Political Law Cases - Part4

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sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations. In this case, the “in lieu of other taxes” provision does not expressly provide in clear and
unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of tax exemption is
not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon City’s
franchise tax.
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (2005)
Facts: The notice of assessment of business taxes against BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation did not
state the legal basis of the business taxes assessed. The City Treasurer claimed that the condominium
owners were making profit by making the condominium’s market price higher through its amenities
Doctrine: BA Lepanto is not liable for business taxes because Yamane’s notice of assessment did not
state the legal basis of the tax. Sec. 131(d) of the Local Government Code defines business as “trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit” and as the
purpose of the condominium corporation has nothing to do with profit-making (as the owner of the
condominium unit and not the condominium corporation obtains profit from the sale of the units and it is
also the owner who pays capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium) it does not fall
under the definition of a business which is liable to pay business taxes.
pals political law reviewer

Secretary of Finance v. Ilarde (2005)
Facts: Cabaluna was charged more than 24% of the land taxes due him as penalty for his failure to pay
land taxes. He paid the amount under protest on the ground that the two regulations issued by the then
Minister of Finance which served as the basis for penalty for delinquent payments, violated Sec. 66 of the
Real Property Tax Code, which imposed a 24% limit on penalties for delinquent taxes.
Doctrine: Both regulations are invalid because they go beyond the 24% limit prescribed by Sec. 66 of the
Real Property Tax Code. The issuance of Executive Order (EO) 73 (which the Minister of Finance claims is
the basis of the two regulations in question) did not alter the structure of real property tax assessments
as provded for in the Real Property Tax Code. The provision in Sec. 2 of EO 73 giving the Minister of
Finance the power to “promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement” the said EO does
not give the Minister of Finance the authority to tinker with the rates of penalty on delinquency taxes in
the Real Property Tax Code because EO 73 did not cover the topic of amendment of rates of delinquest
taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. However, from January 1992 onwards, it
is the Local Government Code that will govern (in this case the assessed taxes were for 1986-1992 and
1991-1992).
Smart Communications Inc. v. Davao City (2008)
Facts: Smart argued that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from the payment of local franchise tax
because its legislative franchise allegedly exempts it from all taxes by way of the national franchise tax
which is paid “in lieu of all taxes.”
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Doctrine: Smart is liable to pay Davao’s franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly
provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The “in lieu of all taxes” clause in Smart’s legislative
franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national
taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax
exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority.
4. Closure and opening of roads
Favis v. City of Baguio (1969)
Facts: The City Council of Baguio passed a resolution permitting the lease of two city lots to Shell, which
caused the street used by Favis as his ingress/egress to be diminished.
Doctrine: The resolution is valid because the city is empowered by its Charter to close or reduce the size
of a city street. By the resolution, no right of the public is defeated (the portion leased to Shell not being
necessary for public use). The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, unless there be fraud or collusion. In determining the
advisability of closing a street, the municipality must consider the following: a) the topography of the
property surrounding the street in light of ingress and egress to other streets, b) the relationship of the
street in the road system throughout the subdivision, c) the problem posed by the ‘dead end’ of the
street, d) the width of the street, e) the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the street as contrasted to its
ultimate value to all of the property in the vicinity, d) inconvenience of those visiting the subdivision, and
e) whether the closing of the street would cut off any property owners from access to a street.
Sanggalang v. IAC (1989)
Facts: The Bel-Air Village Association contested the action of the Mayor of Makati of ordering the
opening of Jupiter street to the public to decongest traffic and for public convenience, arguing that Jupiter
Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air residents.
Doctrine: The Mayor’s act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for
public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local
executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.
5. Legislative power
a) Requisites for valid ordinance
b) Local initiative and referendum
6. Corporate powers
a) To sue and be sued
Department of Public Services Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations (1961)
Facts: The Mayor and Municipal Board of Manila moved to dismiss the case filed against them by the
Department of Public Services Labor Union to enforce Republic Act 1880, which reduced the 7 day work
week of government employees to 5 days. The Mayor claiming that the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that they were immune from suit.
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Doctrine: The CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case since the City of Manila, through the
Department of Public Services (in which the laborers worked), performed governmental functions (i.e.,
functions where it does not obtain pecuniary profit but only acts in the interest of health, safety and
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally) and therefore acted as an
agent of the state and is immune from suit, unless it gives express consent to be sued.
Municipal Board of Cebu City v. Court of Tax Appeals (1964)
Facts: The Municipal Board, representing Cebu City, appealed the exemption from realty taxes granted
by the Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed
the case on the ground that the Board of Assessment Appeals is merely the instrumentality of the City of
Cebu and the latter, being a governmental agency, is not among those who may appeal to the CTA
because it is not a “person, association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment
Appeals” who may file an appeal in the CTA.
Doctrine: The City of Cebu can appeal from the Board of Assessment Appeals decision. The City of Cebu
constitutes a political body corporate created by a special charter (Commonwealth Act No. 58), endowed
with the powers which pertain to a municipal corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and
be sued.
Calleja v. CA (1967)
Facts: Calleja, a civil service employee whose position was abolished by the municipal council of Iriga for
lack of funds, filed an action for mandamus against the Municipality of Iriga, which was granted. A copy of
the decision was given to the Provincial Fiscal representing Iriga but the notice of appeal and appeal
bond was filed not by the Provincial Fiscal but by the municipal attorney. Calleja argued that it was only
the Provincial Fiscal who could represent Iriga.
Doctrine: The municipal attorney of a municipality is a legal officer of the municipality and thus, can
represent the same. Sec. 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264 provides that the municipality may
create the office of Municipal Attorney who shall act as the legal counsel of the municipality. In addition,
the Municipal Council of Iriga passed Resolution 36 which provides that the Municipal Attorney shall be
the chief legal adviser of the municipality and has the duty to represent the municipality or any municipal
officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity.
Province of Cebu v. IAC (1987)
Facts: The officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective
municipalities), along with some taxpayers, hired a private attorney to sue for the nullification of the
donation made by Vice Gov. Almendras.
Doctrine: The hiring of the private attorney in this case is called for. Although the rule is that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in law suits, and
although private attorneys cannot collaborate with the fiscal and municipal attorney unless there is
board authorization, the municipality may hire a private lawyer provided it be expressly limited to
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situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. Here, the Provincial Board would
never have given authorization for the hiring of a private attorney. Furthermore, even if the provincial
fiscal should side with the governor in the filing of the case in question, the provincial board, whose
members are defendants in this case, can simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case
or by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation. Thus, this case falls under the
situation where a private attorney may be hired by the municipality as the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to represent it.
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. CA (1994)
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) questioned the authority of Private Attorney Mendiola to
represent the municipality of Pililla in the computation of PPC’s business tax.
Doctrine: Atty. Mendiola cannot represent Pililla. The municipality’s authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified from representing it
and for such exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality’s case must appear on record. In this case, the fiscal was not disqualified but merely refused
to represent the municipality, which refusal is not a legal justification to employ the services of a private
counsel. The municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal.
b) To acquire and sell property

Vergara v. Ombudsman (2009)
Facts: Vergara alleges that the agreements between the Mayor of Calamba (who was authorized by
Resolution 115 to negotiate and purchase a parcel of land for the new city hall) and Pamana Inc. and
Prudential Bank are void because they were not ratified by the city council.
Doctrine: Ratification by the city council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to be
able to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. Sec. 22 (c) of the Local Government Code only requires
prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolutions 115 and 280 were the City
Council’s stamp of approval and authority for the mayor to purchase the subject lots. As such, the
agreements, though not ratified by the city council, are valid
City of Caloocan v. CA and Gotesco (2006)
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan passed Ordinance 68 which authorized the Mayor to
negotiate and sell the city’s patrimonial property. Mayor Asistio and Mr. Go of Ever Gotesco executed a
deed of absolute sale over the property. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued an ordinance
amending the previous ordinance to comply (and increasing the selling price) to secure the Commission
on Audit’s approval of the sale. The new mayor, Mayor Malonzo, vetoed the amended ordinance, refused
to sign the amended deed of sale, and filed suit to enjoin the registration of what he deemed was an
anomalous sale and to annul the deed of absolute sale and cancel the title issued to Gotesco.
Doctrine: Sec. 455 of the Local Government Code gives the Mayor the authority to file suits for the
recovery of funds and property for the city even without prior authorization from the Sanggunian. This is
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supported by Sec. 9 of the Caloocan City Charter which provides that the mayor has the power to
institute judicial proceedings to recover property and funds of the city. However, since the mayor is the
proper party to file such suits, he should necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-
shopping and not the City Legal Officer who was merely the City’s counsel and not a party to the case.
c) To enter into contracts

(i) Requisites
Vice Mayor Vicencio v. COA Chairman Villar, et al. (2012)
Facts: The new Vice Mayor, Vicencio, used Ordinance 15-2003 (authorizing then Vice Mayor Yambao to
enter into contracts for consultancy services) to also enter into a new contract for consultancy services
Doctrine: Vice Mayor Vicencio had no authority to enter into new consultancy contracts using Ordinance
15-2003, as the said Ordinance is not a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Sec. 456 of the Local Government Code
provides that there is no inherent authority on the part of the city Vice Mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
(ii) Ultra vires contracts
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, et al. (2012)

Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. argues that the favorable endorsement of the local government units
(LGUs) of Barangay Caticlan and Malay Municipality pursuant to the consultation procedures as required
by Local Government Code (LGC) was not obtained by the Province of Aklan, and that there were no
proper consultations entered into with the concerned LGUs when the Sangguniang Bayan of Caticlan
issued a resolution stating its strong opposition on the expansion of the port facilities at Caticlan.
Doctrine: There was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project. Sec. 16 of the
LGC provides that it is the duty of LGUs to promote the people’s right to a balanced ecology, and it is the
duty of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance to secure prior public
consultation and approval of the LGUs for these projects. As such, the project’s implementation was
illegal.
7. Liability of LGUs
Filinvest Land Inc. v. Flood-affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance (2007)
Facts: Homeowners of Meritville filed a complaint against Filinvest Land, Inc. (developer of Meritville)
because their lots were always flooded during the typhoon season allegedly due to the latter’s negligence.
Doctrine: Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code makes local government units responsible for providing
basic services and facilities (including those that deal with drainage, sewerage and flood control). As it is
the Naga River which overflows and causes flooding, and as the said river is public property, it is the
responsibility of the government, particularly the city government of Las Piñas City, to devise and
implement flood-control measures to address the problem.
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City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)
Facts: Teotico filed an action for damages against the City of Manila because he fell into an uncovered
manhole and suffered injuries. The City of Manila averred that it is not liable as Sec. 4 of the Charter of
the City of Manila states that the city “shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from...the negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or other enforcers” while enforcing
or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance. Teotico argued that
the city is liable under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, which holds provinces, cities and municipalities liable
for damages for the death of or injuries suffered by any person due to the defective condition of roads,
streets and other public works under their control and supervision.
Doctrine: The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to
“defective streets”, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not
decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the
object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in particular. On the allegation
of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street where Teotico was injured was a national
highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which responsibility is placed. It is enough
that the said province, city or municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road.
Guilatco v. City of Dagupan (1989)
Facts: Guilatco filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan because she fell into an uncovered
manhole on a sidewalk on Perez Boulevard, and suffered injuries. The City of Dagupan argued that Perez
Boulevard, where the drainage hole is located, is a national road which is not under the supervision or
control of the city.
Doctrine: The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. It is not necessary for the liability under Art. 2189 to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted, but it is only required that the province, city or municipality has either control
or supervision over said street or road. The City Charter clearly indicates that the city has supervision
and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located as the said charter provides that
the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of their use, may be legislated by the Municipal Board.
Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)
Facts: The heirs of Palafox filed an action for damages against the Province of Ilocos Norte when Palafox
died after he was hit by a truck being driven by a driver of the provincial government while the latter was
working in the highway construction.
Doctrine: The Province of Ilocos Norte is not liable for damages as the corporate liability of municipal
corporations only applies where the government is engaged in proprietary or business functions. To
attach liability to the state for the negligence of its officer or employee, the latter must be acting as a
special agent. In the case at bar, the Province of Ilocos Norte, through the driver of the truck, was engaged
in a governmental function and as such, cannot be sued for damages.
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Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. CA (2005)
Facts: Chan filed an action for damages against the Municipality of San Juan after she suffered injuries
when the tire of her car fell into a manhole left open due to the excavations at the corner of two roads in
San Juan.
Doctrine: The Municipality of San Juan is liable for damages, for it is not necessary for the liability under
Art. 2189 to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. It is only required that the province, city or municipality have either
control or supervision over said street or road. Although it was the Department of Public Works and
Highways that issued the permit to undertake the excavation, the Municipality of San Juan is still liable as
it is mandated to exercise supervision and control over the place in question, as the sangguniang bayan of
municipalities are mandated by the Local Government Code to regulate “the drilling and excavation of
the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, the building and repair of…sewers,
drains,” and it must also “adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes…and
similar hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons suffering from
them.”
Municipality of Tiwi and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi v. Betito (2010)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi (a municipality of Albay) authorized Mayor Corral, through a
resolution, to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi in the recovery of their rightful share in realty taxes to be
paid by the National Power Corporation to the province of Albay. Thus, Mayor Corral entered into a
Contract of Legal services with Atty. Betito and Atty. Lawenko.
Doctrine: The Court held that the Municipality of Tiwi is bound by the Contract of Legal Services entered
into by Mayor Corral as the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi (required under Sec. 44
of the Local Government Code for the Mayor to be able to contract on behalf of the municipality) was
granted by the said Sanggunian. The Sangguniang Bayan’s ratification of the contract, however, is not
necessary for the contract to bind Tiwi.
Fajardo v. Hon. Alfredo Lim (2006)
Facts: Fajardo filed an action for damages against Mayor Lim and City Administrator Marzan for not
releasing the checks for the purchase of Fajardo’s lots.
Doctrine: The Local Government Code requires the City Administrator to countersign the check
payment. As such, the judgment granting mandamus was directed to whoever was holding the Office of
City Administrator to release the checks. Mayor Lim was absolved of any civil liability and no damages
were awarded to Fajardo.
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8. Settlement of boundary disputes
Calanza v. PICOP (2009)
Facts: The Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) claims that the land it occupies – for
which Calanza secured a mining permit from Davao Oriental – is situated in Surigao del Sur and not in
Davao Oriental. When Calanza filed a case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), PICOP averred that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the dispute since the area is between two municipalities of two different
provinces.
Doctrine: The RTC has no original jurisdiction over the dispute, as Sec. 118 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) provides that boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. While
Sec. 119 of the LGC gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of the Sanggunian to the
RTC having jurisdiction over the area, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since
there was no petition that was filed and decided by the Sangguniang Panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC and Municipality of Cainta (1999)
Facts: The City of Pasig wanted to create two barangays which Cainta claims are the subjects of a
territorial dispute in a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Cainta wanted to
suspend or cancel the plebiscites for the creation of these two barangays.
Doctrine: The plebiscites must be suspended as the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta must
first be decided before plebiscites may be held, and the boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
Kananga v. Madrona (2003)
Facts: Kananga moved to dismiss the case involving a dispute between the Municipality of Kananga and
Ormoc City, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc, for lack of jurisdiction.
Doctrine: Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since one party is an independent
component city. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies
except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to hear and resolve
the dispute in the case at bar.
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9. Succession of elective officials
Unda v. COMELEC (1990)
Facts: Unda, the elected Vice Mayor, assumed the position of the deceased Mayor Guiling and was made
to succeed Guiling as protestee in an election protest filed by Rangiris.
Doctrine: Unda can substitute Guiling as protestee in the election protest filed by Rangiris place. The
Local Government Code states that the Vice Mayor stands next in line of succession to the Mayor in case
of a permanent vacancy in the latter’s position; as such, in this case, Unda as incumbent Vice Mayor
succeeded by operation of law to the vacated office of Mayor and is entitled to occupy the same for the
unexpired term of the deceased Mayor. As the successor, he is the one directly concerned in the fair and
regular conduct of the election, which makes him the real party in interest in the election protest filed by
Rangiris and in which he must be substituted as the protestee.
Macalincag v. Chang (1992)
Facts: The acting Secretary of Finance issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Makati
Municipal Treasurer Chang. Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone
has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official
function.
Doctrine: Preventive suspension under Sec. 41 of the Presidential Decree 807 (Civil Service Law) does
not provide for the requirement of designating a replacement for the preventive suspension to be
effected. Furthermore, Sec. 156 of Batas Pambansa 337 provides that in case of suspension of the
municipal treasurer, the assistant municipal treasurer or the treasury official next in rank shall
automatically assume the position. As such, Chang’s preventive suspension became effective upon his
receipt of the order of preventive suspension, making the designation of the officer-in-charge to replace
Chang immaterial to the effectivity of his suspension.
Sandoval v. COMELEC (1993)
Facts: Socrates, elected Mayor of Puerto Princesa, argued that the recall resolution, which allowed
Hagedorn to run in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a
fourth consecutive term for elective local officials, was improper due to the absence of notice to the
Preparatory Recall Assembly members.
Doctrine: The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall
election as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on
serving for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive
terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
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Montebon v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Potencioso on the ground that he has already
served three terms as municipal councilor, Potencioso argued that he is qualified to run anew because his
second term was interrupted when he succeeded as Vice Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza.
Doctrine: Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does
not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the
three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and he must have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an
interruption in Potencioso’s second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by operation of law and does not constitute
voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of
office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully
served his second term and as such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.
Mendoza v. Familara and COMELEC (2011)
Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Mendoza on the ground that he had already
served three consecutive terms, Mendoza argued that the three-term limit on barangay elective officials
in Republic Act 9164 (An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections)
was passed by Congress only in 2002 and should thus not cover the elections reckoned from 1994, thus
rendering him qualified to run for a new term as Barangay Captain.
Doctrine: Mendoza is disqualified from running as the three-term limit on barangay elective officials has
been embodied by the Barangay Law (enacted in 1988) even before the 1994 elections and was adopted
by the Local Government Code. The term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any
exclusion or qualification.
Mendoza et al. v. Laxina (2003)
Facts: Laxina took his oath of office and assumed office as Barangay Chairman. Fermo, a rival candidate,
filed an election protest and was declared by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) as the winner, and it
thereafter granted Fermo’s motion for execution pending appeal, causing Laxina to vacate the position
and relinquish it to Fermo. Subsequently, COMELEC annulled the MTC’s order granting execution of the
decision pending appeal and ordered Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman. He thereafter re-
took his oath of office. Mendoza and other barangay councilors filed a case against Laxina for making it
appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services before renewing his oath of office and
reassuming his office.
Doctrine: The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once
Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and
exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to stop him from
assuming office or discharging his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending
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appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTC’s decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo – or when Laxina was occupying the office of Barangay Captain –
was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality, because through the stay of the
MTC’s decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.
Mayor Abundo v. COMELEC (2013)
Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Abundo on the ground of the three-term limit,
Abundo argued that his second term is not to be counted in the three-term limit. In that election, he was
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest only after two years from the year of the
election and as such, the said period during which he served should not be considered as full service of
that particular term.
Doctrine: Abundo is not disqualified from running for another term. For an official to be disqualified, the
official concerned must have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and should have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, his opponent Torres served as Mayor
for two years of his second term before he (Abundo) was declared the rightful winner in the mayoralty
contest. This period should be considered an interruption, which removed Abundo’s case from the ambit
of the three-term limit.
10. Discipline of local officials
a) Elective officials
(i) Grounds
Sison v. People (2010)
Facts: During a post-audit investigation, it was found out that Mayor Sison did not conduct public bidding
during his term. Thus, 7 counts of violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) were filed against him in the Sandiganbayan.
Doctrine: Mayor Sison is guilty of violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 because he did not conduct
any public bidding and did not fulfil the requirements of a personal canvass. There was no showing that
that the award was decided by the Committee on Awards. Sison's signing in a dual capacity - as chairman
and member (representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were being procured) is
prohibited.
Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC (2011)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Amora, a candidate for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol,
on the ground that his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was defectively notarized, as the COC was not
properly sworn to in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code as Amora only presented his
Community Tax Certificate to the notary public instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
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Doctrine: Amora should not be disqualified as Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code does not specify
that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Furthermore, since Amora
and the Notary Public knew each other, there was no need for competent evidence of identity, and the
notary public only needs to indicate that he/she personally knows the candidate.
Valles v. COMELEC (2000)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Lopez, a candidate for Governor of Davao Oriental,
on the ground that she was an Australian citizen.
Doctrine: Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term ‘dual
citizenship’ as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not be disqualified as the
Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not
amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her
Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the loss of citizenship.
Moreno v. COMELEC (2006)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Moreno, a candidate for Punong Barangay, on the
ground that he was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno argued that
he was already granted probation thus he is not disqualifed to run as the disqualification under the Local
Government Code (LGC) only applies only to those who served their sentence.
Doctrine: Moreno should not be disqualified as Sec. 40(a) of the LGC provides that those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, within two
years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. This provision,
however, does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Rodriguez, a candidate for Governor of Quezon
Province, on the ground that he was a ‘fugitive from justice’ because he left the United States where a
charge has been filed against him before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Under Sec. 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, 'fugitives from justice' are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Doctrine: Rodriguez should be not be disqualified and his proclamation as the winner of the
gubernatorial elections should not be nullified as he is not a fugitive from justice. A fugitive from justice
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includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid persecution. Rodriguez is not a fugitive from justice as his arrival in the
Philippines from the United States preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by the same court by almost five months. There was thus no
intent to evade (which is compelling factor which causes one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction) since
there can only be such when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment
or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Mercado v. Manzano (1999)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Manzano, a candidate for Vice Mayor of Makati
City, on the ground that he is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration, and
that he misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Doctrine: Manzano should not be disqualified because the “dual citizenship” meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the
Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to “dual allegiance”. Dual citizenship
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual allegiance, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. Manzano‘s oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his
election of Philippine citizenship.
Abella v. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Abella, a candidate for Governor of Leyte, on the
ground of alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence— she
stipulated that she was a resident of the Municipality of Kananga when in truth she was a resident of
Ormoc City, a component city of the Province of Leyte whose charter prohibits her from voting for any
provincial elective officials and likewise running for such positions.
Doctrine: Abella should be disqualified as Sec. 42(1) of the Local Government Code provides that those
who are not qualified voters registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where the
person proposes to be elected are disqualified from running. It was proven that Abella left her residence
in Kananga in 1975 to move to Ormoc City with her husband, and there was no proof that she cancelled
her voter’s registration in Ormoc City and transferred registration in Kananga.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Frivaldo, the newly elected Governor of Sorsogon,
on the ground that he was only repatriated as a citizen of the Philippines on the day of his oath-taking.
Doctrine: Frivaldo should be disqualified. The Omnibus Election Code says that the perfection of
qualifications must have been on the day of the elections and not upon taking his oath of office.
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Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Labo Jr., a candidate for Baguio City Mayor, on the
ground that he made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of
the Philippines.
Doctrine: Labo should be disqualified as he failed to prove that he has reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office, and even if he was elected by the majority of the
electorate is of no moment because the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone, for if a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The
candidate who got the second highest vote may not be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for
such position was disqualified unless the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Cardino (2012)
Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed against Jalosjos, a
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, on the ground that he made a false material representation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor— Jalosjos was convicted by
final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prision mayor.
Doctrine: Jalosjos made misrepresentations in his COC, and therefore the same was null and void.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides that those who have received a sentence of prisión
mayor by final judgment are disqualified from running for any elective local position, for the penalty of
prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification (which deprives one of the right to vote and being elected into office during the
meting of the penalty) and perpetual special disqualification which, upon the finality of the judgment, will
automatically render him ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.
Mayor Talaga v. COMELEC and Alcala (2012)
Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed against Talaga, a
candidate for Mayor of Lucena City, on the ground that he made a false material representation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible to run for the Office of Mayor despite knowing that
he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City. Talaga argued that
the Sangguniang Bayan preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms, so the
three-limit rule did not apply to him.
Doctrine: Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void.
The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race,
one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (the
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effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to
deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation or denial of due
course of the person’s certificate, with the said person not treated as a candidate at all – as if she never
filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore
cannot be substituted by another person.
Cayat v. COMELEC (2007)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Cayat, a candidate for Mayor of Burguias Benguet,
on the ground that he made a misrepresentation that he was eligible to run when in truth he had been
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, consequently disqualifying him from
running.
Doctrine: Cayat should be disqualified because Sec. 40(a)(1) of the Local Government COde provides
that those who have received a sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an
offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Moral turpitude had been defined as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals, and for which the crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral
turpitude. Sec. 6 of Republic Act 6646 provides that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Cayat was disqualified twenty-
three days before the elections; thus he was legally a non-existent candidate during the elections. The
candidate with the second highest number of votes shall become the Mayor.
Bautista v. COMELEC (2003)
Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed against Bautista, a candidate for
Punong Barangay Barangay Lumbangan, on the ground that he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.
Doctrine: Bautista is disqualified as Sec. 39(a) of the Local Government Code provides that an elective
local official must not only be a “qualified elector” or a “qualified voter,” he must also be a “registered
voter where he intends to be elected”. Bautista admitted in his affidavit that he was not a registered voter
of Barangay Lumbangan, and his name was stricken off the voter's list and once made aware of such fact,
he never did anything to register anew. As Bautista was only disqualified after the elections, the highest
ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest
ranking Sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.
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Bernardo, et al. v. Abalos, et al. (2004)
Facts: The charge against Abalos Jr., who ran for Mayor of Mandaluyong City, of vote-buying was
dismissed by the Commission on Elections due to insufficiency of evidence.
Doctrine: The complainant failed to establish that they violated the Omnibus Election Act referring to
electioneering because all the acts were committed even before the start of the campaign period. As such,
Abalos, Jr. is innocent.
Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013)
Facts: There were three Mayoralty candidates in Lanao del Norte – Balua, Arnado and Maquiling. Balua
filed a Petition for Disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against Arnado, a dual
citizen who applied for repatriation, took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in an
Affidavit of Renunciation, but despite his oath, still continuously used his U.S. Passport even after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Arnado subsequently won in the elections, but the COMELEC First
Division disqualified him but the COMELEC en banc ruled in his favor and upheld his repatriation.
Doctrine: The Court held that Arnado is disqualified from running because while he satisfied the two
requirements needed to qualify to run for a public office under Republic Act 9255 (i.e., taking the Oath of
Allegiance and renouncing his foreign citizenship), his use of a foreign passport after renouncing his
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship. By representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted
to his earlier status as a dual citizen who is, under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, disqualified
from running for any local elective position. As Arnaldo is barred from even being a candidate, his COC is
rendered void from the beginning and the votes cast in his favor should not have even been counted.
Maquiling is thus the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, making him the
winner of the elections. The rule of succession under the Local Government Code will thus not apply.
(ii) Jurisdiction
Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (2010)
Facts: Punong Barangay Rodriguez argued that the Sangguniang Bayan and not the Ombudsman should
exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
Doctrine: Although Sec. 61 of the Local Government Code provides that the Sangguniang Bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Sangguniang Bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as the position of Punong Barangay Rodriguez. Even if they filed in
the Ombudsman and the Sangguniang Bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez, they did not violate
the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case. In
administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body in which the complaint is filed first, and which first opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the
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complaint was filed first with the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman (2005)
Facts: A complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Barangay Chairman Laxina, for an alleged
attempted rape. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) referred the complaint to the
Quezon City Council, while a similar complaint was filed with the Ombudsman. Laxina argued that the
respondents (the Ombudsman, the DILG Secretary and the City Mayor of Quezon City) should have
dismissed the cases against him on the ground of forum-shopping.
Doctrine: Firstly, the rule on forum-shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings and not to
administrative cases. Secondly, the Ombudsman and the Quezon City Council have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases against elective officials like Laxina. Thirdly, Laxina is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman as the records show that Laxina participated in the
proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting evidence. He also did not inform the
Ombudsman of the existence of the other administrative complaint of which he is presumably aware at
the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman were ongoing. Participation in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.

