ARTICLE XIII: Social Justice and Human Rights  It upheld the point-of-hire classification, stating that the principle

int-of-hire classification, stating that the principle of “equal pay

for equal work” does not find application in this case because of the
Note: Art. XIII focuses on social and economic rights. international character of the school requiring such hiring due to the student
 These rights require implementing legislation population

Sec. 1: ISSUE: Is the classification of teachers as foreign-hire and local-hire

constitutional? NO
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that:
 Protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. The Constitution and laws reflect the
 Reduce social, economic, and political inequalities; and policy against these evils. “Equal Pay for Equal Work” is embodied in these
 Remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political provisions. Persons who work with substantially equal qualification, skill, effort and
power for the common good responsibility under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Article XIII: Social Justice and Human Exhorts Congress to “give highest
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and Rights priority to enactment of measures that
disposition of property and its increments. protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic and political inequalities
(1) International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisimbing Article 19 of the Civil Code Every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his
FACTS: duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good
International School, Inc. (ISM) is a domestic educational institution established faith
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
International Law (UDHR, ICESCR, Embody the general principle against
The school hires both foreign and local teachers, classified as foreign-hires and local- International Covenant on the discrimination, the very antithesis of
hires. It employs 4 tests to determine whether one is a foreign-hire or a local-hire: Elimination of All Forms of Racial fairness and justice
a. What is one’s domicile? Discrimination, Convention against
b. Where is one’s home country? Discrimination in Education,
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance? Convention Discriminating in
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the Respect of Employment and
School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? Occupation)
Constitution on Labor Labor is entitled to "humane conditions
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member of work."
is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign hire.
Labor Code ART. 135: prohibits and penalizes the
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires: payment of lesser compensation to a
 Housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel female employee as against a male
allowance employee for work of equal value.
 Salary rate 25% more than local-hires
Its justification: two significant economic disadvantages that foreign-hires have to ART. 248: it is an unfair labor practice for
endure, namely dislocation factor and limited tenure. an employer to discriminate in regard to
wages in order to encourage or
When negotiations for a new CBA were held, petitioner International School Alliance of discourage membership in any labor
Educators (ISAE) contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local- organization
hires. International Covenant on Economic, The State should recognizes the right of
 ISAE claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is Social, and Cultural Rights everyone to the enjoyment of just and
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires favorable conditions of work
constitutes racial discrimination. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work.
The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local hires received the
same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
  This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he receives less or why the others receive more.
 That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.
 International School has failed to discharge this burden, because there is no
evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the
local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions
 The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their
domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay.
Salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local
hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter.
 “Dislocation factor” and “Limited Tenure” cannot service as a valid bases for
the distinction in salary rates. These are adequately compensated by certain
benefits which are accorded them but not to local-hires such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
Point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in
the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-
hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
--
Sec. 2:
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on:
 Freedom of initiative; and
 Self-reliance
TWO PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL JUSTICE:
1. Create more economic opportunities and more wealth
2. Closely regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and political power
Promoting Social Justice
 It is of the highest priority because the very survival of the Republic could
depend on the attainment of these goals
 The most serious problems plaguing the nation can be traced to a long-
standing history of injustice to the underprivileged
 However, it cannot justify breaking the law. While the State is mandated to
promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of
housing, this cannot be interpreted to mean that “squatting” has been
legalized. The State will not tolerate usurpation of property.
Examples of Social Justice in Action:
 Altering contractual relations between landlord and farm tenants
 Increased effort to redistribute private lands through expropriation
LABOR
Sec. 3:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the
right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
May a law be passed prohibiting selected sectors of labor from organizing
unions?
 The right to organize is given to all kinds of workers both in the private and
in the public sector
Workers have a right to participate in the decision-making process of employers on
matters affecting their rights and benefits. This participation can be through:
1. CBAs
2. Grievance machineries
3. Voluntary modes of settling disputes
4. Conciliation proceedings mediated by government
FACTORS IN REGUALTING RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND
EMPLOYEES
 The right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
 The right of enterprise to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion
and growth
The command to promote social justice itself might make it necessary to tilt the balance
in favor of underprivileged workers.
 The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the
(2) Eagle Security v. NLRC Labor Code to assure compliance of the provisions including the statutory minimum
wage.
FACTS:
This joint and several liability facilitates, if not, guarantees, payment of the workers’
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI) and Eagle Security (EAGLE) entered into performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection
a Contract for Security Services” wherein EAGLE agreed to provide security services as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
in PTSI’s premises.  In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that the security guards are the
 PERIOD: November 2, 1979 to July 31, 1985 (roughly 6 years) employees of EAGLE. That they were assigned to guard the premises of PTSI
 Thus, private respondents (Dequina, et al.) were assigned by EAGLE to PTSI pursuant to the contract and that neither of these 2 entities paid their wage
as security guards and allowance increases under the subject wage orders are also admitted.
 Thus, the application of these Labor Code provisions on joint and several
A complaint was filed by the security guards against PTSI and EAGLE for unpaid wage liability of the principal and contractor is appropriate.
and allowance increases under Wage Order Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6, with interest plus
damages and attorney’s fees. OBLICON:
 10 additional complainants joined the suit
The security guard should claim the amount of the increases from EAGLE.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, ordering EAGLE and PTSI to pay jointly and  Under the Labor Code, in case the agency fails to pay them the amounts
severally the security guards their unpaid wages and allowances. claimed, PTSI should be held solidarily liable with EAGLE
 The NLRC affirmed this  Should EAGLE pay, it can claim an adjustment from PTSI for an increase in
consideration to cover the increases payable to the security guards
Contentions:
 PTSI: payment should be borne exclusively by EAGLE pursuant to the Although the Wage Orders are explicit that payment of the increases are “to be borne”
Contract for Security Services by the principal or client, “TO BE BORNE” does not mean that the principal, PTSI, would
 EAGLE: payment should be borne exclusively by PTSI, invoking Wage Order directly pay the security guards the wage and allowance increases because there is no
Nos. 3, 5 and 6 privity of contract between them.
 Instead, the immediate employer, EAGLE, is tasked with the payment of their
ISSUE: Who is liable for payment of the unpaid wages and allowances? PTSI and wages
EAGLE, solidary.
On the other hand, there existed a contractual agreement between PTSI and EAGLE
Their solidary liability for the amounts due the security guard finds support in Articles wherein the latter agreed that the wages, supervision, and training of the security
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. guards will already be deemd covered by the former’s payments for the whole security
service.
Art. 106 In the event that the contractor or  However, the Wage Orders made specific provision to amend existing
subcontractor fails to pay the wages of contracts for security services in regards the consideration to cover the service
his employees in accordance with this contractor’s payment of the increases mandated. Thus, ultimate liability for the
Code, the employer shall be jointly and payment of the increases rests with the principal.
severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor Yet, note that Art. 1217 of the Civil Code provides the right of reimbursement from co-
Art. 107 The provisions of the immediately debtors by the one who paid. It is with respect to this right of reimbursement that
preceding Article shall likewise apply to petitioners can find support in the aforecited contractual stipulation and Wage Order
any person, partnership, association or provision.
corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
contractor for the performance of any Sec. 4:
work, task, job or project
Art. 109 Every employer/indirect employer shall The State shall, by law, undertake an AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM founded
be held responsible with his contractor or on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
subcontractor for any violation of this or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
Code. a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as
the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.
In determining retention limits the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
--
GOALS OF AGRARIAN REFORM:
1. Efficient production
2. A more equitable distribution of land which recognizes the right of farmers and
regular farm workers who are landless to own the land they till
3. A just share of other or seasonal farm workers in the fruits of the land
KINDS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS UNDER THE SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM
 All kinds of agricultural land
 “All agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental
or equity considerations
 * needs implementing legislation *
LANDS EXEMPT FROM LAND REFORM
 Non-agricultural lands and lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than DAR
AGRICULTURAL LANDS
 Those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands
REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND
 Achieved either through voluntary sale, or where necessary, through
expropriation and resale
 Owner should be given just compensation and must follow existing
jurisprudence on the power of eminent domain.
 For purposes of agrarian reform and in the spirit of social justice, while just
compensation means that the landowner has a right to receive as payment an
amount equivalent to the value of the land, the farmer himself will pay only
what he can afford even if this is not equivalent to “just compensation”. Hence,
it will be necessary for the State to subsidize the agrarian reform program in
order that land owners can be properly compensated
 Compensation may be in the form of “financial instruments”
(3) Hacienda Luisita v. PARC
OVERVIEW:
1935 Constitution: specific provisions on social justice and expropriation of landed
estates for distribution to tenants as a solution to land ownership and tenancy issues
were incorporated
1955: The Land Reform Act was passed, setting in motion the expropriation of all
tenanted estates.
1963: Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted, abolishing share tenancy and
converting all instances of share tenancy into leasehold tenancy. It created the Land
Bank of the Philippines to provide support in all phases of agrarian reform.
 As its major thrust, it aimed to create a system of owner-cultivatorship in rice
and corn, supposedly to be accomplished by expropriating lands in excess of
75 hectares for their eventual resale to tenants.
 However, this law had a restricting feature: its operations were confined mainly
