Page 7 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.

125416)
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),
which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.On November
24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the
sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.On April 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing
therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.The
petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.The Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.Not satisfied, respondents resorted to
their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848,
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum.On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with
a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

Issue:

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to
enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

Ruling:

1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at
the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to
the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in
most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.In initiative and referendum, the
Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct
of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and
not yet an approved law.The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ
or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in
regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any
"branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made
no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action
made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened
for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31,
2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28,
2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its
provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines
for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law,
is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under
treaty law and customary international law.Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they
have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties
to the treaty.

Issue:W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence; orWhether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

Held:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution
also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be
taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President
in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for
by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.

Mariano v COMELEC

Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail
sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Montejo vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates
the principle of equality of representation.The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is
composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian,
Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district
of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said
section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.On 1992, the Local
Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion
of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of
Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with
a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution
of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on
December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside. The deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the
1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the
subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress. Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the
ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.”
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but
such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the
respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.) G.R. No. 176970 Case Digest
Rogelio Bagabuyovs COMELEC

Facts:RA 9371 was approved dividing Cagayan de Oro into two legislative districts. Later, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution 7837 implementing RA 9371.Bagabuyo then filed a petition against COMELEC and
other officers asking for nulliffication of RA 9371 and Res. 7837 saying that RA 9371 failed to conduct a
plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local governement unit. The court did not
grant the TRO or writ of prelim. injunction, so the May elections proceeded with CDO divided into two
legislative districts.COMELEC, thru OSG argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts,
as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be dismissed on
this ground?

2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does
it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

Ruling:Except for issue on the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.The present
petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised among them, whether
legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit are reasons
enough for considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition
assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that
R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. For these
reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of
the present case.

Plebiscite
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation
of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the
1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:Sec.
5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.Separately from the legislative districts
that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically and
generically referred to as municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a body politic
and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local
government thereof. The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.Under
both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested
in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division,
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality
exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with
one another.A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite
to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local

government unit.Holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or

reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with
the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with
the concept of legislative apportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1
provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico,
Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and
corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is
only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes
of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not
come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

Aquino III v. COMELEC

Facts:Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers,
taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” In substance,
the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population
of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following
table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:Petitioners contend that the
reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:Article
VIection 5. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.

Issue:whether or not Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as
explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto; and whether or not Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution

Held:
 No. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.The use by the subject provision of a comma
to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase
“or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province.Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.Neither in the text nor
in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation
of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional
legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─based
on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─entitled to two (2) districts in addition
to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes
this point. In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on
the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment
or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that
resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.The factors mentioned during the
deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One;
and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of
the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse
of discretion, that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Aldaba vs. COMELEC

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan
was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill
3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in
2007.House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected,
254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”
is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135
as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:The certification on demographic projection can be
issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not
stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.The certification can be issued only by
the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central
Luzon NSO is unauthorized.The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this
case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.It was also computed that the correct figures
using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will
grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court
ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives
although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground
that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list
system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR
 determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall
be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able
to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the
said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April
11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents
in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for
hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on
the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan
Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on
or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that
the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but
barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."

Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof. The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC"to refrain from proclaiming
any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory
upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785

Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court
in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Court
also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on
that Petition.
 In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's
action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may
just be a formality because the COMELEC, through theOffice of the Solicitor General, has made its position
on the matter quite clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with
public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a
nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseasworkers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Finally, "lack of
well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented." In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to
see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association.
In view of OSG contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. Indeed, the law crafted to address the
peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes
Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, theOSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.
In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work.
In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of
proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide
basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list
system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received
in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the
votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in
order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the
votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented.
What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized
sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of
Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district
elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts
but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House. They may include
Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have
been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical. In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission
that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose
the party-list system. Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the
party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a
basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional
representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of
winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veteransformula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDEthe Resolution of the COMELEC dated
3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissiveceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to
the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote
for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in
the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were
initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political
parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of
votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose
qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three
parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of
votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In
contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties
garnered more than 2%. In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the
time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that
the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people
recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional
political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow
major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the
voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.
That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list
system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast
for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2),
Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as
well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the people’s broadest representation
in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system. Today, a little over eight (8) years
after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are
allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be
realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than
50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The
need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice
Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum
vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the
legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really
been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be
able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.However, with the
burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the
creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote
requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with
time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever
being fully operative. It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the
number of party-list seats in Congress.But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the
precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the
constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down
the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of
the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions
remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment
that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

ABAYON VHRET HE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a
petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo
was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its
nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of
Aangat Tayo.In G.R.189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and
the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels,
and security guards.Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it
was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving
his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said,
before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
HELD:
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies
who the “members” of that House are:Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.10The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

Facts:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59.He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of
his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House should not punish him.The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59,
where it was stated that Sergio Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he
claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things” at premium
prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.

The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and
disrepute.The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to
appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.In support
of his request, Osmeña alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII,
sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without
issuing any preliminary injunction.The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting
on such report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.The respondents filed their answer where
they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its
session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House
has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

Issue:Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself.Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize
the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."Our Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy
the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may
offend."It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does
not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.For unparliamentary conduct, members of
Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April
1949, suspended a senator for one year.Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution
No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House
Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.Granted that
the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights
to take action which had already lapsed.The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period
of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are
subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the
required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.The following is quoted from a reported
decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it
is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own
rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action.
(Certain American cases)In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was
censured by the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks.On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the
court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.Clifford vs. French- several
senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus
proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make
defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested
the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it
may deem sufficient.

In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the
to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a
power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency
which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is
supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the
power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.The Court
merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain.
Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions.

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this
Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may
punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was
one.The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without
that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood
to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party.Now the Congress has the full
legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it
then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.The Legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise.In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not
be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to
jail.Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had
been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the
suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would
seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.Of course, there is
nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable outcome of such reformed
suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.

Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924

Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is
hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for
havingtreacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion
of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said
Mr. Alejandrino.
Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He
prays the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed
without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.
 Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider
the petition and the demurrer must be sustained.The power to control is the power to abrogate and the
power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide
whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must
determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
In view of the propriety of mandamus
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at
least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is
not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be
done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined."
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian
regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the
Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)
They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may
thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member
for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power
granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.
In view of effects of punishment
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative
body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; butsuspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By
suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
qualified expulsion or removal.
In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what
has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ
prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power
of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said thatconclusion leaves the
petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all
power.
 People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

08OCT

FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite
his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as
a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the
sovereign will”.

RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”,
this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison.

G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

o Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
o Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

FACTS:Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner
now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his
case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case,
there was already conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that
former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of
innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat
which is regarded as a "political offense."Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of
noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft
and corruption in the AFP.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.The distinctions cited by petitioner were not
elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.That the cited provisions
apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil.
Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since
he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he
was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The
assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk
that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable
offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
Zandueta v. Dela Costa
NATUREThis is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial
District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the
office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent
FACTSPrior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the
City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of
an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on
which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the
petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first
instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of
Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having
acted on said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner,
pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May
19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim
appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein
respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority
to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments

ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the
office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute

HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by
virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the
same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a
new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the
discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office
and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new
appointment has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, —which new office is incompatible with the
one formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office
he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question
the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166,
par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In
the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by
the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the
petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the
appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his
duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of
his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the
office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath,
thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he
would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue
of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied
and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
 Flores v. Drilon
Facts:

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers
and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that
the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “[n]o elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public
offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwiseprovided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint”, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and
not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus
Election Code, which says:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new
employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing
officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary
or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The
Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential
to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may
be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the
Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of
this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of
salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations . for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject
posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior
to the 11 May 1992 Elections.

Issue: whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, “Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts

Held:In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here,
the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by
an appointiveofficial when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph
appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation
of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself,
e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed
Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the
second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.It is
further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence,
an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the
prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII,
of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions
of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor.This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise.
Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress
would have, at least, avoided the word “appointed” and, instead, “ex officio” would have been used.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13,
par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
As may be defined, an appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or persons having authoty
therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust, or the selection or designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of
the same. Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.When Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee
for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, theproviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to
appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and
goes against the very nature itself of appointment.While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one,
and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a
perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his
prerogative.Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.Where, as in the case of
respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other
government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by
the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of
eligibility.As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, “one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of
the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was
not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . .
. . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such.Conformably with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and
all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which may have been received by respondent Gordon
pursuant to his appointment may be retained by him.

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. —
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office,
agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates
and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant
the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning
of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the
election.The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-
called “midnight” appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be
made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing President.

Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments —
those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but
also appointments of the Presidential election.The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only
the making oftemporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the
President during the period of the ban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the President’s power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general
proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying
and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of
some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed
out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects.
They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.

To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period
of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the
membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly
important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by
neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter,
filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited
His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
 Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their
argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held
the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the
Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is
elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded,
and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of
which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when
he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.The Court however held further that the
PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except
by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The
Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:WHEREFORE, we
declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The
PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the
PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the
second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very
lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.
 The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated
the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,
Inc., thus:This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead,
the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most
adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this
case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under
the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.Since its enactment, the
PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15,
1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition
that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State
and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in
recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from
the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.[T]his Court
[must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the
PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law.
Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII,
Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to
organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009
lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well
as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian
law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a
GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to
hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision
of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC
requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in
an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it
in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive
portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]

UYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr.,
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private
corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat
Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the
appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel
for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15
May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He
then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares
alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had
acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979,
after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners
Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.Under those facts and circumstances, there has been
an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.Thus, the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973
Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the
SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

AVELINO VS. CUENCOPolitical Question; Separation of Power; Legislative Branch

Facts:

1. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against
then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by
his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before
 Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.
2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
4. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not
been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the
24-member Senate.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.

2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
1.3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines
Senate and oust respondent.
4. Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the Constitution for
the transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because
at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun
and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the
House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number
 than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since
the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
1.2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy
arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and
thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition on the ground as it involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in
this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined
from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House, should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"Whereas, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of
Representatives from the Second District of "the province of Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on the one
hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia;'
Whereas, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the
following:"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case,
the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I
am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. * * *.Whereas, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without.basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the
dignity and prestige of the Office of the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the
Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; * * *
Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by
the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President
of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960, and for
such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., to appear before it to substantiate
his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to
do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.- The special committee
shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines."

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged r first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after
the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject
to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's
jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer without
issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed
for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to
perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on
July 18,1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the
House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty
as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San
Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Baltao)[1] filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House
Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July
18,1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59, and that he
refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of
fifteen months, for serious diorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
"Whereas, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960,
found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious diorderly behaviour for making without basis in
truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the
Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
Whereas, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House
of Representatives: Now, Therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is,
declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and * * *."

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his
speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be
questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other
business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House
has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense." [2]Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliament as construed and
applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as
related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before ttye legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the
following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many
infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen
were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a
member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison[3], suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attests to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power
of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension
or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices
of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues,
because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.
Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be
done by unanimous consent. .
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspend the operation of its Rules, it may not,
however, affect past acts or renew its right to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws[4] extending the period of limitation of actions and making
them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as
against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, courts have declared that
"the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them,"[5]And it been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with, their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." [6]
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power
of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly
conduct of business, and as security against hasty action." (Bewiet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs.
Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor,
etc, of Albany, 23 Wend. CN.Y.] 277, 280 j Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. E. 977, 124
Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs.
Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. 159,
Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Taken from the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 South Western Reporter,
p. 584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the
Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite
the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp.
799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct
for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe,
however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent
refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
"Sec. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature.-The principle is well established that the courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature since each department is equally independent within the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution.* * *."
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions- Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to expel a member, the
courts will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.[7] In 1905,
several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined
to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic language:
"Under our form, of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the 'power
committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in
the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient. In Hiss vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass, says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to
perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection,
and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge tof the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '* * *There is no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the
exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the
power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do."

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles
controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may, as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction
to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard
the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of
comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic
illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position on at least two
occasions, thatpersonal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
order.[8] And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been
considered.[9]
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of the Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of that Body for certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.
The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this
Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then
functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones
Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the
Senate and without restriction as to residence senators * * * who will, in his opinion, best represent the
Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district
of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that
remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party
and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the
views of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those powers which were granted
to it by the Jones Law[10]; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised-the power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension[11] which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
"The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192, 212.)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more
weighty in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies
have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.[12]
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special Committee
from acting in pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued,
the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The
House has closed its session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the
case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.[13] Of course, there is nothing to prevent
petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for
reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit,
however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino [14]and Alejandrino vs.
Quezon.[15]
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought
it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R.
ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR,
BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT,
ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO
R. VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.On October 9, 1987, the
petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against
22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A.
Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.On November 17,
1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who
had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the
Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had
filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the
Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same
contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or
inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent
Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the
hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87,
the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as
alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.The petitioners, in
essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure
so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored
to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation,
leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is
neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection
to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,
creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
 case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative'
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it
held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a
panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of
course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of
decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.Said intent is even more clearly
signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the
spirit and intent of the Constitution.Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of
any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.To our
mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which
it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by
its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.It is aptly noted in the first of the
questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility
of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once
more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no
scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we
are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents
referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the
petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of
Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule
on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner
was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare
petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner
from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume
office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab
initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F.
Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed as G.R. No.
80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of
petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.

Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec.
250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on
time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by
private respondent.

A. The Main Case

This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET,
dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on
time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed his comment
with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition,
and considered the case submitted for decision.

Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the
HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's election
protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the
filing of the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent's
protest had been seasonably filed.

To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and, therefore, the
HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
provides:

Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. — A
sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any
regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days
after the proclamation of the results of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the
pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that he
was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a
protest; that private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period
was suspended and began to run again on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy
of the decision of the Court in G.R, No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left
or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent filed his protest with
the HRET only on February 8, 1988.

On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:

Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of
the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to
the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1)
copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these
Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the
Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the
Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules,
subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, ruled the HRET:

On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days
from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15,
1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent herein),
promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the
effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until
Protestant received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC
Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and purposes, therefore, Protestee's
(petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-
day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date.

Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The
protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of this
Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.]

The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction
over it.

Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in
unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the
COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or
city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides
that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-
C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no
provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang
Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.

That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the
1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election
regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay
offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the
election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be
emphasized, however, that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code
to each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the
Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws governing said elections. *

An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11,
1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election
protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules
governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute.

The Court is of the considered view that it may not.

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-
making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of
the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court,
speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol.
1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch
has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act
(Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and
the 1987 Constitutions].

Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states it in this wise:
 See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
(1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No.
L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches
of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature
and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals)
[see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the
delineation between the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional
experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested
in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national
and local officials.

That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant
with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential
system, is too evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's
purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and accredit
citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where
appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this
sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully
applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under
the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging
in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the
period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.

Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the
HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition

Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5,
1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear
to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May
30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions
and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the
grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted.

The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming.

The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the
pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the
determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the
aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRETs sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007,
where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral protest, this Court said:

The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the
COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the
pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on
his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any
final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or and and set aside. But
then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action
taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated
earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same."
(Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)), the Court
declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under the 1987
Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the
duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of
discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed for has been clearly shown.WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private
respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.

Robles v. HRET
G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990
Medialdea, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner
Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election
protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan
City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in
various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election
returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts.

On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of
contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total
contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75
precincts, representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated.on September 8, 1988,
Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to
Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts.No action on Robles’ motion to suspend revision and Santos’
motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET when on September
14,1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. On September 19,
1988, Robles opposed Santos’ motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to
Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal. On the same day,
respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted Santos’ urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest.

Issue:

whether when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised
Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its
jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised
protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.

Held:

No. The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts,
without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction
over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to
the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected
by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a
constitutional body has been upheld in many cases.
GRINO-AQUINO. J.
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the
Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60(1803),
had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government,
finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to
intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too
willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the
sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that "where the matter involved
is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or
both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that
in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for
that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As we pointed out in
the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may
not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being
provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate
of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section I, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution ofthe Philippines which definesjudicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative
branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is

"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice
according to law. x x x It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure
of the law." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates
for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the
following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET
Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of nine
(9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the
House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) as follows:
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's
protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the
Tribunal insisted on a re-appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by
at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.The reexamination and re-appreciation of
the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with
the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his "Chief,"
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but
also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self-respect," and to honor a
"gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the
appreciation of the contested ballot[1] Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP
which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in
HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter[2] that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos,
Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91, had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from
the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are
"not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee-unanimously
confirmed the expulsions.[3]

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it
"especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite."[4]

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mine. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera,
received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal Justices Herrera, Cruz,
and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of
this "distressing development" and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because

"By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
73777-78, promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation,
the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the
finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose
E. Calingasan, dissenting.

"Congressman Camasura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which
he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leadership of his party.

"Under the above circumstances, an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue
with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its integrity and credibility as a
constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member
of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the
performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases
before it.

"In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a
return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the
House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the
Tribunal.

"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the
Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.

"We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership
in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

"There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation
on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.

"But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal
well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.

"Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership
in the Tribunal.

"x x x xxx x x x."

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-
0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

"In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination
and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the
Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda(HRET Case No. 25)
scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the
concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be
validly promulgated.

"The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral
cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the
Tribunal.

"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member
of the Tribunal.

"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention." (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
"x x x in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of
these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before
them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption
of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but
as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals,
the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability,
or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT
them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in
the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial
in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the new that the term of
all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to
REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

"Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise apolitical and judicial travesty will
take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave."
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc
against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., or any other
representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanito G. Camasura Jr., and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, "to withdraw the nomination and
to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal";

2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment[5] on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to
replace Honorable Juanito G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of
the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member
of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the
Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the
sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on
Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in
the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death,
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;[6] that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-
extensive with his legislative term,[7] for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not
removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified;[8] and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is
"purely a party affair" of the LDP[9] and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review.[10]

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the
HRET.[11] Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party
for it was the House, not the HRET, that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in
the HRET.[12]

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a
party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The
petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act
of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET.[13]

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had
nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by
cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. [14] Hence,
although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that
complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge,
give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent
Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."[15]

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced
the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET, several newspapers of general
circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to
take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.[16]

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional
representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of
the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads
as follows:

"Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (1935
Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it was impossible for any political party
to control the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusivejurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created
to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political
body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well
to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

"The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

"The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification
of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in
the legislature."

"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and
to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.

"The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits
of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests
relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered
with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET.

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution,
would, however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority
party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of
the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's
candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal
would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the
three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority
party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid

cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for
the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are
not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal
were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who,
upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of
absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the
judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor
on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and
with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for
"party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc
case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so
that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to
nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the
House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to
change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the
strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for
relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as
the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution
"even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself (Concurring opinion
of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor,
the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13,
1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc,
is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House
of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for
being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91 -
0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the
Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et
al
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office,
on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States
since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent
resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the reason
that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent
since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of
a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

G.R. No. 135996 September 30, 1999

EMILIANO R. "BOY" CARUNCHO III, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and The Chairman ATTY. CASIANO ATUEL, JR. and MEMBERS, ATTY.
GRACE S. BELVIS, DR. FLORENTINA R. LIZANO, City Board of Canvassers, City of Pasig, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the
lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G.
Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent);
Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR);
Elpidio G. Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP).

At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers composed of Atty.
Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member,
started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board received
intelligence reports that one of the candidates for the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera,
and his supporters, might disrupt and stop the canvassing.1âwphi1.nêt

At exactly 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed the
Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was being conducted.
They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As
pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those present in the canvassing venue,
including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel
exited through the backdoors bringing with them the Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as
well as the Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to the City
Treasurer's Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents and paraphernalia
were scattered all over the place when the intruders left.

The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22) Election Returns
and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22
election returns, which contained the names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could
not be found. An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded negative result.
Hence, the Board secured proper authority from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 1 through Election
Director for the National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the reconstitution of the missing page by
making use of the other copies of the election returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy in the
ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.

At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491 election returns
from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the
lone district of Pasig. 2 The votes obtained by the leading three candidates were: Henry P. Lanot — 60,914
votes; Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III — 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera — 36,139 votes. The winner,
Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.

However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a "Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the Basis of
Incomplete Returns" 3 with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded with the proclamation of
Henry Lanot as the winning congressional candidate even though one hundred forty-seven (147) election
returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare
the proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be directed to convene and reopen the
ballot boxes to recount the votes of the candidates for the House of Representatives and thereupon
proclaim the winner. On June 1, 1998, petitioner filed an amended motion to correct some errors in the
listing of precincts under paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3, and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of the original
motion. 4

On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent Pasig City Board
of Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify Lanot's proclamation. In his comment filed on
June 23, 1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and stoppage of the canvass of
election returns on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two (22) election returns, not
147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually recovered. The Board stated in
part:

. . . . Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election Returns were
reported missing. On the following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units have
recovered the 22 missing Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's
Office and from the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). There are no missing election
returns.

That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units, they found out that Page 2 of
the 22 Election Returns they recovered were detached and missing. We wish to inform the
Commission that Page 2 of the Local Election Returns contained the name of candidates for
Congressman. We conducted investigation on who did the detachment of Page 2 of the 22
Election Returns. However, nobody from the Treasurer's Office nor from the PESO admitted
that they committed such election offense.

It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing. The COMELEC Instruction is very
specific that only Election Returns to be canvassed are suppose(d) to be brought out from the
Ballot Boxes containing still uncanvassed Election Returns. The instruction further stated that
once it was read by the Board, it will be stamped "READ" and then deliver the same (sic) to
the 22 sub-canvassing units. Sub-canvassing units cannot get another Election Returns unless
the same is finished, tallied, stamped as "CANVASSED," and submit the same to the
Secretariat and placed inside a separate ballot boxes with stamped "READ" and "CANVASSED"
(sic) sealed with metal seals, padlocked, chained and padlocked again. It was at this time
where (sic) the sub-canvassing units will get another Election Returns from the Board for tally
and so on. Sub-canvassing units are not allowed to canvass 2 or more Election Returns at one
time. This was the very reason why only 22 Election Returns were reported missing but were
recovered without Page 2.

That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading candidates for Congressman were as
follows:

HENRY LANOT — FIRST

EMILIANO CARUNCHO — SECOND

ARNULFO ACEDERA — THIRD

As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading Caruncho by thousands. Very few Election
Returns have Caruncho leading and even if leading, the lead was only a few votes.

Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was secured through Atty. Teresita C.
Suarez, Election Director for National Capital Region for the purpose of making use of other
copies of the Election Returns particularly the Provincial Copy or the Copy in the Ballot Boxes.
Fortunately, the authorities arrived on time so that the Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time
in opening the Ballot Boxes to retrieve the copies from the Board of Canvassers left inside the
Ballot Boxes by the careless Board of Election Inspectors. Provincial copies were used as well
in the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the 22 recovered Election Returns.

That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty. Irene D. Jurado that there were 147
Election Returns which were not canvassed which will affect the result of election for Emiliano
Caruncho. The Board did everything to have all election returns accounted forth (sic). We let
no stone unturned before we finally come to the conclusion. That we have finished canvassing
the 1,491 Election Returns and proclaimed the winning candidates.

That granting without admitting that there were missing Election Returns which were
uncanvassed, and if ordered canvass(ed), the more Lanot will widen his lead because the
trend was that Henry Lanot's lead swollen (sic) as more election returns were canvassed.

That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to the Commission on Elections that on
two (2) occasions, an unidentified persons (sic) talked to me at the unholy hours of the night 2
days while canvassing was going on and offered me TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS in
cold cash just to proclaim "BOY" as the elected Congressman. I declined the offer and told the
man that I am a straight man, I am on the level, I have a family and I am about to retire. . . .

That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed all the winning
candidates for Local positions. As to the Congressman, the following results are as follows:
 HENRY LANOT — 60,914 votes

EMILIANO "BOY" CARUNCHO — 42,942 votes

ARNULFO ACEDERA — 36,139 votes

The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17, 971 votes.

xxx xxx xxx 5

On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division 6 promulgated a Resolution 7 decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission:

1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL
AND VOID;

2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City to
RECONVENE at the Session Hall of the Commission and use the Comelec copy of the one
hundred forty-seven (147) election returns above-mentioned and CANVASS said authentic
copy of the election returns and include the results thereof with the tally of all election
returns previously canvassed and, thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate; and

3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to investigate candidate Arnulfo Acedera
and if after the investigation, the evidence so warrant, to file the necessary charges against
him.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a "Supplemental Comment" raising the following
matters: (a) the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(b) petitioner failed to record his objections to the elections returns and the certificate of canvass in the
minutes of the proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning candidate, Henry Lanot, was not impleaded in
the motion to nullify his proclamation. 8

On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry Lanot filed a motion for leave to intervene in the
case. 9 He also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division and for referral of the case to the COMELEC en banc. In his motion for reconsideration 10 that was
attached to said motion to intervene, movant Lanot argued that failure to notify him of the case was fatal as
he was a real party in interest who must be impleaded therein. He also alleged that under the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case and that the Resolution of June
24, 1998 was "not based on facts."

That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel, 11 filed a motion praying for the "formation" of a
new Board of Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. 12 The
following day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an order setting the case for hearing and postponing the
"reconvening of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City." 13 On July 15, 1998, movant Lanot filed an
opposition to the motion for the formation of a new Board of Canvassers on the ground that the Resolution
of June 24, 1998 is null and void for the following reasons: (a) he was not notified of the proceedings and
therefore his right to due process was violated; (b) said resolution had not become final and executory by his
filing of a motion for reconsideration, and (c) the case was no longer a pre-proclamation controversy but an
electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not the
COMELEC. 14
At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the filing of memorandum. Movant
Lanot, however, manifested that he was no longer filing a memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that
"with or without said memorandum," the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. 15 Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, petitioner filed an opposition to Lanot's motion for
reconsideration 16 after which Lanot filed his comment on the opposition. 17

On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted Lanot's motion for intervention and elevated
his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. 18

Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc 19 promulgated a Resolution dated October 1, 1998 reconsidering the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing petitioner's amended motion (petition) to nullify
the proclamation on the basis of incomplete returns for lack of merit. 20 Relying on facts narrated by the
Pasig City Board of Canvassers in its comment on the motion to nullify the proclamation, the COMELEC en
banc found:

Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all election returns accounted for, and
finished canvassing all the election returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of Pasig City. On the
basis of the canvass, the board proclaimed the winning candidates for local positions. As to
the winning candidate for congressman, the results were as follows:

Henry P. Lanot — 60,914 votes

Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho — 42,942 votes

Arnulfo Acedera — 36,139 votes

However, granting arguendo that there were missing twenty-two (22) election returns
involving about 4,400 votes, the same no longer affect the results of the election as candidate
Henry P. Lanot obtained the highest number of votes, with a lead of 17,971 votes over his
closest rival, Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho. The board of canvassers duly proclaimed candidate
Henry P. Lanot as the winning representative of the lone district of Pasig City.

Consequently, we find without basis petitioner's allegation that the proclamation of Henry P.
Lanot was based on an incomplete canvass. We carefully examined the Comelec copies of the
Statement of Votes and found no truth to the assertion that there were one hundred forty
seven (147) election returns not canvassed.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en banc's Resolution of October 1, 1998, contending that
said body acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in overruling his claim that 147
election returns involving about thirty thousand (30,000) votes were not canvassed. Petitioner argued that it
was enough reason for contesting the proclamation of Lanot as winner under an incomplete canvass.
However, as in the proceedings before the COMELEC, petitioner failed to implead in the instant petition the
proclaimed winning candidate, Lanot.

The petition must be dismissed.

Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the proclamation of Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion were the individual members of the
Board of Canvassers in that city. The proclaimed winner was not included among the respondents. For that
reason alone, the COMELEC should have been forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion that would
affect the substantive rights of the winning candidate, if not the electorate. Due process in quasi-
judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. 21 The proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of the motion to set aside his proclamation. 22 It
was only the intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second Division of the COMELEC allowed, which
cured the procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will of the electorate.

