering into chemical reactions with other kinds of substances,
etc.) are uniformly associated with each other."1
Now both folk beliefs and scientific theories can be widely mis-
taken about the properties they ascribe to members of a natural kind.
For instance, people used to believe that certain kinds of animals
are reincarnations of dead men, and Plato suggested that the ele-
ments are composed of different kinds of triangles. Hence, if Nagel's
theory were true, a statement like 'Fish live in water' would be
false in case water didn't have some of the properties we think it
has. This is because that statement would "implicitly assert" that
fish live in something that has such-and-such properties, while ex
hypothesi water - the liquid fish live in - wouldn't have all these
properties.
Yet, people succeed in talking about the things they misdescribe.
This is possible because members of a kind do have the properties
by which we actually identify them ('identifying properties' below).
Whatever their other properties are, tigers are large cat-like animals
with yellowish and black stripes, and water is a liquid without color,
smell or taste. It seems, prima facie at least, that one couldn't con-
sistently identify particulars as members of a kind and be mistaken
about how to identify them. Thus, the most a description theory
can maintain is that the statement that something is a member of
a natural kind implicitly asserts that it has all of the identifying
properties we believe things of that kind have.
This necessary modification of the description theory makes it
lose its initial appeal: the properties by which we identify members
of a kind are not always more significant for us than other properties
we think they have, and we may be as confident in our ascription of
non-identifying properties as we are in the ascription of identifying
THE SEMANTICS OF KIND TERMS 157
ones. Moreover, when asked to explain what a member of a specific

kind is, we may mention identifying as well as non-identifying prop-
erties. Thus, identifying properties do not have any special status
relative to non-identifying ones in the way we conceive of a natural
kind. For that reason, the claim forced on a description theory, that
the meaning of a natural kind concept is determined only by the
identifying properties of that kind, seems ad hoc.
However, even this more cautious description theory was effec-
tively criticized by Kripke and Putnam. The identifying properties
we ascribe to members of a natural kind, they argued, are not neces-
sary for something to be of that kind. In the first place, abnormal
members that lack some of the identifying properties we attribute to
members of a kind are possible (Putnam, 1970, p. 140; Kripke, 1980,
pp. 119-120). Perhaps this can be accounted for by a more elaborate
description theory, one which holds that at least typical members of
a natural kind have the relevant properties (Putnam, 1970, p. 142;
Kripke, 1980, p. 120). But then, it may be the case that we are
mistaken and no member of that kind has one of the identifying
properties. Perhaps no tiger has stripes, and only because of some
optical illusion, say, we thought they had (Putnam, 1970, p. 142;
Kripke, 1980, pp. 118, 120, 122, 137). If someone who asserts that
some animal is a tiger "implicitly asserts" that it has stripes, then
the discovery that the stripes were an illusion is tantamount to a
discovery that there are no tigers. This result is clearly wrong.
This argument shows that members of a natural kind may not
have some of the properties by which we identify them. The argu-
ment doesn't establish the stronger claim, that members of a natural
kind may not have any of these identifying properties. Kripke, how-
ever, makes this stronger claim as well. He states the following
definition of a tiger, derived from The Shorter Oxford English Dic-
tionary: "a tiger is a large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny
yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly"
(1980, p. 119) and then writes (p. 121):
we might also find out tigers had none of the properties by which we originally
identified them. Perhaps none are quadrupedal, none tawny yellow, none carni-
vorous, and so on; all these properties turn out to be based on optical illusions or
other errors . . .
158 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
Well, can tigers be small herbi

over - i.e., mutant rabbits? I think that in this implausible scenario
we would say that there weren't any tigers and that only because
of some kind of optical illusion people thought that tigers existed.
Compare the case of mermaids and dugongs: the latter are thought
by some to be what sailors mistook for the former; but if this
were somehow confirmed, we would still say that there weren't any
mermaids, and not that mermaids are in fact dugongs.
Kripke tried to establish that all members of a natural kind may
not have any of their identifying properties in order to refute the
cluster-concept theory, which maintains that particulars are mem-
bers of a natural kind if and only if they have most of these
properties (ibid.). But although what he says is unconvincing, the
cluster-concept theory can nevertheless be refuted as follows.
Firstly, contrary to what the cluster-concept theory maintains,
a particular's having of most of the identifying properties that we
ascribe to members of a natural kind is insufficient for membership
of that kind. If in order to be a tiger an animal has to have only
most of the properties we ascribe to tigers, then lions are tigers;
after all, a lion is a large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny
yellow in color - all it lacks are the blackish transverse stripes.
To avoid this false result, a cluster-concept theory will have to
distinguish between necessary and optional properties, more and
less important properties, etc. Yet if we look again at the diction-
ary definition of 'tiger', or at any other definition people would
normally supply, we shall not find there any candidate for a neces-
sary or important property, or at least for any such property that
would rule out lions. It seems that any possible elaboration of the
cluster-concept theory is doomed to be ad hoc. So a cluster-concept
theory cannot supply sufficient conditions for membership of a
kind.
Before examining the necessity part of the cluster-concept the-
ory, I shall distinguish between two types of description theory in
general. On the one hand, a description theory can maintain, as
Nagel seems to do, that to say of something that it is water is to say,
although in a covert way, that it has certain properties. For instance,
to say that fish live in water, according to this type of description
theory, is just to say in a short and covert way that fish live in some-
thing that is in a certain state of aggregation, has a certain color, a

certain freezing and boiling point and so on. 'Water' is just a covert
description. Such a theory is a theory of the meaning of natural kind
terms. I shall call this type of description theory a covert description
theory.
On the other hand, a description theory can maintain that some-
thing is water if and only if it answers a certain description, while
refraining from the claim, made by the covert description theory,
that the concept 'water' is itself just this description though in other
words. This is a theory of the application of natural kind terms. I
shall call this type of description theory an equivalence theory. An
example should make the difference between the equivalence and
covert description theories clear: a figure is a triangle if and only if it
is a polygon with angles that equal two right angles (the equivalence
theory holds), yet 'triangle' is not synonymous with 'polygon with
angles that equal two right angles' ('triangle' is not such a covert
description). Consequently, someone who says that a figure is a tri-
angle doesn't say, though in other words, that it is a polygon of the
latter sort; the person, as well as his community, may be ignorant of
the equivalence.
The equivalence theory is weaker than the covert description the-
ory: the latter entails the former, but not vice versa. The equivalence
theory leaves unexplained the way a kind term contributes to the
meaning of a sentence: if it is not a covert description, then what
exactly is it? Is it a different sort of description, and if so what does it
predicate of its instances? Or is it a different sort of concept? I shall
return to this topic in the last section. I now proceed to examine the
implications of our continuous growth of knowledge on the covert
description and equivalence theories.
As knowledge progresses, we discover more and more prop-
erties of any given natural kind, and many of them are used to
identify members of that kind and find their way into dictionaries
and common knowledge. For instance, among the properties Nagel
enumerates, the freezing and boiling point of water were unknown
to most people during most of history, while they are known to most
people at present. Accordingly, the description that a description
theory correlates with 'water' should change through history. Thus,
according to the covert description version of the cluster-concept
160 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
theory, what people in the 1