Espiritu v. Melgar (1992)
Facts: A preventive suspension was imposed by the Provincial Governor on Mayor Melgar of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro after a complaint for grave misconduct for alleged assault and use of physical violence
was filed against him in the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and a similar
complaint filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro.
Doctrine: The Court held that, per Sec. 63 of the Local Government Code, the Provincial Governor has the
authority to suspend Melgar. The Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend Melgar at any time after the issues had been joined and any of the following
grounds enumerated in Sec. 63 of the LGC were shown to exist— 1) when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, 2) when the evidence of
culpability is strong, 3) When the gravity of the offense so warrants, or 4) when the continuance in office
of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence.
(iii) Preventive suspension
Bunye v. Escareal (1993)
Facts: The Sandiganbayan placed Mayor Bunye et al. under suspension for violation of Republic Act (RA)
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Bunye, et al. argued that the suspension for violation of RA
3019 partakes of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her
constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
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Doctrine: The suspension is mandatory under RA 3019. Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that the
suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory. Preventive suspension
is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty.
Ganzon v. CA (1991)
Facts: Mayor Ganzon, who was given a 60-day preventive suspension and three more suspension orders
due to the finding of probable cause in the ten administrative complaints that he faced, claims that the
President and his agents (in this case, the Department of Interior and Local Government) no longer have
the power to suspend a local official because the phrase “as may be provided by law” (in relation to the
exercise by the President of the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials) has been
removed in the 1987 Constitution.
Doctrine: The deletion of the phrase ‘as may be provided by law’ did not divest the President of the
power to investigate, discipline, or remove local officials as the President can still suspend a local official
but, such must be consistent with law. Thus, Congress maintains its control over municipal corporations,
although it may delegate such power to the President. However, only one suspension order should have
been imposed in this case as ten suspension orders would prevent the mayor from performing his
functions. The suspension is not meant to serve as a penalty but merely to prevent the accused from
influencing the course of the investigation.

Mondano v. Silvosa (1955)
Facts: Mayor Mondano, accused of rape and concubinage, questions his suspension from office by the
Provincial Governor as indorsed by the Assistant Executive Secretary pursuant to a complaint filed before
the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee.
Doctrine: The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over
municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before the
Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated
under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be considered as involving moral
turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner,
there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.
Hebron v. Reyes (1958)
Facts: Mayor Hebron, charged with oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct, was
suspended indefinitely by the Office of the President while the case was under investigation.
Doctrine: The suspension was illegal because the President has no original power to suspend a local
official. The Executive must observe the mandatory procedure for disciplinary actions over municipal
officials to be exercised by the Provincial Board provided in Secs. 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the National Government may conduct an investigation only as a means to
ascertain whether or not the Provincial board should take action.
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Miranda v. Sandiganbayan (2005)
Facts: Mayor Mirando, who was placed under preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for 6 months
for violating Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees), argued that based on Section 63(b) of the Local Governmen Code (LGC), local elective
officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.
Doctrine: The Ombudsman may suspend a local elective official for not more than 90 days.
Administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated
under the Local Government Code, as Section 63 of the LGC does not govern preventive suspensions
imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the
Executive branch of government; the Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension is governed by
Republic Act No. 6770.
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (1994)
Facts: Governor Bolastig, who was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days by the
Sandiganbayan for violating Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), argued that there
can only be preventive suspension when it is shown that the suspension order prevents the accused from
using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him
Doctrine: Sec. 13 of Republic Act 3019 provides that it is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend
any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law. The duration of
preventive suspension will vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide
the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that
the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution.
(iv) Removal
SB of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan penalized Barangay Captain Martinez by removing him from office
because of an administrative charge of Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act filed against the Barangay Captain.
Doctrine: The Sangguniang Bayan can not remove Martinez from office. Sec. 60 of the Local Government
Code provides that the power to remove elective local officials from office is lodged with the courts.
(v) Administrative appeal
Catu v. Rellosa (2008)
Facts: Rellosa, the Punong Barangay, represented one of the parties involved in a complaint against the
tenants of the building owned by the Catus after the conciliation meeting that Rellosa arranged failed.
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Doctrine: Rellosa may appear as counsel of two of the parties subject to authorization from the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Although Section 90 of Republic Act 7160 (The Local
Government Code) provides that local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives, punong barangays are not mentioned in this prohibition in the Local
Government Code. Therefore, Rellosa as Punong Barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he violated the Revised Civil Service Rules, particularly Sec. 12 which prohibits officers or
employees from directly engaging in any private business, vocation or profession without written
permission from the head of the department. As punong barangay, Rellosa should have obtained prior
written permission from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before entering his appearance
as counsel of two of the parties.
Republic v. Rambuyong (2010)
Facts: Atty. Richard Rambuyong, then incumbent Vice Mayor of Ipil, appeared as counsel of Chua in a
case filed for collection of a sum of money/damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Doctrine: Rambuyong may not appear as counsel of Chua. Section 2(10) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) provides that NPC is a government instrumentality, and Sec. 90(b)(1) of the LGC provides that
sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party and being a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC), NPC falls is within the term ‘instrumentality’.
People v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
Facts: Mayor Villapando was charged with violation of Art. 244 of the Revised Penal Code (which
provides that any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications shall be penalized) when he hired Tiape as Municipal Administrative and
Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor, when it has not yet been more
than a year since Tiape lost the elections.
Doctrine: Tiape is ineligible to assume the position as Sec. 6, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution and Sec.
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. A losing candidate has to wait one year before assuming any
appointed position.
Sales v. Carreon, Jr. (2007)
Facts: The newly elected Mayor Carreon, Jr. revoked all 83 appointments made by then Dapitan City
Mayor Ruiz, in compliance with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular imposing a
ban on issuing appointments in the civil service during the election period, arguing that the questioned
appointments were not only "issued in bulk" but that there was no urgent need to fill those positions.
Doctrine: All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and
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such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government
units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after
they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this case, the publication of
vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant.
Quirog v. Aumentado (2008)
Facts: Bohol Provincial Governor Relampagos’ appointment of Quirog as Provincial Government