However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the instant petition for certiorari. In this connection,
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. 23 As
the winning candidate whose proclamation is sought to be nullified, Henry P. Lanot is a real party in interest
in these proceedings. The COMELEC and the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are mere nominal parties
whose decision should be defended by the real party in interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the said Rules:

Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public
respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in
his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the
proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be
against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public respondents but it is the duty of the private
respondent to appear and defend such agency. 24 That duty cannot be fulfilled by the real party in interest
such as the proclaimed winning candidate in a proceeding to annul his proclamation if he is not even named
as private respondent in the petition. Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party in
interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed
must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground
for the dismissal of the petition. 25 However, this being an election case which should be resolved with
dispatch considering the public interest involved, the Court has not deemed it necessary to require that
Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a respondent in this case.

A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a
member of the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard.
Article VI thereof states:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. . . .

The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. — The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta, 26 the Court, in interpreting the aforesaid
constitutional provision, stressed the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over its members,
thus:
 Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code provide that "(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. . . ." In Javier v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court
interpreted the phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as follows:

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its

totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.
But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass
of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in
a quo warrantoproceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty
or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunal's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein
respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. . . .

In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to file an electoral protest
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). 27

Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioner's case is to question the integrity of the election returns
or the validity of the "incomplete canvass" as the basis for Henry Lanot's proclamation, and not the
proclamation itself, still, the instant petition is devoid of merit.

The factual question of how many election returns were missing as a consequence of the disruption of the
canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Thus, raising the same
issue before this Court is pointless because this Court is not a trier of facts. 28 The facts established below
show that all the legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the twenty-
two (22) election returns have been followed. Proper authorization for the reconstitution of that page was
secured from the COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the provincial copy of the election returns that
was retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes. For his part, petitioner failed to have the anomaly recorded in
the minutes of proceedings of respondent Board as required by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166.
Respondent Board, therefore, observed the following provisions of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. — In case its copy of the
election returns is missing, the board canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain
such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned, or if said
returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the
Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of
said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its representative to
investigate the case and immediately report the matter to the Commission.

The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been
received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of
the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the results of the
election.
Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two (22) election returns,
still, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400 votes. That
number cannot affect the result of the election because Henry Lanot's lead over his closest rival, herein
petitioner, was 17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code
aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22) election
returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the winner in the election in Pasig City for Member of the House of
Representatives.

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. 29 A canvass
cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is
omitted. 30 However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results
of the election. It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found that the
election returns which were not counted by respondent canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be
sure, this number will not affect the result of the election considering that Lanot's lead over petitioner was
already 17,971 votes.

On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing petitioner's motion to nullify the proclamation
of Henry P. Lanot as Member of the House of Representatives for the lone district of Pasig City.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED

G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

The petition before us is a petition for certiorari1 with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction and/or status quo ante order, that seeks to annul: (1) the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) March 27, 20132 and May 14, 20133 COMELEC Resolutions cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako
Reyes' (petitioner or Reyes) Certificate of Candidacy ( COC) for the position of Representative in the lone
district of Marinduque, and (2) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality4 declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution
final and executory in SPA Case No. 13-053(DC).

I. THE CASE AND THE DISSENT IN CONTEXT

I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my strong reservations to the majority's outright dismissal of this
most unusual case – a term I do not use lightly as shown by the reasons stated below.

I clarify at the outset that the present case is at its inception stage; it is a newly filed petition that the Court is
acting upon for the first time and which the majority opted to DISMISS OUTRIGHT after an initial review,
based solely on the petition and its annexes and its "finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Elections."

Subsequent to the COMELEC's rulings, however, intervening events occurred that might have materially
affected the jurisdictional situation and the procedural requirements in handling and resolving the case. The
petitioner was proclaimed as the winner by the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), and she
subsequently took her oath of office.
This Dissent is filed, not on the basis of the intrinsic merits of the case, but because of the outright and
reckless denial of the minority’s plea that the respondents be required to at least COMMENT on the petition
in light of the gravity of the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and the affected personal
relationships within and outside the Court, before any further action can be made. The presented issues
refer to –

- the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, which jurisdiction should now
lie with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and

- the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in handling the case that led to the assailed COMELEC
decision.

Viewed in these lights, it should be appreciated that the Court in effect did not rule on the merits of the case
after considering the parties’ legal and factual positions. The majority’s Resolution is in fact only a ruling that
the Court no longer wishes to review the COMELEC’s rulings despite the issues raised and the attendant
intervening circumstances.

Despite its seemingly simple approach, the Court’s outright dismissal of the petition is replete with profound
effects on the petitioner on the indirect beneficiary of the ruling, and on jurisprudence, as it effectively
upholds the disqualification of petitioner and leaves the remaining candidate in Marinduque as an
unopposed candidate.5 What is not easily seen by the lay observer is that by immediately ruling and avoiding
the jurisdiction of the HRET on the matter of qualification, the majority avoids a quo warranto petition that,
if successful, would render petitioner Reyes disqualified, leaving the congressional position in Marinduque’s
lone district vacant.

Significantly, the Dissent is not a lonely one made solely by the undersigned; he is joined by three (3) other
Justices.6 Seven (7) Justices7 formed the majority with three (3) Justices inhibiting for personal reasons, 8 with
one (1) Justice absent.9

II. SUMMARY OF THE DISSENT’S SUPPORTING POSITIONS

That this unusual case at least deserves further proceedings from this Court other than the OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL the majority ordered, is supported by the following considerations:

First, the questions raised in the petition are NOT too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.

a. Under Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the Court may dismiss the petition if it was filed
manifestly for delay, or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. In
the present case, the majority dismissed the petition outright despite the threshold issue of
jurisdiction that Reyes squarely raised.

b. The due process issues Reyes raised with respect to the COMELEC proceedings cannot be taken
lightly, in particular, the COMELEC’s failure to accord her the opportunity to question the nature and
authenticity of the evidence submitted by the respondent Joseph Tan (Tan) as well as controverting
evidence the petition cited. In fact, no less than COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr., echoed this
concern in his Dissenting Opinion from the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc.

c. A third issue raised relates to the COMELEC’s imposition of a qualification for the position of
congressman, other than those mentioned in the Constitution. The Court’s Resolution glossed over
this issue and did not touch it at all. For this reason, this Dissent will similarly refrain from discussing
the issue, except to state that the issue raised touches on the Constitution and should have at least
merited a passing mention by the Court in its immediate and outright dismissal of the petition.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza
(which we should have), the Court should at least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling that
would favor the son of a Member of the Court.

To reiterate, the COMELEC en banc ruling cancelling Reyes’ CoC means that: (1) Reyes’ CoC is void ab initio;
(2) that she was never a valid candidate at all; and (3) all the votes in her favor are stray votes. Consequently,
the remaining candidate would be declared the winner, as held in Aratea v. Commission on
Elections10 Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections11 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.12

Third, the majority’s holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins after the candidate has assumed
the office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence; in fact, it is a major retrogressive jurisprudential
development that can emasculate the HRET. In making this kind of ruling, the Court should have at least
undertaken a full-blown proceeding rather than simply declare the immediate and outright dismissal of the
petition.

Note in this regard that the majority’s jurisprudential ruling –

a. is contrary to the HRET rules.

b. effectively allows the filing of any election protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the
assumption to office by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest. In the context of the present case,
any election protest protest or petition for quo warranto filed on or after June 30 would be declared
patently out of time since the filing would be more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’ proclamation
on May 18, 2013.

c. would affect all future proclamations since they cannot be earlier than 15 days counted from the
June 30 constitutional cut-off for the assumption to office of the newly elected officials.

III. THE ASSAILED COMELEC PETITION

A. The Petition Before the COMELEC

The present petition before this Court and its attachments show that on October 1, 2012, Reyes filed her CoC
for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. On October 10, 2012, Tan filed with
the COMELEC a petition to deny due course or to cancel Reyes’ CoC. Tan alleged that Reyes committed
material misrepresentations in her CoC, specifically: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac
Marinduque when in truth she is a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa Quezon City or Bauan Batangas
following the residence of her husband; (2) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that she is not a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964, when
in truth it is July 3, 1958; (5) that her civil status is single; and (6) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to
be elected to.

B. The COMELEC Proceedings

In her Answer, Reyes averred that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Rep. Hermilando Mandanas
of Bauan, Batangas, the truth of the matter is that they are not legally married; thus, Mandanas’ residence
cannot be attributed to her. She also countered that the evidence presented by Tan does not support the
allegation that she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the United States. With respect to her birth date,
her birth certificate issued by the NSO showed that it was on July 3, 1964. At any rate, Reyes contended that
the representations as to her civil status and date of birth are not material so as to warrant the cancellation
of her CoC.

On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits consisting of, among others, a copy of an article published online on January 8,
2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes." This article provided a database record
from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a
holder of a US passport that she has been using since 2005. Tan also submitted a photocopy of a Certification
of Travel Records from the BID, which showed that Reyes holds a US passport No. 306278853. Based on
these pieces of evidence and the fact that Reyes failed to take an Oath of Allegiance and execute an Affidavit
of Renunciation of her American citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225), Tan argued that
Reyes’ was ineligible to run for the position of Representative and thus, her CoC should be cancelled.

C. The COMELEC First Division Ruling

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution granting the petition and cancelling
Reyes’ CoC. On the alleged misrepresentations in Reyes’ CoC with respect to her civil status and birth date,
the COMELEC First Division held that these are not material representations that could affect her
qualifications or eligibility, thus cancellation of CoC on these grounds is not warranted.

The COMELEC First Division, however, found that Reyes committed false material representation with
respect to her citizenship and residency. Based on the newly discovered evidence submitted by Tan, the
COMELEC First Division found that Reyes was a holder of a US passport, which she continued to use until
June 30, 2012; she also failed to establish that she had applied for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the
required Oath of Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American Citizenship. Based on
these findings, the COMELEC First Division ruled the Reyes remains to be an American citizen, and thus, is
ineligible to run and hold any elective office.

On the issue of her residency in Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque, the COMELEC First Division found that Reyes
did not regain her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque after she lost it when she became a naturalized US
citizen; that Reyes had not shown that she had re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, there
being no proof that she had renounced her US citizenship; thus, she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in America. Citing Japzon v. Commission on Elections,13 the COMELEC First Division held that a Filipino
citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition
of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines by positive
acts and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

Finally, the COMELEC First Division disregarded Reyes’ proof that she met the one-year residency
requirement when she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011 as it is not sufficient to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.

On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration. Attached to the motion were an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 21, 2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque
dated April 17, 2012. In her Motion, Reyes admitted that she was married to an American citizen named
Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997 and thus, she acquired dual citizenship through marriage to an American
citizen.

D. The COMELEC en banc Ruling

On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution denying Reyes’ motion for
reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the COMELEC First Division on the ground that the former’s
motion was a mere rehash of the arguments she raised against the First Division ruling.

D-a. Commissioner Lim’s Concurring Opinion

Commissioner Lim concurred in the result and held that Reyes failed to comply with twin requirements of RA
9225; she belatedly filed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship but failed to submit an Oath of
Allegiance. She also failed to prove that she complied with the one-year residency requirement for lack of
evidence of any overt or positive act that she had established and maintained her residency in Boac,
Marinduque.
D-b. Chairman Brillantes’ Dissenting Opinion

Chairman Brillantes dissented from the majority and held that Tan failed to offer substantial evidence to
prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship. He noted that the internet article by a certain Eli Obligacion
showing that Reyes used a US passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported copy of the BID
certification is merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original, thus similarly
inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes also emphasized that a petition to deny due course under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) cannot be a pre-election substitute for a quo warranto
proceeding. Under prevailing laws, there remains to be no pre-election legal remedy to question the
eligibility or lack of qualification of a candidate. Chairman Brillantes was of the view that a petition to deny
due course tackles exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a qualification, and not the lack
of qualification per se which is the proper subject of a quo warranto proceeding.

Finally, he opined that the issues pertaining to Reyes’ residence and citizenship requires exhaustive
presentation and examination of evidence that are best addressed in a full blown quo warranto proceeding
rather than the summary proceedings in the present case.

IV. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMELEC DECISION

A. On May 18, 2013, the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed Reyes as the duly elected member of the
House of Representatives for Marinduque, having garnered the highest number of votes in the total
of 52, 209 votes.

B. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its May 14, 2013
Resolution final and executory citing paragraph b, Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in relation to paragraph 2, Section 8, of Resolution No. 9523 which provides that a decision
or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the Supreme
Court.

C. On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before House Speaker Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr.

V. THE PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT

A. Positions and Arguments

In support of her petition before this Court, Reyes submits the following positions and arguments:

(1) COMELEC has been ousted of jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed the winner for the
position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque;

(2) COMELEC violated her right to due process when it took cognizance of the documents submitted
by Tan that were not testified to, offered and admitted in evidence without giving her the
opportunity to question the authenticity of these documents as well as present controverting
evidence;

(3) COMELEC gravely erred when it declared that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
the one year residency requirement despite the finding that he assumed and held office as provincial
administrator;

(4) COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in enforcing the provision of RA 9225 insofar as it adds to
the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than those enumerated in the
Constitution.
B. The Issues Raised

As presented to this Court, the petition raised the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the COMELEC is ousted of jurisdiction over the petition who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member, House of
Representatives?

(2) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of Tan’s
newly discovered evidence without having been testified to, as well as offered and admitted in
evidence, in violation of Reyes’ right to due process?

(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared that Reyes is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the one-year residency requirement for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives?

(4) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, by enforcing RA 9225, it imposed
additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?

How the public respondent COMELEC views the issues presented, particularly the question of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion are presently unknown elements in these proceedings as the COMELEC has not
been heard on the case. To be sure, it should have a say, as a named respondent, especially on the matter of
jurisdiction.

VI. THE MAJORITY RULING

On the issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction

Without the benefit of full blown arguments by the parties, the majority ruling ruled on the merits of the
jurisdictional issue and held that the COMELEC has jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes’ qualifications and the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions unless a petition is filed with the tribunal.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. A candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives with the concurrence
of three requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.

It went on to state that Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because she
had not yet assumed office; she can only do so on June 30, 2013. It pointed out, too, that before Reyes’
proclamation on May 18, 2013, the COMELEC en banc had already finally disposed of the issue of Reyes US
citizenship and lack of residency; thus, there was no longer any pending case at that time. In these lights, it
held that COMELEC continued to have jurisdiction.

On the issue of admissibility of the

evidence presented and due process

The majority emphasized that the COMELEC is not strictly bound to adhere to the technical rules of
evidence. Since the proceedings to deny due course or to cancel a CoC are summary in nature, then the
newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by the COMELEC. Also, there was no denial of due process
since Reyes was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC.

