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Hunt Dorothy United Airlines Crash
Hunt Dorothy United Airlines Crash
SA-435
E:xhibit No. 9-C
Report of Examination of
Altimeters and Air Data Computers
Recoyered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972 Midway Chicago, Ill.
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-C
Report of Examination of
Altimeters and Air Data Computers
Recoyered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972 Midway Chicago, Ill.
REPORT OF EXAMlliATION
OF INSTRUMENTS
RECOVERED FROM
UAL - B737 - Registry N9031U
Midway - Chicago, Illin.ois
8, 9 , 1 0, Jan. 197 3
25 January 1973
26 January 1973
II Persons in Attendance
A. Altimeters
1. Gaptain 1 s Altimeter
v A. Altimeters
1. Captain 1 s Altimeter
shaken.
as follows:
above test.
400 -llO
800 -130
1400 -100
1800 -160
J-H 40 If
H-K 40 It
A, Y to case 5 megohms
The baro setting was 30. 05, the reported value set when
of pressure altitude was stopped at +5000 feet. The same values were taken for
The total friction values determined from the above test data are shown below:
The normal friction tolerance in this area is 7 0 ft.
Friction
Test Alt. Increasing Decreasing
,...1000 ft 50 ft 90 ft
0 80 105
+ 500 75 70
+1000 55 110
1500 70 50
2000 70 140
2500 90 95
3 000 165
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v A· I. h} At this point it was decided to conduct a detailed exami-
One unit was left in the oven and when 425°F was
reached it exploded.
ture exposure.
and shafts.
.._.
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -10-
v A. 1. h) 1) continued
The right half of the case was missing. The case and
Main dial
Baro dial
100 ft. pointer
1, 000 ft. pointer
10, 000 ft. pointer
Flag (Servo On/ Off)
that each photo would have one pointer set the same as the
rotate on its shaft. The 100 ft. pointer and the 1000 ft. pointer
(100 ft. pointer) inside the gear box. Inspection of the hand-
to the right due to the heat and forces present on the dial.
•·
.,
. .,
.·,
0 "ft.
+ 0 ft
+100 0 + 5
·+200 0 +10
. +300 0 +20
+400 0 +40
0 ft 0 ft
-100 0 - 5
~zoo 0 -15
,..300. 0 -25
0 0 0 ft 0 ft
0 0 0 ft 0 ft
~
..
,·•·
...,LS -347 0 -295 Tripout
(API).
out units.
(A. P. I.) and it was run through the pres sure altitude range
from -1000 ft. to +2000 ft. and return. The relative friction
subjecting the unit to 2500 ft. /min. descent and then turning
1000 ft. This was repeated for a descent rate of 1000 ft. /min.
5-13 A1 0 6
6-13 A2 0 0
7-13 A4 0 0
8-13 B1 0 0
·l-13 B3 1 1
2-13 B4 0 0
3-13 C1 0 0
4-13 C2 0 1
9-13 C4 1 1
12-13 D4 0 0
K 0 L L S lv1 A N I NS TR U ME N T C 0 R P 0 R A TI 0 N -18-
1. H. . Resistance Readings of Output Devices
Captain F/O
Fine Synchro #1 Stator
24-2S 9 8-1/2
2S-26 9 8-1 /2
24-26 9 8-1/2
Fine Synchro #2 Stator 71-72 42 so
72-73 43 50
71-73 44
J
so
Coarse Synchro #2 Stator 4-5 14 15
5-6 14 15
4-6 14 15
Airspeed Synchro
Resist. Stator 30-31 15 lS
31-32 15 15
30-32· 15 15
- ..... .
Altitude Input
Pressure Alt. Capt. F/o·
Note 1. 1O = 13 • 8 9 ft• {3 O = 4 2 I)
- - ,-, r -Z2-
~~
.,,, ..
. ,_.., ~. :- '. -·
- 445
-·--·-
.,,_ - 250
0 -.-
+ 200 ..... 55
400 .,_-·-
-.-
+ 140
600 340
800 *
.,_
..,.. 540
1000 _,_
..,.. 735
1500 .,_
,,. 935
2000 1430
-·-
-.-
2000 1935
2000 ft
1500 1945
1500 1450
1000
1000
800 955
800 755
600
600 555
400
405 360
+ 200 210
0 1.60
+ 10 40
- 200
-
400
190
390
- 240
600 435
585 640
- 800 - 790
-1000 - 845
- 995 -1045
Note l.
readings taken without vibration
K 0 L LS M AN INS T R lJi\I E NT C 0 RP 0 R AT I 0 N
- .......? _,,-
1
6. Cm;i.st Test
The computer chassis was connected to the computer test console. The
altitude module was removed from the computer chassis and connected
the fixed phase of the altitude module servo motor. This would disable
the motor such that as the pressure altitude changes the servo will not
follow. When sufficient error signal has been generated, the monitor will
trip the failure relay which removes the reliability signal. The normal
to chassis connection had a white flaky deposit in and around the static
port. This material was removed and stored in a container for further
analysis.
·During this test the Captain 1 s CADC A/S reliability signal and associated
reliability signals tripped out and then came on. This was repeated
several times until it was isolated to the A/S module. The servo has a
spring return in the gear system. When po\.ver was off the spring would
signal is latched, the lights would go on; however, the servo was at the
high end of the airspeed system. The cond:ltion was isolated to a gear
and sector (~on-linear) which had become disengaged. This allowed the
of input airspeed.
of the airspeed gears is shown on the enclosed data sheets and is also
equivalent to 120 Knts and was subjected to 20 g 1 s three times and the 25
1
g s three times in the fore and aft direction. Before and after each shock
run, the a.irspeed sensor was tested for operation through the range of
SO to 250 Kts and spot checked at 100, 120 and 200 Kts for any direction
observed.
-~ -
KlHJP"Ft::t. ll. li'SSER C'O,
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A fixture was made to mount the altitude sensor from each CADC and
normal, longitudinal and the half way positions (in between normal and
longitudinal positions).
A Schavitz Acceleration Table was used to perform this test. In this test
the output of the sensor Synchrotel was brought out of the acceleration
was agreed to use 500 ft. altitude as the test value and observe variations
about that value. In each position the altitude would be set at 500 ft., a
reading of the API taken, the table would then be rotated to a value computed
altitude would again be stabilized, a reading of the API taken, the table
would then be allowed to come to rest; the pressure stabilized and the
reading of the API again taken. A test run was demonstrated using an
0
tion of the model sensor was i (27 feet) for accelerations from 0 to 10 g 1 s.
This test was repeated using the two sensors from the aircraft CADC units.
0 18.09° 17.32°
1 18.48 17. 37
0 19. 90 17.41
4 17.67 17.37
0 17.75 17.42
4 17.61 -----
0 17.55 -----
10 17.23 17. 18
0 17.52 17.21
0 18.09° 17.93°
1 18.36 17. 74
0 18.01 17. 9 0
4 18.78 16.60
0 17.91 17. 74
10 15.98 14.50
0 17.82 17.73
10 16.22 -----
0 16.78 -----
Note: 1° = 27.8 ;ft.
A. Gaptain 1 s Altimeter
The primary damage was due ·to fire and heat. Moisture and other
. . ·.r The friction has increased over the normal 30/40 feet to a level of
the low side to be -570 ft. and the high side to be +1600 ft.,
As may be noted on the photo taken at UAL SFO, the angle between
-
the #1 pointer ( 100 ft.) and the #2 pointer ( 1, 000 ft.} is approximately
26°. If we assume that the 100 ft. pointer is indicating +975 feet then
is examined for the 1 rshadowtt of the #2 pointer is noted that the angle
The disc pointer utilizes an eyelet type embossing for the center hole
to attach it to the shaft that drives it. The high heat to which the unit
was exposed would have caused the eyelet tension on the shaft to be
noted by the melted aluminum case, the temperature of this unit was
sulting .in a ttplus 11 effect on the display elements due to the hairspring
tension.
power removal this unit was sensing very close to 650 feet QNE
power removal this unit was sensing very close to 600 feet QNE
which ba9ed on a 30. 05 baro setting would be close to 720 feet QNH.
640 feet QNE. This represents the post accident condition of the
SPECIAL TESTS
changed to a new altitude hz and stabilized. The time for the servo
operation it was also noted if the altitude reliability signal was interrupted
A. Times to Slew
B. Reliability Signal
the lOOft step, the step was just within the trip level and no trip was noted.
high vertical speeds and it was noted on the i;est equipment at what point
the m:onitor was on the edge of tripping. This information was used to
compute the vertical speed and this data was then related to the previously
Decreasing 21,400
Decreasing 115 ft
Decreasing 110 ft
:SY
Robert J. Gordon
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit Noo 7-A
A. ACCIDENT
The chief purpose of the Structures Group was to develop all pertinent
and significant evidence bearing on the nature and probable cause of the
accident.
l. Two houses on the north side of West 7lst Street received extensive
irrIJlact damage of the roof and u;pper floor structure.
2. Two of three houses on the south side of West 70th Place received
extensive impact damage to the roof and upper floor structure. The
third house was destroyed as the result of aircraft impact. Two
garages were severely irrIJlact damaged.
3. Three houses and orte garage on the north side of West 70th Place
were destroyed as the result of aircraft and post impact ground fire.
The first evidence of house and property damage was noted on the south
side of West 7lst Street. Numerous front roof peak shingles were found on
the front lawn and the front UJ>per storm 'Window was detached on house No. 3707.
Two houses on the north side of West 7lst Street were severely damaged.
The northwest upper corner of house No. 3710 was caved inward. The T.V.
antenna located on the chimney was bent over. The left elevator tip of
aircraft N9031U was recovered on the roof. The northeast upper corner of
house No. 3714 was also caved inward. A T.V •. antenna located on the· chimney
-wa.s bent over. A tree approximately 20 :feet in height located in the backyard
and adjacent to the house had numerous branches broken.
The two telephone poles located in the alley wa:y which separates West 7lst
Street and West 70th Blace were broken, Examination of the electrical cables
indicated that they failed in tension. This was evidenced by the necked down
condition of the cable ends.
The garage at the rear of 3717 West 70th Place was knocked off of its
foundation and the north portion of the roof was caved in-ward. A section of
the left horizontal stabilizer skin, P/N 65-47536-501, and a section of the
left elevator, P/N 65-47512-3, was recovered in the alley adjacent to the
garage door. A section of the left horizontal stabilizer was also recovered·
on the ground between two small buildings adjacent to the rear of the garage
and located on tb,e lot of 3719 West 70th Place.
- 4 -
The roof of a garage located at the rear o:f the house and :property at
3715 West 70th Place was corrr.pletly caved in.
The outboard :portion o:f the le:ft horizontal stabilizer :from a:p:proximately
Sta. 207J including the elevator, was recovered in the backyard o:f house
No. 3717 West 70th Place. The house was destroyed by aircra:ft irrr.pact. Two
:pieces of the a_ircra:ft, a hydraulic line and :filter, and a section o:f right
wing outboard mid :fla:p, was recovered in rubble adjacent to the rear foundation
of the subject house.
The right wing ti:p, from Sta. 531 outboard, was recovered at the base of
the rear wall of house No. 3715 West 70th Place. The southwest corner of the
house was extensively im:pact damaged. A section o:f the right wing leading
edge was recovered between house No. 3715 and house No. 3717.
A vacant lot (3719) exists between house No. 3717 and 3723 West 70th
Place. Numerous pieces o:f aircraft structure were :found by the Structures
Grou:p :piled on the sidewalk and in the street in front of this lot . . These
items were not documented at their location subse~uent to aircraft irrr.pact.
These items are listed as followes:
The southern peak and east side of the roof and second floor structure of
the house at 3723 West 70th Place was caved inward its :full length as a result
of aircraft i:awact. Num.erous :pieces of the left wing tip light lense were re-
covered within the upper attic :portion of the house.
Aircraft N9031U came to rest on the pro:perties of 3724, 3722, and 3718 West
70th Place. The three houses were destroyed by ai:r:ieraft impact and :post irrr.pact
ground fire.
l. Empennage
The elevator tab remained intact and attached to the elevator. The
right horizontal stabilizer and elevator assembly was resting on an in-
verted totally destroyed automobile.
The tail cone was f'or the most :part intact and attached to aircrai't
structure. The tail cone upper surf'ace was punchured from Sta. ll56 af't
to Sta. u76. The lower surf'ace at the tail cone showed considerable
damage.
The right side of' the fuselage f'rom approximately Sta. 887 aft remained
partially intact. The uri:per most portion of' the fuselage structure in-
cluding a portion of' the· vertical stabilizer from Sta .. 10o6 f'orward was
f'or the most part consumed by post impact ground fire. The right hand
fuselage interior had been subjected to ground f'ire. The af't window opening
at approximately Sta. 934 b.B.d. been blocked with sheet metal and remained
intact.
The window.at approximately Sta. 9l7 was severely heat damaged. The
window at approximately Sta. 897 was missing. The galley area exhibited
extensive post impact fire dam.age. The right galley door was f'ound in
the open position.
The le:ft side of' the fuselage from approximately Sta~ 1016 forward was
consumed by f'ire. The upper portion of' the pressure bulkhead at Sta. lOl6
was burned through.
The left hand passenger door was found in a vertical :plane within
the ap:proximate center of the door opening with the forward edge o:f'
the door rotated inward approximately 40°. The fuselage structure aft
of the :passenger door including the door surr01.md had se:parated and ro-
tated rearward. The door was jal!lilled in the :partially open :position.
The le:ft cockpit seat and left instrument :panel remained in their
relative positions. The pilots Nao l window was shattered and punchured.
The :pilots No. 2 window was shattered and the No. 3 window re?M.ined in-
tact with evidence of smoke and heat discoloration. The two eyebrow
windows were intact with evidence of heat damage.
The right cockpit structure showed evidence of severe impa.ct and :post
impact ground fire damage. Various :pieces of right cockpit structure 'WaS
recovered from under rubble of both house No. 3718 and house No. 3722 West
70tb. Place.
The airstair assembly was recovered in the area of the cockpit wreckage
and exhibited no evidence of fire damage. The nose gear' assembly was re-
covered under the cock.pit weckage.
Le:ft Wing
The le:ft engine had separated from its pylon structure and was positioned
adjacent to the left aft i'uselage structure at ap:proximately S=!;,a.. 1016.
- 7 -
-
/' Right Wing
A section of right inboard wing approximately 18 feet in length which
included a 2 foot 9 inch section of the inboard center flap, a short section
of leading edge slat,and the engine pylon structure,were recovered under the
rubble of house No. 3718.
The follciwlng right wing flap sections. were recovered in the immediate
area of' house No. 3T-L8:
Two top flap sections, one section 13 feet 3 inches iri length, one
section 2 feet 10 inches in length.
Two top flap sections:,; one section 4 'feet 4 inche;s in length, one
section 4 feet 2 inches in length.
One center and one bottom flap remained attached to each other and
measured 7 feet 10 inches in length.
The right engine had separated from its pylon structure and was positioned
in the front area of house No. 3T-L8.
The right main landing gear had separated from the aircraft and was recovered
adjacent to the right -wall of' the garage located in the back of house No. 3T-L8.
lftf~j
VQ J. Gordon
Air Safety Investigator
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONA.L TRAHSFORTATION SAFEI'Y BOARD
WASHINGTON> D. C. 20591
---------------------------------------
PREHEA.RING CONFE:REI!TCE
February 26> 1973
--------------------------------------
PREHEA.RING CONFERENCE OUTLII\'E
Mr. William 'R. Hendricks Hearing Officer
Mr. Hendricks will open the conference and :introduce the
Members of the Board of Inquiry and. Technical Panel.
Ex: 4B
Ex: 4B
Ex: 4B
- 2 -
EX: 6B
••• c ~.· : . ,
...... :-·!'~
Ex.: 6B
Ex.: 6B
- 3 -
Ex: 6c
·Ex: 6c
Ex: 6c
4 -
Ex: 6:m
- 5 -
...........
r
- 0 -
- 9 -
***********************
In t)J.eMatter bf Investigation of Accident *
Invb+v{.ug United Air Lines) Inc.; :Boeing 737* D::icket No. SA-435
o('Ur1;it~q_ $tates Registry N903lU, *
ChicagO.; Illinois) December 8) l972 *
*~*********************
ORDER OF HE.ll..RING
Saf'ety I)oard in connection ·with the above matter at a time and :place to
************************
In the Matter of Investigation of Accident *
Involving United Air Lines; Inc.; Boeing 737 * D:lcket No. SA-435
of United States Registry N9031U; *
Chicago) Illinois) December 8; l972 *
************************
.,....---, I . it
Cv:' ·tu,Ji·u
C. O. Miller
Director; Bureau of Aviation Safety
Exhibit No. 1-
* '* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
I'i\, :tlie.. Matter of Investigation of Accident
Irtr/'o1ying United Air Lines) Inc. ):Boeing 737 * J):x~ket No. SA-435
of United States Registry N9031U *
Ch:i,e·a'.io;, Illinois) December 8, 1972 *·
************************
NOTICE OF REA.RING
the a~ove matter will be held commencing at 9:30 a.:m.) (local time) on
// /)' ~
/!-
tC./d'..C.t.c<.~~
Will~am··R.
e.Hendricks
#~;<-£..\..
·. _-·
+- •~ •
Exhibit No. l-D
******~****************
In the-Matter of Investigation of Accident *
Involv}ng United Air tines; Inc.) Bo~ing 73T~ Docket No. SA-435
of Uhit.~d States Registry N903lU) *
Chic<;J.gO; Illinois, December 8, l972 *
***********************
~JJ A. V3Ct.Aq,e~
Isabel A. Burgess d ·
Chairman, Board of In~uiry
··)
UNITED STATE3 OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPOfilATION SAFErY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2059l
STU.ARI' ROOM
SHERA.TON-0 1H.ARE MOTOR HOTEL
ROSEMONT, ILLINOIS
FEBRUARY 27, l973
RJBLIC HFARING
BOARD OF INQUIRY
Honorable Isabel A. Burgess Member
National Transportation Safety
Board
Washington, D. C.
CHAIBMAN, BOARD OF·INQUIRY
Mr. Bernard C. Doyle • • . . . . • • • • • • • Chief, Investigation Division
Bureau of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety
Board
Washington, D. C.
TEJHNICAL PANEL
---------------------------------------
Mr. Brad D.inbar • • . • · • • • • • • • • • . Deputy Director,
Office of Public Affairs
National.Transportation Safety
Board
Washington, D. C.
- 3 -
HFARING OUTLINE
Member Burgess will give the opening statement of' the public
hearing.
Mr. Hendricks will identify and receive into the record the
f'ollowing:
Mr. Lamb will report for the record, the notification of' the accident
and the organization o:f the investigation. He will review the investigation
activities and submit all exhibits to be entered into the public record o:f
the accident.
Exhibit No. 3-A Air Traf'f'ic Control Group Chairman's Factual Report
3-B Statements, ATC Bersonnel
3-C ATC Transcript (Approach Control)
3-D ATC Transcript (Midway Tower)
3-E Aerocommande·r N309US Q::-:-ound Track Chart
plotted f'rom orHare Radar ARrS III Computer Readout
3-F UAL Flight 553 Ground Track Chart - plotted from
orHare Radar .ARI'S III computer readout
WITNESS LIST
1. Mr. William J. Simonini Eyewitness
Chicago; Illinois
--
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 5L
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January 8, 1973
Dear Sir:
The year 1962 sho.ving 011 the date-time stamp is invalid and should read
as 1972.
Enc.
cc: EXOFS - J. D. Smith Manager of Meteorology
location: Elk Grove Township, Illinois, on Roule 62, one-half mile west of Roule 83
LE 620 Rh'. f ·58 Ptinfe-d m U.S A.
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Exhibit No. 5K
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U.S. DEPARTMEllT Of COMMEICE
--~lanai Ocenlo ............................._.
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE .
uc..a
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The ceiling was measured utilizing the Rotating Beaa Ceilometer, located
approxiaately two ailes northwest of the Weather Service Office. The
ceiling waa aeUllred a:t SOO !eet, and was reported as variable from 400-
600 teet. The use o! a balloon to determine the ceiling 30 ainutee
following the accident gave a height of Soo feet. The balloon wall carrled
by the wind to the east., giving an even greater separation between
ae&suring locations.
Visibility was detenlined from both the control tower and weather station
uaing previous dete:nained visibility markers. Visibility was fairly
constant preceeding the accident.
ObaerYations were disetdnated to the control tower and airlinee by means or
an ~rewriter. The last obserTation preceeding the accident va.s taken
at l and transaitted by electrowriter at 13520. The obaerYation taken
following the accident wae recorded at 1433 and transmitted at 1436C.
Weather condition• had remained fairly stable for seYeral hours preceeding
the accident. Subsequent to the accident the Tisibilty did ilrprove to
tvo llilea as renected in the observation taken at 1441.C.
All weather equiptaent was operational and checked for accuracy following
the accident. All equipta-nt was also ti.lie checked and found accurate.
The sole exception vu ~he Runw&J':/Viaual Range recorder. This wu
inoperatiTe at the weather statictn due to a defective signal line
between the tower and the weatheir station.
Jr~~~~
Willi• M. Hargis
cc i CRH, lCC MO
WSF0 1 Chicago I hereby certif~ that this ls an Oft!clal
ore, Midway True copy of a National Wat-her. Service
Record.~
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cJ~ftz, '~~~~go IL
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Reply to
attfn ort
Subjectt
Tor KIC/OIC at
On this date all checks have ooan completed on the following piaees of Equ!pment
~ RCMI. 70-46 dated Dec. 28 1 1970, Dus to an aircraft aeeidant at O? nsn:r
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Exhibit No. 5E
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THAT THIS IS AN OFFICIAL
I CER~THE WEATHER RECORDS
c;SPY 0 , - , ,.,.., ONAL AIR-
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PQRT, WASHINGTON, D, C.
E IL ISoN. Meteorologist in~
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Docket,, No. SA-1~35
Exhibi i; No • 5lP
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CAL18flllATIOH DAlUM DAT&• TtllH. ,.ILM "°"""".._ 01<rL. T1"4CI cOuNTlA -o.-r,. r1•£T cou"''" ) cMi1rt:10./ ... .-.G .. zit.fl *O,. J c..•1t .. ''""r :. . -, ..... .,(
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Docket No. SA-h35
Exhibit No. '7fl
by
Alan I. Brunsi.ein
·.
Docket No.- ,SA-435
Exhibit No. 5-A
.i
A. ACCIDENT
B. WEATHER GROUP
Member Glen Louis, Chief, Air Carrier Avionics Unit, FAA, ACDO,
Des Plaines, Ill.
-c. SUMMARY
The accident site was within an area in which there was extensive low
cloudiness and fog, as well as intermittent, light freezing precipitation
and snow.
D. DEI'AILS OF INVESTIGATION
l. Synoptic Situation
* All times used are central standard based on the 24-hour clock.
DCA 73-A-3 2
The 850 mb. and 700 :r;o.b. charts for both 0600 and l8oo showed a
general southwesterly airfJow over northern Illinois.
Midway
l200, measured 6oo feet overcast, visibility 1 mile, fog, temperature 26°F,
dew point 25°F. wind ll0°, 4 knots, altimeter setting 30.05 inches,
ceiling ragged, rain ended ll45, pressure falling rapidly.
l300, Record Special, measured 500 overcast, 1 mile, fog, 27°F, 26°F, l 70°,
4 knots, 30.04 inches, ceiling ragged.
l4oO, measured 500 overcast, 1 mile, fog, 27°F, 26°F, 260°, 6 knots,
30.05 inches, ceiling ragged.
J..!±33., local, measured 500 variable overcast, l mile, fog, 250°, 6 knots,
30.05 inches, ceiling 4oo variable to.600, aircraft mishap.
l504, local, balloon ceiling 500 feet, overcast, 2 miles, fog, 270°, 6 knots,
30.06 inches, ceiling ragged.
Runway Vi~ual Range (RVRJ 4500 variable to 6, 000 plus, ceiling 300
variable to 500, :freezing drizzle began lll4, snow ended 112l.
1300, Record Special, measur ::d 4oo variable overcast, 3/4 mile, very light
:freezing drizzle, fog, 28°F, 28°F, 230°, 3 knots, 30.03 inches, ·
Runway l4 right, RVR 6, 000 plus, ceiling 300 variable to 500.
l422, Special, measured 600 overcast, l~ miles, very light :freezing drizzle,
fog, 260°, 6 knots, 30.03 inches, ceiling ragged.
l443, Local, measured 600 overcast, l~ miles, very light :freezing driz:zJe,
fog, 28o0 • 7 knots, 30.04 inches, ceiling ragged.
DCA 73-A-3 j
1500, measured 600 overcast, l·~ rnJl e::) very liv,ht freezing drizzle) fog,
28°F, 28°F, 280°, 7 knots; 30. r 111 inches, ceiling ragged; freezing
drizzle_began 1402, snow ended 1418.
Meigs Field
1500, measured 800 overcast) 3 miles, fog) 30°F, 27°F) 300°, 6 knots)
30.02 inches.
3. Pilot Reports
Entered by Du Page:
During climb off Du Page top overca::t 5, 500, light to moderate icing.
Over O'Hare top overcast 6, 400 lighi. to moderate rime during descent,
BEl8.
Through the cooperation of the ATC and O:perations Groups, inflight weather
observations were solicited from piloiswho had been near the accident area
around the time of the accident. Pertinent observations will be included
in the Factual report of the Operations Group Chairman.
(surface} 14o 7
1 150 8
2 150 12
3 l50 15
e. The Green Bay and Peoria 181 )0 upper wind observations were, in
part, as follows :
Green Bay
( 'eurf'ace) 290 12
1 2:x:i 11
2 2')5 10
3 24o 8
4 210 9
5 220 10
6 235 14
7 245 21
8 ·260 28
9 260 33
12 250 41
Peoria
(surface) 300 10
1 305 10
2 305 11
3 300 14
4 250 29
6 245 35
7 250 41
8 245 4B
9 245 50
12 250 59
6. Forecasts
Mid Mississippi Valley, Lower Ohio Valley, Mo._, Ill., Ind., ceilings
500-800 feet broken, overcast layer based at 2_,000 feet visibility
l-5 miles, light freezing deizzle, light freezing rain, light snow, fog,
haze. Tops l0,500-l4,ooo.... -
over Ill., Ind., southern Wis., southern Lake Mich., southern Lower
Mich. occasional moderate or greater turbulence below l5,000 feet.
Continue advisory beyond 1300. See area forecast to be issued l300
for f'urther advisories.
SIGME!r 3. Over Wis., Mich., Upper Great Lakes, Ind., Ill., Ky., Mo.,
~astern Iowa, moderate and occasionally severe mixed icing in clouds and
precipitation. Continue beyond l900.
Midway _
l. storm Warning Nr. 68, j ssued at 0236, valid from 0300-l200, for
Kansas City International, Des Moines_, Cedar Rapids, Moline,
Milwaukee, 0 1 Ha.re and 11idway. Expect occasional light freezing
precipitation thru :period slowly decreasing from the west.
.-- 8. Miscell~1eous
@h_),~~
Alan I. Brunstein ~
Senior olo ist, NTSE '\
a.nuary l6, l973 - _____../
·,
DOCKET NO. SA.-435
EXRIB IT NO. 13-F
DECBKBJ!;I. 8, 1972
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2/23/73
Docket No. SA-435
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DECEMBER 8, 1972
:,f·'
NATIONAL TRA:r:rSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C.
t
(b) Operational An.alysis J.:6-J.7728
(c~~l) Laboratory Tests Lab Tei:;ts T6-5007 *
Dry Air Flight Tests Flight Tests D6-1o666
c) ( 2)
4) Natural Icing Flight Tests
d) Power Plant Icing
*Data frorn T6-5007 is also included in this document under. Lab Testing.
{ .... _i
I
The :following ta;bulation summarizes the t~ and :meana of protection
'---'
provided :for the surfaces of the 737 which are subject to i.c.ing or
TABLE 3-1
MEANS OF PRorECTI~
SUBSYSTn.t PR.orECTION ~ OR HEAT SOURCE
Wing Leadir,g Ed.ge Slat Anti-Icing Air Conditioning
SUpply Mani fold
(eighth stage or
high pressure
bleed air)
Engines Cowl Leading Edge Anti-Icing High Pressure
Compressor Bleed·
Air Mixed With
Engine Inlet
Airflow
Inlet Guide Vanes Anti-Icing Eighth Stage
Nose Dome and Pt
Probe 2 Compressor Bleed
Air
Empennage None
@>
Windshields No. l and Ho. 2 Anti-Icing anrl .Electrical
Antl-F1?5g lnP,
No. 4 and No. '.i Jtnti.-Focginc; Electrica.l
Ho. 3 n0n1? @>
W;ndows I'assenecr None
@>
~ & Pitot Static Tubes All l\nt: -Ic l.ng !'!lee tr ical
Stall Warning Anti.-iclne
Senso1~ Electr>!al
0 ~
[t>
All systems wh i.ch provide.. ant :-icin;:; a:re also capable of clekinc.
Component is deslgnerl to 9revent cr"Ltlcal l.ce (or fog) formation.
Not required baserl. on service e~~per ience and fl Lglit tests.
38.8.