to areas in Central Luzon, and its implementation at any level of intensity
limited to the pilot project in Nueva Ecija
 Subsequently, Congress passed the Code of Agrarian Reform, declaring the
entire country a land reform area, and providing for the automatic conversion
of tenancy to leasehold tenancy in all areas. From 75 hectares, the retention
limit was cut down to 7 hectares.
1972: President Marcos issued PD No. 27 for the emancipation of the tiller from the
bondage soil; tenant-farmers, depending on the size of the landholding worked on, can
either purchase the land they tilled or shift from share to fixed-rent leasehold tenancy.
It only covered tenanted, privately-owned rice and corn lands.
1987: Comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was instituted, covering all
agricultural lands, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced.
 EO No. 229 was issued, providing the mechanisms for CARP implementation
 The CARP Law was passed in 1988, ushering a new process of land
classification, acquisition and distribution.
HISTORY OF HACIENDA LUISITA
Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac was originally owned by the Spaniards. It was originally a
6443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential land in Tarlac.
In 1958, it was bought by TADECO, owned by Jose Cojuangco.
 To facilitate the sale, TADECO obtained a dollar loan from the Central Bank
of the Philippines, with the help of the Philippine government.
 The peso loan was obtained from GSIS but with the following condition: that
Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the corporation and sold at cost to the
tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act
 As of March 31, 1958, TADECO had fully paid the purchase price.
However, on May 7, 1980, the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before the RTC
against TADECO, praying that it surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform so it can be distributed to farmers at cost
 RTC: ordered TADECO to surrender the Hacienda
 TADECO appealed to CA but OSG moved to withdraw the case
  CA dismissed the case subject to the condition that TADECO gets PARC’s
approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must immediately be
implemented after such approval has been secure
EO 229 allows corporate landowners to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase
shares of stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-
share ration, as an alternative to the land transfer scheme of CARP.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, Sec. 31 also provides for 2 alternatives modalities to the CARP
land transfer scheme:
1. Land Transfer
2. Stock Transfer
Pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP, but subject
to well-defined conditions and timelines
TADECO opted for the stock distribution scheme. To comply, it organized a spin-off
organization named Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) to facilitate stock acquisition by the
farmworkers.
 TADECO conveyed 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land and other farm-
related properties of the Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock
 In its proposed Stock Development Plan (SDP), the properties and assets of
TADECO contributed to the capital stock of HLI, as appraised and approved
by the SEC, have an aggregate value of Php590,554,220 or after deducting
the total liabilities of the farm amounting to Php235,422,758 a net value of
Php355,531,462, which translated to 355,531,462 shares with a par value of
Php1/share
On May 1989, 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita
accepted the proposed Stock Distribution Option Plan, so the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) was entered into by the TADECO and the FWBs. It contained the
basis and mechanics of the SDP. The following are part of the SDOA:
a. Production-sharing equivalent to 3% of gross sales from the production of the
agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus;
and
b. Distribution of free home lots of not more than 240 square meters each to
family beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable
irrespective of whether HLI makes money or not, implying that the benefits do
not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily understood under
corporation law
HLI then submitted to DAR the SDP which was based on the SDOA. After its review,
PARC, under then DAR Sec. Miriam Defensor, issued a PARC Resolution, which
approved of the SDP.
 During this time, HLI had 6,296 farmers of permanent, season and causal
master list/payroll and non-master list members.
HLI claimed that it gave the following benefits:
a. P3B worth of salaries, wages and fringe benefits
b. P59 shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs
c. P150M representing 3% of the gross produce
d. P37.5M representing 3% from the sale of 500 hectares of converted
agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita
e. 240-square meter home lots distributed for free
f. P2.4M representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares at 80 million for the
SCTEX
g. Social service benefits
HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural
to industrial use.
 According to HLI, this was backed by around 5,000 FWBs. This was allowed
by Sec. 65 of RA 6657 which DAR then approved thru then Sec. Ernesto
Garilao in its DAR Conversion Order subject to payment of three percent (3%)
of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with
its undertakings under the SDP.
Out of the 500 hectares of the newly-converted land, 300 was ceded to Centenary
Holdings, Inc in exchange for subscription of shares of stock and then all 300 hectares
were sold to LIPCO.
 LIPCO then, transferred it to RCBC by way of dacion en pago as payment of
its obligation. The left 200 was transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation.
Aside from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were detached from the area of
Hacienda Luisita which was acquired by the government for the SCTEX. So,
4,335.75/4,915 hectares were left to HLI.
2 petitions reached the DAR saying that HIL violated SDOA’s terms. They ask for the
revocation of the SDOA. DAR formed a Special Task Force to attend to the issues of
the SDP, to review the SDOA, and evaluate HLI’s compliance to such.
Its findings are embodied in its Terminal Report finding that HLI did not comply with its
obligations under RA 6657. This report was the basis of PARC Resolution No. 2005-
32-01 which revoked the SDP. Petitioner appealed but pending appeal, DAR placed it
under CARP already.
ISSUE 1: Does PARC have jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP? YES
HLI’s contentions:
 HLI states that PARC is without authority to revoke an SDP because neither
RA 6657 nor EO 229 expressly vests PARC with such authority.
 And even though EO 229 empowers PARC to approve the plan for stock
distribution in appropriate cases, the empowerment only includes the power
to disapprove, but not to recall its previous approval of the SDP after it has
already been implemented by the parties
Court disagrees. The authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate
landowners belongs to the PARC. PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which
it previously approved.
 This power is conferred to PARC under the principle of necessary implication,
a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, the
conferment of express power to approve a plan of stock distribution of the
 agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke
or recall the approval of a plan.
 Gordon v Veridiano II is instructive: “The power to approve a license includes
by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By
extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license,
from which it is derived in the first place.
To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP,
because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate
landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to imposed sanctions for
non-compliance with it.
 Only PARC can effect such revocation. Even the DAR Secretary cannot do
so, as the acceptance and/or approval of the SDP sought to be taken back or
undone is the act of the PARC, which includes, no less than, the President as
chair, the DAR Secretary as vice-chair, and at least 11 other department
heads.
ISSUE 2: Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 constitutional? YES
ARGUMENTS:
 FARM (intervenors): ask for the invalidation of Sec. 311 of RA 6657. They
contend that the stock distribution impairs the right of farmers under Art. 13,
Sec. 4. Particularly, they claim that in permitting stock transfer in lieu of
outright agricultural land transfer, there is stock certificate ownership of the
farms or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as what the
Constitution mandates.
 HLI: insists on the other hand that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of
land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention
in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and scope of the term
“agrarian reform.” They add that the constitutionality of the law cannot be
attacked collaterally.
RA 6675 is constitutional.
THERE IS NO GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
ART. XII, SEC. 4 Discussion
The wording of Art. XIII, Sec. 4 is unequivocal—the farmers and regular farmworkers
have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THAT THEY TILL.
The basic law allows 2 modes of land distribution: direct and indirect ownership.
 DIRECT – there is a direct transfer to individual farmers thus a direct
ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. This is the most
commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted
 INDIRECT – there is an indirect transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land.
Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be
found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives
of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be
exercised.
 The word “collective” is defined as “indicating a number of persons or things
considered as constituting one group or aggregate,” while “collectively” is
defined as “in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or body.”
 By using the word “collectively,” the Constitution allows for indirect ownership
of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.
Sec. 4 is NOT SELF-EXECUTORY. Legislation is needed to implement the urgently
needed program, of agrarian reform. And RA 6657 has been enacted precisely to and
as a mechanism to carry out the constitutional mandate.
 RA 6657 in fact restates the agrarian reform policy established in the
provision of the Constitution that promotes the welfare of the landless
farmers.
 RA 6657 defines “agrarian reform” as the “redistribution of lands…to farmers
and regular farmworkers who are landless...to lift the economic status of the
beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical
redistribution of lands, such as production, or profit sharing, labor
administration, and the distribution of shares of stock which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.”
SC emphasizes that Sec. 4, Art. XIII doesn’t constrict Congress to passing an
agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by farmers
and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality.
--
DISCUSSION OF RA 6675 in relation to ART. XIII, SEC. 4
Collective ownership is permitted in 2 provisions of RA 6657 (full provision in notes):
 Sec. 29 – allows workers’ cooperatives or associations to collectively own the
land
 Sec. 31 – the 2nd paragraph allows corporations or associations to own
agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members
SC holds that clearly, workers’ cooperatives or associations under Sec. 29 and
corporations or associations under Sec. 31, as differentiated from individual farmers,
are authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land.
 Cooperatives can be registered with the Cooperative Development Authority
and acquire legal personality of their own.
 Corporations are juridical persons under the Corporation Code.
Based on the foregoing, it is thus clear that the statute and the Constitutional mandate
are not clashing. This conclusion is even supported by the Constitutional framers.
 Commissioner Tadeo explained that the farmers will work on the agricultural
land “sama-sama” or collectively. Thus, the main requisite for collective
ownership of land is collective or group work by farmers of the agricultural
land. WON the landowner is a cooperative, association, or corporation
composed of farmers, as long as concerted group work by the farmers on the
land is present, then it falls within the ambit of collective partnership scheme.
CONTENTION ON NOT REALLY OWNING LAND
 FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec.
31 do not own agricultural land but merely given stock certificates. Thus, they
 hold that this makes the farmers lose control over the land to the board of
directors and executive officials who actually manage the land
 SC holds that while it is true that the farmers are issued stock certificate and
doesn’t directly own the land, the Corporation Code makes it clear that the
FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest in the assets
of the corporation, which include the agricultural land. FWBs will also
ultimately own the land owned by the corporation when the corporation
eventually dissolves or liquidates.
CONTENTION ON LOSING CONTROL OF THE LAND
 The famers contend the alleged loss of control of the farmers over the
agricultural land operated and managed by the corporation.
 SC holds that Sec. 31 holds otherwise. The said provision provides that
qualified beneficiaries have “right to purchase such proportion of the capital
stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to the company's total assets”
 The wording of the formula in the computation of the number of shares that
can be bought by the farmers doesn’t mean loss of control on the part of the