On the issue of citizenship

Again ruling on the merits, the majority upheld the COMELEC’s finding that based on the Tan’s newly
discovered evidence, Reyes is an American citizen and thus is ineligible to run and hold any elective office.
The majority likewise held that the burden of proof had been shifted to Reyes to prove that: (1) she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that (2) she re-acquired such status by properly complying with the
requirements of RA 9225, and that Reyes had failed to substantiate that she is a natural born Filipino citizen
and complied with the requirements of RA 9925. It emphasized that Reyes inexplicably failed to submit an
Oath of Allegiance despite belatedly filing an Oath of Renunciation and that her oath that she took in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator does not suffice to satisfy the requirements of
RA 9225.

On the issue of residency

The majority similarly affirmed the COMELEC’s ruling that Reyes had not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the United States and thus did not satisfy the one-year Philippine residency requirement. It held that Reyes
effectively abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque when she became a naturalized US citizen.
In the absence of proof that she had renounced her American citizenship, she cannot be considered to have
abandoned her domicile of choice in the US. The majority also noted that Reyes’ service as Provincial
Administrator from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency in
Boac, Marinduque.

VII. COMMENTS ON THE MAJORITY’S RULING

The majority’s unusual approach and strained rulings that already touched on the merits of substantial issues
raised should, at the very least, not be allowed to stand without comments. I call these "comments" as a
"refutation" implies a consideration on the merits of properly submitted and debated issues, which did not
happen in this case.

A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.

Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court14 merely requires that the petition be sufficient in form and
substance to justify an order from the Court to act on the petition and to require the respondents to file
their comments. The same rule also provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as the
majority did in the present case) if it was filed manifestly for delay or if the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.

In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient in form and substance; no issue on this point was
even raised. Thus, the question before the Court – if Rule 64, Section 6 were to be followed – is whether the
issues raised by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.

I submit that the issues raised cannot be unsubstantial as they involve crucial issues of jurisdiction and due
process.

The due process issue, of course, pertained to the assailed COMELEC ruling that admittedly can be evaluated
based on the records. The matter of evaluation, however, is not simply a matter of doing it; it is the very
problem that I raise because it must be a meaningful one that fully appreciates the parties’ positions,
particularly in a situation where the petition raised arguments that are not without their merits. In this
situation, the Court cannot simply go through the motions of evaluation and then simply strike out the
petitioner’s positions. The Court’s role as adjudicator and the demands of basic fairness require that we
should fully hear the parties and rule based on our appreciation of the merits of their positions in light of
what the law and established jurisprudence require.

a. The Due Process Component

The determination of the merits of the petitioner’s claim point us, at the very least, to the need to consider
whether evidence attributed to a person who is not before the Court and whose statement cannot be
confirmed for the genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to be established in the case,
should be taken as "truth." Even casting technical rules of evidence aside, common sense and the minimum
sense of fairness dictate that an article in the internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of
what it says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine be taken as proof of the "truth." To
accept these materials as statements of "truth" is to be partisan and to deny the petitioner her right to both
procedural and substantive due process. Again, at the very least, further inquiry should have been made
before there was the judgment.

Some, to be sure, may label the denial of further inquiry to lack of prudence; others, not so charitably
minded, may however refer to this as partisanship.

b. The Jurisdictional Component.

The jurisdictional component of the petition is interesting because it involved matters that were not covered
by the assailed COMELEC rulings for the simple reason that they were intervening events that transpired
outside (although related with) the assailed rulings. In fact, they involved questions of fact and law separate
from those of the assailed COMELEC rulings. Yet, the majority, in its rush to judgment, lumped them
together with the assailed rulings under the dismissive phrase "did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion" in the dispositive portion of its ruling. Such was the haste the majority exhibited in the desire to
pronounce swift and dismissive judgment. I can only surmise that the majority might have considered the
jurisdictional issues raised "too insubstantial to warrant further proceedings."

Is this still lack of prudence? Reyes’ proclamation divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction over her
qualifications in favor of the HRET

The profound effect of the majority’s ruling on HRET jurisdiction and on jurisprudence render comments on
this point obligatory, if only to show that the matter is not insubstantial and should further be explored by
the Court.

The majority held that the COMELEC still has jurisdiction because the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over
the issue of the petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed resolutions unless a petition is duly
filed. The ponencia emphasizes that Reyes has not averred that she has filed such action.

This line of thought is, to say the least, confusing, particularly on the point of why Reyes who has garnered
the majority of the votes cast in Marinduque, who has been proclaimed pursuant to this electoral mandate,
and who has since taken her oath of office, would file a petition, either of protest or quo warranto, before
the HRET. Why she would file a petition for certiorari before this Court may be easier to understand – the
COMELEC, despite her proclamation and oath, has issued an order mandating her disqualification executory;
she may merely want to halt the enforcement of this COMELEC order with the claim that the arena for her
election and qualification has shifted now to the HRET and is no longer with the COMELEC.

In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET
has always constituted a dichotomy; the relationship between the COMELEC and the HRET in terms of
jurisdiction is not an appellate one but is mutually exclusive.

This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule, sequential. This means that the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction ends when the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no point in time, when a vacuum in
jurisdiction would exist involving congressional candidates. This jurisdiction, of course, refers to jurisdiction
over the subject matter, which no less than the Philippine Constitution governs. Under Section 17, Article VI,
the subject matter of HRET’s jurisdiction is the "election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives."

Where one jurisdiction ends and the other begins, is a matter that jurisprudence appears to have settled, but
is nevertheless an issue that the Court should perhaps continue to examine and re-examine because of the
permutation of possible obtaining situations – which, to my mind, translates to the existence of a critical
issue that should be ventilated before this Court if it is to make any definitive ruling on any given situation.

I submit on this point that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the
jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s election, return and
qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the
qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo
warranto) before the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the House of Representatives.

The Court has interestingly rendered various rulings on the points which all point to the statement above. In
Limkaichong v. Comelec,15 the Court pointedly held that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.16

The Court speaking through no less than Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad in the recent case of Jalosjos, Jr. v
Commission on Elections17 held that the settled rule is that "the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET" 18

Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any ruling from this Court – as the majority ruled – that
the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative who has been proclaimed but not yet assumed office is a major retrogressive
jurisprudential development, in fact, a complete turnaround from the Court’s prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter; such rule – if it becomes established – can very well emasculate the HRET.

Thus, the Court should now fully hear this matter, instead of dismissively ruling on a new petition where the
respondent side has not been fully heard.

The ponencia’s holding on the COMELEC’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the HRET is inconsistent with the HRET Rules

The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of
the HRET is also supported by the HRET Rules. They state:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

RULE 15. How Initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of a verified petition of protest or a
verified petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo warranto include an election
protest.

RULE 16. Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing
the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. x x
x

RULE 17. Quo Warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the
House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
be filed by any registered voter of the district concerned within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the
adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is concerned, the proclamation of the
winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any
contests relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction.

In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction (because Reyes,
although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates the HRET of
its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the
assumption to office by the candidate (i.e, on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the
present case, any election protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15)
days from Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having
been filed out of time under the HRET rules.

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared its May 14, 2013 Resolution final and
executory?

By the petitioner’s theory, the COMELEC en banc’s May 14, 2013 Resolution (cancelling Reyes’ CoC) did not
attain finality because Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013 divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it relating to Reyes’ eligibility. Two material records are critical on this point. First,
the fact of proclamation on May 18, 2013 which came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for
the finality of the May 14, 2013 Resolution pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The second is the
COMELEC order of June 5, 2013 which declared its resolution of May 14, 2013 final and executory.

How these instruments will co-exist and be given weight in relation with one another is a matter that, at this
point and in the absence of research, deliberation, debate and discussion may not be easily be made. The
Court, to be sure, would want to hear the HRET, the COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General, on this
point. Of course, this hearing and debate will not take place under the hasty dismissive action the majority
made.

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in the appreciation and evaluation of the evidence leading it to
erroneously conclude that Reyes is not a natural born Filipino citizen and that she had abandoned and lost
her domicile of origin when she became a naturalized American citizen

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. However, exceptions to this rule have been established and consistently recognized, among
others, when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly unreasonable as to turn
into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.19

It is also basic in the law of evidence that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In
administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence. 20 In the present case, the
majority obviously believed, together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this burden and that his
documentary evidence he submitted established that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash between
the parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes, as expressed in her petition, is of the completely
opposite view. Even a quick look at Tan’s evidence, however, indicates that Reyes’ view is not without its
merits and should not simply be dismissively set aside.

First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog article) written by one Eli J. Obligacion (Obligacion)
entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O. Reyes." This printed blog article stated that the
author had obtained records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American citizen; that she is the holder of
a US passport and that she has been using the same since 2005.

How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion's blog article or, for that matter, any similar
newspaper article, is not hard for a law student answering the Bar exam to tackle: the article is double
hearsay or hearsay evidence that is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to prove its
contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without any other competent and credible evidence to
corroborate them. Separately of course from this consideration of admissibility is the question of probative
value. On top of these underlying considerations is the direct and frontal question: did the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion when it relied on this piece of evidence to conclude that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen?

Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a "certification" issued by one Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID
showing the travel records of Reyes from February 15, 2000 to June 30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US
Passport No. 306278853. This photocopy also indicates in some entries that Reyes is an American while
other entries denote that she is Filipino. The same questions of admissibility and probative value of evidence
arise, together with the direct query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since the COMELEC
concluded on the basis of these pieces of evidence that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because it is not only
incompetent but also lacks probative value as evidence.

Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this Court that a "certification" is not a certified copy and
is not a document that proves that a party is not a Filipino citizen.21

Interestingly, in its March 27, 2013 Resolution that the petitioner now also assails, the COMELEC First
Division ruled:

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her CoC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective
public office in the Philippines.22

This ruling, undeniably, opens for Reyes the argument that in the absence of sufficient proof (i.e, other than
a photocopy of a "certification") that she is not a natural born Filipino citizen, no burden of evidence shifts to
her to prove anything, particularly the fact that she is not an American citizen. Considering that Tan might
have also failed to prove by substantial evidence his allegation that Reyes is an American citizen, the burden
of evidence also cannot be shifted to the latter to prove that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 in
order to re-acquire her status as a natural born Filipino citizen.

It ought to be considered, too, that in the absence of sufficient proof that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship,
the twin requirements under RA 9225 for re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship should not apply to her. Of
course, Reyes admitted in her MR before the COMELEC that she is married to an American citizen. This
admission, however, leads only to further arguments on how her admitted marriage affected her citizenship.
Jurisprudence is not lacking on this point as in Cordora v. Comelec,23 the Court held that the twin
requirements of RA 9225 does not apply to a candidate who is a natural born Filipino citizen who did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country, viz.:

We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano Valles v.
COMELEC, and AASJS v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case.
Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was
born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that
dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office,
by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public
office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s
foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the
promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:

I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with
the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship
and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and
Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

As to the issue of Reyes’ residency in Boac, Marinduque, the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the
COMELEC en banc held:

Accordingly, the more appropriate issue is whether respondent had regained her domicile of origin in the
Municipality of Boac, Marinduque after she lost the same when she became a naturalized American citizen.

xxxx

Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the
time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing that whatsoever that respondent had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines.
There being no proof that respondent had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by respondent to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement of
the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, respondent has never regained her domicile in Marinduque
as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.24

This COMELEC action again opens questions about its appreciation and evaluation of the evidence and
whether it overstepped the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, if indeed the
above-cited findings and conclusions have no basis in fact and in law.
To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is admissible, arguably does not prove
that Reyes was a naturalized American citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes
was the holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec,25 the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not portend
that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship. In
addition, how the COMELEC arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is naturalized American citizen can be seen as
baffling as it did not appear to have provided any factual basis for this conclusion.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

All told, the COMELEC does not appear to have an airtight case based on substantial evidence on the
citizenship and residence issues, and much less a similar case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a VERY
PROMPT OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL ACTION from this Court. Bolstering this view is that petitioner Reyes is not
lacking in arguably meritorious positions to support her cause, even if only to the extent of being fully heard
by this Court.

If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTERING

JUSTICE in the way described in the speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind of
hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if the Court indeed honestly
wants to achieve this objective in the present case, is to require the COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition
and to decide matters from that point.

G.R. No. 89914

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners to
testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035
(PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez et. al.",
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations
therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint,[1] the herein petitioners were impleaded as party
defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
"14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or
in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:

(a) obtained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon, Mario D.
Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty.
Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings
groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose
M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest
business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation (BENGUET), Pilipinas Shell Corporation and the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques
calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible
'cash-out' from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez. x x x

xxx

(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Phil-guarantee officials led by chairman
Cesar E.A. Virata and the senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose
M. Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount
of P527,387,440.71 within sufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc. to appear viable and to
borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philguarantee has reached a total of more than P2
Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's
Revolution, in conspiracy with, support, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of
the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. manipulated, schemed, and/or executed a series of devices
intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and
jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendants individual and
collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited in the instant Complaint.