37 .1 Flight 25-6
Mostly cu:mulua type clouds were encountered at altitudes between
penetrations of the icing clouds were made until one to 1-1/2 inches
of moetly rime ice had accumulated on the wing !llld empennage leading
edges. The airplane was flown into clear air to obtain photographs
deJllO!lstrated vi th this ice on the surfaces. The wing vas then de -iced
The nul!iber one engine anti-icing l!lyatem we.a turned o'ff periodically to
allow up to 1/2 inch of ice to build up on the cowl lip. The engine
"'
~
"'0
<
.-
REV SYM c HOE,N& NO. D6-17728
PAGE 37.l
6·7000
re sponu v:'..t11- L:e accretion on the inlet was checked. The engine
ice Bhedding '1aa checked. The airpilne 'WaB taken to 22, 000 tt
from the AACA icing rate meter (aae :Figure 38-l). Tbe anti-icing
conditiais of hea'fY rain and snow were encountered but "With very
"'
"'"
systems on. The average li~uid water content was .76 GM/~ and
rate meter and are sh0>1n in Figure 38-5. Figure 38-·4 presents a cloud
because the heat was inadvertently le~ off. The probes de-iced
in less than two minutes after the heat waa turned on.
0
"'...
"'
.;:
REV SYM c .BDE-'.NC I
No.])6-17728
PAGE .
37 3
The e:econd .!.c;;.·.::g enco1.l:lkr of flight 25-30 occurred at 8, 000 ft
altitude and &'1 runrient ten..pere.ture of 5.0 }'. The average liq_uid
water conten~ for a 6.5 minute period. in this icing condition was
.31 GH/M3 with & ma:.d.mum of 1.20 GM/W as sh=n in Figure 313-6.
.21 inches per minute for the first icing encounter of flight 25-3f,
mounted C&JDen., and periodically the No. l engine cowl vere used
the ice accretion on the back of the wing mounted camer& is shovn
represents the total ice accretion during tue first icing encounter
Of flight 25-30.
38.1 ~
icing and de-icing system. During flight test 25-6 the system vas
a
"
REY SYM BD.E.FN& ~o. D6-l 7728
c PAGE "":{8_ 1
on the wing laading edges aa shown in Figure 313-8. This ice shed
tree the heated leading edge ala.ta surfaces Yithin t'Wo minutes
after the sy11tea vaa turned on. 'l'be surface temperature prot'ile
at slat Sta. 350 is shown in Figure 38-9 for the de-icing run.
Thia ice accretion on the slat and other unheated aurfacea of the
i
The wing system was operated as an anti-icing system on flights 25-16,
I 25-22, and 25-30. During anti-icing operation no ice or runback
I
ice occurred on ~ of the heated surfaces. The system performance
!
during the light icing encounter ot' flight 25-22 is shown in
Figure 3 8-2.
content during this flight was .39 GM;J,f3 over a !'our-minute icing
profile (Figure 38-12) was taken at the .68 GM/W maximum liquid
Figures 3 8-5, -6, -13, and -14 give the 11ing anti-icing syste11
L...._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ · - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REV SYM
c HDE.hV& INO.D6-17728
PAGE 38. 2
6~7000
with a ma.xi~ of 1.87 GMM over a 5-1/2 minute period during
and it ex~s the FAR, part 25, continUOUI! maximum icing cloud.
tunnel test condition which shows that the actual system performance
and tunnel test data. A smal.1 amount ot runback ice was observed on
the slat upper aurfa.ce 5-1/2 inches att of the heated area.
The second icing encounter o:t 25-30 was a. moderate icing condition
with a.n average LWC o:t .31 GM/M3 as shown in l"igures 38-6 and
38-10. The airplane waa flown into this encounter 1iith the
ala.ta extended at 208 knots true air speed and normal holding
powers. The surface temperatures at slat Sta. 77 and 350 are shown
not favorable for good photographic coverage. The 727 outboard slat
surface tel!!Peraturea for an equivalent icing condition are included
for cm12parison, a.Di show that the 737 wing ice protection system
PAGE
D6-1TI28
38.3 6-7000
/
38.2 Engine and Engine Inlet
\
The engine ice protection system performance
During !lights 25-6 and 25-16, the No. 1 engine anti-icing Y&ll
turned of! occaaionally and up to 1/2 inch thick rime ice was
and performance were checked with thia ice accretion before the
heat wa. turned on. Figures 38-18 and 38-19 show the ice accretion
and ice shedding into the inlet during the Q.e-icing runs. There
38.3 ~indshielda
Figure 38-20.
during all the natural icing !light test• conducted on the 737-130
During !light 25-6, when ice acc1.lllllllated greater than 1.0 inch
the APJ inlet scoop lip. The illlpingement area was lees than 50
0
<
Figure 38 -23 shows the APU torque box plenum pressure during and
APU exhaust gas temperature ~as monitored during all icing flights
di tiona. The one to 1-1/2 inches ice accumulation on the wing and
Applying the same factor to the APU ice accumulation of flight 25-6
and adjWJting for gla~e icing conditions, the maximum ice thickness
Figure 38-22. This ice accretion "1ill not restrict the inlet scoop
flow area below the throat area, connquently, it will not affect
737 inlet scoop throat area is slightly larger tb4n the optimum
0
NACA inflight design specification. This characteristic is evidenced
REY SYM C
PAGE 38.6 &.70.00
The 737 empen.nage does not have an ice protection system. Air-
inch thick rime ice cap had :!.CCUlllulated on the wing and empennage
All the ice had shed· .from the stabili:r;er in •ma.11 pieces before
natural icing and silllllated icing !light testing have shown that
the 737 airplane can be operated safely without a.n e~nna.ge ice
protection aystem.
~l__~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_J
REV SYM c .BO.EI.NC INO. DEi-17728
PAGE 38. 7 6·7000
&f'ter 11.nding subsequ«llt to _,evera.l of the n&tu:ral icing flights.
detr:iJa8nta.l effects vara noted :t'!"om the ice which shed trom the
unprotected ccmponents.
i
eTI:r, the a.irspeed imlie&tions r•turned to no:rm&.l a.tter descendillf\
I
to lUl altitude of 12,6oo feet where the total a.ir temperature W"as
15 F.
I
I
I
"W11.a tra.ced to ice plugging of the tota.l press~ aense line in the
sense line near the probe base. These pitot-sta.tic probes, Fart
*
0
737 Airplanes prior to customer deli very. The redesign.ct probe con-
1. Ground and flight te~t data ahows that all ice protection ayetem.ll
2. Natu:ral icing flight test data corroborates dry air and icing
tunnel data.
and icing tunnel test have demonstrated that all ice protection
0,
<•
l.-----·-----·------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
REV SYM c .HOE/NC INO, D6-l7728
PAGE ?O 1
h
· 1e"
conduction from the pitot sense line into the probe base.
~IL__~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~-~~
bonded to the base and lower mast up to one inch from the j.
~
REV SYM E DOE/At'& ~o. Do-17728
PAGE 42.6
base. The boot limited the heat loss from the probe in this
ture rise at the probe base. The sense line temperature profile
in the mast was then nearly constant at 70°F above total air
airplanes.
~t__~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J
REV SYM E HOE/At'& N•).
PAGE
D6-.l7723
42.7 +-
.r~
~vi.--------------,
I 45 watts; and
'.l'he .L0-6.L458-6 prooe is a modi!"ied. -·r with two add.i tiona.L static
sensing hd.es incorporated as described in item 2 above. These
the -7 probe.
The tlrain hole location on the pitot static probes was changed to
0 the drain hole locations was submitted to the FAA in Ref. 40 letter.
"
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&ilirAHI ALTrMlTE"
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------l'ITOT •'I
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- - - - - - f"llU T OfTICER' ~ ST.(l'IC Wczj 1'1.IGHT "ECOllOE"
.f="I:..,
- - - -2nd AUX STATIC
-------CA,.TAitfS SU.TIC
BM•~tRSPEEO SWITQf
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~
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FOR
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PITOT STATIC SYSTEM
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Handling qualities of the 737-100 series airplane with simulated ice shapes
installed on the unheated leading edge portions of the wing and empennage
were investigated for FAA certification. Testing was conducted to show
compliance with FAR 25.1419 and TTA CT113'.J\.IE-D. TC>st conditions were flown
to demonstrate satisfactory hlgh speed handling characteristics,
maneuverability and stall characteristics. The results of the ice shapes
testing satisfy the above certification regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The 737-100 series airplane, N73700, was test flown at forward and aft C.G.
positions to satisfy .the intent of References (a) and (b) by demonstrating
that no serious degradation of airplane characteristics exis.t with ice
build .ups on the unheated leading edge portions of the wing and empennage.
Full stalls were conducted with flaps 0, 15 and 40 at both forward and aft
C.G. positions. Stalls were initiated from 1.4 Vs trim speed at idle powe.!·.
Steady sideslips were conducted to maximum rudder deflection, both right and
le.ft, with flaps 40.
Sudden heading changes were evaluated into and away from an inoperative
engine with 15 flaps. Lateral control was used to keep the wings level.
Approach stability was investigated with flaps 15, landing gear up, at aft
C.G. to demonstrate that no serious degradation of longitudinal stability
due to ice build up exists.
.
0
"'
"' Trim characteristics with ice shapes installed were evaluated.
0
<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Frequency Modulation (Fi-!), Pulse Code Modulation (PCH) and Pulse Duration
Modulation (PDH) magnetic tape systems were used to record test data, see
Reference (f). These data are contained in Reference (g). Manual notes
were taken to supplement the tape recorded data and are filed in Reference (h).
Time history plotted data contained in this report were recorded and plotted
at a rate of 2.5 samples per second for the PDM and PCM data. F~! data were
recorded continuously and plotted at a rate of 5 samples per second. The
IMB 7094 and 360 computers were used to process ra'W data into calibraced
and computed data. The computer programs used are substantiated in
Reference (i).
Idle power stalls were conducted at 0, .15 nn<l 40 flap positions. ThC'
airplane 'NaSI trimmed at approximately 1. 4 V8 for all st.alls. Stall entry rate> a[!
approximately 1 knot/s<!cond were u,;cd for the <;talls. Hoth forward and aft ·
C.G. positions were investigaced for the above flap settings. lnitial
buffet with ice shapes installed was noted at speeds higher than those noted
W'ith no ice shapes installed. The stall warning system "'as active and
satisfactory for the conditions performed. Stall characteristics were
satisfactory with no discernible rolling tendencies. Time history scall
plots are shown on Pages 14 through 25 •
Sudden heading changes of approximately 15 degrees away from and into the
inoperative number 2 engine were conducted with 15 flaps. The airplane was
trimmed at 1.4 Vs and a gross weight of 90,000 pounds. Aileron control was
used to keep the wings level during the maneuvers.
The heading changes were obtained for rudder inputs of 9.5 and -17 degrees.
Directional control was satisfactory.
Approach stability with ice shapes installed was evaluated at an aft C.G.
position. The airplane was trimmed at 1.4 Vs W'ith a flap setting of 15
and gear up. The airplane gross weight was approximately 90,000 pounds.
Testing was conducted by slowing to 1.1 Vs and accelerating to VFE frnm the
trim speed using elevator control only. The test results presented on
Page 26 show that positive stability exists.
CONCLUSIONS
The stall characteristics were normal and acceptable for all of the conJitions
investigated. Sufficient elevator control is available to cunduct full stalls
and the stall warning system provides adequate warning with ice shapes
installed.
The sideslip maneuvers and sudden heading changes were satisfactory wit~
0
the ice shapes installed.
0
<'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'
eoEnvc I,,oD6-l066 7
REY SYM
\PAGE 6-?IJC:)
Sec. 1.35.051 4
CONCLUSIONS (Continued)
:;: The airplane maneuverability and high speed handling qualities were acceptable
during the simulated ice testin~.
The airplane trim characteristics with ice shap~s installed vere satisfactory.
~. a
~/L~~~:___--~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~
REY SYM .SL7EZ!V& NO. D6-l01i67
PAGE
Sec. 1.35.051 5
-,
AD 1546 D
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rn
<
(/1 TABLE I
-<
::;::
Simulated Ice Shapes Test Summary - Airplane N73700
(Reference FAR 25.1419, TIA CTll39WE-D)
Gross
Configuration wt.~ C.G.~
Condition No. ~ F1aps/Gear Kruger flaps lb x 10-3 t_MAc Remarks
i.35.05i.001 85-1 O"/TJp Locked TJp 88.8 10.2} High speed handling characteristics testing
.002 85-1 o•/TJp Locked TJp 82.8 10.6 was performed. Airplane trimmed at M.84
(30,000 feet) and 350 KIAS (10,000 feet).
l
.003 85-1 o•/TJp Locked TJp 88.7 10.2} Airplane trimmed at 270 KlAS (10,000 :teet) and
.004 85-4 10°/TJp Free 88.9 10.6 at 1.3 Ys 1 (10,000 feet). Msneuve1~bility
evaluated,
.005
.006
85-1
85-4
O"/TJp
15° /Up
Locked TJp
Free
88.2
91
10.2
ig·2:
Airpl•ne trimmed ot i.• V,l' idle power.
Stalls conducted for various entr:r ratee ,<Ja
.007 85-4 40°/Dn Free 90,5
.008 85-2 O"/TJp Locked TJp 90.2 29 2 noted on plots.
.009 85-3 15°/TJp Free 92.1 29.9
U'l
(ti .010 85-3 40°/Dn Free 91.6 29.9
~
f-' .on 85-3 40°/Dn Free 91.2 29. 9 } Airplane trimmed at 1. 3 V8 • Right and left
.012 40° /Dn
~
w 85-3 Free 91 29.9 sideslips conducted.
Lil
.013 15"/Up
~
0
Lil 85-3 Free 90.6 30 } Sudden heading change right and left. l.4 V6
f-' .014 85-3 15° /Up Free 90.5 30 trim with one engine inoperative.
-
~ . 015 85-3 15°/TJp Free 90.2 30 } Approach stability (Ll V6 ). Trimmed at 1.4 V6 •
~>Cl Iz0
.016 85-3 15°/Up Free 89.6 30 Approach stability (VFE). Trimmed at 1.4 Y8 •
•
rn a
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AO 1546 D
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VI
-< T ABL E I (Continued)
3:::
Simulated Ice Shapes Test Summary - Airplane N73700
(References FAR 25.1419, TIA CT1139WE-D)
1.15.051.001 85-1 O/Up Locked Up 83.8 10,8 Trim 8.0 Level 173 9,700 J
Point Flt
.002 84.8 10.7 7.2 188 9,100 ·.•·· ~.i[,._j
.003 85.8 10.5 6.3 205 9,100 ... "'.:,::'
.004 85-1. 0/Up Locked Up 86.4 10.4 6.0 221 9,100 ..
,005 Deleted
,006 85-4 l/Up Free 84.1 10.2 8.5 143 13,100
.007 85,0 10.4 8.2 153 13,500
.003 85.9 J.0.6 7.4 , 171 13,200
.009 l/Up 87.1 11 6,8 184 13,900
n~ .010 40/Dn 83,2 10.5 12.3 106 13,500 ,.
..... >...
<1 .011 81.9 l0.6 12.2 11s 13,200
w ·~ 1.15.051.012 80.5 10.7 12 Level 127 12,500
!;"
0
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~
/ · I
.Flt
::C ~ 1.35.051,00! 85-4 40/Dn Free 90.5 10.4 Trim *15,1 Idle 136 12,000
~ I · Point
"I" )> 0
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'1' >'<XOTE: 1.4 VrJ trim was obtained manually past the electrical trim limit of 13 units ·'
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?AGE 31
SUMMARY
The flight test results reported herein were conducted on Hodel 737-130, N73700
to establish the drag pola~s at three flap settings with simulated ice fitted to
the tail surfaces and the wing leadinh ed~e in the Krueger flap area. These
results vill be compared l<lth the certification drag polars established on
Hodel 737-130 N2286C and the resultini;: :i.ncrement used to calculate climb per-
formance of the 737-100 and -200 under icin~ conditions.
Final drag polars and climb calculations are presented in Reference (o).
INTRODUCTION
Reference (n) specifies airplane climb performance minima and, during operations
into known icing conditions, allowances must be made for extra drag caused by
ice formation on those areas of the airplane which do not have de-ice or anti-ice
provisions. On the 737-100 and -200 these areas include the vertical and hori-
zontal tail surface leading edges and the wing leading edge between the fusela&e
and nacelle in the Krueger flap area.
Reference (q) outlines the derivation of the simulated ice shapes and defines the
Krueger flaps UP and DOwN installation on airplane Hodel 737-130, N73700.
The tests were flown at approximately the for.rard CG limit (9%) of the airplane
at three flap settings, namely, UP and 1 with gear up, 40 with gear down.
Increments at flaps 1 and 4o will enable approach and landing climb performance
to be calculated under icing conditions.
All tests were conducted from Boeing Field on Hodel 737-130 N73700 with
Mr. B. S. ~ygle as the Boeing pilot. FAA pilots were Hr. E. Southerland for
Test 85-1 and Mr. D. Helton for Test 85-4. Hr. D. R. Buell was the FAA engineer
on each test.
All the instrumentation measurements necessary to compute thrust and hence dra~
were recorded by a Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) magnetic tape system which is
described in detail in reference (g).
Airspeed and altitude information was supplied by a shielded pi tot and trailing
bomb static pressure sensing device. References (k) and (1) present the pressure ,
error of these devices from wind tunnel calibrations; these errors are used in
the reduction of flight test data to obtain correct airspeed and altitude data.
The computer programs to produce performance information are the Basic Airplane
(Bi\), Engine Perfor.iance (EP), Entlne Fuel Flow (EFF) and Airplane Perfor:·~:i.nce
(AP) and these are described in Reference (g); the document substantiating these
programs to the FAA is given under reference (h).
~I
;/
<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References (f) and (g) develop the eouations used in the basic drag computation
equations and are summarized below:
The trailing bomb drag increment is obtained from reference (m). In (1) above,
dv dh ·
dt and dt are obtained by the computer program sloping the true airspeed and
tapeline altitude time histories. Automatic plots of these are available in
reference (e) together with the complete outputs of the computer pro~rams.
The drag points were conducted at as constant a speed and altitude as uossible
for a period of three minutes; Reference (b) contains manual notes data t~ken
during each test. The points obtained during the certification dra~ testin~
on Hodel 737-130 N2286C were duplicated for these tests over the ran~e of CL
necessary to bracket the approach and landin~ climb sneeds; at ~1.aps UP l.?, l.h,
1.5 and 1.6 x Vst~ll' at rl.aps 1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 x Vstall and flans
40, 1.2, 1.3 and l.4 VStall. -
Reference (j) scheduled tests to be conducted at flaps UP 1.6, 1.8 and 2.0
Vstall and flaps 40/gear up at 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 x Ystall; h.:iwever, to :::o-;er
a more practical area, the flaps UP and flaps 40/gear down points si:ated abo,'e
were car:::-ied out. Fla:ps 1 da t~ is addi tionaJ. to re fert>nce ( j) and war. obt·< ~ ''~d ':'.c
establish the chang;e in drag increment with flap position and hence to i::t.::?r-:::)l:i::r
for those intermediate settings applicable to the approach and landin~.
REV SYM
Sec. 1.15.051 PAGE 3
l
CONCLUSIONS
This document presents Model 737-100 drnp; polars obtained 'With simulatf'ri :ice
shapes oh the tail surfaces ·and wing leudinp; ed~es in the Krueger Q11p i;1;·ar,.
Perfonnance calculations based on these results and basic low speed dra~ polars
obtained during earlier certification with a Model 737-130 N228i'iC will hf' us<>d
to calculate climb performance 'With icin~ present~ Th:ese calculations will be
presented to the FAA in Document D6-4743 Section 6-3,· (Reference o).
.
uq i---------------------S::.E=-C.=-Tc:.1.:::.:.0N J. 15. OS I
INTRODUCTION
CONFIGURATION
A magnetic tape recording system with Frequency Modulation (FM) and Pulse
Duration Modulation (PDM) capability was used to record the data.
Reference (i) describes the instrumentation configuration used on
Airplane N9002U. The FM system was used to record longitudinal control
forces and movements. Pilot indicated airspeed and altitude were recorded
using the PDM system. Reference (j) contains the manual notes taken
during the test by the crew members and observers.
Q
<'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·----'
The teat r:!ata were processed by the 1.BM 7090 computer UBinf.: the Calibration
program substxitiated in Reference (k). The to.bulated computer data Gl'f:
filed in Reference (1). An lnstrumcntati0n problen: s.ffectinF, ;:tabili~~r
position was discovered after all instrumentation had been ::-emoveci fr.,; 0
the airplane. Therefore, the pilot's trim indicator values s.re prea<'!u t,•.'l
in this report.
In compliance with the TIA (Reference (a)), Item 18B.8 the longitudinal
trim characteristics with simulated ice shapes were evaluated ~~ forH:i.rd
C.G. with flaps 4o and gear down usin~ idle thrust. The airplane was
trimmed approximately 1.7 Vs with 1.:5 units of trim, 1.4 Vs with 15 unit<:.
and 1.2 Vs at the mechanical limit (17 units). The results <U'e listed
below.
Approx.
Approx. Stabilizer
Gross Weight C.G. Altitude Airspeed
Pounds Vtrim/Vs Position
~
~
~Feet ~KGAS
Uni ts
,-.J
CONCLUSIONS
<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·-~~~~-
REV SYM DD.EI.NC
Sec. l.35.052 PAGE
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NO. Db-i\-'1cn
By
William G. Laynor
Air Safety Investigator
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. l3A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C. 2059l
February 9, l973
A. ACCIDENT
C. SUMMARY (continued)
D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
2. Icing Certification
Investigator
-_.:,..... _,.·
"WITNESS STATEMEi'iTS
i
Budget Bureau No. 30-R024.a.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
Th£ purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
.. . j. n.w --------~fti!___________
I. Place of acciden~)21&.IJ.J.!7--tb.f-!!-y/~_&_~ Date ________ J_,g)f).f_;<,. _________ Hour dd_o_f!t[
II. Aircraft -~-7J_1__~--- FAA Certificate No. --~-J!.:f_7J!L__;[_£_~-'-----------
III. What is your name ____ rif~--~---~r----------- Age ___ 1-_~----------------
_____________________________________________ _
IV. Address ______ Q.JJ_p___ li~!l.ze_~..f-L~:.
. . ii,,,,,,,µ,LJ ~ J,,,;; Jie_ !!~
V. Occupat10nl"~~-U-i~-------~Y whom employed --~-----:Z.if.li...:YL~+----1
Av, et , C'..{) •
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
Date __ JS!_Pf!~J-~--------------------
III. What. is your name _:. __ J".J:=.r-.:r __ /:l.!__JJ?_t~..!i'L~--------------------- Age ____ Lh _______________ _
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, o.c. zosg1
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
Date ..J3__;.M__j_t2-~-------------
_!YJ,_';J::_"Q_~_F..-2)--0-:b:&=- _[)_~_}l _7_2._ _________
I. Place of accident
Pol<. 'r
Date
7 Hour __a_;_~_<}
III. What is your name __ §_~_&_N_lLtu=;;_rI_E __ ~.Q_°Y-'..!2..E. ______ Age ___ [_?.,._ ______________ _
VI. Where were you at .the time of the accident -~_8._"J;__Q..s_ __E__w_&._:¥____7_~~~---------------
Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solel for use in d · · er • •
sta-nces, and the probable cause of the subject a!ident. etermmm., the facts, cond1t1ons and circum-
Budget Bureau No. 31l-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
II. Aircraft \./.f!.f:.:. ___:f!__3_L_____ FAA Certificate No. _()__JJ_~___ E.!:."?;__:_£~"'J_ ________________ _
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
-J1--J-l~-------
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ·BOARD Budget Bureau No. a9-R@
DEPARTMENT. OF TRANSPORTATION\
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20591
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this s·tatement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
;
. I •
Date ____
it
'l__Q~!.==--------------------
I. Place of accident ___S-~.!;:?J~--~~~:':.~'.J_______ Date ------~-9_-::i_'...~------------- Hour _L1L~S>__ f_S-,.
II, Aircraft ---~:::.?~?___________ FAA Certilicate No. ___'::!'.!_~--"=~~~-----------------------------
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident __Q~_.tl::::. __~~~l_!::_ __=:!_j~ __,f!:':~:-±___ ~q;_--~~--~-~'".:'::'--
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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J~-1-
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHlNGTON. D.C. W591
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
:Date ...Li?1_.:._::f_=_..:;!_i1::.,_______________ _
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject acicident.
.
n~ ~ Date
/;<~D4"'-
-------L~-/_!_ ____________ ?6__ _
I. Place of accident ____ LJ~_W,_(_J_ ___ Date _______ j_~JJ/-"1--~--------- Hour __?:-:.;!ll!L
acc~- -f:B~~-1-~--
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VI. Where were you at .the time of the
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before a;{;:;-j ~e accident occurred.
(,~Ur),?:~~~
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau No, a~R@
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20St1
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely f~r use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau No. 3 9 - R @
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHJNGTON. c.c. wst
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
stances, and the probable cause of the subject a~ident. e m deternunmg the facts, conditions and circum-
The purpose of this statement is intended solel for us . . . .
III. What
.
is your name kt2.fL.L_d_
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__.!!!d__~/!.._o------------------------Age
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IV. Address 2 '7 J._ S- ~ 7i.,..;
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V. Occupation __ 5'....T.:.h_d ~ 4- t
--- - ------------- By whom employed ------===------- ---------
1
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident G... 'i:f' ',
Id.. - __
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C? S! Cl. -:r-1-c.5--Poh.-t:
S .f-.."i___ 7...3...... i::_J_,__ s_E
VII. Tell in your own w ords wh at you saw or heard before an<l at the time th e acer'd ent occurred.
Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
1-c "bo:. 7 (,
D a t e ---------------------------------
ill. What is your name ---~~.::_:.L~--~·__ _'t::E:-~·jl':_ ______________________ Age __ Lfi.._ _________________ _
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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(Signature)
Budget Bureau No, 39-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF
The purpose of th' t WITNESS .
s ances, and the probable cause of~:~:~~iect j and mrcum-
t is s atement is · t accident.
solely .for use in determining the f acts, conditions
. ·
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Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3,
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use .
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.. m determining the fac~s, conditions and circum-
Budget Bureau No, 31l-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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Budget Bureau No. 39-R~
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, a,nd the probable cause of the subject accident.
II. Aircraft --~---l~] _____________ FAA. Certificate No. ---~B-~ __ .::_1_! __ ~~2--------------------------
III. What is your name __ L'l::~:i-i.1>:Ar.J~~.s_ ________:._ _________________ Age ____;_.;_:__ _______________ _
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the f~ts, conditions and circ=-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and -at the time the accident occurred.
Budget Bureau No. 31l-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
Date __ JJ_Qi!_<::_':u~---------------------
I. Place of accident -~S!.~ __0_~~-fu~'::'"l __ Date __'Q_ll_~ __J]<. ___ ~----------- Hour _l4_,'.3~-~ff
II. Aircraft --~.::J3-.) ____________ FAA Certificate No. __(J.tl:.(.. __ E~t~.sA:~--------------------------
III. What is your name __ G"u-_-..~L_L __G.h_~~<>l~JS _______________________ Age __ _?.:?_________________ _
VI. Where were you at ·the time of the accident __i('!c.~~-j.,,.j-__.,t_J:-Li:>•.Q.;;_.:f.L<d-::t.<:. __"2=-~!_ __~:..~~'11-2.k.__~
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determi.Iling the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts,' conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
Date __ (_2__-=:-__!_!_-::_Z_~----------
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determ · · •
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident. mmg the facts, conditions and circum-
VI. Where were you at ·the time of the accident _7.£,_Q_L_5.!.M.fr.J.D:.£J_-?_ 7 _(:::_~::.~ii~k~~:kt
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident.occu r·re d .
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STATEMENT OF \tVITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determinin h · · ·
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident. g t e facts, Dond1t1ons and c1rcum-
VII. Tell in your ow~ .words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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Budget Bureau No, 39-R024,3.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
VI. 'Where were you at the time of the accident -~~.l.f.:S_-~!_-t__':'.~--?~:~--~~"±-_'._ __b_::_~".'.__0'.:-~~-~---
. Mo'""'7-, - -,.,...,<. o~ f-i.... s;,,,,,J-..c:L... "<- ""ils."I s-1--.:i-
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before an<l at the time the accident occurred.
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STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, {)Onditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
ill. What is your name ---~2'-~~i-____ t'l_:_ _____Q?.!:.L0.:<_'=":-.::i. _______________ Age __ LL----------~-------
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20591
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
/.~~-JL~---
w ' r- (Signature)
/ITSJ.D "';v~T>&:.a W..d"" .al~~ .fur di.A.rrr.a.m ..ann pAdHionsl .&Wement) .GP n 9 3'... D!J!l
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 4A
by
DELBERT C. VALLE
Exhibit 4A
A. ACCIDENT
C. SUMMARY
D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
Of the persons interviewed six stated that they saw the aircraft on
a near northwesterly heading as it descended from the low cloud deck.
From these observations it was determined that visual contact with
the aircraft prevailed over a distance of about six city blocks or
approximately one-half mile. When the witnesses initially observed
the aircraft the wings were near level, the nose attitude high and
the rate of descent appeared to be greater than normal when com-
pared to other aircraft flying along this segment of the approach
to Midway Airport. Persons that were indoors and located about
under the area of where the aircraft came out of the clouds stated
that the noise level was very high .and .they were so concerned that
they rushed to the. windows to view the aircraft. These. witnesses
were in general agreement that the loud noise was considered abnormal
only as a result of the aircraft being at such a low altitude when
it passed over their positions.
v!ulvd-c. ~
Delbert C. Valle
Air Safety Investigator
January 11, 1973
---: ·----:-r·' . ' ..-.· . . :, ' ,
' ' '.'.~.