Department Head of the Office of the Provincial Agriculture was opposed on the ground that Quirog was
part of the bulk of midnight appointments made by Governor Relampagos before the end of this term.
Doctrine: Quirog’s appointment was valid. The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a
midnight appointment as Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto.
Nazareo v. City of Dumaguete (2009)
Facts: The newly elected Dumaguete City Mayor Perdices announced that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo, who promoted 15 and regularized another 74 city hall
employees.

Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that all the promotions and regularizations were void. Although not
all 'mass appointments' are prohibited by the Civil Service Commission, it must be shown that the
appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is
a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. The validity of an
appointment issued immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to be
determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and the
particular circumstances surrounding the same. In this case, there was no evidence to show any
deliberation on the qualifications of the appointed city hall employees, nor any indication of an urgent
need for the issuance of such appointments.
Montuerto v. Ty (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan requested the Civil Service Commission to revoke the appointment of
Montuerto as Budget Officer as it was not with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Doctrine: Montuerto’s appointment was invalid. Sec. 443(a) and (d) of the Local Government Code
provides that the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such as the Municipal
Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang
Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
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Mayor Tolentino v. COMELEC (2010)
Facts: Election protests were filed against the proclamation of Tolentino and de Castro as duly elected
Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. In light of the issuances of the Commission on Elections ordering the
revision of forty-four ballot boxes without first resolving whether sixteen of the said forty-four ballot
boxes, which were segregated or set aside, should be included in the revision, and without resolving how
the revision (examination of ballots which results from a general averment of fraud or irregularities in
the counting of votes) proceedings would be conducted, Tolentino and de Castro argued that they were
denied their right to due process.
Doctrine: Tolentino and de Castro were not denied their right to due process, as the requirements for
procedural due process enumerated in Air Manila Inc v. Balatbat— 1) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right, 2) the right to a
reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor, 3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction, and 4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or
disclosed to the parties, were satisfied when the parties were afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. The COMELEC had required Tolentino to provide the names
of his revisors (who will raise objections, claim the votes for him, or contest votes in favor of his
opponent) and he has not alleged being deprived of this opportunity. The opportunity during the revision
stage to raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses and file his memorandum before the case
would be submitted for resolution, fully meet the demands of due process.
Acuzar v. Jarolan and Hon. Apresa (2010)
Facts: Acuzar, who was dismissed from the Philippine National Police for an administrative case for
having an illicit relationship with a minor argued that he was denied due process because the People’s
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB)’s decision was reached allegedly without giving him an opportunity to
be heard.
Doctrine: Acuzar was not denied due process in an administrative context, as due process does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. In administrative proceedings,
procedural due process has been recognized to include: 1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights, 2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to
defend one’s rights, 3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality, and 4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Acuzar was notified of the
complaint against him, he was able to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, and
he attended hearings with his counsel.
(vi) Doctrine of condonation

b) Appointive officials
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De Villa et al. v. The City of Bacolod (1990)
Facts: The City of Bacolod argues that the Integrated National Police (INP) Director General’s act of
relieving Lt. Col. Plotena as Bacolod City INP Station Commander and assigning him to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City is invalid and illegal because Executive Orders
(EO) 1027 and 1028 provided that there had to be prior recommendation of, or consultation with the
local chief executive which is the City Mayor of Bacolod before any relief is done.
Doctrine: EOs 1012 and 1027 did not remove administrative supervision and control (i.e., the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter) over police units from the INP chief.
The local executives have general supervision (i.e., the power to see to it that units or elements of the INP
perform their duties properly according to existing laws and rules) and operational supervision (i.e., the
same as general supervision, with the added power to deploy or employ such units or elements in
coordination with the Provincial or District Police Superintendent, Station Commander or Officer-in-
Charge) over local police units, but no power of administrative supervision or control over them. As such,
under existing laws, the power to relieve or reassign a city INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP
Director General and consequently, the INP Director General’s act of relieving Lt. Col. Plotena as Bacolod
INP Station Commander and assigning him to the PC Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City is valid and
legal.
11. Recall
12. Term limits
Carpio v. Executive Secretary (1992)
Facts: Carpio claims that there was a manifest derogation of the power of control of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) over the Philippine National Police (PNP) when Republic Act 6975 vested the
power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors,
respectively, the power of “operational supervision and control” over police units in city and municipal
mayors, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-
General as well as the administration of qualifying entrance examinations in the Civil Service
Commission, and disciplinary powers over PNP members in the People’s Law Enforcement Boards and
city and municipal mayors.
Doctrine: There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM. Under Sec. 51 of Republic
ACt 6975, full control remains with the National Police Commission, and under this provision, local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM; They will choose the officers concerned
from a list of eligibles to be recommended by PNP officials.
Ignacio v. Banate, Jr. (1987)
Facts: Ignacio, then President of the Katipunang Panlungsod ng mga Barangay (KPB) and a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or City Council, argued that Banate, his appointed replacement in the KPB,
is not qualified to replace him because Banate is not an officer, much less President of the Katipunan and
has not been duly elected for any said positions.
174
Doctrine: Banate, Jr., not being a Barangay Captain and never having been elected president of the
association of barangay councils, cannot be appointed a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as an
unqualified person cannot be appointed a member even in an acting capacity. Sec 3, par. 1 of Batas
Pambansa 51 provides that one has to be a barangay chairman and president of the barangacy councils to
be qualified. Since the appointment of Ignacio’s successor (Banate) is invalid, Ignacio’s tenure could not
be terminated on the basis of such appointment.
Galarosa v. Valencia (1993)
Facts: Lasay, the incumbent Barangay Captain of barangay Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon,
assails that Galarosa, the incumbent president of the Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of the municipality of Sorsogon, and an appointed member of the Sanggunian Bayan of
Sorsogon, should be replaced since the terms of office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon has already
ended.
Doctrine: Galarosa's term as ex-officio member of Sangguniang Bayan ends with the end of the term of
the latter. He can continue to serve as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond 30 June 1992 (the
date when the term of office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired) but only through holding
over authority as there is no law which prohibits them from holding over as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan if there has yet to be a reelection of Barangay Captain. The hold-over authority of ABC presidents
is also recognized. Thus, while his term of office has expired, Galarosa can stay on as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan until the officers of the Liga are elected.
e. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
National Patrimony
Regalian Doctrine
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos (2004)
The La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association challenged the issuance of mining permits and other measures
allowing for the exploration, development of natural resources. The Court held that the mining permits
should no longer be issued, applying the the Regalian Doctrine.
The Regalian Doctrine, which declares all natural resources of the Philippines, including mineral lands
and minerals, to be property belonging to the State, extends not only to land but also to "all natural
wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth." Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of
natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its
wars against other nations.
175
Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions
EDU of Natural Resources
Franchises, Authority, and Certificates of Public Utilities
Acquisition Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands
Practice of Professions
Organization and Regulation of Corporations, Private and Public
Monopolies, Restraint of Trade and Unfair Competition
National Economy and Patrimony
Tanada v. Angara (1997)
Senate Resolution No. 97, which ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement, was challenged, on
the ground that it violates Article II, Section 19 and Article XII, Sections 10 and 12 of the 1987
Constitution (embodying the “Filipino First” policy).
The SC upheld the WTO agreement. While the Constitution has a bias towards Filipino goods, services,
labor, and enterprises, there is also a need for some degree of equality and reciprocity in the country’s
business dealings with the rest of the world. The framers did not intend to adopt an isolationist policy. A
“self-reliant and independent national economy” cannot be interpreted to mean a bar on foreign
investments, goods, and services. It is not “economic seclusion”, nor is it “mendicancy in the international
community.” What the Constitution shall do is protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition.
Natural Resources
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Ass’n v. Ramos (2004), supra.
Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” in Art. XII, Section 2(4) of the Constitution?
Held: The exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources may be undertaken in the
following ways: 1) the State by itself directly and solely, 2) by co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations, 3) small-scale utilization allowed by law in
favor of Filipino citizens, and, 5) large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law.
176
The use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Service contracts were not banned under the 1987 Constitution.
Agrarian Reform
Urban Land Reform and Housing
Organization and Regulation of Private Corporations
Operation of Public Utilities
On Mass Media and Advertising Industry
Practice of Professions
State Operation of Private Enterprises
Agan v. Piatco (2004)
The consortium that eventually became PIATCO was awarded the NAIA III terminal project. As a
consequence, it entered into a “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement
of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the

franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which was charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I
and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline
airport services. This led the employees of the service providers to file a petition for prohibition. Several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.
On the issue of whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public
interest, the SC held in this case that it could not. PIATCO could not, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government
to pay “reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The national emergency contemplated in that provision was defined to
include threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes “unless it is of
such proportion that it would paralyze government service.” The duration of the emergency is the
determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover of the government will last.
177
Monopolies, Combinations, and Unfair Competition
NEA v. Mendoza (1985)
The IBP Oriental Mindoro Chapter opposed the increased electric rates being charged by ORMECO in
accordance with the NEA’s approved increase in rates, on the ground that it did so without a public
hearing. The CFI issued a restraining order that prevented ORMECO from charging the rates.
The Supreme Court held that the CFI gravely abused its discretion and set the order aside.because the
consumers are members of the cooperative ORMECO, which is a non-profit organization. The consumers
are already represented by the Board of Directors whom they had elected. The necessity of a public
hearing is lost.
Money, Banking, and Credit
Cooperatives
Communication and Information in Nation-Building
Autonomy of Local Governments
Recognition of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure

Valmonte v. Belmonte (1989)
Valmonte wanted Belmonte to give him a list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a P2 million loan on guaranty of Imelda Marcos from the GSIS. GSIS
refused on the ground of confidentiality. Valmonte, et al., filed a petition for mandamus.
The SC held that the right to access the records does not include the right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and the administrator of insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume a
public character. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with law. The public nature of the funds and the public office of
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (2002)
PEA is the central implementing agency for reclamation projects in the country. It took over the leasing
and selling functions of the DENR as far as reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. Despite a Senate
investigation report, the Legal Task Force appointed by the President upheld the JVA. Chavez filed a
petition for mandamus and asked that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA.
178
The SC held that the right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.
f. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

g. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
h. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Guidelines
 Please note that there are a number of cases that come up frequently in the study of international
law because they are rich with information and helpful explanations on different aspects of
international law (e.g. North Sea Case, Nicaragua v. United States). For the purpose of this
reference material, these cases have been distilled to provide only the very basic doctrines
relevant to the subject being discussed and necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of
international law. A greater appreciation of the teachings of these cases can only be reached by
reading the cases in full.
A. International Law and National Law
 pals political law reviewer

International Law (IL) is a body of principles, norms, and processes which regulates the relations
of states and other international persons, and governs their conduct affecting the interests of the
international community of states as a whole. (Magallona)
 IL is characterized as a continuing process of authoritative decisions. It is a system of normative

conduct—conduct which is regarded by each actor, and by the group as a whole, as being
obligatory. (Higgins, “Problems and Process”, 1994)
 The development of IL follows the actual use of rules described as rules of IL by governments. All
normal governments employ experts to provide routine and other advice on matters of IL and
constantly define their relations with other states in terms of IL. Governments and their officials
routinely use rules which they have for a long time called “the law of nations” or “international
law.” Reference by governments to international law has been part of the normal process of
decision-making. (Brownlie, “Principles of Public International Law”, 1998 Edition)
 International law is that law which deals with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical. (“Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States”)
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Table 1. Comparison of International Law and National/Municipal Law (Based on the discussion in
Bernas, “Introduction to Public International Law”)
International National
Source Found in treaties and Product of local custom or of
customs grown among legislation
states
Relations Regulated Regulates relations between Regulates relations between
states individual persons under the
state
Substance A law between sovereign A law of a sovereign over
states individuals
 Based on existing treaties, when there is a conflict between international and national law, the
rule provided in international law must prevail:
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States (1949)

Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for
failure to perform this duty.

However, domestic law still has an impact on international law. As will be discussed further under
“Sources of International Law”, domestic law can be a source of international law if it propounds a
rule or custom generally accepted by domestic legal systems.
B. Sources of International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree thereto.
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Note!
In certain cases, the ICJ will render a decision on a dispute without actually applying any of the foregoing
sources of international law. This happens when the Court declares that “there is nothing on which to
give judgment”, such as when the object of the claim has disappeared.
CASE
Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France, 1974)

France was conducting atmospheric nuclear tests over the South Pacific, prompting complaints from
Australia and New Zealand. The Court ruled that since France, through its President and Minister of
Defense, had made several public statements that the testing would cease, the object of the dispute
ceased to exist. When it is the intention of a state making a declaration that it should be bound according
to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the state being
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with its declaration.
SOURCES OF LAW DIFFERENTIATED
1. International Conventions – refer to law-making treaties and other similar sources.

Treaties create legal obligations, the non-observance of which by individual states will not dissolve the
obligations.
Note! (Exception)
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties
“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law” (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.
Examples:
The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 on the Law of War and Neutrality
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 of Prohibited Weapons
2. International Custom (or Customary Law) – States create law by what they do in practice or by their
conduct, believing that their practice or conduct is obligatory. In order for customary law to form, States
must act with the belief that the practice is required by law, and not because of courtesy or political
expediency. (Magallona)
Elements of Customary Law

a. Uniformity, consistency, and generality of practice – complete uniformity, consistency, and
generality is not required. Rather, it must be established by a party relying on this custom that this
custom has been established and is binding on the other party. (See Asylum Case and Colombia v.
Peru in case list below) Evidence of uniform, consistent, and general state practice may be
established in numerous ways, e.g. the presentation of bilateral treaties, conclusions of
international conferences, and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
181
b. Opinio juris et necessitatis – the belief on the part of States that a particular custom or conduct is
obligatory
* On duration of practice – Duration is not necessarily an element for the establishment of customary law.
(See North Sea Case below) However, it may be used as evidence of uniform, consistent, and general
practice by States.
Note! (Exception)
While a custom is coming to be established, the emerging custom will not be binding upon a state that is a
persistent objector. Evidence of the state’s objection to the practice must be clear and consistent. (See
North Sea Case below)
CASES
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949, Philippine case)

Kuroda was charged with war crimes following the Japanese Occupation. Kuroda argued that since the
Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare, the crimes he was charged with were not based on law. The Supreme Court ruled that the rules
and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law, hence these rules became part of Philippine law despite the
Philippines’ status as non-signatory to the relevant Conventions.
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (“Nicaragua v.
United States”, 1986, International Court of Justice)
Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States in relation to military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. In response to Nicaragua’s invocation of the customary prohibition on
the use of force, the United States argued that the customary exception to the prohibition is the right to
individual and collective self-defense. The ICJ first made a clear pronouncement as to the prohibition on
the use of force as a well-established rule in customary IL (since both Nicaragua and the United States
practiced and displayed belief in its status as law) before acknowledging that there was an exception to
this general rule.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands were in dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf
they shared. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the use of the equidistance principle in
delimitation was a principle of customary or general IL, binding on Germany. The Court ruled that
Germany was not bound to use the equidistance principle because this principle was not a principle of
customary law. While the Court acknowledged that a customary rule could evolve in a relatively short
period of time, what was material was whether there was extensive and substantially uniform state
practice particularly among states whose interests were specially affected. There was no evidence that
the equidistance principle was consistently used to delineate the continental shelf of states in dispute
over it. On the contrary, Germany had persistently objected to the use of the equidistance principle.
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru, 1950, International Court of Justice)

Colombia unilaterally granted a Peruvian rebel asylum in the Colombian embassy in Peru. In defense of
its action, Colombia argued that diplomatic asylum (where the refugee is in the territory of the state
where the offense was committed) was a principle of customary law and presented numerous treaties
and conventions on extradition as evidence. While the Court acknowledged the conventions, it ruled that
182
due to the limited number of states which had ratified the conventions, diplomatic asylum was not yet a
principle of customary law.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion of the ICJ,
1996)
The question posed to the Court by the United Nations General Assembly was: “Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under IL?” The Court ruled that there was no rule in
customary IL which permits or prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court noted that the
members of the international community were divided on the matter of nuclear weapons, making it
difficult to determine uniform practice or even opinio juris. Instead the Court held that the use of nuclear
weapons should be subject to the same rules and restraints as other weapons (e.g. necessity and
proportionality under international humanitarian law), regardless of the unique nature of nuclear
weapons.
The Case of the Paquete Habana (American Case, 1900)

During the Spanish-American War, two Spanish fishing vessels were seized by the American navy while
they were fishing off the coast of Cuba. The fishermen were treated as prisoners of war and their cargo
seized. The Court ruled that while there was no specific law, statute, or treaty exempting fishing boats
from capture during wartime, it was an ancient rule of custom that nations were to leave fishing vessels
alone. By tracing the origins of the custom, the Court found that it was a custom between civilized nations
to leave fishing vessels alone even during wartime, and this custom had ripened into a rule of
international law.

The Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (“Portugal v. India”, 1960)
Portugal claimed a right of passage between its territory of Damao to its landlocked territories of Dadra
and Nagar-Aveli, both of which were surrounded by Indian territory. The Court held that Portugal could
claim a right of passage based on long-standing local custom between India and Portugal themselves. A
customary rule may develop to bind two states and impose mutual rights and obligations, provided that it
is shown this was a long-held practice between the two states and accepted by them as regulating their
relations.
Salonga v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2009)

Daniel Smith was moved from the Makati City Jail to a detention cell in the US Embassy. The Court held
that it was a customary rule that foreign armed forces allowed to enter a state’s territory are immune
from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The VFA, which was the relevant agreement,
provided that while Smith could be in US custody pending trial, in the event of a conviction he should be
detained by Philippine authorities.
3. General Principles of Law – while general principles of law may include rules of customary law, they
are primarily rules that have become so well-established and accepted that they are no longer directly
associated with state practice.
Examples:
Principle of consent
Principle of reciprocity
Principle of equality of states
Principle of finality of awards and settlements
Principle of the legal validity of agreements
Principle of good faith
183
Principle of domestic jurisdiction
CASES
Prosecutor v. Tadic (ICTY, 1995)

Tadic was charged before the ICTY for war crimes he was alleged to have committed in Bosnia. He argued
that the Tribunal was not established according to law and therefore lacked jurisdiction, and that it was a
general principle of law that the charges brought against him should only be determined by a tribunal
established by law. The Court ruled that the tribunal was established by law and reaffirmed the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction based on the general principle of la competence de la competence (French) or
kompetenz-kompetenz (German). The power of a tribunal to determine its jurisdiction over a dispute is a
major part of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal. It is a necessary
component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the
constitutive documents of tribunals.
Case Concerning Preah Vihear Temple (Cambodia v. Thailand, ICJ, 1962)

The temple of Preah Vihear sat on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. The demarcation of the
Cambodia-Thailand border was, by agreement, to follow the natural waterline but the maps drawn up
were not in compliance with the agreement and the temple was marked as being on Cambodian soil.
Several decades passed before Thailand questioned the maps, and the Court ruled that based on its
behavior Thailand was deemed to have accepted the maps (in so many words, the principle of estoppel).
Corfu Channel Case (ICJ, 1949)

British warships sailed through Albanian waters in the North Corfu, hitting several mines that had been
laid in the water. The Court ruled that the Albanian authorities had an obligation to notify the British
warships about the existence of minefields in Albanian waters. This obligation was not anchored on the
Hague Convention of 1907, but on general and well-recognized principles of international law:
elementary considerations of humanity (especially in times of peace, not just war), freedom of maritime
communication, and the obligation of every state to ensure that its territory will not be used in a manner
that will violate the rights of other states.
Chorzow Factory Case (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928)

Germany claimed reparations from Poland for the latter’s takeover of a nitrate factory in Chorzow. The
Court ruled that it is a general principle of international law (“and even a general conception of law”) that
any breach of a right or obligation involves an obligation to make reparation. Reparation must wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and must restore the victim to the state he would have been if not
for the illegal act. If this is not possible, then the victim must be compensated in an amount
corresponding to the value which restitution would bear.
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Case (ICJ, 1970)

