Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IPL Notes (Based On Atty. Raymundo's Outline)
IPL Notes (Based On Atty. Raymundo's Outline)
Introduction
Preliminary Matters
SEC. 171. Definitions. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms have the following
meaning:
171.1. "Author" is the natural person who has created the work;
171.2. A "collective work" is a work which has been created by two (2) or more natural persons
at the initiative and under the direction of another with the understanding that it will be
disclosed by the latter under his own name and that contributing natural persons will not be
identified;
171.5. "Public lending" is the transfer of possession of the original or a copy of a work or sound
recording for a limited period, for non-profit purposes, by an institution, the services of which
are available to the public, such as public library or archive;
171.6. "Public performance," in the case of a work other than an audiovisual work, is the
recitation, playing, dancing, acting or otherwise performing the work, either directly or by
means of any device or process; in the case of an audiovisual work, the showing of its images
in sequence and the making of the sounds accompanying it audible; and, in the case of a sound
recording, making the recorded sounds audible at a place or at places where persons outside
the normal circle of a family and that family's closest social acquaintances are or can be present,
irrespective of whether they are or can be present at the same place and at the same time, or at
different places and/or at different times, and where the performance can be perceived without
the need for communication within the meaning of Subsection 171.3;
171.7. "Published works" mean works, which with the consent of the authors, are made
available to the public by wire or wireless means in such a way that members of the public may
access these works from a place and time individually chosen by them: Provided, That
availability of such copies has been such, as to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public,
having regard to the nature of the work;
171.8. "Rental" is the transfer of the possession of the original or a copy of a work or a sound
recording for a limited period of time, for profit-making purposes;
171.9. "Reproduction"
171.10. A "work of applied art" is an artistic creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated
in a useful article, whether made by hand or produced on an industrial scale;
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form
of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose. (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 49a)
SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. – Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and
173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or
operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed,
explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts
having the character of mere items of press information; or any official text of a legislative,
administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof. (n)
4. Works Protected
172.1. Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works," are original intellectual
creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and
shall include in particular:
(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;
(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery, whether or not
reduced in writing or other material form;
(d) Letters;
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or entertainment
in dumb shows;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or other
works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not
registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to
photography; lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process
analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form
of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.
Since Sec. 2 of P.D. 49 provides that "the right granted under this Decree shall, from the moment
of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works," then even with respect
to works which are required under the Decree to be registered and with copies to be deposited
with National Library, failure to comply with said requirements does not deprive the copyright
owner of the right to sue for infringement; it merely limits the remedies available to him and
subjects him to the corresponding sanction. Under the present state of the law, the copyright
for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the
absence of registration and deposit.
Ching vs. Salinas, G.R. No. 161295, June 29, 2005
FACTS: On September 4, 2001, Ching and Joseph Yu were issued by the National Library
Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit of the said work described therein as "Leaf
Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile."
On September 20, 2001, Ching requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
police/investigative assistance for the apprehension and prosecution of illegal manufacturers,
producers and/or distributors of the works. After due investigation, the NBI filed applications
for search warrants in the RTC of Manila against William Salinas, Sr. and the officers and
members of the Board of Directors of Wilaware Product Corporation.
The trial court subsequently quashed the warrants that were issued. The RTC as affirmed by
the CA ruled that it is settled that preliminarily, there must be a finding that a specific offense
must have been committed to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
The petitioner is praying for the reinstatement of the search warrants issued, but subsequently
quashed, for the offense of Violation of Class Designation of Copyrightable Works under
Section 177.1 in relation to Section 177.3 of Republic Act 8293.
ISSUE: Whether or not the items subject of the search warrant were copyrightable
RULING: It is worthy to state that the works protected under the Law on Copyright are:
literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173). The Leaf Spring Eye Bushing
and Vehicle Bearing Cushion fall on neither classification. Accordingly, if, in the first place, the
item subject of the petition is not entitled to be protected by the law on copyright, how can
there be any violation?
The said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile is merely a utility model described as
comprising a generally cylindrical body having a co-axial bore that is centrally located and
provided with a perpendicular flange on one of its ends and a cylindrical metal jacket
surrounding the peripheral walls of said body, with the bushing made of plastic that is either
polyvinyl chloride or polypropylene. Likewise, the Vehicle Bearing Cushion is illustrated as a
bearing cushion comprising a generally semi-circular body having a central hole to secure a
conventional bearing and a plurality of ridges provided therefore, with said cushion bearing
being made of the same plastic materials. Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They
are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art. They
are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value.
It bears stressing that the focus of copyright is the usefulness of the artistic design, and not its
marketability. The central inquiry is whether the article is a work of art. Works for applied art
include all original pictorials, graphics, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have
been embodied in useful article regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial
exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection.