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY EoARD
BUREAU OF AVIATION S.l\.FETY
WASH!NGTOli, D. C. , 20591
/
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7 .. "1ertnex 17 C,'llos111..t.1c
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPOmATION SAFErY BOARD
WASEINGTON, D. C. 2059l
STUARI'. ROOM
SHERATON-0 1HARE MOTOR ROTmi
ROS»!ONT, ILLINOIS
FEBRUARY 27, l973
RJBLIC HEARING
BOARD OF INQUIRY
Honorable Isabel A. Burgess Member
Nation.al Transportation Sa.:fety
Board
Washington, D. C.
CHAIBMAN, BOARD OF INQUIRY
- 2 -
TEJHNIC.AL PANEL
EFABING OurLINE
Member :Burgess will give the o:pening statement of' the :public
hearing.
Mr. Hendricks will identify and receive into the record the
following:
Mr. Lamb will report for the record, the notification of' the accident
and the organization of' the investigation. He will review the investigation
activities and submit all exhibits to be entered into the :public record of'
the accident.
Exh:i:bit No. 3-A Air Traffic Control Group Cha.innan' s Factual Report
'~ ·· 3-B Statements, A'ro Bersonnel
3-C A'ro Transcript (Approach Control)
3-D A'ro Transcript (Midway Tower)
3-E Aerocommander N309US ~und Track Chart
plotted. from O'Hare Radar .ARrS III Computer Readout
3-F UAL Flight 553 Ground Track Chart - plotted from
O'Hare Radar ARl'S III computer readout
- 6 -
-·. .
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~-~=-
Mr•~W~am J. S:irr:lonini
WITNESS LIST
Eyewitness
Chicago, Illinois
l3 • Mi;:\ .George W.
.~~~~···
Kipp Ex:ecutive Pilot
·;,_! .
-
Ft. Madison, Iowa
Captain, United Air Lines
Arlington, Virginia
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OEPAR'.TMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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Washington, D. C. · 2053.5
!~}.$');1~~,..@:~!~;~~-.,,;i;·-fhe
1l·. "'·:.*"..'''·'-. ·.- '· ·.·
the purpo,e of the FBI '
','t;;'~Ziifi;i'th.:i~(i;C:a'Se;:
reasons for the early response and unus_ual FBI actiona:,
····~eti'dii• t:•k~
the number.of FBI personnel involved, all investigative
by '.he •gents and the thne• they took •uch •ctions_ (includ: j
mg the time the first FBI agents arrived on the s.ccne), and copies. of a:tt-1
reports" and records made by the agents in connection with their investi- ·
gationa (we· already
documents ihould pehave·::~-bpi~a
of 26 FBI iJ'1.terview reports; any other
provided, therefore).
While we have initiated action· a.t the staff level between our agency
and yours to effect better liaison and avoiq engaging in efforts which may
be in conflict in the !utu.re.r we 'ha.ve that aome mo,re formal determ~1ed
agr.~.em~.t?:t
o~
arrangement--in·th:e natl.ire of' an infe_ragency m.emorandum of'
=der•tandini' tor _insianco--woUld •eem appropriato. It would cl<iiijiiy
resp~ctive fo~th p-roc.edt:r~.~s
if,yq:~'
de-lineate our statutory responsibilities and s_et
to eliminate any !liture conflicti;. We would therefore appreciate#
would designate, ·at your· earliest convenience, an official with. w}\-Om we:
may discuss this matter an{f with the authority to negotiate such a.forn:ial
agreement with the Safety Board.
Sincerely,
ti Original aiiD•d by
John B. llo&d
John H. Reed
Chairman
UNITED STATES DEPARTn!EJ";T OF JUSTIE:E
;.--··'~
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';:'.\f~~'-'>'.·.~::: _FEDER-A~ BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
. . . ·z;f.::. 'WASHINGTO~,D.C~ :iosu
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I
June U, 1973
I
Mr. John H. Reed
Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board
Department of Transportation
Washington, D. C. 20591 ..
. : .,1
:::~::c:~:::~igative jurisdiction~);~.
8 9
December :h: ; : : : : :
in connection with the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor-~<-· ~.tJ.~
Vehicles (DMN) Statute, Title 18, Section 32, U, S •._ Co~e·, ~>
which pertains to the willful damaging, destroying or ~- . ·~·~
disabling of any civil aircraft in interstate, overseas or -~
foreign air commerce. In addition, Congresp specifically ~-
designated the FBI to handle investigations under the Crime ii)
~.board Aircraft (CAA) Statute, Title 49, Section 1472,
U. s. Code, pertaining, among other things, to aircraft
piracy, interference with flight crew members and certain
specified crimes aboard aircraft in flight, including assault, · ·
murder, manslaughter and attempts to commit murder or
manslaughter.
crash
~~®!* ;Q EB• llsJent~onded
seen~ to the
s ones arriving within 45 minutes of
the crash. FBI Agents did interview witnesses to the crash,
including flight attendants. Speciai Agent (SA) Robert E.
Hartz proceeded to the Midway Airport tower shortly after the
crash to determine if tower personnel could shed any light as
to the reason for the crash. ·On arriving at the tower, SA Hartz
identified himself as an FBI Agent and explained the reason
for his presence. He was invited by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) personnel at the tower to listen to the
recording made at the tower of the conversation between the <;o_'-._
tower and United Air Lines Flight 55 3. At no time did ;. . ·f,..;·
i
SA Hartz request to be allowed to listen to the .tapes. ~After.,
.,' listening to the tapes, SA Hartz identified a sound as ~eirrg ~·
that of the stall indicator on the aircraft. The FAA agreed'
~
that SA Hartz was right and immediately notified FAA Head-
quarters at Washington, D. c.
:.~-.i-·
·The FBI's investigation in' this. matter was
terminated within 20 hours· of the accident and on December ll, .J
~-""'.?70. - n ~~~
/lr::C--~ ./'? .(/ l?r /}
William D. Ruckelshaus
Acting Director ~:
- 2
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SLIP SHEET
* Reliability * Confidentiality
* Speed * Security
* Accuracy * Professionalism
* State-of-the-Art * Finishing/Binding
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FREE
Pick-up and Delivery
CAI,J, OUR COPY HOTLINE* (630) 789-COPY
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INDEx: OF PHOTOGRAPHS
3 Center Panel
4 Flight Director Panel
5 Pedestal
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7 Flap Jackscrew
8 Horizontal Stabilizer Jacksr rew
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. PQWERJ?LANT GROUP CRA.J.RMAN 'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVE}3IJ:IGATION
INDEX TO PHOTOGRAPHS
By
Edward P. Wizniak
;,
-' ·,
NATION.AL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Exhibit 8B
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. c.
February 2, l973
INDEX TO PHOTOGRAPHS
ON SCENE
2. No. l Engine: View towards the front of the engines; the 4th
stage compressor disk is visible; blades are bent opposite to
the direction of compressor rotation.
ll. No. 2 Engine: View showing exhaust section and 4th stage
turbine blades.
12. No. 2 Engine: View showing metal splatter adhering to the first
stage turbine nozzle guide vanes.
. ·"' ',• .;-_: ..-'•
Index to Photographs - 2 -
14.. No. 2 Engine: Layout of inlet guide vane· anti .:.tee system.
~f.'0J~~
Edward P. Wizniak .
Air Safety Investigator
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY :SOARD
BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY
WASHINGTON; D. C.. 2059l
PHOTOGRAPHS
BY
Robert J. Gordon
.,- ----
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l, Area of Left Engine
2. Area of Left Wing
3. Right Engine
4. Area of Right Wing
5. Cockpit Section
6. Right Main Cear
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Galley Area
IOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-TI
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2. Iaentificatioi:l Re1iort -
Clyae c. Snow)· Ph. TI.
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REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
._ ..,..:;r..l!:f......
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ACCIDENT SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 crashed at approximately 2:28 p.m. CST
on 8 December 1972. The cloud ceiling in the area of Midway Airport
was approximately 500 feet with reported patches of fog or low
clouds at 100 feet.
Shortly after the initial surge, a tremor was felt which to one
qualified witness resembled the earlier application of power.
Immediately following the tremor, brili:i~ntly. fla~·hingli-ght~-· --·--
11
accompanied by popping 11 noises were observed on the left side and
then the overhead bins and ceiling liners began to fall.
Impact forces varied widely from the tail section to the cockpit
due to the early, nose-high attitude of the aircraft and exposure to
the house structures. _The tail section experienced the least forces;
therefore, witness statements of crew members and passengers seated in
this area (regarding the crash sequence) were weighed heavily by this
investigator.
The final impact sheared the right half of the cockpit and an
undetermined allX)unt of the first-class section, broke the fuselage at
the forward and aft edges of the wings, and separated the forward cabin
from the aft cabin.
All of the surviving passengers attest to the fact that the cabin
interior was quite dark after impact and that a condition of quiet prevailed.
A stewardess seated in the tail section was aware of a hissing noise which
this investigator attributes to a sheared natural gas line (supply line)
in the basement of the house in which the plane ~ame to rest.
-3-
Fire broke out immediately both forward and in the area of the
left wing. The progress of the fire was rapid because natural gas
was feeding it, fuel from the wings was p~oling in ~he basement.
and there was wooden debris surrounding the wreckage.
There were three flight crew members, three cabin attendants, eleven
paid first-class passengers, and forty-two paid tourist passengers plus
two infants. The survivors were primarily near the immediate tail
section or over the center wing area. None of the flight crew survived,
although Captain Whitehouse survived for a sufficient time to build a
carbon monoxide level of 40.4%. ~fone 9£ the passengers seated in the first
section (1st 5 rows) .s.urvived although the "stewardess ..seated i~ the
·· rearWard.facing ju~p seat on the forward l~ft side of the cabin did
su·rvive. She was ·taken .out of her seat a·nd from. beneath pipes, bricks,
and other debris by firemen who were forced to fight flames to reach
her. Her exit from the fuselage area was made through the open right
side of the cabin.
Fourteen paid passengers and one infant out of the forty-two passengers
and two infants seated in the tourist section survived the impact and
fire. Passengers in seats SC, SD, and SF exited through the hole created
by the cabin separation in the forward wing area and climbed back
through the rubble on the right side of. the aircraft to the area of the aft
galley service door and up to the street. Passengers in SA, lOA, lOB,
lOC, 12E, 12F, 16E, 16F, and 17B all exited through the aft galley
service door. Passengers in lOB and 12F were small children and
were carried from the aircraft by cabin attendants or adult passengers.
Passengers in lOD, lOF, and .llF went out what was described as a hole
larger than an overwing exit, at least six feet wide and on the right
side near where they were seated. They walked over debris in getting
back past the aft galley service door and out to the street. Two
cabin attendants for the tourist section were in their jump seats
and secured by full seatbelt and shoulder harness restraints. Their
seats remained intact and the restraint.s released with no difficulties.
The attendant on the left portion of the jum~ seat (nearest door)
attempted to open the left aft cabin door but fire was immediately
apparent.
Fire began coming in the door and considerable time was
consumed in trying to close it because the slide dislodged from
its case and blocked the closing. A man sitting in Seat 17B was of
assistance in closing this door, and he was also extremely help~ul
I
PERTINENT OBSERVATIONS
SEAT DOaJMENTATION
The Capt~in s seat is virtually intact and shows o~ly minor fire
1
.: damage .. Floor a ttachme.nts held. The pedesta i·· was cut to remo"ve the seat
.sometirge after th~s investigator photog"raphed it, in place, at the site.
The rest~aint system was ~ac{fic Scientific using the collective tjpe
buckle. Each. insertion point functioned when exa_mined at the hanger. The
shoulder restraints were completely within the enertia reels except for
buckle inserts and hard to start when unreeling. A complete lack of
scortching, discoloring, abrasion marks, or soiling other than that
portion attached to the buckle inserts (scortched) points to the fact
that this portion of the restraint system was not, in use at the time of
impact.
The first officers seat was recovered in part and showed evidence of
impact damage and extensive burning. Only the back portion and part of the
arm rest (left) were accounted for. The shoulder restraints were recovered
in part although the buckle inserts were missing and the inertial reel
housings had partially melted into the belts. The reels were stuck but
inspection disclosed that they were full of unburned belt and indicates
I
that this portion of the full restraint was not used. The restraint system
on this seat was also Pacific Scientific and utilized the collective buckle.
The 2nd officer's seat was almost totally destroyed and the only portion
recovered was the upper part of the telescoping backrest. All parts of the
restraint system were missing.
occupied seat.
Cabin attendant seat. (:E01:ward facing) on "the aft cabin wall was missing
. .
as well as the restraint systems (Pacific Scienti_fic with collective buckles.
and enertia reels). Both attendants survived and were not hospitalized. They
were in complete aggeement that the seat and restraint systems functioned
perfectly. They also agree that movement from the aft galley area forward of
about row 15 was extremely difficult because seats on the left side had
broken loose and the overhead bins had fallen. Survivors had climbed over
Fire was extensive and extremely hot in the main wreckage so that very
little by way of passenger seat units were recovered. Those seats and seat
portions brought to the hanger storage at Midway airport were badly damaged
by impact and fire. Only two tourist seat units (three seat sections each)
were recovered relatively intact and no first class units were recovered
intact.
I
All passenger seats which were sufficiently intact to make any analysis
on showed a downward loading in excess of the 4 1/2 g set by government
regulation and a side loading in excess of the 1 1/2 g set by the same
regulation (Part 25.561). Damage to seats, other than fire, was far more
extensive from the forces which devestated the fuselage than by passenger
loading.
No seat could be positively established as having been in a specific
place within the aircraft, other than being a def:i,nite type and possibly a
right or left unit. The two tourist units recovered reasonably intact could
be identified as one right hand unit and one left unit. According to burn
patterns, they would have been fully loaded and in an area where the seating
chart denotes this type of seat occupancy.
One tourist class unit, window section on the right side, was sheared
off and backwards from the center section destroying the seat pan of that
section.
One tourist class unit, window section right side, the only remaining
section of that unit, was punttured from behind at a point approximately
8 inches up from bottom and near center. The blunt penetrating 'object
pierced the seat back frame, cushoin, and fabric covering. Evidence indicates
- .-~ - ... ..-
theseat was occupied so the object would have entered the passenger"s
lower back, somewhere near the lumbar region and top of the pelvis.
Recommendations:
.·.
" 1. This invest~gator would re.commend that the. e~ergency Oxygen supply
bottles for the cabin and crew systems be located in the tail section rather
than in a forward area. In the case of UA-553 they were located in the
forward most part of the forward cargo pit on tHe right side in close
proximity to the storage batteries. I cannot say that these bottles were
responsible for loss of life, but they were empty when found and carried a
significant amount of Oxygen.
2. A nationwide re-education of parties most apt to be in attendance at
a crash site for rescue and/or;removal of victoms is recommended. Marking
body locations will help Human 'Factors investigators in the analysis of
evacuation patterns, injury causation, or reasons for an unsuccessful
attempts toward escape.
3. Survivors, other than those at the aft galley "ervice ddor, were
quite aware of the cabin darkness after impact. Smoke would have rendered
emergency cabin lighting ineffective after a period of time but the survivor
statements indicate an immediate total darkness and the probability of a
1
failure of the emergency light lng system. This investigator would recommend
a more protected location fo~ :the emergency lighting hardware and a more
reliable triggering method.
,-
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(Identification Report)
-------
UNITED AIR LINES, FLIGHT 553
BOEING 737
.· Midway Airport
chfcago, ·n1inois
8 December 1972
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IDENTIFICATION
4.
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24 January 1973
cn......................
"'3.......
IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS ON VICTIMS
OF UAL B-737 ACCIDENT
MIDWAY AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILUNOIS
TABLE I , I
8 DECEMBER 1972
,ody
Nr Name Sex ,\ge Race Stat Wt
Ident. B"
Finger- Visual/Pers.
Dentition or in ts
. Effects Remarks
I Time
Identii
!i 3 Abner, v. 'i' 83 N 62 160 x .Invalid
I 2000
! 12 /10
1
88 Baldwin T. J 42 w 69 160, x r ! 12 /9
97 Bayer, L.
l
j 42 } l 0900
,.r w 73 175 x ! 12 /9
l [
l ! 1030.
87 Bes hoar J. <'<" ~ 47 w 70 200! x IX I i2110
73 Blodgett, R. o L7 w 75 220 x x I 1 1100
I 12 /9
79 Clark, M. 9 Lg N ! 68 \ 125, x f
.. { . I 12/9
l 1500
!
86 .Coble, W. l c! \ 43 !w j 70 ·190!
I
x . ff lst 11250
Officer
1 12 /10
I
j
'
107 Collins, G. r" } 47 N.· I I·
1
'
x
tu .s,
~Congressman
t 2000
1°2 /18 f
i T T
75 Elder. B. 0 i 31 f
I
w l
72 ! 180f 1x ! i 1215
! 2nd Officer ) 12 /9
dl Ellison. R. 2 l 41 ! N l
I 67 I 1361 x '
:,
l
I 2000
I 12 /10
85 Ellison, F. oLs fN !
I
70
t
! 125i
I
x
I
l
!x
II I
(Invalid?
: 1430
j
12 /l 0
l. l 1500
'15 · Ender l A 70 i 170~ x 12 /10
' I I l
!
. iw ~
! I I
}
i i 1610
72 Fields, E. 2 163 64 j 150~ x ! ! Inva 1 id f 12 /l 0
c. 2 '23
I I
' I. 1:' 1 f l I
i l
--
104 Janda, E. d f47 lw n! lSOj x I 12/9
:
78 Jordan, M. x f
Jordan, H.
I
82 x ix
i !
1·
93 Jording J. 64 '! 120\ x
I
1
l
1
99 Jording, Infant 17. I
I 1045
·25 Know land, R. r' 35 W 72 200' x :x
I
J 2 / J II
I
l t 20.'.5
102 Kri 11, A. er ''44 w 66 i 143l x J 2 /8
\ I 2000
71 Kru er J. cl . 72 I' 1811
! 34 \ w x 12 /8
! ~ i I 1800
70 Lewis. B. J 0'
' 35 I W i 73. 185i x ' I 12 /I 0
1 I
II --
94 McNair w. r! ! 37 f w~
}
'
l x I I l r 12 /9
1405
~
( i I l\ l
1 11 Moreau R. er f 50 I N 67' 1551 i ! \ 12 /9
J T 1645
(N i : I
I Il l I
1()~ Newm:1n v. 9 f 50 65'.
. 140! x : 12I1 o
! \I 1 I 1650
l
(
1)(1 NL•wm:in s. 9 \ 24 ! N
l\ 65·
}
I
1301 x 12 /l 0
r
?
1 l ! I
I
I
I l '<
1 2000
TABLE I
IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS ON VTCTJMS
OF UAL B-737 ACCIDENT
HIIMAY AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
8 DECEMBER 1972
Ident. B'i
Finger- Visual/Pers. Time
h iffiC Sex Age Racj Stat Wt Dentition or in ts Effects Remarks Idcnti:
Slwrman F. Q 58 w I 62 llC i. x
1330
12 /9
--
s_~ull K. 0 42 Iw 71 165 x x l
!
12/l 0
____.Jvst Iw I
I
I 2000
\_ W. Sr. r{' 42 !
' 66 116 x I 12 /8
_-.._,_w'l':;t, W. Jr. / 7 w 44 ! x I
I
!t
1045
12 /9
lI l 1045
-.. - -
wt'St. M. 2 10 w 44 f
t
x ! 12 /9
lfst c. .2 8 i w I 45 x I I
I
i
I
I
2230
12/10
lw ! l 0945
~!St J. 0 55 74 26°5 x ·Ix :
~ ! 12/fO
I
,2225
! 65 l 157
l r
!":thers, c. c! ·33 N !' x I 12/8
l
lhifehouse w. i 0 44 w 71 I 185· x
l
i Pilot
i
I
1115
12/9
Iw I
I 1515
• l \
_Jl_\:__li J liam. R. 0 27 70. I 145 x i I
I 12 /9
l l
--
,r, C:ucul ich, T. 2 37 ! w l 49 ! 641 x
'
l
I
Ground
Fatality 12 /10
--
n c''::culich, v. I 9 70
i
!
i w I 61
i
! 130!
i
x ,I Ground
Fatality 12 /10
Box J. 4 l tr Time I 4i I
ff Ccmpan.ios Changing Qua:rters. Covering Dislricts. etc.
343
~~I
_q4
3 .6/
1l I
JI CZ /421
f 3 ::JI
~'I
!15
14-4l 1141 7o
- 111~
J418 I '61 /.
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J.-11
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• .: ! . c,t;J:J.41; I £. I hS
5 1 0 4
1 u
j -
~r. Docket No. SA-435
. Exhibit No. 9-C-l
j i
•
;.
Photographs of
Altimeters and Air Data Computers
Recovered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972./Midway Chicago, IlL
\.. ,
~ ;!· - - •
:-:..:.·--·;_ -·~
~.-~-1:~ .-:r:~ ;._>. ~
INDEX OF PHOTOGRAPHS
L Captain's Altimeter
/-(
f
·'
-r
1 /,
f
- ·~--.
!-~
~
T
--
1-f
/-~
't-.
'··
/--(0
!f('';,. 1
r
2-(
2-2, j
~:~j:~,Jf
~~...~~~~;~:- .
'•IO;:.,-:,,
~~·· ..
t
~~
{
·},
i:=
\:.:.
f'
c:'·
• r
·~~-
.;;~
.. -
~
,. f
~ :.
n
{'
'·· .. ~
'
t '
d
r
2 r-- ,,... ;
I:. '
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I'
3 .. 3
i
- ·1
3-4
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1
IJ Jl
l~,.·,
.~ '·I)
y
t
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3-f
#
:;i:
<'
4-J
•~-A¥Jt.t
,_ ·--· .. .._:
., _
4-4
1-4
1-7
. Powerplant Gro.up Chairra.an 1 s Factual Report of' Investigation
- 24 -
Recovered Components (continued)
---
~ -
No. 1- Engine
No. 2 Engine
Oil Pressure Dif'f'erential 4436
Switch 606
Engine Bleed Air Valve 1642
F8-347
Main Oil Pump 198
M364
Pressure Ratio Bleed Control 615781
6322585
NL = Not Legible
NF = Not Found~:
GS =
~
------
Transferred to Systems Group
·;,,-,
:~·";..,. -·~~<·_. ~
, :,.
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOB
INDEX
"
UNITED AIR LINES, BOEING MODEL B-737, N9031U
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 8, 1972
FLIGHT RECORDER, FAIRCHILD MODEL F-5424, S/N 5134
35X
"[i'ffiICATED i\TRSPEED
35X
ALTITUDE
UNITF.D AIR LINF.S, BOEING HODEL B-737, N9031U
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 8, 1972
FLIGHT RECORDER, FAIRCHILD HODEL F-5424, S/N 5134
BOX
INDICATED AIRSPEED
SOX
ALTITUDE
i
··~
J
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOA
By
Billy M. Hopper
I
Docket l'lo. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOA
~ATIONAL TRANSPORTATION f>AFETY BOl\RD
Bureau of Aviat:l.on :>afP.ty
Washington, D. r,. 20591
February 7, 1973
A. ACCillENT
The subject aircraft was reported to have crashed and burned during
an approach to land on Runway 3lL at Midway Airport. The subject flight
recorder was recovered from the wreckage and was forwarded to the Safety
Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety offices in Washington, D. C., for exam-
ination and readout of the pertinent flight record.
reflected that. che recorder had been operatlng wtth:in the cA.librat Inn
tolerances. The Trip and De.te 111 nary trace.: was examined 'ln the area
of the .last indicated takeoff wlt!t the flndi.11g that the nwnbers "055308"
had been registered. These numbers ind\.cater1 flight number 553 of the
8th day, corresponding to the reported number and day of the accident
flight.
The recording styli for the above parameters are held away from the
foil surface normally. A cB.lh-operated pres sure bar is employed to-
depress all four parameter styli against the foil surface simultaneously
to record stylus positions. Double-lobe cams mounted at each end of a
motor-dri.ven shaft activate the pressure bar periodically at t.he nominal
rate of every 0.55 second.
Such evidence was found at a point 0.372 inch beyond the abrupt
ending of the parameter traces in the form of two stylus impressions made
by each recording stylus for altitude, airspeed, and heading. A great
amount of activity was present in the area of the vertical acceleration
trace at this point. These impressions were found to be of corresponding
size and shape when compared to the impressions made by their respective
styli prior to the abrupt ending of the recording. The lateral separation
in each pair of impressions also corresponded to that in previous recordings.
The total flight time from takeoff to the ace ident 1'as detc.rm:ined
by NTSB investlgators to be approximatcely 96 minutes; however, the subject
recorder ceased to record the various parameters 82: 14 m.imites after take-
off, thus indicating that the recording ·stopped approximately 14 minutes
prior to the accident. The flight recorder receives its 115 VAC electrical
power from the No. l Unswitched Radio Bus, the same source W"hich supplies
po;rer to the coclqlit voice recorder.
The flight recorder was for1'arded to the United Air Lines Maintenance
Operations Base for examination to determine the cause for the record•er
failure. During the examination it was found that a mitre gear, P /N 10466,
wh1ch is part of the drive assembly had slipped on .its shaft causi.ng the
recording function to cease operating. The United Air Lines report of
this finding is contained in Exhibit lOC.
E. FINDINGS
2. The flight recorder was examined with the finding lhat a mal-
function in "the drive gear train caused the cessation of norinnl
recording.
E. F INDINGS (c ontinued)
4. Heat d a mage to t he rP.c nrrlt~ r d i rl nnt ~•. f"l'~c:I. U 1e r cC'o r·ued tr·a (' t):;
and basic rcfc..•rc?tLr.P rnr~~1: :11 1·•!ll'l' ' lii .f; rcf]r) •· .Lr~ rl 'Lhat r1"?C'o r.dP.r l' per·-
Rt [n11 lJacJ been witl il ri 111•· •·1ttT•!11t c:aliurnl. i(in 1.oler·anc P.iL
,·
'
t ·.
i
~\:..'.. :-:''·'<.
Mr. W. Lamb
National Transportation
Safety Board
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C. 20591
Sincerely,
,: J
ice President
F·light Safety and Industry Affairs
Encl.
Loi:ation: Elk Grove To1~nship. lllirrois. on Route 62. one-h;ilfn1ile >vest of Route 83
IC .. o '" •11 , ..... , •• us~
.,
../ /•
During this analysis we found the miter gear on the cross shaft
which engages the miter gear on the motor and block assembly
failed to drive the cross shaft. Please refer to the attached
photographs and sketch for more details. Subsequent detailed
analysis of other ccmponents of the recorder have not disclosed
any other possible source of failure.
(
\
'-....
Earl Kabel
FEK:mn
Attachment
.,
Notes cm cause of failure of flight recorder - MR31212-6i42 (Fairchild
S/N 5134).
.. - .· ..
•
TDWU£
CON!~l !.rt~N.G
MITER GEAR
NUMBZR I
MOTCR
". ~-. . ..
. . ., . , ·-~ .
;~ .. ..
...
..... '\ .
.. ' t•:: • ·"" ·:'-- "' • .....,. '"!-
SA-435 File No. 1-0048
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Synopsis . • . . . • • 1
Investigation .... 2
1.
History of the Flight 2
1.1
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft 4
Other Damage • . • . 5
1.4
Crew Information . . 5
1. 5
1.6 Aircraft Information 5
1. 7 Meteorological Information .. 5
Aids to Navigation . 7
1. 8
1. 9 Communications . . ~ 7
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities 7
1.11 Flight Recorders . 8
1.12 Aircraft Wreckage 9
1.13 Fire o • • • • ~ • 11
1.14 Survival Aspects • 12
1.15 Tests and Research 14
1.15. 1 Automated Radar Terminal Service Data
and Derivation of Flight Profile •• 14
1.15. 2 General Electric Engine Sound Spectrogram Study 16
1.15. 3 B-737 Performance Study 17
1.15. 4 Simulator Tests ........... g ••
19
1.15. 5 B-737 Flight Tests . . . . . . . • . • . . • 20
1. 15. 6 Central Air Data Computer (CADC) Examination 21
1.15. 7 Description of B-737 Ice Protection and Certification. 21
United Air Lines Crew Procedures 22
1.16
Analysis and Conclusions 23
2.
23
2.1 Analysis . • .
Conclusions . . . • 31
2.2
(a) Findings 31
(b) Probable Cause 32
Recornmenda tions 33
3.
Appendices
Appendix A - Investigation and Hearing 35
Appendix B - Cre·w· Information . . . . 36
Appendix C - Aircraft Information 38
Appendix D - Wreckage Distribution Chart 39
Appendix E - Approach Chart • 41
Appendix F - Transcription of CVR 42
Appendix G - Approach Profile (ARTS-III) 55
Appendix H - Nonprecision Approach Profile 57
Appendix I- Safety Recommendations A-73-39 thru 43 58
iii
SA-435 File No. 1-0048
15.Supplementary Notes
This report contains Aviation Safety Recommendations A-73-73 and A-73-74.