live in water' is different from what people nowadays say when
they say the same sentence. Moreover, we don't even understand
what they were saying unless we know what they believed about
water. Hence, a consequence of a covert description theory is that
communication between people from different cultures is all but
impossible. This is surely unacceptable. When we read in the Bible
the sentence, 'Water covered the earth', although we don't know
what the author believed about water, we know what that sentence
means: that water covered the earth. I think this is sufficient to
refute a covert description version of the cluster-concept theory. (Of
course, compared with medieval man, we can infer more from the
fact, say, that fish live in water; we can therefore use that sentence
to imply different things, but that doesn't say that the sentence has a
different meaning.)
The equivalence theory version of the cluster-concept theory
doesn't face the same problem. Suppose a set A of descriptions
is correlated with 'water' at one period while a different set B is
correlated with it at another. It can still be the case that something
is water if and only if it has all properties in A and if and only
if it has all properties in B. Compare: a triangle is equilateral if
and only if it is equiangular and if and only if it has three equal
leights. It follows that one can maintain the equivalence version of
the cluster-concept theory in spite of the change of knowledge with
time and place. We have seen, however, that the sufficiency claim
of any cluster-concept theory cannot be maintained. Thus, all that
is left from the cluster-concept theory is the necessity condition of
its equivalence version: if something is water then it has most of the
identifying properties of water. These remnants of the description
theory leave a lot to explain concerning the semantics of natural kind
terms.
I shall now criticize one more claim that Kripke and Putnam
make against the description theory. Both have argued that a thing
can have all of the identifying properties of a certain natural kind,
yet not be a member of that kind. Kripke's standard example is
fool's gold, i.e., iron pyrites. "This is not another kind of gold", he
writes (ibid., p. 1 19), "it's a completely different thing which to the
uninitiated person looks just like the substance which we discovered

and called gold." Since Naming and Necessity was first published,
fool's gold has become the standard example of the insufficiency
of having the identifying properties of a natural kind for belonging
to that kind. But this is a very bad example; it is, indeed, fool's
gold. For iron pyrites has only a faint resemblance to gold. It is a
brass-yellowish stone, somewhat shining, that would never mislead
anybody who has seen real gold. Only some unexperienced miners
may have been fooled by it in the darkness of their tunnels (this is
how it received its name). Fool's gold doesn't have the appearance
of gold, and thus it doesn't show that the identifying properties we
ascribe to gold are insufficient for something to be gold. I am not
familiar with any other would-be historical example in the literature
which is intended to show that a thing can have all the properties by
which we determine that something is a member of a natural kind
yet not be a member of that kind.
Of course, Kripke and Putnam discuss several hypothetical cases
as well. These cases are intended both to show that possession of
all the identifying properties is not a sufficient condition for mem-
bership of a natural kind and to support their alternative theory. As
I criticize their alternative theory below, I shall postpone discussion
of these hypothetical cases to section 2.4. But at this stage, we can
still maintain that if a thing has all properties by which we identify
members of a kind, it is of that kind.
Another argument used by Putnam in this context relies on the
division of linguistic labor (1975, pp. 227-229). Although I think
his arguments here are important for the philosophy of language
and mind, they are irrelevant to the topic of the present paper. The
division of linguistic labor is consistent with a description theory of
natural kind terms if the descriptions determining the meaning of a
natural kind term which a person uses are taken to be not those he
would supply, but those that would be supplied by members of his
community to whom he would, or should, defer in order to decide
whether or not something belongs to that natural kind.2
I now turn to a discussion of Kripke's and Putnam's alternative
theory of the semantics of natural kind terms.
162 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
2. A CRITIQUE OF KRIPKE AND PUTNAM ON NATURAL KIND

TERMS
2.1. Exposition and Elaboration of Kripke 's and Putnam's Theory
Both Kripke and Putnam hold that each natural kind has its own
nature (Kripke, 1980, pp. 124-125, 138; Putnam, 1981, p. 24), its
essential nature (Kripke, 1980, p. 135; Putnam, 1970, p. 140), its
essence (Kripke, 1980, p. 138) or its essential properties (Kripke,
1980, p. 133), and that these determine membership of this natural
kind. This aspect of the KPT has made it known as an essentialist
theory. When encountering a new thing that has all the known prop-
erties of members of a natural kind, we don't know if it is of that
kind for as long as we don't know whether its essential properties
are the same as their possibly still undiscovered ones, i.e., if it has
the same nature that they have. And this is true of all things in all
possible worlds.
Kripke and Putnam never discussed in sufficient detail how
essential properties are determined. However, all the examples of
essential properties they mentioned are of structural properties.
These examples are of substances, organisms, diseases and even
artifacts (Putnam, 1975, pp. 242-245). Moreover, Putnam explicitly
says (ibid., p. 241) that "if there is a hidden structure, then generally
it determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, not only
in the actual world, but in all possible worlds". We can thus take the
essential properties of a natural kind to be some kind of structural
properties. Putnam, in his paper 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', uses
the phrase 'hidden structure', but as is clear from the examples he
mentions, hidden structure is hidden only to the naked eye; it can be
determined, or even observed, by other means. Moreover, the fact
that the structure of natural kinds is difficult to observe is surely
contingent. 'Structure' thus seems preferable as a term to 'hidden
structure'.
Of course, the specific structural properties Kripke and Putnam
have in mind are atomic and subatomic ones. This is clear from their
examples: H20 as what water necessarily is, chromosome structure
as the essential nature of organisms (Putnam, 1970, p. 141; 1975,
p. 240), etc. That is why Putnam uses, in later works, the phrases
'ultimate constitution' (1988, pp. 34-35), 'deep structure' (1990,
p. 60) or 'microstructure' (ibid., p. 69). But the claim that atomic