As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are useful
articles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. Indeed, while works of applied
art, original intellectual, literary and artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works
of industrial design are not. A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the
extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian
aspects of the article.
Functional components of useful articles, no matter how artistically designed, have generally
been denied copyright protection unless they are separable from the useful article.
In this case, the petitioner’s models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works. They are
utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or value.
173.2. The works referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Subsection 173.1 shall be protected as
new works: Provided, however, That such new work shall not affect the force of any subsisting
copyright upon the original works employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply any
right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works.
(Sec. 8, P.D. 49; Art. 10, TRIPS)
The plaintiff was, according to the laws regulating literary properties, the registered owner and
author of a literary work entitled Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary)
published in the City of Manila in 1889 by the printing establishment La Opinion, and a copy
of which was attached to the complaint, as Exhibit A; (2) that the defendant, without the
consent of the plaintiff, reproduced said literary work, improperly copied the greater part
thereof in the work published by him and entitled Diccionariong Kastila-Tagalog.
The defendant in his answer denied generally each and every allegation of the complaint and
prayed the court to absolve him from the complaint.
The ground of the decision appealed from is that a comparison of the plaintiff's dictionary with
that of the defendant does not show that the latter is an improper copy of the former, which
has been published and offered for sale by the plaintiff for about twenty-five years or more.
For this reason the court held that the plaintiff had no right of action and that the remedy
sought by him could not be granted.
it is not necessary, as the court below seems to have understood, that a work should be an
improper copy of another work previously published. It is enough that another's work has been
reproduced without the consent of the owner, even though it be only to annotate, add
something to it, or improve any edition thereof.
SEC. 174. Published Edition of Work. – In addition to the right to publish granted by the author,
his heirs, or assigns, the publisher shall have a copyright consisting merely of the right of
reproduction of the typographical arrangement of the published edition of the work. (n)
Sec. 175
SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. – Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and
173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or
operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed,
explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts
having the character of mere items of press information; or any official text of a legislative,
administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof. (n)
On July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of BJPI,
saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which was produced by IXL Productions, Inc.
Show Format Not Protected - The format or mechanics of a television show are not
copyrightable under Sec. 2 of P.D. 49 which enumerates the work that can be copyrighted,
which is the same as Sec. 172 of IPC, which refers to finished works and not
concepts. The copyright does not extent to an idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory
right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and
not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a
statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and
may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects
and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the
statute. Since copyright in published works is purely a statutory
creation, a copyright may be obtained only for a work falling within
the statutory enumeration or description.
(1) if the engineering or technical drawings of an advertising display unit (light box) are
granted copyright protection (copyright certificate of registration) by the National
Library, is the light box depicted in such engineering drawings ipso facto also
protected by such copyright?
RULING: Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. Being a
mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It may be
obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on
terms and conditions specified in the statute.7 Accordingly, it can cover only the
works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. the scope of a
copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual
creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation.
(2) or should the light box be registered separately and protected by a patent issued by
the Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer (now Intellectual
Property Office) — in addition to the copyright of the engineering drawings?
Hence, on November 7, 1967, appellant filed a complaint with the lower court for
infringement of copyright against defendant-appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-
appellee's restaurant of said songs copyrighted in the name of the former.
ISSUE: The principal issues in this case are whether or not the playing and signing of musical
compositions which have been copyrighted under the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act
3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee constitute a public performance for
profit within the meaning and contemplation of the Copyright Law of the Philippines
RULING: Playing of music in dine and dance establishment which was paid for by the public
in purchases of food and constitutes "performance for profit" within the Copyright Law.
Nevertheless,
defendant cannot be held to have violated the Copyright Law
because the composers of the contested musical compositions
are deemed to have waived their rights in favor of the general
public because they have failed to comply with the regulation
requiring an intellectual creation to be copyrighted within 30 days
after publication.
complaint alleges that plaintiff Mauro Malang Santos designed for former Ambassador Felino
Neri, for his personal Christmas Card greetings for the year 1959, the artistic motif in
question. The following year the defendant McCullough Printing Company, without the
knowledge and authority of plaintiff, displayed the very design in its album of Christmas
cards and offered it for sale, for a price.
As a general proposition, there can be no dispute that the artist acquires ownership of the
product of his art. At the time of its creation, he has the absolute dominion over it. To help the
author protect his rights the copyright law was enacted.
The plaintiff in this case did not choose to protect his intellectual creation by a copyright. The
fact that the design was used in the Christmas card of Ambassador Neri who distributed
eight hundred copies thereof among his friends during the Christmas season of 1959, shows
that the, same was published.