16 .Abstract (
A United Air Lines Boeing 737-222 crashed on December 8, 1972, at 1428 c.s.t~
while making a nonprecision instrument approach to Runway 31L at the Chicago-Midway
Airport, Chicago, Illinois. 111e accident occurred in a residential area approxi-
mately 1.5 miles southeast of the approach end of Runi;vay 31L. 111e aircraft was
destroyed by impact and subsequent fire. A number of houses and other structures
in the impact area were also destroyed.
111ere i;vere 55 passengers and 6 crewmembers aboard the aircraft. Forty pas-
sengers and three crewmembers were killed. Two persons on the ground also received
fatal injuries.
The aircraft was observed below the overcast in a nose-high attitude and with
the sound of high engine power just before it crashed into structures on the ground.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
this accident was the captain's failure to exercise positive flight management during
the execution of a nonprecision approach, which culminated in a critical deterio-
ration of airspeed into the stall regime where level flight could no longer be
maintained.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Synopsis . • • • • • • 1
1. Investigation • . • • 2
1.1 History of the Flight 2
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft 4
1.4 Other Damage • . . . 5
1.5 Crew Infonna ti on • • 5
1.6 Aircraft Infonnation 5
1. 7 Meteorological Infonnation .. 5
1. 8 Aids to Navigation • 7
1. 9 Connnunications • • " 7
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities 7
1.11 Flight Recorders • 8
1.12 Aircraft Wreckage 9
1.13 Fire . . . . . . . . . 11
1.14 Survival Aspects • 12
1.15 Tests and Research 14
1. 15. 1 Automated Radar Tenninal Service Data
and Derivation of Flight Profile • . 14
1.15. 2 General Electric Engine Sound Spectrogram Study 16
1.15. 3 B-737 Performance Study 17
1.15.4 Simulator Tests • • . • • • • . . • . ,, . • 19
1. 15. 5 B-737 Flight Tests • . • . . . . . • • . . . 20
1.15. 6 Central Air Data Computer (CADC) Examination 21
1.15. 7 Description of B-737 Ice Protection and Certification. 21
1.16 United Air Lines Crei;.;r Procedures 22
2. Analysis and Conclusions 23
2.1 Analysis . . . 23
2.2 Conclusions 31
(a) Findings 31
(b) Probable Cause 32
3. Reconnnenda tions 33
Appendices
Appendix.A - Investigation and Hearing 35
Appendix B - Crew Infonna ti on • • . . 36
Appendix C - Aircraft Information 38
Appendix D - Wreckage Distribution Chart 39
Appendix E - Approach Chart . 41
Appendix F - Transcription of CVR 42
Appendix G - Approach Profile (ARTS-III) 55
Appendix H - Nonprecision Approach Profile 57
Appendix I- Safety Recommendations A-73-39 thru 43 58
iii
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1973
SYNOPSIS
1. INVESTIGATION
At the same time, approach control was handling other traffic, includ-
ing Aero Commander N309VS which had executed a missed approach at Midway (
and was being vectored back to the Kedzie outer marker (OM) to intercept
the localizer for a second approach to Runway 31L.
1/ All times herein are central standard, based on the 24-hour clock.
The approach controller stated that after the tower controller had
coordinated with him regarding the missed approach clearance issued to
UA-553, he noticed that the radar target associated with the aircraft had
drifted approximately 1/8 to 1/4 mile to the right of the localizer center-
line. He observed the, target for two sweeps of the radar antenna after
which he saw it disappear from the radarscope.
Several survivors said that the aircraft shuddered following the nose-
up pitch change; four of them estimated that the aircraft 1 s nose rose at
least 30°. One passenger stated that the nose pitchup occurred in two
phases: the first, gradual and to a moderate angle; the second, abrupt and
to a high angle.
Several eyewitnesses heard loud engine sounds and observed the aircraft
in a nose-high attitude. A licensed pilot stated that when he saw the air-
craft break out of the overcast at 400 to 450 feet above the ground, it i;vas
descending in a level attitude. He said: "There was a surge of power and
there i;vas an abrupt attitude change in the aircraft. The nose went to a
very high angle of attack."
0
The geographic coordinates of the crash site '\Vere 41°45 1 51 11'. N.
87 42' 54" w.
Fatal 3 40 2
Nonfatal 1 15 2
None 2 0 (
The impact and subsequent fire destroyed five ·w·ood and brick frame
houses and one garage, and damaged thre·e other houses and two garages.
(See Appendix D for detailed information.)
1. 5 Crei;v Inform.a ti on
The aircraft weight and center of gravity (e.g.) at the time of the
accident, computed to have been 86,394 poun~s, and 19.0 percent mean aero-
dynamic chord (MAC), respectively.., were both wit:hi1 .. specified limits.
(For detailed information, see Appendix C.)
The Midway low level radiosonde (upper air) observation made at 1106
showed saturated conditions from just above the surface to approximately
- 6 -
6,100 feet mean sea level (m.s.l.). The air was generally stable with
several inversions in evidence. Temperatures were subfreezing except in a
layer between about 5,700 and 6,700 feet where temperatures were a fraction
of a degree above freezing.
Weather Service forecasts for the route included SIGMETS )_/ warning of
moderate or greater turbulence below 15,000 feet, and moderate to occasionally
severe icing in clouds and precipitation. Company forecasts anticipated
low level clear air turbulence produced by wind shear at various terminals,
including Midway, and also warned of light freezing precipitation.
With his other dispatch documents, the captain of Flight 553 received
a weather packet containing current and forecast en route and terminal
weather conditions, and forecast winds and temperatures aloft. Similar
information was aVailable in the company dispatch office at Washington
National Airport.
The captain of Delta Air Lines Flight 567, a DC-9 which arrived from
Detroit, Michigan, and landed on 31L just before the Aero Conrrnander, stated
that he encountered light icing conditions and used all available anti-
icing equipment, including empennage anti-icing. He noted very little
accumulation of ice on his aircraft, possibly less than a quarter of an
inch, during the entire approach. He stated that he was still in the over-
cast when he was over the Kedzie OM. Just beyond Kedzie, he found some
holes in the overcast "and had ground contact right away, but ... didn't
actually come out from under the overcast until just about 500 feet. 11
The pilot of a Cessna 310, which landed on 31L immediately after the
accident, reported that he entered the overcast in the 1'1idi;vay area at
4,000 feet m.s.l. and that he remained in i t for about 8 or 9 minutes
during his approach. He stated that the buildup of ice on his aircraft was
about 1/2 inch and that he intennittently operated the wing and empennage
deicing boots. He estimated that he had visual ground contact from an
altitude of 500 to 600 feet above the ground.
1.9 Corrrrnunications
N9031U was equipped with a Fairchild Model F-5424 Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) serial No. 5134. The altitude, indicated airspeed, magnetic heading,
and vertical acceleration traces ended abruptly 82:14 minutes after takeoff
(approximately 14 minutes before the accident). Measurements at the end of
these traces indicated an altitude of 10,625 feet m.s.l., an airspeed of
307 knots, and a heading of 274° magnetic. Examination of the flight
recorder showed that a miter gear (P/N 10466), which is part of the drive
gear assembly, had slipped on its shaft causing the recorder to stop
functioning.
The aircraft was also equipped with a Sundstrand, United Control Data
Division Model V-557, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) serial No. 1648.
Although the CVR showed evidence of extreme fire and heat damage, the entire
tape was recovered with only moderate damage to a nonpertinent area. A
transcription was made of the final 27~ minutes of the recording. Communi-
cations and conversations by the individual crewmembers were identified
by persons who were familiar with their voices. Simulator studies and air-
craft test flights were conducted to duplicate and to record various CVR
sounds, such as: gear and flap lever movements, various switch actuations,
aural war!ling signals, etc. A transcript of all pertinent sounds and
communications during the last 8 minutes of recorder operations is included
in Appendix F.
(
Precise timing of the CVR data was made by determining the accuracy
of elapsed times between recorded events. First, a time base for the CVR
recording was established by comparing the recorded identification signal
frequency of the Kedzie OM with the known frequency characteristics of that
signal. Next, the times thus established for all recorded events were
correlated to real time by reference to a recorded time signal that had
been transmitted by Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) at 1400.
The cockpit area microphone (CAM) track of the CVR was examined to
the fullest extent of the Safety Board 1 s audio laboratory capability in an
attempt to identify engine sound frequencies during the final phase of the
flight. No evidence relating to engine thrust settings was found. A
similar attempt was made by United Air Lines, using special engine-analysing
equipment; the results were negative. The CAi:1 track recording was then
examined by the General Electric Company's Research and Development
Laboratories. The engine operating data developed by General Electric are
summarized in Section 1.15, Tests and Research.
- 9 -
Portions of both wings and the fuselage from just aft of the cockpit
to the rear galley door were consumed by the postcrash fire. The relatively
intact left cockpit section and empennage incurred only minor fire damage.
All airframe structural components were accounted for either in the main
wreckage area or along the path of impact.
The left main landing gear was found almost fully retracted but not
completely within the up-lock. The right main gear was completely separated
from the aircraft. The nose gear was torn loose from its mount; the
position of its retract mechanism indicated that it had been retracted at
impact.
The left wing anti-ice valve was found in the ·closed (wing heat off)
position. Damage to the right wing anti-ice valve precluded a detennination
of its preimpact position. Both air conditioning pack valves were found in
the closed position.
Both engines were separated from the aircraft. All first stage fan
blades of the No. 1 engine were broken off above the blade root platforms.
Nearly all second stage fan blades and all attached fourth stage compressor
blades were bent opposite to the direction of compressor rotation. Large
amounts of debris and building materials were found in the air inlet and
front fan areas of the No. 2 engine. The leading edges of the first and
second stage fan blades were extensively damaged and bent opposite to the
- 10 -
The center control pedestal was toTil away at impact from its nonnal
position. The flap selector handle was relatively intact and moved freely (
between the 30° and 40° positions. The flight spoiler (speed brake) handle
was in the stowed pesition. The stabilizer trim indicator ·was found set
at 9~ units aircraft noseup. The landing gear handle was not recovered.
The No. 1 engine pressure ratio (EPR) gauge was recovered with the
pointer indicating 1. 66 EPR and with a target EPR reading of 1. 97 in the
selector window. The No. 2 engine EPR pointer indicated 1.90 EPR with a
reading of 1.95 in the selector window.
The anti-ice switches of both engines, the Pitot heat switches, and
the window heat switches were 11 0N. ri The filaments in the related indicator
light bulbs were stretched.
The two VEF navigation receiver frequency selector heads i:;vere found
set at the Runway 31L localizer frequency.
The captain's flight director panel mode selector switch was in the
rrt.anual 11 position. The first officer 1 s mode selector switch was 11 0FF. 11
11
The captain's and the first officer's altimeters were recovered with
barometric settings of 30.05 and 30.04, respectively; no meaningful alti-
tude indications were obtained from either instrument 1 s face. The captain's
altimeter appeared to be vir~ually intact, but showed evidence of ground
fire damage. In a functional· test, this altimeter responded to pressure
changes in the "barometric mode, 11 but because of hea:t damage to the internal
components, no assessment could be made of the preimpact accuracy or oper~
a.ting capability of the instrument in the 11 servo mode. 11 Only the charred
face and a portion of the servo unit of the first officer 1 s altimeter were
recovered.
1.13 Fire
The first witnesses at the crash site stated that structures on bOth
sides of the aircraft fuselage were burning, and that white smoke was
emanating from the fire. They also stated that the fire was very intense
around the center section of the aircraft, and that thick black smoke
obscured part of the fuselage. The overall conflagration involved the
aircraft as well as the destroyed dwellings and their contents.
The Chicago Fire Department was first notified of the crash at 1429.
Five engines, three truck companies, one helicopter, one dry chemical unit,
and three ambulances responded immediately. The first radio calls report-
ing that units were "on the scene 11 were made at 1431 and 1432. Additional
alarms were struck at 1437 and 1449.
The fire was put out almost entirely with water; 20 gallons Of foam
were used in the rear service door area. The main fire was controlled
within 20 to 30 minutes after the fire fighting equipment arrived at the
scene. Smoke, heat, and small 11 flareups 11 continued for more than 3 hours
after the crash.
- 12 -
The first sounds of impact were recorded about 1 second before the
end of the CVR recording. The aircraft either damaged or destroyed
several houses _before coming to rest across the foundation of one of them.
Except for the a.ft portion of the coach section, the ernpennage, and the
left side of the cockpit, the fuselage was destroyed by impact and fire.
Therefore, the analysis of the conditions in the cabin and the related
survival aspects, irrunediately after impact, is based on survivor observa-
tions.
The only survivor in the fuselage section forward of the wing was
the first-class flight attendant who occupied the aft-facing jumpseat
adjacent to the left forward entry door. She was seriously injured when
her seat collapsed and she was trapped by debris from the aircraft and the
house. She was freed from the wreckage after an intensive JO-minute rescue
operation by Chicago Fire Department personnel. No first-class section
seats '\Vere recovered intact.
Survivors reported that all cabin lights went out after the impact,
and that no lights were visible during the evacuation. Six survivors
escaped through breaks in the fuselage. Nine passengers who exited through
the rear service door were assisted by the two flight attendants; these
attendants were the last to leave the aircraft.
The left side of the cockpit and the left forward entry door area
were relatively intact. The captain's seat was intact and sustained only
minor fire damage. The floor attachments for this seat were in place; the
4-point seatbelt and shoulder harness release mechanism was found unlocked
and operable. Shoulder harness straps were found retracted in the inertial
reel without signs of scorching or discoloration.
The first and second officers' seats were destroyed by impact and
fire. The first officer's shoulder harness straps were found retracted
inside the inertial reel and showed no thermal damage.
In view of the allegations of foul play which have been injected into
the publicity surrounding this accident, the Safety Board finds it neces-
sary to present certain aspects of the trauma experienced by nonsurvJ.vors
in more detail than would normally be reported.
Four pathologists from the Cook County Coroner's Office prepared brief
gross descriptions of the passenger fatalities and established a cause
of death in each case. Although the deaths of most occupants r;ve"X."e attributed
to burns, some of the causes of death mentioned different fonns of trauma,
such as 11multiple injuries 11 and 11 extreme 11 and 11 partial body destruction. 11
Several also contained the statement, 11 associated with carbon monoxide
asphyxia; 11 some of them mentioned cyanide.
The magnetic tape containing the tracking data of UA-553 was examined
to recons true t the aircraft 1 s flight p refile before the crash. 1-'leteoro-
logical data, i.e., winds and temperatures were applied to the ARTS-III
positional and altitude data to derive calibrated airspeed and vertical
velocity as a function of time. Use of the ART3-I(I raw positional data
to calculate airspeed resulted in an erratic trace because of the afore-
mentioned positional tolerances; therefore, it was necessary to smooth
these data. The after-the-fact smoothing technique differed from that used
in the ARTS-III ground speed manipulation in that future, as well as past,
data points could be considered. The result Was an estimate of actual
value which did not include the lag inherent in the AR'D3-III calculation.
The AR'D3-III computations for UA-553 indicated that the flight, when
first acquired at 9,500 feet m.s.l., was descending to 4,000 feet m.s.l.
approximately 1,000 feet per minute (ft/min). The flight remained level at
4,000 feet for approximately 5 minutes and decelerated during approximately
the last 3 minutes of this period from an airspeed of 230 knots to abo~t
180 knots. At that time, the final 'approach descent i;.;as initiated with a
descent rate of 750 ft/min. About l~ minutes after the start of this
descent, the aircraft had decelerated to 145 knots, and the descent rate
had increased to approximately 1,250 ft/min. This descent rate was main-
tained until the aircraft was over the Kedzie OH where the ARTS-III data
showed an altitude of 2,200 feet m.s.l. After a momentary level-off, the
descent rate increased to about 1, 550 ft/min, which i;vas maintained until
the aircraft reached 1,100 feet m.s.l. and level-off was initiated. The
- 16 -
airspeed at level-off was approximately 120 knots. Level flight was main-
tained for 16 seconds before the ARTS-III system lost the aircraft's
beacon return.
10. The overall noise level of the tape reached a maximum very
shortly after the engines reached their peak speeds, making
interpretation difficult. Oscillations were noted but little
can be said reg£rding their nature except that their extremities
did not exceed the equivalent of 4 percent N1 .
the 15° flap extension at 1423:20, inferred from CVR sounds, was made at the
placard airspeed of .195 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), approximately
10 knots below the airspeed derived from the ARTS-III data. Subsequent
changes in configuration were keyed to intracockpit conversation and other
sounds similar to lever movements recorded on the CVR.
It was determined from this study that the profile of the accident
aircraft could be matched closely with the theoretical perfonnance capa-
bility of the B-737 for that part of the approach preceding passage of the
Kedzie OM. The correlation was achieved with the flaps extended 15°,
landing gear up, and partial flight spoiler extension coincident with the
initiation of the descent from 4,000 feet at 1424:10 approximately. The
theoretical deceleration to this point would have produced an airspeed of
157 KIAS. At a 750 ft/min rate of descent, the aircraft would have con-
tinued to decelerate and would have reached an airspeed of 140 KIAS at
1425:32; at that time an increased rate of descent to approximately
1,250 ft/min would have produced a positive acceleration. Recorded cockpit
sounds indicate that the landing gear was extended at 1425:50, and that
the flaps were repositioned at 1426:00, although the position to which the
flaps were extended was not apparent. The theoretical airspeed at this
time would have been 152 KIAS.
In the 30° flap, gear down, flight detent spoiler configuration with
a combined engine thrust of 5,900 pounds, as indicated by the engine sound
spectrogram, the aircraft would have decelerated approximately at 2 knots
per second after levelling off. The theoretical speed for stickshaker
activation in this configuration is 116 KIAS. Without making allowances
for levelling-off technique or increase in thrust, it would have taken
approximately 8~ seconds under these conditions to decelerate from 133 to
116 KIAS.
the stickshaker activation speed of 105 KIAS, about 25 seconds would have
elapsed beti;;veen the aircraft level-off and activation of the stickshaker.
The first test series was conducted prior to the receipt of the
engine sound spectrogram findings; consequently, a flight idle engine
thrust level during the latter portion of the descent profile was chosen
for investigative purposes. Engine thrust levels ranging from takeoff
thrust to as low as 1.50 EPR were investigated during the recovery phase
of the profile.
'~issed Approaches
1
~pproaches to Stalls
1
~pproach Descent
After completion of the Final Descent Check List, the Captain 1vill
announce the target approach speed. Hhen the airplane is 1,000 feet
- 23 -
11
At 500 feet above field elevation as determined by barometric
altimeter, the F/0 will announce: 500 feet above field elevation.
Starting at 500 feet above field elevation and at approximately each
100 feet increment, he -i:vill. call out only displacement or deviation
errors as pertinent. . •• At approximately 100 feet above minimum
altitude by use of the barometric altimeter, he will announce:
approaching Minimums. At minimum altitude by use of the barometric
altimeter (Radio Altimeter for CAT-II approach), he will announce:
Minimums •.. If the Captain executes a missed approach, he will
announce: Going Around.
11
In icing conditions, maintain engine RPM above approximately
55 percent Nl for satisfactory anti-icing.
11
If ice does form on the engine inlet, disturbance of the airfloi;v
can produce engine surging, high EGT's, flameout, etc. With even a
small amount of ice present, turning on Engine Anti-Ice will cause the
'
melting ice to go through the engine and may cause violent engine
surging at intervals of one to two minutes. Throttle adjustments
should be sloi;v and deliberate to avoid exposure to engine flame-out. 11
2.1 Analysis
Both CADC units were capable of normal operation, but their altitude
synchros, as recovered, showed an altitude higher than that of the crash-
site. The alti~ude differences, which could have been transmitted from the
CADC units to the captain 1 s and first officer 1 s servo altimeters, were
157 feet and 103 feet, respectively.
The two CADC units are connected to static sources located on inde-
pendent Pitot/static probes which have no corrrrnon connections. The same
probes contain independent static sources for the airspeed indicators. A
static source error equivalent to an altitude error of 100 feet could
produce a 10-knot airspeed indicator error in the same direction, i.e., if
the aircraft is higher than the altimeter indicates, the airspeed indicator
\<Till sho\..;:r a speed that is higher than the aircraft's actual airspeed.
Several sources for connnon errors in the two independent systems were
considered. One \..;:ras ice, which could have accumulated on the Pitot/static
probes. However, since both probe heat switches were found in the "ON 11
position, and since examination of the filaments of the probe head indica-
ting lights showed that probe heat was energizeP at the time of impact, it
is unlikely that probe icing was the source of error in this case. Another
source of error could have been the effect of the aircraft 1 s extreme nose-
high attitude during the final moments of flight. According to The Boeing
Company's flight test data, pitch angles within the stall buffeting region
can produce static system errors that result in altimeter readings 60 feet
higher than the actual altitude. Also, if electrical power to the CADC was
interrupted while the aircraft was in a nose-high attitude at impact, the
Pitot/static sensing ports could have been 20 feet or more above the eleva-
tion of the crash site. Additional errors inherent in the reported baro-
metric pressure correction at the time of impact could account for still
another 15 to 20 feet. Since it is possible, as shown above, to account
for a significant portion of the difference between impact elevation and
the CADC altitude computations at the time of power interruption, the
Safety Board concludes that the static system errors reflected in the CADC
readings at impact do not have a bearing on the events that occurred at ~IDA~
The flight 1 s progress was routine until arrival in the Chicago area
and the start of the approach descent. Although an approach clearance was
not issued to UA-553 in accordance with the applicable ATC procedures, the
radio and cockpit conversations, and the subsequent events leave no doubt
that the controller and the crew understood that the flight was cleared for
the approach.
the ARTS-III data showed an airspeed in excess of 200 knots at that time,
it is more likely that 15° flaps were selected at or below the flap limit
speed of 195 knots, as the aircraft was decelerating. The engine poi;ver
setting remained at approximately 63 percent N during that time period.
1
When the controller advised the flight to slow to approach speed, 106
seconds after_ he issued his first speed advisory, the aircraft 1 s speed. i;.Jas
still in excess of 180 knots. The deceleration rate for that entire period
i;vas less than the aircraft 1 s deceleration capability, provided the thrust
had been reduced and the flight spoilers extended.
When the tower controller could not make Runway 31L available to the
flight by diverting the Aero Commander to land on Runway 31R, he issued a
missed approach clearance to UA-553. The fact that the onset of the stick-
shaker activation coincided~with the first worO of the missed approach
clearance indicates that this clearance had no bearing on the events at 1'1DA.
In view of the above circumstances, the Board concludes that ATC was
not a factor in this accident.
The reason for the crew's relatively slow response to ATC advisories
appears to be their unawareness of the exact distance to the Kedzie 01'1.
There was no DME associated with this approach; and the crew did not request,
or receive, distance advisories from the approach controller. Another
method for the crew to determine their position on the localizer with regard
to the 01'1 i:vas the use of the Calume-.t intersection, as depicted on the
pertinent approach chart. The distance from Calumet to the Kedzie OM is
6.9 nmi. However, there is no direct or indirect reference to the use of
the Calumet intersection recorded on the CVR. The conversation from the
time of level-off at 4,000 feet until the aircraft passed the Calumet inter-
section deals mainly 'tvith the inoperative status of the FDR and means to
troubleshoot it.
- 26 -
The first and second officers did not complete the checklist until
the captain had leveled off approximately at 1,000 feet. As a result, the
first officer did not make any of the required altitude callouts, nor does
it appear that he i;.;ras monitoring airspeed and rate of descent. In regard
to his checklist response that the spoilers were 11 arrned, 11 it is noted that
the green 11 armed 11 light is illuminated whenever the spoiler lever is moved
out of its forward 11 stowed 11 position and placed in the 11 arrned 11 detent
(spoilers retracted and the system ready for automatic deployment upon
landing) or in any position aft of that, including the "flight" detent
(maximum in-flight ·deployment). Since the flight spoilers affected the
aircraft 1 s performance and were needed to expedite the descent, the first
officer probably would not have retracted them on his own initiative. There-
fore, to account for this checklist item in the limited time available, he
may have based his response on the illumination of the light, rather than
on the position of the speed brake lever.
ARTS-III and CVR data show that the level-off coincides with the final
checklist response. The first officer's 1,000-foot call, about 1 second
after his final checklist response, seems more of an afterthought than the
- 28 -
ARTS-III, CVR, and engine sound correlation shows that the engine
thrust was not increased in anticipation of the level-off. The throttles
were repositioned to produce 72 percent Ni on one engine and 79.2 percent N1
on the other within 6 to 7 seconds after initiation of the level-off
maneuver. Although the addition of power may have been intentionally
delayed because of the captain 1 s observation of an airspeed higher than
Vreference' the asyrrrrnetrical development of ·thrust was probably associated
with the abrupt nature of the maneuver. Probably more significant in this
context is the fact that the captain moved the throttles to a position
that corresponded closely i:vith the thrust required to maintain his reference_
speed in the nonnal landing configuration i:vith the spoilers stoi:ved.
The stickshaker started to sound as the poi:ver was increased, and the
sound continued for the 20 seconds remaining until impact. The ARTS-Ill
data indicate that the aircraft continued to maintain level flight for 8
to 10 seconds of this time period.
the stickshaker activation speed with the spoilers deployed, this decelera-
tion rate correlates closely with the indicated time sequence of events.
The stickshaker sound started while the engines 'Were still accelerating
in response to the captain 1 s application of level-off poi;.;er. C\TR evidence
suggests that instead of applying more power, the captain's irrrrnediate
reaction was to reconfigure the aircraft; within 2 seconds of stickshaker
onset, there i;vas a sound indicative of flap lever movement. If the flaps
were retracted to 15° at this time, the associated loss of lift would cause
the aircraft to settle. It is quite likely that the captain would councer
this situation by increasing the nose attitude even further. Eyewitnesses
and surviving passengers both attested to such an increase in pitch at::it•.tde.
angle of attack may have been so high as to make recovery impossible even
with full thrust developing.
That the crew realized the position of the flight spoilers during
this 20-second sequence of events is not evident4 After the accident, the
spoiler lever wa·s found in the fonvard or stowed position, and the spoilers
in the retracted position. Ho'l:.;ever, the postimpact condition of the center
control pedestal and the possibility of spoiler retraction when hydraulic
pressure was lost during the impact make this evidence inconclusive.
The weather conditions during the approach of UA-553 were also condu-
cive to airframe icing. The aircraft would have been subject to these condi-
tions for approximately 6 minutes. Pilots conducting approaches to Midway
dtiring the time period involved reported that the ice accumulation on their
aircraft was not significant. The pilot of a DC-9 which operated in these
- 31 -
conditions for about 7 minutes reported less than 1/4-inch ice accumulation.
Although the greater portion of this analysis deals with the events
surrounding the level-off, the Board wishes to emphasize that the accident
sequence was triggered by the captain's failure to exercise positive flight
management earlier during the approach.
2.2 Conclusions
a. Findings
9. The crew did not use one of the available means to detennine
their distance to the outer marker.
10. The aircraft crossed the outer marker about 700 feet above the
published minimum crossing altitude.
11. The captain did not call for the final descent check until
the aircraft had passed the outer marker; the distance from
the outer marker to the runway was 3.3 nmi.
13. The first officer did not make the prescribed altitude call-
outs during the approach.
14. The flight spoilers were deployed to the flight detent posi-
tion for the final descent from the Kedzie OM and remained
in this position during the level-off at MDA.
b. Probable Cause
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the role of the flight spoilers in this accident and the
indication that the crew was not aware of the reason for the higher-than-
normal stall warning activation speed, the Safety Board concludes that
certain crew training deficiencies exist and recorrrrnends that the Federal
Aviation Administration:
Is I ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member
Is I WILLIAM R. HALEY
Member
John H. Reed, Chairman, was not present and did not participate in the
adoption of this report.
APPENDIX A
1. Investigation
2. Hearing
3. Reports
APPENDIX B
CREW INFORMATION
Captain Wendell Lewis Whitehouse, aged 44, was employed by United Air
Lines on January 30, 1956. He held Airline Transport Pilot Certificate
No. 1159888, issued on October 3, 1968, with type ratings in the Douglas
DC-6/7 and the Boeing 737 aircraft. He also held Flight Engineer
Certificate No. 1386803. He was upgraded to captain in the Boeing 737 on
October 29, 1968.
First Officer Walter 0. Coble, aged 43, was employed by United Air
Lines on October 4, 1957. He held Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1300051,
issued on June 30, 1958, with ASEL and instrument ratings. He was quali-
fied as a Boeing 737 first officer on January 31, 1969. On June 19, 1972,
he flew an unsatisfactory proficiency check, but passed a subsequent recheck
on June 21, 1972. His last proficiency check was conducted on June 21,
1972, and his last line check on October 25, 1972. His most recent
first-class medical certificate was issued, without limitation, on July 28,
1972.
Second Officer Barry J. Elder, aged 31, was employed by United Air
Lines on May 8, 1967. He held Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1646564
with ASEL and instrument ratings. He was qualified as a Boeing 737 first
officer on September 16, 1970, but because of company personnel reductions
he reverted to second officer status on the aircraft. He had not received
proficiency flight training or recurrent ground training from the company
since January 31, 1971. His most recent first-class medical certificate
was issued, without limitation, on November 11, 1972.
The three flightcrew members had a 23-hour rest period prior to this
flight.
- 37 -
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
Aircraft and component records showed that all inspections and over-
hauls had been performed within the prescribed time limits and that the
aircraft had been maintained in accordance with all company procedures and
Federal Aviation Administration regulations. All applicable airworthiness
directives had been complied with as of December 8, 1972.
The aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines. The
No. 1 engine, serial No. 655956, had a total of 5,852 hours since overhaul
and the No. 2 engine, serial No. 655840, had a total of 6,554 hours since
overhaul.
I
llGENO llGENO
@ROOF DAMAGED
CD NORTHEAST CORNER OF ROOF DAMACrn. @HOUSEDE..SIROYED
©NUMEROUS LIMBS OF TRff BROKEN.
@HOUSE DESTROYED
0 SECTION
P/N
Of llFT l!OR!ZO~TAL STMILllER SKIN,
65-~1;31>·~.SECTIONOFllfHW/ATOR, @HOUSEOESJROHD
P/N65·4751M.
@cocKPIT AREA AGAINST TREE
CD 6POLEINCHES
SNAPPED OFF APPROXIMATELY) HET
ABOVE GROUl'iO. UPPER SECTION
NOTE: @GARAGE DESTR0\10
ONCAMGEROOf. PATH OF FLIGHT .3~0'
COCKPIT HEADING 30' @RIGHT MAlN LANDING GEAR.
0 POlf SNAPPED APPROXIW.REY II FtET B INCHES
ABOVE CROOOO. UPPER S£C110N IN BACK YARD.
EMPfNNAGE HEADING 25'
NOTE> PRESENTATION NOT TO SCALE
mtPHONE CABLE LOCATED 20 f1£T AB-OVE
GROUND UVEL
EU:CTRICAl CABLE LOCA1£0 TOP OF POLE,
POllS ~'IASURto APPRO~IM.\TElY 34 fill WEST 70th. PLACE
IN HEIGHT.
CABLES FAILED INTtNSION.
HOUSES. "z
Q
APPE~
@ Stell ON Of llFT HOR 1ZONTAL ST AB llllER.
@SECllOO OF FUP TRACK INCLUDING JACK SCREW.
'
,..,..
.. "j;-- ··..;,.~"-'
- 41 -
APPENDIX E
CHICAGO Approach
] ] 9 .35
!R)--1 ATISl20.05109.9
Deµa-;-;::·1R.-,---..LG-,-,-.,,-.,,-----~
) ] 9 .35 121.7
LOC
NDBRwy 3 ll
l 09. 9 !MXT g::_
270' . 090• MSA I 80 270"
~1---------~-..L-------..L~l2:::;.l~.7_.:;C"n..-----'-'~'~o~o-·~1_,2~20~0~·..L~'~'~o~o·..,
2049'
840'•
HINES
LOM
219MD=:: 938'
•
*·~
2399' I.
.1041' *
862d,
cl,968'
825' 764'
"'0 • (!.
> 847cli
19. !
2300 093~
899' 087°-
-2670
.;>/
..?o
0 /u: <!p
0 4 o 0o CALUMET
~/
•
730'
I
I
• 779' ol~I
"' .1037'
• 993'
I
~w
g~~
0
r .1020·
MM LOM
-~ ~,ii EAST
~ 2000'
I
•
'-----w-------
~
•I
,i, ~i'*1soo·
3~1'§! {889'}
,,,,,,\ (1389')
10 NM
~ 1$
TDZ RWY 31 L 61 1 1 ~ 2.7 ~~
APT.619' 0 0.6 3.3
PULL UP: Climbing LEFT turn to 2600 feet and proceed to EON VOR via
inbound R-001.
STRAIGHT -IN LANDING RWY 31 l CIRCLE-TO.LAND
LOC NOB
1 1
MOA l 040 (429'} MOA 1120 509')
A A
1120 1 (501')-l
8 8
c c 1120 1(501' -1 1h
D D
& 1180'(''"'!1-·2
Alt MDA 1 040 1{429') MOA 1120 1(509') E~g Non·Skd -1 3 I
1,"~s~~·-----l'-----'----'-A~·'~·~c~,1'--'o~,~1'~4--~~,_"'~----'-2_s_o~·r_,,_,_1_.2____S_:..,
: 'G"""'d"'"'O"'oo;dc.·"'""-'_ _,_6.,,o'--'_,s,,o'--'-'-'o.,,oL!."'2<00L1.cel4"'0'"'Ic;6"'-0 NOT E: SJr d I ng sca le N A.
~ LOM to MAP 3.3 3:18 2:29 1:59 1:39 1:25 1:14
CHANGES, LO C frequency. Cl IH1' JEPPESEN t..co. O(NVE<, (Oto. U.S ....
..LL••GHrs ·~seovm
TRANSCRIPI'ION OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING, UA 553 1 DECE!>ffiER 8, 1972
CAM Cockpit area microphone CAPO Radio transmission from Chicago Approach Control
RDO Radio transmission from N9031U (UA 553) MTWR Radio transmission from Midway Tower
-1 Voice identified as Captain * Unintelligible word/words
-2 Voic;e. .i,1,_entifiea as First Officer NOnpertinent word
-3 Voi'ce id'EintitiE:d as Second Officer Break in c.ontinllity
-? Voice unidentified' QuestiOnable teX~:"
9\18 ·naciio ii_.a;{S-inis'si:on frbm Aero comnianaer 680 1 N309\'.~· .'EaitOrial inse·rticin
·pa'.U.Se
Nal'E: Al'i ti'tiie· appears· as
. . ' ' . a'reenwi~h Me8.n Time- (Gl<fl'J ·1:-. ~·:.;~;., ..., :·'
:·,,,,..,·
• ''- ·.11.~.i. .
INTRA.,..·cocKPIT . ·')UR-GROUND COl>MUNICATIONS:';
CAM-3 Yeah
CAM-'?.
* **
2019:<5.5
CAM-1 See what 1 s -wrong -with it, will ya?
2019: 50.0
RlXl-2 Do ya read United five five three?
INTRA.- COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
~
2019:52.0
CHI APC Sir, I was busy on that phone over there, you 1 re in
radar contact, two ninety heading, intercept thirty-
one left localizer for Midway, Oscar's current
2020:00,0
RD0-2 Okay, thank you, we got_Qs_ca]'_, ah, __ two nip~:t:;y on t_he
heading --- intercept three one left
202o:o4.o
CHI AFC --S, sir
2020:09.0
C!IT APO Nine Victor Sugar radar contact south heading, two
thousand five hundred, vector for thi1·ty-one left
again
RL0-2 Sound of LOM IDENT ((KedZie LOM, TIP.SH, DASH, DASH, IDT,
IXJT, DABH))
2020:37 .5
CAM-3 Braking aetion :reported fair by a guppy
CAM-l Fair?
CAM-? ***
CAM-l Sounds to me a_ circuit breaker} perhaps
2020:52.5
CAH-3 Hah?
CAl<!-? ** l(-
SOURCE SOURCE
& TJME & TIME CONTENT
2021:13.0
CAM-3 It tests
CAM-?
***
2021:23 .o
CAJ·i-3 :1.t says off
,·,1'
2o21: 23 \i; '' -·,:-
':cJir.AJ?c . Ze1•~__ nine vs.L:tu:rn left to one" three zero
11
CAM-1 You got. an off" light
CAfl-?
** *
CAM-3 And it shows, indicating tape
)
'
'
'
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR~G:RoUND COtMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME & TiME
2021:56.5 United five five thTee, slow to a hundred an eighty
CHI AR; knots
2021:59,5
R00-2 Hundred an eighty knots, :five five three
2022:00.0
CAM Sound of two clicks ((similar to flap lever
movement))
2022:26.5
CHI AR; Zero nine VS, descend to two thousand feet
2022:112 ,5
CAM-2 Wonder why they put that in there, final approach
from holding.pattern at Kedzie not authorized?
2022:45.5
CHI APO Zero nine VS turn left zero nine zero
CAM-? ** -l(·
CAM-2 Yeah
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIME
20'23:12.0
CHI APO Zero nine VS turn left heading zero two zero
'•
2023:16.0
CHI. APO
0
20?3:l8.5
RD0-2
' .
Five five three, slow to a hundred an sixty knots
2023:19.5
CAM .SbtindJ p_f thi-ee cliclm ((similar t.o movement of
~~P .levei·,) _): ,1
2023 ,35.0
CHI APC An zero nine VS -- whet is your S:irspeed now?
2023 ,39.5
CHI APC 1 key 1 keep it up for a while, please
2023:42.0
CHI APC Five five three start slowin 1 toyer approach speed,
please
2023:44.5
R00-2 Okay, slowin 1 up
TNTRA-CCCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE· SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIMli:
2024:08.5
CHI AFC * VS, turn left heading three two zero now, intercept,
cleared for the approach, stay ~"ith me
2024:31.5 ··~-~
CAM-7 ***
2024:44.5
CHI AFC Nine VS, keep as much speed as long as you can sir,
call the tower now, one eighteen seven
2024:50.0
CAM-3 I doll 1 t know
CAM-1 Call it in
2025:ll.5
CAM-3 I 1 ll have to call Dispatch
CAM-1 ***
D·lTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
~ CONTENT
- --- & TIME
.2025,28.0
1100-2 Eighteen ·se.venJ .five .five three
.-~:~~~::~:.M.~~~Y-":t_bife_r_,
. .;:.:.~~:: ~~tt~~-~ ~-Un.it~&:'
-":.~~:;~~-~~~ ·. -.'.\--;-;-;~~: . ~' )~~~;
"f.ive._;five' i::hiee·,
of,·,: three ·;fo17 t-wo
.- ';:
,.-. ·
---_,.
Uni:ted five~-.five :th~'ee_,_ ~·:epo~t passing the
· :nwnber t;.;p, on:.st~1e ·-~~~'rOach,
,·
,;··
Chic?-80:., 'this is .fi've -:ri-V'e·three ((secon~.. Off~i;?~r·: c;--~ ,.,, ,.
2025,44.o . '
R00-'2_-· -dKa~ ;-·. ~~~o~:g~'.:~-{1~}~~:~t~R -m~:;·ke~
~~ :_,,~- - ' - ---5~·
Let 1 s have the gear down please
SOUEOE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
----
2025:52.20
'1r\IR Nine Victor-sugar, what's your airspeed?
2025:54.14
9VS Ah, we 1 re down to ah, hundred twenty knots
\
2025:55.06
CAM Increase in rnnbient noise level ((similar to
increase made by nose lanaing gear extended))
2025:56.82
!,fi'WR Ah hund1·ed and twenty, okay
2026:00.64
CAH Sonnd of fi1·st of four clicks in rapid increase
((sounds simila1· to flap lever moved from fifteen
degrees to 25 degrees position))
2026: 01. 50
Gear 1 own
CAM-?
2026:10.02
RD0-1 Sou.~d of beginning of second series of Kedzie outer
marker beacon tones
2026:20.02
RD0-1 End of sound of second series of Kedzie outer marker
beacon tones
2026 :211. 66
CAN-1 Final descent check
I
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT
---- & TINE
2026:25.66
CAM-3 Flight and nav
2026:27 .ll
CA.H-2 Cross-checked
"-:·
CAM-? ***
CAM ·sound··of'
·clicks ((similar t·~
trim act~tion)_) __ , :·· '
2026:35,97 '
. '~:
CAH-? Flight
. ,. ' ~
"'
0
,_._
."\--, ..2:026 ,3\; .38 '
>'~.-:,. ··,.,
"- ~ J ,: -·--
-~ .;· _
~u±n~~~~:),··r1.~:,, ·
.1'£---t· ,: 1 -,.v_-, . .'··'
',·~fu¢. ,_ .-'· 'Unl.itba .five· _f.ive :thre'ej conti_nue Tnbo'Urldi you~-re
twOOn ~p~- appio_ac~i. 1
ll -t~~e_p-· yqU advised ·. 'A>
~\ :--. \
2026:110.10 '
CAN Sound of seve:Ja.i clicks ((similar-to soUna of
electrical stabilizer txim actuation))
2026:110.46
R00-2 Okay
2026:40.96
CAM-2 Cross-checked
CAM-2 No glideslope
2026:41.10
9VS Eh, nine VS has the runvay
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
- --
2026:43.06
Ml'WR Nine VS, runway three one left cleared to land
2026:44.67
CAM-3 Aaan the --- landing gear
2026:46.18
9'/S Okay
2026:48.40
MTWR Nine VS, do ya have the right runway in sight by
any chance?
2026:50.41
C/\.M-2 Down, three greens
2026:51.37 2026:51.37
CN·l-3 Speed brake? 9'/S Affinnative
2026:52.45
CAM.-2 Ah --- anned
2026:52.6
MTWR 'ud you swing over to that and land? There's a jet
about two m-- and disregard that, ah, okay, I see
ya now, you're cleared to land on thirty-one left
2026:54.69
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by moving
speed brake lever to anned position))
2026:56.o4
CAN-3 Wing flaps
2026:58.75
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by flap
lever moving into detent))
IN'rHA-COCKPI'l' AIR-GROUND COM!•M1ICAT!ON$
SOURCE SOURCE
~ & 1
fIME
2026,59.112
CAM-2 ThirtyJ green 1.ightJ pressure fluid
2027,oi.48
Cl\M-3 An the auto-pilot?.
2027,o4.11 .--,
CAH-2 Ah thousand .feet
.
.,._
2027:15.33
CAM-? Flaps fifteen
2027:16.14
CAM-? I'm sorry
2027:16.47
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by flap
leyer moving into detent))
2027:20.14
CAM Sound of double click ( (som1d similar to landing
gear lever moved into up detent))
2027:20.64
CAN Sound of landing gear warning horn begins and
continues to end of recording
2027:23.55
CAM Sound of initial impact and garbled voice
2027:25.02
RD0-1 END OF RECORDING
·'-~·
CAllBRATED AIRSPUD·KNOTS
g ~ s 8 3 ~ ~ ~ ~
''
''
''
CAM-l·l: OJSCUSSIO'I ON lNOP'ERATJVE STATUS Of FDR ''
,,''
,,
,,
i
I
'
l' ~
l ~
I §
I
, I
=
• I
I
.•
"'1
'' 'I
I
' I
I
I
~'
~
Z:h42 •CHI APC, 553 START SlOWING TO YOUR APPROACH SPEED
RD0·21 Ot!J..Y, SLOWING UP '
I
I
I
I
I
~ ,, I
8 ,,,
,
,,
~
3:
~
~
,
3::
;-. ,,
,!
~ 24:ll ,,
" ,I
,I
,,
,,,
,,
CAl.H-3: DISCUSSION ON INOPERATIVE STATUS _Of fDR
,,
I
I
I
25:11
'
I
I
I
I
I
,
I
,,
I
I
/25:35 • RD0·2i MIDWAY, TOWER UNITED 553,AN' WE'RE
I
Ol!T Of THREE fOR TWO I
<'.5:39 • MTl'IR: UNITED 553, REPORT PASSINO THE OUTER ll'ARKfR,
NUMBER TWO ON THE APPROACH ''
25M • RDD·21 OKAY REPORT THE OUTER ,\\llRKER
25'46 ·CAI.Ht lfT'S HAVE THE C£11R DOWN PLEASE 'II
25:48 • RD0·1: FIRST SERIES OF )(£OZIE BEACON TONES
25,51- CAM: SOUNO SIMILAR TO CEAR l£VER /t\OVEMENT I'
I
I
~ ,
,'
,,
Z6:00 ·CA At SOUND SIMJIAR TO FlAP l£VER N10VEMEW FROM
,.. 8 15°TO 2S"
-0
-0 2f,,\o· RDO•l: START Of 2nd StRIES OF KEDZ!E OM B£11CON TO~ES
,,
I
z<= "'
,..
0 I
~z
>-
~ -<
"' ,..
z KEDZIE /26:20 - RDO·l: £ND Of" SOUND Of KEOZIE OM 9EACON
IOETERMINED TO HAVE HEFJJ TURN£0 Off I'
I
~
"'
~
~
~
-<
~.z
~-
/26:36 • MTWR, UNITED 5~3, CONTINUE INBOUND YOU'RE <2
ON THE APPROACH· l'tl KEEP YOU ADV ISEO
?~ Jl • 91/)· f\J!\( 'I~ f'A~ T~' 011'1,YAV
I
I
!'
~ '~ 0
"'
,j'1
,-.,-
-57
APPENDIX H
TTh1E CHECK
VREF + 15 KTS.
MISSED APPROACH
TAKEOFF THRUST
FLAPS 15
GEAR UP - ON POsrrrvE
APPROACH CONFIG• RATE-OF-CLl1fB
AFTER CLEAR OF
OBSTACLES:
FOLU)\V FLAP RETRAC-
TION SCHEDULE.
CLIMB THRUST.
*APPROACH CONFIGURATION:
NO~MAL J\1ANEUVERING or
FLAPS 25/VREF + 12 KTS
FLAPS 30/VREF + 5 KTS
NON-PRECISION APPROACHES/MAP
TWO ENGINES
-_,.'' ,,·"..:-:··
-
,.,.,;
__...
·.r'.:
- 59 -
APPENDIX I
--',';;--
,.
·',•
.,-··
'-··
':.:;>··;~ .·.-;~·;,,,.-
·( .•. -..· ,., . ·.!- "'
~-·
_"(
'-·.-' ··-
',, '--··
·-i
;...,_ "•
___._-,_-c-
_ __
:'!/.. .>.,::f~,: t
~--~-; ~-:··,:;;··
" "~ •
,- ~ ;1.;.'
·. ·.:_;·,f
- 61 -
APPENDIX I
. · :~ - ..
~·\•
:"·_-,;;~.'.../~:.
"~~( ;~ ;::..;,'· .
.\-;/'>.
.,, .
·-'~'~
'.;;r~
" .
' ~··
. ,
,, ',.,_
..
/
(
/
/
;·.:
{' .
,
. .~ :.:
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
:·,
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20305
Pending receipt of the investigative report, this case has been reviewed
and coded, as ::indicated above. Upon completion of the pathologic studies
in this case, it is requested that the report of autopsy,· photographs,
x-rays and pathological materials be submitted for review. Kindly address
ship to: The Director, Attn: Chief, Aerospace Pathology Branch, Armed
Foreces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C. 20305.
The reported heart weight of 390 grams, left ventricular wall thickness of
1.8 cm, and the right ventricular 1·1all thickness of 0.5 cm are greater- than
average for a normotensive man of 44. Hov1ever, cardiac v1eight and ven-
tricular thickness can vary with the diligence of the prosector, and the
_ventricular measurements were reported to be approximate.
The five different sections of myocardium submitted for revie\'1 appear es-
sentially normal. Coronary arteries were not present in any of these sectfons.
In the opinion of the staff, "ultra-acute myocardial infarction" is not present
in this material.
I R. W. MORRISSEY
Colonel, USAF, Mt
Examination and report; ):>y: The..Di rector ,
'( I
MAJ Robert R. McMeeki\1, i·:C, USA ·: ! r 1 " : ••• ·, ·
Chief, Aerospace Pathology Branch : James L. Hansen, 1 U~ D.A
; ,' Col:i:1cl, }~C,, USl..
1 Deputy Director.
,/
·-;.. __ .
'-'-; .
-:_,
.:~:
-~·\:/~J, ::.r~,- i-':(f~ -~,
~:
;P~t
-~"?':·" ;:;.:;· i,
·' .
.... ,.
'<
~
:-•
'
:;''
1
·i
.....
~- '
::-·,
;,,11 1 )/,,1~··
.. ·.L;TLTE1ArC-
''1!11 ..•.
Ji~ ...~. ~~·-
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
1. ~-rener3.l
ii. l11e pitot static nystem consists of four combined pitot static probes,
cwt> ~11 ternotc ~-t-.:1tic r•,"lrts, und connecting tuhing to .':lir Ou.ta inr.trunlf~nt£".
'''"1 dr:.tin trap and tN:I·. fittin{';S. (See figures 1 und 2.) 111cG1'
i11i.~tr11111Pnl·:.; !!11·:1.011r0 .·~\'ll:.u11jc ( pitot) and tl.JT1l)i0nt (static) air prc'u~;1t1·1·~: t.o
.Jl·h 1111i11r :1i1·11:1n1: vr~l'tic:.i.l :.•peed, air.c;i•ef:c1, 111~1t~l1 1u1rnber, u.nd :..tll:.itudt•.
i!e~tcor circuits arn provided for anti-icing of the pitot static probes.
k-ofel' to f'itot Static Tubes and Temperature Probe Anti-Icing System,
c1~:...pt".er 30.
· )ttot ~:y.stem
.,. r:.-,1n· pitot tubes :tre uced t.o sense dynamic air pressure. Two probes :::!.re
no. :int ed 1.111 ear.Ii :;'tile c·f the fuselage below control cabin window No. 3.
i'l·t· ..::~i 1 !:1i11'r; pitl)t'. source is from the upper left pitot static probe and
t.: !(' r-i r::t. 1 'ffl.1..'<'!' I G f1·om the upper right pi tot static }1rObe. ~hesc pi tot
! 1'f':~:."1·l':.; rL't-:'! Ll1eir 1·t :..;pectivc co1.1hined mach 1 . irspeed indl.c:-ttors.
f'. •dn: l.l i:t!',V tfr~. 1 :uKl N,). 2 [d.t.ot prl~~;c11rf's from the lower rigl·t :u1d lowc1·
l C>f'L l i !·.or. ct.:·ttic !··1·0\ie feed r.hc various indi.catorc :1.nd equipnent as
:.:l1nw11 in ftp:ut·c ; 1 •
1\, Static or ambient pressures are sensed through two ports on the combined
pitot static rrobe. Each static port is connected to a port on the
opp:isite side of the airplane as shown in figure 2. Static pressure is
also available from alternate static ports locatP.d at station 4o6 on both
sides of the airplane. The four static pressure systems feed indicators
ond equirment 'J.S shown in figure 2 ..
50:'"'
;,,w 15 /C8 34-11-0
+ Page 1
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
B. The static source selector valve provides a second source of static
pressure for the captain's and first officer's altimeter, instantaneous
vertical speed indicator and roach/airspeed indicator. Each valve is
controlled by the applicable static source selector switches located on
the captain's or first officer's side :i:anel. Static air pressure is
used from the appropriate static source when the switch is in NORMAL
position and from the alternate static source when the switch is in
ALTERNATE position.
00000 0 0 DODOO
i
ALTERNATE LOWER RIGHT LOWER LEFT ALTERNATE
STATIC PORl SEE DETAIL A STATIC PORT
>---PITOT
STATIC
PROBE
CAPTAINS OR
FIRST OFFICERS
STATIC PORTS
/C>--\----::7"'----- N 0 1 0 R N 0. 2
AUXILIARY
STATIC PORTS
DETAIL A
0 \
\
\
I
III ?
I~
~
&-
NO. 10 I
§
~ @ ~ \ I
ii:
NO . • I I DP
\ \ IL ~-
-fSn__.!'!OSTAT~ J. \f
I I I
---L ~~----~
NO 4
~T~AE_STATIC_ _ _ _ _ _ ~
CAPT mor
/
I I\\
I \\
O / / \
·
~'2.o..' AUX..2.!ATIC.__ -?----@No.
I
J
I
6
II \\ ADC I
Il NO. 12 \ \ NO. , I
I I --@ \ \ NO. 2 AUX PITOT 0 NO. 7 I
\
INSTRUMENTS EQUIPMENT
8 Al TIMETER
AIRSPEED MACH
WARNING SWITCH
STATIC POAT
STATIC LINE
NO. 6 ANO NO. 7 · LE FT S! DE OF E 1 RACK
PITOT LINE
NO. 8, NO. 9, AND NO, 10 ·RIGHT FORWARD END
OF NOSE WHEEL WELL
·. ._;
~-,'
',-•
... ...
.,.. _
' .
( INSTRUCTION MANUAL
1. General
A. Air data pressure instruments are those which derive their inputs from
the pitot static air pressure system and the air data compucer system.
Refer to Picot Static System, 34-11-0. The air data.pressure instruments
a.re composed of two airspeed/rnach indicatorsJ two instantaneous vertical
speed/rate of cllmb indicatoi·s, two altimeters, and two air data
comp11 ters.
D. Altitude throughout the range of 1000 feet below mean sea level to
50,000 feet above mean sea level may conventionally be indicated on both
captain 1 s and first officer 1 s indicators from static air pressure
information and by fine altitude signals from the air data computer to
the ca.ptain 1 s altimeter.
E. Each air data computer s.vstern electrically integrates and computes from
pitot static pressures the corrected altitude, mach number and airspeed
signals. 'l.'his data is sent 'co the ATC transponder, autopilot, flight
director, rnacl1 "tr1rn, and. other systerns as sL.)wn in figure 6. Power to
operate the comp11\.e1· is obtained from the circuit breaker panels Pl8 and
P6.
~102 34-12-0
Play ;_'.1/bt; Pat!:t'·
+
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
ALTIMETER·
--AIRSPHD,-MACH INDICATOR
AIRSPEED -· · ALTIMETER
MACH INDICATOR··
VERTICAL
SPHD
IND ICA TOR ---''c--o,.L_,
OI ITT
2. Airspeed/Mach Indicators
D. The airspeed dial and subdial scale factors are selected so that the
single pointer shows airspeed on the outer perimeter of the dial and
mach number on the subdial scale through a cutout in the main dial
adjacent to the high airspeed markings. (See figure 2.)
E. A manually set airspeed command index, which may be rotated around the
outer periphery of the main dial, is set by the airspeed command knob.
Hhen the auto throttle system is installed, the airspeed command index is
used to set the airsi;eed to be maintained. (See 22-31-0.) The
difference between the index setting and actual airspeed generates an
airspeed error, This error, if used in the flight director system pitch
corni;uter, 1naintains the airplane s1-eed at the ir Jex setting. (See
311._2(,-( ) . ) Two monually set indices are also mounted at the
perimeter; howev·er, these arc not controlled by the airspeed c0nnnn.nd knob.
AIRSPEED
COMMAND
KNOB
,,..,
,_..,. .........
u• IYSI
DOWN VERTICAL
SPEED
ZERO
ADJUSTMENT
SCREW ------ll-...q,
03.01
4. Altimeters
A. Altimeters are provided for both captain and first officer. 'fhese are
servopneumatic three-pointer instruments and have a range of -1000 feet
to 50,000 feet. The large pointer, which indicates feet in hundreds,
moves once around the dial for each 1000 feet of altitude. The
intermediate pointer, which indicates thousands of feet, moves once
around the dial for each 10,000 feet of altitude. The third hand (cross),
which indicates 10,000's of feet, moves one half a revolution for the
instrument range of 50,000 feet. This hand is part of a rotating disk
which is shaped so that a cross hatched area is exposed below 16,000 feet.
As the disk rotates, above 10,000 feet, a white arc is exposed. A slot
in the face of the instrument exposes a dial which indicates the
altimeter setting in inches of mercury. The altimeter is set by manually
rotating a set knob on the front of the instrument. (See figure 4.)
r · ·--··1000 FT POINTER
THREE
POINTER
ALTIMETER - - -
J_JOO FOOT
POINTER
Altimeters
Jun 15/66 Figure 4 34-12-0
+ Page 5
..
?c7JJ,7! ~····"-
1•• . .. 'IA'&
DLTE.
'. /)
··~/II'
~~~·-·-·-·.
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
5. Air Data Computer
A. General
(2) The air data computer consists of individual plug-in altitude, mach
and airspeed modules, and a chassis assembly. (See figure 5.) The
computer front panel has pitot and static pressure input connections,
six test switches, a function test select switch, and three failure
annunciators.
B. Computer Modules
502
34-12-0 May 15/68
Dos•·.:. (.,
+
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
- -- - - - - FUNCTION TEST.
SELECT SWITCH
- - - -- TE ST SWITCH
FAILURE
ANNUNCIATOR S ~~-111--49--0
MACH
ASSEMBL Y
ALTITUDE
TRAN SDUC ER ---._
AIRSPEED
TRAN SDUCER
I t:. .. -:.~ 1(
I •llllUDl -:11::::u•t
• .,JT O H"'l
JltAN\ OV(U
• Ll l PJDI
~~T-
I
~----
I
,l,~~1 ~:1;":~~T!llZlO I
r - -- - -, u , " ' - - - - - - - - CHAI. ALT TO l'IUSUI·
~;~~~~~~~
I llSV
AC
\C A L~ ~ llOI:
U..«t!CTOI
- -
I
1
- - - - - _
I
I
- - l'l lSS. S~TIM
;p
...... I
VIJl lOUS O PIUTING
VOllA.G!S 10 MACH
AN O Al_ S,tf D M00-
UlES ANO CHASSIS
J I
1
1
A.LI MOD\JlE
4DAl'T£t
I
_ ,+ _
--,I
FI NI All
SYNC..0
NO 1
'1 '1t:d . LOO P.
t:!
pl
~OMl'\J m -1
SYNCHIO
LOG O<
r - - ---+
I
ALT I llNALT
ALlll\JDI
M _ _ __._ _ _ TO lAT/ l l'll !Vt
r.
pl
0
1611 • C
2o V 4 (
......
~~.......::'=---~
, ,.. ~ I ~ LOGIC
I" "UI'
IXC FIOM MACH
lllMCOUl'l!I
I I
COAISI
l'Ol. IND (IF US!D)
...
~
0
.a CAl'l AllM
I
CHAIACTEllZID
Al l l'Ol.
4 Ll
I YNCHI O
c
>:j 16 J x I OU4 L MACH n
-....z
...... i:: ~---- ll lM l'OT. ~-'-----+..------
~~
Cb
,--
L_ _
1
I
1
0
(J)
~'<
en
~ A.PT 4 l t~ · i~ c
L--- CHAl ..CTlllZ!D
I,,
IT.. llC I OUKE
4 A\.t •1lSPE fO POT .
c1" EllOll coca
~ ( II
t:!
