VOL.
419, JANUARY 537 is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial
judge gravely abused his discretion.—The first six assigned errors
raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court,
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial
judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.
_______________
* EN BANC.
538
538 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
Same; Same; Same; Relationship; The key element in parricide
is the relationship of the offender with the victim.—The key element
in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In
the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the
fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is
not objected to.
Same; Same; Same; Admission; Exceptions; Axiomatic is the
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making
it, with exceptions.—Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission
showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable
mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; In
criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.—When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the
rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a
stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered Woman Syndrome
(BWS); The concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a
form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.—In
claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence,
the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating
evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome,
foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful
state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Battered Woman”,
defined; In order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice.—A battered
woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order
to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
539
VOL. 419, 539
JANUARY 15,
2004
People vs. Genosa
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered women exhibit
common personality traits.—Battered women exhibit common
personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about
the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence
upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for
the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Cycle of
Violence”; Phases; Tension-Building Phase; During the tension-
building phase, minor battering occurs—it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.—During
the tension-building phase,minor battering occurs—it could be
verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.
The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of
kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What
actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent
the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her “placatory” and
passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse
her in the first place. However, the techniques adopted by the
woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and
the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the
imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair.
Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and
abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence “spirals
out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Acute Battering
Incident; The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death.—The acute
battering incidentis said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this
phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the
violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its
explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman
usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition. At this stage, she
has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows
from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute
battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such
that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
540
540 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tranquil
Period; The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends—during this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief.—The final phase of the cycle of violence
begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil
period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the
batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make
up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat
her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and
caring man” is the real person whom she loves. A battered woman
usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability
of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances
of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very
slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she
leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her
back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is
most thoroughly tormented psychologically. The illusion of absolute
inter dependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche.
In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other—she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence
and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die
than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent,
capable of functioning without the other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; One who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on one’s life, not merely imaginary.—
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense: “Art. 11. Justifying
circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability:
“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlawful
aggression; Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.—Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack—or
an imminent danger thereof—on the life or safety of a person.
541
VOL. 419, 541
JANUARY 15,
2004
People vs. Genosa
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aggression, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense.—Aggression, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense—complete or incomplete—
on the part of the victim.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Passion and
Obfuscation; Requisites; To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur.—In addition, we also find in
favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Because of
the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself.—There is treachery when one
commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. In
order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be
deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place
in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal law; Parricide; Justifying Circumstances; Self-
defense; Battered Woman Syndrome; Phases; The Battered Woman
Syndrome has three (3) phases.—As exhaustively discussed in
the ponencia, the “Battered Woman Syndrome” has three phases, to
wit: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in the
form of verbal or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries
to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior;
or by simply staying out of his way; (2) the acute battering incident
phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and
sometimes, death. The battered woman usually realizes that she
cannot reason with him and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where the couple
experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a tender
and nurturing behavior towards his partner.
542
542 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Once BWS and an
impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in previous
battering episodes are established, actual occurrence of an assault is
no longer a condition sine qua non before self-defense may be
upheld.—Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be
appreciated, the unlawful aggression or the attack must be
imminent and actually in existence. This interpretation must,
however, be re-evaluated vis-à-visthe recognized inherent
characteristic of the psyche of a person afflicted with the “Battered
Woman Syndrome.” As previously discussed, women afflicted by
this syndrome live in constant fear for their life and thus respond in
self-defense. Once BWS and an impending danger based on the
conduct of the deceased in previous battering episodes are
established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer a
condition sine qua non before self defense may be
upheld. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.As stated in the ponencia, to require
the battered person to await an obvious deadly attack before she can
defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
installment.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc, Leyte, Br. 35.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor Generalfor appellee.
Katrina Legarda and Dulce T. Asensi for appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her
prayer for acquittal on a novel theory—the “battered woman
syndrome” (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense.
Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to
complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression—no immediate and unexpected attack on her by
her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted
on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that
broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
“psychological paralysis” she suffered diminished her will
power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under
paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
543
VOL. 419, JANUARY 543
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night
in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that
she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her
life and her unborn child’s.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating
circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be
released from custody on parole, because she has already
served the minimum period of her penalty while under
detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25,
1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
1
(Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic
Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the
Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance
and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
 “The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the bone of the head,
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00), Philippine resulting [in] laceration
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos of the brain,
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.” 2

spontaneous rupture of
The Information charged appellant with parricide as follows:
3 the blood vessels on
“That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay the posterior surface of
Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and the brain, laceration of
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named the dura and meningeal
accused, with intent
_______________
vessels producing
severe intracranial
1 Penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona. hemorrhage.
Assailed Decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 43.
‘Blisters at both
2

3 Signed by Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta.

extremities, anterior
544
chest, posterior chest,
544 SUPREME COURT trunk w/ shedding of
REPORTS the epidermis.
ANNOTATED ‘Abdomen distended
People vs. Genosa w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound which caused his death.” 4

one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the With the assistance of her counsel, appellant pleaded not
5

purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit: guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. In due 6

course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.

‘Cadaveric spasm.
The Facts
‘Body on the 2nd stage
Version of the Prosecution
of decomposition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
‘Face, black, blownup prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:
& swollen w/ evident “Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November
postmortem lividity. 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of
Eyes protruding from Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben’s younger
its sockets and tongue brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
slightly protrudes out however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at
of the mouth. Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two
children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
‘Fracture, open,
depressed, circular _______________
located at the occipital 4 Rollo, p. 9.
 5Atty. Joventino Isidro. The accused was also represented later by Atty. Gil door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked
Marvel P. Tabucanon. it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the
6 Records, p. 65.
offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of
545 Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only
VOL. 419, JANUARY 545 in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban
15, 2004 went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his
son’s misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of
People vs. Genosa
Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight
“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin,
after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer
then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report
before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben’s house before
regarding the foul smell at the Genosas’ rented house. Together with
reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a
9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs
not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner
Genosas’ rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’
to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’ That was 546
the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since 546 SUPREME COURT
then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared uninhabited and was REPORTS
always closed. ANNOTATED
“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her
People vs. Genosa
close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her
at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from
house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a
where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured
pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her
three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half
motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately
(1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red
had no money to buy it.
stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was
“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of
waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out
its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before
of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
the postmortemexamination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte
he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas’
responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had
rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus
been dead for two to three days and his body was already
to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded
appellant did not want to talk to him.
the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed
“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him
against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben’s death was
about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben
‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].’
but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
“Appellant admitted killing Ben.She testified that going home
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband
borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen
who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a
payday. With her cousin Ecel Arano, appellant went to look for Ben
at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him
there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’
house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her to sleep
in their house.
“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the
light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television
antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the
side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point,
appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave.
Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew
into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a
drawer holding her by the neck, and told her ‘You might as well be
killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified that she was
aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his
wallet. She however, ‘smashed’ the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing
him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben
at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and
his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer
where the gun was
547
VOL. 419, JANUARY 547
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom.” (Citations omitted)
7
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
“1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November
19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San
Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husband’s death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City.
The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and
Marie Bianca.
“2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary
school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and
they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against
their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other
suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her
constant partner at fiestas.
“3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s
parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the
first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived happily’. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and
their fights would become violent.
“4. Ben’s brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could
not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when
Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home
drunk. Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one
incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben
had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood.
Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently
having asked for Ben’s forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben’s
aid again and saw blood from Ben’s forehead and Marivic holding
an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had
apparently again asked for Ben’s forgiveness.
“Mrs. lluminada Genosa, Marivic’s mother-in-law, testified too,
saying that Ben and Marivic married in ‘1986 or 1985 more or less
here in Fatima, Ormoc City.’ She said as the marriage went along,
Marivic became ‘already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa
said that after the birth of Marivic’s two sons, there were ‘three (3)
misunderstandings.’ The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with
a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
_______________
7 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 5-13; Rollo, pp. 435-443. Signed by Solicitor General
Alfredo L. Benipayo, Assistant Solicitor General Karl B. Miranda, and Solicitor Ma.
Ana C. Rivera.
 548
548 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
Benon the forehead ‘using a sharp instrument until the eye was also
affected. It was wounded and also the ear’ and her husband went to
Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had
already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben’s
hand was plastered as ‘the bone cracked.’
“Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic
for medical intervention.
“5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on
November 15, 1995 ‘After we collected our salary, we went to the
cock-fighting place of ISCO.’ They stayed there for three (3) hours,
after which they went to ‘Uniloks’ and drank beer—allegedly only
two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went
to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait ‘for
the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that
time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting
for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.’ On his way
home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing.
They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one ‘Fredo’
who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas’ testimony on
the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic
saying ‘I will never hesitate to kill you’, whilst Ben replied ‘Why kill
me when I am innocent’ Basobas thought they were joking.
“He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road
from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were
always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that
he once told Ben ‘before when he was stricken with a bottle by
Marivic Genosa’ that he should leave her and that Ben would always
take her back after she would leave him ‘so many times’.
“Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it
was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben ‘even
had a wound’ on the right forehead. He had known the couple for
only one (1) year.
“6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben
became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down
on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
“These incidents happened several times and she would often run
home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out,
promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said
after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter
the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said
Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at
least three times a week.
549
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People vs. Genosa
“7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to
Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the
hands of Ben.
‘7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben
and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies,
he saw the spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke
hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please
note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos. )
8
‘7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr.
Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on
the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut
which is located beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling
with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck
of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said after a while, Marivic was able to
extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went
back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the
next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Basobas).
‘7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while
they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50)
meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living
together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling.
Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use
the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if somebody would
come.’ He testified that while Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when
he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, Teody’ because
that was what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means ‘let’s go and
look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife
and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the
witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken
to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too.
He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
‘7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her
house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic
_______________
8 Spelled as “Basobas” in some parts of the record.
550
550 SUPREME COURT
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People vs. Genosa
wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house ‘because she might be
battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00
in the evening, Miss Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and
was drunk.’ Miss Arano knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering
walking and I can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the house and she
heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was
not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic
would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one
time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were very noisy in the sala and I had
heard something was broken like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran into her
room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and
a knife and ‘showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared
us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-
examination, she said that when she left Marivic’s house on November 15,
1995, the couple were still quarreling.
‘7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient ‘many
times’ and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing
testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6)
episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were
reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him
an expert witness.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Dr. Caing’s clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of
Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits ‘2’
and ‘2-B.’ The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected
all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit ‘3.’
“On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he
could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime
committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the
psychological make-up of the patient, ‘whether she is capable of committing
a crime or not.’
7.6. Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the
Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died,
Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to
settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing ‘family
troubles’. He told Marivic to return in the morn-
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15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
ing, but he did not hear from her again and assumed ‘that they might have
settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the provocation.
Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In
fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre
as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby
was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
“Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow
her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was because ‘he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.’
“On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun;
she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be
heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995;
that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and
got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias ‘Marvelous
Isidro’; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
‘Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun
away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to ‘smash
him once’; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bob; and
that two (2) hours after she was ‘whirled’ by Ben, he kicked her ‘ass’ and
dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his
things.’
“9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995
after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the
Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution
witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
“10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal
Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among
her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal
cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of
cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took
the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the
police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw
‘some police officers and neighbors around.’ She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to
the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxx xxx xxx
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552 SUPREME COURT
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People vs. Genosa
“Dra. Cerillo said that ‘there is only one injury and that is the injury
involving the skeletal area of the head’ which she described as a
‘fracture’. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2
or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
“Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
“11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against
Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE
committed ‘with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of
a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.’
“12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21
July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15
and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
“13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day
of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ of the crime of
parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
“14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon
automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic’s
trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary
measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant’s Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
“The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon
and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
“15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a
letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the
same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of
Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her ‘Brief
without counsels’ to the Court.
“This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4
February 2000.
“16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and
stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000,
undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed
her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
553
VOL. 419, JANUARY 553
15, 2004
 People vs. Genosa
“Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of
Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the
country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit ‘A’) is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
“17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the
Honorable Court partly granted Marivic’s URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION and remanded the case ‘to the trial court for the reception
of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the ‘battered
woman syndrome’ plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and,
thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken,
together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.’
“18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and
testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City.
“Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a
quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan
informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
“Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for
twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected
presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this,
she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption
College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts
in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD
from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American
Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International
Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the
Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has
written a book entitled ‘Energy Global Psychology’ (together with
Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first
time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the
first case of that nature.
“Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the
socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases
over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that ‘there are lots of
variables that cause all
554
554 SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.
“Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of ‘a lot of
incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse
to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, ‘the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating
and self-sacrificing characteristics, x x x they usually think very
lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they
usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who
precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them.’ Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from
‘broken homes.’
“Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman,
‘also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have
superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very
hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very
low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in
vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.’
The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which
over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything.
Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so ‘there is
a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.’
“Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame
and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which
makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her
obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the
violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another room,
or sometimes try to fight back triggering ‘physical violence on both
of them. She said that in a ‘normal marital relationship,’ abuses also
happen, but these are ‘not consistent, not chronic, are not happening
day in [and] day out.’ In an ‘abnormal marital relationship,’ the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and ‘even would
cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological
tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the
profile of a battered woman because ‘inspite of her feeling of self-
confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of
loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged
and as a broken person. And
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VOL. 419, JANUARY 555
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she
had experienced in the past.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and
did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of
the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then
thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
“19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who
has since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch
35, Ormoc City.
“Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a
Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the
practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in
private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and
neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center
for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government
service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his
medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a
member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon
City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the
Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
“He authored ‘The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown
in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 - 1978’
which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000’, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He
had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a
Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an
E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional
disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the
brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish
medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
“Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical
Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he
has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the
primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence
556
556 SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
 People vs. Genosa
cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
“As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping,
pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ‘depends on the
vulnerability of the victim.’ Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not
very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional
stamina of the victim is stronger, ‘it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x
x x is very dangerous.’
“In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated
under the ‘anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.’ It is produced
by ‘overwhelming brutality, trauma.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that with ‘neurotic anxiety’, the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not
actually being beaten at that time. She thinks ‘of nothing but the
suffering.’
xxx xxx xxx
“A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic,
her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She
tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her ‘self-world’ is damaged.
“Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates
to an individual’s illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous
care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
‘internalizes what is around him within the environment.’ And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming
high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong facade ‘but in
it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that ‘even though without the presence
of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering,
that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the
individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in
his mind.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress
disorder try to defend themselves, and ‘primarily with knives.
Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the
immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound
in the household.’ He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has
‘reached the lowest rock
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VOL. 419, JANUARY 557
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to
act decisively.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office
in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17)
minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case
studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
“On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo
said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic’c mental
condition was that she was ‘re-experiencing the trauma.’ He said
‘that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of
the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes
and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.’ At the time he
interviewed Marivic ‘she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament
she is involved.’
xxx xxx xxx
“20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either
the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the
Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-
opened trial a quowere elevated.” 9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the
RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant
had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further,
the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
supposedly defenseless when he was killed—lying in bed
asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of
his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
_______________
9 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10-71; Rollo, pp. 284-345; signed by Atty. Katrina
Legarda. Citations omitted.
558
558 SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death;
(2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts’
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for
the lower court to admit the experts’ testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution
granting in part appellant’s Motion, remanding the case to the
trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea;
and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN
and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court’s Resolution, the trial judge authorized
the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs.
Natividad Dayan and Alfredo Pajarillo, supposedly experts
10 11
on domestic
_______________
10 Qualifying her expertise, Dra. Dayan stated that she had been a
practising clinical psychologist for over twenty (20) years. Currently, she is a
professor at the De La Salle University. Prior thereto, she was the head of the
Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology of the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and
the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She obtained her
bachelor’s degree in psychology from the University of the Philippines (UP),
her Master of Arts in Clinical Counseling from Ateneo, and her Ph.D. also from
UP. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists,
comprised of members from about 68 countries; and was the past president of
the Psychological Association of the Philippines. She is a member of the
Forensic Psychology Association, the American Psychological Association, and
the ASEAN Counseling Association. She authored the book entitled Energy
Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allen Tan and Allan Bernardo). Dra.
Dayan also lectures at the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently on the socio-
demographic and psychological profiles of families involved in domestic
violence cases. On the subject, she had conducted, for over a period of ten years,
research on the profiles of about 500 families involved in domestic violence.
11 Dr. Pajarillo obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo
Tomas and has been in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight years. He
honed his practice in psychiatry and neurology during his stint
559
VOL. 419, JANUARY 559
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary
evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower
court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part
of the records of the case. 12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court
for this Court’s consideration:
1. “1.The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense.
 2. “2.The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that
Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that
she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. “3.The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of
death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. “4.The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and
disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a
gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further
gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a
battered husband.
_______________
with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre. Thereafter, he was called to
active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and was assigned at the V.
Luna Medical Center for twenty-six years. He was a diplomate of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry; and a fellow of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry and the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was also a member
of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical
Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons. He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous
Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954-
1978, which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored
“The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000,” which was
likewise published internationally and locally. On a Parke-Davis grant, he
published a medical textbook on the use of Prasepam; on an ER Squibb grant,
he was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline); and he published the use of the
drug Zopiclom in 1985-86. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. (TSN, February 9, 2001, pp. 6-9;
Exhibits “F”-“F-9”-Appellant (Bio-Data of Dr. Pajarillo).
12 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 4, 2003, upon
receipt by this Court of appellee’s Brief. Appellant’s Brief was filed on
December 2, 2002.
560
560 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
1. “5.The trial court gravely erred in not requiring
testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
2. “6.The trial court gravely erred in concluding that
Marivic’s flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear
attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
3. “7.The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there
was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
4. “8.The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-
evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this
case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of
the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death.” 13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1)
whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her
fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in
nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal
issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the
trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances
of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.14
In appellant’s first six assigned items, we find no grave
abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of
material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court’s
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly
dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
_______________
13Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 346-347. Original in upper case.
14Caca v. Court of Appeals and People, 341 Phil. 114; 275 SCRA 123, July
7, 1997; People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923; 257 SCRA 118, May 24, 1996;People
v. Tanoj,387 Phil. 750; 332 SCRA 12, May 12, 2000; People v. Magaro, 353 Phil.
862; 291 SCRA 681, July 2, 1998.
561
VOL. 419, JANUARY 561
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated “an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.” We note that in his 17-page
Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and—on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on
record—made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-
defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court,
may not agree with the trial judge’s conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made
in an “obviously hasty” manner. The Information had been
filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter,
trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year.
It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the
trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case
should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that
Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite
the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago, this Court held:
16
“The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with
the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact
_______________
15 §15 of Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
“Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within x x x three months for all other lower courts.
“(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.”
16 333 Phil. 20; 265 SCRA 198, December 2, 1996, per Puno, J.
562
562 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.”
Two of the prosecution witnesses—namely, the mother and
the brother of appellant’s deceased spouse—attested in court
that Ben had been married to Marivic. The defense raised no 17
objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of
her marriage to Ben. Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial
18
admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only
when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
made. Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of
19
the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
15
mistake.
Third,under the circumstances of this case, the specific or
direct cause of Ben’s death—whether by a gunshot or by
beating with a pipe—has no legal consequence. As the Court
elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, “[considering
that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband
and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of
shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to
determine which of said acts actually caused the victim’s
death.”Determining which of these admitted acts caused the
death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully
appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for
automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense
of “battered woman syndrome,” for which such evidence may
have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly,
the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence,
his
_______________
17 TSN, September 23, 1997, pp. 11-12 & 14; TSN, November 12, 1997, pp.
29 & 33.
18 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 7-8.
19 People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32; 317 SCRA 684, October 29, 1999.
563
VOL. 419, JANUARY 563
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not
constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not
requiring testimony from appellant’s children. As correctly
elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which
witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. As the 20
former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children
as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for
not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of
whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent
apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible
error as to the trial court’s appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal
liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn
child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled21
is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly,
defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof
from the prosecution to the defense. 22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of
the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine
jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form
_______________
20 Appellee’s Brief, p. 26, citing People v. De los Reyes, 229 SCRA 439,
January 21, 1994. See also §5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure and People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560, April 28, 1993.
21 People v. Rabanal, 349 SCRA 655, January 19, 2001; People v. Carlo,351
Phil. 644; 288 SCRA 404, March 31, 1998; People v. Baniel,341 Phil. 471; 275
SCRA 472, July 15, 1997.
22 People v. Peralta, 350 SCRA 198, January 24, 2001.
564
564 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By 23
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted
with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding
of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been
cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.” 24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified
as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.” 25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as
low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family
and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has 27
three phases:
_______________
23 See Ibn-Tamas v. US, 477 A.2d 626, 1979 DC App. LEXIS 457; McLuckie
v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193; 2003 US App. LEXIS 15240; DePetris v.
Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057; 2001 US App. LEXIS 1062; State v. Kelley, 478
A.2d 364 (1984); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (RI 1992); State v. Frost, 577
A.2d 1282 (NJ Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (NM
Ct. App. 1986); R v. Lavallee(1990) 1 SCR; Reilly v. The Queen,(1984) 2 SCR
396.
24 Symposium on Domestic Violence. Article: “Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law LEXSEE 21
Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (Summer 1993), 1161.
25 McMaugb v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 731, quoting L. Walker, The Battered
Woman, at XV (1979).
26 People v. Torres, 128 Misc2d, 129, 488 NYS2d 358; McMaugh v. State,612
A.2d 725.
27 Walker, Lenore, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984), pp. 95-96. Dr.
Walker, a clinical psychologist, is an acknowledged expert on BWS in the
United States. She is a pioneer researcher in the field. In this book, she reports
the results of her study involving 400 battered women. Her research was
designed to test empirically the theories expounded in her
565
VOL. 419, JANUARY 565
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
(1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28
During the tension-building phase,minor battering
occurs—it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another
form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the
escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her “placatory”
and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her
effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal
and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the
imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair.
Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman
soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes
emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point,
the violence “spirals out of control” and leads to an acute
battering incident. 29
The acute battering incidentis said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The
battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also
inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his
reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would
only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack
and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of
acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost
always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it
_______________
earlier book, The Battered Woman (1979). In 1989, she also
wrote Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds
28 Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society
Responds (Harper Perennial, 1989), p. 42.
29Ibid. See also R. v. Lavallee, supra;Ibn-Tamas v. US, supra.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole
anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his
isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being.
The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him
does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back.
Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is
most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched
in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her
batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other—she
for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath
this miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and forgiveness,”
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of
functioning without the other. 31