(o) maneuvered, with the technical know-how and legalistic talents of the FMMC senior managers and
some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.
Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant
Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, Inc., (ii) A & E International Corporation (A
& E), First Manila Management Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Maguindanao Navigation (MNI), (v) SOLOIL, Inc.
(SOLOIL), (vi) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to
PNI Holdings, Inc. (whose purported incorporators are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for
only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government,
particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested
himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being
protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior
managers who still control and run the affairs of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to
approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as 'donation' to the
Government;

(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assistance of the Bengzon law firm represented by
Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario
D. Camacho and Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by
causing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity
at 50% each, thee Fund's (a) 8,028,011 common shares in the Bank and (b) 'Deposit in Subscription' in the
amount of P4,929,972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI
Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of
P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the
assigned shares brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the
voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to
happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million
shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act,
although, they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions
in excess of the 30% ceiling 'to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ...' and not the
whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24,
1986);

(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise
of the FMMC senior managers and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T.
Mills, Abelardo S. Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr.
together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose. F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E.
Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr. and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin
T. Romualdezincluding, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle
East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their
disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares
in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp.
purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a 'merger company of the First Manila
Management Corp. group' supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still
beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

x x x"

On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as defendants) filed their respective answers.[2] Meanwhile, from 2 to 6
August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were
carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romualdez firms had
not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked previously as
lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March
1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the "Romualdez companies" were sold for P5
million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the
President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase
of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their
assets.[3]
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a
matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Incorporated, the
flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the
Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."[4]
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee).[5] Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of the thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose
F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due process, and averring that
the publicity generated by respondent Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those
of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file
their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution [6] dated 5 June
1989 rejecting the petitioners' plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and
continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented.[7]
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their Constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed
with the Court a motion for intervention,[8] which the Court granted in the resolution[9] of 21 December
1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committe to comment on the petition in
intervention. In compliance therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its
comment[10] thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioners and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional
question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this Court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin the Congress or any of its regular
and special committees -- like what petitioners seek -- from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, which obtains in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission,[11] the Court held:
"The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x xx.

xxx xxx xxx

"But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the government."
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case,[12] "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."[13]
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries
into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation.[14] Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected."[15]

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected". It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in
Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al.,[16] the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any
speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of
legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the
speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to
Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over" the FMMC Group of
Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by
Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that
these repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of
the privilege hour,[17] so that he could respond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as
a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that
he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his
speech,[18] Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
"Mr. President, I rise this afternoon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr.
President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he
denies categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which
includes SOLOIL Incorporated.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

"In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential
Commission on Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez,
in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII: In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then
Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration
order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of
the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.

"I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramirez' memorandum.

"The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:

'Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said
another representation was being made to this Commission for the eventual lifting of our sequestration
order. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojuangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our
order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us
the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with force the moment we
insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward
incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this
Commission in view of the seemingly influential representation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue
our work.'
"Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote
Mr. President:

'The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr.
Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been
divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopawho according to them, is the brother-in-law of
the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother
of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for
supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused
vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this
Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to
the President if our desire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government.'
"The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally
confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

"Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of
the newspaper Malayaheadlined 'On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms.'

"Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:

'12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate
price. The sale of these companies and our prior right to reacquire them have never been at issue.'
"Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious
statements."
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
"Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of
which reads as follows and I quote:

'Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. -- It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President
of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided,
that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above
officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of
business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not
discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided
by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.'
"Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own
conclusion."

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent
Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging
to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose
D. Lina in view of the representations made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-
governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the
charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum, i.e., that it had adopted a
"get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil, exploration firm. The pertinent
portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

"WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the
PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of
'ineptness, incompetence and corruption' and that theSandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to
answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it had adopted a 'get-rich-quick
scheme' for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;

"WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had
made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges
against PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution
took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our
people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels, reforestation, and employment
generation for rural and urban workers;

"WHEREAS, the government and the present leadership must demonstrate in their public and private lives
integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and
lose hope and return to an ideology and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom,
democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.

"Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be
investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article
XVIII of the Constitution." [19]
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the
three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article
XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212, because,
firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States,[20] it was held:
"xxx. The power of congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is
broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in
terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument in this
case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and
judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of
a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible." (underlining supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of
that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants
therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since
the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioners' respective answers thereto, the
issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been
acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would
not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal,
but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its
influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that
had much earlier set in. In Baremblattvs. United States,[21] it was held that:
"Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only investigate into
those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are
within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power
given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither
can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. x x x."

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including 'the relevant limitations of
the Bill of Rights'." [22]
In another case -
". . . the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of
Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress
in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that
every congresssional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights
affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to
insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his
liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly."[23]

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-
incrimination.[24] This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the
accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al.[25] thus-
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse
to answer any and all questions."

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. In Galmanvs. Pamaran,[26] the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059)
to illustate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal
proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
It was held that:
"We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot
refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only
when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly
then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not."

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumstance
that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves
issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners
and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest
Facts:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a
letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal
for such attendance.

Issue:

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Ruling:

To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of
the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this
power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In
view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation
must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that
the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress
has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice
to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for
a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official
to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a)
are however valid.

UDANI VS. SENGA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of
the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of
a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so
by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere
with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the
armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried
to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege.
This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,
and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process”
and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information, G.R. No. 170338, 23

December 2008

31JUL

FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped communication of then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of
the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is a
substantial compliance of the constitutional requirement of publication.

RULING
NO.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility
in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does
not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L.
ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

At issue once again is Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes
issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development (Committee) in
connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

The Facts

On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the
Committee an invitation,1 signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:

Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND
OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING A
LOSS TO OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION" and P.S. Resolution No. 543, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE
ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS,
THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II," x x x
the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of August 2006 at the Sen. G.T. Pecson
Room, 2nd floor, Senate of the Philippines, Pasay City.
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to
the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation
relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.

By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987 Constitution regarding inquiries
in aid of legislation, may we have the privilege of inviting you to the said hearing to shed light on any matter,
within your knowledge and competence, covered by the subject matter and purpose of the inquiry. Rest
assured that your rights, when properly invoked and not unfounded, will be duly respected. (Emphasis in the
original.)

In his letter-reply2 dated August 18, 2006, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and
testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine
Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. He predicated his request on grounds he would later substantially
reiterate in this petition for prohibition.

On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being
unmeritorious, was denied.3 On the same date, invitations were sent to each of the other six petitioners,
then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., requesting them to attend the September 4,
2006 Committee hearing. The following day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee,
caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum4 on petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and
testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas5 to other petitioners, albeit for a different
hearing date.

On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the
Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it
pursuant to the invitations thus issued.

Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the September 4,
2006 Committee investigation.

Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO 6alleging, among others,
that: (1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain
project and how much of OWWA’s original investment had already been paid; (2) when Senator Estrada
called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with
the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,7 none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry;
and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to
return at the resumption of the investigation.

The manifestation was followed by the filing on September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a TRO in
which petitioners imputed to the Committee the intention to harass them as, except for petitioner Romero
II, none of them had even been mentioned in relation to the subject of the investigation.

Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with our September 5, 2006 Resolution that ordered them to submit
a comment on the original plea for a TRO, interposed an opposition,8 observing that the Senate’s motives in
calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question. They also averred that the pendency
of Chavez "is not sufficient ground to divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into
the matters alleged in the petition."

In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to
the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners’
criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and
testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a
TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony
against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G.R. No. 164527.
In their Comment dated October 17, 2006,9 respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in
Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners
raised at every possible turn. Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on
the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine the
propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to
protect OWWA funds in the future. They likewise raised the following main arguments: (1) the proposed
resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners’ right against self-incrimination
was well-protected and could be invoked when incriminating questions were propounded.

On December 28, 2006, petitioners filed their Reply10 reiterating the arguments stated in their petition, first
and foremost of which is: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub judice.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.

The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice

Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez
petition.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule
may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rationale for
the rule adverted to is set out in Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez:

[I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.12

Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed
investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration." 13 For by an en banc
Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as
the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine, it
will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed
congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of
the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 14 Courts
decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save in certain exceptional
instances,15 none of which, however, obtains under the premises.

Thus, there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable––to the
continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding.

At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still,
such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. What we said in Sabio v.
Gordon suggests as much:

The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being
litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.16
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;17 and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation,18 albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions
and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the following reason:

[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is
an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative
investigation.1avvphi1.zw+

As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––

[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be
had to others who possess it.19

While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before
lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that
these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special
civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.

The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial of the instant recourse is still indicated for another
compelling reason. As may be noted, PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-
invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin
resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it, the aforesaid
invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for
all intents and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Court draws attention to its pronouncements
embodied in its Resolution of September 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643 entitled Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations:

Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before it. The Rules
of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

xxxx

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which
will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. x x x (Emphasis added.)

Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, et al.,20 it can very well be stated that the termination of the
assailed investigations has veritably mooted the instant petition. This disposition becomes all the more
impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present Congress has not, per available records, opted to
take up anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey
Mountain project.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. Suffice it
to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was
quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons
to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.21 Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear
before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked by the
said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked, since
they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them."http://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/DOCUMENTS/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2006.zip%3E528,df%
7C2006/OCT2006/174340.htm - _ftn That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for
denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

xxxx

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected by
respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts
needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to
matters within the realm of proper investigation.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality
except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota23 of the controversy. So it must be here. Indeed, the
matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis-à-vis the
investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable
controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated. In short,
there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation
the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it
being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign
the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Demetria v. Alba
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
Fernan, J.

Facts:

Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of NA/BP sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the
Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of ‘77. Demetria assailed
the constitutionality of Sec 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that “The President shall have the
authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of
the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.” Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

Issue:

whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. Section 16, paragraph 4 of the 1973 Constitution provides that:

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel,
CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA,
VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ
ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES,
EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA,
Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in
representation of the Members of the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together
with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to
LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums
to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members
of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is,
in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must
be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on
mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case;
and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal.
HELD:
I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete,
real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the
sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits
is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the
Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.
The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption
of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation,
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate
[a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed
it but also of the executive which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge
the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which
may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects
submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates
the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per
se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress
receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and
the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
 These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
 HELD:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE
PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

Osmeña v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993
Narvasa, C.J.

Facts:
 On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for
cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and
from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a “trust liability account,” in virtue of E.O. 1024, and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987,
expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a
result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left
for determination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
reading as follows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

The petitioner argues that “the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a ‘SPECIAL FUND,’ not as a ‘trust account’ or a ‘trust fund,’ and that “if a special tax is collected for
a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall ‘be treated as a special fund’ to be used only for
the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective.” Petitioner further points out
that since “a ‘special fund’ consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts
belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was
created.”

He also contends that the “delegation of legislative authority” to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI
of the Constitution, viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government;

and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, “the limits, limitations and
restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and)
what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax.”

Issue:

whether or Not the invalidity of the “TRUST ACCOUNT” in the books of account of the Ministry of
Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to § 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as
amended, “said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the Constitution

Held:

The OPSF is a “Trust Account” which was established “for the purpose of minimizing the frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude
oil and imported petroleum products.” Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated
27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products
subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the
Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as
may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund
through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or
companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation
of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign
exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the
special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what
the law refers to as a “trust liability account,” the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a
“special fund.” Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.

Issue:

whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by
Executive Order No. 137, for “being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy
Regulatory Board

Held:

The Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional
amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In
addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or “a specific limit
on how much to tax.” The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is
involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is
not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose
additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the
overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the
law which are embraced by the police power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund,
do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner.
To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable
consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the
exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
PEPSI-COLA v. MUn.of TAnauan

ECISION
 MARTIN, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in its Civil Case No. 3294, which was
certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on October 6, 1969, as involving only pure questions of law,
challenging the power of taxation delegated to municipalities under the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act
No. 2264, as amended, June 19, 1959).

On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc.,
commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte for that Court
to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, 1 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,
unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27,
series of 1962, of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void.

On July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions of which state that,
first, both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 embrace or cover the same subject matter and the production tax
rates imposed therein are practically the same, and second that on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal
Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte, as per his letter addressed to the Manager of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Plant in
said municipality, sought to enforce compliance by the latter of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27,
series of 1962.chanrobles law library : red

Municipal Ordinance No. 23, of Tanauan, Leyte, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies and
collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every
bottle of soft drink corked." 2 For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company or
corporation producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report of the total
number of bottles produced and corked during the month. 3

On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance No. 27, which was approved on October 28, 1962, levies and
collects "on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax
of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity." 4 For the purpose of
computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company, partnership, corporation or plant producing soft drinks
shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report of the total number of gallons produced or
manufactured during the month. 5

The tax imposed in both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 is denominated as "municipal production tax."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment "dismissing the complaint and
upholding the constitutionality of [Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264]; declaring Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27
valid, legal and constitutional; ordering the plaintiff to pay the taxes due under the oft-said Ordinances; and
to pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

From this judgment, the plaintiff Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in
turn, elevated the case to Us pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

There are three capital questions raised in this appeal:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Is Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive?

2. Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes?

3. Are Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?

1. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right
to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. 6 It is a power that is
purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial
department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception,
however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers
may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern. 7 This is sanctioned by
immemorial practice. 8 By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political corporations for
purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local governmental agencies
the power to tax. 9 Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: "Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
emanated from beyond the sphere of the legislative power to enact and vest in local governments the power
of local taxation.