...,. F. ') IN ST , ANH
O..·
I
1'1101
l'l!SSUI! -
SCALI EllOI AUTortLO I
I I SV A(
4UTO ~F~ IL _ _ _
TO LOGIC
I OUIC!
COllECTO- 01'01.
_J
COMIUTU- 1 All DATA COMl'\Jl[l NO. I
~V A(
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
(3) The mach assembl;r develops a mechanical value of mach from the log
Qc/Ps input. This input is formed by the log Ps synchro in the
altitude transducer by a log Qc signal, above 115 knots, from the
scale error corrector and a mechanical value of altitude, Log Qc/
Ps drives a servo loop within the rnach assembly which in turn
positions a motor-generator. The motor-generator mechanical output
of mach drives the static source error correction kit (if installed)
and the dual mach trim potentiometer that sends inach number signals
to the rnach trim system. ·
(1) The functional test circuits drive the airspeed and/or altitude
transducers to test the operation of the modules. (See figure 7.)
The function test select switch on the computer front panel selects
the desired signal to be monitored by the test indicator.
(2) The airspeed transducer and mach assembly are operationall;r tested
by depressing the IAS SERVO test switch. The altitude transducer
is tested by the 600 FEM and the ALT SIEW switches. These switches
provide a simulated error signal that causes the servo motor to
drive. If the signal is within tolerance the pointer of the
test indicator will travel from the red area to the green area as
long as the servo drives. When it reaches a null, the pointer
returns to its original'position. The 5KN and 60 FI test switches
drive the airspeed servo 5 knots from null and the altitude servo
f/J feet from null respectively.
502
May 15/68 34-12-0
+ Page 9
,,
-----·· - - .. ---------------------------------------
l "' ;.Ji..•1;' "LAG (<J'•'•ECPU Jt • ..\ll(~LAl·H5 '.'.IJH
I
>--' ·1 ·~ABU
- .. -
1•1!.Jl(Al(.iO: QR >OUll'ME-t~T lt-.ISTALL~D IA I
r0 I MACH
'
;o --0 ----() - ALTITUDE RATE I
IMOI
ALTITUDf ~Tf 2 v
1rT!l lrT!l
I
!iKI I jW!T(H
AJRSP!:[lJ 60 fl SWITCH
140•
ALTlfUDE - FUNCTION TES
T?.Ar i'iDIJCEP TRAN)DUCER SELECT
~OG
'''" ..
..--<>
~
QC
PS MACH
ASSEMBLY TO ALTllUDF
SWITCH
1401
ALTITUDE 5lfW
""'I
REPbRTfll:
~
':.WITCH S405 DIGITIZER
IAS JLfW
SWIT\H 5403 I VOLTAGE FAILURE WARN-
DIVIDER ING RELAY
.,,-0
HI LOW I HI LOW HI LOW
K401
-z
600 FPM
SWITCH
S.W6 MACH
"'.... ~
AIRSPEED ALTITUDE
FAILURE
MONITCA:
FAtlURf
MONITOR - FAILURE
MONITOR WARNING
FLAG ;ia
t t 5WllCHES
c ~
-
~
.. TEST TEST TEST
...-
n
,~
I
..
~
0 f.
MON TRIP Al TITUOE MONITOR
IAS MONITCit z ~!Ill
~
SWITCH 5-407
1-MCH MONITOll TAS/SAT
<D
> fl',~
GATE 2 ~
l'l
rl
INVERTERS
ov
1401
AND DlOOE
LOGIC CIRCUIT
AUTOPILOT
AIRSPEED >
r-
-NO"~ti I
ALTIMEHR
<D
S SEC
FLIGHT
DIRECTOR
jf GATE 1 NO. I
FLIGHT
AIRSPEED
I DIRECTOR
~ ANNU/'KIATOR
NO, 7.
(4) When a logic 0 output from a failure monitor is applied to the diode
logic circuits, the applicable warning flag switches will ~ause the
indicator flags to appear. When the mach assembly corrects for
s,tatic source error, it contains a jumper so that a failure in mach
will cause the altimeter warning flag to indicate a malfunction.
502
May 15/68 34-12-0
+ Page 11
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A
BY
C. Hayden LeRoy
(
Docket lio. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C. 20591
A. ACCIDENT (DCA-73-A-3)
C. SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 was en route from Washington National
Airport, Washington, D. C. to Chicago-}!idway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
with 61 people onboard (53 ticketed passengers, two unticketed infants,
and a crev1 of six.) The aircraft 1vas executing a localizer - only ILS
approach to Runway 31L at Midway Airport. The crew maintained radio
contact with Midway Tower during the final portion of the approach. At
approximately 1428 c.s.t., the aircraft crashed about 1.5 nautical miles
southeast of Runway 3 lL, Midi;vay Airport into a residential area, destroy-
ing several houses~ The aircraft -i;vas destroyed by impact and subsequent
fire. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 500 feet
ceiling and 1 mile visibility.
]) All times herein are central standard time based on the 24-hour clock.
r
- 2 -
1. Aircraft
a. Cockpit Configuration
of the cabin, with a closet located forward of it and the forward galley
unit situated aft of it.
2. Occupants
.. Occupants of the aircraft at the time of the accident i;vere
identified as follows:
a. Flight Crew
b. Flight Attendants
Seat Location
Position
. r
- 4 -
c.. Passengers
T
-
- 5 -
·4. Fire
b. Fuels Available
Crew 39 cu.
ft.~ {compress e d to
Passenger 1
Passenger 2
114 cu.
76 cu.
ft:
ft
(1850 p.s .i. @
(4) United Air Lines advised that two air freight ship-
ments destined to Omaha comprised the entire contents of the aft cargo
compartment, and consisted of one 70-lb. piece of machine parts and a
344-lb. shipment of nylon hosiery packaged in 5 cartons.
Co Site Characteristics
When the aircraft came to rest, the normal cabin lighting had
failed and it ivas very d~rk inside. No one saiv emergency lights and
the breaks in the right side of the fuselage did not get noticed until
they were illuminated by the fire from outside the aircraft.
With the exception of two passengers i;vho could not remember, all
survivors stated that their seatbelts remained intact and most reported
bruises to attest to this fact. Male survivors on the right side at
Rows 8, 10, and 11 had difficulty releasing their respective seatbelts
because their seats, though intact, had come partially loose and were
leaning forward, consequently semi-suspending the occupants by their
seatbelts.
One survivor said he saw t1vo men unsuccessfully try to opG11 the
right ove~-w·ing window exit~ The left 1vindoi:;v exit w"as opened and a sur-
vivor reported seeing one passenger go through 'it, even though it led ·to
only a fire and no apparent exit. He called to him to return but appar-
ently was not heeded. One body was.recovered along the outside of the
fuselage in that area.
The {fa2 Stewardess was able to go about midway into the cabin
to assist those who were trapped. Several trips into the cabin were
made, interspersed with a gasp for air at the aft exit door. At first,
the smoke was thick and grey and limited visibility to only 4 or 5 feet
maximum. However, it dramatically changed to billowing, thick, very
black smoke, which the Stewardess described as seeming 11 to have weight
and if you tried .to inhale, it just i;vouldn rt go doi;m your tl1roat. 11
The stewardess from the first class cabin was trapped in the
forward stei;vardess jump seat under debris which was at least i::vaist deep.
The forward entry door was found by the investigators to be jammed in a
partially open position with the forward edge rotated inward approximately
40°. Rescue efforts continued for almost half an hour before the stewardess
could be extricated. The fireman advised that the right side of the air-
craft had been destroyed quite far back, beyond the stewardess' location.
She was removed from the wreckage out toward the right where the aircraft
had been obliterated.
la Medical Examination
a. Summary
Crew 3 1 2 6
Passengers 40 11 4 55
Others''' 2 0 2 4
Total 45 12 8 65
*Two occupants of one of the houses struck by the aircraft during the
crash received fatal injuries as a result of the ·accident. Their
location in the house at the time of impact is not kno<;~Q Two persons
near -the accident site received minor injuries and were treated in a
hospital emergency room. One, 1vhose house 1vas demolished, 1vas treated
for smoke inhalation; and the other for burns to both hands and an
I
-11-
8. Aircraft Wreckage
The smaller break was large enough that one man reported
he left the aircraft through it, without tearing his suit. No
survivors reported aµy breaks on the left side of the aircraft.
Ground witnesses who observed the wreckage from either the front
or back had the impression that the hull appeared fairly intact.
Of course, the center section was not observed because it was
entangled with the wreckage of the houses which were destroyed.
C. Hayden LeRoy
Air Safety Investigator
EXHIBIT 6A
ATTACHMENT I
PASSENGER LIST
~
n
~ ATTACHMENT II
"'
~
I I
,-.---~
=
~ KNOWll LOCATION OF SURVIVORS AND FATALITIES
:0
I..--""
"'
COAT
~
CLO~?'.T
.,, \
g"'o
z :0 L -L~..J
o-<" R ~
;o :0 )>
r
·~
r ...J
-< :0
0 "'-< SUM1'l-\RY OF SURVIVOR ~?_f~f..~- T:f..!.1J1S. I
A B c D
r---1-1 rus ELAGE G
~
EXITED VIA BREAK IN
I I
~ L-- - _ _;
z0 EXITED VIA REAR SERVI~E ·nooR l l
I
I
L __ - - .... J..
I
<
;·.
''= ·~·:
1
"'
:0 IN FUSEIAGE
ABC
6I .L_-1-B
DEF
- -~
I
.,
c -,.,
~7~m
! 3:
~~
"' G>
i--------t-"'
nz"' !; n
"' -<
o-~--·~- "~~"' ..-:.
rD 1 ~- "" 1
~ ... .,
Le{ - - I 9 f:· -- ?J LEGEND ,
---- - ;
-· --~-
•_..:..,; __ .I
c CHILD !
R RESCUED FROM WRECKA.GE
i
B EXITED VIA BREAK IN FUSEL\GE I
I
D EXITED VI.A RE.AR SERVICE DOOR
d" 'HALE
i FEMALE
lll'i-1--,
V-:1.j ___ _114 fQ~~1 __ J
~--.,
~SEAT l10T OCCUPIED
IA I BAGGAGE IN SEATS
~ F~TALITY
~1·FATALITI 1 SEX UKKNa,.,"N
"'
.______ o"',.
o :o.,,
o.5~
:on
'
"'
n
rn
oo
..
~ "":.
ATTllCHJ.LENT III
COCKPIT CREWMEMBERS
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS
LOCATION Il~JURIES.
6B II
(Infant) Extensive burns Neg. Neg Neg.
6F II
Shock incidental to Neg. 46
e"--treme burns; advanced
incineration changes
associated with carbon
monoY.ide asphyxia and
cyanide.
II
IC Extensive burns Neg. 90 O.l91
SD II
Burns of left ear, right
hand and abdomen. Fx and
laceration of left leg.
II
Contusion upper lip. Fx
L-3, L-4. Bilateral con-
tusion left leg. Burns
of left leg.
II
Shins bruised. Right ank:h
twisted. Abdomen bruises
and head lacerations.
Lower back strained.
Lacerations on right hand.
Laceration of :forehead. I
l6F "
Fx nose. Laceration upper
lip and nose. Avulsion
of front incissors. Con-
tusions of abdomen, buttocks.
left knee.
·, lTB n
Lower abdominal hernia.
-··; ,.·
- 6 -
OCCUPAl'!TS OF COACH SECTION .
OTHERS
Acidic & Neutral Drugs none detected . none detected none detected
(Acid-Ether Extraction, (blood) (tissue) \blood)
UV Scan)
.·
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A
.;
.;
'
•i
.,
BY
C. Hayden LeRoy
... ,
·'
- .. _......._ ...
,..
A. ACCIDENT (DCA-73-A-3)
\
c. SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 was en route from Washington National
' Airport, Washington, D. C. to Chicago-}lidway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
,, with 61 people onboard [53 ticketed passengers, two unticketed infants,
j
and a crew oI six.) The aircraft was executing a localizer - only ILS
W approach to R~ at Midi;vay Airport. The cre-..v maintained radio
.: 0 /'- contact with Midway Tower during the final portion of the approach. At
i (Jvu.J- <2..- ~oximately 1428 c.s.t., the aircraft crashed about 1.5 nautical miles
·f ~-,/ southeast of Runway 31L, 1'1idway Airport into a residential area, dest-:-oy-
; )l/_ ·"o \ ing several houses. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and subsequent
'. ') ~ fire. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 500 feet
; / ceiling and 1 mile visibility'.
J
·j ./)_,rl
1?-----
/ ,,.
- :.:~,..;-/. / f1 & 1/ All times herein are central standard time based .on the 24-hour clock.
: ti <-
-l c?~
!
..
- 2 -
1. Aircraft
a. Cockpit Configuration
l
.,
,•
~ ..
of the cabin; with a closet located forward of it and the forward galley
unit situated aft of it.
2. Occupants
a. Flight Crew
b. Flight Attendants
I
- 4 -
c. Fas sengers
1«1J ]
·.•
JAzPjf Init~:~s~:;~:~!~~d17~~:!Il:~a~~~ R~~t ~s~h~~~g~y1 ~o~:~,
!:s
that some mentioned having· heard the landing gear do down, seen the "No
1
:x:::t
Smoking 11 sign come on, and the ste;;vardess cabin check for seatbelts fastened
and seatbacks and foodtrays upright. Some noticed that they were closer
) to the ground than usual when the aircraft broke out of the clouds. Host
'
; were altered by the increased engine sound and then startled by the air-
' craft nose-high attitude, variously described as: "extreme attitude
" (nose-high) of the aircraft 11 ; up lane 1 s nose was up at an unusual angle";
and "extreme rotation of the aircraft." A few believed the aircraft
turned to the right, having noted hoi:v close the roof tops v7ere as vie"ved
through the windows on the right side of the aircraft. The plane was very
low and still losing altitude, described by one man as a 11 sinking feeling."
Only three passengers reported having time to assume a 11 brace 11 position
... before impact. Five survivors reported that the tail section and bottom
of the aircraft struck objects (assumed to be trees and houses) and
1
\.
i'
iI
i
!
l
- 5 -
'
11
i
about 3 feet forward of the aft galley door, was completely engulfed
in flames about 10 feet high. He had been trained in firefighting
and assisted on a hose near the right engine. He reported that as
close as he was to the fire.he could not feel the heat. He also men-
.i tioned that firemen manning a hose near the aft galley door seemed to
'j
1
I
1
j
1I
l
·- --~·--'-'-~--~··- ~
- 6 -
- 7 -
b. Fuels Available
Crew 39 cu.
114 cu·.
ft.~
f ~compresse dto
Passenger 1
76 cu.
f~: 1850 p.s.i.@ 70°F
Passenger 2
(4) Ur.ited Air Lines advised that two air freight ship-_
ments destined to._Omaha comprised the entire contents of the aft cargo 7
~~
compartment, and consisted of one 70-lb. piece of machine parts and a
344-lb. shipment of nylon hosiery packaged-in 5 cartons.
c. Site Characteristics
. ,.,
- 8
ij
!
to information supplied by survivors from the area of seat rows 8 thru 12,
16 and 17, and the aft entry/galley compartment. The #1 Stewardess, who
was the only survivor from the front of the aircraft, advised that she
blacked out on impact and had her eyes closed during most of the time
it took rescuers to extricate her from the i;vreckage. She was removed
toward the missing right side of the First Class cabin. No one success-
.j
fully evacuated from the First Class cabin.
l
·1
!' When the aircraft came to rest, the normal cabin lighting had
failed and it was very dark inside. No one saw emergency lights and
1,. the breaks in the right side of the fuselage did not get noticed until
l they were illuminated by the fire from outsid.e the aircraft.
With the exception of two passengers who could not remember, all
survivors stated that their seatbelts remained intact and most reported
bruises to attest to this fact. Male survivors on the right side at
Rows 8, 10, and 11 had difficulty releasing their respective seatbelts
because their seats, though intact, had come partially loose and were
.j' leaning forward, consequently semi-suspending the occupants by their
seatbelts.
l
- 9 -
One survivor said he saw two men unsuccessfully try to open the
right ovei:ving window exit. The left window exit w·as opened and a sur-
vivor reported seeing one passenger go through 'it, even though it led ·to
only a. fire and no apparent exit. He called to him to return but appar-
ently was not heeded. One body was.recovered along the outside of the
fuselage in that area. ·
The jf2 Stewardess was able to go about midway into the cabin
to assist those who were trapped. Several trips into the cabin were
made, interspersed with a gasp for air at the aft exit door. At first,
the smoke was thick and grey and limited visibility to only 4 or 5 feet
maximum. However, it dramatically changed to billowing, thick, very
black smoke, which the Stewardess described as see01.ing"to have weight
and if you tried .to inhale, it just wouldn't go down your throat."
·--- The stewardess from the first class cabin was trapped in the
forward stewardess jump seat under debris which was at least waist deep,
The forward entry door was found by the investigators to be jammed in a
partially open position with the forward edge rotated inward approximately
40°. Rescue efforts continued for almost half an hour before the stewardess
could be extricated. The fireman advised that the right side of the air-
craft had been destroyed quite far back, beyond the stewardess' location.
She was removed from the wreckage out toward the right where the aircraft
had been obliterated.
7. Medical Examination
a. Summary
Crew 3 1 2 6
Passengers 40 11 4 55
Others>' 2 0 2 4
Total 45. 12 8 65
*Two occupants of one of the houses struck by the aircraft during the
crash received fata~ injuries as a result of the ·accident. Their
location in the house at the time of impact is not knoi;.;rn. Two persons
near ·the accident site received minor injuries and were treated in a
hospital emergency room. One, whose house was demolished, 11vas treated
for smoke inhalation; and the other for burns to both hands and an
-11-
8. Aircraft Wreckage
The smaller break was large enough that one man reported
he left the aircraft thiough it, without tearing his suit. No
survivors reported any breaks on the left side of the aircraft.
Ground witnesses who observed the wreckage from either the front
or back had the impression that the hull appeared fairly intact.
Of course, the center section was not observed because it was
entangled with the wreckage of the houses which were destroyed.
~~ t!::fi4:;~cl
C. Hayden LeRo~~~r
Air Safety Inve~~~
..
EXHIBIT 611.
ATTACHNe!T I
PASSENGER LIST
. ·1 1
BALDWIN, Theodore G. ,i 42 Tames W.
BESHOAR, John R. ,/ .. fllf:J _
46 LEWIS, "Barry W. 34
BLODGETT, Ralph~/.)11~~ MC NAIR, William R. 37
COLLINS, George W. 47 MOREAU, Roger W. 48 c •.:.,,rf,) IV /Ir-<:"""-
_.j., i;).,4
ENDER, Arnold L. 49 WEST, James R. 55 - \0-y> -
HUNT, Mrs. Dorothy L. 52
C-OAT
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COG'tCPIT CREYn.fEi.IBERS
FLIGHT ATI'ENDA1'TTS
LOCATION IllJURIES
- 2 -
Unknown
It
Extensive burns 35.0 90 neg.
Unknown
It
Shock incidental to neg. neg. neg.
extreme burns, wi.th. II
advanced incinera- :··.:...
"
ti on
.J Unknrnm
It
:Burns with incinera- 33.0 89 neg •.
ti on. c·nanges;
associated carbon
·:·
monoxide a~phyxia
Unknrnm n
Extensive burns neg .. neg. neg.
Unknown
n
Extensive burns with 19.0 - -
multiple injuries,
extreme
Unknown
n
Extensive burns neg-~ neg. -
.j
~
... Unkn mm It
Extensive burns 18.o neg. -
... Unkn mm
II
Severe burns. and 21.0 neg. -
extensive multiple
internal injuries
·.
)
Unknown " Cranio-cerebral neg. neg. neg ..
. ...
'
• : ! ••
injury with
fr:actured neck
.~
,
;
·i
•;'
- 3 -
6B
If
(Infant) Extensive burns Neg. Neg Neg.
<
i
~,
.__'
6F If
Shock incidental to Neg. 46 0.269
/ extreme burns; adva11ced , l/
incineration changes
associated with carbon
monoxid~hyxia and
( cyanide. ,, ~
f:.:::
TC
If
Ex-tensive burns Neg. 90 O.l9l
/
'
8 Survivor Burns of head and left
hand. Contusions of
right hand. :&<ck sprain.
Abrasions of legs. Burns
and contusions of abdomen.
.
"
G If
Burns of left earJ right
hand and abdomen • Fx and
laceration of left leg.
:1
j
·'
"
(9 If
Contusion upper lip. Fx
L-3, L-4. Bilateral con-
tusion left leg. Burns
of left leg.
.,
0 If
.
Shins bruised. Right anl&
twisted • Abdomen bruises
and head lacerations •
Lower back strained.
Lacerations on :right hand.
..
0
; : ; .
Surviyor (Child) Contusions of
buttock and across hips •
,, - ...
, ~ ~' . .. . ,,,.. - ... - . ..
'
.· .·
- 4 -
I\ 10~ . Survivor
.
(Infant) Bruises of right
arm and contus.ions right
side.
B
n
Multiple abrasions of
,.
head and face. Fx left
arm. Bilateral con-
tusions of hands,
abdomen, thighs, knees J
legs. Abrasions of feet.
..
\:) n
.
Abrasions left lateral
chest. La.ceration of
head. Laceration of leg.
® n
Abrasions of head. Fx L".
clavicle. Dislocation ·L.
shoulder. Bilateral con-
tusions of legs.
'
:j l2A Fatality (Child) Extensive burns Neg" 9J Neg.
·,:
---...
I
12B n
Severe burns involving
about 75% of the body
along with multiple
internal injuries;
Neg. 9J
E)
associated with combined
ca~h~n monoxide and
.;
. •':! ·. <:'.:cyanidC)asphyxia 'l
12C
l2D
n
".
(Child) Extensive burns
Neg.
9J
9J
E -
with carhon monoxide
i asphxia.
'
:
- 5 -
OCCUPANTS OF COACH SECTION
. ·: .., ..
-. ·. .. .... ;.-,·:··
'
"
6 - . ",
OCCllPANTS OF COACH SECTION
n
Unknown CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Extensive burns of body
.....
. unknown ti
CAUSE OF DEATH: 4.o 90 neg.
Extensive burns
n
Unknown CAUSE OF DEATH: 35.0 90 neg.
Extensive burns
·Unknown n
CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 0.099
Extensive burns
II
Unknrnm CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Severe burns
II
UnknDlffi CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Multiple severe burns
l
i
UnknDlffi " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Extensive burns with
multiple injuries,
., extreme
'J II
Unkn mm CAUSE OF DEATH : neg. 90 neg.
Extensive burns and
multiple injuries,
extreme
.,
-~
OTHERS
i
;
Cyanide
(Conway Diffusion,
Na OH)
~
)
Dnr:Yc·:I.; Nn. :1!1 lJ.")'.)
l"xrd.b i I; ~f". 3D
D«ceml>er 8, 1972
Chicago, Illinoia
O'Rare TOW9r
I~ ·~i~ ~·!S
y,o(. cc 2ti2(i1'
O& ec zo:r.,29
1'0·1 cc 202'.~ v.•ve ·..q p. - ~ , - ca.•t stw thu u enter
t1a dcJi&. •'• a Uttu t - c:i,Qff.
~ cc 20:M>t43
!ID iX 2028115
c.u.n cc 2llt8: Z2
C© '-~G W2&:4l
t·~ cc ZC:ti>:43
0M ~c ZoS:4S 11".:.v
;,D>;;; c:~ 20!' ·:?f; Oloay - - 'GO& p&i<ltillg htin en- talldag tC' ht.a
')kl r:- CI: 2ozg,29 ~ t>ra';o Iii It 184iar,. 04 d1Mpp#' ..... 1tp,ht
J-t V-:.t fony .dn"eo 1 u.. i&. I f fwt~ ~ 11-
-.re
ho ~ <ie..aht.tt t don't knew if. ha '-a - - ·
TI&
{J~f1,t CG .. 2029 ::'.l'll
iP1 cc ..U:Q) S..UU. ltlJUy 414 , _ ;,.vu h.W: froa TJ>.\lt4d iiw
ft.tty .....
~ GC 20i1:04 ,_ 1*1ut.U'v.1
01':.·o cc 2011:19 y. .
OftD •'"......
·-~
2031:21
~.Cl: 2{\31:23
Decembe.r 8, ·1 1)72
f.' "
·-~~1'--~--~y-~·~,~·'~~~-._......,:~~·-1 ~~ l.,,.L·-·-~~'"'-c=:.~~-
L
Facility Chief, !<i.dway To<nr
TllG!.
TWR 2017:46 Nine victDr •up,s.r thra.e one left clear«<! to land
N9VR 2017:47 vs
TilR 2017:55 Joliet Delta cleared acro•s runway a.h thre" en.. right
TWR 2018:23 Hotel rDmeo croH tlwl naxt run-y continue eaet bound
and ah over to two two left that 1 1 be the oecond
runway
2018:37 Baron six five tango run~ay three one right cleared
for tai<aoff malt• a right turn out to ft h94din& of
zero nine zero
1!1567 2019:08 Midway T_,- Delta five sixty sevQn is with you ai1
coming up on Calumet
'fWTt io19,1z Delta five sixty s~ven report pasainy, thf::: outer cu1rker.
TIIR 2019:-'•2 Unable I got jet traffic inbound make a left turn to 1.1
one haadiD~ of one nine zero climb to twenty five
hundred and go back to approach on one t>ighteen four
TIME
1~1I:.~ 2020:06 Si:t. five tango right to :~rr1; ni.11e :::ero cont!lct
departure now 011e- one eigl!t point four
'i'·T~'. 2020:26 Hot•il romeo poeition an<l holtl <>n two t"'o left
NLtHP.. 2020:28 Roger
TlYR 2020:53 Four hotal r011BeO maintai11 tvo thousand feat now
until further advised
TH!' 2021: 00 Okay four hotel roaeo runway t = tuo le l't cle.ar10d
for takeoff maintain a beading of two two ><ero
'lW:( 2021:52 Delta five eixty eeven three one left cleared to
land report the ·runway in eight
TUR 2{)22:02 trour hotel romeo contact departure. now on one one
eight: point f.our good day
':'WR 2023 :44 U..lta fiva Bixty aeven a right turn at the end and
taxi aaat. Cleared across three one right than
cba11l!e to ground on the othl!r side and hov'd you
find the braking
Par,1· J
THIE
20?4 28 And ah five oix aeven wae cleared acroae the oth._,,.
runway right
..:...,r-,..
{' Y641 air cleared acro"a and ah and juot better yet
make anot:her right -turn taxi aoutheaat that: ah
equi:p•mt i8 ~oun.a ba holding foT you
"'~ 11\. 7.02'" 54 Nine victor aug&r r:unway one ah three one left
clearad to land re?OTt the left run""Y in sight
;'[i~;· 2025. 28 Ah three two golf 11 on the south rawp sir, I'd ~.ik"
a s~i&l vn northbound
:;AS53 2025. 33 And tli.ch1ay Towar United tive five three were out of
three for two
·~1;.;r~ 2025 ·)7 United five five three report paasine the outer
mark.e.r > ntJ"Jd>er two in tlte. :lp!?rCIBch
'i.'\!!Z 2025 :45 Police copter three tvo golf hold on the e;roun<l
·;:im 2026:45 Nine \18 do you have the right runway in aight by i1ny
chance
\f!.'553 2027: r.c Okay left turn heading one eight ze..ro left turn okuy
202?: '.~3 l!!xpedit" to t.h<a ond pl..aoa. MAke • <'i&ht t:urn 1mn
ele«red to er.a. rtl.tl.\My thr .. e one riaht.
:~027: 26
TWYl 2027 32
TIIR 2027 :36 !Jnited five five thr- eenl:a<:t departure control
now - one eight !>4Jint four
1;7t~3·r_, 2027:45 Ah Midway uven zero faur thr"0 Una coming up
on Ked"iA
'J.'\iJR 2029: ,;.3 Unit6d five !ifcy three Htd-y i f you read contttict:
0 na:r~ ou o~ one eight point four
1
1J1H:l\C!. l'lU. >iA 1 ~j"
PERSONNEL STATEMENTS
Midway Ai:rport Traffic Cont:r<>l Tower
570() Soutl" Cteero A•enue
Chiell&O, Illinois 60638
Decedler 8, 1972
During the period 1400 GMT Deceiober 8, 1912 to 2200 Gift Dacmabsr 8, 1972
I was on duty in the lli.dway . T - . I _ . wwki.11¥ the Loe&! C.Ctrol
~ositiou from 1924 GMT to 2040 Gier J>ecembtir 8, 1972.
At approximately 2025 GMI United 553 called laavit1£ 3000 for 2000. This
was the first contact I bad with Uni&<MI 553. I t:h9'l 1-W at the radar
duplay to sea hm.r far Untted "3 - bellW - Aero Cc 4a, Jl309"m,
..tao had p:uviou.aly r~rud ~1.ua tha llL o...ter llllrk«. I ®••Nil
N309VS atod Uni.ted 553 _,;e ~ two and - U l f (l\) t41 clu'ee (3) 11fl-
apart = tlla radar di.apl&)'. I &dyiead lhrlt.ed 553 he - I a t - on
the approach ~ I would kee> him &:fviaed. I then aaUli. ~ .._his
airspeed "'14 Aud he said, llt ~. Unj.tilt '53 ched:ia4 nu tM 3U. Ovtar
!~ket: !afore ll309Yll repo~ the ~y hi. •iglat:.