and subatomic structure constitute essential nature surely cannot be
part of a linguistic theory. The existence and properties of atoms and
their constituents are a relatively recent empirical discovery, while
the KPT is supposed to apply to the way people have always been
using words, as well as to the meanings of words in other possible
worlds. The general linguistic claim can only be that the essential
properties of natural kinds are structural properties.
Now when we take something to be a member of a natural kind
we may be ignorant of its structure; this, indeed, was the usual case
throughout most of human history. That is why Kripke says that
"the original concept of [a natural kind] is: that kind of thing, where
the kind can be identified by paradigmatic instances" (Kripke, 1980,
p. 122; cf. pp. 120-121, 135; Putnam, 1975, p. 234). However, even
when the essential nature is unknown, an essential nature common
to all members of a natural kind is assumed.
I shall now discuss a few criticisms of the KPT and suggest how
the theory can be modified in order to overcome them. I start with
an objection that is often voiced. Usually not all samples of a sub-
stance that is recognized as a natural kind have the same structure.
Zemach has noted that since chemical elements usually have several
isotopes, not all molecules of water, say, have the same structure
(1976, p. 120). Water, a recurrent example of a natural kind, comes
as H2016, H2017, H2018 and in other combinations as well. Thus,
Kripke and Putnam cannot maintain that items of a natural kind have
to have the same structure.
They can, however, overcome this difficulty. Items belonging to
a natural kind, they can maintain, don't have to have exactly the
same structure. All that is needed is that they have some structural
properties in common. Oxygen, for example, is a substance whose
atoms have exactly eight protons in their nuclei, no matter how
many neutrons the nuclei contain; mutatis mutandis for hydrogen.
Accordingly, water is a substance whose molecules are composed
out of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms.
But a further difficulty will require some modification of the
theory.3 As we have seen, according to both Kripke and Putnam,
a natural kind term is defined by means of paradigmatic instances.
To give the meaning of 'tiger' one should point to a few tigers and
164 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
say that a tiger is anything of that kind. However, these tigers are
paradigmatic instances of several natural kinds: of tigers, felines,
mammals, animals, etc. Thus, according to the KPT, it should be
indeterminate which one of the several natural kinds to which tigers
belong the term 'tiger' names.
To meet this difficulty, the following modification of the KPT
suggests itself, a modification I believe is in accord with the spirit
of the theory. Kripke and Putnam rely on our practice of identifying
something as a tiger, or at least as a paradigmatic tiger, in order to
determine the meaning of 'tiger'. But they can extend the instances
that determine the meaning of the term to include not only paradig-
matic tigers, but also paradigmatic non-tigers. To explain what an X
is, one would indicate examples of both X's and non-X's. Even inde-
pendently of their specific theory, this is surely a legitimate way to
introduce a concept into language. Moreover, the set of paradigmatic
non-tigers referred to in this procedure of reference determination
needn't be very large: it would suffice if it includes animals which
aren't tigers, but are closely related to tigers. If one points to a lion
as something that is not a tiger, then 'tiger' cannot name felines,
mammals or animals in general, otherwise it would name the lion as
well, the latter being a member of all these kinds.
Returning to the KPT, Kripke and Putnam can maintain that the
structural properties which determine whether or not something is a
tiger are those common to all paradigmatic tigers and not shared
by paradigmatic non-tigers. In this way, the structural properties
include as many characteristics as are needed to rule out lions and
leopards, but which are still common to all paradigmatic tigers.
But some indeterminacy lingers on even after this move. Suppose
that the only isotope of oxygen in the atmosphere were 016, that is
atoms that contain eight protons and eight neutrons in their nuclei; in
addition, suppose that there were no other atoms that had eight neut-
rons in their nuclei. If we discovered oxygen before discovering its
atomic structure, we would define it, according to the KPT, as any-
thing having the same structure as samples of 016. Now if one took
the common structure of all 016 atoms to consist in having exactly
eight protons and eight neutrons in their nuclei, that would exclude
all known samples of non-oxygen molecules; but then 017, when
discovered, again before discovering its atomic structure, shouldn't
count as oxygen - a result that may seem unsatisfactory. To avoid it,

one can count as the essential structural properties the minimal set
of structural properties that would distinguish the known samples
of oxygen from all known samples of non-oxygen. But here inde-
terminacy sets in again: in the situation described, those minimal
structural properties could be either having eight protons in the
nucleus or having eight neutrons in it. And though according to
the first alternative O17 would count as oxygen, it still wouldn't be
oxygen according to the second one; and the KPT, even in its more
sophisticated form, doesn't have any way to decide between the two
alternatives.4
One might suggest that to decide between the alternatives we
should consider which structural properties cause or are respons-
ible for the identifying properties of the kind. Suppose that in the
above example ol6 were identified by means of chemical reactions
in which it participated. Then, since the number of protons in the
nucleus influences these reactions to a much greater degree than
does the number of neutrons in it, the number of protons in the
nucleus should count as the essential property of the stuff.
I believe the discussion in sections 2.3 and 2.4 below will show
this suggestion to be untenable. But even if it were not so, the sug-
gestion departs too much from the spirit of the KPT to be acceptable
by an adherent of the theory. In contrast to the KPT, this sug-
gestion ascribes central importance to the properties by which we
identify members of the kind: the essential properties are determ-
ined as those responsible for definite identifying properties. Kripke
and Putnam, however, belittle the importance of identifying proper-
ties. As mentioned above, according to them we might be mistaken
in some or even all of the identifying properties we ascribe to
members of a natural kind (Putnam, 1970, p. 142; Kripke, 1980,
pp. 118-120, 122, 137). This is why they attempt to determine the
essential properties by means of samples, not properties (Kripke,
1980, pp. 120-122, 135; Putnam, 1975, p. 234). The above sugges-
tion is therefore too far removed from their original theory to be
considered an acceptable modification of it in its defence.
I am not familiar with any other modification of the KPT that
picks out the essential properties of natural kinds in a way that
avoids the indeterminacy discussed above. However, Kripke and
166 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
Putnam may still reply that

indeterminate what would co
though in some cases it migh
easy to see that if we took th
of a natural kind to be the pro
its members, this indetermina
I now proceed to more conclu
2.2. Elementary Particles
A paradigm of natural kinds are elementary particles; if anything i

a natural kind, electrons, quarks and photons are. However, elemen-
tary particles have no structure - that is why they are elementary
particles. Hence, two elementary particles can be members of the
same natural kind not by virtue of having the same structure.
So why are all electrons members of the same natural kind? It is
because all electrons have exactly the same properties: exactly the
same charge, mass, and so on. We classify elementary particles into
kinds according to identity in properties, not according to identity in
structure.
The classification of elementary particles into kinds doesn't agree
with the points of the KPT listed above. It is according to properties
and not according to structure, no unknown structure is assumed to
exist, and the definition of the kind is not by reference to paradigms.
As classification into natural kinds by means of properties, a
classification that doesn't assume a common structure, is permiss-
ible in the case of elementary particles, it should be permissible
in the case of other objects and phenomena as well. Kripke and
Putnam didn't furnish us with any reason for using different meth-
ods of classification in different cases, and the fact that composite
objects and phenomena have a structure surely doesn't compel us
to limit ourselves to it in our classifications. I conclude that since
a classification into natural kinds, that doesn't assume a common
structure and is according to non-structural properties, is legitimate
in the case of elementary particles, it is generally legitimate.
2.3. Reactions to the Absence of a Common Essential Nature
Many classifications of ordinary language don't match any scientific

classification. For instance, the lowest biological taxon that includes
all the species we recognize as lilies includes onion and garlic as