The plenary nature of the taxing power thus delegated, contrary to plaintiff-appellant’s pretense, would not
suffice to invalidate the said law as confiscatory and oppressive. In delegating the authority, the State is not
limited to the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be
delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there may be delegated such measure of power to
impose and collect taxes as the legislature may deem expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to
tax subjects which for reasons of public policy the State has not deemed wise to tax for more general
purposes. 10 This is not to say though that the constitutional injunction against deprivation of property
without due process of law may be passed over under the guise of the taxing power, except when the taking
of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as when (1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2)
the rule on uniformity of taxation is observed; (3) either the person or property taxed is within the
jurisdiction of the government levying the tax; and (4) in the assessment and collection of certain kinds of
taxes notice and opportunity for hearing are provided. 11 Due process is usually violated where the tax
imposed is for a private as distinguished from a public purpose; a tax is imposed on property outside the
State, i.e., extra-territorial taxation; and arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting
taxes. But, a tax does not violate the due process clause, as applied to a particular taxpayer, although the
purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit to such taxpayer. Due process does not
require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax to be raised should be determined by
judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and the manner in which it shall be
apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law. 12

There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the
theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and
enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. 13 The reason is that the State has
exclusively reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not
forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double
taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union. 14 Double taxation
becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity
15 or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, 16 but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the
State and the other by the city or municipality. 17

2. The plaintiff-appellant submits that Ordinance Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation, because these
two ordinances cover the same subject matter and impose practically the same tax rate. The thesis proceeds
from its assumption that both ordinances are valid and legally enforceable. This is not so. As earlier quoted,
Ordinance No. 23, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies or collects from soft drinks producers
or manufacturers a tax of one-sixteen (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle corked, irrespective of the volume
contents of the bottle used. When it was discovered that the producer or manufacturer could increase the
volume contents of the bottle and still pay the same tax rate, the Municipality of Tanauan enacted
Ordinance No. 27, approved on October 28, 1962, imposing a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128
fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The difference between the two ordinances clearly lies in the tax rate
of the soft drinks produced: in Ordinance No. 23, it was 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle corked; in
Ordinance No. 27, it is one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The
intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was intended as a
plain substitute for the prior Ordinance No. 23, and operates as a repeal of the latter, even without words to
that effect. 18 Plaintiff-appellant in its brief admitted that defendants-appellees are only seeking to enforce
Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. Even the stipulation of facts confirms the fact that the Acting Municipal
Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte sought to compel compliance by the plaintiff-appellant of the provisions of said
Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. The aforementioned admission shows that only Ordinance No. 27, series of
1962 is being enforced by defendants-appellees. Even the Provincial Fiscal, counsel for defendants-appellees
admits in his brief "that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 clearly repeals Ordinance No. 23 as the
provisions of the latter are inconsistent with the provisions of the former."cralaw virtua1aw library

That brings Us to the question of whether the remaining Ordinance No. 27 imposes a percentage or a
specific tax. Undoubtedly, the taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2, Republic Act
No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything, excepting those which are mentioned
therein." As long as the tax levied under the authority of a city or municipal ordinance is not within the
exceptions and limitations in the law, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the
rules of expresio unius est exclusio alterius, and exceptio firmat regulum in casibus non excepti. 19 The
limitation applies, particularly, to the prohibition against municipalities and municipal districts to impose
"any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject
to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of
this particular limitation, a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax
and the volume of sales of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being outside the power
of the municipality to enact. 20 But, the imposition of "a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid
ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity" on all soft drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does
not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is
levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayers
production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but
there is no set ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of the tax. 21

Nor can the tax levied be treated as a specific tax. Specific taxes are those imposed on specified articles, such
as distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches,
firecrackers, manufactured oils and other fuels, coal, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil, cinematographic films,
playing cards, saccharine, opium and other habit-forming drugs. 22 Soft drink is not one of those
specified.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

3. The tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity on all soft drinks,
produced or manufactured, or an equivalent of 1-1/2 centavos per case, 23 cannot be considered unjust and
unfair. 24 An increase in the tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and
confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of imposable
taxes. 25 This is in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local
governments in matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No.
231, July 1, 1973). 26 Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off
an ordinance as unreasonable. 27 Reluctance should not deter compliance with an ordinance such as
Ordinance No. 27 if the purpose of the law to further strengthen local autonomy were to be realized. 28

Finally, the municipal license tax of P1,000.00 per corking machine with five but not more than ten crowners
or P2,000.00 with ten but not more than twenty crowners imposed on manufacturers, producers, importers
and dealers of soft drinks and/or mineral waters under Ordinance No. 54, series of 1964, as amended by
Ordinance No. 41, series of 1968, of defendant Municipality, 29 appears not to affect the resolution of the
validity of Ordinance No. 27. Municipalities are empowered to impose, not only municipal license taxes upon
persons engaged in any business or occupation but also to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes.
The ordinance in question (Ordinance No. 27) comes within the second power of a municipality.
ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and Municipal Ordinance No. 27 of the Municipality of
Tanauan, Leyte, series of 1962, repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 23, same series, is hereby declared of
valid and legal effect. Costs against petitioner-appellant.
Sison v Ancheta G.R. No. L-59431. July 25, 1984.
C. J. Fernando

Declaratory Relief

Facts:

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended

Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or
residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other
winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes
and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits
of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.

Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher
rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character.

For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession
than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.

(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as
well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation)

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:

The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's role to fill the gap not done by public
enterprise in order to meet the needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for the public welfare.

The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state
functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds.

The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power of the government. There are
restrictions, however, diversely affecting as it does property rights, both the due process and equal
protection clauses may properly be invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue
measure. If it were otherwise, taxation would be a destructive power.

The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis
without a factual foundation. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due
process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion.

It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds
no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation
of property. That would be a clear abuse of power.

It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for
a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on
due process grounds.

For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this was denied in the exercise of police
power or eminent domain was the presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.

It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or
that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looks upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on
the rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the ideal of the
laws's benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.

The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth
Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not
relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed
to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust Company- The rule of uniformity does not
call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable

Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall
be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications
for purposes of taxation

There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax
"applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation"

There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or
taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.

The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules
removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be
applied to all of them. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make
deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less.

Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class.

On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no
uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard
 the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax
rates on the basis of gross income.

There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due process and equal protection, and he
reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and
businessmen not being a dubious classification.

CIR vs. Algue Inc.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue Inc.

GR No. L-28896 | Feb. 17, 1988

Facts:

Algue Inc. is a domestic corp engaged in engineering, construction and other allied activities

On Jan. 14, 1965, the corp received a letter from the CIR regarding its delinquency income taxes from
1958-1959, amtg to P83,183.85

A letter of protest or reconsideration was filed by Algue Inc on Jan 18

On March 12, a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to Algue Inc. thru its counsel, Atty. Guevara,
who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest

Since the protest was not found on the records, a file copy from the corp was produced and given to BIR
Agent Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant

On April 7, Atty. Guevara was informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it was
only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be served

On April 23, Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the CIR with the Court of Tax Appeals

CIR contentions:

- the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable
or necessary business expense

- payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the same family in control of Algue
and that there is not enough substantiation of such payments

CTA: 75K had been legitimately paid by Algue Inc. for actual services rendered in the form of promotional
fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Company.

Issue: W/N the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction claimed by
Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns
Ruling:

Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance,
made in accordance with law.

RA 1125: the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged

During the intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be served.

Originally, CIR claimed that the 75K promotional fees to be personal holding company income, but later on
conformed to the decision of CTA

There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in their income tax
returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. CTA also found, after examining the evidence, that no
distribution of dividends was involved

CIR suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary
deduction

Algue Inc. was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and immediate
issuance of receipts was not required. at the end of the year, when the books were to be closed, each payee
made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. This
arrangement was understandable in view of the close relationship among the persons in the family
corporation

The amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The total commission paid by the Philippine Sugar
Estate Development Co. to Algue Inc. was P125K. After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a balance of
P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission.
This was a reasonable proportion, considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties.

Sec. 30 of the Tax Code: allowed deductions in the net income – Expenses - All the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered xxx

the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction

In this case, Algue Inc. has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light
of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an
experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos.

Taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack
of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of
one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in
the running of the government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible
and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material
values

Taxation must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then
the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor
Algue Inc.’s appeal from the decision of the CIR was filed on time with the CTA in accordance with Rep. Act
No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction by Algue Inc. was permitted under the Internal
Revenue Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by the CIR

olentino v. Secretary of Finance

Facts:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which
is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to
concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

UNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY

Posted by kaye lee on 5:15 PM
G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative Department; Taxation ]

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition
hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the
resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real
property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision
was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the
provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and
the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to
the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under
PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies
granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real
properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This
provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties
are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the
hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are
not exempt from such taxes.

Soliven v Makasiar Nov 14, 1988 G.R. No. 82585

Per Curiam

(Topic on Warrant Issued by RTC)

Facts:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The
President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC issued a warrant of arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause.
Held: No

Ratio:

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't required
to examine the complainant and the witnesses.

He shall only personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and required the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Otherwise, judges would be burdened with preliminary investigation instead of hearing cases.

STRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the
Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were
only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against
Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until
his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of people power of

exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the
whole government.
freedom of speech and freedom of
assemblyto petition the
government for redress of
grievances which only affected the
office of the President.

extra constitutional and the

intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government
resignation of the sitting President
that resulted from it cannot be the
that it caused and the succession of
subject of judicial review
the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant
issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
(he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the
Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual,
cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough
evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable
to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896
194 SCRA 317
February 22, 1991

Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union

Respondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino
on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold other
than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

 Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of

the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in
the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

 Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position
in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two
(2) positions other than his primary position.

 Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice
President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of
Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

 Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their Deputies
or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.

 Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided
by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of
the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of
the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR
Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM
Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is
hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
TECSON V. COMELEC (2004)
EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. 161434, MARCH 03, 2004 ]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON AND FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (A.K.A. FERNANDO POE, JR.) AND VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
RESPONDENTS. [*]

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, PETITIONER, VS. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, A.K.A. FERNANDO POE, JR.,
RESPONDENT. [*]

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It
is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,”[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to
the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath.
Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us
of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his
claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of
the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for
San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could
be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration
No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie
Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the
records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,
docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel
FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false” –

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections” -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to
file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in
an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the
1987 Constitution also reads –

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power “includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well
be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution
to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained
this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4]as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional
lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be
the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government
under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warrantowhich, although two distinct remedies, would have
one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. -The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

“Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.”

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This
rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.,"
and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr."
would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding
of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he
described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with
rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such
as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of
the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain
however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal
Decrees.[14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing
views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in
the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was
included, would be governed by special laws.[19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out
with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

“(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

“(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

“(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

“(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.”[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United
States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under
Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to
the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year
from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus –

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the
native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on
the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in
the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of
1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight
and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines
on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once
and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

“(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly,
as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

“Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

“(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act
or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3)
thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

“The following are citizens of the Philippines:

“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

“(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa
in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of
his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes.
Introduced by petitioner was an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected
the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents
were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe
to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San
Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

“Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

“x x x x x x x x x

“(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.”
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facieproof of their contents. Section 44, Rule
130, of the Rules of Court provides:

“Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facieevidence of the facts therein stated.”

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year
1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record
about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child,
FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be
used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day
prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to
the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.”

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza
vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or
not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon
as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such
a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as
proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary,
legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of
full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the
child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however,
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of
the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

“(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

“(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
“(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

“(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

“Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.

“x x x x x x x x x.

“Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.

“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.”

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this
body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any,
to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights
or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the
Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]

In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity
of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property,
the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree
it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses,
are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered
the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced
to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of
members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or
Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects
on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the
Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.”

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify,
(b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as
Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

Petitioner’s Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of
a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20
August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on
16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended
that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen,
basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra
vs. Republic.[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine
under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement
would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
Court to look closely into these cases.

“First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The
stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

“Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

“Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus
sanguinis.

“Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan
who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was
his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
“The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter
that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.

“x x x x x x x x x

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it
would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.

“The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

“x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault
of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no
fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him
for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither
justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated.”
 The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben
Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so
for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in
line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty
to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum –

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R.
No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack
of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ
has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and
No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954
at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
 absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father
of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful. G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., et.al, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

(Digest by Ali Caronongan – Sourced from class digest)

FACTS :

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential
elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued
its implementation.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the
AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and counting system for
the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier
of the computerized voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC
nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for
national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement
in tabulation procedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election
Code that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the
situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall
notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the
use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the
use of such devices.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of
election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID,
as it is unconstitutional.
HELD:

YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the
Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.

REASONS:

Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the
respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the
Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass
of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of
Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case,
NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the
respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an
"unofficial" count.

In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and
unsealed only when needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that
may be established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution,
does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes.
Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than
thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices, after failing to submit any document proving
that it had notified all political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, PROTESTANT, VS. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, PROTESTEE.

RESOLUTION

In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam Defensor-
Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with
and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.

We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective
memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a
Senator in the May 1995 electionand her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.

The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs.
Mencias,[1] Lomugdang vs. Javier,[2] and De Castro vs. Ginete,[3] she asserts that an election contest involves
not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but more
importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of
the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with, public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to
determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the
term of the contested office has expired,[4] thus her electionas Senator and assumption of office as such
cannot, ‘under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,[5] be construed as an abandonment of the instant
protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the orthodox view that a case should be
dismissed if it has been mooted.[6]

For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant
is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra[7] which
construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).[8] He submits, however, that public
interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering that: (a) it involves a matter of
paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep Protestant Santiago in the limelight
in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise claims that a resolution on the merits would confirm
his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential election and prove that the instant protest is unfounded.
Furthermore, it would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to
presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench and the bar and preventing the
indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.

We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator
Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg.
881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of
candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity." Even more plain is that
the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy for Senator
nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.

Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee’s proposition that this case should nevertheless be
resolved on the merits because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the Protestant in the
limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public interest would be served if
this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the Senate. Finally, neither do we find
any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in the event that we find it to be moot, simply
to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to election protests involving the
office of the President or the Vice- President.

I.

The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and public
policy and their encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally expressed in the
cases cited by the Protestant.

In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,[9] this Court stated:

It is axiomatic that an election contest involving as it does not only the adjudication settlement of the private
interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispellling once and for all the uncertainty
that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and
above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the
imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as
expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end
that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960;
Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the
contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the
voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an
adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the
office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the
jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46
Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).

Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in
the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and
must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520
[1967], where the trial court proceeded with the trial of an election protest and decided it even if the
protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession, this Court, instead of
dismissing the appeal brought on behalf of the deceased protestee, required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on
the side of the appellant).

In Lomugdang vs. Javier,[10] this Court declared:

Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore,
public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the
contestant. We have squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October
26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense
(Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee’s cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal
of the contest nor detract the Court’s jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).

In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, Republic Act 2264,
the vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is
entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor
succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.

In Moraleja vs. Relova,[11] this Court ruled:

As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned
his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the
public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the
parties, so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of
cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same
manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a ground for
dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-259, citing Calvo v.
Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee from the contested office
(Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be known,
neither can the acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of
the Vice-Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant’s
determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of
the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of an
employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he
prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not
deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525,
February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course,
the case of protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We
are not ruling on it here.

In De Castro vs. Ginete,[12] this Court stated:

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of
canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the
correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning
candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act
of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing
candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.

The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,[13] the protestee had been proclaimed the
winning mayoralty candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the pendency of
the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the protestant who died during the pendency of the
protest.

In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant’s acceptance of temporary employment during the
pendency of his election protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,[14] cited in Sibulo vda. de De
Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the resignation from office of the protestee.

Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the ground
of estoppel. In this proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed
the winner by the board of canvassers and even exhorted those present during the inauguration and
installation into office of the protestee to support the latter’s administration.

May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after
her election as such in the 8 May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not resolved in
Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the protestant therein of a temporary appointment
during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor could it be considered
inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the election protest,
this Court noted:
"Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a permanentappointment to a regular office could be differ
ent, but We are not ruling on it here."[15]

Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a
popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the
8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that
the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election[16] and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her
high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the
electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy
for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation.