The company in this case was a Canadian company in Spain which eventually went bankrupt. Belgium
initiated proceedings before the ICJ on behalf of Belgian shareholders of the company, who were
supposedly prejudiced by the bankruptcy proceedings in Spain. The Court explained that it is to rules
generally accepted by municipal systems, and not to the municipal law of a particular state, that
international law refers. The Court ruled that it was a general principle of international law that if an
illegal act is committed against a company, it is the country of which the company is a national that can
seek protection or redress (in this case, Canada). No rule of international law confers this right to the
country of which a shareholder is a national.
184
TEXACO v. Libya (1978)

Libya sought to nationalize all the rights, interests, and properties of TEXACO, arguing that municipal and
not international law should govern the process. Both parties cited UN General Assembly Resolutions as
bases for their arguments. The Court ruled that UN General Assembly Resolutions are not binding
declarations of general principles of international law, and for such resolutions to be binding they must
be accepted by the members of the UN, in particular those member states that are specially affected by
the resolution (e.g. developing countries).
BP Exploration v. Libya (1973)

BP and Libya were in disagreement as to which law should govern their dispute: international law alone,
or Libyan law? Based on the concession agreement entered into by BP and Libya, the Court ruled that
Libyan law would be applied insofar as Libyan law corresponded to principles of international law. Only
when there were no principles of Libyan law common with international law would the general
principles of international law be applied. In other words, when Libyan law is in conflict with
international law, then general principles of law must be applied.
Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1963)

The parties were in conflict over the terms of two agreements for the export and sale of oil. The Court
ruled in favor of ARAMCO’s claim as first concessionaire, declaring that the principle of respect for
acquired rights is one of the fundamental principles both of public international law and of municipal law
of most civilized states.
4. Judicial Decisions and the Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists – it is important to
stress that these are subsidiary sources for the determination of the rules of law. Ultimately, the tribunal
before which these sources are presented must determine the value and persuasiveness of the material
presented.
Judicial Decisions
a. Decisions of international tribunals (e.g. the International Court of Justice, the respective regional
human rights courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights)
b. Decisions of ad hoc international tribunals – these differ from other international tribunals in that
they are established by a number of states for a special purpose. Due to the special nature of these
tribunals, they are often a source of valuable pronouncements on highly specific issues. An
example of an ad hoc international tribunal would be the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, from which a great number of vital doctrines of international humanitarian
law have emerged.
c. Decisions of national and municipal courts
Writings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists
Again, the determination of whether a publicist is indeed the “most highly qualified” is ultimately up to
the discretion of the tribunal before which the publicist’s work is presented. There are certain materials,
however, that have been considered at least as authoritative as the writings of the most highly qualified
publicists, i.e. the Draft Articles on State Responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission
and the reports and resolutions of the Institute of International Law and other expert bodies.
185
CASE
Medellin v. Texas (American Case, 2008)

Medellin and his gang-mates were sentenced to death for the rape/slay of two little girls. He argued that
he had a right under the Vienna Convention and customary law to a review and reconsideration of his
sentence, among his evidence a declaration of President Bush that the US would comply with its
obligations under the ICJ decision in Avena. The Court ruled that the Avena decision was not enforceable
as domestic law. As provided in Article 94 of the UN Charter, decisions of the ICJ only explicitly binds
states which are a party to the case. Even an undertaking to comply with the decision is not an
acknowledgment that an ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of UN members, but a
commitment on the part of UN members to take future actions of compliance through their political
branches.
C. Important Concepts
Other than the basic outline of international law and its sources provided above, there are a few
fundamental concepts that must be highlighted in order to solidify one’s understanding of international
law.
1. Obligations erga omnes
CASES
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Case (supra)
An obligation erga omnes is an obligation of every state towards the international community as a whole.
It is an obligation which is the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved in this
kind of obligation, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.
The Case Concerning East Timor (“Portugal v. Australia”, ICJ Case, 1995)
Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia over the latter’s continuing negotiations with Indonesia
in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor. Portugal alleged
that Australia had violated the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, as well as
Portugal’s right as the administering power. While the Court refused to rule on the case because
Indonesia was not a party, it agreed that the right of peoples to self-determination has an erga omnes
character. However, simply because a right invoked is of an erga omnes character does not mean that the
Court can acquire jurisdiction over a state which has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction in a case.
Regardless of the character of the right invoked, the Court cannot evaluate the lawfulness of the conduct
of a state which is not a party to the case.
2. Jus cogens
Jus cogens, as discussed in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see above), is
an absolute rule of international law. It is a general principle of law that has become so firmly established
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole that derogation is simply not
permitted. It can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. There is no consensus as to the criteria which would enable one to identify which general
principles of law have become peremptory norms. For instance, some important provisions of human
186
rights treaties (e.g. due process) have not been clearly established to be jus cogens. (Aust, “Handbook of
International Law”, 2010)
Examples of accepted jus cogens norms:

Prohibition on genocide
Prohibition on slavery
Prohibition on racial discrimination
Prohibition on torture and crimes against humanity
Prohibition on the use of force
CASE
Ex Parte Pinochet (ICJ Case, 1999)

Pinochet was the former head of state of Chile accused with, among others, the crime of torture. Spain
sought his extradition while he was in London for medical treatment. In denying his immunity for the
crime of torture, the Court explained that the rule of international law prohibiting torture has the
character of jus cogens or a peremptory norm. The violation of a jus cogens norm cannot be subject to any
kind of immunity; the universal jurisdiction granted over those who violate the rule against torture is
justified by its jus cogens nature.
3. Ex aequo et bono
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto.
Ex aequo et bono is a Latin phrase that roughly translates to “what is fair and just” and is very similar to
the concept of equity. As provided in Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute, if the parties agree to it, then the
Court may decide a case without adhering to the existing rules of international law and resolve the
dispute according to what is fair and just under the circumstances.
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D. Subjects of International Law
Table 2. Enumeration of Subjects in International Law

Established Legal Persons Special Types of Personalities
1. States 1. Non-self-governing peoples
2. Political entities legally proximate to 2. National liberation movements

states (e.g. the former Free City of
3. States in statu nascendi – the
Danzig)
continuity of the political entity of
3. Condominium – the joint exercise of the state, in certain cases, in order to
state power within a particular give effect to acts done before
territory by means of an autonomous independence
local administration acting as an
4. Legal constructions – the opposite of
agent of the states
#3 above, when called for a state’s
4. Internationalized territories – a legal entity may be projected in
special status created by multilateral certain cases even though the state
treaties and protected by an has politically ceased to exist
international organization
5. Belligerent/insurgent communities –
5. UN administration of territories para-statal entities recognized as

immediately prior to independence
(e.g. UN Transitional Administration
possessing a definite if limited form
of international personality
of East Timor)
6. Entities sui generis – e.g. the Holy See
6. International organizations and the Vatican
7. Agencies of states – entities acting as 7. Individuals

agents of states with delegated
powers (e.g. an arbitral tribunal)
CASES
Barcelona Traction Case (supra)

Even in municipal law, there is a clear distinction between the rights of a company and those of a
shareholder. Only the company, which has a distinct and separate legal personality from its shareholders,
may make a claim for compensation. A wrong done to the company does in fact prejudice its
shareholders, but this does not mean that both the company and shareholders are entitled to make
claims for compensation.
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1949)
The UN General Assembly asked the ICJ several questions relating to whether the UN could bring claims
for reparations for itself and in behalf of its agents. The Court ruled that the UN was an international
person subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, as well as
the corresponding capacity to protect its rights by bringing international claims. The competence to bring
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an international claim is the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law
for the establishment, presentation, and settlement of claims.
Mavrommatis Case (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1924)

Mavrommatis was a Greek national embroiled in disputes with Great Britain over concessions awarded
to him in British-controlled Palestine. When Greece brought Britain before the Court, the Court took
cognizance of the case, finding that there was in fact a dispute between two states: Britain and Greece.
The latter was claiming indemnity because Britain had acted in breach of its obligations to one of Greece’s
subjects. A state is entitled to protect its subjects when they are injured by acts of another state which are
contrary to international law.
1. STATES
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
1. A permanent population;
2. A defined territory;
3. Government; and
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states.

NOTES ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD
1. Territory – arguably the most important qualification. There must be a reasonably stable basis for a
political community in control of a specific area. While clearly demarcated borders are not necessary,
there must be an area clearly marked as a place where a political community is established.
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state. It is
the principle of exclusive competence of the state with regard to its own territory. (Island of Palmas Case)
Summary of Modes of Acquiring Territorial Sovereignty (Brownlie)

1. Discovery and effective occupation – after discovering territory, there must be effective
occupation, i.e. an intention to act as a sovereign over that territory (animus occupandi) as well as
the continuous display of such authority
2. Cession – the transfer of territory from one state to another by agreement, usually treaty. The
validity of the cession depends on the validity of the title of the ceding state
3. Prescription – occupation which must be—
a. Under the title of sovereignty;
b. Peaceful and uninterrupted;

189
c. Public; and
d. Endure for a length of time
4. Accession or accretion – the natural process of land transfer resulting in an increase of territory
Cases
Island of Palmas Case (PCIJ, 1932)

The Dutch and the Americans were in dispute over the island: the Dutch claimed that the Dutch East
Indies Company possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty through agreements made with the
natives; the Americans claimed that they had acquired their rights through the Spanish, who supposedly
discovered the island around the same time that they found the rest of the Philippines. The Court favored
the Dutch based on the evidence presented, emphasizing that it was not only discovery of the island that
established sovereignty, but effective occupation through the display of state authority.
Eastern Greenland Case (PCIJ, 1933)

Norway and Denmark were in dispute over the territory of Eastern Greenland. Both sides had equal
amounts of evidence with varying substance to prove their claim, but tipping it in Denmark’s favor was
public acquiescence by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to Denmark’s sovereignty over the
territory. While acquiescence is not a means of gaining title, it strengthened Denmark’s claim.
Additionally, while Norway was in constant occupation of the area in dispute, there was no exercise of
state authority. What was material to the Court was not just physical possession, but the intent to
exercise state authority over an area.
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (“United Kingdom v. France”, ICJ, 1951)

The UK and France were in dispute over two groups of rocky islands, both citing ancient title, treaties,
and supposedly sovereign acts. The Court ruled in favor of the UK because it proved the exercise of
jurisdiction, local administration, and legislation over the islands. The exercise of ordinary local
administration (licensing, customs, ordinary court functions, the registry of deeds, etc.) was better proof
of sovereignty than any ancient title or treaty, in the Court’s view.
Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (“Indonesia v. Malaysia”, ICJ,
2002)
Indonesia and Malaysia were in dispute over two islands, both citing treaties, colonial effectivites, and
title by succession. The ICJ ruled in Malaysia’s favor because of its “acts of administration” over the
islands (e.g. its regulation on the gathering of turtle eggs and declaration of a bird sanctuary).
Eritrea v. Yemen (ICJ, 1998)