well; and the lowest taxon that includes all moths includes all but-
terflies too (Dupre, 1981, pp. 74-75). Earth and air were taken to
be paradigms of natural kinds for more than 2000 years, yet they
don't appear in the classifications of contemporary science. This
was also the case with jade, which for centuries was thought to be a
single gemstone, until in 1863 two types were recognized, jadeite
and nephrite, chemically very different from each other; the two
minerals are similar only in their appearance and textural proper-
ties. Science did not discover any unknown structural or essential
properties that could separate lilies from other flowers, moths from
other insects, earth from other substances, etc. However, all these
discoveries did not affect our use of words: we still say that lilies
are beautiful, that the moth flies mainly at night, and so on. Should
this constitute a problem for the KPT?
As we have seen, Kripke and Putnam think that "the original
concept of [a natural kind] is: that kind of thing, where the kind
can be identified by paradigmatic instances" (Kripke, 1980, p. 122;
cf. pp. 120-121, 135; Putnam, 1975, p. 234). So, if the word 'moth'
meant anything having the essential nature - in this case genetic
structure - of these things, where 'these' referred to some paradig-
matic moths, then either butterflies are also moths, since the genetic
structure common to all the insects we called 'moth' is also com-
mon to butterflies; or, if butterflies are not moths, then it seems
that 'moth' shouldn't mean anything, since the samples we used
to define the supposed kind don't determine any kind of insect.
(On the KPT's account of definition, the second alternative arises
because the definition of moth was like the following definition: 'an
X is anything having the same ultimate constitution as these (and
here one points, say, to a dog, a horse and a man) and is not a
member of any of the kinds to which these belong (and here one
points, for instance, to another dog, a monkey, etc)'. This definition
of X clearly doesn't define any coherent concept.) It thus seems that
the KPT entails that a change in the use of a supposed natural kind
term should follow the discovery that the particulars, which were
considered members of that kind, do not have a distinctive uniform
nature. However, we go on to identify as moths all and only the
particulars that we would have identified as moths had the biological
168 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
facts not been discovered. How

theory against this problem?
Kripke seems to acknowledge t
that we cannot continue to use
used to if it is discovered that i
tive essential property in common
that there is one uniform subs
proves p radically in error, rea
declare [if it were to happen wi
gold, sometimes we may drop t
are not supposed to be exhausti
implies that the use of the term
discovery. But both options Krip
Firstly, we distinguish betwee
discovered not to be a natural k
distinguish between several kin
considered a natural kind: wher
between different things, we ca
sub-kinds of one natural kind o
distinctions doesn't show that th
involved the mistaken presuppo
nature or structure. Moreover,
doesn't presuppose, at present, a
continue to apply it to the sam
discovery. And, since use deter
proves that the meaning of the
tion of a uniform nature or struc
alternative actually shows his th
Secondly, the reason to drop a te
covered not to determine a nat
we continue to talk about moth
although none of them is used in
term if the distinctions made by
If people had been interested in
geologically important mineral,
talking about it after the discov
ally very different from each
as an ornament, no such change
one day people stop being interested in p

term 'electron'. So Kripke's second alternative is also not a reaction
to the discovery that there isn't "one uniform substance or kind in
the initial sample" and consequently it doesn't prove that the term's
meaning involved such a presupposition.
Indeed, Kripke says that "[t]hese possibilities are not supposed
to be exhaustive". However, no additional reaction has to take place.
And, as I have argued, these possible reactions are not reactions to
the discovery that the original sample doesn't have a uniform nature
or structure, so they don't justify Kripke's claim that the meaning of
a supposed natural kind term involves such an assumption. Finally,
the fact that the use of a supposed natural kind term need not be
affected by the discovery that members of the kind don't have a
distinctive and uniform structure or nature is sufficient to show that
even before the discovery the meaning of the term didn't involve
such an assumption.
Putnam says the following on the consequences of a discovery
that paradigms don't have a distinctive uniform structure: "But local
water, or whatever, may have two or more hidden structures - or
so many that 'hidden structure' becomes irrelevant, and superficial
characteristics become the decisive ones" (1975, p. 241; emphasis
added). And again, considering the same discovery: "[i]n that case
the necessary and sufficient condition for being 'water' would have
been possession of sufficiently many of the superficial characteris-
tics" (ibid.). So Putnam acknowledges that such a discovery should
have, according to his theory, semantic consequences.
But the coherence of the consequences Putnam describes is ques-
tionable. As he admits, the particulars we identify as members of
the kind don't change as a result of the discovery. He should also
acknowledge that the criteria used to apply the term don't change
either; after all, as the kind never had a distinctive structure, the
only criteria we could use before the discovery, as well as after it,
were those he calls 'superficial'. Thus, there is no change in the
way the term is applied, and therefore no reason to assume that the
necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the kind term
have changed. And since after the discovery the only possible neces-
sary and sufficient conditions are those relying on the 'superficial'
properties, we have no reason to assume that the relevant conditions
170 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
before the discovery were differen

the term is used doesn't change a
the conclusion that its meaning
meaning is determined by use. An
the discovery involves only the
meaning before the discovery.
In addition, most people who t
ignorant of the mentioned scien
indifferent to them; a strange fac
to it science, by discovering ess
these people talk about.
To recapitulate, the KPT entail
ledge, that the discovery that
have a uniform and distinctive s
sequences. But the linguistic c
result of the discovery of the lack
and the semantic change Putnam
the indifference of language u
seems at odds with the KPT, and
unchanged use of terms is in disag
2.4. Application of Old Terms to
Kripke and Putnam rely heavily

attempts to refute description t
establish their essentialist theor
in which we discover something
which we identify things as m
but (2) differs in some structura
formerly counted as belonging t
newly discovered thing is not a me
1980, pp. 120, 128; Putnam, 19
structure of a natural kind is un
covered something that had all
kind but differed from all othe
structure, then although we would
kind as the other members we w
pp. 120-121; Putnam ibid.; 1990,
by maintaining that we always
essential nature determines whether or n

to the same natural kind. Their claim is not just that members of
a single kind may be further divided into several sub-kinds when
additional differences between them are discovered. This claim is
insufficient, neither to refute a description theory of natural kind
terms nor to support any kind of essentialism. Their claim is that it
would be absolutely incorrect to consider something as a member of
the same natural kind as paradigms of that kind, if it didn't share a
possibly unknown structure with them.
Now, this claim has been found either counter-intuitive or at least
questionable by many, and the thought experiments are certainly not
compelling. Applied to Putnam's famous example, some find it intu-
itive to maintain that before 1750 it wouldn't have been a mistake
to count liquid XYZ as water, although subsequently it would have
been discovered to be a different kind of water. As far as intuitions
are concerned, the most Kripke and Putnam achieve is a draw.
Is there any other source of data that can decide between the
different claims? We can search for relevant data in the history of
science. We should look for the following scenario. Scientists are
familiar with a certain natural kind, say a certain substance, which
is found in specific circumstances. They are, however, ignorant of
its structural properties, which presumably determine the properties
they know. Some substance is then discovered in markedly different
circumstances, but it nevertheless has all the known properties of
the substance they are already familiar with. However, the circum-
stances are sufficiently dissimilar for differences in some unknown
structural properties to be plausible. If the scientists show reserva-
tions in identifying the newly discovered substance with the old one,
because of their ignorance of the substances' structures, this would
support the KPT; while if such reservations do not arise, then this
would be evidence against it.
It should be remembered that Kripke and Putnam attempt to
describe the way natural kind terms are actually used, by laymen
as well as by scientists, and that they do not engage in linguistic
legislation. They repeatedly refer to what we would presumably say,
and Putnam explicitly claims that he describes what scientists would
say (1975, p. 235; 1990, pp. 59-60). The practice of scientists is,
thus, highly relevant to an appreciation of the KPT.
172 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
I believe the discovery of sugar in sugar-beet fits our scenano.