In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the
office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was
elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that public
office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[17]

Indeed, it has been aptly said:

It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society exercised, without the
aid and intervention of public servants or officers, and every person, therefore, who enters into civil society
and avails himself of the benefits and protection of the government, must owe to this society, or, in other
words, to the public, at least a social duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and
performing, under reasonable circumstances, the duties of those public offices to which he may be lawfully
chosen.[18]
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge
an elective office.[19]

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which
coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language
of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter
of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the
instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the
aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-too crucial
political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may
be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the
following grounds:

(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;

(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;

(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;

(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the
protest; and

(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.[20]

Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory
character,[21] may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may,
in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds.[22] In sum, if an election protest may be
dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due
to its abandonment by the Protestant.

II.

There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.

This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the
remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot
areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18
October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October 1993:
After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the
Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and
against the immediate application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the
Counter-Protest.

At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the revised ballots
are "considerable" enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an
appropriate action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots
from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of the
representative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the
proper time to raise the objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage.

Consequently, we resolved therein to:

A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A
of the 5 October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to
collect said ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in
the event that their revisions in connection with other election protests in which they are involved have
been terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or
court in which such other election protests are pending and which have already obtained custody of the
ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such
other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election documents and
paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and

B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present evidence in connection
therewith.

Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of
the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection
therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant’s revisors discovered in the course
of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and
have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is merely the first stage, and
not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms then, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 18 March 1993 that:

Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision phase of her
protest is but the first stage in the resolution of her electoral protest and that the function of the revisors is
very limited. In her 12 February 1993 Comment on Protestee’s 5 February 1993 Urgent Motion for the
issuance of a resolution which, inter alia, would clarify that revisors may observe the objections and/or
claims made by the revisors of the other party as welt as the ballots subject thereof, and record such
observations in a form to be provided for that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated:
"8.
Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the
entire election contest into various stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical
examination if so desired by either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of
parties’ memoranda."

and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots according to which
ballots they would like to contestor object (contested ballots) and those which they admit or have no
objections (uncontested ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their duties are merely
clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision on the more
crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung
vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be
given to the revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an acceptable basis for
the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed during an election or that a Protestant
had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the
revision thereof, object - for any imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and
ridiculous - to all ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even
announce to the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in the election returns, Protestee had
actually lost the elections.

All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.

III.

However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a reply
to the important points they raise is in order.

Mr. Justice Puno’s perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic
on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the
course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant; and second, she
abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May 1995 senatorial elections," is
inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for any doubt or miscomprehension
that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest
"has been rendered moot andacademic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequen
ce of herelection and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties andfunctions thereof."
There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered moot and academic, i.e.,
it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the parties were required, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective memoranda.

The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently understood,
that this protest has become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by the Protestant’s
revisors in the course of the revision of the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in the pilot areas are
"entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest by filing a certificate of candidacy
for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority’s views on "irrelevancy" and "on the filing
of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but parts only of the arguments to
strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e., abandonment.Otherwise stated, in order to make the point crystal
clear, the majority never held that the irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest
has become moot and academic. It only declared that the Protestant’s: (a) waiver of revision of the
unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017 contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to comply
with the resolution of 21 October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if
she would still present evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas -
rendered such "findings" of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal’s disquisitions on
what revisionis in its 18 March 1993 resolution.

In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words “entirely irrelevant” from the fourth paragraph under the
heading “II” of this Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to
the preceding two paragraphs relating to the above-mentioned waiver and non-compliance, which provide
the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the latter is nothing more than the logical
conclusion which the major premises support.

The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant’s turn-around are mere speculations. In any
event, the Protestant’s possible "belief that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly
appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory," cannot stand against her previous insistence to
proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the aforementioned finding of the Tribunal
in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow pace of the protest," if at all
she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The
Protestant knew from the outset that the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this
protest because, under Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the
Tribunal were convinced that she would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the
ballots from the pilot areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in connection therewith. It goes
without saying that every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.

Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant’s filing of the certificate of candidacy for a
seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice
Puno perceives to be the majority’s second ground why this protest has become moot and academic. To the
majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts performed by the Protestant to convincingly
evince her abandonment of this protest, viz., campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of such
office after her election, and her discharge of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their
respective memoranda on the issue.

[o]f whether or not the

protest has not been rendered moot and academicby the election of the Protestant as Senator and her subse
quentassumption of office as such on 30 June 1995." (italics supplied)

As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black’s Law Dictionary and
the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission,[23] Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co.,[24] and McCall vs.
Cull,

[25]
cited therein. We have turned to the primary sources of these cases, meticulously perused them, and found
none materially significant to this protest.

The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a
roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in order for
there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public use, two elements must concur, viz., (a) intention to
relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to any particular person; and (b) the
external act which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on the issue of whether the plaintiff
therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to abandon must be
determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive
act of the party to constitute abandonment in respect of a right secured - an act done which shows a
determination in the individual not to have a benefit which is designed for him.

It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property.[26]

Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:

Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office, implies that the
occupant has quit the office and ceased to perform its duties. As long as he continues to discharge the duties
of the office, even though his source of title is two appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot
be said he has abandoned it. It was said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Corn. App., 220 S.W. 77,
78: "A public office may be abandoned. Abandonment is a species of resignation. Resignation and
abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the latter a relinquishment through
non-user. Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user does not, of itself, constitute abandonment. The
failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention on the part of
the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of
the party, and is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his
wrongful removal or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved."

Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Kapunan, the Protestant could not abandon the office of President which she was not holding at the time
she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the majority of the Tribunal never declared, nor even
implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that she had yet nothing to abandon.
Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that office, to thereafter assume and perform
the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that
the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby rendering this protest moot.

Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve
it "for lack of competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which
can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the contrary, the Protestee
does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it be decided on the merits."
Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned the following facts, which by
themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon the protest:

(a) Filling of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;

(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election,

(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor;

(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and

(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.

These acts speak for themselves - res ipsa loquitur - to negate any proposition that the Protestant has not
abandoned this protest.

Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This must
also be the verdict upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:

A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the
majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less
with the private interest of the candidates but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of
government, the overarching object of an electioncontest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people
on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution
underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just
as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus, in
Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that "x x x once the court has acquired jurisdiction over
an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to
the wishes or acts of the parties so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts
in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even
on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.

The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even
while the protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet
to expire, and even while the protestee and the protestant together plead that the Tribunal should
determine the true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on technicalities that
trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to decide this electioncontest on the
merit[s] and vindicate the political judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other
considerations. Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the
uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind of convenience,
and not by the weal of the public.

For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms. demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings of
the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno.
Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further miscomprehension, that the Moraleja ruling even conceded
that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner therein had accepted
"a permanentappointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact
intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent
appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a
protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of
the term of the contested office, and after winning the said election, took her oath and assumed office and
thereafter continuously serves it.

In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of specific
"acts or wishes" of the parties which must he disregarded because of the public interest component of
an election protest. As reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno’s dissent, only
default, compromise, or stipulation of facts are included.

Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed
out in the early part of this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests
even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes
attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods
fixed in the Rules,[27] and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. All these provisions of the
Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified or amended in a way not authorized by the
Rules, if the theory of. Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to
the technical minutiae of trial on the merits to bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before
it - including those filed by candidates who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the
final count, but, unable to accept defeat, filed a protest claiming massive fraud and irregularities, vote-
buying, and terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be
spent appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court,
as, the electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would have to
be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good stands to be thereby served.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to

(1) GRANT the Protestant’s Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of
ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas:

(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by
its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of
office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and

(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee’s Counter-Protest.

CARMEN PLANAS v. JOSE GIL

Facts:
Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts of certain government
officials in connection with the general election for Assemblymen held on November 8, 1938 in one of the
local dailies. The statement as published in the issue of La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the
following statements:

“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8 elections, but lost instead because of a
disastrous division due to people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisely so that the President maydevote all hi
s time to the administration of public affairs for the welfare of the people, but thePresident was the first t
o play politics. Publicly expressing his preference for candidates of his liking; and with the President all other
officials of the government also moved, taking part in electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten the opposition and preventcandidates s
upported by the people from going to the National Assembly, and with frauds and violations of all rules of
the civil service to push to victory the candidates of the Nacionalista Party and the administration, all
constructive opposition in the country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe that the President is from this moment paving the way for hisreelection. It is
to be feared that the new National Assembly will change this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the
reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."

The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the petitioner received a letter, where she is
informed that she needs to appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to prove her statements
otherwise she may be suspended or removed from office.

At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, appeared at the office of the respondent
and delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the authority of the respondent to
conduct the investigation. The respondent Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the
investigation, but announced before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that he would decide the
question raised as to his jurisdiction on November 26, 1938.

It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in this court her original petition for
prohibition of November 25, 1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commisioner from continuing with the investigation.

Issues:
1. WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the president has the power to order the investigation
3. WON the investigation is in accordance with the law

Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

1. Yes.

In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. The Commissioner of Civil Service is the
party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Government that because an investigation undertaken
by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the
present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen
Planas. The argument is farfetched.A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting und
er orders from the ChiefExecutive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive up
on this court.Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicialint
erference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate officials andemployees of the
Executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authoritythat it purports the jurisdi
ction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executiveorder is necessarily abated or suspe
nded.

Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice,or to preve
nt the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or amultiplicity of actions." (
Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant
proceedings and will accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present controversy.

2. Yes.

It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the order, but it is contended "that the said
investigation with a view to petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of the
Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended
petition.) It, therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional and legal authority of the
President to order the investigation which has given rise to the present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show
that extensive authority over the public service is granted thePresident of the Philippines. Article VII of the
Constitution begins in its section 1 with thedeclaration that "The Executive power shall be vested in a Pres
ident of the Philippines." Allexecutive authority is thus vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitut
ional duty ofseeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VIII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last clause.) In thef
ulfillment of this duty which he cannot evade, he is granted specific and express powers andfunctions. (Art
. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and functions, hemay also exercise those ne
cessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National Assembly may not
enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921]) The Constitutionprovides that the President "shall have control of all the executive departments, b
ureaus, andoffices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general supervision over all localgo
vernments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of control andsupervision is an im
portant constitutional grant. The President in the exercise of the executivepower under the Constitution m
ay act through the heads of the executive departments.

Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature
involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with which
the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercisegeneral supervision over all local government
s and to take care that the laws be faithfullyexecuted must be construed to authorize him to order an inve
stigation of the act or conduct, ofthe petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an activ
e power. It is certainlynot without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and cond
itions in orderto render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed
after careful study and investigation.

Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief Executive by our Constitution, we should be
reluctant to yield to the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and steady hand
without vexatious or embarrassing interference and much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of
the power to order the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should avoid that result.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to Chief
Executive in this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body,
mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy
vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over
local governments (Booten vs. Pinson,
[1915]). The result was the recognition ofthe power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection
of what otherwise would be animperium in, imperio to the detriment of a strong national government.

Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides
as follows:

"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General (President) shall have such specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers
and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action
or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the
official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See
sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)

3. Yes.

The interest of the public service requires that these charges be investigated, so that, if found to be true,
appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of illegal acts, and if found
untrue and made without justifiable motives, the party making them may be proceeded against in
accordance with section 2440, in connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised Administrative Code."
Assuming that this is not one of the grounds provided by law for which the petitioner may be investigated
administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there is weight in the argument that the investigation would
still be in order
if for no other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all the facts sothat, if found proper an
d justified, appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged tohave been guilty of the illegal act
s charged. The enforcement of the law and the maintenance of peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "takecare that the laws be faithfully executed" is mor
e an imposition of an obligation than aconferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithfully and consc
ientiously fulfill" his duties asPresident, "preserve and defend" the Constitution and "execute" the law. Thi
s duty of theExecutive to see that the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to the enforcement oflegisl
ative acts or the express terms of the Constitution but also includes the due enforcement ofrights, duties,
obligations, prerogatives and immunities growing out of the Constitution itself andof the protection implie
d by the nature of the government under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle)

We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecting the constitutional guarantyof freedo
m of speech and of the press, no less than the right of assembly and petition which,according to Stimson (
The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights, 152), is its originrather than its derivation. In the p
resent case, however, the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is shebeing investigated because she had ex
ercised that right. She has a perfect right to criticize theGovernment, its administration, its policies and offici
als, but she may not, on the plea of freedom ofspeech and of the press, impute violations of law and the com
mission of frauds and thereafter fold herarms and decline to face an investigation conducted to elicit the trut
h or falsity of the charges formulatedby her. Otherwise, the guarantee which, in the language of Wendell Phil
lips, is "at once the instrument,and the guarantee, and the bright consummate flower of all liberty" would de
generate into an unbridledlicense, and render the Government powerless to act.

.S. Supreme Court

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925)

Myers v. United States

No. 2

Argued December 5, 1923

Reargued April 13, 14, 1925

Decided October 25, 1926

272 U.S. 52

Syllabus

1. A postmaster who was removed from office petitioned the President and the Senate committee on Post
Offices for a hearing on any charges filed; protested to the Post Office Department; and,
Page 272 U. S. 53

three months before his four-year term expired, having pursued no other occupation and derived no
compensation for other service in the interval, began suit in the Court of Claims for salary since removal. No
notice of the removal, nor any nomination of a successor, had been sent in the meantime to the Senate
whereby his case could have been brought before that body, and the commencement of suit was within a
month after the ending of its last session preceding the expiration of the four years. Held that the plaintiff
was not guilty of laches. P. 272 U. S. 107.

2. Section 6 of the Act of July 12, 1876, providing that

"Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner
removed or suspended according to law,"

is unconstitutional in its attempt to make the President's power of removal dependent upon consent of the
Senate. Pp. 272 U. S. 107, 272 U. S. 176.

3. The President is empowered by the Constitution to remove any executive officer appointed by him by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and this power is not subject in its exercise to the assent of the
Senate, nor can it be made so by an act of Congress. Pp. 272 U. S. 119, 272 U. S. 125.

4. The provision of Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President" is
a grant of the power, and not merely a naming of a department of the government. Pp. 272 U. S. 151, 272 U.
S. 163.

5. The provisions of Art. II, § 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of
the Executive, are limitations upon this general grant of the Executive power which are to be strictly
construed, and not to be extended by implication. P. 272 U. S. 164.

6. It is a canon of interpretation that real effect should be given to all the words of the Constitution. P. 272 U.
S. 151.