Eritrea and Yemen were in dispute over numerous islands, citing historic title (on the part of Yemen) and
effective occupation for over a hundred years (on the part of Eritrea). The Court did not award all the
islands to one claimant, instead determining the ownership of each island or island group individually. Of
note in this case is the Court’s use of the Portico Doctrine: Islands nearest to coastal states (particularly
those within the state’s territorial sea) belong to such states.
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Libya v. Chad (ICJ, 1994)

Libya and Chad were embroiled in a dispute over boundaries. Chad was citing a treaty entered into
between Libya and France, when France was still Chad’s colonial ruler. The Court ruled in Chad’s favor,
propounding the theory of auto-limitation: in order to prevent conflict and instability, a boundary
established by a treaty becomes permanent, though the treaty itself is not necessarily permanent.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (“United Kingdom v. Norway”, ICJ, 1975)

After drawing its own baselines, Norway issued a decree delineating its exclusive fishery zones,
prompting protest from the UK. The Court laid down the fundamental considerations in the drawing of
baselines and the determination of territorial waters: (1) the baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast because it is land which confers upon the
coastal state the right to the waters off its coast; (2) the seas lying within the baseline must be closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters; and (3) the economic interest
peculiar to the region, as evidenced by long usage.
Western Sahara Case (ICJ, 1975)

Morocco and Mauritania both made claims to the effect that they had legal ties to the Western Sahara.
Spain argued that the Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time, hence its occupation thereof was not
to the prejudice of any recognized State. The Court ruled that the Western Sahara was not terra nullius
(or “a territory belonging to no one”) over which sovereignty may be acquired through occupation. State
practice is to the effect that a territory inhabited by tribes with a socio-political organization (e.g. the
Bedouins) is not terra nullius. But neither can there be reversion of title to either Morocco or Mauritania,
since neither were able to prove legal ties that demonstrated either state’s control over the region.
El Salvador v. Honduras with Nicaragua Intervening (ICJ, 1992)
Following the collapse of Spanish rule over Central America, several states sought to have their
boundaries determined by the Court. The Court did not rely on the rule of effective occupation, since after
all only one colonial power controlled the area and merely established administrative boundaries.
Instead, the Court applied the principle of uti possidetis juris: previous colonial boundaries are continually
adopted, and the succeeding state must respect the boundaries set forth by the outgoing colonial powers.
Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico, 1931)

France declared sovereignty over Clipperton Island after France’s navy first landed on the uninhabited
island in 1858. The Court ruled that France had successfully acquired title over what was terra nullius
through occupation. It also elaborated that continued physical occupation of territory is not necessary
where: (1) the territory is terra nullius at the time the occupying state arrives there; and (2) taking of
possession and intent to possess is shown by a public declaration of sovereignty.
2. Population – together with territory, population provides the physical evidence for the existence of a
state. “As an element of a state, ‘people’ simply means a community of persons sufficient in number and
capable of maintaining the permanent existence of the community and held together by a common bond
of law. It is of no legal consequence if they possess diverse racial, cultural, or economic interests. Nor is a
minimum population required.” (Bernas)
3. Government – the existence of an effective government with centralized legislative and administrative
organs is the best evidence of a stable political community. That being said, no specific form of
government has been required in international law. Furthermore, states have been considered to
continue to exist in the absence of an effective government—such as when states are rocked by violent
internal upheavals or during the occupation by a foreign power.
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4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states – this qualification is attached to the concept of
independence, as well as an implied requirement: recognition of statehood by other states. After all, if
other states do not recognize one to be a fellow state, relations are not possible. However, it has been
argued that a new state acquires legal personality purely by its own acts in achieving the objective
qualifications of statehood, rather than through recognition by other states. If recognition were made a
requirement of statehood, some states could not be considered such on account of the refusal by some
other states to recognize their independence (e.g. Taiwan and Kosovo).
2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
An international organization is an organization that is set up by treaty among two or more states. Since
the constitutive document of international organization is a treaty, only states are members of
international organizations. (Bernas)
An important feature of international organizations is they often enjoy immunities and privileges in order
to facilitate the effective exercise of their functions. Their powers and privileges are in turn kept in check
by the treaties that created them.
Examples of International Organizations:

United Nations
International Court of Justice
CASES
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (supra)
International organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a
general competence. International organizations are governed by the principle of speciality, i.e. they are
invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common
interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. The powers conferred on international
organizations are normally the subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments.
Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need for organizations to possess
subsidiary (or “implied”) powers not expressly provided for in their basic instruments.
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja (Philippine Case, 1990, G.R. No. 85750)
This involved two consolidated cases: ICMC v. Calleja and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In the case of ICMC, the Court affirmed the immunity of ICMC as a
specialized agency under the Charter of the United Nations. With respect to IRRI, the Court noted that
while it was not an international organization because it was the product of a MOA between the
Philippines and two private organizations, the promulgation of a Presidential Decree granted IRRI the
privileges and immunities of an international organization. The Court explained that the objective of
granting immunity to international organizations is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings.
World Health Organization v. Aquino (Philippine Case, G.R. No. L-35131, 1972)
A judge issued a search warrant for the personal effects of an official of the WHO. In quashing the
warrant, the Court explained that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Where the plea
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of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, the judicial department must
follow the action of the political branch and should not embarrass the latter by assuming antagonistic
jurisdiction.
Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Board (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 113191,
1996)
An illegal dismissal case was filed against the Asian Development Bank. In upholding the ADB’s immunity,
the Court cited several provisions of the ADB’s Charter granting it “immunity from legal process of every
form”. It also repeated the doctrine in the earlier case of WHO v. Aquino and pointed out that the Charter
of the ADB was a treaty that the Philippines was a party to. In entering into that treaty, the political
branches of the Philippine government extended immunities to the ADB which could not be ignored by
the judicial department.
Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng) v. People (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 125865, 2001)
Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. While Liang, an economist, was an agent of an
international organization, the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB was not absolute. The
immunity is limited to acts performed in an official capacity and does not cover the commission of a
crime—slander or oral defamation are not acts that can be considered as ones performed in official
capacity.
3. INDIVIDUALS
 In the early days of international law, individuals were objects, or at best beneficiaries of
international law, exclusively under the control of states. (Bernas)
 The international legal status of individuals is unique: it is lopsided because as far as their
international obligations are concerned, they are required to respect certain fundamental values
and may be punished as individuals for failure to do so. However, when their individual rights are
violated, they do not always have the right to bring their cases before international bodies and
instead have to rely on their own states to bring the cases on their behalf. The only exception is
when a treaty that their state has entered into or a resolution that an international organization
has adopted envisages the right of the individual to bring a case to an international body on his
own behalf. (Cassese, “International Law”, 2001; Bernas)
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
 International Criminal Law can trace its beginnings to the end of World War II, when the world
was confronted with the reality that during the war millions of crimes had been committed by
individuals. The horror of the Second World War brought about the idea that in certain cases,
some acts are so horrific that compensation from the state will not suffice, and the individual
directly responsible must be punished. The earliest courts for international criminal law were
the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.
 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1978 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
were the next step in the development of international criminal law, though the particular
193
focus of these conventions and protocols were crimes committed in the context of an armed
conflict.
 The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal (1993) and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal (1994) were
special tribunals under the United Nations Security Council. Again, the focus of these bodies
was the punishment of crimes committed in the context of an armed conflict. However, these
ad hoc tribunals brought back an idea that the UN had been contemplating since its creation:
the necessity for a permanent court to deal with cases of international criminal law.
 The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court was adopted by the UN in 1998.
The Four Most Serious International Crimes (as provided in the Rome Statute)
1. Genocide
2. Crimes against humanity
3. War crimes
4. The crime of aggression
 The principle of complementarity applies with respect to jurisdiction: municipal courts of

states party to the Statute still have the primary duty to prosecute international crimes
committed by their nationals or committed in their territory. The International Criminal Court
(ICC) will only have jurisdiction if the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute the
international crime.
E. Diplomatic and Consular Law
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) is the codification of rules of international law
particularly applicable to the political relations of states. Diplomatic relations between states are entered
into by mutual consent.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967) is the codification of rules of international law
particularly applicable to consular relations. While consular relations between states are also entered
into by mutual consent, consular relations are more specific than diplomatic relations. Consuls attend to
administrative and economic matters between the sending and receiving states. It is clarified in Article
3(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that a diplomatic mission may still perform
consular functions.
194
Table 3. Comparison of the two Vienna Conventions

On Diplomatic Relations On Consular Relations
Functions Article 3: Article 5 (summarized, trimmed
1. Representing the sending down from full enumeration):
state (SS) in the receiving state
1. Protecting the interests of the
(RS). SS and its nationals (both
2. Protecting the interests of the
individual and bodies
SS and its nationals in the RS.corporate).
3. Negotiating with the
2. Furthering the development of
government of the RS. commercial, economic, cultural,
4. Ascertaining by all lawful and scientific relations, as well
means the conditions and as promoting friendly relations.
developments in the RS and 3. Ascertaining by all lawful
reporting such to the SS. means the conditions and
5. Promoting friendly relationsdevelopments in the RS’
between the SS and RS, as well commercial, economic, cultural,
as developing their economic, and scientific life, and reporting
cultural, and scientific relations.
to persons interested.
4. Issuing passports and travel
documents to SS nationals;
issuing visas and other
documents to persons wishing to
travel to the SS.
pals political law reviewer 5. Assisting nationals of the SS.
6. Acting as notary, civil
registrar, in similar capacities,
and performing certain functions
of administrative nature not
contrary to RS laws.
7. Following RS procedural laws,
representing or arranging for the
representation of SS nationals
before RS tribunals and
authorities.
8. Transmitting judicial and
extra-judicial documents.
9. Exercising rights of
supervision and inspection in
respect of SS vessels, aircraft,
and crew.
10. Performing other functions
entrusted to a consular post by
the SS, not prohibited by RS laws
or not objected to by the RS.
Heads Article 14: Classes of Heads Article 9: Classes of Heads
1. Ambassadors or nuncios 1. Consuls-general
2. Envoys, ministers, and 2. Consuls
internuncios 3. Vice-consuls
3. Charges des affaires 4. Consular agents
195
Except as concerns precedence