In 1747, Andreas Sigismund Marggraf (1709-1782) published a
paper in which he described how he managed to extract and crys-
talize sugar from several plants, including the white mangel-wurzel.
The details of the extraction and crystallization are irrelevant to the
present topic, but Marggraf's reasons for the identification of the
substance he extracted as sugar are not. He writes that he extracted
"a beautiful and firm crystallized salt, which had all properties of
sugar" (? 5, p. 5)5 In section 15, he emphasizes again the identity
in properties between the substance he extracted and ordinary sugar,
extracted from sugar-cane. Marggraf also looked at the crystals of
the substances through a microscope and observed their identical
form (? 3). All these observations sufficed for him in order to
identify confidently the substance he extracted as sugar, and even
as "real sugar" ("wahre Zucker", title & ? 21). As far as I know, his
judgment was never contested.
Notice that Marggraf relies only on observable properties of
sugar in order to establish his identification. Thus, according to
Kripke and Putnam, Marggraf's evidence for identifying the new
substance as sugar was inconclusive, since he did not know if the
substance he extracted from the white mangel-wurzel had the same
structure as cane-sugar, not to say the same 'ultimate constitution'.
However, neither Marggraf (who might have been biased in favor of
the identification) nor any of his contemporaries (who could have
been biased against it) showed any doubts concerning the identi-
fication of the new substance as sugar. Of course, had Marggraf
classified the new substance as sugar, because he believed it had
exactly the same unknown microstructure as cane-sugar, then we
would have been justified in arguing that he didn't have conclu-
sive evidence for his classification. But Marggraf never expressed
such a belief, nor do we have any indication that he thought micro-
structure relevant to his purposes. Putnam's declaration, that "when
Archimedes asserted that something was gold ... he was saying that
it had the same general hidden structure (the same 'essence', so to
speak) as any normal piece of local gold" (1975, p. 235; cf. Putnam,
1990, pp. 59-60), doesn't find any support in Marggraf's case.
A discrepancy between the claims of the KPT and the actual use
of natural kind terms exists also in cases where a new kind of thing
is discovered which is very similar to, thou

an already known second kind of thing.
the KPT, since in such cases we have a go
essential properties to differ, the two kind
two sub-kinds of one more inclusive natu
not always the case.
For example, Marggraf, in his attempts to extract sugar from
several plants, succeeded in extracting from the "beautiful roses" a
substance which he called 'a kind of sugar' ('eine Art Zucker'; ? 22,
p. 13). This kind of sugar was sufficiently different from cane-sugar
for Marggraf to recognize that they are not identical substances; they
were, however, similar enough for him to decide that it is a different
kind of sugar. Contemporary chemistry follows Marggraf: what he
extracted from the beautiful roses was grape-sugar, whose defini-
tion in one modem dictionary (OALD; italics added) is "dextrose
or glucose, a type of sugar found in ripe grapes and other kinds of
fruit." Two things are important here. Firstly, Marggraf considered
grape-sugar to be a kind of sugar, though it was obvious that it is
not identical with cane-sugar. Secondly, the considerations both for
taking the new substance to be a kind of sugar and for taking it to
be sugar of a different kind were independent of any considerations
relating to unknown structural properties; at least, Marggraf never
mentions such considerations in his paper.
Marggraf's grape-sugar case is far from unique in the history of
science. Biology supplies us with further examples. When North
American trees were first studied by botanists, a kind of tree was
discovered that was very similar to the European beech though
it differed from it in having, among other things, larger leaves.
Both species were thus assigned to the genus Fagus (beech), the
European species being called Fagus sylvatica and the American
species Fagus grandifolia (Dupre, 1981, pp. 71-72). Thus, what
made botanists consider Fagus grandifolia to be a kind of beech
wasn't its unknown genetic code or other essential properties, con-
trary to what the KPT claims; it was its more readily observable
properties.
To account for scientists' classifications of grape-sugar as sugar
and of Fagus grandifolia as beech, Kripke and Putnam can fall
back on the indeterminacy involved according to their theory in the
174 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
determination of the essential

above, ? 2. 1). Suppose the esse
ficient for distinguishing par
other known substances. Then possibly both a narrower and a wider
set of essential properties are sufficient for this distinction; and while
the narrower set would determine grape-sugar, when discovered, as
sugar, it wouldn't be sugar according to the wider set. That is why,
Kripke and Putnam might maintain, scientists classified grape-sugar
as sugar, though sugar of a different kind: the scientists struck a kind
of compromise between two possible sets of essential properties.
But firstly, Marggraf didn't know whether or not grape-sugar is
structurally more similar to cane-sugar than to any other known sub-
stance: his classifications were guided by the more readily observ-
able properties of the substances. There is no evidence that hypo-
theses concerning structure were involved. And secondly, according
to the suggested response, if grape-sugar had later been discovered
to have more structural properties in common with some other
known substance than with cane-sugar, that would have entailed that
its classification as grape-sugar was a mistake. Analogously, when it
was discovered that the marsupial mouse is genetically closer to the
kangaroo than to the placental mouse, it should have been concluded
that it had been a mistake to call it a marsupial mouse. But no such
scientific misgivings are detectible. The suggested response is thus
unsupported by the data.
A debate about whether or not grape-sugar is a kind of sugar
or Fagus grandifolia a kind of beech is misguided. The degree of
arbitrariness in linguistic conventions is sufficient to allow scient-
ists to count glucose either as a kind of sugar or as a new kind of
substance; and the same applies to Fagus grandifolia. If a newly
discovered thing is more similar to a certain known kind of thing
than to any other known kind, then it would probably be called by
the same name plus some modifier, though no one would compel
the discoverer to use this rather than that appellation. There is no
fact of the matter that should determine whether or not grape-sugar
is "really" sugar.
Kripke and Putnam, in contrast, ascribe to language more strict-
ness than it in fact shows, as is manifest in their modal claims.
Both claim that natural kinds couldn't have had a structure differ-
ent from the one they in fact have (Kr