farmers. It must be remembered that the determination of the percentage of
the capital stock that can be bought by the farmers depends on the value of
the agricultural land and the value of the total assets of the corporation. Thus,
there is nothing in the formula that is unconstitutional.
 The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must
always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR
and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common
shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that
the farmers will have a clear majority in the board.
Sec. 5:
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as
well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate
in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide
support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and
adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
NOTE: The State must ensure that redistributed land will be efficiently productive and
effectively beneficial for all concerned.
--
Sec. 6:
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
--
Sec. 7:
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect,
develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish workers
shall receive a just share from their labor in the enjoyment of marine and fishing
resources.
NOTE: Agrarian reform does not extend only to private agricultural land, but also to
“other natural resources”, even including the use and enjoyment of “communal marine
and fishing resources” and “offshore fishing grounds”
--
Sec. 8:
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the
agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment
for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
NOTE: Industrialization and Agrarian Reform should be a mutually beneficial
relationship.
 Agrarian Reform should unlock idle wealth hidden in land for investment in
industrialization
 Industrialization should be able to absorb farm workers released from farms
because of mechanization.
 The improvement of the economic lot of both farm and industrial workers
should result in “enhancement of human dignity” referred to in Sec. 1.
 The assured value of “financial instruments” should enable landowners to
channel their wealth into non-agricultural production ventures
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Sec. 9:
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.
It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such programs the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners.
--
“REFORM”
 What is sought is not just proper urban land use or zoning but also the righting
of inequitable land distribution.
  Thus, it includes the authorization to use expropriation for redistribution of
urban land
Sec. 10:
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate
consultation with them and the communities where they are to be located.
--
This provision requires that eviction be done with due process (in accordance with law).
“In accordance with law and in a just and humane manner”
 It does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is
hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by
the government
 Rather, it means that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an
opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or
possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the
landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the
occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done;
and there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or
damage to properties.
(4) Macasiano v. NHA
FACTS:
Macasiano seeks to have the Court declare as unconstitutional Secs. 28 and 44 of RA
No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locus
standi on his being a:
 Consultant of the DPWH pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation
for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachment on Properties of Public
Domain
o Secs. 28 and 44 contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback to his tasks and duties regarding demolition of
illegal structures and that because of the said sections, he is unable
to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously
and faithfully carried out in the past
 Taxpayer
o He has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully disbursed
GIST OF THE PROVISIONS
 Sec. 28: Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged, except
under the situations provided for in such provision
 Sec. 44: There is a moratorium on the eviction/demolition for a period of 3
years from the effectivity of this Act, provided, that the moratorium shall not
apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the
effectivity of this Act and for cases enumerated in Sec. 28
MACASIANO’S CONTENDS THE PROVISIONS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE:
a. They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their
property without due process of law and without compensation
b. They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically
declared as unlawful acts
c. They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one’s property
to be given to plain interlopers
d. They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the
State
e. They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgment and
orders
The OGCC filed a comment for the NHA that the provisions are indeed unconstitutional
and after a circumspect evaluation of the petition, they find no cogent reason not to
support the position taken by the NHA.
ISSUE: Are said provisions (Sec. 28&44 of RA7279) unconstitutional? NO
Requisites for a successful judicial inquiry:
a. The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination
b. The constitutional question must be raised by a proper party
c. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity
d. The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision
of the case
It is easily discernible that the first 2 requisites are absent.
 There is no actual controversy. Moreover, Macasiano does not claim that, in
either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been
actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising
his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any
benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act.
 Thus, judicial review cannot be exercised.
Macasiano is also NOT A PROPER PARTY.
 As a consultant of the DPWH under the Contract for Consultancy, he is not
vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on
properties of the public domain, much less on private lands.
 The consultancy contract limits his duties to the following:
a. To organize and train selected DPWH personnel
b. To provide advice to the Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding
prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and encroachments
c. To conduct field inspection from time to time of areas recommended for
clearing
d. To provide advice in developing appropriate standard and techniques in
cost effective implementation of the removal and demolition of
obstructions and encroachments
 e. To develop operational procedures that will institutionalize demolition
processes
Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on Dec. 31, 1992 and Macasiano has not
manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof. Nor does Macasiano claim
that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected
the challenged provisions.
Court:
We cannot end this resolution without a few words on the comment of the OGCC for
public respondent National Housing Authority wherein the OGCC merely adopted the
stand of the officer-in-charge of the Legal Department of the said Authority that the
challenged sections of R.A. No. 7279 are unconstitutional. On its own, the OGCC did
not even attempt to reason out why this petition should be granted or denied. It has
obviously treated this case without the circumspection and seriousness expected of it
especially in the light of the functions, duties and responsibilities of the NHA under the
challenged Act. The OGCC should not have cursorily adopted the opinion of the officer-
in-charge who acted on his own and who, apparently, did not even refer his opinion to
the Board of Directors of the NHA.
(5) People v. Leachon
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Resolution of the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed 2 separate informations for violations of P.D.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego
Escala.
The case proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the
cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on Nov. 14, 1991.
 From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was referred to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition.
The CA reversed the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of these
criminal cases.
On Jan. 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the CA, Judge Leachon
dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that:
 PD 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Secs. 9 and 10, Art.
XIII of the Constitution, which provides that “urban or rural poor dwellers shall
not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law
and in a just and human manner”
 Judge Leachon denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE: Did Judge Leachon commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring
the said law as repugnant to the Constitution? NO
Basic concepts:
 Every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality. Unless
otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this
Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty
of the court is to apply the law.
 It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored unless it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. The will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation
The Anti-Squatting Law enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. At the time Judge
Leachon rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal, PD No.
772 was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality,
notwithstanding Sec. 9 and 10, Art. XIII (social justice provisions on urban land reform
and housing)
Judge Leachon dismissed the subject criminal cases for anti-squatting, ratiocinating
that:
 if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted, it will run
counter to the said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction
and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government has
not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to
all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all
the accused as to where they should be relocated
The reason of respondent Judge in dismissing subject cases is that the eviction of the
accused was not effected in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet
established a resettlement area for the accused, and those who would be evicted have
not been consulted as to the place of their relocation.
The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited
constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition
of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
However, Judge Leachon erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the
existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the
eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane
manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged
on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.
 What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane
manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an
opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or
possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the
landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the
occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done;
and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or
damage to properties.
Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged "squatters" the
opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be
amply protected and due process strictly observed.
 By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the
first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be
heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession
of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner
and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking
advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners.
Furthermore, what gives impetus to P.D. 772 is the constitutional mandate that — "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
 Far from contravening, P.D. 772 conforms with the 1987 Constitution, in that
it protects the rights of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion.
In this case, Judge Leachon dismissed the cases after the prosecution had rested the
same and without giving the accused an opportunity to present their evidence. Also,
there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of PD 772 was ever posed by the
accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple
reason that it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity.
HEALTH
Sec. 11:
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
INTEGRATED AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO HEALTH DEVELOPMENT
 INTEGRATION: unified health delivery system, a combination of private and
public sectors, and a blend of western medicine and traditional health care
modalities
 COMPREHENSIVENESS: health promotion, disease prevention, education
and planning
Sec. 12:
The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health manpower development and research,
responsive to the country’s health needs and problems.
--
Sec. 13:
The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for their
rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
WOMEN
Sec. 14:
The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation.
ROLE AND RIGHTS – PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 15:
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable
the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means.
People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated
capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership,
membership, and structure.
--
Sec. 16:
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms.
PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATIONS
 They need not be juridical persons.
 This speaks of independent people’s organizations, that is, organizations
which are not controlled by manipulative forces in or out of government.
 However, if one must speak of rights, in the case of organizations which are
not juridical persons, the right protected is that of individual members, because
only persons can be subject of rights
HUMAN RIGHTS
Sec. 17:
1. There is hereby created an office called the Commission on Human
Rights
2. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and 4 Members who
must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom
shall be members of the Bar. The terms of office and other qualifications
and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by
law.
3. Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present
functions and powers.
 4. The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
--
(6) CHR Employees v. CHR
FACTS:
The CHR released a resolution reclassifying the salary grades of several positions and
creating two offices with new positions (offices created: Public Affairs Office and
Finance Management Office).
This proposal was submitted to the DBM but it was disapproved. The DBM said that
there was no legal basis for the CHR's reclassification of the salary grades, and that in
any case, it must comply with the Compensation Standardization Law.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission Regional Office rejected the appointments
to the reclassified positions. The CSC Central Office, however, upheld the CHR’s salary
reclassification. When CHREA brought the issue to the Court of Appeals, the CA said
that the CHR had the power to reclassify pursuant to the fiscal autonomy granted to it
by the Constitution. The CHREA insists, however, that this “fiscal autonomy” is limited
to the automatic and regular release of the CHR’s approved appropriations.
ISSUE: Does CHR enjoy fiscal autonomy? YES, TO A LIMITED EXTENT
Fiscal autonomy refers to a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize resources
as needs require. It includes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation, and allocate and disburse funds in the course of the
discharge of their functions. This larger concept includes the privilege of automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations. This is the kind of fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the COA, COMELEC, CSC, Judiciary, and the Ombudsman.
The Court, however, distinguished the CHR from these bodies by pointing out the
difference in the constitutional provisions relating to fiscal autonomy. The provisions
relating to these bodies [ConComs, Judi., Omb.] are always composed of two
sentences: (1) that the body shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) that its approved
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
For example, the general provisions for the Constitutional Commissions provide:
Art. XI-A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Notably, only the second sentence appears in the provision relating to the CHR:
Art. XII, Sec. 7 (4). The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
It is the same case with the Administrative Code, which also omits the first sentence
when referring to the CHR. Applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the omission of the first sentence shows an intent to limit the extent of fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the CHR. This intent is supported by the constitutional
deliberations on the provision, where debates were made whether the first sentence is
a mere surplusage. It was agreed then that it was not so; by mentioning “fiscal
autonomy” in the first sentence, privileges beyond the automatic and regular release of
funds were expressly granted to these bodies. Thus, the consequence of the omission
is that the CHR's fiscal autonomy is limited to the automatic and regular release of
appropriations. It does not include other aspects of fiscal autonomy such as the ability
to increase salaries and salary classifications on its own.
The Court also noted that regardless of whether the CHR does enjoy fiscal autonomy,
all government offices must nevertheless abide by the Salary Standardization Law.
Only the DBM is authorized and competent to evaluate compliance with this law and
so this means that even, say, the Judiciary has to seek DBM’s approval before it can
implement any reclassification or upgrading of positions.
Finally, the CHR is also invoking the General Appropriations Act for 1998 as basis for
its salary reclassification, particularly the provisions relating to “Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy”. The Court said that these GAA provisions contemplate the
broader sense of fiscal autonomy (the kind enjoyed by the Ombudsman etc.) and so
the CHR is not within its coverage. Even assuming it was included, the invoked
provisions themselves prescribe that any salary reclassification has to be “in
accordance xxx with compensation standardization laws.” Therefore, even those
bodies enjoying fiscal autonomy in the broader sense have to comply with the
Compensation Standardization Law and get the approval of the DBM.
Sec. 18:
The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights
of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information
to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights,
or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
--
POWERS OF THE COMMISSION
 Only investigative; no prosecutorial power
 For prosecution, it must rely on the executive department
 It may not issue writs of injunction or restraining orders against supposed
violators of human rights to compel them to cease and desist from continuing
their acts complained of
NOTES:
 The focus is on violations of human rights no matter by whom committed.
However, the Commission, in being authorized to adopt its “operational
guidelines”, is in fact authorized to fix priorities according to what is most
needed at the moment
 The CHR can legally do short of passing judgment on legality or ordering the
release of detainees
 The CHR can be of help to those who are abroad through representation with
consular and other diplomatic personnel abroad.
(7) Carino v. CHR
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.
 According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14,
1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate
the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education.
 The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours
or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements.
 Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in the days that followed.
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.
 "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents, the latter led separate answers, opted for a
formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by . . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary restraining order."
 But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November
8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion
for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings."
 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
The Striking Teachers Case was decided through a Court’s joint Resolution which
determined that Sec. Carino’s return-to-work order, their filing of administrative charges
and preventively suspending private respondents were lawful.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also
made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
 whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by
their superiors; and
 whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of nality and de niteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
ISSUE: Does CHR have the power to try and decide cases? NO
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
 The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
 To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. Upon
its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person.
It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt
and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
 In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of
its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether
in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has
no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or
the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed
by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord
success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort,
frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's
conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and
lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary
Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate
unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
(8) Simon, Jr. v. CHR
FACTS:
A “Demolition Notice” signed by Quimpo in his capacity as Executive Officer of the QC
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent
to, and received by, the private respondents, being the officers and members of the
North EDSA Vendors Association, Inc.
In the notice, the private respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA, to give way to the “People’s Park”.
The respondents then filed a letter-complaint with the CHR, asking the latter to write a
letter to the Mayor to stop the demolition of the private respondents’ stalls, sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
 An Order was then issued by the CHR, directing the petitioners to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of
the complaint and ordering the petitioners to appear before the CHR. The CHR
warned the petitioners that a violation of the Order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest.
The CHR also issued a Resolution ordering the disbursement of financial assistance of
not more than P200,000 in favor of the respondents.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss before the CHR, stating that the
Commission’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that the rights allegedly
violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business. The motion was subsequently denied.
 In an Order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the order to
desist, and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
 The CHR opined that it was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission
to limit their power to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be
considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all person within the
Philippines.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to investigate the
alleged violations of the “business rights” of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by
the Mayor of Quezon City? NO
On the issue regarding the jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violations of the
“business rights” of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners, the court ruled that the CHR has no adjudicatory powers.
 The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution, and its powers and functions
are defined by the Constitution. The CHR was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
 Under the Constitution, it is only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgement, but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
 The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the public respondent has a jurisdiction to impose a fine
of P500 each on the petitioners? NO
On the extent of the CHR’s investigative power:
Section 18, Article XIII of the Constitution empowers the CHR to investigate on
its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.
1. Civil Rights - rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in
a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of government.
2. Political Rights - refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right
to hold public office, the right to of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission make it apparent that the delegates
envisioned CHR to focus on more severe cases of human rights violations. For
instance, (1) the protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of torture, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.
Given the circumstances, the Court is not prepared to conclude that the demolition can
fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights”
intended by the Constitution.
 In the case at bar, what are sought to be demolished are stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which is a busy national
highway that poses a danger to the life and limb of the petitioners.
 Moreover, the CHR acted beyond its mandate in citing the respondents in
contempt and in issuing the order to desist.
o The power to cite for contempt applies only to violations of the CHR’s
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure to carry out its
investigatorial powers.
 The “order to desist,” on the other hand, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
--
Sec. 19:
The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendations
ARTICLE XIV: Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and
Sports
EDUCATION
Sec. 1:
The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all.
--
(9) DECS v. San Diego
FACTS:
San Diego is a graduate of UE with a degree in BS Zoology. The DECS claims that he
took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again,
the DECS rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He went to the
RTC to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education.
 By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the
NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In
 an amended petition led with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-
cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong
held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power
ISSUE: Is MECS Order No. 12 constitutional? YES
The decision must be reversed. In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. There, the SC held that the regulation of the practice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public and it includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that Tablarin was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test
and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at
bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. There
is a valid exercise of police power because of a lawful subject and lawful method.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health. Also, the method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule
is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved. Also, the right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests
are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution; one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While
his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.
Sec 2:
The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system
of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary
and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their
children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving
students in both public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as
self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those
that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in
civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Sec. 3:
(1) All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part
of the curricula.
(2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal
discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
(3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall
be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high
schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by
the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong,
without additional cost to the Government.
--
(10) Miriam College v. CA
FACTS:
SUMMARY OF THE POEMS/ARTICLES
(Digest note: YOU CAN SKIP THIS PART! In the origs, the transcript was actually in
Tagalog so I diligently tried to translate this into English, so hard to understand kasi)
“Flirtation” by Gerald Garry Renacido This treats of the experience of a group of
young, male, combo players who, one
evening, after their performance went to
 see a bold show in a place called
“Flirtation”. It was happy hour and this
group wanted to go to Flirtation Bar. So
the first dancer here is Red Raven. She
was wearing a red bikini with a bit of yellow
sa “bandang utong”. The song being
played was “Goodbye” by Air Supply. She
looked at Mike and “may mga nanigas”
daw. Mike was like “Kaskas mo pa” while
she was touching him. The crowd
cheered. So the group was on their way
home and a pedestrian happened to cross
the street, saying a few words, however,
they were hit by a truck.
“Virgin Writes Erotic” by Jerome This was about a man having fantasies in
Gomez his sleep. The last verse said: “At zenith I
pull it out and find myself alone in this
fantasy”. Opposite the page where this
poem appeared was a drawing of a man
asleep and dreaming of a naked woman
lying in bed on her buttocks with her head
up. The woman’s right nipple can be seen
clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with
her knees akimbo on the bed.
“Naisip ko Lang” by Belle This was about a young student who has
Campanario a love-selection problem: who will he
choose: ang teacher niyang praning or
yung boyfriend niyang bading?
“Malas ang Tatlo” by unknown (translated): Did you picture us two beside
each other in a sofa: you, the legitimate
spouse and me, your side hoe. And them
she sat beside us: you, me and her.
Kulang nalang camera.
“Sa Gilid ng Itim” by Gerald Renacido Check the origs nalang, this was too
disturbing to even translate/summarize
The contents of the September-October 1994 issue of Miriam College’s school paper
“Chi-Rho” and magazine “Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho” were described by
some members of the Miriam College community as “obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross,
sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral values”.
Nov. 4, 1994: Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members
of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, and all students of Miriam
College, received a letter signed by Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the Discipline Committee,
stating that those responsible for the paper/magazine are subject for inquiry and
investigation.
Nov. 21, 1994: Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers.
In response, Atty. Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline
Committee:
 Reiterating his clients’ position that the Committee has no jurisdiction over
them
 The Committee was trying to impose discipline on account of their having
written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists
 What applies is RA 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act)
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation. Thereafter, after a review of
the report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students, including expulsion,
suspension, dismissal and withholding of graduation privileges.
The above students filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the RTC of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction
of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them
ISSUE 1: Is the case moot and academic? NO
The Court finds that the case is not moot.
It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining
order, not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a
preliminary injunction.
We find that the order was indeed intended for private respondents (in the appellate
court) Miriam College, et al., and not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the case,
the trial judge recalled and set aside all orders it had previously issued, including the
writ of preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and
suspension of the students to remain in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to
construe the order as being directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for
Miriam College.
True, respondent-students should have asked for a clari cation of the above order. They
did not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd," then it should have
sought a clari cation itself so the Court of Appeals could have cleared up any confusion.
It chose not to. Instead, it took advantage of the supposed vagueness of the order and
used the same to justify its refusal to readmit the students.
As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has no
basis. How then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot when
it knew all along that the facts on which the purported moot character of the case were
based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA's wrongful assumption
that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversal of the CA's decision.
Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensions to the contrary
notwithstanding.
ISSUE 2: Does RTC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari filed
by the students? YES
Congress enacted RA 7079 or the “Campus Journalism Act”.
 "To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and
to promote the development and growth of campus journalism as a means of
 strengthening ethical values, encouraging critical and creative thinking, and
developing moral character and personal discipline of the Filipino youth,"
 Sec. 7 provides that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on
the basis of articles he or she was written, or on the basis of the performance
of his or her duties in the student publication.
 Sec. 9 mandates the DECS to “promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act”.
It may be recalled that after the Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary sanctions upon
the students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC.
Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office, and
not the school, had jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the other hand,
alleged lack of impartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby
deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. These
were the same grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to answer the charges
against them. The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction — a question
purely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial
court, not the DECS Regional Office.
However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the
DECS Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be
more popish than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardly
contain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of its docket." We
remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and
the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to render a
decision in a case properly submitted to it. Accordingly, the trial court should not have
dismissed the petition without settling the issues presented before it.
ISSUE 3: Does Miriam have the power to suspend or dismiss the students? YES
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school
or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Academic freedom includes:
 Who may teach
 What may be taught
 How it shall be taught
 Who may be admitted to study
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom,
i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of
anarchy.
 Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational
institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an
orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for
the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in
the freedom "what to teach."
 Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline
in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
Section 4(1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate
educational institution:
 The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions
As may be gleaned from this provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the
regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
In several cases, the Court upheld the right of the students to free speech in school
premises.
Malabanan v. Ramento
Petitioners invoke their rights to The right of the students to free speech
peaceable assembly and free speech. in school premises, however, is not
They are entitled to do so. They enjoy absolute. The right to free speech must
like the rest of the citizens the freedom always be applied in light of the special
to express their views and communicate characteristics of the school
their thoughts to those disposed to listen environment.53 Thus, while we upheld
in gatherings such as was held in this the right of the students to free
case. They do not, to borrow from the expression in these cases, we did not
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des rule out disciplinary action by the school
Moines Community School District, for "conduct by the student, in class or
'shed their constitutional rights to out of it, which for any reason — whether
freedom of speech or expression at the it stems from time, place, or type of
schoolhouse gate.' While, therefore, the behavior — which materially disrupts
authority of educational institutions over classwork or involves substantial
the conduct of students must be disorder or invasion of the rights of
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be others."
violative of constitutional safeguards.
Other cases: Villar v. TIP, Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University, Non v. Dames II
It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act.
Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts
of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid
their conflicting with the fundamental law
 Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right
to discipline its students.
 At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly
restrict the right of the students to free speech.
Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to
mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
ISSUE 4: Does Miriam College have jurisdiction over the complaints against the
students? YES
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It
is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
hat power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore
rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against
respondent students.
Sec. 4:
(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions.
(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino
equity participation in all educational institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no
group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any
school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established
for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise
provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of
such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by
law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by
law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations,
or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from tax.
--
(11) CIR v. DLSU
FACTS:
These are 3 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari (1st and 3rd petitions filed by
CIR, 2nd filed by DLSU).
In 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued to DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA)
No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers to examine the latter's books of accounts and
other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the period Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years 

BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following deficiency taxes:
1. income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores
operating within the campus;
2. value-added tax (VAT) on business income; and
3. documentary stamp tax (DST) on loans and lease contracts 

BIR demanded the payment of P17,303,001.12; DLSU protested the assessment and
filed a petition for review with the CTA Division.
DLSU anchored its petition on Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3), which provides: (3) All revenues and
assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational 
 purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties
The CTA Division partially granted DLSU's petition, but still ordered 
 them to pay
P18,421,363.53

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration, and both were denied. Both parties
appealed to the CTA En Banc
CTA En Banc's Rulings 

 Relying on the findings of the court-commissioned Independent Certified
Public Accountant (Independent CPA),
 the CTA En Banc found that DLSU was able to prove that a portion of the
assessed rental income was used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes; hence, exempt from tax 

 CTA En Banc found that DLSU's DST payments had been remitted to the BIR,
evidenced by the stamp on the documents made by a DST (documentary
stamp tax) imprinting machine 

 CTA En Banc partially granted DLSU's petition for review and further reduced
its tax liabilities to P2,554,825.47 

 Citing jurisprudence, the CTA En Banc held that a LOA should cover only one
taxable period and that the practice of issuing a LOA covering audit of
unverified prior years is prohibited 

 LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior
Years. Hence, the assessments for deficiency income tax, VAT and DST for
taxable years 2001 and 2002 are void, but the assessment for taxable year
2003 is valid
 Not pleased with the CTA En Banc’s rulings, both parties filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC
Petitioner's Contentions classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it
 DLSU's rental income is taxable regardless of how such income is derived, seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for
used or disposed of. DLSU's operations of canteens and bookstores within its educational purposes.
campus even though exclusively serving the university community do not
negate income tax liability 
 Article XIV, Section 4 (3) categorically states that "all revenues and assets . . . used
 Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution must be harmonized with actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes
Section 30 (H) of the Tax Code, which states among others, that the income and duties."
of whatever kind and character of [a non-stock and non-profit
educational institution] from any of [its] properties, real or personal, or The Courts finds that the text demonstrates the policy of the 1987 Constitution,
from any of [its] activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition discernible from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to provide broader
made of such income, shall be subject to tax imposed by this Code 
 tax privilege to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions as recognition of
 CTA En Banc misread and misapplied the case of Commissioner of Internal their role in assisting the State provide a public good. The tax exemption was seen
Revenue v. YMCA 
 as beneficial to students who may otherwise be charged unreasonable tuition fees if
 DLSU is estopped from questioning the LOA's validity because it failed to raise not for the tax exemption extended to all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
this issue in both the administrative and judicial proceedings 
 educational institutions.

Respondent's Contentions The Court, then, differentiated taxation on revenues and taxation on assets.
 RMO No. 43-90 prohibits the practice of issuing a LOA with any indication of
unverified prior years. A LOA issued contrary to RMO No. 43-90 is void, thus, Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the conduct of
an assessment issued based on such defective LOA must also be void 
 business operations. Revenue is a component of the tax base in income tax, VAT, and
 DLSU invokes the principle of uniformity in taxation, which mandates that for local business tax (LBT).
similarly situated parties, the same set of evidence should be appreciated and
weighed in the same manner 
 Assets, on the other hand, are the tangible and intangible properties owned by a person
 DLSU stresses that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution is clear that or entity. In Philippine taxation, the fair market value of real property is a component of
all assets and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used the tax base in real property tax (RPT).
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from
taxes and duties 
 Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution proves that it uses its
revenues actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes, it shall be

 ISSUE 1: Is DLSU’s income and revenues proved to have been used actually, exempted from income tax, VAT, and LBT. On the other hand, when it also shows that
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and it uses its assets in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be
taxes? YES exempted from RPT.

The Court observes that DLSU falls under the first kind of educational institution, a non-
stock, non-profit educational institution. The other one is a proprietary educational
institution. The Court notes that there must be a distinction made between the 2
because it is important in determining the nature and extent of the tax exemption
granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions.
To illustrate, the Court said that if a university actually, directly and exclusively uses for
educational purposes the revenues earned from the lease of its school building, such
revenues shall be exempt from taxes and duties. The tax exemption no longer hinges
on the use of the asset from which the revenues were earned, but on the actual, direct
and exclusive use of the revenues for educational purposes.

The Court looked at CIR v. YMCA and in that case, It had already analyzed and
explained the meaning of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3). The issue in YMCA was whether the
income derived from rentals of real property owned by the YMCA, established as a
"welfare, educational and charitable non- profit corporation," was subject to income tax
under the Tax Code and the Constitution.
The Court denied YMCA's claim for exemption on the ground that as a charitable
institution falling under Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution, the YMCA is not
tax-exempt per se; "what is exempted is not the institution itself . . . those
exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes."
The Court then significantly laid down the requisites for availing the tax exemption
under Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1) the taxpayer falls under the
The crucial point of inquiry then is on the use of the assets or on the use of the
revenues. These are two things that must be viewed and treated separately. But so
long as the assets or revenues are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes, they are exempt from duties and taxes.
A non-stock, non-profit educational institution is classified as a tax- exempt entity under
Section 30 (Exemptions from Tax on Corporations) of the Tax Code. To be specific,
Section 30 provides that exempt organizations like non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions shall not be taxed on income received by them as such.
However, the last part of the section reads:
The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title [Tax on Income] in
respect to income received by them as such:
xxx xxx xxx
(H) A non-stock and non-profit educational institution
xxx xxx xxx
 Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income
of whatever kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of their
properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit
regardless of the disposition made of such income shall be subject to tax imposed
under this Code.
Thus, we declare the last paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code without force and
effect for being contrary to the Constitution insofar as it subjects to tax the income and
revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes.
For all these reasons, we hold that the income and revenues of DLSU proven to
have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are
exempt from duties and taxes.
ISSUE 2: Should the entire assessment be voided because of the defective LOA?
NO
A LOA is the authority given to the appropriate revenue officer to examine the books of
account and other accounting records of the taxpayer in order to determine the
taxpayer's correct internal revenue liabilities and for the purpose of collecting the
correct amount of tax.
The relevant provision is Section C of RMO No. 43-90, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
3. A Letter of Authority [LOA] should cover a taxable period not exceeding one
taxable year. The practice of issuing [LOAs] covering audit of unverified prior
years is hereby prohibited. If the audit of a taxpayer shall include more than one
taxable period, the other periods or years shall be specifically indicated in the [LOA].
What this provision clearly prohibits is the practice of issuing LOAs covering audit of
unverified prior years. RMO 43-90 does not say that a LOA which contains unverified
prior years is void. It merely prescribes that if the audit includes more than one taxable
period, the other periods or years must be specified.
In the present case, the LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and
Unverified Prior Years. The LOA does not strictly comply with RMO 43-90 because it
includes unverified prior years. This does not mean, however, that the entire LOA is
void.
As the CTA correctly held, the assessment for taxable year 2003 is valid because this
taxable period is specified in the LOA. Corollarily, the assessments for taxable years
2001 and 2002 are void for having been unspecified on separate LOAs as required
under RMO No. 43-90.

 
 ISSUE 3: Did the CTA correctly admit DLSU’s supplemental pieces of
evidence? YES
We uphold the CT A Division's admission of the supplemental evidence on distinct but
mutually reinforcing grounds, to wit: (1) the Commissioner failed to timely object to the
formal offer of supplemental evidence; and (2) the CTA is not governed strictly by the
technical rules of evidence.
The Court has previously held that while it is true that strict procedural rules generally
frown upon the submission of documents after the trial, the law creating the CTA
specifically provides that proceedings before it shall not be governed strictly by the
technical rules of evidence and that the paramount consideration remains the
ascertainment of truth.
ISSUE 4: Can the CTA’s appreciation of the sufficiency of DLSU’s evidence be
disturbed by the Court? NO
It is doctrinal that the Court will not lightly set aside the conclusions reached by the CTA
which, by the very nature of its function of being dedicated exclusively to the resolution
of tax problems, has developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an
abuse or improvident exercise of authority. We thus accord the findings of fact by the
CTA with the highest respect.
The parties failed to raise credible basis for us to disturb the CTA's findings that DLSU
had used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes a portion of its
assessed income and that it had remitted the DST payments though an online
imprinting machine.
The CTA reduced DLSU's deficiency income tax and V A T liabilities in view of the
submission of the supplemental evidence, which consisted of statement of receipts,
statement of disbursement and fund balance and statement of fund changes.
The CTA also found that DLSU's rental income from other concessionaires, which were
allegedly deposited to a fund (CF-CPA Account), intended for the university's capital
projects, was not proved to have been used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes. The CTA observed that "[DLSU] . . . failed to fully account for
and substantiate all the disbursements from the [fund]." Thus, the CTA "cannot
ascertain whether rental income from the [other] concessionaires was indeed used for
educational purposes."
However, while we generally respect the factual findings of the CTA, it does not mean
that we are bound by its conclusions. In the present case, we do not agree with the
method used by the CTA to arrive at DLSU's unsubstantiated rental income.
The Court held that DLSU was able to substantiate disbursements from the CF-CPA
Account amounting to P6,259,078.30.
The records show that DLSU never claimed that the total CF-CPA disbursements of
P23.46 million had been for educational purposes and should thus be tax-exempt;
DLSU only claimed P10.61 million for tax- exemption and should thus be required to
prove that this amount had been used as claimed. The amount in issue is therefore the
balance of P6.60 million which was transferred to the CF-CPA which in turn made
disbursements of P23.46 million for various general purposes, among them the P6.60
million transferred by DLSU.
The Independent CPA confirmed that the CF-CPA made disbursements for educational
purposes in year 2003 in the amount P6.26 million. Based on these given figures, the
CTA concluded that the expenses for educational purposes that had been coursed
through the CF-CPA should be prorated so that only the portion that P6.26 million bears
to the total CF-CPA disbursements should be credited to DLSU for tax exemption. This
approach, in our view, is flawed given the constitutional requirement that revenues
actually and directly used for educational purposes should be tax-exempt.
The Court held that o prorating is necessary. To state the obvious, exemption is based
on actual and direct use and this DLSU has indisputably proven.
And so, the Court believes that DLSU only had to substantiate its P10.6 million rental
income, part of which was the P6,602,655.00 transferred to the CF-CPA account.
On DLSU's argument that the CTA should have appreciated its evidence in the same
way as it did with the evidence submitted by Ateneo in another separate case, the CTA
explained that the issue in the Ateneo case was not the same as the issue in the present
case.
The Court held that the sufficiency and materiality of the evidence supporting their
(DLSU and Ateneo) respective claims for tax exemption would necessarily differ
because their attendant issues and facts differ.
The Court explained the concept of uniformity taxation. Equality and uniformity of
taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
shall be taxed at the same rate. A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. The concept requires that all
subjects of taxation similarly situated should be treated alike and placed in equal
footing.
Sec. 5:
(1) the State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions
and shall encourage local planning in the development of educational policies
and programs.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement.
Non-teaching academic and non-academic personnel shall enjoy the protection
of the State.
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
--
(12) Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee
FACTS:
Loyola School of Theology’s Faculty Admission Committee admitted Garcia for studies
leading to an M.A. in Theology. May 30, 1975, when Garcia wanted to enroll for the
same course for the first semester the next year, she received a letter saying that the
faculty decided to bar her from enrolling again in Ateneo.
Garcia contends that the reasons stated in said letter, do not constitute valid legal
ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's
regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct. Garcia spent a lot of time asking
for a compromise with the faculty but all in vain. She was told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the
school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their
decision was final, and that it is better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate
School. She was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but
that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order
to have her degree later in Theology — which would take about four to five years more
of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of Studies, it would take only about two
years more.
Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case, enrolled as a special
student in UST, even if her units were not credited. She could have recourse neither to
the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz nor with the Secretary of Education, and
June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration. 

She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the
current semester. She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition
so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline
for registration and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST be
recognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father
Lambino which started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in
two theology subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her. 

 "Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the
Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City.
 In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of
Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes and/or take courses
in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained
from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and
not by the Loyola School of Theology.
 For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of
Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by
the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University
in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program.
 Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some
courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree
program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila
Graduate School can make such admission.
 In the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the
Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not
accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some
courses for credit during the summer of 1975. Furthermore, petitioner
was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or
 the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in the
summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it free of charge.
 Respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of
Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has
discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said
school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual
standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering
the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
 The Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much
less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit the petitioner therein
in the current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of
Theology."
It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of May
19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in said seminary
"is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonable grounds..." Then reference was made
to the availability of non-judicial remedies which petitioner could have pursued. 
 categories of expenditure.
The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought
permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of why
under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a resolution of
August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition
was deemed submitted for decision. 
 academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the
ISSUE: Was mandamus proper? NO
Petitioner cannot compel respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola
School of Theology. Respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The
Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly
and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a
woman. And even assuming she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still
no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school

 has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to
limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations.
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of 
 Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in
the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot
therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence
of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ. 
 language:
There is the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying
academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to
pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him
in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers
that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. 
 
According to educator and philosopher, academic freedom is the freedom of
professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they
see it in the field of their competence. 
 o It is subject to no control or authority except
the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are
sought and established in these disciplines. 

Such view does not fully comprehend the scope of academic freedom recognized by
the Constitution. It is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher
learning" as the recipients of this boon. The school or college itself is possessed of
such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It
is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students. 

Academic freedom for the institution is distinguished from the academic freedom of
the scholar, which is the freedom to discover, publish, and teach the truth as he sees
fit in the field of one’s competence. 
 o Academic freedom likewise includes discretion
as to the tenure of the academic staff as well as the allocation of income among different


According to Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, "It is a
well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions
of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means
the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds
of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of
university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher." 

He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric
Ashby: “The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the
academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: 

(i) the admission and examination of students;

(ii) (ii) the curricula for courses of study;

(iii) (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and
 o (iv) the
allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.
It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal
interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members
control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these functions
are laid on the shoulders of the law governing body.”
Justice Frankfurter, a former Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to what he
called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms in the following
 "It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university:
 to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
 what may be taught,

 how it shall be taught, and

who may be admitted to study."
It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and
universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to
whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different,
and certainly higher, category.
(13) University of San Carlos v. CA
FACTS:
Jennifer Lee was initially an Architecture student at University of San Carlos. She got
a grade of ‘incomplete’ in one Architecture subject, and two ‘5s’ (failing marks) in two
other Architecture subjects. She shifted to Commerce. In this course, her grades were
good enough that it may have warranted her honors. 
 Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.
In hopes of graduating with honors, she tried to get her incomplete and failing marks
from her previous course withdrawn. 
 o She wrote a letter to the Council of Deans,
requesting that those grades be disregarded in the computation of her grade average.
The USC President responded that she is still disqualified because it is university policy
that any student obtaining a failing grade in any course will disqualify them from honors.


Jennifer was persistent. When the USC President was out of town, she was able to
convince the USC Registrar to change her grades from incomplete to 1.9 and from 5 to
withdrawn. 

It was later discovered that her change of grades was not supported by records, so she
still graduated without honors. Hence, Jennifer filed a petition for mandamus to compel
the university to grant her honors. Lower court granted the petition; hence USC filed
this petition in the SC. 
 preservation of Filipino and other languages.
ISSUE: Was mandamus the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a
degree with honors? NO
It is part of academic freedom of the university.
A part of academic freedom is the ample discretion given to Schools of Learning to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. It
is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to
the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic
matter may not be disturbed unless there is grave abuse of discretion. 
 Sec. 11:
Application: Jennifer knew of the proper procedure to withdraw from the classes. To
withdraw, there must be written permission from a parent or guardian. And for
incomplete grades, there must be an application for it within 1 year otherwise it
becomes final. In both cases, Jennifer failed to do what was required of her. 
 technologists, and specially gifted citizens.
Nevertheless, SC said her ‘removal’ of her grades when the USC President was out of
town was a back-door solution and is not allowed. SC said that nevertheless, even if
she was able to remove her failing grades, the university still had discretion to
determine if she was entitled for honors. 

LANGUAGE
Sec. 6:
The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be
further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other
languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the
Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a
medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the
educational system.
Sec. 7:
For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the
The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and
shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.
Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.
Sec. 8:
This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be
translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish.
Sec. 9:
The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of
representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake,
coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 10: Science and technology are essential for national development and
progress. The State shall give priority to research and development, invention,
innovation, and their utilization; and to science and technology education,
training, and services. It shall support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, and their application to the country’s
productive systems and national life.
The Congress may provide for incentives, including tax deductions, to
encourage private participation in programs of basic and applied scientific
research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives shall be
provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors,
Sec. 12:
The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the adaptation of technology
from all sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the widest
participation of private groups, local governments, and community-based
organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology.

Sec. 13:
The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors,
artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations,
particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be provided by
law.

ARTS AND CULTURE

Sec. 14:
The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a
Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate
of free artistic and intellectual expression.

Sec. 15:
Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve,
promote, and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and
resources, as well as artistic creations.

Sec. 16:
All the country’s artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of
the nation and shall be under the protection of the State which may regulate its
disposition.

Sec. 17:
The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions.
It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.

Sec. 18:
(1) The State shall ensure equal access to cultural opportunities through the
educational system, public or private cultural entities, scholarships, grants and
other incentives, and community cultural centers, and other public venues.
(2) The State shall encourage and support researches and studies on the arts
and culture.

SPORTS
Sec. 19:
(1) The State shall promote physical education and encourage sports programs,
league competitions, and amateur sports, including training for international
competitions, to foster self-discipline, teamwork, and excellence for the
development of a healthy and alert citizenry.

(2) All educational institutions shall undertake regular sports activities

throughout the country in cooperation with athletic clubs and other sectors.