(i.e. seniority) and etiquette,
there shall be no differentiation
between heads of mission by
reason of their class
Persona non grata Article 9: Article 23:
1. The RS may, at any time and 1. The RS may, at any time and
without having to explain its without explanation, notify the
decision, notify the SS that the SS that a consular officer or any
head of the mission, any member member of the consular staff is
of the diplomatic staff, or persona non grata or not
member of the mission is acceptable. The SS shall either
persona non grata or not recall the person or terminate
acceptable. The SS shall either his functions with the consular
recall or terminate the person’s post.
functions with the mission. The 2. If the SS refuses or fails within
declaration of a person to be a reasonable time to carry out its
persona non grata or not obligation to recall/terminate
acceptable may come before his functions, the RS may either
arrival in the RS’ territory. withdraw the exequatur (the
2. If the SS refuses or fails within declaration made by the RS
a reasonable period to carry out recognizing the consul of the SS
its obligation to recall or and authorizing him to perform
terminate the person’s functions,
the RS may refuse to recognize
his function in the RS. There is
no prescribed form for an
the person as a member of the exequatur.
mission. 3. A person appointed as a
member of the consular post
may be declared unacceptable,
without explanation, before
arriving in the territory of the RS
or before beginning his duties.
The SS shall withdraw his
appointment.
End of Function Article 43: Article 25:
1. Upon notification by the SS to 1. Upon notification by the SS to
the RS that the functions of the the RS that the functions of a
diplomatic agent have come to member of the consular post
an end. have come to an end.
2. Upon notification by the RS to 2. Upon withdrawal of the
the SS that it refuses to exequatur.
recognize the diplomatic agent 3. Notification by the RS to the SS
as a member of the mission. that the RS has ceased to
consider the member of the
consular staff as a member of the
consular staff.
Inviolability of Article 29: The person of a Article 40: The RS shall treat
Agent/Officer diplomatic agent shall be consular officers with due
inviolable. He shall not be liable respect and shall take all
196
to any form of arrest or appropriate steps to prevent any

detention. The RS shall treat him attack on their person, freedom,
with due respect and shall take or dignity.
all appropriate steps to prevent
any attack on his person, Article 41:
freedom, or dignity. 1. Consular officers shall not be
liable to arrest or detention
pending trial except in the case of
a grave crime and pursuant to a
decision by the competent
judicial authority.
2. Consular officers shall not be
committed to prison or liable to
any other form of restriction on
their personal freedom save in
execution of a judicial decision of
final effect (same exception as
#1 above).
3. If criminal proceedings are
instituted against a consular
officer, he must appear before
the competent authorities. The
proceedings shall be conducted
pals political law reviewer with the respect due him by
reason of his official position and
(except in cases of grave crime)
in a manner which will hamper
the exercise of official functions
as little as possible. In cases of
grave crime, when it becomes
necessary to detain a consular
officer, the proceedings against
him shall be instituted with
minimum delay.
Inviolability of Article 22: Article 31:
Premises 1. The premises of the mission 1. Consular premises shall be
shall be inviolable. The agents of inviolable to the extent provided
the RS may not enter without the in this article.
consent of the head of the 2. The RS authorities shall not
mission. enter that part of the consular
2. The RS is under a special duty premises which is used
to take all appropriate steps to exclusively for the purpose of the
protect the premises of the work of the consular post except
mission against any intrusion or with the consent of the head of
damage, and to prevent any the consular post or of his
disturbance of the mission or designee, or of the head of the
impairment of its dignity. diplomatic mission. Such consent
3. Premises of the mission, may be assumed in cases of fire
furnishings, and other property or other disaster requiring
197
thereon, including the means of prompt protective action.

transport of the mission, shall be 3. The RS is under a special duty
immune from search, to take all appropriate steps to
requisition, attachment, or protect the consular premises
execution. against any intrusion or damage
and to prevent any disturbance
Article 30: of the peace of the consular post
1. The private residence of a or impairment of its dignity.
diplomatic agent shall enjoy the 4. Consular premises,
same inviolability and protection furnishings, property of the
as the premises of the mission. consular post, and its means of
2. His papers, correspondence, transport shall be immune from
and (except as provided in any form of requisition for
Article 31 below) property shall purposes of national defense or
also be inviolable. public utility. If expropriation is
necessary for such purposes, all
possible steps shall be taken to
avoid impeding performance of
consular functions and prompt,
adequate, and effective
compensation shall be paid to
the SS.
Immunity from Article 31: Article 43:
Jurisdiction
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal
1. Consular officers and consular
employees shall not be amenable
jurisdiction of the RS. He shall to the jurisdiction of the judicial
also enjoy immunity from its or administrative authorities of
civil and administrative the RS in respect of acts
jurisdiction. performed in the exercise of
2. A diplomatic agent is not consular functions.
obliged to give evidence as a
witness.
3. No measures of execution may
be taken in respect of a
diplomatic agent.
Exceptions to Article 31: A diplomatic agent is Article 43:
Immunity from not immune from civil and The immunity provided shall not
Jurisdiction administrative jurisdiction in apply in respect of a civil action
cases of— either—
1. A real action relating to 1. Arising out of a contract
private immovable property concluded by a consular officer
situated in RS territory, unless or a consular employee in which
(exception to the exception) he he did not contract expressly or
holds it on behalf of the SS for impliedly as an agent of the SS;
purposes of the mission. or
2. An action relating to 2. By a third party for damage
succession in which the arising from an accident in the
diplomatic agent is involved as RS caused by a vehicle, vessel, or
executor, administrator, heir, or aircraft.
198
legatee as a private person and

not on behalf of the SS.
3. An action relating to any
professional or commercial
activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the RS
outside his official functions
*Measures of execution may be
taken in respect of a diplomatic
agent in the three cases listed
above, provided that such
measures can be taken without
infringing upon the inviolability
of his person or residence.
Waiver of Article 32: Article 45:
Immunity 1. The immunity from 1. The SS may waive the
jurisdiction of diplomatic agents privileges or immunities
may be waived by the SS. provided for a member of the
2. Waiver must always be consular post.
express. 2. The waiver shall in all cases be
3. Initiation of proceedings by a express, except as provided
diplomatic agent shall preclude under this Article, and shall be
him from invoking immunity communicated to the RS in
from jurisdiction in respect of
any counter-claim directly
writing.
3. The initiation of proceedings
connected with the principal by a consular officer or a
claim. consular employee in a matter
4. Waiver of immunity from where he might enjoy immunity
jurisdiction in respect of civil or shall preclude him from invoking
administrative proceedings shall immunity from jurisdiction in
not be held to imply waiver of respect of any counter-claim
immunity in respect of the directly connected with the
execution of the judgment, for principal claim.
which a separate waiver shall be 4. The waiver of immunity from
necessary. jurisdiction for the purpose of
civil or administrative
proceedings shall not be deemed
to imply the waiver of immunity
from the measures of execution
resulting from the judicial
decision (in which case a
separate waiver shall be
necessary).
Special Obligations Article 41: Article 55:
of Agents/Officers 1. Without prejudice to their 1. Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities, it is privileges and immunities, it is
the duty of all persons enjoying the duty of all persons enjoying
such privileges and immunities such privileges and immunities
to respect the RS’ laws and not to respect the RS’ laws and not to
199
to interfere in the internal affairs interfere in the internal affairs of

of that state. that state.
2. All official business with the The consular premises shall not
RS entrusted to the mission by be used in any manner
the SS shall be conducted with or incompatible with the exercise of
through the Ministry of Foreign consular functions. This
Affairs of the RS or such other provision shall not exclude the
ministry as may be agreed. possibility of offices of other
3. Premises of the mission must institutions or agencies being
not be used in any manner installed in part of the building
incompatible with the functions in which the consular premises
of the mission under this are situated, provided that the
Convention, rules of general IL, premises assigned to them are
or special agreements between separate from those used by the
the RS and SS. consular post. Said offices are
not considered to form part of
the consular premises.
Beginning and End Article 39: Article 53:
of Immunities and 1. Immunities and privileges are 1. Immunities and privileges are
Privileges enjoyed from the moment the enjoyed from the moment the
agent enters the RS’ territory on member of the consular post
proceeding to take up his post. enters the RS’ territory on
2. If he is already in the RS’ proceeding to take up his post.
territory, immunities and
privileges are enjoyed when his
2. If he is already in the country,
immunities and privileges are
appointment is notified to the enjoyed when he enters on his
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. duties with the consular post.
3. When the agent’s functions 3. When the functions of the
have come to an end, the member of the consular post
immunities and privileges he have come to an end, immunities
enjoys shall normally cease the and privileges shall cease the
moment he leaves the country or moment he leaves the RS or on
on expiry of a reasonable period the expiry of a reasonable period
to do so (in the meantime, they to do so, whichever is sooner
subsist, even during an armed (but shall subsist until that time,
conflict). even during an armed conflict).
4. With respect to acts 4. With respect to acts
performed by an agent in the performed by a consular officer
exercise of his functions as a or a consular employee in the
member of the mission, exercise of his functions,
immunity shall subsist. immunity shall continue to
subsist without limitation of
time.
200
F. Treaties
 The law on treaties is found in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969)
Article 2, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

A treaty is an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.
Summary of Essential Principles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
 Consent to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments

constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, or by any other means if
so agreed (Article 11)
Summary of steps to make a treaty binding upon a state (as provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties):
1. Negotiation
2. Giving of consent to be bound:

a. Signing of treaty
b. Exchange of instruments with the express provision that in doing so the exchanging parties
become bound
c. Ratification/acceptance/approval – process of ratification varies with each State. At all times

the instrument which is proof of the ratification must be deposited with the body specified as
depositary or, if not specified, the UN Secretary General. The effect of non-deposit is that the
treaty cannot be enforced against the state by any UN agency
*Ratification in the Philippines: Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution provides that no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate
 Every state which has signed or otherwise expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty has
the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
(Article 18)
 Pacta sunt servanda is the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith (Article 26)
 States may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless—

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151

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (2005)

pals political law reviewer

Smart Communications Inc. v. Davao City (2008)

4. Closure and opening of roads

Favis v. City of Baguio (1969)

Sanggalang v. IAC (1989)

Department of Public Services Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations (1961)

Municipal Board of Cebu City v. Court of Tax Appeals (1964)

Province of Cebu v. IAC (1987)

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. CA (1994)

b) To acquire and sell property

City of Caloocan v. CA and Gotesco (2006)

c) To enter into contracts

Vice Mayor Vicencio v. COA Chairman Villar, et al. (2012)

(ii) Ultra vires contracts

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, et al. (2012)

pals political law reviewer

Filinvest Land Inc. v. Flood-affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance (2007)

City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)

Guilatco v. City of Dagupan (1989)

Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)

Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. CA (2005)

Municipality of Tiwi and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi v. Betito (2010)

Fajardo v. Hon. Alfredo Lim (2006)

8. Settlement of boundary disputes

Calanza v. PICOP (2009)

City of Pasig v. COMELEC and Municipality of Cainta (1999)

Kananga v. Madrona (2003)

9. Succession of elective officials

Unda v. COMELEC (1990)

Macalincag v. Chang (1992)

Sandoval v. COMELEC (1993)

Montebon v. COMELEC (2008)

Mendoza v. Familara and COMELEC (2011)

Mendoza et al. v. Laxina (2003)

Mayor Abundo v. COMELEC (2013)

10. Discipline of local officials

Sison v. People (2010)

Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC (2011)

Valles v. COMELEC (2000)

Moreno v. COMELEC (2006)

Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)

Mercado v. Manzano (1999)

Abella v. COMELEC (1991)

Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992)

Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Cardino (2012)

Mayor Talaga v. COMELEC and Alcala (2012)

Cayat v. COMELEC (2007)

Bautista v. COMELEC (2003)

Bernardo, et al. v. Abalos, et al. (2004)

Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013)

Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (2010)

Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman (2005)

pals political law reviewer

(iii) Preventive suspension