1975, p. 233)6 However, since grape-sugar has a molecular structure
different from that of cane-sugar, then if it is considered to be a
kind of sugar (a rather arbitrary decision), it follows that people in
1700 were right if they said that sugar can have a structure different
from that of the sugar they know; while if it is considered not to be
sugar (again a rather arbitrary decision), it follows that people back
then may have been right to hold that sugar cannot have a structure
different from that of the sugar they use. Thus, the arbitrariness in
linguistic conventions leaves the modal facts indeterminate in these
cases. For the same reason, the truth value of the general claim,
made before the discovery of North America, that all beech trees
around the world have small leaves, was indeterminate, since the
decision to count Fagus grandifolia as a new kind of beech was
partly arbitrary.7
Although some may find this indeterminacy undesirable, I don't
think there is anything unacceptable in it. Such indeterminacy
usually doesn't exist, since the generalizations we make are sup-
posed to apply to specific domains, and these usually don't include
any very similar unknown kinds. And in case a generalization is sup-
posed to apply also to domains that do include such unknown kinds,
then once the unknown kinds are discovered further distinctions
will be made that would remove any possible misunderstanding.
So, there is no reason to oppose such indeterminacy of modal and
general claims.
A move that might be thought open to Kripke and Putnam at this
stage is to maintain that though it is either possible that, or inde-
terminate whether there could be sugar, tigers, etc. with a structure
different from that of the particulars we know, our sugar and tigers
couldn't have had a structure different from the one they actually
have. Kripke in fact makes such a move in response to an objec-
tion to his modal arguments, in note 68 (p. 133) of Naming and
Necessity. However, such a response is ineffective. Kripke's claims
are about kinds of particulars, not about a contingent set of actually
existing particulars. Accordingly, 'our tigers' cannot mean this tiger
over here, that one over there, etc.; after all, other tigers which are
of the same kind as the tigers actually existing are possible. So 'our
tigers' should mean something like tigers of exactly the same kind
176 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
(or kinds) as those actually exi

same kind as, yet different in some structural characteristics from
all existing or known tigers are certainly possible: each tiger is a
unique particular, different from all of its co-specifics in some struc-
tural and other properties, yet nonetheless a tiger. So all that Kripke
can maintain is the tautology that tigers of exactly the same kind
as those actually existing or known cannot differ from the latter in
structural characteristics that matter for classification. But this tau-
tology doesn't entail that we assume each natural kind has essential
yet possibly unknown properties, which are its structural properties,
and that this assumption is somehow involved in the kind term's
meaning; or that the original definition of a natural kind term is by
reference to paradigms. These latter claims, however, are the ones
distinctive of the KPT.
To review this long sub-section, I have criticized Kripke's and
Putnam's claims about how we would classify newly discovered
things that are identical in their known properties to members of
a natural kind we are already familiar with. Their claims, I have
argued, are clearly not intuitive and historical cases speak against
them as well. Moreover, the considerations guiding the application
of terms of old kinds to newly discovered different kinds don't fit
their theory either. And their modal claims are unsustainable given
the degree of arbitrariness in linguistic conventions.
I believe the arguments in this section show that the KPT is false.
A better theory of the semantics of natural kind terms is called for. I
try to supply one in the next section.
3. THE SEMANTICS OF KIND TERMS
Ever since Frege's Begriffsschrift, philosophers have analyzed

natural language by means of the predicate calculus. The sentence
'All tigers are dangerous' is translated in the predicate calculus by
'(all x)(Tx -* Dx)'; that is, the common noun 'tiger' is taken to
be a predicate, just like the adjective 'dangerous', and to describe
the particulars to which the variable refers in the same way that
'dangerous' does. And this is the way common nouns in their typ-
ical occurrences in natural language are translated into the calculus.
Consequently, philosophers have taken common nouns to be pre-
dicates. A typical one-place predicate, like 'dangerous', ascribes a

property to its subject. The question then arose, what properties do
common nouns ascribe to the particulars they apply to? The way
to a description theory of kind terms was short. Even Kripke and
Putnam, despite their criticisms of description theories, still think
of natural kind terms as ascribing properties to particulars, but this
time essential properties.
However, the above translation is, I think, a distortion of the way
kind terms function in natural language. Kind terms are not predic-
ates; they are, basically, referring expressions. Their function in a
sentence is to refer to, "stand for", or denote particulars and not to
ascribe any property to them. 'Tiger' in 'Tigers are dangerous' is
not a predicate, but a referring expression - like 'Paul' in 'Paul is
clever'. This is in contrast with adjectives, which ascribe proper-
ties to particulars referred to by other expressions in the sentence.
'Are pretty' and 'runs very fast' do not refer to things, but say what
properties things have.
A comparison with plural definite descriptions and demonstra-
tives should make the manner of reference of kind terms clear. 'My
children' in 'My children are asleep' is used to refer to my children,
and the sentence says of each of them that he or she is asleep. In
'Some of these students are brilliant', 'these students' is used to
refer to all relevant students, and the sentence says that some of
them are brilliant. To return to kind terms, 'tigers' in 'Tigers are
dangerous' and 'Some tigers are beautiful' is used to refer to tigers
in the same way that 'my children' and 'these students' are used in
the former examples: it stands for each relevant tiger in the domain
of discourse.
Moreover, the only semantic function of kind terms in their basic
occurrences in natural language is to refer to particulars. The prop-
erties that we think members of a kind have are not part of the
meaning of the kind term. We rely on some of these properties when
we identify members of the kind to which the term applies, but the
semantic function of the term is to refer to members of the kind and
not to ascribe any property to them. In the same way, we rely on
properties we think Paul has when we identify him, but those prop-
erties are not part of the meaning of 'Paul'. In its typical occurrences
in language, 'Paul's semantic function is just to refer to Paul.
178 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
But is 'tiger' in (1) 'This animal is a tiger' a referring expression,

or does it ascribe properties to the animal, as does the adjective
'dangerous' in (2) 'This animal is dangerous'? I think none of these
alternatives is correct. Although 'tiger' in (1) is not used to refer to
a tiger, neither does it ascribe any property to the animal referred
to. (1) is analogous, in this respect, to the sentence (3) 'This man
is Paul', where 'Paul' is not used to refer to Paul, but neither does
it ascribe any property to him. (1) doesn't ascribe a property to the
animal, but classifies it as a tiger, and it does that because 'tiger' in
its basic uses refers to tigers. In that respect it is again analogous to
(3), which doesn't ascribe a property to the man, but says who he
is, and it does that because 'Paul' in its basic uses refers to Paul. In
contrast, it would be artificial to say that 'dangerous' in (2), 'This
animal is dangerous', is typically used to refer to anything. Should
it refer to dangerous things in general or only to dangerous animals?
Or perhaps to the property of being dangerous? I find it more intuit-
ive to say that 'dangerous' ascribes a property to the animal referred
to, without itself referring to anything.
My view, that kind terms are referring expressions, obviously
stands in need of further clarification and justification within the
framework of a more general semantic theory. But the presentation
of such a theory is not the topic of this paper. Here I shall only show
how this view is superior to both the description theory and the KPT
in accounting for the semantical features of kind terms.
As the principal purpose of language is communication, and as
kind terms are referring expressions, all members of a community
that speak the same language should intend to refer to the same
things when they use the same kind term. The intended referents
of a kind term are what the informed speaker would identify as
members of that kind. Quite often, different people identify the same
particulars as members of the same kind by means of different sets
of criteria. These different sets may partly overlap, one set may
include another, and in extreme cases two sets may have no criterion
in common. For example, a botanist knows much more than I do
about elms and he can, therefore, identify elms by means of criteria
I am ignorant of. Nevertheless, we usually agree on the trees we
identify as elms, and in cases of disagreement one of us will be
found mistaken. Thus, we say the same thing when we say 'There's
an elm in the front quad'. This is because the word 'elm' is not used
to ascribe any property to elms, but just to refer to them - and we
refer to the same things.
Accordingly, a theory that takes kind terms to be referring expres-
sions is immune to an objection to description theories of such terms
we encountered above (? 1). As we saw there, because of the differ-
ence in knowledge and beliefs between people and between cultures,
it cannot be maintained that a natural kind term is a covert descrip-
tion comprising properties we ascribe to members of that kind: if
that were the case, communication would be all but impossible.
The theory suggested in this section doesn't have this unacceptable
consequence. Since the semantic function of kind terms is to refer,
people mean the same thing when they use the same kind term as
long as they refer with it to the same things, whether or not their
knowledge about these things is the same. The case with kind terms
here is like that with proper names, since both are referring expres-
sions. Different people can mean the same thing when they say
'Paul is in his room', although what they know and think of Paul
differs, since they use 'Paul' to refer to one and the same person.
Analogously, although they were ignorant of water's constitution,
what people in the 12th century were saying when they said 'Fish
live in water' is what people nowadays say when they utter that
sentence, since both would identify the same stuff as water.
As I shall now show, the theory that kind terms are referring
expressions can also account for the fact that we may prove to be
mistaken in ascribing a certain property to particulars of a given
kind, without this mistake affecting the meaning of the correspond-
ing term or concept. This fact was perhaps Kripke's and Putnam's
strongest ground for rejecting description theories of natural kind
terms; it also made them think that the right way to define a
natural kind is by means of paradigms. The fact that the theory sug-
gested here can account for this semantic phenomenon is, therefore,
significant.
Firstly, suppose we thought tigers were reincamations of dead
murderers, but later came to recognize that we were wrong. As this
mistaken opinion never played a part in identifying anything as a
tiger, the same particulars would be identified as tigers whether we
hold it or not. Thus, as 'tiger' is a referring expression, and as its
180 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
reference didn't change when the mistake was acknowledged, its

meaning didn't change either. A property that is not used as a cri-
terion of identification can be ascribed or denied to particulars of
a kind without the corresponding term changing its meaning. What
forced an ad hoc modification of the description theory (? 1) is an
immediate result of the present theory.
Secondly, even if an identifying property were due to some kind
of mistake, we could come to recognize our mistake without this
affecting the meaning of the relevant term. For instance, suppose
again it were discovered that tigers didn't have stripes, and that
we thought they had it only because of the alternating shades and
lights cast on their bodies between trees in the jungle. As there was
a general agreement between users of the word 'tiger' on which
particulars are tigers and which are not, and as the particulars did
have most of the properties that we used in order to identify them
as tigers, we would carry on calling them 'tigers'. Thus, as long as
there is an agreement about the application of a kind term, a few
criteria of identification can be found false without affecting the
meaning of the term.
We have seen above (? 1), that although a cluster-concept theory
succeeds in supplying necessary conditions for membership of a
given kind (having most of the identifying properties), it fails to
supply the corresponding sufficient conditions. This is not a fault
in the theory. I believe such sufficient conditions, conditions that
would cover all possible cases, do not exist. In case a thing has all
the identifying properties of a kind, it is a member of that kind. But
there are several ways in which particulars can be members of a
kind although they don't have a few of the kind's identifying prop-
erties. Firstly, when one of our identification procedures is proved
to involve a mistake, but the rest of the identifying properties suffice
to pick out as members of the kind the things we previously thought
are members of that kind, we would probably continue to use them
as the only identifying properties. This is the hypothetical case of
the stripeless tigers considered above. Secondly, if we discover that
an identifying property of a certain kind gives, for a few particulars,
results that contradict the results given by most of the identifying
properties of that kind, we may reject or alter it and take ourselves
to have been mistaken in considering some particulars as members
of that kind. As in a democracy, what decides is the agreement of the

majority. That was probably the case with having a certain shape as
an identifying property of fish: when it was noticed that dolphins,
in contrast to fish, don't have gills or scales, that they don't spawn,
that their young suck, that they are not mute and so on, people came
to think that a typical hydrodynamic shape is insufficient for being
a fish. Thirdly, in the case of biological species, if an organism has
most of the properties typical members of a certain species have and
is the offspring of typical members, then we would count it as a
member of the same species. And there are probably other ways
as well in which a particular can be a member of a kind while
lacking this or that identifying property. The purpose of our con-
ventions, here as elsewhere, is to aid communication; and this can
be achieved, and sometimes facilitated, even if a degree of arbit-
rariness is admitted into our conventions. That is why the sufficient
conditions for something being a member of a given kind cannot be
codified. When it comes to fixing a defective practice, opportunism
reigns.
The theory that kind terms are referring expressions is intended to
apply to natural kind terms as well as to other kind terms; to water as
well as to wine, jadeite as well as jade. Natural kind terms, however,
do have some semantic characteristics that distinguish them from
other kind terms. Natural kinds have an inexhaustible number of
distinctive properties, which are not logically derivable from each
other (Mill, A System of Logic, 8th edition, 1.VII.4, 4.VI.4;8 cf.
Russell, 1948, p. 335). Because of these characteristics, for every
natural kind there is always the possibility that it will be discovered
to have some hitherto unknown property, which will then be used
to identify members of this kind. For example, when the freezing
point of water was discovered, it could be used to determine whether
some new sample of liquid is water. This definition of natural kinds
explains why elementary particles are such kinds, a fact that created
a problem to the KPT (? 2.2).
In addition, because of their many distinctive properties, which
are non-logically interconnected, many law-like generalizations
involving natural kinds are possible. As a result, natural kinds play
an important role in natural science. But this is already a topic for
182 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
epistemology and not for semantics, while this paper discusses the
semantics of kind terms.
According to the theory propounded in this paper, there isn't any
difference between natural kind terms and other kind terms in their
semantic function, in the way their reference is determined, or in
the way they are introduced into language. The only difference is
in the dynamics of the identifying properties of natural kind terms.
Moreover, if a kind that we have assumed to be natural is discovered
not to be such, this in itself doesn't have any semantic implications.
If the reference of a term was agreed upon before the discovery, then,
since the function of a kind term is to refer, there is no hindrance to
continuing to apply the term in the same way as before. In contrast,
we have seen (? 2.3) that a consequence of the KPT is that some
semantic change should follow such a discovery and that it cannot
account for the continued undisturbed use of terms.
To recapitulate. Taking kind terms to be referring expressions
explains how the meaning of what we say need not be affected
by the fact that different people know different things and identify
in different ways the kinds they talk about. It also explains how
we can be mistaken in the properties, including some identifying
properties, that we ascribe to members of these kinds, without this
mistake affecting either the reference of our words or the meaning of
what we say. It, thus, meets the difficulties that confronted descrip-
tion theories of kind terms. Moreover, adopting Mill's conception
of natural kinds, the theory explains how the referents of a natural
kind term can affect the properties used to identify the kind: there
are always unknown distinctive properties of a given natural kinZd to
be discovered and, once discovered, they may be used to identify it.
Finally, in contrast to the KPT, the theory propounded here doesn't
accord any special place in semantics to structural or other allegedly
unknown essential properties, nor does it conceive of samples as
initially determining the real meaning of a natural kind term.9
NOTES
1 Cf. Hempel (1965, pp. 138-139). Putnam (1975) often contrasts hidde
ture with superficial characteristics, the latter being what philosophers
natural kind terms mean or connote. As can be seen from Nagel's list, there
needn't be anything literally superficial in the properties we ascribe to members
of a natural kind. These properties may not be e