566 History of Abuse in the Present Case

566 SUPREME COURT To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the
REPORTS defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her
ANNOTATED heart-rending experience as follows:
People vs. Genosa “ATTY. TABUCANON
is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very Q How did you describe
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or your marriage with Ben
intervenors are likely to get hurt. 30 Genosa?
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the _______________
acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the Ibid.
30

couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the Ibid.

31

batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards

567
his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
VOL. 419, 567
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and
promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the
JANUARY
battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery 15, 2004
will never happen again; that her partner will change for the People vs. Genosa
better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real A In the first year,
person whom she loves. I lived with him
happily but in
 the subsequent A I went away to
year he was my mother and
cruel to me and I ran to my
a behavior of father and we
habitual drinker. separate each
Q You said that in other.
the subsequent Q What was the
year of your action of Ben
marriage, your Genosa towards
husband was you leaving
abusive to you home?
and cruel. In A He is following
what way was me, after that he
this abusive and sought after me.
cruelty Q What will
manifested to happen when he
you? follow you?
A He always A He said he
provoke me in changed, he
everything, he asked for
always slap me forgiveness and
and sometimes I was convinced
he pinned me and after that I
down on the go to him and
bed and he said ‘sorry’.
sometimes beat Q During those
me. times that you
Q How many were the
times did this recipient of
happen? such cruelty and
A Several times abusive
already. behavior by
Q What did you your husband,
do when these were you able
things happen to to see a doctor?
you? A Yes, sir.
 Q Who are these inflicted on
doctors? your occurred,
A The company after your
physician, Dr. marriage, from
Dino Caing, Dr. that time on,
Lucero and Dra. how frequent
Cerillo. was the
xxx xx occurrence?
x xxx 568
Q You said that 568 SUPREME COURT
you saw a REPORTS
doctor in ANNOTATED
relation to your People vs. Genosa
injuries? A Everytime he got drunk.
A Yes, sir. Q Is it daily, weekly,
Q Who inflicted monthly or how many
these injuries? times in a month or in a
A Of course my week?
husband. A Three times a week.
Q You mean Ben Q Do you mean three
Genosa? times a week he would
A Yes, sir. beat you?
xxx xx A Not necessarily that he
x xxx would beat me but
[Court] to the witness sometimes he will just
Q How frequent quarrel me.”32

was the alleged Referring to his “Out-Patient Chart” on Marivic Genosa at

33

cruelty that you the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her
said? foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
A Everytime he “Q So, do you have a
got drunk. summary of those six (6)
Q No, from the incidents which are found
time that you in the chart of your
said the cruelty clinic?
or the infliction A Yes, sir.
of injury
Q Who prepared the list of contusion Pregnancy.
six (6) incidents, Doctor? Attending physician:
A I did. Dr. Canora.
Q Will you please read the Q Among the findings,
physical findings there were two (2)
together with the dates incidents wherein you
for the record. were the attending
A 1. May 12, 1990— physician, is that correct?
physical findings are A Yes, sir.
as follows: Hematoma Q Did you actually physical
(R) lower eyelid and examine the accused?
redness of eye. A Yes, sir.
Attending physician: _______________
Dr. Lucero; 32 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 12-19.
2. March 10, 1992— 33 Exhibits “1” & “1-A”; Records, p. 44.
Contusion-Hematoma
569
(L) lower arbital area, VOL. 419, 569
pain and contusion (R) JANUARY
breast. Attending 15, 2004
physician: Dr. Canora;
People vs. Genosa
3. March 26, 1993—
Q Now, going to
Abrasion, Furuncle
your finding no.
(L) Axilla;
3 where you
4. August 1, 1994—
were the one
Pain, mastitis (L)
who attended
breast, 2° to trauma.
the patient.
Attending physician:
What do you
Dr. Caing;
mean by
5. April 17, 1995—
abrasion
Trauma, tenderness
furuncle left
(R) Shoulder.
axilla?
Attending physician:
A Abrasion is a
Dr. Canora; and
skin wound
6. June 5, 1995—
usually when it
Swelling Abrasion (L)
comes in
leg, multiple
 contact with xxx xx
something x xxx
rough substance Q Were you able
if force is to talk with the
applied. patient?
Q What is meant A Yes, sir.
by furuncle Q What did she
axilla? tell you?
A It is secondary A As a doctor-
of the light patient
infection over relationship, we
the abrasion. need to know
Q What is meant the cause of
by pain mastitis these injuries.
secondary to And she told me
trauma? that it was done
A So, in this 4th to her by her
episode of husband.
physical injuries Q You mean, Ben
there is an Genosa?
inflammation of A Yes, sir.
left breast. So, xxx xx
[pain] meaning x xxx
there is ATTY. TABUCANON:
tenderness. Q By the way
When your Doctor, were
breast is you able to
traumatized, physical
there is examine the
tenderness pain. accused
Q So, these are sometime in the
objective month of
physical November,
injuries. 1995 when this
Doctor? incident
happened?
 A As per record, 570 SUPREME COURT
yes. REPORTS
Q What was the ANNOTATED
date? People vs. Genosa
A It was on Q What was your
November 6, November 6, 1995
1995. examination, was it an
Q So, did you examination about her
actually see the pregnancy or for some
accused other findings?
physically? A No, she was admitted for
A Yes, sir. hypertension headache
Q On November 6, which complicates her
1995, will you pregnancy.
please tell this Q When you said admitted,
Honorable meaning she was
Court, was the confined?
patient A Yes, sir.
pregnant? Q For how many days?
A Yes, sir. A One day.
Q Being a doctor, Q Where?
can you more A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
engage at what xxx xxx xxx
stage of Q Lets go back to the
pregnancy was clinical history of
she? Marivic Genosa. You
A Eight (8) said that you were able
months to examine her
pregnant. personally on November
Q So in other 6,1995 and she was 8
words, it was an months pregnant. What
advance stage of is this all about?
pregnancy? A Because she has this
A Yes, sir. problem of tension
570 headache secondary to
hypertension and I think
 I have a record here, comes from the
also the same period domestic problem.
from 1989 to 1995, she Q You mean problem in
had a consultation for her household?
twenty-three (23) times. A Probably.
Q For what? Q Can family trouble cause
A Tension headache. elevation of blood
Q Can we say that pressure, Doctor?
specially during the A Yes, if it is emotionally
latter consultation, that related and stressful it
the patient had can cause increases in
hypertension? hypertension which is
A The patient definitely unfortunately does not
had hypertension. It was response to the
refractory to our medication.
treatment. She does not Q In November 6, 1995,
response when the the date of the incident,
medication was given to did you take the blood
her, because tension pressure of the accused?
headache is more or less 571
stress related and VOL. 419, 571
emotional in nature. JANUARY
Q What did you deduce of 15, 2004
tension headache when People vs. Genosa
you said is emotional in A On November
nature? 6, 1995
A From what I deduced as consultation, the
part of our physical blood pressure
examination of the was 180/120.
patient is the family Q Is this
history in line of giving considered
the root cause of what is hypertension?
causing this disease. So, A Yes, sir, severe.
from the moment you Q Considering
ask to the patient all that she was 8
months
 pregnant, you 34 TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 14-23, 27-31.
35 TSN, December 16, 1997, pp. 15-17 & 20-21.
mean this is 36 TSN, May 22,1998, pp. 2-20.