Unless satisfactorily explained a delay in applying for a copyright, of more than thirty days
from the date of its publication, converts the property to one of public domain.
IOW: Author of design for Christmas card is owner thereof and entitled to payment for its
use, but once published and he has failed to copyright same, anyone may use those designs.
9. Limitations of Copyright
- A&M Records Inc. vs. Napster Inc. No. 00-16401 (U.S. Court Decision)
The court first considered these four factors on an abstract level of the system
itself.
1. They agreed with the District Court's finding that downloading an MP3 is
not transformative under the purpose and character of use factor, and that
even though Napster didn't directly benefit financially from users'
downloads (i.e., charge for the service), "repeated and exploitative copying
of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale" could be
considered a commercial use.
2. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that creative works, such
as the songs in question, are "closer to the core" of intended copyright
protection" than non-creative works, thus favoring the plaintiffs on the
second factor.
3. They considered the potential that in some cases, wholesale copying of a
work may be protected, noting time-shifting as an example.
4. Finally, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that
widespread wholesale transfer of plaintiff's music negatively affected the
market for CD sales and that it also jeopardizes the record industry's future
in digital markets.
The court then turned to the three uses Napster identified as fair use in the
conduct of its users:
1. sampling, where users make temporary copies of a work to sample it
before purchase, which the District Court found to be a commercial use
even if a user purchases the work at a later time. Sampling was deemed to not be a fair use,
because the "samples" were in fact permanent and
complete copies of the desired media.
2. space-shifting, where users access a sound recording through the Napster
system that they already own in audio CD format; here the District Court
found that neither of the shifting analyses used in the Sony or RIAA v.
Diamond Multimedia cases applied in this case because the "shifting" in
neither case included or enabled distribution. The space-shifting argument
did not succeed because, while the shift to a digital format may have been
a personal storage use, it was accompanied by making the file available to
the rest of the system's users.
3. permissive distribution of recordings by both new and established artists
who have authorized their music to be disseminated in the Napster
system, which the District Court ruled was not an infringing use and could
continue, along with chat rooms and other non-distributory features of
Napster.
When is there a substantial reproduction of a book? It does not necessarily require that the
entire copyrighted work, or even a large portion of it, be copied. If so much is taken that the
value of the original work is substantially diminished, there is an infringement of
copyright and to an injurious extent, the work is appropriated.
In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the
copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not
necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so
much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is
sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.
deleted by RA 10372)
10. Registration and Deposit with National Library and Supreme Court Library - Sec. 191 (as
g. Scope and Limitation of Right on Sound Recordings - Sec. 208 as amended; 210
-ABS-CBN vs. Phil. Multi-Media System Inc., G.R. No. 175769-70, Jan. 19, 2009
ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals which the
viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the
programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin
or author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely
retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its
premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is
basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting
organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
In Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC,36 the Court held that a
franchise is a mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public
service. Thus:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among
other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that
“any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires.”
In Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC,36 the Court held that a
franchise is a mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public
service. Thus:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among
other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that
“any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires.”
15. Infringement
Microsoft Corp. vs. Hwang, G.R. No. 147043, June 21, 2005
Columbia Pictures v. CA
-Bayanihan Music Phils., Inc. vs BMG Records, G.R. No. 166337, March 7, 2005
a. For Literary and Artistic Works and Derivative Works - Sec. 221; 221.1
Pearl & Dean Inc. vs. Shoemart Inc., G.R. No. 148222, August 15, 2003
- Philip Morris Inc. vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp. G.R. No. 158589, June 27, 2006
2. Historical Development
Mirpuri vs. CA, G.R. No. 114508, Nov. 19, 1999