During the period 1400 Gr.IT December 8, 1972 to 2200 GHr December 3, 1972
I was on duty in the Midway Tower. I """' working the Local Control
Position from 1924 ill-IT to 2040 GMr December 8, 1972.
During the time United 553 was on the approach to the airport, the high
intensity rumvay lights on Runway 31L were set on step 5, and the P..unway
31L ruil<Jay end identifier lights s:witch was in the ''On" position.
ad R.~a<-q~
V;~ E. Margoda
tlid.,•.ay .\.lrpoirt Traffic Control T""1<lr
5700 S!Jltcil Cicco A-ft<me
Chi~. !111-111 ~3
Dec""""'8r 8 , l9 72
Hy ,....., i• Albert II. Del>aav. Mo' addr-a u 5520 o..kdsl• Dri..,.., oak Lam.
Illblois f.66S3. I = tllipl.,,..d u ait Aa.iatllnt C2i:1-1'. by the W ir al
Aviation Adsdnillerttion at ti. Mt.i-y li~ ?Taffi<: C~l 'f'lllWow,
CbiellgO, Illin<>b.
During the .,erioo 1400 QI! ~ 8, 1912 to 2.200 llHl a.cam-- B, 1972
I "113 the ll&t:ch ~-.
cal i•
" t&la~ =11 from fflJl Raili.• &t.&t!ioa. -6 he Mid t1lail:. a T#i.t- lwl
>tqin& - aircraft Ui a· ' • ill cM Yiet.-.tty ol 9t. i.-t. ..r
Lawnhl• 6-Ni.. , - " ~ __. 1 _ . . . , . . _ o&!W alsl....... o:f- abcraft
A.t approx1-taly 2026 GMT, after cool:dinal:ion with t!N< Leeal Ceaeroller, I
infor-.d Chicago Approach Control via im:erpho1» tb&t Uftited 553 - l d ba
on a missed approach bec.wa" of iruou,fficient s-ep•ration tr.. p~.-ling
traffic. I infornied Aff'l"oec:h of Wat h-diug and altitude - l d he Uaued
to United 553. I tben uUyed thi.JI t<>. Loc&l Co>Krol at llt~. 1 hearil
the ~1 Cont:rolls Uett6 ~ app~ hatr11etiana to United .5S3 and
t:hs aeltnowUdgemint: by trn:kM SS3.
'. 'i
/-;c/6{~,":_
/
I
2.
The A81l wa .<Xl ciw1111>el S ao.4 l uad t.he llCOp<I vLf-canc:e~d .Df'prcid-uily
12 .mii.i'.-..
tJOri:4 °"
th• 40 .UJA. u~. I had th@ ~P int-Rity, 'Maco<>
i!1tmuiity, Jal gai.U Ml for ~1 la:.>ala with lin&tr poLtriwt:lon on.
The· !Ci'I ;gatlag -• adj-ted wt to 40 ld.lAa •
.--)
(
!
·;,'.,,.--
1c· .;•
I j'
• '"-
{
/ _.,
/"' ;t
~I l~"l •.
,,. • - /: / f .__ ..
.·::· '/
. jl}Jilf J •. !.W.DW1li
ATC8(T.)
~ig· :t~.r.w una:AH. ~
Dtlring tfte period 1230 t. 2034 ·Qa • i lJec 'er 1972, 1 - • oa dnty
in th4! o•u.ra 1'-. 1-• tile ActiA& t . . ~aor Ln charge of
0 'Bare I11l ~ f:rc. 2010 . . JOJ4 cmr.
At l~ -dJls f f tea. ...perviaior ill CIUrl!IB of
local (2029Z} whila
t:aa In.=-· I - • nodtte;t ~Hr • .i-. laW&, tba -Ch At.alliw
costreller, of tM poa.. M~ duct 9Gf .... 5.SJ Ud ...- <kMa while
OB - D'JI. appr'CMl:c:h to C:W-• Ml$ S, airport. Ba antt4 . . all lJ'1
lftrlp on ta SSJ cBli l vro« tba tu. et 202• - t:a. a-L I aa.d
Mr. 1!111 ldlri.• u cocfira dliat. Jll. .7 r-. -• aR: talk1ac bl IJA 553.
l coutacted taa O'llare allai!IAll& mu.f 1a the ~ cu &ad M>t:l.£1.ed
him. of tile 1.Dci.dl!nt. *·
Otl the gro.md appro411Steq - -.t •taalt .U- t - a..,,
k W • "GPff• d that tlA 553 - • dsftaLtel.y
airport:.
l thee ma arr-as ta to Mirk tlla _ . d e r ta.-a. reli.eve t:be
controllers - " ' &.. tbeir r rtU-, aad i a f - tile tacil:lty
deputy chief of all av•ll•hla p;artl.cCllare -Hlliag UA 5Sl.
r· ( ,
·.
·...
by
.Lloyd C. LaGrange
'
ERRATUM TO THE ATC REPORT OF THE ACCillENT INVOLVING UNITED AIR
LINES, INCORPORATED, FLIGHT 553, A BOEING 737-222, N 9031U, ON
DECEMBER 8, 1972
I. INTRODUCTION
~µ{!_, ~fdw~
Lloyd·c. La Grange
Air Safety Investigator
February 23, 1973
·..
'
NATIONAL TRANSPOfilATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau oi' Av.iation Sai'ety
Washington, D. C. 2059l
BY
IJ.oyd C • La Grange
ADDENDUM TO THE ATC REPORT OF THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING UNITED
AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, FLIGHT 553, A BOEING 737-222, N903lU,
ON DECEMBER 8, l972
I. INTRODUCTION
II. DELETION
III. INSERTION
~~,~~
Lloyd C. La Grange
Air Safety Investigator
February 22, l9T3
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 3A
By
LloyQ C. La Grange
. ~- '
Docket No, SA 435
Exhibit 3A
A. ACCIDENT
B. ATC GROUP
c. SUMMARY
United Air Lines, Inc., Flight 553 (UA 553), a scheduled air carrier
flight, crashed approximately l.'T statute miles southeast of the approach
end of Runway 3l Left (Rwy 3lL) at Midway International Airport (MIW),
Chicago, Illinois. The accident occurred at approximately 2028:00 !Jon
December 8, 19'T2.
Six crewmembers and fifty five passengers were aboard the airplane
when it descended into a residential area. Three crewmembers and forty
passengers received fatal injuries as a result of the ground impact and
subsequent fire. Two additional persons who were in the area of the
crash site also received fatal injuries.
i/ All times used in this report are Greenwich Mean Time, based on the 24-
hour clock unless otherwise noted.
- 2 -
D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
2. Navigational Aids
3. Communications
The time signals recorded on the ATC tapes at the Chicago approach
control facility were provided by Audio Chron. Audio Chron is a connnercial
facility which provides recorded time signals for TELCO (Bell Telephone Cci.)
in the Chicago local area. Audio Chron time signals are obtained from radio
station WWV, Fort Collins, Colorado. V/VN broadcasts continously, except
45 to 49 minutes after each hour. Audio Chron time signals are ac_curate
to within tolerances of 4o· milliseconds.
Chicago Approach Control feeds time signals via land line to MDW,
Merrill C. Meigs Field ( CGX), Illinois, Dupage County Airport (DPA),
Illinois, and to Palwaukee Airport (PWK), Illinois. Prior to the December 8,
1972, aircraft accident, Chicago Approach Control checked the facility time j-
with 'l.'ELCO once a week. Since that date, the facility checks the time every
24 hours at night. The Chicago Approach Control tolerances are listed .CJ.s
I seconds.
5. Weather Data
The MDW- surface weather "boervation which was recorilcd n.t 2041:00
(first report subsequent to· accia_ent) was:
6. Radar
Chicago Approach Control is equipped with ASR-4 'i}_) radar. The radar
antenna is located at the O'Hare AiJ:1lort. The antenna rotates at 15 RPM.
When the accident occurred the facility was utilizing radar channel B e.nd
beacon channel 1. The controller had the beacon intensity, sweep intensity,
and MTI 21
gains set at normal levels. Linear polarization ~ was being
utilized. The railar scope was set at a range of 40 miles and offset
approximately 12 miles to the north. The MTI gate was adjusted to 4o miles.
'i}_) Search radar which provides azimuth and range information at lower
levels of :flight within approximately a 50 mile radi.us of the aiJ:1lort.
21 Moving Target Indicator - An electronic circuit that cancels or attenua.t8s
video signals derived from stationary targets while permitting sign~.ls from
moving targets to be displayed normally. This permits aircraft to be
tracked over areas of ground return.
~ Normal radar transmissions that will cause an echo from anythine; thr.tt rw.c
mass.
- '( -
1
ri; .. ru vnr.:: ;_:L:_i,f('f-d "vii !.i1 1;·1 C'.tir1Lr·cd.l.t:1·:;, i.t1l.·l11d.i irr~
J~tt.: TF_n
:··q). :·vLu111·y JH..!J'UCJtltHd.) \·Jhen tl1t.: :;.1·1·id.t·11L ••{'('l!l."l"t.:d. :111t{:l'l~ Wt;J'I' .•1!;;11
t.:-V'/'. i: ('ilirl:rol1.l·.ro 1)11 a:ut,y :ln Liu 0 1 !1_:t:r•1• 'J.=tlWl.'"t' c:i.IJ) .LucaLc:a. ahnvc~ \;}it~
IFF, ~·-:.!11n.
".cqul sl ti•)n. The alphanumeric tag or data block associated with the
''"~'''ld'lry target for UA 553 on the video display included identity,
c ·,mput•:>rl ground speed, and Mode C (beacon derived) altitude. The
ground speed as displayed in the data block was expressed in knQ'I.;:.;,
roJn<±"d nff to the nearest ten. The ARTS III system at the Chict<gG
App:c·:u.ch Control facility has undergone three modifications since the
time of installation .
• l . NG.tlonaJ. Airspace System Stage A - An automatea. system uJ:' (~n route :1,J r'
!:..:=/
tr::tffic cor1trol Tlfhit.!h pro1rides flight data processing and t'aci_tJ.r d:-,t.•i
TJl'l)cessing capability. The radar controller 1s position \>fill QJap·! r·J.Y
~.'lpha.numeric fligr1t data associated. ·with the secondary radn:r i;{1.1:r;c-:t·,.
12/ Automated Radar Terminal SystemIII - An automated system of termin:1 I . i r
t;ro,f fj.c control which provides flight data processing ancl raclar iht'"
rrocessing capability. The raclar controller's position will d.1sp1'i.,y
~lphanumeric flight data associated with the secondary rad<ir targ<:I;. ,
- 8 -
T!1e AKrS III systen1 J..s dea'.i.gned so tl1at 1vhenever a beacor1 t.r-i.ru:et
is lest P1' too weak to correlate - U:'!:' when there are too many targets in
the s81!1e immediate area - the trd.i.!k. Ls _placeJ. in a coast ota;tus . rmen
coe.s1.ing ;:iccurs. the computer m<nres the data block along a predicted pEl.th
basecl. •rp,··.u the sto:r-ed history of target -,relocity and position) and the
Tett---rs 11 t:ST 11 displace the Mode C deri>red a.ltitud.e ana. gro11nd spcell
'"'.r.c.t ··-- ,,c.. ·in i.n the data block. \,Then a beaco11 target correlates withlu
:; .. 'c. .o.· .... 3 (sweeps), the coasting track's d.ata block will be repositioned.
to the correlated. position by the computer. If no target correlation
oc~urs within three successive scans, the d.ata block is dropped. and. tho
f'-ircra~ identification is placed in the coas·t-suspeud list. ·
'l'he MDW Tower cab is equipped. with a BRITE 1 !!±} display. Th"'
i:li:-c;p~u.;:,.r
.;.s used as a sequencing aid by the to"rrrer contr·ollers and is
flormal ..ly set at a range of 20 miles, off centered..
The Tenninal Air Traffic Control Hanubook 7110.SB ~' Section 13,
Ps£e ll0-1, _paragraph 981, contained the following directive:
The Chicago approach controller was assigned to work the day shift
(O'(OC-1500 c.s.t.) and he had had 16 hours off-duty time since working his
_previously assigned duty shift. The approach controller had a total of
fou:r years ARI'CC experience; two years at the Anchorage Center and two
years at the Chicago Center. He has had a total of six years of tenninal
ATC experience; two years at Elmendorf, Alaska, and four years at the
Chicago approach control facility where he is _presently rated as a fully
qualified journeyman controller. Prior to his employment by the FAA, he
served four years _with the United States Navy as a controller. Additionally,
he _possesses the following ainnan ratings~
Commercial Pilot
Airplane Single Engine Land & Sea
Certified Flight Instructor
Instrument Flight Instructor
Handbook 7110.SB was effective during the month of December 1972 but
has since been replaced by Handbook 7110.8c. The directive cited was
extracted from change 6 to Handbook 7110.BB, dated July 1, 1972.
- lO -
lS/ A smoke stack located on the Cracker Jack industrial plant. This is
c.c-prominent landmark located near the Midway Airport and it is an authorized
fix used by the controllers for surface visibility observations. The
smoke stack is located to the south of the airport.
- ll -
At 2013:00, the activ<· runway fox- Mllfl was chex1ged f.rom l(wy l3H
';n R·ry 31L. The controller activ1.1tc:: the localizer for the nelcc:l.o:d
.''JnWay by pooi tioning a toggle switch. The toggle switch may be
positioned so that the localizer can be selected. for either Rwy l3R or
Tu-ry 3lL, but not for both runways siml.iltaneously. Twelve seconds
elapsed· time are required for the electronic equipment to cycle from on"
selected position to the other. The controller is provided with a
monitor panel which gives him an indication of the operational status of the
selected localizer equipment by the illumination of red or green lights.
The high intensity runway lights (HIRL) on Rwy 31L were ucl: on
step 5 during the time that UA 553 was on the approach to MDW, and the
runway end identifier lights (REIL) switch was in the "ON" position. The
VASI-L lights were on.
WLS advisin£ him that a local resident had called the station with in-
formation that an aircraft had crnsl1cd in the vicinity of St . Louis anil
Lawnilale Avenues, anil another rr,r:J.rkrrt l:o.d called with information that
an .A.ircraft hail crRshed at 7lsl; Street allfl Inwndale Avenue. 'Tur·
supervi.sor instructed controller f.JUl"t:onncl to 11oti1'y CFD ond the polic:r:
ileparl;ment, ana. tu r:hrmge the e.ctivco rnnway Lo I0ry 4R. The supcr·v-·J.::•ir
stA.teil tM.t there were several clcvr' l.<lJlinCntal cnntrollcrs II} prr.::;• .rrl; i 11 +
the tower cab. The develo:pmentR.:L cuntro.Llt~.r.:.; vrcir-e si;o..ndin13 .in Li1c rc:~r
of the tower cab and .the supeJ"V:csor instructed them i;o go a.ownstn.irs.
9, Flight Tests
When the helicopter was positioned visually over the cr0.sh oil;c:
by the helicopter flightcrew, the controller obtained a raile,r fix for the
crash site l! mile from the end of Rwy 311 and -/;- mile to the ric;ht 0f the
localizer center line. The helicopter was leveled off" at increments ,,f
100 feet and the helicopter flightcrew broadcasted the altitude. The
following data were obtained in the approach facility by members of thr,
A'rc investigating group:
When the helicopter was positioned over the Kedzie outer marker
by the helicopter flightcrew, the controller obtained a radar. positi<>n fot·
Kedzie 3.4 miles from MIM and 18 miles from the radar antenna. The
following data were recorded:
- 1 4 -
.The second. segment of tho flight test was nccomplished.,by
vectoring UA 553, the regularly scheduled. air carrier flight on
Deceinbe'r• 14, 1972, along the ''tJ>Jlt"llXImate flir.;ht track maintained. by
UA 55.3 qn .December 8, 1972. Thu "bsurvers noted. that· the seconclr1ry
rs.d.ar tareet ·for UA 553 was vin I Iii<! on i;he video display, at; 0hic1tgo
Approach .Control approximately ·1 () 11ri.les prior to the d.esignn:l;erl
Chicago Ce.nter hand.off point. 'Vite <'l:rta block for Ui\ 553 was d.rupper.I
aut6mat'}:cally at a point one· milo frnm the n.i.rport aJ.though ·/\RrS III
was. aole . to track the target to app.coximately 'ii mile .from the n.irport.
The track drop area is. determined. locally. The /\'.l.'0• investigating e;rrmp
1{as provided. with computer printout data for each helicopter run and. for
the a~proach to MIJW by UA 553.
~~<t.t..-l,~ J~_ .
Lloyd. . La Grange ~~
Air Safety Investigator
January 30, 1973 ·
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 3E
.·._'
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE:TY BOARD
Washington, D. C. 2059l
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DOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-E
I
J
Comment: I wish to commenrJ the on-duty and off-duty members of the Chicago
Fire Department and all members of the above participating agencies.
Because of their cooperation and dedication, a tragic incident was
copE'Al with, with dispatch.
Curtis W. Volkamer
Chief Fire Marshal
.,._ -
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Sir:
I respectfully repo:-l that o;; Frioay, Decemher Rth at 1420 hotirs a still
Bnd hox D1rir1n response \VBS g:·:en by the EnglEnvoocI F_t\.O. for ri plane crn.sh
at 70tl1 :ind L1wndtlle. The response consisted of:
1437 Hours: a second alarm was called for by the 2Gth Battalion. This dispatched
4 more engines, 2 more truck companies 1 con1munications \·an 1
deluge rig, Big John (\vhich \Vas not put in ser\~ice), a light \\'agonl
3 more ambulances, 2 snorkels, Chief Fire Marshal Volkamer, 2nd
·Deputy Neville, 1st Deputy Fire l\Iarshal Foley, Acting 2nd Deputy
1
Hart.
1445 Hours: Director nf F',ire Prevention Bureau, 1 squad company, Battalion Chief.
1440 Hours: a third c.:,,rm w"s struck at the requ0st of the 7th Division ofarshal
and lhe following- equipment responded: 4 more engines, l truck ar;d
light \vagon.
l
. -·- ·- -
...•
File No. _ _ _ _ __
...
~-·-:·": '""""'.--:':! ~. r,.,...~ .. ..--: ..... ~~
c:-:-: O?
·--~- ....... ·~- .- ..... ~-·-·--'-•
Di\r:!sio:u. No. _ _ __
Page 2
TO
FRO;\!
SUBJECT
Sir:
J 'iOO JI ours: ~rel hnlieoptcr
lf.i22 IIours: 1 J11ore light \\':igon. The Dis:Jster lTnit fron1 0 1Hnre Field \\"as
likewise dispatched.
I \Vas in the Fi-re Cnn1n1issioner's office \Vhen the originol alar11t \'.'3S dis-
patched. I immediately called the Englewood Fire Alarm Office as to particulars
and type of pl:rne. At thnt moment they had no information. I asked that they
notify me as soon as the 26th Battalion reported. At 1437 hours the office no-
tified me it was a jet liner and they were striking a second alarm. I responded
from the City Hall and while enroute notified the Englewood office to put a Plan
~ into effect. Also notified the office to call Repair Shop to send mechanical
foam and have Chiefs Foley and Hart respond and send additional rescue equip-
ment in stock.
Notified the Englewood Alarm Office to contact hospitals in the area rhat
1hey could expect an influx of '·ictims and to notify the Chicago Hospitnl Council.
Hc•que,tc•cl, while enroute. th'1t several light wagons be dispatched. Xotified
the Eng·Jc•1v0od office to have a command post established and to set up the
pub] ic schnol :-it 70th & 1,.1\vnd:i le BS a ten1porary mo~·gue.
·- : :~
._,._ ..
u
File No. _ _ _ __
TO
A TIE:\'TIO ;-; :
Fl~OM
s1:n.mcT
Sir:
On arrival, 3nd reporting on the scene at 1459 hours, I notified the Fire
Alarm ()ifi<:c to contact police to block all intersections around ihe entire area
to prevent private vehicles from entering. Was informed that Police Plan #3
was in effect.
In 1118king a qutc1\ survey of the situatiOn I found the fo]lo\\'i1:g: The l..,.ni:ed
Air]ines Flight ~;fl5:1, Boeing 7.'37, app8rently in losing oltitude strucl-: the tip of
the roof, or g;ible at the rear of a home at 3714 W. 7lst Street. It also did sli~::1t
damage to the home of :lfr. Ed Str:isek, 3710 and Mr. William Benecki, 3716 \\".
71st Street (north side of street).
The final settling of the plane took place after completely leveling the hm:r,e
of ?lfrs. Veronica Cuculich. (3722 \\'. 70th Place - north side of 70th Place). :llrs.
Cuculich and her daughter Theresa perished in the crash. The homes on either
side of the Cuculich residence were likewise destroyed, 3718 to the ea st owned by
John Slnde\vsl~i, \Vho \Vas at \Vork, His \Vife Cind.Y \Vas in the hon1e at the ti111e of
the crash, but escaped from the wr·eckage through the rubble in the front. The
next residence east of the Sladewski home,. 3716, owned by Joseph Tworzydlos,
\vas just slightly d8.1naged.
ThC' clwe.llinp; to the> west of lhc Cuculich home, .')72'l, also cornplc<C'ly
destroyed \Vris O\Vnecl l)y Amy Busch.
.,;
File No. _ _ _ _ __
rt'-: . . . . ., __
?~
•.....
__________ ,196 _ _
_ _ _ Co. No _ _ __ Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
TO
Sir:
1'hc nose. or fJight cre\V S section. (Bbout 12 1 in length) cnme to rest up
1
tn the ~]Jc~)· :ilon~sicle of n tree and entered a fran1e garnge \Vhich \Vas destroyed.
1
The l:iil ~cciion projected sH;;htly over the front sidewalk with the center of the
fusel,1p:e, \\'hi ch included first class and coach area, completely torn away exposing
the entire interior of the plane. Several trees had also been sheared off by impact.
The entire ar(!a had been con1pletely enveloped in fire involving plar10 s nd the homes
at 3Gl8 - 3G22 a1od 3624, as weli a.s the frame garages in the rear. Chica[;o Fire
Department Helicopters landed at tJ:ie school yard just northwest of the accident,
prepared to take injured to the hospital.
One airline hostess was being extricated from directly behi;1d the crew
compartment. on the left side of the plane. She was alive. One male of the
flight crew was in a standing position with his h0ad above the ripped off fuselage
a11d his ar)11 resting 011 same .as though he \Vere attc1npting to evacuate. He h2d
expired from apparent inhalation of super-heated air and flame. Th( main body
of the fuselage cut through ti1e floor of the house with a portion of flooring midway
through the center of the plane. Tons of brick and rubble were on top and u;cder-
neath. Victims werG being removed as rapidly as they could be found and dc:g out.
Several persons, male and fa1nele 1 hsd earlier escaped through the right rer:.r
escape door, thi:s included the two hostesses and one male id0ntified as Harold
Metcalf. They had momenta Ty protection by being shielded by the skin of the.
tail section which was about 12 to 14 feet long. All other victims remo\'Gd \Yere
in the open area that was exposed to flame.
- - - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
----------~Co. No _ _ __ Address. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page o
TO
<:;:_ •
• •, 1 •
2r1th Bntt:i1ion Chief Enright \Vas ordered h)' 1ne to sen1·r·h hon1es on eitber
sirlc for possible victims. Acting 2nd Deputy 7\farshnl Ifarl was ordered by me to
supervise rescae or remov<11 of persons aft of middle section. 2nd Deputy )Iarshal
Nevil lo \Vas ordered to take a team of 1nen and check for \'ictir11s in ho1r1es ~:cross
the street.
AlJ the injured ti~· this time had been removed and [ll] \VOrk \\'CJS directed at
ren1oving th(' de~ir1. S dece8sed hB<l been tnken to the tempor:l.ry n1or2,"ue - the
schooJ. 1t \V:lS \Vithont Jig-l'1t beCBuse of the crash. A Fire Dcpartn1er:t light \Yazon
\Vas sent to provide 1ip:ht. 1)ut by this tin1e Coroner Ton1an \Vas 0~1 the scene ar.d
indicated thnt all de8d be removed to the morgcie at Cook County llosrii;ni ir,:;1e8d
of the school. I had alrend)' issued orders that the plane sho1ild be kft intaet as
much as possil)}e and onJy such portions cut '1\Va3r or ren1oved 8S \'.'0re c:-:pciciic:1t
to the removal 0: victims.
i
11er1ical tenrns hrid :lrYi\·eO on the scene 8nc1 g<1\?e riid to t~ose needing :::.r.;-:~e
a.nd pronounced the dead. Srecial crews from United, and F. A. A. were now
assemblinrr and I informed tlwm on whnt action had been taken and cooperated with
~ ,.,'cl.;.~"~/~
them in search for voice records and other instrumentation.
All n12il 1J3gs 2nd loose n1ail \Vas turned over to post8l authorities \Vhor:i
I had notified. F. B. L agents were a.lso in attendance.
Police cooperation \Vas exce11ent ill cro\Vd control re1110\'8l of the de:id
1
fro111 iho scene as \Vell 3S ini.rentor3' of personal helonp;ings \Vhich \Vere found by
Fire ncpartment personnel and turned over to them.
Page 6
TO
ATTF.C.:TlOc;:
FRO~!
SUBJECT
Sir:
Medi en] te~ms which included those sent from Holy Cross Hospital and
South Chi crigo Co1nn1unit:; Ilospita l \Vere assembled in a t\vo-ca r gn rage north
of ihe incident and administered to the injured.
At this time all the living had been ren)oved and sent to hospltr.ls. Little
Compan,• of :ITary Hospital had sent teams nnd medical supplies but were turned
back. Christ Community, and Von Solbrig Hospitals put disaster plans into
effect but were notified not to send medical teams.
All victims I actually saw, which numbered the majority, had clothing
burned off, with almost complete body burns. There were mauy amputees. The
greater number of deceased were removed within the first hour.
Laborious and careful digging then tool.::: place, shifting building n1aterinls
in search for bodies. Several victims were found in the tail section, under the
flooring with what appeared to be the Food compartmented Unit of extreme
\\'eight on them. }\t,this ti1ne I requ.ested of Co111missioner I\IcDonough the ne0d
for a crane with a long boom, to Ji(t the unit so as to extricate the bodies. This
was on the site in a short time and used effectively.
Appro?:imatel;.• 12 to l;:} vi~ti1ns \Vere removed frorn the l)C?:lly 0rf':1 ir:clt~c1in~
one fernolc whose torso wtis cut in two. Several sections of the plone hod to be cm
with the rescue saw and lifted by the crane out of the building- foundation to e:-:t ricote
victilns.
f
File No. _ _ _ _ _ __
:Page 7
TO
SlTR./ECT
Sir:
Chica;:?;ors ::\fa;.·or P.i<:!::1rd D:ilc~· nnd the Chn_ir1n:in of the Fire and Police
ro111rr,j....;_:;fnn~ 1\lt10r. I3urke, \Vere on the scene and I reported to the :\la.ror the
circnn1st::1nces of events fronr time to time.
A nevi auto1nohiJe thnt h:id })een parJ.:::crl unattend0d \V:-ts fottr1d drr.gged \'."ith
the plnne and under the tail s-edion demolished.
By this time (0:00 P. :'!S.) most of the medical personnel h8d left the sce:1e.
Dr. Tucker and Dr. Cari, C. F. D. physicians did work with firefighters and re-
ma.ined till about 11:00 P. TIL
(
Firefighters assisted Postal authorities to retrie\•e i11ail bags ar..d a.ll loose
n1ai1. Personel belongings and effects, purses, lugg;age, etc, \Vere turned o\·er
to Evidence and Record Property Division of the Chicago Police Departme:1t for
inveraor}' and identificntion.
Page 8
TO
ATTENTION:
FRO.M
SUBJECT
Sir: There had been conflicting reports as to how many passengers Flight
#553 had carried. In requesting a head count of those injured in hospita.ls,
it was established tlwt Christ Community has received JG injured, Von Solbrig
Hospital had 3 D. O. A. and the morgue accounted for 40. Up to this time there
was no assurance as to victims that might be buried in !be rubble of the tlestro;:c·d
homes. Search bad been made commensura.nte with safely of the firefighte1·s as
the buildings were structurally unstable and a really thorough search couVi not
be made till a crane could carefully dismantle the structure.
The sea.rch for victims continued tmtil about 2330 hours when I was in
contact \Vith United Airlines top executi\'GS through a conference crill in,·ol\·ing
several citi.es. In relating conditions as existed at that tine and the count from
both hospibls and morgue, which at that tin-e appeared to be 5P It \\'8S decided
to terminate operations for the night and resume about 8:00 A. ill. the following
morning when daylight would prevail. Dr. Joseph Cari concurred that if any
other victims were still in the ruins at this time, 9 hours after crash, that they
would inevitably be dead.
Fires in the building had long been extinguished, but due to deep seatGd
smouldering and the possibility of a rekindle, three men were detailed with
charged hose lines from a jeep pumper to remain overnight or till relief was
sent, with orders not to disturb or touch ahything. All other units and personnel
were ordered back to quarters. Light wagons remained on the scene to kcc;1 the
area illuminated and lhe ranking Police officer given orders by me to keep a
security guard arow1d the entire area.