dangerous level 37 TSN (Arturo Basobas), July 21, 1997, pp. 13, 15 & 21; TSN (Jose

of blood Barrientos), December 15, 1997, pp. 17-20; TSN (Junnie Barrientos), December
15, 1997, pp. 35-37; TSN (Ecel Arano), May 22, 1998, pp. 10 & 20.
pressure?
A It was 572
dangerous to the 572 SUPREME COURT
child or to the REPORTS
fetus.”
34 ANNOTATED
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor People vs. Genosa
of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the “ATTY. TABUCANON:
couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Q Please tell this Court,
Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the can you recall the
injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35
incident in November
Ecel Arano also testified that for a number of times she had
36
15, 1995 in the evening?
been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because A Whole morning and in
the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt the afternoon, I was in
her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was the office working then
awakened about ten o’clock at night, because the couple “were after office hours, I
very noisy . . . and I heard something was broken like a vase.” boarded the service bus
Then Marivic came running into Ecel’s room and locked the and went to Bilwang.
door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring
When I reached
them with a knife.
Bilwang, I immediately
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again
asked my son, where
asked her help—this time to find Ben—but they were unable
was his father, then my
to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him
already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic
second child said, ‘he
asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of was not home yet’. I was
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple worried because that
start arguing, she decided to leave. was payday, I was
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben anticipating that he was
Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple gambling. So while
quarreling. Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of
37 waiting for him, my
the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in eldest son arrived from
the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her: school, I prepared dinner
_______________ for my children.
Q This is evening of that he was again drunk
November 15, 1995? and I was worried that
A Yes, sir. he would again beat me
Q What time did Ben so I requested my cousin
Genosa arrive? to sleep with me, but she
A When he arrived, I was resisted because she had
not there, I was in Isabel fears that the same thing
looking for him. will happen again last
Q So when he arrived you year.
were in Isabel looking Q Who was this cousin of
for him? yours who you requested
A Yes, sir. to sleep with you?
Q Did you come back to A Ecel Araño, the one who
your house? testified.
A Yes, sir. Q Did Ecel sleep with you
Q By the way, where was in your house on that
your conjugal residence evening?
situated this time? A No, because she
A Bilwang. expressed fears, she said
Q Is this your house or you her father would not
are renting? allow her because of
A Renting. Ben.
Q What time were you 573
able to come back in VOL. 419, 573
your residence at JANUARY
Bilwang? 15, 2004
A I went back around People vs. Genosa
almost 8:00 o’clock. Q During this
Q What happened when period
you arrived in your November 15,
residence? 1995, were you
A When I arrived home pregnant?
with my cousin Ecel A Yes, 8 months.
whom I requested to Q How advance
sleep with me at that was your
time because I had fears pregnancy?
A Eight (8) A His usual
months. attitude when he
Q Was the baby got drunk.
subsequently Q You said that
born? when you
A Yes, sir. arrived, he was
Q What’s the drunk and
name of the yelling at you?
baby you were What else did he
carrying at that do if any?
time? A He is nagging at
A Marie Bianca. me for
Q What time were following him
you able to meet and he dared me
personally your to quarrel him.
husband? Q What was the
A Yes, sir. cause of his
Q What time? nagging or
A When I arrived quarreling at
home, he was you if you
there already in know?
his usual A He was angry at
behavior. me because I
Q Will you tell this was following x
Court What was x x him, looking
his disposition? for him. I was
A He was drunk just worried he
again, he was might be overly
yelling in his drunk and he
usual unruly would beat me
behavior. again.
Q What was he Q You said that he
yelling all was yelling at
about? you, what else,
did he do to you
if any?
A He was nagging from watching
at me at that television.
time and I just Q What did he do
ignored him with the bolo?
because I want A He cut the
to avoid trouble antenna wire to
for fear that he keep me from
will beat me watching T.V.
again. Perhaps 574
he was 574 SUPREME COURT
disappointed REPORTS
because I just ANNOTATED
ignore him of People vs. Genosa
his provocation Q What else happened
and he switch after he cut the wire?
off the light and A He switch off the light
I said to him, and the children were
‘why did you shouting because they
switch off the were scared and he was
light when the already holding the bolo.
children were Q How do you described
there.’ At that this bolo?
time I was also A 1 1/2 feet.
attending to my Q What was the bolo used
children who for usually?
were doing their A For chopping meat.
assignments. He Q You said the children
was angry with were scared, what else
me for not happened as Ben was
answering his carrying that bolo?
challenge, so he A He was about to attack
went to the me so I run to the room.
kitchen and Q What do you mean that
[got] a bolo and he was about to attack
cut the antenna you?
wire to stop me
A When I attempt to run he Q You said that when Ben
held my hands and he came back to your
whirled me and I fell to house, he dragged you?
the bedside. How did he drag you?
Q So when he whirled you, COURT INTERPRETER:
what happened to you? The witness
A I screamed for help and demonstrated to the
then he left. Court by using her right
Q You said earlier that he hand flexed forcibly in
whirled you and you fell her front neck)
on the bedside? A And he dragged me
A Yes, sir. towards the door
Q You screamed for help backward.
and he left, do you know ATTY. TABUCANON:
where he was going? Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside perhaps to drink 575
more. VOL. 419, 575
Q When he left what did JANUARY
you do in that particular 15, 2004
time? People vs. Genosa
A I packed all his clothes. A Outside the
Q What was your reason in bedroom and he
packing his clothes? wanted to get
A I wanted him to leave something and
us. then he kept on
Q During this time, where shouting at me
were your children, what that ‘you might
were their reactions? as well be killed
A After a couple of hours, so there will be
he went back again and nobody to nag
he got angry with me for me.’
packing his clothes, then Q So you said that
he dragged me again of he dragged you
the bedroom holding my towards the
neck. drawer?
A Yes, sir.
 Q What is there in one he used to
the drawer? open the drawer
A I was aware that I saw, it was a
it was a gun. pipe about that
COURT INTERPRETER: long, and when
(At this juncture the witness he was about to
started crying). pick-up the
ATTY. TABUCANON: wallet and the
Q Were you blade, I smashed
actually brought him then I ran to
to the drawer? the other room,
A Yes, sir. and on that very
Q What happened moment
when you were everything on
brought to that my mind was to
drawer? pity on myself,
A He dragged me then the feeling
towards the I had on that
drawer and he very moment
was about to was the same
open the drawer when I was
but he could not admitted in
open it because PHILPHOS
he did not have Clinic, I was
the key then he about to vomit.
pulled his wallet COURT INTERPRETER:
which contained (The witness at this juncture
a blade about 3 is crying intensely).
inches long and xxx xx
I was aware that x xxx
he was going to ATTY. TABUCANON:
kill me and I Q Talking of
smashed his arm drawer, is this
and then the drawer outside
wallet and the your room?
blade fell. The A Outside.
 Q In what part of A Yes, because he once
the house? used it to me.
A Dining. Q How did he do it?
Q Where were the A He wanted to cut my
children during throat.
that time? Q With the same blade?
A My children A Yes, sir, that was the
were already object used when he
asleep. intimidate me.”38

Q You mean they In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to
were inside the testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the
room? psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa
A Yes, sir. for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on
Q You said that he their talks, the former briefly related the latter’s ordeal to the
dropped the court a quo as follows:
blade, for the “Q What can you say, that
record will you you found Marivic as a
please describe battered wife? Could you
this blade about in layman’s term describe
3 inches long, to this Court what her life
how does it look was like as said to you?
like? A What I remember
A Three (3) inches happened then was it was
long and 1/2 more than ten years, that
inch wide. she was suffering
576 emotional anguish. There
576 SUPREME COURT were a lot of instances of
REPORTS abuses, to emotional
ANNOTATED abuse, to verbal abuse
People vs. Genosa and to physical abuse.
Q Is it a flexible blade? The husband had a very
A It’s a cutter. meager income, she was
Q How do you describe the the one who was
blade, is it sharp both practically the bread
edges? earner of the family. The
husband was involved in
 a lot of vices, going out case in 1999, where you
with barkadas, drinking, talked to her about three
even womanizing being hours, what was the
involved in cockfight and most relevant
going home very angry information did you
and which will trigger a gather?
lot of physical abuse. She A The most relevant
also had the experience a information was the
lot of taunting from the tragedy that happened.
husband for the reason The most important
that the husband even information were
accused her of infidelity, escalating abuses that
the husband was saying she had experienced
that the child she was during her marital life.
carrying was not his own. Q Before you met her in
So she was very angry, 1999 for three hours, we
she was at the same time presume that you
very depressed because already knew of the
she was also aware, facts of the case or at
almost like living in least you have
purgatory or even hell substantial knowledge of
when it was happening the facts of the case?
day in and day out.” 39
A I believe I had an idea of
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not the case, but I do not
merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, know whether I can
additional supporting evidence as shown below: consider them as
_______________ substantial.
38 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 19-32. xxx xxx xxx
39 TSN, January 15, 2001, pp. 37-38. Q Did you gather an
577
information from
577 VOL. 419, JANUARY Marivic that on the side
15, 2004 of her husband they
People vs. Genosa were fond of battering
“Q In your first encounter their wives?
with the appellant in this A I also heard that from
her?
Q You heard that from Q Being an expert witness,
her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a
complete example who
are the relatives of her
husband that were fond
of battering their wives? A Sir, my opinion is, she is
A What I remember that
there were brothers of
her husband who are
also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you
that there was an
instance that she stayed
in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband
followed her and
battered [her] several
times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in
what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not
remember but I was told
that she was battered in
that room.
Q Several times in that 578
room?
A Yes, sir. What I
remember was that there
is no problem about
being battered, it really
happened.
our jurisprudence is not
complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the
first time that we have
this in the Philippines,
what is your opinion?
really a battered wife
and in this kind
happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also
believe that there had
been provocation and I
also believe that she
became a disordered
person. She had to suffer
anxiety reaction because
of all the battering that
happened and so she
became an abnormal
person who had lost
she’s not during the time
and that is why it
happened because of all
the physical battering,
emo-
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
tional battering, all the
psychological abuses
that she had experienced
from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a data that I’m gathering
battered wife. Was she from her are the truth.” 41

extremely battered? The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo
A Sir, it is an extreme form Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report, which was based
42

of battering. Yes.40 on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated Report said that during the first three years of her marriage
as follows: to Ben, everything looked good—the atmosphere was fine,
“Q And you also said that normal and happy—until “Ben started to be attracted to other
you administered [the] girls and was also enticed in [to] gambling[,] especially
objective personality test, cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining
what x x x [is this] all his barkada in drinking sprees.”
about? The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he
A The objective personality showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report
test is the Millon Clinical continued: “At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as
Multiaxial Inventory. The time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed
purpose of that test is to that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every
time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to
find out about the lying
anticipate whenever
prone[ne]ss of the _______________
person.
Q What do you mean by 40Id., pp. 51-53.
41Id., p. 36.
that? 42 Exhibits “G”-”G-3” - Appellant.

A Meaning, am I dealing
with a client who is 579
telling me the truth, or is VOL. 419, JANUARY 579
she someone who can 15, 2004
exaggerate or x x x [will] People vs. Genosa
tell a lie[?] she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree].
Q And what did you They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more
discover on the basis of than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly
this objective personality and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.”
test? Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her
A She was a person who efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, “[s]he
also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-
passed the honesty test.
meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
Meaning she is a person
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and
that I can trust. That the
more frequent and more severe. x x x. 43
 From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no
doubt in the Court’s mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was
a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In
determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating
the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian
court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the
mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue
to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who
beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would
expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called ‘battered wife syndrome.’ ”
44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s
viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary,
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who
has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with—nay, comprehensible to—those who have not
been through a similar experi-
_______________
43 Ibid.
44 In R. v. Lavallee, supra.
580
580 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
ence. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women. 45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well
as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant
impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered
woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence
inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s
“ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel
trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.” In her
46
years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then.” 47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said
that “the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics, x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they
usually think that they provoke [d] it, that they were the one[s]
who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their
spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to
them.” 48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner—
poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter’s belief
that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to
keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. 49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is
also helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving
violent family relations, having evaluated “probably ten to
twenty thousand” violent family disputes within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a
result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he
became a consultant of the Battered
_______________
Ibid.
45
 46 Fiona E. Raittand M. Suzanne Zeedyk, The Implicit Relation of predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or
Psychology and Law: Women and Syndrome Evidence, pp. 66-67 (Exh. “D”).
47 Walker, Terrifying Love, p. 47.
anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.” 54

48 TSN, January 15, 2001, p. 18. Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is
49Id., p. 20. somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner,
581
she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that
VOL. 419, JANUARY 581 there is no escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from
55

15, 2004 pervasive anxiety, and

_______________
People vs. Genosa
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in 50 TSN, February 9, 2001, pp. 11-13.
about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the 51Id., p. 14.
52 Walker, Terrifying Love, p. 48.

physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to 53Id., pp. 49-50.

her loss of consciousness. 50 54Ibid.

Dr. Pajarillo explained that “overwhelming brutality, 55 Dr. Lenore Walker’s testimony before the court in Ibn-Tamas, supra.

trauma” could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form 582

of “anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.” After being
51
582 SUPREME COURT
repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons “may believe REPORTS
that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change ANNOTATED
their situation, x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the People vs. Genosa
effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to
usually fail to leave the relationship. Unless a shelter is
56

the trauma at the expense of the victim’s ability to muster an

available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore,
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she
x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even
have a predictable positive effect. 52

more. 57

A study conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at

53

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for

the University of Pennsylvania, found that “even if a person
specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the
has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she
repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long
will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
responses rather than trying to escape.” He said that it was
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that
the cognitive aspect—the individual’s thoughts—that proved
would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed
all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as “learned
to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the
helplessness.” “[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be
essential characteristics of BWS.
less important than the individual’s set of beliefs or
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don’t
“cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may
of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly
described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able
to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
stage. However, that single incident does not prove the
existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove
that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or
build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally
respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did she
employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the
next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard
to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she
would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s house; that 58
Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise
to change; and that believing his words, she would return to
their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents
between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the
only
_______________
56Psychologist Nancy Kaser-Boyd testifying as an expert on the battered
woman syndrome in Depetris, supra.
57 Dr. Lenore Walker’s testimony before the court in Ibn-Tamas, supra.
58 Her biological parents lived separately.
583
VOL. 419, JANUARY 583
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of
his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped
in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as
preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her
factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the
expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to
explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically,
how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings
inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated
each other’s testimonies, which were culled from their
numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they
failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts
that appellant had related to them—if at all—based on which
they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a
modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the Records lack supporting evidence
that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman
syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. 59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court
reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of
mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense —she 60
must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer
and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save
her life.
_______________
59State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982).
60“The case would rise or fall on whether . . . [appellant] acted in actual fear
of imminent harm from her husband when she shot [or injured] him . . .
.” Depetris v. Kuykendall, supra. See also People v. Torres, 128 Misc2d 129, 488
NYS.2d 358.
584
584 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
 People vs. Genosa
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one
who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
61
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense: 62
“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful
aggression;
Second. Reasonable
necessity of the means
employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of
sufficient provocation
on the part of the
person defending
himself.”
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected
63
attack—or an imminent danger thereof—on the life or safety
of a person. In the present case, however, according to the
64
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from
his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of
their children’s bedroom—and based on past violent incidents,
there was a great probability that he would still have pursued
her and inflicted graver harm—then, the imminence of the
real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is
_______________
61 People v. PO3 Langres, 375 Phil. 240, 258; 316 SCRA 769, October 13,
1999.
62 See also People v. Plazo, 350 SCRA 433, January 29, 2001; People v.
Cario, 351 Phil. 644; 288 SCRA 404, March 31, 1998; People v. Timblor, 348
Phil. 847; 285 SCRA 64, January 27, 1998.
63 People v. Saul, 312 SCRA 636, December 19, 2001.
64 People v. Galapin, 355 Phil. 212; 293 SCRA 474, July 31, 1998; People v.
Panes, 343 Phil. 878; 278 SCRA 357, August 29, 1997.
585
VOL. 419, JANUARY 585
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious,
deadly attack before she can defend her life “would amount to
sentencing her to ‘murder by installment.’ ” Still, impending
65
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous
battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force
must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can
satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such
66
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of
67
such aggression, there can be no self-defense—complete or
incomplete—on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic’s killing
68
of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not
raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her
penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her
favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a A What causes the trauma
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it is probably the
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not repetitious battering.
been raised by the parties. 69
Second, the severity of
From several psychological tests she had administered to the battering. Third, the
Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report prolonged administration
dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows: of battering or the
“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated prolonged commission of
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form
the battering and the
of
_______________ psychological and
constitutional stamina of
65 State v. Gallegos, 104 NM 247, 719 P.2d 1268, citing Eber, The Battered Wife’s
the victim and another
Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed,32 Hasting LJ 895, 928 (1981).
66Id., citing State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (1985). one is the public and
67 People v. Saul, supra.
social support available
68 People v. Bato, 348 SCRA 253, December 15, 2000.

69 People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169; 308 SCRA 687, June 21, 1999; People v.
to the victim. If nobody
Discalsota, G.R. No. 136892, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 583. is interceding, the more
586
she will go to that
586 SUPREME COURT disorder . . . .
REPORTS xxx xxx xxx
ANNOTATED Q You referred a while ago
People vs. Genosa to severity. What are the
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological qualifications in terms of
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she severity of the
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her posttraumatic stress
husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can A The severity is the most
only be ended by an act of violence on her part.” 70
severe continuously to
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He trig[g]er this
explained that the effect of “repetitious pain taking, post[t]raumatic stress
repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment” as well disorder is injury to the
as the severity and the prolonged administration of the head, banging of the head
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. Expounding 71 like that. It is usually the
thereon, he said: very very severe stimulus
“Q What causes the trauma, that precipitate this
Mr. Witness? post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are
 suffocating the victim ]classification
like holding a pillow on you called
the face, strangulating the delayed or
individual, suffocating [a]typical]?
the individual, and A The acute is the
boxing the individual. In one that usually
this situation therefore, require only one
the victim is heightened battering and the
to painful stimulus, like individual will
for example she is manifest now a
pregnant, she is very severe emotional
susceptible because the instability,
woman will not only higher
protect herself, she is also irritability
to protect the fetus. So remorse,
the anxiety is heightened restlessness, and
to the end [sic] degree. fear and
Q But in terms of the probably in most
gravity of the disorder, [acute] cases the
Mr. Witness, how do you first thing will
classify? be happened to
A We classify the disorder the individual
as [acute], or chronic or will be thinking
delayed or [a]typical. of suicide.
_______________ Q And in chronic
70 Exhibits “B” et seq. - Appellant, p. 10.
cases, Mr.
71 TSN, February 9, 2001, p. 19. Witness?
A The chronic
587
VOL. 419, 587 cases is this
JANUARY repetitious
15, 2004 battering,
repetitious
People vs. Genosa
maltreatment,
Q Can you please
any prolonged, it
describe this
is longer than
pre[-
six (6) months.
 The [acute] is Q As you were saying[,] it
only the first day x x x obfuscated her
to six (6) rationality?
months. After A Of course obfuscated.”73

this six (6) In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence
months you inflicted upon appellant resulted in “cumulative provocation
become chronic. which broke down her psychological resistance and natural
It is stated in the self-control,” “psychological paralysis,” and “difficulty in
book concentrating or impairment of memory.”
specifically that Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
after six (6) manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished
months is the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
chronic. The depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
[a]typical one is resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or
the repetitious intent. Pursuant to para-
_______________
battering but the
individual who 72Id., pp. 15-17.
is abnormal and 73Id., p. 54.
then become 588
normal. This is 588 SUPREME COURT
how you get REPORTS
neurosis from ANNOTATED
neurotic People vs. Genosa
personality of graphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
74 75

these cases of circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a

post[t]raumatic mitigating factor. 76

stress disorder.” 72
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
expert witness clarified further: powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
“Q But just the same[,] obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present
neurosis especially on when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
battered woman burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or
syndrome x x x affects x by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
x x his or her mental reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
77

capacity? requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
A Yes, your Honor. sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was
the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic.
He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by
the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It
should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her
fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was
79
directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child,
naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to
_______________
74 “Art.
13. Mitigating Circumstances.—The following are mitigating
circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
“9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of
the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.”
75 “10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned.”
76 See People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 596; 311 SCRA 576, July 28, 1999; People
v. Amit, 82 Phil 820, February 15, 1949; People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, July
16, 1947; People v. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805, January 9, 1948.
77 People v. Lobino, 375 Phil. 1065; 317 SCRA 606, October 28, 1999; People
v. Valles, 334 Phil. 763; 267 SCRA 103, January 28, 1997.
78 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, p. 272 (1998).
79 According to Dr. Lenore Walker, batterers commonly “escalate their
abusiveness” when their wives are pregnant.
589
VOL. 419, JANUARY 589
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state
continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and
her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried
open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took
the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion
that there was no considerable period of time within which
Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful
is Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony that with “neurotic anxiety”—a
80
psychological effect on a victim of ‘‘overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma”—the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She
cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the most
vicious trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but
the suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a
person under similar circumstances, must have been what
Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and
prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity.
Accordingly, she should further be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances—
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation—
did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the
cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings
over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis,
which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her
acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from
the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the
killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months
pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt
not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn, child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation
on her part.
_______________
Id., pp. 17-18.
80
590
590 SUPREME COURT A And he dragged me
REPORTS towards the door
ANNOTATED backward.
People vs. Genosa ATTY. TABUCANON:
Second Legal Issue: Q Where did he bring you?
Treachery A Outside the bedroom and
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes he wanted to get
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the something and then he
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the kept on shouting at me
defense that the offended party might make. In order to
81
that ‘you might as well
qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be killed so there will be
be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be nobody to nag me’
deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no Q So you said that he
place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the gravity of
82
dragged you towards the
the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively drawer?
as the killing itself.
83
A Yes, sir.
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the Q What is there in the
trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It drawer?
inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact A I was aware that it was a
that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with
gun.
an “open, depressed, circular” fracture located at the back of _______________
his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally
attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish 81People v. Cabande, 381 Phil. 889; 325 SCRA 77, February 8, 2000.
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads 82People v. Llanes, 381 Phil. 733; 324 SCRA 727, February 4, 2000.
83 People v. Albao, 383 Phil. 873; 327 SCRA 123, March 2, 2000; People v.

us to the events surrounding his death: Aguilar, 354 Phil. 360; 292 SCRA 349, July 10, 1998.
“Q You said that when Ben
591
came back to your house,
VOL. 419, 591
he dragged you? How did
he drag you? JANUARY
15, 2004
COURT:
(The witness People vs. Genosa
demonstrated to the COURT INTERPRETER
Court by using her right (At this juncture
hand flexed forcibly in the witness
her front neck) started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you blade, I smashed
actually brought him then I ran to
to the drawer? the other room,
A Yes, sir. and on that very
Q What happened moment
when you were everything on
brought to that my mind was to
drawer? pity on myself,
A He dragged me then the feeling
towards the I had on that
drawer and he very moment
was about to was the same
open the drawer when I was
but he could not admitted in
open it because PHILPHOS
he did not have Clinic, I was
the key then he about to vomit.
pulled his wallet COURT INTERPRETER
which contained (The witness at
a blade about 3 this juncture is
inches long and crying
I was aware that intensely).
he was going to xxx xx
kill me and I x xxx
smashed his arm Q You said that he
and then the dropped the
wallet and the blade, for the
blade fell. The record will you
one he used to please describe
open the drawer this blade about
I saw, it was a 3 inches long,
pipe about that how does it look
long, and when like?
he was about to A Three (3) inches
pick-up the long and 1/2
wallet and the inch wide.
 Q It is a flexible and I ran to the
blade? other room.
A It’s a cutter. 592
Q How do you 592 SUPREME COURT
describe the REPORTS
blade, is it sharp ANNOTATED
both edges? People vs. Genosa
A Yes, because he Q What else happened?
once used it to A When I was in the other
me. room, I felt the same
Q How did he do thing like what
it? happened before when I
A He wanted to was admitted in
cut my throat. PHILPHOS Clinic, I
Q With the same was about to vomit. I
blade? know my blood pressure
A Yes, sir, that was raised. I was
was the object frightened I was about to
used when he die because of my blood
intimidate me. pressure.
xxx xx COURT INTERPRETER:
x xxx (Upon the answer of the
ATTY. TABUCANON: witness getting the pipe
Q You said that and smashed him, the
this blade fell witness at the same time
from his grip, is pointed at the back of
it correct? her neck or the nape).
A Yes, because I ATTY. TABUCANON:
smashed him. Q You said you went to the
Q What happened? room, what else
A Ben tried to happened?
pick-up the A Considering all the
wallet and the physical sufferings that
blade, I pick-up I’ve been through with
the pipe and I him, I took pity on
smashed him myself and I felt I was
 about to die also because thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the
of my blood pressure same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In
and the baby, so I got the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
that gun and I shot him. deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
COURT crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the
/to Atty. Tabucanon doubt in her favor. 87