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. CA. GR No. 120900. July 20, 2000
4. Functions of a Trademark
Phil. Refining Co. vs. Ng Sam, G.R. No. L-26676. July 30, 1982
Arce Sons and Co. vs. Selects Biscuits, 1 SCRA 253 (1961)
Converse Rubber vs. Universal Rubber, G.R. No. L-27906, Jan. 8, 1987
Sec. 122 Puma Sportsshenfabriken vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75067, Feb. 26, 1988
Marvex Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Petra Hawpia & Co, L-16297, Dec. 22, 1926
Unno vs. General Milling, G.R. No. L-28554, Feb. 28, 1983
Emerald Garments Mfg. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 100098, December 29, 1995,
251 SCRA 600
Berris Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Norby Abyudang, G.R. No. 183404, October 13, 2010
Sec. 3
Emerald Garments Mfg. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995,
251 SCRA 600
Chuanchow Soy & Canning Co. vs. Director of Patents, 108 Phil 833, 836
Phil. Refining Co. vs. Ng Sam, G.R. No. L-26676, July 30, 1982
Esso Standard Eastern Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29971, Aug. 31, 1982
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. CA, G.R. No. 120900, July 20, 2000
American Wire Cable Co. vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26557, Feb. 18. 1970
Rueda Hermanos vs. Paglinawan. G.R. No. 10738, Jan. 14, 1916
Fruit of the Loom vs. CA, GR No. L-32747. Nov. 29, 1984
Lim Hoa vs. Director of Patents, GR No. L-8072. Oct. 31, 1956
McDonalds Corp. vs. L.C. Big Mak GR No. 143993, Aug. 18, 2004
Faberge Inc. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71189, Nov. 4. 1992
Hickock Manufacturing vs. CA, G.R. No. L-44707, Aug. 31, 1982
Acoje Mining Co. vs. Director of Patents GR No. L-28744, April 29, 1971
Luft Co. Inc, Vs. Ngo Guan, G.R. No. L-21915, Dec. 17, 1900 1995, 251 SCRA 600
Emerald Garments Mfg. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, December 29,
McDonalds Corp. vs. L.C. Big Mak. G.R. No. 143993, Aug. 18, 2004
American Wire Cable Co. vs. Director of Patents. G.R. No. L-26557, Feb. 18, 1970
Acoje Mining Co. vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-28744, April 29, 1971
1. Phonetic similarity
Marvex Commercial Covs, Petra Haw Pia, L-16297, Dec. 22, 1926
2. Holistic Test
Mead Johnson & Co., NW Van Dorf Ltd, & SCRA 768 (1963)
3. Dominancy Test
Asia Brewery Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103543, July 5, 1993
American Wire Cable Co. vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26557, Feb. 18, 1970
Emerald Garments Mfg. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, December
29, 1995, 251 SCRA 600
East Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-14377, Dec. 29, 1960
Masso Hermanos vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-3952, Dec. 29, 1953
Phil. Refining Co. vs. Ng Sam, G.R. No. L-26676, July 30, 1982
Asia Brewery Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103543, July 5, 1993
Ong Ai Gui vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-6235, March 28, 1955
Arce Sons and Co. vs. Selects Biscuits, 1 SCRA 253 91961)
Lyceum of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101897, March 5, 199
Sec. 123.1 Sec. 147.2 Rule 100 par. C, Trademark Regulations Rule 102
246 Corp. vs. Daway, G.R. No. 157216, November 20, 2003
McDonald's Corp. vs MACJOY Fastfood Corp., G.R. No. 166115. February 2, 2007
Mirpuri vs. CA, supra McDonalds Corp. vs. L.C. Big Mak, supra
Fredco Manufacturing Corp. V. President and Fellows of Harvard College, G.R. No.
185917. June 1, 2011
Levi Strauss v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc. GR No. 138900, September 20, 2005
- Sec. 124
30. Assignment and Transfer of Application and Registration - Sec 149, 149.2;149.4, 149.5
Prosource International, Inc., v. Horphag Research Management SA, G.R. No: 180073,
November 25, 2009
36. Actions, Damages and Injunction for Infringement - Sec. 156 - 158, 170
- Shangri-la Int'l Hotel Management vs. CA, G.R. No. 111580, June 21, 2001
- Conrad and Company Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 115115, 246 SCRA 691[1995]
38. Rights of Foreign Corporation to sue in Trademark or Service Mark Enforcement action- Sec.
160
Coffee Partners, Inc. v. San Francisco Coffee and Roastery, Inc, G.R. No. 169504, March
3. 2010
In-N-Out Burger, Inc., v. Sehwani, Incorporated and/or Benita's Frites, Inc., G.R. No.
179127. December 24, 2008
2. Patentability
Novelty - Sec. 23
Creser Precision Systems Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118708, Feb.
2. 1998
b. Non-Patentable Inventions - Sec. 22 as amended by RA 9502
3. Right to Patent
4. Patent Application
- Sec. 107
b. Doctrine of Equivalents
Smith Kline Beckman Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126627, Aug. 14, 2003
9. Voluntary Licensing
g. Non-Registration - Sec. 92
- Smith Kline vs. CA, G.R. No. 121267. October 23, 200
Parke Davis & Co. vs. Doctors' Pharmaceutical, 14 SCRA 1053 (1964)
a. Applicability of Provisions Relating to Patents - Sec. 108 Sec. 108.2 Sec. 109.1
Patentable Inventions Sec. 109.3
Del Rosario vs. CA, G.R. No. 115106, March 15, 1996; 255 SCRA 152 (1996)
b. Conversion of Patent Application for Utility Model Registration - Sec. 110.1; 110.2
f. Rights Conferred to Owner of Layout Design Registration - Sec. 119.4; Sec. 119.5
References:
Course Syllabus for Copyright and Intellectual Property Laws by Judge Marc Joseph
Quirante