may presuppose a lot of scientific theory. Acco
might be misleading, I shall not use it below.
2 See also Zemach (1976), ?111 on this point.
3 This difficulty is mentioned by Devitt and Sterelny (1987, ?5.3).
4 Related points were made by Papineau (1979, pp. 159-162) and Donnellan
(1983, ?VII). Papineau mentions some relevant historical examples.
5 I am translating from a German version of Marggraf's original paper, a ver-
sion published in Marggraf's lifetime in his Chymischen Schriften, Berlin 1767.
Ohad Parnes supplied me with Marggraf's paper. The discussion in this section is
indebted to our correspondence on these topics.
6 Putnam mitigated his modal claims in later works; see his 1990, pp. 69-70. But
the indeterminacy for which I argue below seems more extensive than the one he
admits.
7 In the October 1957 issue of Analysis, J.L. Austin presented a 'problem': 'All
swans are white or black': does this refer to possible swans on canals on Mars? In
the April 1958 issue of the same journal, he reported on the responses submitted
and his own opinions of the matter. The point he intended to raise was "the limits
of reference, in special connexion with the word 'all' ". He was "constructing a
not-too-serious contemporary version of the text-book case, where the Ancient
said 'All swans are white' before Australia was discovered or even thought of:
should we really assume without question that [the Ancient] was referring to (or,
that his assertion referred to) 'possible swans in undiscovered parts of the earth' ?"
(p. 97). Austin concludes his report in saying: "Perhaps the Ancient is unfairly
treated if, on the discovery of black swans in Australia, his assertion is simply
said to have been false: yet he must now withdraw or qualify it" (p. 98). I find my
approach to the element of semantic indeterminacy that follows from the partial
arbitrariness in classification of kinds in accord with Austin's attitude.
8 Mill calls natural kinds 'real kinds' or 'Kinds' with a capital 'K'. The term
'natural kind' was introduced only later, by John Venn, in his Logic of Chance
of 1866, as another name for Mill's real kinds. (The reference to Venn is from
Hacking, 1991, pp. 111-112 and note 4.)
The term 'natural kind' is infelicitous. It suggests that natural kinds are to be
contrasted with artificial kinds, but that is not the case. As both Wiggins (1980,
p. 89) and Wilkerson (1988, ? 2) remarked, we can fabricate in the laboratory
materials, including such that are not found elsewhere in nature, that would
qualify as natural kinds. Mill's 'real kinds' is unsatisfactory as well, because it
suggests that other kinds are not real: that tables, and perhaps even soil (is soil a
Millian real kind?), do not really exist. These terminological reservations made, I
shall continue to use the term 'natural kind'.
9 I am grateful to Chris Daly, Vered Glickman, Peter Hacker, John Hyman,
Ohad Parnes, Philip Percival, Roger Teichmann and Ruth Weintraub for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
184 HANOCH BEN-YAMI
REFERENCES
Austin, J.L. (1957-58): "Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 12", Analysis 18,
pp. 97-98.
Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1987): Language and Reality: an Introduction to the
Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.
Donnellan, K.S. (1983): 'Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms', in C. Ginet
and S. Shoemaker (eds.) Knowledge and Mind, pp. 84-104, Oxford, OUP.
Dupre, J. (1981): 'Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa', The Philosophical Review
90, pp. 66-90.
Hacking, I. (1991): 'A Tradition of Natural Kinds', Philosophical Studies 61,
pp. 109-126.
Hempel, C.G. (1965): 'Fundamentals of Taxonomy', in Aspects of Scientific
Explanation, pp. 137-154, New York, The Free Press.
Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Oxford, Blackwell.
Marggraf, A.S. (1747): 'Chymische Versuche, einen wahren Zucker aus ver-
schiedenen Pflanzen, die in unseren Landern wachsen, zu ziehen', reprinted in
E.O. von Lippmann (ed.) (1907): Die beiden Grundschriften der Rubenzucker-
fabrikation, pp. 1-13, Leipzig, Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.
Mill, J.S.: A System of Logic, Eighth edition.
Nagel, E. (1960, 19792): The Structure of Science. Indianapolis & Cambridge,
Hackett Publishing Company.
Papineau, D. (1979): Theory and Meaning, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Putnam, H. (1970): "Is Semantics Possible?", reprinted in his (1975) Mind,
Language and Reality, pp. 139-152, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1975): "The Meaning of 'Meaning' ", reprinted in his (1975) Mind,
Language and Reality, pp. 215-271, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1981): Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Putnam, H. (1988): Representation and Reality, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.
Putnam, H. (1990): "Is Water Necessarily H20?", in his Realism With a Human
Face, pp. 54-79, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Russell, B. (1948): Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, London, George
Allen and Unwin.
Wiggins, D. (1980): Sameness and Substance, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wilkerson, T.E. (1988): "Natural Kinds", Philosophy 63, pp. 29-42.
Zemach, E.M. (1976): "Putnam's Theory of the Reference of Substance Terms",
The Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 116-127.
Philosophy Department
Tel-Aviv University
Tel-Aviv 69978
Israel

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The Semantics of Kind Terms

Author(s): Hanoch Ben-Yami

THE SEMANTICS OF KIND TERMS

(Received in revised form 3 April 1999)

The theory of the semantics of natural kind terms presented by

La Philosophical Studies 102: 155-184, 2001.

1. PROBLEMS OF DESCRIPTION THEORIES OF NATURAL KIND

ones. Moreover, when asked to explain what a member of a specific

Well, can tigers be small herbi

thing that is in a certain state of aggregation, has a certain color, a

theory, what people in the 1

uninitiated person looks just like the substance which we discovered

2. A CRITIQUE OF KRIPKE AND PUTNAM ON NATURAL KIND

2.1. Exposition and Elaboration of Kripke 's and Putnam's Theory

p. 60) or 'microstructure' (ibid., p. 69). But the claim that atomic

count as oxygen - a result that may seem unsatisfactory. To avoid it,

Putnam may still reply that

2.2. Elementary Particles

A paradigm of natural kinds are elementary particles; if anything i

2.3. Reactions to the Absence of a Common Essential Nature

Many classifications of ordinary language don't match any scientific

all the species we recognize as lilies includes onion and garlic as

facts not been discovered. How

one day people stop being interested in p

before the discovery were differen

2.4. Application of Old Terms to

Kripke and Putnam rely heavily

essential nature determines whether or n

I believe the discovery of sugar in sugar-beet fits our scenano.

is discovered which is very similar to, thou

determination of the essential

ent from the one they in fact have (Kr

(or kinds) as those actually exi

3. THE SEMANTICS OF KIND TERMS

Ever since Frege's Begriffsschrift, philosophers have analyzed

dicates. A typical one-place predicate, like 'dangerous', ascribes a

But is 'tiger' in (1) 'This animal is a tiger' a referring expression,

reference didn't change when the mistake was acknowledged, its

of that kind. As in a democracy, what decides is the agreement of the

of a natural kind. These properties may not be e

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