Q You shot him? Proper Penalty

A Yes, I distorted the
drawer.” 84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence
of treachery. There is no showing of the victim’s position
relative to appellant’s at the time of the shooting. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
have been found to have attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The
88 89

by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant. 85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is
imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are
to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree,
and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have
attended the commission of the offense. Under the 90

assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense
that might be put up by the party attacked. There is no 86
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally
chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
_______________
84 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 26-32.
85 People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364; 325 SCRA 476, February 15,
2000;People v. Ereño, 383 Phil. 30; 326 SCRA 157, February 22, 2000.
86 People v. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478, February 5, 1923; People v. Narvaez, 206
Phil 314; 121 SCRA 389, April 20, 1983.
593
VOL. 419, JANUARY 593
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
shall be within the range of that which is next lower in
degree—prision mayor—and the maximum shall be within the
range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we
deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day
in prison as minimum; toreclusion temporal in its medium
period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting
that appellant has already served
_______________
87People v. Aguilar, supra.
88“Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods.
xxx xxx xxx
“5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.”
xxx xxx xxx
 89 People v. Narvaez, 206 Phil. 314; 121 SCRA 389, April 20, 1983; Guevarra
v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 484, July 16, 1990.
90 Basan v. People, 61 SCRA 275, November 29, 1974.
594
594 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released
from detention on parole. 91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered
woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and
recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case.
The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-
day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in
which decisions are made—on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and
proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look
at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand
the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of
the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and
appellant’s counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in
such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered
persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only
Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of
self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We
now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding
the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third,at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily
immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the
present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
_______________
91 §5, Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as amended).
595
VOL. 419, JANUARY 595
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is
REDUCEDto six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de
oficio.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., I join Mm. Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., In the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J.,Please see dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I am joining Justice Santiago
in her dissent.
 Austria-Martinez, J.,I am joining Justice Santiago in
her dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our
esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban found
that there was no factual basis to conclude that Marivic was
suffering from “Battered Woman Syndrome” (BWS) at the
time she took the life of her husband. With due respect, I
register my dissent.
The novel theory of “Battered Woman Syndrome” is
recognized in foreign jurisprudence as a form of self-defense.
It operates upon the premise that a woman who has been
cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time develops
a fearful state of mind. Living in constant danger of harm or
death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to
occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of
the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a
particular attack is forthcoming, and
596
596 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle
of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible
solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her
batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending
lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity
beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal
means of eliminating her sufferings. 1
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the “Battered
Woman Syndrome” has three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-
building phase, where minor batterings in the form of verbal
or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to pacify
the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way; (2) the acute battering incident
phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and
sometimes, death. The battered woman usually realizes that
she cannot reason with him and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where
the couple experience a compound relief and the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was
able to establish the occurrence on more than one occasion of
the “tension-building phase” of the cycle. The various
testimonies of appellant’s witnesses clearly reveal that she
knew exactly when she would once again be subjected to acute
battery. Her cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she often asked
the latter to sleep in her house as she was afraid every time
her husband came home drunk. Clearly, whenever appellant
requested for Arano’s company, she was experiencing a
tension-building phase. The barangay captain, Panfilo Tero,
also testified that appellant sought his help two months before
she killed her husband, again demonstrating that she was in
the tension-building phase and was attempting to prevent
another incident of acute battery. Appellant presented
evidence to prove that the tension-building phase would occur
whenever her husband would go out looking for other women,
would lose at cockfights or would come home drunk. She often
tried to ignore her husband’s attitude or, as testified to by
some witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought
off or even injured her husband during
_______________
1 People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA 493,
498.
597
VOL. 419, JANUARY 597
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute
battery.
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-
building phase of the cycle immediately prior to the death of
her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that she was going to
be killed by the deceased. She could not possibly have testified
by the repeated “kiss and make-up” episodes of their
relationship. On more than 5 occasions,
_______________
2 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 22-30; 47-49; 50-51.
3Id., pp. 8-13, 18.
4 Exhibit “1”, Compilation of Exhibits, p. 44.

with clarity as to prior tension-building phases in the cycle as 598

she had never tried to kill her husband before this time. 598 SUPREME COURT
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even REPORTS
witnesses for the prosecution that appellant would seek
ANNOTATED
shelter in her mother’s or her father’s house after an acute
People vs. Genosa
battering incident, after which would begin the process of
begging for forgiveness, promises of change in behavior and Marivic ran to her parents’ house after violent fights with the
return to the conjugal home, only for the same cycle to begin deceased only to forgive the latter every time he would fetch
all over again. her and promise to change. 5

To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance
deceased, as seems to be required in the ponencia,would mean and forgiveness developed a trauma in the mind of Marivic
that no person would ever be able to prove self-defense in a making her believe that a forthcoming attack from the
battered woman case. Appellant could not possibly prove deceased would cause her death. This state of mind of Marivic
whether the deceased felt provoked into battering by any act was revealed in her testimony given way back in 1998, before
or omission of appellant. She cannot possibly prove that she she was examined by experts on BWS. Unaware of the
felt herself to be the sole support of the deceased’s emotional significance of her declarations, she candidly narrated how she
stability and well-being. Nevertheless, appellant felt trapped felt immediately before she killed the deceased, thus—
and helpless in the relationship as, in the end, she resorted to ATTY. TABUCANON
killing her husband as no one could or did help her, whether Q So you said that he
out of fear or insensitivity, during the violent marriage she dragged you towards the
endured. drawer?
The “acute battering incident stage” was well demonstrated A Yes, sir.
by the severe beatings suffered by Marivic in the hands of the Q What is there in the
deceased as well as the threats to kill her using a bolo or a drawer?
cutter. The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times a week in
2 A I was aware that it was a
the 11 miserable years of their marriage, six incidents of
3 gun.
which were documented by the 1990-1995 medical records of xxx xxx xxx
Marivic. They included, among others, hematoma, contusion, Q What happened when you
and pain on the breasts; multiple contusions and trauma on were brought to the
the different parts of her body even during her pregnancy in drawer?
1995. The tranquil period underwent by Marivic was shown
4
A He dragged me towards
the drawer and he was
about to open the drawer
but he could not open it
because he did not have
the key. [T]hen he pulled
his wallet which contained
a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that
he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the
blade fell. The one he used
to open the drawer I saw,
it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was
about to pick-up the wallet
and the blade, I smashed
him then I ran to the room,
and on that very moment
everything on my mind
was pity on myself, then
the feeling I had on that
very moment was the
same when I was admitted
in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx 6
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I
felt the same thing like
what happened before I
was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
about to vomit. I know my
blood pressure has raised.
I was frightened I was
about to die because of my
blood pressure.
xxx xxx xxx
_______________
5TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 12-13; 36-37.
Id., pp. 27-28.
6
599
VOL. 419, 599
JANUARY
15, 2004
People vs. Genosa
A Considering all
the physical
sufferings that
I’ve been
throughhim, I
took pity on
myself and I felt
I was about to
die also because
of my blood
pressure and the
baby, so I got
the gun andshot
him. 7
It must be stressed that the defense of “Battered Woman
Syndrome” was not raised by Marivic before the lower court
but only here on automatic review. This makes the foregoing
testimony more worthy of great weight and credence
considering that the same could not have been cunningly given
to suit or conform to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death
because of her medical history. Dr. Dino Caing testified that
he treated Marivic for hypertension due to domestically
related emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The latest was carrying was not his
one was on November 6, 1995 when she suffered from severe own. So she was very
hypertension and had a blood pressure of 180/120 on the 8th angry, she was at the same
month of her pregnancy. 8
time very depressed
Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical because she . . . [felt]
psychologist and an expert on BWS who examined Marivic, almost like living in
assessed the effects of the repeated violence on the latter as purgatory or even in hell
follows: when it was happening
A What I remember . . . was day in and day out.
it was more than ten years xxx xxx xxx
that she was suffering _______________
from emotional anguish.
There were a lot of Id., pp. 31-32.
7

8TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 21-31.

instance of abuses, . . .
emotional abuse...verbal 600
abuse and . . . physical 600 SUPREME COURT
abuse. The husband had REPORTS
very meager income, she ANNOTATED
was the one who was People vs. Genosa
practically the bread Q And what was it that
earner of the family. The triggered . . . that
husband was involved in a tragedy in your opinion?
lot of vices, going out A I think for several
with barkadas, drinking, weeks, she was already
even womanizing, being having all those
involved in cockfighting tensions, all those
and in going home very anxieties, they were not
angry which . . . triggered enough, that the husband
a lot of physical abuse. was even going to
She also had the cockfighting x x x
experience of taunting A She was angry with him,
from the husband for the he was angry with her
reason that the husband and I think he dragged
even accused her of her and even spun her
infidelity, the husband was around. She tried to fight
saying that the child she him so there was a lot of
 fight and when she was hour contact with
able to escape, she went appellant Mrs. Genosa,
to another room and she could you say that this is
locked herself with the not ordinary self-defense
children. And when the but a survival on her
husband was for a while part?
very angry he calms A Yes, sir.
down then and then Q To what she did to her
(sic). But I remember husband (sic)?
before that the husband A Yes, sir this is not an
was looking for the gun ordinary self-defense,
and I think he was not but this [is] a need to
able to open the cabinet survive, a need to
because she had the key. survive with her two
So during that time, I sons and [the] child
remember, that she was she’s bringing.
very much afraid of him, Q Had she not able to kill
so when the husband her husband, would she
calmed down and he still be in the very short
was asleep, all she was moment with the victim
concerned was to end up (sic)?
her misery, to save her A If she did not do that she
child which she was believes that she will be
carrying and to save her the one who would be
two children. I believe killed.10

that somehow she’s not There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the
rational.
9
“Battered Woman Syndrome” and that it was an apprehension
xxx xxx xxx of death and the instinct to defend her and her unborn child’s
PROS. TRUYA life that drove her to kill her husband.
Q Mrs. Witness, being an _______________

expert witness, giving 9 TSN, January 15, 2001, pp. 38-40.

more the facts and 10 Id.,pp. 74-75.
circumstances on this 601
case that the books you VOL. 419, JANUARY 601
studied in the expertise 15, 2004
in line and in the 77
 People vs. Genosa A When I arrived home, he
The ponente further refused to sustain the self-defense was already in his usual
proffered by Marivic because there was allegedly no behavior.
aggression or danger posed on her life by the victim at the time xxx xxx xxx
she attacked the latter; Again, I beg to disagree. A He was drunk again, he
Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be was yelling in his usual
appreciated, the unlawful aggression or the attack must be unruly behavior.
imminent and actually in existence. This interpretation must, xxx xxx xxx
however, be re-evaluated vis-à-vis the recognized inherent A He was nagging . . . me at
characteristic of the psyche of a person afflicted with the that time and I just
“Battered Woman Syndrome.” As previously discussed, ignore[d] him because I
women afflicted by this syndrome live in constant fear for their want to avoid trouble for
life and thus respond in self-defense. Once BWS and an fear that he will beat me
impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in again. Perhaps he was
previous battering episodes are established, actual occurrence disappointed because I just
of an assault is no longer a condition sine qua non before self
ignore[d]
defense may be upheld. Threatening behavior or 602
communication can satisfy the required imminence of 602 SUPREME COURT
danger. As stated in the ponencia,to require the battered REPORTS
person to await an obvious deadly attack before she can defend ANNOTATED
her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
People vs. Genosa
installment.
hi[s] provocation and he
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the
deceased, which culminated in the physical assaults and an
switch off the light and I
attempt to shoot Marivic when she was 8 months pregnant, said to him, “why did
took the place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her to a you switch off the light
complete self-defense even if there was no actualemployment when the children were
of violence by the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic there.” At that time I
had every reason to believe that the deceased would kill her was also attending to my
that night not only because the latter was verbally threatening children who were doing
to kill her while attempting to get a gun from the drawer, but their assignments. He
more importantly because the deceased wounded her on the was angry with me for
wrist with a bolo, and because of the deceased’s previous not answering his
conduct of threatening to cut her throat with a cutter which he challenge, so he went to
kept in his wallet. Quoted hereunder are the relevant the kitchen and g[o]t a
testimonies of Marivic— bolo and cut the antenna
 wire to stop me from Q Were you wounded or
watching television. were there inflictions on
xxx xxx xxx your body when he was
A He switch[ed] off the holding and trying to
light and the children frighten you [with] that
were shouting because bolo?
they were scared and he A No, only here.
was already holding a COURT INTERPRETER
bolo. (The witness pointed to her
Q How do you describe wrist).
this bolo? COURT
A 1 1/2 feet. To the witness
xxx xxx xxx Q You were demonstrating
Q You said the children a motion, whirling, did
were scared, what else your husband really
happened as Ben was whirl you?
carrying that bolo? A Yes, your Honor.
A He was about to attack Q How did he whirl you?
me so I ran to the room. A Whirled around.
Q What do you mean that _______________
he was about to attack 11 TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 22-25.
you?
A When I attempted] to 603

run he held my hands VOL. 419, 603

and he whirled me and I JANUARY
fell [on] the bedside.
11
15, 2004
xxx xxx xxx People vs. Genosa
COURT Q Just like
To the witness spinning.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xx
Q The bolo that you said x xxx
which Ben was holding Q Where did he
at that time, [was] it a whirl you, was
bolo or a knife? it inside the
A Bolo. bedroom or
outside?
A In our bedroom. I was afraid and
Q Then after the I want to make
whirling what sure I would
happened? deliver my baby
A He kicked my safely.14

ass and then I xxx xx

screamed. 12
x xxx
xxx xx A After a couple
x xxx of hours, he
Q You screamed went back again
for help and he and got angry
left, do you with me for
know where he packing his
was going? clothes, then he
A Outside perhaps dragged me
to drink more. again outside of
Q When he left the bedroom
what did you do holding my
. . .? neck.
A I packed all his ATTY. TABUCANON
clothes. Q You said that
Q What was your when Ben came
reason in back to your
packing his house, he
clothes? dragged you?
A I wanted him to How did he drag
leave us.
13
. . . you?
xxx xx COURT INTERPRETER
x xxx (The witness
A I was frightened demonstrated to
that my husband the Court by
would hurt me, using her right
so I packed all hand flexed
his things then forcibly in her
on the following front neck)
day I will leave,
 A
And he dragged Q What happened when
me towards the you were brought to the
door backwards. drawer?
ATTY. TABUCANON A He dragged me towards
Q Where did he the drawer and he was
bring you? about to open the drawer
A Outside the but he could not open it
bedroom and he because he did not have
wanted to get the key. [T]hen he
something and pulled his wallet which
then he kept contained a blade about
shouting at me 3 inches long and I was
that “you might aware that he was going
as well be killed to kill me and I smashed
so there will be his arm and then the
nobody to nag wallet and the blade fell.
me.” The one he used to open
_______________ the drawer I saw, it was
12Id., pp. 47-49.
a pipe about that long,
13Id., pp. 25-26. and when he was about
14Id., p. 34.
to pick-up the wallet and
604 the blade, I smashed him
604 SUPREME COURT then I ran to the room,
REPORTS and on that very moment
ANNOTATED everything on my mind
People vs. Genosa was pity on myself, then
Q So you said that he the feeling I had on that
dragged you towards the very moment was the
drawer? same when I was
A Yes, sir. admitted in PHILPHOS
Q What is there in the Clinic, I was about to
drawer? vomit.
A I was aware that it was a xxx xxx xxx
gun. Q You said that he
xxx xxx xxx dropped the blade, for
the record will you
 please describe this happened on the second
blade about 3 inches incident (sic)?
long, how does it look _______________
like? Id.,pp. 26-30.
15

A Three (3) inches long

and 1/2 inch wide. 605

Q Is it a flexible blade? VOL. 419, 605

A It’s a cutter. JANUARY
Q How do you describe the 15, 2004
blade, is it sharp both People vs. Genosa
edges? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, because he once COURT
used it to me. To the witness
Q How did he do it? xxx xx
A He wanted to cut my x xxx
throat. Q Why, what is
Q With the same blade? that blade
A Yes sir, that was the about?
object used when he A A cutter about
intimidate me. 15 3 inches long.
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. Q Who used
TABUCANON that?
Q In other words, there A Ben.
were two (2) incidents, Q He used that
the first incident and on you?
then he left and then two A He scared me
(2) hours after he came on that (sic).
back? xxx xx
A Yes, sir. x xxx
Q And the whirling Q But he did not
happened in the first hit you with
incident? that?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, because I
Q And the dragging with managed to
arms flexed in her neck run every time
and on that blade
 he scared
(sic).
16
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct
evidence. One of this is state of mind. In the case at bar, there
is more than sufficient physical evidence presented by the
appellant from which her mental state can be inferred. The
prosecution did not object to the presentation of these physical
and testimonial pieces of evidence, namely, the medical
records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related injuries
and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the
barangay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23 reported
instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her spouse in
the first place. The majority need not worry that women
around the country will mastermind the killings of their
husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their attempts
to employ the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be
allowed the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a finding that the
acts of violence and battery committed by the deceased were
illegal and unlawful and were committed immediately before
appellant could recover her natural equanimity. But what is
the natural equanimity of a battered woman? Appellant was
not a normal married woman. She can never be in a state of
natural equanimity as she was in a constant state of alertness
and hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute battery. The
esteemed ponente also correctly found that the
_______________
16 Id.,pp. 50-51.
606
606 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
appellant acted with diminished will-power. However, he
failed to go further. In the case of People v. Javier, it was held:
17
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance
of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the
accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss
of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental
condition at the time of the killing. This Court can hardly rely on
the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions
and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that
accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his
exercise of will-power at the time of the kill-ing.
18
In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact
present clear and convincing evidence that she was a battered
woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from the
“Battered Woman Syndrome.” Expert testimony was
presented and admitted to this effect, such that
the ponente ably discussed the causes and effects of the
syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence thus
presented is to make impossible the proof of mental state.
Evidence as to the mental state need not be also “beyond
reasonable doubt.”
Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern
of the batterer in previous violent episodes was sufficiently
satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic’s
affliction with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The
danger posed or created in her mind by the latter’s threats
using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the
circumstances, the natural response of the battered woman
would be to defend herself even at the cost of taking the life of
the batterer.
The ponencia’sacknowledgement of “Battered Woman
Syndrome” as a valid form of self-defense, is a noble
recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women
who are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This
would however be an empty victory if we deliberately close our
eyes to the antecedents of this case. The facts are simple.
Marivic was suffering from the “Battered Woman Syndrome”
and was defending herself when she killed her husband. Her
acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in order.
_______________

G.R. No. 130654, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 576.

17

Supra,at 581-582.
18

607
VOL. 419, JANUARY 607
15, 2004
People vs. Badajos
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person—a mere threatening or intimidating attitude
is not sufficient. (Calim vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA
559 [2001])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; The law reclassified rape as a crime
against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against
chastity.—In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept
of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a
crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps
the law’s most progressive proviso is the 2ndparagraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz.: Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.—The subsequent
valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal
husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. Read
together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the
term “man” in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353
penal-
* FIRST DIVISION.
109izes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; In spite of qualms on tagging the
crime as ‘marital rape’ due to conservative Filipino impressions on
marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of ‘rape.’—The
explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records
of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law’s progenitor’s,
House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of ‘rape.’
Same; Same; Same; The paradigm shift on marital rape in the
Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which
regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may
be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family
abode.—The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine
jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape
within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed
by a man against his wife within or outside the family
abode, viz.: Violence against women and their children refers
to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: A.
“Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm; B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to: a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking
the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do
110indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser; b) acts causing or attempting to
cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion; c) Prostituting the woman or child. Statistical figures
confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of
nonpersonal violence are the most common type of spousal violence
accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in
seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their
husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion
that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed.—The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the
role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination
of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures is R.A.
No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights
over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
which was promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to
the CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-
based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women,
identified ‘marital rape’ as a species of sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; A man who penetrates her wife without her
consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under
111R.A. No. 8353.—Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape,
as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to
the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. A woman is no longer
the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who
has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property,
he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without
her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on
its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance
in a progressive society. It is true that the Family Code, obligates
the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and
sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force
or coercion.
Same; Same; Same; The delicate and reverent nature of sexual
intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and
coercion.—The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy
between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual
intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by
the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.
When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation,
the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice
and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who
feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife’s absolute
refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court’s
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an
essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.112
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; To treat
marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.—To treat marital
rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of rape in Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator’s own spouse.—As above discussed, the definition of rape
in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally
known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
victim is the perpetrator’s own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.
Same; Same; Same; A marriage license should not be viewed as
a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity.—The
Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale
in Liberta in rejecting the argument
akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right
to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give
or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband
and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she
refuses.
Same; Same; Same; The human rights of women include their
right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive
health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.—The human
rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
113freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality,
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence. Women do not divest themselves of
such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that
human rights are inalienable. In fine, since the law does not
separately categorize marital rape and nonmarital rape nor provide
for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to
interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the
forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from
what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or
stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally
classify them differently from the victims of nonmarital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply
the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the
aggressor is the woman’s own legal husband. The elements and
quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape
cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Same; Same; Evidence; In rape cases, the conviction of the
accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.—In rape cases,
the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the
victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine
thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused
in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to
establish that their reliance on the victim’s testimony is justified.
Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and
otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is settled that the
evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.—It is settled that the
evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its
inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their
deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-
examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was
tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value
114have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.
Criminal Law; Rape; Prosecution of Offenses; In the prosecution
of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence
of the victim’s consent to the sexual congress.—Entrenched is the rule
that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that
must be proved is the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual
congress. Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled
from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended
party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Same; Same; As an element of rape, force or intimidation need
not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired
result.—As an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be
irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result.
What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such
a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into
submission.
Same; Same; Medical Certificates; It is not the presence or
absence of blood on the victim’s underwear that determines the fact
of rapeinasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that
is not necessary to prove rape.—Contrary to the accused-appellant’s
allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK’s panties or the lack of
a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or
absence of blood on the victim’s underwear that determines the fact
of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not pertain to
the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is —
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent.
Same; Same; It must be stressed that rape is essentially
committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who
can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.—
The accused-appellant’s assertion that MMM and OOO’s
testimonies
115lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual
rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially
committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim
who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO’s
testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape
but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK’s
narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and
concurrent with, the rape incidents.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; Fear of reprisal thru social
humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital
rape cases.—Fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the
common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to
the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in
view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife’s absolute
obligation to submit to her husband’s carnal desires. A husband
raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or
trivialized as simple domestic trouble. Unfamiliarity with or lack of
knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and
public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had
the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been
sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in
reporting the subject rape incidents.
Same; Alibi; Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only
because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is
easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut.—Alibi is one of the
weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify
falsely. For the defense of alibito prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance
between the place where the accused was and the place where the
crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more
importantly, the facility of access between the two places.
116
Same; Same; Denials; Between the accused-
appellant’s alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court
must give weight to the latter.—Between the accused-
appellant’s alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court
must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive
on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Same; Rape; Penalties; Parole; Persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of R.A. No. 9346, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.—The Court affirms the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the
accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation
to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that “persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”
 Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Rape is a crime that evokes
global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman’s value
and dignity as a human being.—Rape is a crime that evokes global
condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman’s value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical
condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen
to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her
time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by
her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide
the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; Husbands are reminded that
marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives.—Husbands are
once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape
their wives. A husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of
marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human
right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can
lawfully
117opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A
husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to
make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that
can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage. Sexual
intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual
and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of
procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dacalos Law Office for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.:
“Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to
love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide
her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his
means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He
is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain
and support her, but also to protect her from oppression
and wrong.”[1]
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State
policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353
or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
_______________
[1] 26 Am Jur SS8, p. 636.
118
The Case
This is an automatic review[2] of the Decision[3]dated July
9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00353, which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated April 1, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669
convicting Edgar Jumawan (accused-appellant) of two (2)
counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,[5] were married on
October 18, 1975. They lived together since then and raised
their four (4) children[6] as they put up several businesses over
the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit,[7] alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence
in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and
_______________
[2] Pursuant to People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433
SCRA 640, 653-658.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate
Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 5-
30.
[4] Issued by Judge Anthony E. Santos; Records, pp. 760-769.
 [5] The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other 120
information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed 1997.
to protect her privacy and fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in
accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703; 502 SCRA 419 [2006]), The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued
and A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC dated September 19, 2006.
on July 21, 1999.[11]On August 18, 1999, the accused-
[6] Pre-trial Order dated November 16, 1999, Records, pp. 71-74.
[7] Id., at pp. 23-24. appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,[12] which was
denied by the trial court in an Order[13]dated August 19, 1999.
119that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he
her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.[14]
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to
Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,[8]finding Admit Amended Information[15] averring that the name of the
probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries private complainant was omitted in the original informations
and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a
information be filed against the accused-appellant. Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,[16] attested
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16,
before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99- 1998 and October 17, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated
668[9]and Criminal Case No. 99-669.[10] The Information in in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted
Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as on January 18, 2000.[17]Accordingly, the criminal
follows: informations were amended as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, Criminal Case No. 99-668:
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[’]s will. person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
1997. against the latter’s will.
_______________
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 [11] Id., at p. 27.
reads: [12] Id., at pp. 44-48.
[13] Id., at p. 50.
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, [14] Id., at p. 49.
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the [15] Id., at pp. 84-85.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by [16] Exhibit “7.”
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully [17] Records, p. 89.
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private 121
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter’s will. Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
_______________
1997.[18]
[8] Id., at pp. 3-5.
[9] Id., at p. 2.
[10] Id., at p. 13. Criminal Case No. 99-669:
 That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
against the latter’s will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.[19]
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint
trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s theory was anchored on the testimonies
of KKK, and her daughters MMM and OOO, which, together
with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following
events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents
where his father was one of the laborers. They got married
after a year of courtship.[20] When their first child, MMM, was
born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-
saristore.[21] Later on, they engaged in several other
businesses — trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed
the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was
under the accused-appellant’s supervision with the help of a
trusted
_______________
[18] Id., at p. 86.
[19] Id., at p. 87.
[20] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 93-95.
[21] Id., at pp. 98-99.
122employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the
rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to
haul goods.[22]
Accused-appellant’s keenness to make the businesses
flourish was not as fervent as KKK’s dedication. Even the
daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their
parents.[23] He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK
was the one who actively managed the businesses.[24] She
wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on
the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.[25]
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and
built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City.[26] Three of the children transferred residence therein
while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed
in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places
regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.[27] In 1998,
KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of
the week.[28] On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan,
Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then
returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.[29]
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems
between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.[30] However, in
1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
_______________
[22] Id., at p. 101; TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 5.
[23] TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 26-27.
[24] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21.
[25] TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 99.
[26] Id.
[27] Id., at p. 100; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 21-22.
[28] TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 30.
[29] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 23.
[30] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 95-97.
123her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual
ambush but he would threaten her into submission.[31]
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started
quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in
their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at
home because “a woman must stay in the house and only good
in bed (sic) x x x.” She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her
goal of providing a good future for the children.[32]
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October
12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in
Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter
were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already
back in Cagayan de Oro City.[33]
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK
and their children went about their nightly routine. The family
store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before
supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to
the girls’ bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the
rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the
living room.[34] OOO and MMM then prepared their beds.
Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to
come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of
the house. KKK complied.[35]
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a dasterand fixed
the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the
accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
_______________
[31] TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 17; TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 14; KKK’s Complaint
Affidavit dated February 19, 1999, Records, pp. 10-11.
[32] TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 6-7.
[33] TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 37.
[34] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 8-9; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 45-47; TSN,
August 2, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[35] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 74-75.
124the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: “[W]hy are you lying on the c[o]t[?],” and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here [to] our bed.”[36]
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had
headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified,
KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.[37]
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before
long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his
fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.[38]
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning
and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he
pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.[39] KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.[40]
The accused-appellant then raised
KKK’s daster,[41]stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her
hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying
out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “[D]on’t do that to me because I’m not
feeling well.”[42]
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden
partition on the other enclosing the spouses’
bedroom,[43] KKK’s
_______________
[36] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-76.
[37] Id., at pp. 76-77.
[38] Id., at pp. 77-78.
[39] Id., at pp. 78-79; Exhibit “A.”
[40] TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 11.
[41] Id.
[42] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 79-81.
[43] TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 46-47.
125pleas were audible in the children’s bedroom where MMM
lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting:
“Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me,”[44] MMM woke
up OOO who prodded her to go to their parents’
room.[45]MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously
knocked on the door of her parents’ bedroom and inquired: “Pa,
why is it that Mama is crying?”[46] The accused-appellant then
quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and
said: “[D]on’t interfere because this is a family trouble,” before
closing it again.[47] Since she heard her mother continue to
cry, MMM ignored his father’s admonition, knocked at the
bedroom door again, and then kicked it.[48] A furious accused-
appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once
more: “Don’t interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family
trouble!” Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the
bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother
and asked: “Ma, why are you crying?” before asking her father:
“Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is
torn[?]”[49]
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions,
she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls’
bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear and covered
herself with a blanket.[50] However, their breakout from the
room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards
the knob. He commanded KKK to “[S]tay here, you sleep in our
room,” when the trembling KKK pleaded: “Eddie, allow me to
go out.” He then held KKK’s hands but she pulled
_______________
[44] Id., at pp. 49-50.
[45] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.
[46] TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 11.
[47] Id., at p. 12; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 81-82.
[48] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 11-13; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.
[49] TSN, February 3, 2000, id.
[50] Id., at p. 14; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 82-83.
126them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against
door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their
way out.[51]
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water
and queried her as to what happened.[52] KKK relayed:
“[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex
with him when I’m not feeling well.” The girls then locked the
door and let her rest.”[53]
The accused-appellant’s aggression recurred the following
night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK
and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did
not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the
children proceeded to the girls’ bedroom and prayed the
rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room’s small
bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the
accused-appellant entered. “Why are you sleeping in the room
of our children,” he asked KKK, who responded that she
preferred to sleep with the children.[54] He then scoffed: “It’s
alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women
that could be paid [P]1,000.00.” She dismissed his comment by
turning her head away after retorting: “So be it.” After that,
he left the room.[55]
He returned 15 minutes later[56] and when KKK still
refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her
from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: “Why will you sleep here[?] Let’s go to our
bedroom.” When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants
causing
_______________
[51] TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 56-59.
[52] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 14-15.
[53] Id., at p. 16; TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 83; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 9-10.
[54] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 17-19; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 84-86; TSN,
August 2, 2000, pp. 11-13.
[55] TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 40-41.
[56] Id., at pp. 44-45.
127them to tear apart.[57] At this point, MMM interfered, “Pa,
don’t do that to Mama because we are in front of you.”[58]
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify
the accused-appellant who yelled, “[E]ven in front of you, I can
have sex of your mother [sic] because I’m the head of the
family.” He then ordered his daughters to leave the room.
Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where
they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed.[59]
 The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The
accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK’s short pants and
panties. He paid no heed as she begged, “[D]on’t do that to me,
my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do
what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex.”[60]
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her
legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside
her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short
pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing
as he conceitedly uttered: “[I]t’s nice, that is what you deserve
because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex.” He then retreated to
the masters’ bedroom.[61]
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased,
MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked.
MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached
for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering
the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the
bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: “Ma, what
happened to you, why are you crying?” KKK re-
_______________
[57] Exhibit “B.”
[58] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 19-20; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 86-87; TSN,
August 2, 2000, pp. 13-14.
[59] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 21-22; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 87-88; TSN,
August 2, 2000, pp. 14-16.
[60] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.
[61] Id., at pp. 89-90.
128plied: “[Y]our father is a beast and animal, he again forced
me to have sex with him even if I don’t feel well.”[62]
Version of the Defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant’s
father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK’s father. He came
to know KKK because she brought food for her father’s
laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was
a high school graduate while she was an elementary
graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them
from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard
work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that included
a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove
their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or corn.[63]
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16
and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. On October 7, his truck
met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside
because he had to attend MMM’s graduation in Cebu on
October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on
October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan
de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of
the truck and buy some corn.[64]
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses’ driver from January 1996
until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to
him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within
the vicinity of the rice mill’s loading area in Dangcagan,
_______________
[62] Id., at p. 90; TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 23-24; TSN, August 2, 2000,
pp. 16, 18-19.
[63] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 4-7.
[64] Id., at p. 17.
129Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998,
he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
loading sacks of corn into the truck. They finished loading at
3:00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to
proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the
former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper
and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled
truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and
thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the
separate truck loaded with corn.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three
hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar
of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant
arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to
Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3:00 a.m. of
October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while
the other three men brought the damaged truck to
Cugman.[65]
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took
over the control and management of their businesses as well
as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The
accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to
account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The
entries in their bank account showed the balance of
P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or
on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly
P9,894.88.[66] Her failure to immediately report to the police
also belies her rape allegations.[67]
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which
the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM’s
graduation
_______________
[65] TSN, April 30, 2001, pp. 6-8.
[66] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 7, 10-11; Exhibit “1.”
[67] Id., at p. 7.
130rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual
intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get
a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request
as “high-tech,” because they did not do the same when they
had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly
indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee,
not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied
herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever
she went out.[68]
Bebs,[69] KKK’s cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon
store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters
purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for
KKK.[70]
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the
accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy
or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National
Police, another one is a government employee, a certain
Fernandez and three other priests.[71] Several persons told
him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted
her or them about it because he trusted her.[72]
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement
made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was
listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch
a television program, he asked OOO to turn down the volume
of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player,
spinned around and hit the accused-appellant’s head with the
socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-
appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took
OOO’s side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK
was better off without the accused-appellant because she had
somebody young, handsome, and a businessman
_______________
[68] Id., at pp. 12-13.
[69] Also referred to as Bebie in the other parts of the Records.
[70] Id., at p. 14; Exhibit “3.”
[71] TSN, February 2, 2001, pp. 14-15.
[72] Id., at pp. 16-17.
131unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was
old, and ugly.[73]
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with
three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the
accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push
through because the accused-appellant’s parents
intervened.[74] Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation
from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No.
00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to
File Action dated February 18, 1999.[75]
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment[76] dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained
the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater
weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. The trial court also
upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters’ testimonies,
as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify
against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same
was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found
unbelievable the accused-appellant’s accusations of extra-
marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial
court shelved the accused-appellant’s alibi for being premised
on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations
of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-
appellant’s actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998.
Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
_______________
[73] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 19-21; TSN, March 12, 2001,
p. 155.
[74] TSN, October 24, 2000, p. 18.
[75] Id., at pp. 18-19; Exhibit “2.”
[76] Records, pp. 760-769.
132
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan
“GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges
of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of [P]75,000.00 in
each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[77]
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision[78] dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in
toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment
of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant
was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-
arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the
straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape
under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK’s failure to submit herself to
medical examination did not negate the commission of the
crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove
rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant’s argument that
since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual
obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be
convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged
force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The
_______________
[77] Id., at p. 769.
[78] Rollo, pp. 5-30.
133CA explained that physical showing of external injuries is
not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape;
what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the
accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness
of KKK’s accusations because no wife in her right mind would
accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently
explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out
that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and
physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant’s alibifor
lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the
time of the commission of the crimes, considering that
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is
only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal
portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.[79] [82]Id., at pp. 78-93.
[83] Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the
Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 Fordham
Hence, the present review. In the Court Urban Law Journal, p. 861 (1995). http://ir.
lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj, last accessed on March 31, 2014.
Resolution[80] dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the [84] Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman’s
parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective Right of Privacy, 11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., p. 725
supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion[81] dated (1981). http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/1, last accessed
September 4, 2009, the on March 31, 2014.
[85] Supra note 83.
_______________
[86] Id.
[79] Id., at p. 29.
[80] Id., at pp. 35-36; The contents of the Resolution was reiterated in 135
another Resolution dated November 15, 2010, id., at pp. 47-48.
[81] Id., at pp. 37-38.
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or
goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
134appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6thcentury, a
expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On woman was the property of her father until she marries to
April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed become the property of her husband.[87]If a man abducted an
his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her
de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) synonymous.[88]
KKK’s voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her
on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK’s failure to put up resistance or identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power
seek help from police authorities; and (c) the absence of a and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.[89] A
medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK’s panties.[82] husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.[90]
Our Ruling This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a
English practices of ‘bride capture’ whereby a man conquered contract, sue another, own personal property or write a
a woman through rape and ‘stealing an heiress’ whereby a will.[91]
man abducted a woman and married her.[83] II. The marital exemption rule
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief
violation of the woman’s chastity but rather to punish the act Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent
of obtaining the heiress’ property by forcible marriage[84] or to theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption
protect a man’s valuable interest in his wife’s chastity or her rule in rape. He stated that:
_______________
daughter’s virginity.[85] If a man raped an unmarried virgin, [87] Id., at p. 860.
he was guilty of stealing her father’s property and if a man [88] Id., at pp. 860-861, citing Arthur R. Cleveland, Woman Under the
raped his wife, he was merely using his property.[86] English Law 71 (Fred B. Rothman 7 Co. 1987) (1896), p. 24.
_______________ [89] Id., at pp. 859-860.
 [90] Id., at p. 860, citing 1 William Blackstone Commentaries *432 and
Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and
Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L.
REV. 79, 81 (1994).
[91] Id., citing Schelong, 86. (Other citations omitted)
136
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband,
which she cannot retract.[92]
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the
United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an
act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife.[93] In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as
“the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the
wife of the perpetrator.”[94]
The first case in the USA that applied the marital
exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty[95]promulgated
in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show
marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a
similar rationale with all of them citing Hale’s theory as
basis.[96]
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New
York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute
immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.[97] The
privilege
_______________
[92] 1 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, pp. 628-629 (1736), as cited
in People v. Liberta, Court of Appeals of New York, 474 N.E. 2D 567 (1984).
[93] Supra note 84 at p. 717. (Citations Omitted)
[94] Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape, The Misunderstood
Crime, United States, Sage Publications, Inc., p. 87 (1993).
[95] 74 Mass 489, as cited in People v. Liberta, supra note 92.
[96] See People v. Liberta, supranote 92.
[97] DeLaMothe, supra note 83 at p. 862, citing N.Y. Penal Law SS 2010
(Consol. 1909), viz.:
“A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his
wife, against her will or without her consent…[i]s guilty of rape in the first
degree and punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
137was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the
marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids
or abets another person in raping her.[98]
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women’s
movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being
violative of married women’s right to be equally protected
under rape laws.[99]
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New
York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where
the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court
order “which by its terms or in its effects requires such living
apart,” or a decree, judgment or written agreement of
separation.[100]
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New
York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the
same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta[101] for lack of
rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-
_______________
A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his
wife, under the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amounting to
rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree, and punishable
with imprisonment for not more than ten years.”
[98] Id., citing the 1922 case of People v. Meli (193 N.Y.S. 365 [Sup. Ct.
1922]). John Meli was convicted of rape for aiding and abetting another man
in raping his wife. Meli did not commit the rape himself but he was present
while the rape was being committed and he actually helped to overcome his
wife.
[99] Racquel Kennedy Bergen, Ph.D., Marital Rape, Applied Research
Forum, National Electronic Network on Violence Against Women, p. 2
(1999). www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Marital Rape.pdf, last accessed on April 1,
2014, citing Bidwell, L., & White, P., The family context of marital rape. The
Journal of Family Violence, I, pp. 277-287 (1986) and Finkelhor, D., & Yllo, K.,
License to Rape: Sexual Abuse of Wives, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston
(1985).
[100] People v. Liberta, supranote 92.
[101] Id.
138marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale’s
irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which
have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based
upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident
to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the
New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale’s notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married
woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a
degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the
victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational
and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has
never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced
intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his
wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control
her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels
“aggrieved” by his wife’s refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he
should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in
“violent or forceful self-help x x x.”
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption
were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of
her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was
“incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x.” Both
these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State.
Indeed, “[nowhere] in the common-law world — [or] in any modern
society — is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of
a separate legal identity and the dig-
139nity associated with recognition as a whole human
being x x x.”[102] (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17
of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act
without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted
some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when
the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious,
asleep, or legally unable to consent.[103]
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever
reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale’s irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited
form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino,[104] a husband may not be guilty of
rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is
legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if
he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.[105]
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).[106]
_______________
[102] Id.
[103] Bergen, supra note 99, citing Bergen, R.K., Wife Rape:
Understanding the Response of Survivors and Service Providers. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage (1996) and Russell, D.E.H., Rape in Marriage, New York,
Macmillan Press (1990).
[104] Tenure: November 20, 1985 to March 6, 1986.
[105] Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III, Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. (1988 ed.), pp. 382-383.
[106] http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments/cedaw/state-
obligations, last visited on March 20, 2014; CEDAW came into effect on
September 4, 1981, the Philippines has signed it on July 17, 1980 and ratified
it on July 19, 1981, the first Association of South East Asian Nation country to
do so.
140Hailed as the first international women’s bill of rights, the
CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on
all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines
assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women’s
empowerment as a vital element in addressing global
concerns.[107] The country also committed, among others, to
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and
agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay,
a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to
this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women
in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not
yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.[108]
In compliance with the foregoing international
commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in
Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
_______________
[107] CA Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, Women
Empowerment, http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_conte
nts&ap=j8040&p=y, last accessed on April 1, 2014.
[108] CEDAW, Article 2, Part I.
141
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.
The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the
generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDAW and its allied issuances, viz.:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to
propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated
the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the
RPC.[109]The law reclassified rape as a crime against person
and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity.
More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law’s
most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz.:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.—The subsequent valid
marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the
_______________
[109] Also known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the law took effect on October
22, 1997; See People v. Maceda, 405 Phil. 698, 721; 353 SCRA 228, 247 (2001).
142penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which
unqualifiedly uses the term “man” in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without
regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed.—Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;
 c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from
the records of the deliberations of the 10thCongress on the law’s
progenitor’s, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus
of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital
rape under the general definition of ‘rape,’ viz.:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more
point of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape
Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape.
But under Article 266-C, it says here: “In case it is the legal
husband who is
143the offender…” Does this presuppose that there is now
marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a
limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the
legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can
put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued
by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don’t have any
jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband.
That is why even if we don’t provide in this bill expanding
the definition of crime that is now being presented for
approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don’t provide here
for marital rape, even if we don’t provide for sexual rape,
there is the right of the wife to go against the husband.
The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she
cannot be prevented from doing so because in this
jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing
so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C
because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true
that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we
don’t provide it here, then we must provide for something
that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together
that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the
House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our
provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital
rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because
there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor,
direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our
understanding that in the second paragraph, quote:
“In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,
this refers to marital rape filed against the husband?
Is that correct?
144
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer
is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual
assault, what do you call it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault,
Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because
under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is
no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that
our House version which provided for sexual assault
was not carried by the Senate version because all
sexual crimes under this bicameral conference
committee report are all now denominated as rape
whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to
death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor.
So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am
in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the
husband who forces the wife even to 30 years
imprisonment. But please do not call it marital
rape, call it marital sexual assault because of
 the sanctity of marriage. x x x.[110] (Emphasis
ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention
marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific
mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang ‘yungmarital
rape. x x x x
HON. ROCO: x x x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then
this marital rape can be implicitly contained
_______________
[110] Consideration of the Conference Committee Reports, September 3, 1997.
145in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually
was in the House version x x x. But it was not
another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says,
that because you are the lawful husband does not mean
that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you
can beat up your wife until she’s blue. And if the wife
complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just
cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But
where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat
you up? That’s all it means. That is why if we stop
referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy.
Because parang angmarital rape, married na nga kami. I
cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you’re [the]
husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That’s why to
me it’s not alarming. It was just a way of saying you’re
[the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with
rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHANI: All right, so how do
you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are
the lawful husband does not mean you can have
carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation
or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of
authority, I don’t know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi
ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification
of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain
266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit
already in the first proviso. It implies nathere
is an instance when a husband can be charged
[with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-
delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule
146of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F,
the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this
effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on
page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect
of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it
because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I
think we should understand that a husband cannot
beat at his wife to have sex. Di ba? I think that
should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of
marital rape. All we are saying is that if you’re [the] legal
husband, Jesus Christ, don’t beat up to have sex. I almost
want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as
inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the
women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand
that we are not defining or creating a new crime but
instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify
as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does
not negate.[111]
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of
the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is
where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are
 two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is
rape if it is done with force or in-
_______________
[111] Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting, Committee on Revision of
Laws J/W Committee on Women, March 17, 1997.
147timidation or any of the circumstances that would
define rape x x ximmaterial. The fact that the
husband and wife are separated does not come into
the picture. So even if they are living under one
roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is
present, then that is rape.[112]
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr.
Chairman, x x x[t]his provision on marital rape,
it does not actually change the meaning of rape.
It merely erases the doubt in anybody’s mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed
by the husband against the wife. So the bill really
says, you having been married to one another is not a
legal impediment. So I don’t really think there is
any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code.
This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely
clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow
beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated
into having sexual intercourse against her will,
then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding
the fact that they have been legally married. It
does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no
change on this x x x.[113]
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine
jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,[114] which
regards
_______________
[112] Sub-committee on Disadvantaged Women (Committee on Women) JT.
Sub-committee on Criminal Laws Committee on Revision of Laws), November
15, 1995.
[113] Committee on Revision of Laws J/W Committee on Women, January
29, 1996.
148rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may
be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the
family abode, viz.:
Violence against women and their children refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:
A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual
in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman
or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in
the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim
to engage in any sexual activity by
_______________
 [114] ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.
149force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization.
Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal violence are the
most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-
married women experienced physical violence by their
husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual
violence.[115]
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant’s arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant’s plea for acquittal
mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal
brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual
intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape,
were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and
the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is
proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should
be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and
that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband
and wife.[116]
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the
irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been
superseded by modern global principles on the equality of
rights
_______________
[115]http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201304/statistics-violence-against-
filipino-women, last visited on March 18, 2014.
[116] CA Rollo, pp. 150-151.
150between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international conventions, such as the
CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well
as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to
achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country
vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.[117] One of such
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic
notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has
absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always
obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender
equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, which was promulgated[118] by the UN
General Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW. The
Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based
violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women,
identified ‘marital rape’ as a species of sexual violence, viz.:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence
against women” means any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
_______________
[117] CEDAW, Article 5, Part I.
[118] UN General Assembly, December 20,
1993. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm, last accessed on April
1, 2014.
151
 Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence
occurring in the family, includingbattering, sexual
abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and
other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to
exploitation.[119] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of
sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates
her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices
labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with
his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity
equal[120] to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted
to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act
without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines
cannot renege on its international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities[121] that have lost their relevance in a progressive
society.
_______________
[119] Id.
[120] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood.
[121] UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
Article 4:
152
It is true that the Family Code,[122] obligates the spouses to
love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual
intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual[123]and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted
by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual
intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and
coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive
interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the
other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.[124] When it is egoistically utilized to despoil
marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus
by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws
and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by
his indifferent or uninterested wife’s absolute refusal to
engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court’s
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill an essential marital obligation.[125] But
_______________
States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any
custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with
respect to its elimination. States should pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women x x x.
[122] Article 68.—The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. (Emphasis ours)
[123] See Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294, 304; 266 SCRA 324, 334
(1997).
[124] Id.
[125] Refusal to have sexual intercourse must be rooted on psychological
incapacity which in turn must be established by the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138,
December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 350, 368-369;
153he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
 Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from
nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute
the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the
equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws[126]ordains that similar subjects should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is
enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.[127]
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim
is the perpetrator’s own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the law does not
distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped
by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily
discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried
rape victims because it withholds from married women raped
by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to
all rape victims.
_______________
See also the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in the
case stating that: “The failure to consummate the marriage by itself, however,
does not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouse’s refusal to
have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in
nature, i.e., the psychological condition of the spouse renders [her] incapable of
having intimate sexual relations with the other. x x x.” 636 SCRA 350, 375.
[126] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.
[127] City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 326; 455 SCRA 308,
347 (2005).
154
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the
rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those
raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should
not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his
wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to
control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.[128] She
can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with
her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent
from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive
health, free of coercion, discrimination and
violence.[129] Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights
are inalienable.[130]
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital
rape and nonmarital rape nor provide for different definition
or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply
what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of
judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what
_______________
[128] Supra note 92.
[129] Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, The Fourth World
Conference on Women, September 15, 1995, paragraph
96. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf, last
accessed on April 3, 2014. According to the Philippine Commission on Women,
the Philippines acceded to the commitments set forth in the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action. http://www.pcw.gov.ph/international-
commitments, last accessed on April 3, 2014.
[130] R.A. No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women), Section 3:
Principles of Human Rights of Women.—Human rights areuniversal
and inalienable. All people in the world are entitled to them. The universality
of human rights is encompassed in the words of Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all human beings are free and
equal in dignity and rights. (Emphasis ours)
155the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or
stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and
irrationally classify them differently from the victims of
nonmarital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court
to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any
differently if the aggressor is the woman’s own legal husband.
The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral
certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly
regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and
his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in
accordance with the established legal principles and
evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape
cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the
conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on
the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all
courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended
party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely
on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are,
nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the
victim’s testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the
testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent
with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.[131]
_______________
[131] People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734,
742.
156It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to
the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their
deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-
examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was
tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and
value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.[132]
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru
a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial
proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses’ testimony,
the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony
were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness
stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither
did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and
certitude. She remained consistent, categorical,
straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-
examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to
convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the
defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her
to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998.
He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal
bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In
order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed,
he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his
advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for
intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding,
KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly
pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear
apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged
him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued
_______________
[132] People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 194581, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 424, 434.
157him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands,
mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his
penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never
desisted.[133]
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on
October 17, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling
episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK
decided to sleep in the children’s bedroom. While her
daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant
barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with
him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in
the children’s bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and
pulled her up. MMM’s attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of
the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To
demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to
go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into
sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants
and panties as KKK begged “Don’t do that to me, my body is
still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex.”[134] But her pleas
fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts
and briefs, spread KKK’s legs apart, held her hands, mounted
her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying
himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: “It’s nice,
that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of
sex.”[135]
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases,
the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the
victim’s consent to the sexual congress.[136] Under the law,
consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the
_______________
[133] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-81.
[134] Id., at pp. 87-89.
[135] Id., at pp. 89-90.
[136] Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645,
659.
158victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the
offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant’s asseverations, KKK’s
consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation
both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
_______________
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz.:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband,
do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I
warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. “witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by
touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex.”
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this
juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with
you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic]
was torn.
159
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so
strong.
xxxx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was torn by your husband, what else did he
do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no
matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her
testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont’ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs
and rode on you and held your two hands?
A I told him, “don’t do that because I’m not feeling well and my whole body
is aching.”
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, “don’t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.[137]
[137] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 77-81.
160
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA:
 Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband
normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because
according to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because
I don’t want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also
remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.[138]
_______________
[138] TSN, July 13, 2000, pp. 10-11.
161
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and
pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, “don’t do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand
sex.”
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was torn.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what
did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted
on me and succeeded in having sex with me.[139]
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly
overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and
then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired nonconsensual sexual
intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed
sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the
actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously
demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter
coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK
refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to
_______________
[139] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.
162sleep in the children’s bedroom and the fact that he
exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into
submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-
appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998
cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced
sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was
KKK’s husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in
the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such
act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications
that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of
consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is
legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the
person from whom the consent was desired. The significant
point when consent must be given is at that time when it is
clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual
congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-
appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse,
which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate
and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant’s
argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she
was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an
element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim
the burden to prove resistance[140] much more requires her to
raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible
resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to
her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused
_______________
[140] People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376,
386.
163to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for
him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need
not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the
desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the
accused had in mind[141] or is of such a degree as to impel the
defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.[142]
Contrary to the accused-appellant’s allusions, the absence
of blood traces in KKK’s panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence
of blood on the victim’s underwear that determines the fact of
rape[143] inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.[144] These details
do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of
the offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent.[145]
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling
in People v. Godoy,[146] the evidentiary circumstances of
which are, however, disparate from those in the present case.
In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently
weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution’s
medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not
applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This
led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of
physical
_______________
[141] People v. Dimanawa, G.R. No. 184600, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 770,
778.
[142] People v. Magtibay, 435 Phil. 353, 365; 386 SCRA 322, 342 (2002).
[143] People v. Baltazar, 397 Phil. 277, 288; 343 SCRA 250, 259-260 (2000).
[144] People v. Joey Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013, 706
SCRA 170.
[145] Id.
[146] 321 Phil. 279; 250 SCRA 676 (1995).
164violence on the victim’s body is an indication of
consent.[147] Here, however, KKK’s testimony is, as discussed
earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of
credence.
The accused-appellant’s assertion that MMM and OOO’s
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually
only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the
forced sexual intercourse.[148] Hence, the probative value of
MMM and OOO’s testimonies rest not on whether they
actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations
were in harmony with KKK’s narration of the circumstances,
preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape
incidents.
MMM and OOO’s testimonies substantiated significant
points in KKK’s narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and
crying: “Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me”[149] on the
night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-
appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went
upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant
admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother
who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the
accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM
once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room
downstairs.
_______________
[147] Id., at p. 318; pp. 708-709.
[148] People v. Cias, G.R. No. 194379, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 326, 337.
[149] TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 10; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 48-50.
 165
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying,
with her hair disheveled while her torn panty lay on the floor.
After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and
KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children’s
bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: “[Y]our father
is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when
I’m not feeling well.”
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the
following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the
children’s bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her
and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with
his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of
the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they
afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting
for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently
depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force
and intimidation, had nonconsensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and
17, 1998.
KKK’s helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom
coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw
her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on
October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant
on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes — all generate the
conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will.
Failure to immediately report to
the police authorities, if satisfac-
torily explained, is not fatal to
the credibility of a witness.
166The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be
discredited merely because they failed to report the rape
incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed
the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in
reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.[150]
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that
a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could
sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique,
Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
against the accused-appellant.[151] It must be noted that the
incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is
understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as
opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.
In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is
the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the
crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it
is the wife’s absolute obligation to submit to her husband’s
carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often
dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple
domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law
criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny
that could have befallen KKK and her family had the
intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been
sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in
reporting the subject rape incidents.
_______________
[150] People v. Satioquia, 460 Phil. 167, 173; 414 SCRA 60, 65 (2003).
[151] TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 13-14.
167
The victim’s testimony on the wit-
ness stand rendered unnecessary
the presentation of her complaint-
affidavit as evidence.
 The failure of the prosecution to present KKK’s complaint-
affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and
positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial
evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it
underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-
cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex
parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate.
Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in
court.[152]
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to
KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes
generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The
prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit
in the spouses’ bank account was the proceeds of their loan
from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is
a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the
amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-
appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the
accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he
admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for the
construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively
belie the accused-appellant’s allegation that KKK could not
account for the money deposited in the bank.[153]
Anent, KKK’s alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-
appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK
when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a “happy birthday” on
_______________
[152] See People v. Cabtalan, G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, 666
SCRA 174, 192-193.
[153] TSN, November 21, 2000, pp. 13-14.
168October 28 while KKK’s birthday is June 23. The accused-
appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more
competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters
for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to
present the original copies of such love letters neither did he
substantiate KKK’s supposed extra-marital affairs by
presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims.
Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man
would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men — some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant’s erratic statements on the witness stand
are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance
making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those
malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out
of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were
the accused-appellant’s unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy
KKK’s credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the
defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that
KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-
appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied
consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has
essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied
in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is
inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion
thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is
inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over
_______________
[154] People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 395, 413,
citing People v. Palomar, 343 Phil. 628, 663-664; 278 SCRA 114, 147 (1997).
[155] People v. Viojela, G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012, 684 SCRA 241,
257-258.
[156] TSN, May 11, 2001, p. 171.
169the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses
who had no improper motive to testify falsely.[154]
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to
the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed
when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility
of access between the two places.[155]
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had
indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was
hauling corn with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-
appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the
crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four
or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by
private vehicle which was available to the accused-appellant
at any time.[156] Thus, it was not physically impossible for him
to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two
rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant’s alibi and denial, and the
positive identification and credible testimony of the victim,
and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the
latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to
falsely testify against the accused-appellant.170
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-
appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK’s clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence
of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape
is extant from KKK’s narration as believably corroborated by
the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence
of KKK’s torn panties and short pants. Based thereon, the
reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for
each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being
in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC.
Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that “persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”[157]
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the
amount of P50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape
victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under
the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from
the experience she underwent.[158]
_______________
[157] People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, supra note 144.
[158] Id.
171
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon
the finding that rape took place. Considering that the crime
committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate
amount is P50,000.00[159] and not P75,000.00 as awarded by
the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter
a similar form of domestic violence, an award of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imperative.[160]
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.[161]
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it
is an abhorrence to a woman’s value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside
her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from
cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives
that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a
license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own
his wife’s body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does
not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or
withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved
by his wife’s unremitting refusal to engage in sexual
_______________
[159] Id.
[160] Id.
[161] Id.
172intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to
make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts
that can determine whether her refusal constitutes
psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the
marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it
is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the
marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-
giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the
herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this
as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be
stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in
place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape
complaints and any person who institutes untrue and
malicious charges will be made answerable under the
pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision
dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00353 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the
victim, KKK, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin andVillarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
173
Notes.―The crime of rape is no longer to be found under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code, or crimes against
chastity; As per Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, the crime of rape has been reclassified as a crime
against persons. (People vs. Lindo, 627 SCRA 519 [2010])
The commission of rape is not hindered by time or place as
in fact it can be committed even in the most public of places.
(Id.)
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