7. Removal of executive officials from office is an executive function; the power to remove, like the power to
appoint, is part of "the Executive power," -- a conclusion which is confirmed by the obligation "to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." Pp. 272 U. S. 161, 272 U. S. 164.

8. The power of removal is an incident of the power to appoint; but such incident does not extend the
Senate's power of checking appointments, to removals. Pp. 272 U. S. 119, 272 U. S. 121, 272 U. S. 126, 272 U.
S. 161.

9. The excepting clause in § 2 of Art. II, providing

"but Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers

Page 272 U. S. 54

as they may think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law or in the heads of departments,"

does not enable Congress to regulate the removal of inferior officers appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Pp. 272 U. S. 158-161.

10. A contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and
framers of the Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for many years, fixes
the meaning of the provisions so construed. P. 272 U. S. 175.
11. Upon an historical examination of the subject, the Court finds that the action of the First Congress, in
1789, touching the Bill to establish a Department of Foreign Affairs, was a clean-cut and deliberate
construction of the Constitution as vesting in the President alone the power to remove officers, inferior as
well as superior, appointed by him with the consent of the Senate; that this construction was acquiesced in
by all branches of the Government for 73 years, and that subsequent attempts of Congress, through the
Tenure of Office Act of March 2, 1867, and other acts of that period, to reverse the construction of 1789 by
subjecting the President's power to remove executive officers appointed by him and confirmed by the
Senate to the control of the Senate or lodge such power elsewhere in the Government were not acquiesced
in, but their validity was denied by the Executive whenever any real issue over it arose. Pp. 272 U. S. 111, 272
U. S. 164-176.

12. The weight of congressional legislation as supporting a particular construction of the Constitution by
acquiescence depends not only upon the nature of the question, but also upon the attitude of the executive
and judicial branches of the government and the number of instances in the execution of the law in which
opportunity for objection in the courts or elsewhere has been afforded. P. 272 U. S. 170.

13. The provisions of the Act of May 15, 1820, for removal of the officers therein named "at pleasure," were
not based on the assumption that, without them, the President would not have that power, but were
inserted in acquiescence to the legislative decision of 1789. P. 272 U. S. 146.

14. Approval by the President of acts of Congress containing provisions purporting to restrict the President's
constitutional power of removing officers held not proof of Executive acquiescence in such curtailment
where the approval was explicable by the value of the legislation in other respects -- as where the restriction
was in a rider imposed on an appropriation act. P. 272 U. S. 170.

Page 272 U. S. 55

15. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, considered, in connection with Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S.
324, and held not authoritative on the question of removal power here involved. Pp. 272 U. S. 139-144, 272
U. S. 158.

-----

The questions (1) whether a judge appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate under an act of
Congress, not under authority of Art. III of the Constitution, can be removed by the President alone without
the consent of the Senate; (2), whether the legislative decision of 1789 covers such a case, and (3), whether
Congress may provide for his removal in some other way, present considerations different from those which
apply in the removal of executive officers, and are not herein decided. Pp. 272 U. S. 154-158.

This Court has recognized (United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483) that Congress may prescribe incidental
regulations controlling and restricting the heads of departments in the exercise of the power of removal; but
it has never held, and could not reasonably hold, that the excepting clause enables Congress to draw to
itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.
To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of that clause and to infringe the constitutional
principle of the separation of govern mental powers. P. 272 U. S. 161.

Assuming the power of Congress to regulate removals as incidental to the exercise of its constitutional
power to vest appointments of inferior officers in the heads of departments, certainly so long as Congress
does not exercise that power, the power of removal must remain where the Constitution places it -- with the
President, as part of the executive power, in accordance with the legislative decision of 1789. P. 272 U. S.
161.

Whether the action of Congress in removing the necessity for the advice and consent of the Senate, and
putting the power of appointment in the President alone, would make his power of removal in such case any
more subject to Congressional legislation than before is a question not heretofore decided by this Court and
not presented or decided in this case. P. 272 U. S. 161.

Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has
vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the
Senate's consent. P. 272 U. S. 164.

58 Ct.Cls. 199, affirmed.

Page 272 U. S. 56

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Claims rejecting a claim for salary. Appellant's intestate, Frank S.
Myers, was reappointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as a postmaster
of the first class. The Act of July, 1876, § 6, c. 179, 19 Stat. 80, provides that such postmasters shall hold
office for four years, unless sooner removed or suspended according to law, and provides that they may be
removed by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Myers was removed, before
the expiration of his term, by an order of the Postmaster General, sanctioned by the President. The removal
was not referred to the Senate, either directly or through nomination of a successor, during the four-year
period. Judgment of the Court below that Myers could not claim salary for the part of that period following
the removal was based on the view that there had been laches in asserting the claim. The appeal was argued
and submitted by counsel for the appellant on December 5, 1924. On January 5, 1925, the Court restored the
case for reargument. It invited the Honorable George Wharton Pepper, United States Senator from
Pennsylvania, to participate as amicus curiae. The reargument occurred on April 13, 14, 1925. In view of the
great importance of the matter, the Reporter has deemed it advisable to print, in part, the oral arguments, in
addition to summaries of the briefs. [Oral arguments and briefs omitted.]

Page 272 U. S. 106

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Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondent’s appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.
Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected
by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and
it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

15. ALFREDO M. DE LEON v. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA

153 SCRA 602 | August, 31, 1987
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay
Election Act of 1982. Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which
provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and
the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality.
Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be
six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance
with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respondent OIC Governor no longer had
the authority to replace them as well as designate successors.
Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from
taking over their positions.
ISSUE:
Whether the designation of successors is valid.
HELD:
No, memoranda has no legal effect. The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum
issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect.
February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in effect then
because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all
previous constitution were suspended.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional
constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately
upon its ratification.
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?
The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision
under Article XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose.” (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five
votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of 1986)
The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the
people have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of
ratification. It should not be on the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people.
In fact, there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is
merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other hand,
should make the official announcement that the votes show that the Constitution was ratified, but the
canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite.

16. Gonzales v.COMELECGonzales v. COMELEC No. L-28196, 21 SCRA 774 [Nov 9, 1967] 6 Following the
principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings."
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Under Sec.3(3), Art. XI,
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that
the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. On the other hand, the impeachment
proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. (Ibid.) 7 There was a
preliminary issue on whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Reps the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power: the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official (Art. XI, Secs. 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5)). Where there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies, our courts are dutybound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits pursuant to its expanded
certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1: the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality. (Id.) N.B. There are two types of political questions: (1) justiciable
and (2) non-justiciable. The determination of one from the other lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
(Id.) Facts. Congress passed three resolutions simultaneously on the same date proposing amendments to
the Constitution: (1) RBH 8 No. 1: to increase the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives
from 120 to 180; (2) RBH No. 2: calling a Constitutional Convention to be held on Nov 1971; and (3) RBH No.
3: to authorize members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and if elected
thereto, to authorize them to be delegates without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Upon approval by the
President, the bill became RA 4913, which provided that RBH No. 1 and No. 3 be submitted for the
ratification of the people at the general elections on Nov 14, 1967. Issue. May Constitutional amendments
be submitted for ratification in a general election? Held. Yes. 1935 Constitution, Art XV, Sec 1 provides: “xxx
[Constitutional] amendments shall be valid xxx when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
9 at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” There is nothing in the
provision to indicate that the “election” therein referred to is a “special” election and not a general election.
There is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of the proposed
amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities involved in general elections. But then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of
holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. [Though admirable, we] are unable to
subscribe to the contrary view without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what is not written thereon
and what cannot fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter
of sheer speculation. The plenary authority of Congress to call a constitutional convention includes, by
necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effectiveexercise of such principal power.
Implementing details may be provided by Congress as a constituent assembly or as a legislative body.
17. Santiago v. COMELEC GR 127325, 270 SCRA 106 [Mar 19, 1997]
Facts. Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution by people’s initiative. He proposed to
lift the term limits of elective officials. COMELEC acted on the petition. Santiago et al. now petitions to
prohibit COMELEC from further acting on the petition. They aver that the constitutional provision on
people’s initiative (Art XVII, Sec 2) has no implementing law yet16 notwithstanding RA 6735, and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it seeks to govern the conduct of initiative on the amendments to
the Constitution, is ultra vires. Issues. (1) Is RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) a sufficient
statutory implementation of Art XVII, Sec 2 of the Constitution? (2) May COMELEC validly take cognizance of
the Delfin Petition? Held. (1) No. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. The inclusion of the word
“Constitution” in Sec 2 of RA 6735 (section on the “Statement and Policy”) was a delayedafterthought. It is
neither germane or relevant to that section. While the Act provides subtitles for initiative on national laws
and local laws, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws [only]. RA 6735
merely paid lip service to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution in contrast to the
utmost diligence and care exerted in providing for the details of that for the national and local legislation. (2)
No. The lacunae of RA 6735 on the foregoing substantive matter (the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution) are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes [the] Act” Therefore, COMELEC Res. No. 2300,
insofar as it promulgates such rules and regulations, is void. Two elements to be complied with in order to
propose constitutional amendments by initiative: (1) the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal; and (2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

18. Lambino v. COMELEC GR 174153, 505 SCRA 160 [Oct 25, 2006] Facts. Lambino et al. sought to propose
amendments to the Constitution by People’s initiative through RA 6735. The sheet used to gather signatures
from the people contained only the questions “Do you approve of the Amendment of Articles VI and VII of
the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of the government from the present bicameral-presidential to a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government in order to achieve greater efficiency xxx; and providing an
Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions xxx?” The signature sheet further provides a table wherein the personal
data of the person signing shall be indicated. Subsequently, Lambino et al. filed with COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite to ratify their proposal. They have in fact gathered signatures of >12% of all registered voters with
each district represented by 3% at least (6,327,952 voters). COMELEC invoked Santiago v. COMELEC and
denied the petition. Issue. Did the Lambino petition comply with Art XVII, Sec 2 of the Constitution? Held.
No. Firstly, for the amendment to be “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”,
two elements must be complied with: (1) the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal (no agent
or representative can sign on their behalf); and (2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The
deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the framers mean to adopt the American
Jurisprudence on the matter which in particular reveals that the intention is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and the people must sign the petition containing
such full text. The said elements are present only if the foregoing has been shown. In the Lambino petition,
the proposed changes were not incorporated with or attached to the signature sheets. Secondly, American
Jurisprudence outlaws logrolling—when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in
the same petition. In the Lambino petition, the proposed changes include a provision empowering the
interim Parliament to convene and propose amendments/revisions to the Constitution, which the Court
finds as logrolling. Thirdly, a shift from a bicameral-presidential to a unicameralparliamentary system xxx
constitute, beyond doubt, a revision. It is clear the Constitution only sanctions “amendments” and not
revisions thereto by people’s initiative. From the foregoing, it is plain that even if RA 6735 is valid, Lambino’s
initiative will still fail. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as the outcome of this
case will not be changed thereby

19. Tolentino v. COMELEC No. L-34150, 41 SCRA 702 [Oct 16, 1971]
Facts. The first Organic Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention proposed to reduce the
voting age from 21 to 18 years of age. It was also provided therein that the plebiscite to ratify such partial
amendment shall coincide with the local elections in November 1971 and shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by the same Convention. Petitioners now seek to restrain
COMELEC on acting on such resolution. Issue. May amendments to the Constitution be submitted to the
electorate for ratification partially without prejudice to future amendments that may be proposed by the
Constitutional Convention? Held. No. Art XV, Sec 1 of the 1935 Const. clearly provides that “such
amendments shall be valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification”, thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment/s proposed by the
same Convention. The provision unequivocally says “an election” which means only one. In order that the
plebiscite xxx may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the case at bar, the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of the proposals. To present to the people any single proposal cannot comply with this
requirement. There is here “no proper submission”.
 20. JAVELLANNA v.executive supra
21.SANIDAD v COMELECSanidad v. COMELEC No. L-44640, 73 SCA 333 [Oct 12, 1976]
Facts. In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a referendumplebiscite two questions: “(1) Do you
want martial law to be continued?; “(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you
approve the following amendments to the Constitution? xxx” Petitioners now seek to declare void the
presidential decrees which submitted the aforementioned issues to the people in a plebiscitereferendum.
They aver that the incumbent President has no constitutional grant of constituent power to propose
amendments to the Constitution; consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now seek
to enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite. Issues. (1) Is the nature of the question on the
constitutionality of the assailed presidential decrees political or justiciable? (2) Does the President possess
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people? (3) Is the submission to the
people of the proposed amendments sufficient and proper? Held. (1) The question is justiciable. The
constitutional amending in this case is in the form of a delegated and hence a limited power so that the SC is
vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. Political
questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the case at bar,]
what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the Constitutional authority of the President to
perform such acts or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. If the Constitution provides how it may
be amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
24; MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, et al.
G.R. No. 122156 | February 3, 1997
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS:
The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares. In a close bidding only two(2) bidder participated, the
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm. First the MPH has a lower bid compare
to the Malaysian firm but later matched the bid of the Malaysian firm with all the compliance of the bidding
rules imposed by the GSIS on the contracts.
Perhaps apprehensive the respondent GSIS has disregarded the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the
MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad. The petitioner came to
the court on prohibition and mandamus. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
The petitioner invoked Sec 10, second par. Article XII. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
constitution. [In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos]. Respondent, opposing that the provision is not self-
executing and requires implementing legislation, and Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution are self-executing.
HELD:
No, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means if which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is self-executing. Sec 10, second par. Article
XII of the 1987 constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. It means that- qualified Filipino shall be preferred. And
when our constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject,
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforce
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium.
Whether the 51% share of Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony?
No, the national patrimony that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the constitution speaks for patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippines
heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony; for sure 51 % of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. Wherefore the respondents are directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RenongBerhad. And accept the matching bid of the manila prince hotel
corporation.
25. Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its majortrading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports,particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides newopportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associatedwith exporting and more investment in the country. These are
thepredicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by

the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as onethat limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty andlegislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitutionwas taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Held:
on the challenge posed by thepetitioners that the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement violated
the Constitution, particularly Sec. 19, Art. II(which mandates the development of a self-reliant and
independentnational economy), the Supreme Court held that this was a justiciable controversy, because
where an action of the Legislature isalleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only theright
but the duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
26.MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic
State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then
in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving
as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international
law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III: