1.

Director of Lands v Santiago

FACTS: this is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to
order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal
of the respondent corporation’s application for registration. On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by
respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb.
19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria
Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted
by the respondent Judge Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the
warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official
Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his
counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the
lands in favor of the respondent corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of
his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was
however denied.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:

1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;

HELD: The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New
Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared
VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporation’s application for registration, without
sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court is not
convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter,
through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.

The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to
the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case
to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of
default against the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and
filed his opposition or answer. The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for
such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Especially in this case where the greater
public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received
the applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and
petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government’s claim.

2. Avila v. Tapucar

Facts: In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land. Said property was
inherited in 1965 by private respondents, as successors-in-interest. In 1960, petitioner Avila bought a 4,371 square meter parcel
of land which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor, under a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land. On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent Application for a lot which has a total area
of 6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from the land
purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila. They filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the Avilas. In their
answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense of having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has
been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary
writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the
fruits on the land in controversy until the termination of the case. In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was
approved and the free patent was issued , and on the same date an Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs
of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.
Issue: W/N the subsequent approval of the application for free patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land which
rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included therein), the issuance of free patent and original certificate of title
in favor of the Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title is proper

Ruling: No. The free patent that was issued to the Bahans is erroneous as it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands
which belong to the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make
the latter owners thereof. A cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in any
claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title issued under the circumstances to
such persons would be declared null and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.
While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the
Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title
under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he
does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.
Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith.
The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.

3. Legarda vs. Saleeby

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is
registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor
of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter
included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Is Legarda the owner of the questioned property?

Ruling: Yes. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the Torrens
system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of
two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet
title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated.

4. DENR et al VS. YAP et al

Facts: President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming
that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

Issue: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands
alienable.

Ruling: No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.

5. Republic vs Naguiat G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006 Aceberos

FACTS: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales.
The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners
and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof. Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious (OCEN) possession and occupation of the lands in question since
12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified
from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

RULING: No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
MAIN POINT: The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. (page 2-3)

6. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 Aceberos

FACTS: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997/IPRA), on the ground that
it amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources
therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.

ISSUE: Is IPRA unconstitutional?

RULING: No. 7 Justices voted to dismiss the petition while 7 others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided
(7-7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the validity of the law was deemed upheld.

MAIN POINT: The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. (page 7)

7. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004 Aceberos

FACTS: The petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3)
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical
to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources; Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract‖ that permits
fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

RULING: 1. Yes. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations
to exploit the Philippine natural resources. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must
be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

2. Yes. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent
to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

MAIN POINT: The present Constitution provides that, except for agricultural lands of the public domain which alone may be
alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain with the State, the exploration,
development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. (page 6)

8. Carino V. Insular Government (1909)

Facts: Petitioner is an Igorot who applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners
for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he
applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: Whether petitioner has ownership and is entitled to registration

Ruling: YES. Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated,
30.
Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser. There must be a presumption against the government when a private
individual claims property as his or her own. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue
of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
Every presumption should be indulged against the government claiming title to land in the Province of Benguet in the
Philippine Islands, which, for more than fifty years prior to the treaty of peace with Spain of April 11, 1899, has been held by the
present native Igorot holder and his ancestors under claim of private ownership.

9. Oh Cho vs Director of Lands G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

Facts: Petitioner Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly,
continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor
General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.

Issue: Whether Oh Cho had title

Whether Oh Cho should be entitled to a decree of registration

Ruling: No. He failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. All lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
No. Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of
registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was
not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what
was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As
an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

10. Francisco Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Bay Development Corporation
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

J. Carpio, ponente

Facts
 On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
the Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
 On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1084 creating the Public Estates Authority (PEA)
which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, Marcos also issued P.D. No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
 On December 29, 1981, Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that all future
works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of
Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated that CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such
other works in the MCCRRP to be paid according to the progress of works, and that CDCP shall give up all its development
rights and cede and transfer in favor of PEA.
 On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The Senate Committee later released a report which claimed the following:
o The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEAA cannot alienate these lands;
o The certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are void, and the JVA itself is illegal.

Issue(s)/Ruling(s)
1. Whether PEA can hold title to public lands?

Yes. The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to
PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies
now, only to private corporations and associations. PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA to hold lands of the public
domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute. Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as
well as title to lands of the public domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative
authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which
states “Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)”

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such
legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

2. Whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the
public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged
areas shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

11. Camilo Borromeo v. Antonietta Descallar

Facts:
 Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial court’s ruling in his favor which declared the titles of respondent as
null and void.
 Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. Eventually, however, they went
their separate ways as respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich
met petitioner who was engaged in the real estate business and built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter. To pay
for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment." When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots
have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
 Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for holding that Jambrich has no title to the titles in question and may
not therefore transfer and assign any rights or interests in favor of the petitioner.

Issue(s)/Ruling(s)
1. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the
effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondents?

In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have
been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the
acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation were void ab initio since they were contrary
to the Constitution of the Philippines, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured
the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

12. IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. Hon. CA, Domingo Calalung, and Esteban Calalung

FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5 hectares in Magsaysay, Isabela. When it was surveyed
for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the river, so much so, that by 1958,
a 19,964 sq. m. had been added to the registered area

Respondents in this case claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in OCENCO of said portion of land
since 1933. Petitioners moved for an action to quiet title to the land.
The trial court adjudged the ownership of the land to petitioners

ISSUE: WON the alluvial property belong to petitioners and if it is whether such bcomes automatically registered land.

RULING: NO. There can be no dispute that petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. It does not however, become a registered land just because the lot which receives it
is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible.
Ownership of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system is quite another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining the river is governed by the civil code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration Laws. The fact remains that petitioners
never sought registration of said alluvial property.
The increment therefore never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of
Imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens System. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by 3rd persons.

13. OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name
of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his
son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario
Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April
21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking
assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said
barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next
thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

RULING: No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article
84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments
from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties
has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

14. DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. C.A

Facts: Sometimes in 1979, PR Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio
Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, PR allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result,
petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of CDO. A decision was rendered against PR, which decision was affirmed by
the RTC of Misamis Oriental, before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the Survey plan
with a view of perfecting his title over the accretion are being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released
to the applicant, however it was protested by PR before the Bureau of Land.
Upon investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was recommended that Survey Plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
who denied the motion, Respondent Director of Land then ordered him to vacate the portion adjudicated to private respondent be
placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno
and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by
respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio
affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the
Bureau of Lands, On Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complain.

Issue: W/N the subject land is public land.

Ruling: Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Art. 457
of the Civil Code which provides: To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effect of the current of the water. In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a
mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites. That the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea).
That the land where takes place is adjacent to the bank of river (or the sea cost).

These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owner of lands adjoining the bank of rivers or stream
any accretion gradually received from the effect of the current of waters.

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands, classified the subject land as an accretion are which was formed by deposits of sawdust in
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Land

15. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay,
covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited
the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all
the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the
RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD: The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
 confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or
just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest
that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

16. Baranda Vs. Gustillo

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate
of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and
respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the
transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting
Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate
of title?

HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot
be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to
the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have
any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10
of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in
writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117
of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration
or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument,
the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through
the Register of Deeds.”

17. Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan

FACTS: On June 28, 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of
Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed
of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following
grounds: That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo,
and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of
the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when
the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of such
refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the
lower court, declaring that “the Mandamus does not lie… because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
1151” dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

RULING: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law
on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction. A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

18. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator vs. LRC(J. Felix; 20 December 1957)

Facts: Rodis executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, a
corporation sole, with Msgr. Thibault, a Canadian Citizen, as the actual incumbent. When the Roman Catholic Administrator
presented the deed of sale for registration at the Register of Deeds of Davao, the latter required that the corporation sole prepare
an affidavit declaring that 60% of the members were Filipino citizens.In spite of assurance by the corporation sole that the totality
of the Catholic population of Davao would become the owner of the property, the Register of Deeds still had some doubts as to the
registerability of thedocument, and referred the matter to the Land Registration Commissioner. The Land Registration
Commissioner found that the corporation sole was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines because of the
requirement that 60% of the corporation was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens; as the present incumbent of the
corporation was a Canadian citizen, the LRC found that the corporation sole was not compliant. Consequently the corporation sole
instituted an action for mandamus with the Supreme Court alleging that the sale in favor is in favor of the Catholic Church, which
is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that the
registration be recognized.

Issue: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc. is entitled to acquire private properties

Held: Yes. In a corporation sole, the bishops or archbishops who sit as the incumbent are merely administrators of the church
properties, and they only hold these in trust for the church. Consequently, upon the death of the incumbent of the corporation sole,
the church properties acquired will pass on to his successor in office. The Court also finds that here is no provision of law that
confers ownership of the church properties on to the Pope, or even to the corporation sole or heads of the corporation sole who are
mere administrators of said properties; rather, ownership of these properties fall and develop upon the congregation. While the
Catholic congregation does follow the guidance of the Pope, there cannot be said to be a merger of personalities between the Pope
and the Catholic Church, and it cannot be said that the political and civil rights of the Catholics are affected by their relationship
with the Pope; the fact that the clergy derive their authorities from the Vatican does not mean that the Pope bestows his own
citizenship to each priest. To allow the theory that all of the Churches around the world would follow the citizenship of the Pope
would lead to the absurdity that each member of the Catholic Church would be a citizen of the Vatican or of Italy. As such, it cannot
be said that the citizenship of the corporation sole, as created under Philippine laws, is altered by the citizenship of whoever is the
incumbent head. The Corporation Law recognized that corporation soles as those which are organized and composed of a single
individual for the administration of the properties not used exclusively for religious worship of the church. The successor in office
will become the corporation on ascension to office. Furthermore, the Corporation Law also recognized that the corporation sole can
purchase real property, although there are restrictions as to the power to sell or mortgage depending on the rules, regulations and
discipline of the church concerned. As such, the Court finds it absurd that the corporation sole can purchase properties but would
not be able to register properties in its name. While the Constitution prohibits foreigners from taking, acquiring, exploiting or
developing the natural resources of the country, the Court finds that the provisions relating to these are not applicable to
corporation soles because they are merely administrators of the properties titled in their name. Furthermore, the administration
of these properties is for the benefit of the members of the congregation, which is overwhelmingly comprised of Filipinos. As the
acquisition of the properties is for the benefit of the congregation, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao cannot be
deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of
the right to register these properties in its name in the Register of Deeds of Davao

19. Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds, City of Manila G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

Doctrine: Aliens have no right to acquire any public or private land or private agricultural, commercial, or residential lands (except
by hereditary succession).
Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In
1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot
acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private ownership prior to the approval
of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

Ruling: 1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since
the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private
lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired
by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that
no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted
the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.

20. MULLER vs MULLER G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Facts: Elena and Helmut,a German national were married in Germany and resided there in a house owned by Helmut’ s parents
but later permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of Elena. After they separated, Helmut filed a motion for separation of properties for reimbursement of the
property in Antipolo.

Issue: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?

Ruling: No. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut’s disqualification from owning lands inthe
Philippines is absolute. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

21. CHEESMAN v IAC

FACTS: Thomas Cheesman (American) and Criselda (Filipino) were married in 1970 and got separated in 1981. Before they got
separated, Criselda was able to purchase a land. Although aware of the sale and the fact that the property was only in the name of
his wife, Thomas never objected to the said transaction. Tax declarations where issued in the name of Criselda and she exercised
exclusive management over the property. In 198, Criselda sold the property. Thomas now complained and filed annulment of the
sale since it was executed without his knowledge and consent.

ISSUE: Whether Thomas can contest the validity of the Contract?

RULING: NO. Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the property by his wife on the theory
that by doing so he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. ALSO, the presumption that
all properties acquired during the marriage belongs exclusively to the conjugal partnership DOES NOT APPLY because Thomas,
an American Citizen, is disqualified under Constitution to acquire and own real properties. Finally, the buyer herein was in good
faith thus, he is also protected by the law.

22. DIRECTOR OF LANDS v CA, GR 102858

FACTS: On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. The land registration court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction.

Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant
application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation."
 The CA ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court
of its authority to grant the application.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent CA which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor
General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Director of Lands is correct that a newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory?

RULING: YES. Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration
by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication
in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

23. MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: Maria de Consuelo Felisa Roxas y chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of
having registered, under the Torrens system, 4 parcels of land, known as Parcels A, B, C and D. In parcel A, there was a discrepancy
with the boundary in the technical description of the title and the plan presented in court.
The adjoining owners of the land, one of them are the heirs of Enriques, were informed of such application, but no one went to
question it so they were in default. The same application is published in 2 newspapers. The court approved the application and
Consuelo was given the titles.
In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the correction of the title because it covered a public road. It was alo in 1912 that Consuelo
went to court to ask for a correction of the title there were 2 building which were not included in the title, although it was in the
application. During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court questioning the
title. The Court granted the motion of City of Manila and Consuelo, however, it denied the opposition of Enriquez.

ISSUE: Was the court correct in denying the opposition of the heirs of Enriquez?

RULING: NO. Appellants assert in their argument that “personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court
below in rendering a decree.” The Court ruled that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the
Torrens system. In this case, notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides that said
“certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before
the return day and shall be conclusive proof of such service.”

24. LEYVA VS JANDOC No. L-16965. February 28, 1962

FACTS: In September 10, 1958 - Manuela Jandoc applied, in the CFI-Cotabato, for the registration 3 parcels of land situated in
Dadiangas, General Santos, Cotabato. December 10, 1958 - Eligio T. Leyva objected thereto with respect to a portion of said land
of about one (1) hectare which he claimed to have adversely possessed in good faith and under legal title since 1937. Bureau of
Lands also filed an opposition claiming that the land applied for as part of the public domain. In the course of argument while
hearing the case in CFI, the counsel for the Leyvas admitted that the right which his clients desire to protect in the case is based
merely on a foreshore lease contract between Leyvas and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Declaring that the
claim of the Leyvas may be recognized only if the land in question is public land, and since the Director of Lands has already filed
an opposition based on the ground that the land sought to be registered is public land, the court ruled that the Leyvas have no
right to appear as independent oppositors, but could collaborate with the provincial fiscal. As the court continued on receiving
evidence despite several petitions for postponement by the Leyvas, the latter filed a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin CFI- Cotabato from further proceeding in the case with a prayer than the orders of said court denying their right to intervene
therein, except in a condition of subordination to the opposition of the Director of Lands, be annulled and that they be allowed to
assert and defend their rights independently of that of said officer under the pretext of Section 34 of Act No. 496: "
 Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day,
or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall
set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by
him or by some person in his behalf ." CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: WON petitioners may intervene independently

RULING: NO. Although the provisions of law just cited apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an
opposition to an application for registration, it is our view nevertheless that the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or
some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government. The interest of the oppositors
were private in nature; otherwise stated, their interests were not in any manner subordinate to those of the Government. While
the right claimed by the petitioners herein seemed at first blush to be directly opposed to the adjudication of ownership to the
applicant, it developed in the proceedings that their right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate
to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public
domain. In such case, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well
as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it.
It is well-settled that the interests of the Government cannot be represented by private persons. It may not be amiss to add, also,
that this being an action in rem, there is no reason why claims which do not partake of the nature of real rights or rights in rem
should be settled therein.

25. MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.

FACTS: Dela Cruz is the heir of the tenant/occupant of the land co-owned by the petitioners. The four petitioners, as co-owners,
sought to have registered the subject agricultural land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of
Bulacan. It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was occupying the two
parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant
of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason
they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance. After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the
12th of February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the
land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as co-owners, subject to the usufructuary right
of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey. Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking
for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having
inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. The Land Court upon this motion
reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, its decision modifying the former
decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. The court below held that the
failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of
land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of
said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document
of purchase of 1864.

ISSUES:
1. Will the court’s modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper? Did the petitioners obtain the
decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud?
2. Taking into account that appellee Dela Cruz was not notified by the petitioners,despite that the Land Registration Act
requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail; the main question is, is making
Dela Cruz a party defendant, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern" sufficient alone even
if Dela Cruz as occupant was not notified and not named in the petition?
3. Differentiate in personam proceeding from in rem proceeding.

RULING:
1ST ISSUE:
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section.
It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived
of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above.
Thus,the said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That
decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was
occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant.
2nd ISSUE:
Yes, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (Tyler vs.
Judges, supra.)1
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of
Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all
occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right
to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word.

3rd ISSUE:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense,
the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is
to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if
anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

26. Benin vs Tuason G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

Facts: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. In
Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands,
described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city)
of Caloocan, province of Rizal and that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In Civil Case No. 3622
the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, and that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara. In Civil Case No.
3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma
(now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel
of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; and they and
their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same; had said lands declared for taxation
purposes. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951
while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co.
Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other
demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of
plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements. They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously
included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants,
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason
y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered
owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the
registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; They allege that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and
parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681,
the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned
in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never
published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration
in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate). They contend that the decision
dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise
null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree
of registration. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on
February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.
The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on
September 29, 1965

Issue: Whether or not the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision for the reason that the amendment to the original plan was
not published.
Held: The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa
Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason
y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land,
designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2
with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the
two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911. On December 23, 1911 the
court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681. November 11, 1913 the applicants and the
Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for
registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land
be allowed to remain. On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision which, among others, stated that
during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas
that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the
Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which
were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the
decree in LRC No. 3563. In compliance with the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration submitted a stating
that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.
The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the
decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area
of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in
the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496
(Land Registration Act). We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without
jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an
amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. If the
amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication
is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the
decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. The reason is because
without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third
parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. But
if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the case at bar, we find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that
were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case. , when the lower court said that the area of
Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact
that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be
of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that this very slight
increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional
lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an
area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), we believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the
computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared,
cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases
where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in
the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that
was added after the publication of the original plan. The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application,
that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and
the decree of registration must be declared null and void but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is concerned.
This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the
basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included
in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration
court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration
court had not acquired jurisdiction. The court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact that appellants herein
were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons
in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings
in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by
publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellees predecessors in interest freed the lands from claims and liens
of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the
certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Sivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition,
there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings,
and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of
such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more. The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

27. Director of Lands v. IAC [G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993

Facts: Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan,
the area consists of 187,288 sq. m., more or less. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, as amended. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed
the application alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors
possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged
that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within
the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently
withdrawn. In an amended application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestationmotion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms,
Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court
rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
the decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12 December 1985.

ISSUES: 1) whether the presentation of the tracing cloth plan is necessary; and 2) whether the land known as "Tambac Island"
can be subject to registration.

1)In a very recent decision of this Court, entitled The Director of Lands v. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino
Anit,6 We have ruled that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. Reiterating Our
ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes,7 We asserted that failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal it being
a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the said plan. What is required is the
original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and objection to such requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.8
This case is no different from the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra wherein We said that if the original tracing cloth plan
was indeed with the Land Registration Commission, there is no reason why the applicant cannot easily retrieve the same and
submit it in evidence, it being an essential requirement for registration.

2.Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the reports of the District Land Officer of Dagupan City, show
that the subject property is an unclassified public land, not forest land. This claim is rather misleading. The report of Supervising
Land Examiner Nieva specifically states that the "land is within the unclassified forest land" under the administrative jurisdiction
of the then Bureau of Forest Development.13 This was based on the reports of Land Inspector Daroy and District Land Officer
Feliciano Liggayu.
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable
Lands.14 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of
the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as
agricultural lands and so released for alienation. 15 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so. 16
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. 17
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.18
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present evidence and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. 19
In this particular case, respondent presented proof that as early as 1921, the subject property has been declared for tax purposes
with receipts attached, in the names of respondent's predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span of time there had been no
attempt to register the same either under Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather intriguing that Vicente
Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the property from Alejo Ambrosia, et al. on June 18, 1958 and from Julio Castelo on June 19,
1958 immediately sold the same to applicant J. Antonio Araneta on 3 July 1958.
According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Vicente Castelo
only in 1958 and the purported old tax declarations are not on file with the Provincial Assessor's Office.
In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported
by evidence.20 The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants or
of their predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.21 Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified on August 8, 1927 which was the basis of the report
and recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated; that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even presented
in evidence, is not well taken. As We have said in the case of Director of Lands v. CA:22
And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within unclassified region was not
presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled
rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission there was, in fact.
Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an unclassified public land as of 1927 and remains to be unclassified.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. 23 The conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction. We reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 24 In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously consider the
matter of the reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their name should not only be viewed with understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy encouraged. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the courts a quo are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

28. Republic vs. CA G.R. No. 100995

FACTS: Private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and
registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet, Camarines Norte.
On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his appearance on behalf of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except
petitioner which had filed an opposition.

At the hearing, respondent Dolor’s counsel marked as Exhibits “A” to “D,” respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate
of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of
the Editor of the “Weekly Informer,” and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.

Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court confirmed her title thereto and ordered
its registration as her exclusive property.

Petitioner assailed the trial court’s decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent
upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance
with the requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree .
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that “the jurisdictional requirements have
been complied with” on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before
the Branch Clerk of Court. Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there was no
notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet been
conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial
court.

ISSUE: W/N the registration was proper.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED
and SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property
described therein is DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court which culminated in its decision
granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of
Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not
precluded from taking cognizance of its own record. But, the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the
scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the publication
requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with. Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for
publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however
released for publication only on 31 January 1989
In petitioner’s brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed,
respondent court could have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but
also by ample jurisprudence

The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial court should be tested is
jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section
23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be
given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will
be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. And
when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial hearing is the same: to require all
persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the application should not be granted.

Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in the Official Gazette but for reasons
already obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was
included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication
only on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was already afait accompli. The point of reference in establishing lack
of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that date when the notice was made known to the
people in general. Verily, the late publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro
forma notice.
NOTES: In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, an issue similar to the one presented in the present petition was posed,
that is, whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing,
instead of at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine
the petition. We answered in the negative since the purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the
Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good
cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.

29. SERAFIN B. YNGSON v. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for
conversion into fishponds.

 The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less,
situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental.
 In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications
with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who
filed her application, followed by Custodio Doromal. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then
still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.
 Petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed
by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with
the same bureau.
 When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond
purposes and the same was only released for said purpose. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to
the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order awarding the whole area in favor of the
petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M.
Lopez appealed the order.
 In an order, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the
order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three
portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications
 Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
first Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.

The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director
of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office
of the President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.

ISSUE: Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely
abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules?
RULING: We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise
dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery
or other purposes.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority
given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for
disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether
or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case.

30. HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS: The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area
of 645,703 square meters.

 Roque Borre, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, filed
an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion
of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs
of Jose Amunategui.
 The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration
of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the
public domain.
 Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square
meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
 During the progress of the trial, Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
 After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the
land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
 A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in
the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act
No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
 The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a "mangrove swamp".
 On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin,
contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui.
 The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision that the disputed lot is part of the public
domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the
parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as
forest land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING: The petition is without merit.

Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and
third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp,
is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
31. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April 15, 1988)

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where
the discovery is made be private. In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine
was not correctly applied.

Facts: From the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by J. de la Rosa on his own behalf and
on behalf of his three children. The land, situated in Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots. According to the application, Lots
1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by M. Balbalio and J. Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The application
was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and
all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date
of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by
its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts,
and its payment of taxes on the land. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which
has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on
the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this
Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument
that neither the private

Issue: Whether Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims?

Ruling: YES. Decision of the Trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. The trial
court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims
of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred
to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

32. Director of Lands vs Datu G.R. No. L-57573. July 5, 1982

Facts: The spouses, E. Datu and C. Valenzuela, filed on January 8, 1973 an application for the registration of Lot No. 2027-B of the
Bataan cadastre with an area of 24,573 sq m.The Director of Lands opposed the application. He alleged through the Solicitor-
General that the land had already been declared public land in a cadastral proceeding. The Land Registration Commission reported
that in Cadastral Case No. 12, NLRC Cadastral Record No. 388, the lower court in a decision dated September 27, 1946, held that
said Lot No. 2027-B belongs to the Government subject to the right of Mariano Siasat under his Homestead Application. The lower
court on December 16, 1974, applicant Emesto Datu, 48, testified that he had possessed the lot "openly, adversely, notoriously and
in the concept of an owner" since 1950 when it was sold to him by Cipriano Penaflor who had allegedly possessed the lot "in the
same manner" since 1938, or for more than thirty years, but that the deed of sale was executed only on May 6, 1974 when the
consent to the sale of the Commission on National Integration was secured. Datu allegedly converted the land from cogon land to
sugarcane land. When he did so, he did not specify in his testimony. The said deed of sale, which is in English was thumbmarked
by Peñaflor. There is no statement in the deed as to how Peñaflor acquired the land or that he possessed it since 1938. There is no
tax declaration in Pennon's name. He did not testify at the hearing. Applicant Datu presented as evidence a 1972 tax declaration
in his name showing that the lot, a "fruit land," had an assessed value of P490. He also Identified a 1974 tax declaration showing
that the land had a market value of p6,757 and an assessed value of P2,700. Datu paid the realty taxes on the land only for the
years 1972 to 1974. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ordered the registration of Lot No. 2027-B in the names of the Datu
spouses on the theory that they and their predecessor, Penaflor, had possessed it for more than thirty years and that they had an
imperfect title to it which could be judicially confirmed pursuant to section 48(b) of the Public Land Law as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942. The Director of Lands appealed. He contends that the Appellate Court erred in holding that the evidence of the Datu
spouses sufficiently establishes their claim of thirty years' possession of Lot No. 2027-B in the concept of owner.

Issue: Whether Lot no. 2027-B is part of the public domain?

Ruling: Yes. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. Lot No. 2027-B is hereby declared
to be part of the public domain. Considering that the applicants failed to prove what acts of ownership and cultivation were
performed by their predecessor-in-interest, that they declared the land for taxation only in 1972, that they did not prove when they
or their tenants started cultivating the land and that the investigator of the Bureau of Lands reported that the land was cogon
land, it cannot be said with certitude that the applicants and their predecessor had possessed the lot in question under claim of
ownership for 30 years preceding the filing of their application. On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot
justifiably be concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.
We cannot apply to this case the juris et de jure presumption that the lot claimed by the applicants had ceased to be public land
and had become private property. The record does not substantiate an implied grant from the State arising from more than thirty
years' possession under claim of ownership.

33. HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING vs CA

Facts: Petitioners claim that they, together with private respondents Luis and Eriberta Bauzon, own the disputed lots in common
and pro-indiviso. Luis and Eriberta, the latter represented by her husband Placido Zulueta, aver that their father Roque Bauzon
was the owner of the subject lots by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. Roque, together with Juan Maningding, Maria
Maningding and Segunda Maningding were the surviving children of Ramon Bauzon y Untalan who died intestate in
1948. According to petitioners, Roque Bauzon repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to
himself,[1] and that in 1970 Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favor of
Roque Bauzon by virtue of an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation.[2] Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to
his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon, both transactions being evidenced by deeds of sale.
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his
children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but
were unsuccessful. On the other hand private respondents aver that the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over
the riceland was executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding. With regard to
the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented by petitioners. He claimed that
he acquired ownership over both the sugarland and the riceland by donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and
Sotera Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra Loresco. Since the death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque
had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject properties

Issue: Who owns the land?

Ruling: Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a
mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and
with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.

34. HEIRS OF ROXAS VS CA

Facts: On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation)
filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City.The original
registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge
Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn,
bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices
of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or
NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of
the proceedings. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991. Petitioner
filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration
on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she
inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open,
continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before
they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida
Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud

Issue: Whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over
two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration

Ruling: Registra-tion of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or
cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before
such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person
affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However,
the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree
of registration. It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year
from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred
to an innocent purchaser.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means
of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.[19] Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental
effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to
commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[20]

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved
in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy.[21] Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, is
awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners

35. Esconde vs. Delfin

Facts: On April 14, 1969, private respondent Ramon Delfin filed an "Application for Registration of Title". The application was
granted in a Decision and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by an
Original Certificate of Title. On February 13, 1978, private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses
Francisco and Basilisa Esconde. The petitioners filed a motion to quash which was then denied. On November 17, 1983, private
respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises
to private respondent; the same was granted in the Order of November 21, 1983. Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino
Constantino of the RTC of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on
the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance.

Issue: May the action for reconveyance prosper?

Ruling: No. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after 1 year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of
the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.
An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.

Main point: Reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of irregularity neither in the issuance of title, nor in the
proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period
of 1 year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Petitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.

36. People vs. Cainglet

Facts: Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the CFI of Zamboanga del Sur for falsification of public and/or official documents.
The accused moved to quash the informations filed against him on the ground that they contain averments, which if true, would
constitute an excuse or justification, invoking Section 2 (g) of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. The informations contained statements
that in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 the CFI of Zamboanga del Sur, it was declared that Lot Nos. 8479
and 8492 with improvements thereon belong to Cainglet; that such judicial pronouncement which has become final, as can be
inferred from the information, allegedly runs counter to the charge that accused falsely claimed said real estate to be his own
private properties.

Issue: Whether the final judgment in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 declaring Cainglet as the owner of
Lot Nos. 8479 and 8492 bars his subsequent prosecution for falsely stating in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed
and owned Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492?
Ruling: No. It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, a proceeding in rem, is binding and
conclusive upon the whole world. However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of
exceptions. The aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property or a personal action for recovery of damages against
the party who registered his property through fraud. In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for perjury
the party who obtains registration through fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in
cadastral proceedings. Section 116 applies to all and does not distinguish between those who make false statements and successfully
procure registration by such statements, and those whose statements were not given credence by the land registration court. The
law therefore applies with equal brunt on both types of offenders.

For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to unduly discriminate in the prosecution of persons charged with
falsification or perjury. Every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. A judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the indefeasibility of the titles over Lot Nos. 8479 and
8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for falsification or perjury be a collateral attack on the titles in question. The
prosecution for falsification or perjury is a proceeding in personam which inquires into the criminal liability of the accused. Not
being an attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered therein would leave said titles undisturbed.