/t
File No . _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ _ __ - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
___________ Co. No _ _ __ Addres~----------------
Page 9
TO
ATIF:NTJON:
FRO!.!
SUBJECT
Sir:
I left the scene at 2.34.'.l hours.
Battalion No _ _ _~ - - - - - - - - - · l9G _ _
Co. No _ _ __ Address·---------------~
Page 10
TO
.ATTENTION:
FRO Ill
·SUBJECT
Building Commissioner Joe Fitzgerald was at the scene and I pointed out
the need for a crane wiih bctcket to skillfully remove the roof and dangerous wci!ls
of 3724 \V. 70th Pl. so a search of these premises could take pln.ce lo assure that
no other victims remained and also because of danger of toppling and doing damage
to the next building west.
In tnlking with illr. Da'Je Medland, there was no need for the sen-ice of the
Fire D<:>partment, other tlrnn an ambulance to remain while F.A.A. <md United
perso .. c,el would remove and dismantle the plane. (This is a requirement by the
National Safety Board.)
Arrangements were made to cover this phase and I notified ilTr. i1Iedla;1d
that if he required the service of the Fire Department in any wa.y to contact me
or the Englewood Fire AL· 1·m Office.
On Sunday, December 10th, upon leaving the scene of a. 4-11 alarm fire, I
again reported to the crash site and checked with Mr. Dale i\Iedland if the Chic8go
Fire Department could be of any asE istance. The stand-by ambulance wa.s dis-
mi: 'ed at 1630 hours on Wednesday, December 13.
It has been definitely established that Mrs. Cuculich and daughter, Theresa,
had been killed and buried on December 12th. This accounts for all victims.
Respectfully submit~e~
~JJ.t/~~
Curtis W. Volkarner
Chief Fire l\Iarshal
File No. _ _ _ _ __
( '-
Division No. _ _ __
Sir:
I respectfull.v re.port thnt at 1429 hours today I responded by radio to a
still and box alarm given as" plane down near 70th St. 2nd So. l.2wnclale Ave.
At this line I was near 74th St. and So. Ashland Ave. As I reached 71.st St.
and California at the open area of Marquette Park I could see a heavy cloud
of black .••moke. H & L 31A arrived first on the scene and reported a jct
passenger plBne do\Vn ancl burning. Engine 88 'reported they \Vere lc~d;ng out.
At 7lst and Lawndale I was unable to turn north due to the heavy civilian traffic.
As I proceeded further west to Hamlin Avenue I saw the plane and three houses
heavily involved in flame. As I turi1ed north on Hamlin I was again blocked by
ci.vilian autos so I immediately notified the office that from my view I would
need a 2-11 alarm. Many arriving companies were forced to drive over lawns
ancl sidewalks to reach the fir.e scene at 3722 W. 70th St.
After arriving at the scene I found that Engine 88 and Engine 15 had led
out two lines and the extra line.s were manned by Squad and H & L companies.
H & L 31A had led out both of their booster lines. All of the engine companies
arriving at this time did the s2me. The fire ball unit of Engine 118 urrin·d and
used their foam but with poor results due to the cramped quarters of the plane
and the fallen brick walls around it. A survey was taken of the damaged houses
south of the crash and the fuel that was spilled. No victims were found nor any
fire problem from the spill.
The fire was contained to its original area. As the wreckage cooled, all
available manpower including off duty mernl;iers and other volunteers was used
to clig through the ruins for victims. I had concentrated ~y activities to the
front of the fire by order of 7t:h Division Marshal Linnane while he concentrated
on the re nr where rescue operations were first initiated.
'
i'
·.·- -
/.\_
File No. _ _ _ _ _
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,l9G_ _
ATTENTION:
FR0111 :
SUBJECT
.Sir:
I do n_ot think that any one tyre of equipment not on the scene at the outset
of.the crash would have been overly helpful due to the condltions of a rlanc and
hous .. , being intermixed and so heavily involved in flame clue to the jet fuel [n-
volved.
I "Norked under the supervision of Chief Fire il'!nrsba l Volka mer, 1st
Deputy Foley, 2nd Deputy PrendergBst, Neville and Hart and 7th Di\·ision
Marshal Llnnane.
:Respectfully reported,
~d!~J~.&
/ Edmund J. Enrignt
Chief, Battalion 26
EJE/pl
/'f
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Division No._7_ _
Battalion No _ _ __
Sir:
At approximately 2:28 P. l\I. on December 8, 1972 I resronclcd to a box
alarm from Station 24GG9.
Upon arrival at the scene there was a rlane (United 737) resti;ig on o
building at 3726 and between buildings at 3724 and 3728. All tl11·0c l>Ltilc1ings
were on fire as was the plane and the g;;rage in the rear of the mai1• buildill;.
Engine Co. 88, the still alarm engine, had dropped two lines in the front
of the building and Truck #31 manned one of the lirws I orclered bc•th lines to
confine the fire to the original area. I then went to the rear and fonnd t!JG nose
of the plane a gr< inst the garage and the tree. I ordered Engine 15 to lead out
two lines in the rear of the building. I then asked the Fire Alarm Office for
more ambulances and the Edison Co. It appea.recl at this time t.hut the fire was
contained, but I needed more manpower. for removal of bodies so I orde<·ed a
3-11 alarm. I then told my driver to walk out of the alley to confirm the 3-11 with
the Fire Alarm Office and to notify them that we had approxfmate!y 53 pccple on
the plane.
\.\-'hi le this '\vas going on one of the firen1en told me he hcaTd son1eone n10~1 ning
in the front section of the plane. While checking the front of the rlnne I found one
of the airline stewardesses alive and trapped in the front of the plane, behind the
cockpit. At this time 2nd Deputy Marshal Prenclergest arrived on the scene. I
then ordered a line turned into the cockpit to extinguish the flames so that we could
get into the plane to remove her. This was.clone by going into the top o[ the plane
through a hole that was torn at impact. She was then removed to Holy Cross Hos-
pital by Ambulance 12. I then ordered the removal of the bodies of the three crew
men who were also in the coclqiit. We then checked buildings to the east and west
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Page 2
TO
ATIEN'TION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
of the scene where Engines 12D and 64 were working their lines, while the rest
of the members converged on the pbne fuselage and began remo\"iClg bodies. All
the while we had I.~" lines on the plane for hot spots. \Ve also hnd lo put lwo
ladders against the wall of the building east of the plane to keep it fc·om faliin~~ c'n
the men. Chief Prendergast ordered all va!ual)[es given to poliee in llt8 yard of
3724 W. 70th Place.
Chief Fire l\Trirshal \'olkBmer .\Vas no\v in chC1rge of the fire in front of the
building. All members worked until about ·13 bodies were removed. At about
2300 hours Chief Volkamer ordered Chief Prendergast and I to secure the scene.
Vie secured the scene with a jeep from Engine SO's quarters and 3 dt!Lailed men.
They were to remain on Lhe scene until relieved at 0300 hours.
All officers and members of the Chicago Fire Department performed !heir
duties in the truest tradition of the Fire Service and it would be impossible to
single out any one for meriloriotis service commendation.
Respectfully submitted,
~~uz- /0aq~
Thomas Linane
Division Marshal, 7th Division
TV Pl
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
TO Fire Commissioner
Sir:
I respectfully report my activities at plane crash on December 8, 1972.
I responded on still and box, 70t:h Place & Imvnd3le from quarters,
Engine 8. While enroute a 2-11 a.nd subsequently a 3-11 by 2-2-7 y;as struck.
T\vo engine companies \Vith 2~ 11 line each \Vere led out in front 2r1d
directing stream on burning plane. The front of each home adjacent to plane
was sufficiently open due to crash that streams could temr1orarily be diverlocl
to control possible communication of fire to other homes both east am1 west of
crash scene. There was no communication beyond origlnal crash areo..
7th Division Marshal Linane came from rear and informed me tlit!re \\'as
a woman victim in plane still alive and trapped in wreckage, I immediately went
to rear and observed cockpit of plane resting half into a wood gan ge, which Y."as
on fire, but under control as there were engine compa•1ies led out in area
working streams on both fuselage and homes.
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ - - - - - - - - - · 195_ _
___________Co. No _ _ __ Address. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page 2
TO
A 'ITENTION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
H &. L 31 had a hand line west of plane a.nd was covering exposure in
this area ..
Victim was a. stewardess who was trapped by debris across her legs. She
was extricated and transported to hospitnJ by Ambulance 12. I onlc·red two
additional Flying Squads to the scene.
Chief Fire l\Iarshal had arrived on scene a:.:J I remained in rear v.'orking
nnder his command.
As fire was curtailed in plane and house re.sting on plane victims were
removed and transported by ambulance and squa.drol .!J mor·gue. Fi:·es were
controlled and victims extricated from debris and remove·j lo morc,'l.t2. I
returned at 0145 hours December 9th.
Respectfully submitted,
tltl-eJ--f2;,r_,cfu ""~------
Albert Prendergast (
2nd Deputy Fire Marshal
AP/pl
-,
---· -.:.. --·~ ·-· ~
"//')
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __
December 11 1D\2i.96 _ _
E.12.gine llBeo. No _ _ __
_______ Addres,,____
5_8._37_S_._C_e_n_tr_a_J_ _ _ _ __
Sir:
Respectfully submitted,
P:h~tY
Robert O'Connr: 1
Lieut., 7th Div. Relief
RO'C/pl
--
·---- ~· 7
File No _ _ _ _ __
"·
Divisior. No. _ _ __
Sir:
I respectfully wish to report the following account of the activities of
H & L 41 at the jet airliner crash on December 8, 1972 at 3726 W. 70th Pl.
Upon arriving at the scene of the crash I saw the tnil section of 8 c0rn-
mercial jet a irHner protruding from the front lawn of whJt was once 0 hm:~:e
locat0d nt. 3726 W. 70th Pl. The rest of the plane covci·ed the entire Jot. area,
the cockpit section at the alley. Both i.he houses to lhe east and west were
involved to the e.:-.-i:ent that they were almost completely destroyed. Tlw entire
fusila.ge section of the plane and the three houses were totally engulfed in flames.
I ordered the mc·n on my company to lead out 3 3" line from Engine Co. 101
(by then pumping from a hydrant at 3730 W. 70th Pl.) Vic worked lhe line from
the exposure to the east of the fire area until such time as it was possible to
gain access to the plane.
We then participated in the removal of victims from the plane nnd continued
to search among the debris for possible victims who may have been in tho houses
at the time of the crash.
Respectfully submitted,
~o~,·~~
Captain, H & L 41
JO'C/pl
.. -.-.--'--
-.
File No _ _ _ _ _...:'..:
_
Sir:
Place. Later helped ir1 the re1noval of bodies. \\'orked under SU(.'Crvision of
Chief Enright, 26th Datta lion, Chief of 7th Division Linanc, 2nd De;n1ty J\:~;·chnt
Prendergast, Chief ):'ire Marshal VolkamGr.
Respectfully submitted,
JC/pl
---··;,.-
Division No. _ _ __
Sir:
The following is a brief summary of my recall of the conditionr, rid the
work procedure followed by these companies at the plane crash.
Enroute to the scene at approximately 73rd and Pul2ski all members noticed
black: smoke rising fron1 the scene. A fe\v blocks later \Ve could 2Jso see flnme.
Our route followed Pulaski to 71st and then eas.t to Hamlin, liamli1; lo \'0th Place
and then east to the scene. Apparatus H & L 31A was first imms·.liatcly followed
by F. M. S. 3 and Hook & Ladder 31. The tail of the plane was visiblu on nrrirnl
when H & L 31A reported on the scene. No persons were seen on the north side
of the street near the wreckage. We led out with the booster line to the ;car to
cue' the a1:ea where a stewardess was trapped. Also assisted Engine 88 and
Engine 15 to lead out two lines each to front and bad:. We then assisted i.n the
removal of the stewardess from behind the cockpit and genera 1 fire anj rescue
duty and the removal of numerous bodies.
Respectfully submitted,
A. C. Munin
Captain, H & L 31
CCM/pl
- '··
---
File No _ _ _ _ __
: z.
Sir:
I respectfully report that on December 8th, 1972 this compsny responded
to a box alarm from station 24669 at 1430 hours. Reported to 7th Division
Marshal Linane and were ordered to stretch 400 ft. of 2~ 11 line to rear of fire
:i.nd work stream front section of aircraft, garages and fire buildings. Assisted
in removing a live woman from front section of aircraft. Later, we were ordered
to attach di,rider and tv. 0 l~tt lines and wa.sh d~\Vn, and dug through cleb1~is f('r
1
bodies.
cff;:::~
, Lieut. , Engine Co. 127
JF/pl
File No _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
- - - -Ambulance
-- 8 Co. No _ _ __ Address 5218 S. Western Avenue
Sir:
Reported to Chief Enright, Chief 26th Bttn. Removed from tlrn scene
three male persons to Holy Cross Hospital from the airplane crash. Also
removed one person to County l\Iorgue. Returned to SC·Jt~8 of pla1::; era,:::.
Ordered to standby. Assisted Ambulance 12 and Ambulcnce 18 8nd Poli.cc
Department in removing people from the plane crash.
Res~ef(ully submitted, ~;
~,a,~__, e~·.:U.-<.ra.c--c:.~
Edwrn'Zawacki, F.:i:) l/c, Ambulance 8
EZ/pl
- .··
~ -
File No _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Division No.
Battalion No _ __ - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
Page 2
TO
ATIENTJON:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
We then cleaned and checked the equipment and found the following:
1 each ambulance cot from Ambulance 35, notified and picked up.
1 each chair stretcher from Ambulance 33, notified.
1 each wooden fracture board from Ambulance 18, notified and picked up.
1 each salvage cover from H & L 59, notlfled and picked up.
Respectfully submitted,
CJfL v? LW!~f;j
John R. O'Malley,
F. F. 1/c, Ambulance 12
JRO'MipI
F,O, 2A-2SM
CG
File No _ _ _ __
Sir:
followed by a 3-11. Upon arrival we helped man a hose line with Engine 64.
We then later reported to Col. McCarthy. We helped dig for victims that
were buried in the wreckage. We removed two bodies to the County Morgue .
. One male and one female. Both bodies were unknown. We reported back
to the scene and were ordered to stand by and help search for bodies. We
were released from the scene by 2-1-5. Company responded to the fire
at 14:40 and returned to quarters at 23:40.
Respectfully submitted,
ECB/pl
File No. _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Sir:
1. On R December 1972, at approximately 1430 hours, I received a radio call
advising of a plane crash at 70th Place and Llwndale Avenue. At the tlme, my
assistant, Chief Crawford Smith, and I were assisting in conducting a session
at the Illinois Research Hospital, which dealt with emergency action necessary
at the time of a crash of a cargo plane. Chief Sm.lth and I advised the Fire
Alarm Office that we would leave immediately for the crash scene.
2. Upon arrival at the scene we found there already were three or four Fire
Department Ambulances present which were removing injured persons to Holy
Cross Hospital, as well as Police Department squadrols and ambulances from
nearby suburbs.
3. We reported to Chief Fire Marshal Curtis Volkamer and operated under his
supervision during the entire time we were at the scene.
4. Mr. George Behnley, Deputy Cook County Coroner, had set up an emergency
morgue in the gymnasium of the nearby Hurley School and asked that Chief
Crawford Smith assist him there. However, when it was learned, after several
bodies had been removed l:o the gym, that the electricity (and heat) were off in
the school, he requested that all bodies be taken directly to the Cook County
Morgµe. ·
(By this time there were twelve (12) Fire Department Ambulances at the
scene, making removals to the hospital and the morgue on a "round-trlp" basis.
They were, of course, augmented by the Police Department and their vehicles.
Battalion No _ _ __
· - - - - - - - · 196_ _
_________ c-0. No_ _ __
Addre'""---------------
Page 2
TO
ATI'ENTION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
!i, It was approximately 21 :45 hours when Chief Smith and I left the scene of
the disaster and at that time we had two (2) Fire Department Ambulances re-
maining at the scene on a "standby" basis.·
6. It should be noted that the Chicago Fire Department Ambulances did not
have an ample supply of body bags and it was necessary to borrow this type
""··- of equipment from the Police Dei:nrtment and other responding agencies.
JJMcC/pl
F.D. 2A-1SM
Flle .NO·------
I organized four teams of six firefighters each (many off-duty men were on
the scene) and designated the buildings they were to search and then I patrolled in
supervision.
Next I went in to help 2nd Deputy Albert Prendergast, who was directing
the main body of extrication. I worked until released about 0100 on Saturday,
December 9, 1972.
I returned to the crash site at 1030 hours on December 9 and took on the
responsibility of providing work maps for the Transportation Safety Board (F. A. A.·
and United Airlines investigation teams. Assignment completed about 1330 hours
on Monday, December 11, 1972.
ctfully s_ubmitted,
~/d.7~
s B. Neville
2nd Deputy Chief Fire Marshal
Sir:
I reported to Chief Fire Marshal Volkamer and was ordered to check the
.'- ruins in the area of 3718-22 W. 7oth Pl. for two bodies that were missing
after the crash. 2nd Deputy Marshal Johnson, 26th Battalion Chief Bronersky,
F.M.S. 3, H & L 59 and Engine 101 were also on the scene. We searched
the area and at about 0925 hours we found one body along the east wall about
the center of the basement at 3722 W. 7oth Pl. and about 25 minutes later the
other body was found in the debris about the center of the basement near the
. plane at the same address. They were removed to the police squadrol, who
removed them from the scene. Later we were ordered to search through the
debris for any valuable or Important articles that could be found. We turned
them over to the following members of the Edidence and Record Property
Division of the Chicago Police Department - Officers Matuszak, Aeberly and
Korkowicz.
Respectfully submitted,
~~-E~ct~
Carl F. Groth
7th Division Marshal
~ - ms. On1'• s n
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CHICA00-0 '!!AU APPROhCH CONTROL
SOUTH IATll.Llll POSIT ION
8 OECIHBD 19 71
2015:10
DL 567: Ah Chicago approach Delta five six sevens with you we're out
of forty •even for four - bllve oacar
2015:20
CHI APC: Delts five .w.ty se"Yen radar contact two ninety haading to
intercept thirty ona left. for Midway fly it inbound localizer
approach
2015:25
DL 567: Okay two ninety to intercapt
2015 :45
MDW TWll: Satellite ·Midway
2015 :45
CHI APC: Yah
2015: 50
MDW Tiffi.:
Three six five tango ia a ltaron he'd be going to thirty one
and South. Bend at five
2015:55
CHI APC: . Ah sixty five tango okay
2015;55
MDW TWR: He '.s re lea aed huh
2015: 55
CHI APC: Yah you can let him go
2015:55
MD"1 TWR: Okay
2016:00
CHI APC: Looks like it will be a little delay for thi• guy huh
2016:00
HDW TWR: That's too bad
2.
2016:00
CHI APC: Yah
7-016: :JO
MDW TWR: That's his cboice
2016: ()(J
CHI .~.?C: Okay Delta five sixty aeven will be b,.hind •h zero nine victor
sugar .
2Ul6:ll~
''IDW fWR: Okay
2 U16: li.J
Cl!! APC: Zero nine V S is four miles from Kadzie char ed for tlia approach
I'll have one more turn for you
20lb:l5
N09VS: Zero nine V S ••Y again
~016:20
CHI Al-'C; Y.ou 're four mile11 from Kedzie air clMreJ for the approach
I'll have one more turn for you
i.Ulu!2)
;:roq,,s . Ok<ly nine V S
2016:2~)
!'.DI>/ TWP.: Oscar is current ah Loyde
2016:3()
CHI APC: Okay
0 016: 5:;:
CHI APC: Zero nine V S turn left heading three Lwo zero intercept call
the tower now one eighteen seven
2Gl6: J5
!W9VS: :line V S
3.
2017:10
MJJW TWll: liatallita Midway thia Hotel Jlomeo uid hi' ll go to t,.., twc laft
for d•partura can h• go lih•n ha IP't• there
2017: 15
CHI APC: Yah
2017:15
MOW TWR: Okay
2017:20
ARTCC: Satellite Big llun
2017: 20
CHI APC: Yah
2017:20
ARTCC: Just by Joliet .-ven.zere four three Lima c11ena three ten
aix thousand landiq Midway G C
2017 :25
CHI APC: Okay radar
2017:40
N7043L: Approach seven zero four three Lima level eix with November
2017:45
CHI AI'C: Seven zero seven thr8& Lima radar contact fly the zero nine zaro
heading descand to four thousand vector for a thirty one left
localizer approach at Midway
2017:55
N7043L: Zero nine zero leaving six for four ah for a thirty one left
2018:0G
CHI Ai'C: Yes sir Oscar is now current let me know when you have i t
2018:00
N7043L: I'll get it
2018: 05
G!U Al'C: Ali right
2018:10
CHI AFC: Delta five aixty aeven desoend to two thouHnd five hundred
2018:15
DL 567: Five aixty seven out of four for twenty fiva hundred
2018:.30
CHI Al'C: A1 a !lllltter of fM:t Delta five •ixty .-v•n yo11 'r• three wiles
from calumet int•r-Cion olured for the appl'OOlch and ull Midway
tower _,, on one aia;btaen MIVen
2018140
DL 567: Cleared for the •PPTOa<lh and w '11 call the tower
2018140
CHI APC: So long
2018:50
ARTCC: South aAtellite Nil.ea
2019:00
N7043L: Forty three Li<llll haa Oioar
2019100
CHI APC: Thank you sir
2019: 05
ARTCC: South satellite Niles
2019: 15
CHI APC: Satellite
5.
2019:20
AR'.l'CC: South of Plant iive United five five three a ...ven thirty aeven
four thousand two ninety for Kedzie
2019:20
CHI APC:
' 2019:30
·'' !1DW TI/R: Satellite Midway with " odued approacl1
2019: JS
CHI APC: He can't do that
2019:40
MIJW TWR: Yah I know he can't nine victor augar a miaa we 1 ra 5ending him
left to one eight zero giving him twenty five hundred feet and
coming to you what fsequeuey
2019:40
MDW TWR: Ah eighteen four
2019:40
UA 553: And Midway approach United five five three we're at four
thouaand understand three one left
2019;1;5
MOW TWR: Eighteen four okay and cilat other clown i• ~•tbound that
sixty five taugo
2019:45
CHI APC: Okay
2019:50
UA 553: Do you read United five fi''" three
2019:55
CHI APC: Yes eir I was busy on the phone over there in radar contact
two ninety heading intercept thirty one left localizer for
Midw3y Oscar is current
6.
2020:00
\Ji. 553: . OllAy truinlL JO'I . . got Oecar .ii i:- ni.,.cy • ta. W.d!Da
iata'cept ta. - - 0.- 1.tt
2.\>20105
CHI APC: y.,, dr
2020:10
M09ft:
2020:10
CllZ APC: Ni.mavictor ....,.r radar -tact aCNth hM.tuls ~ thouuad
five llUn.tnMl wectoc for all tlllRy - i.tt ...ta
2029:15
Jf09Va:
2020:.10
CHI Al'Ct 11ici1My a t , - tell,.,.. -•n OD ~llala
2020:35
MllW Tlfll: No no .,.. tol.4 -
2020:40
CHI APC:
All tijjlt ve ' n lattiag tlli• llotel Romo go aad we 're gotn&
to a...i hi111 atraigjlt: GJ't ~ that lllis•
2020:45
CHI APC: Ot.ay
2020:45
MOW nlll: Off of two ~ -11 4D you~ Ila to hol4 lUa to CV. <>T de
yov to (aaial*lllpble)
Chieeao dafMlrbaa ..,r_ lkn ,1; ... r tar- •ix fi,,.. UJO&D out:
of two for tlaree
2020:50
A.rec: o'S.n aouth .atalUu uacer (wiin.telligibl•)
2020:50
CHI APC:
2"20: 50
MW TWI.: All dpt va'U bold hiat to to-.
1020: S()
CliI AIC: 'Ell ill tll• aidat of cll
Ah six fivo ta'1&0 - 11 .. ~..
~ lavol oU ac .Ut altitu.da ,,_ llavo Cha• -4 ~~ fly m
uat U.di.. . air
2020:55
1!16.ST: Six five taap 1 - 1 off at i : - - , - ~d
2021:00
CRl AJIC1
2021t05
N6ST: Ab wa 'd Ulte to gU lligjwlr •• llOOCl as poaaibl.a - 're picldJlj!,
up!·at thie altituda
2021:05
ARl'CC:
2021:05
C'AI APC: Yea 8Lr there 1 11 traffic at bMlva o 'cloclt and •bout " 111ile
and he's about ah fif~ i>""*-d feet above you "" aooa aa
I get: you by him - d a cauple of others I'll have l'\i~r for
)'OU
B.
2021:10
N65T1 Six five ta~ thaak you air
2021: 15
Clil APCI
2021:20
Clil APC: Zero nine V I tun. laft. h11&ding one three MllrO
2021:20
AIITCC: O'Hare SQUth aatallita south .i.p.rture1 on the 1even sixty
fiv• lU.
2021: 20
N09YS: Left to one three dro nine V s
2021120
Clil APC: Y.,b.
2021: 30
ARTCC: miue ia seven throe four !tl)tel romeo Midway ~n.s climbing
to aeventaen a gt.tlf atr,,...
2021: 35
CH! Ai?C: He ebol.lld be off vary sh~rtly
2021: 35
AR'ICC: !le should be off ahortly h..U
2021:40
Clil APC: Yoh
20:21:4(.1
ARTCC: Okay good-by
2021:40
CHI A~: Yah
·-'
9.
2021145
CIU Al'C: Six five ta1110 aliM to thi'e« thouHnd and I' 11 have lligher
for you in about another !iV<> mil••
2021 :50
N65T: Six five tanao 1. .ving two for three
2021:55
CHI AFC: United five fiva tbrae alov to hunctrad eiahty knots
2022:00
UA 553: Hundred eighty -.....~ fiva fiva thr..
2022:U
N34HR: And departure Ho~l -ao-o h with you heading two tvo &ail>&
to two thouaan4
2022:20
en APC: Hotel l.oaao radar contact a..S. clilllb and maintain one ae,,_
thousand ff'l'itld:ffll tllou-4
2022:25
N34!lR: Roger on up to oll9 aevan oil
2022:30
CHI APC: Zaro nine V S deacand to two tbouland faet
2022 :30
N09VS1 Nina V S down to two
2022:45
CHI AFC: Zero nine V s tu~n laft ca~ nine zero
20ll: 55
CHI APC:
2022155
AlttCCI
2023:00
Clll. APC: »crtb of ltl.l.. . t1IO i• nx f1- ca.., I'• ljC>i. . t.e i..ep ilia
for a Utt.la ~la
2023:00
AftCC: I 'f I.
2023:05
Citt APC: Oh ,.h
20llt05
Arl'CC:
2023:05
ClU APC: BR lu
202.3: 05
CHI Al'C:
2013:05
uttc:
21J23:l0
CHI A.PC:
20%3:10
A.an:c: Forget it. be Ullode4 at .Joliet
Okay
2023: 10
AJl.TCC: LJ
ll.
2023: 1.5
CHI APC: Zero nine V S turn left: headina zero two zero
2023: 15
NO<JVS: Zero t'Wo .zero
2023:15
CHI APC: United five fiv• three 1l<>W to hundr•d aixt:y knot:'S
2.023:20
UA .553: Hundred sixty knou five five thr-
2023:20
CHI APC: YH sir then deaaend to ah two thoueand feet Unit:ed five
five thret
2023: 2.5
UA 553: Down to two thoulland five Ii,,. thr•• leavin& four
2023:30
Clll Al'C: Forty three Lima 4e90end to two thoueand five hundred
2023:30
N7043L: Out of four for two point five forty three LiDUI
2023: 35
CHI APC: And z .. ro nine V S what ii your air spe"d now
2023:40
N09VS: Ah hundred forty
2023:40
CHI Al'C: That's okay keep th•t for a while please
2023:40
N09VS: Okay
r. u.
JOUt.U.
cm ucs ........ f i - f i - dttee •urt -~- to ~ ....- - ......
,.J.M
lllZ3t~5
DA S53t
2G:ltJO
Clll AJCt
1023:5-0
ll7043L:
2023;53
Clll &PC: DU.r&y four llDcel a.-o peer
2026110
Clll AIC:
cl•e-t I.- die •Pfr:OM!l •7
(tm1.,.Utpjtla) \! JI tua Wt II.Melina Ch.:ee tvv un -
witk •
int.rcept
2024125
Clll APC: Six fiw ta-.o cU.mb to fiw tbcn>. .nd c o - t CM c..ter one
tWc ~ po1M two
2024;30
CHl Al'C:
ZQ2fu45
CHI APC: z.ero .U.ue Y a ~ a• . - speecl •• lOll& •• JO& cav. air u 11
the tCNer - oae upteet ••en
l. 3.
202.4:4,
M09VSt
2024:55
Clil.APC: iland off south
2024155
ARTCC: Yah
2025:00
CHI APC: East of Big Run four mil•• is ah four Hotal Romeo
2025:00
ARTCC: Radar
20.25100
CHI APC: Yep
2025:10
CHI APC 1 Hotel Jlomeo pro<!eed direet Peotone call. tha centftr now o""
twenty five two
202,5: 15
N34HR: One twenty five two ao long
2025 :15
CHI AFC: So long
2025:25
CHI APC: Unitad five five three call the tower now on one eighteen
a even
2025:·30
UA 553: Eighteen se~n for five five thrfle
202fi..:OO
CHI AFC: Four three Lima turn left zero two zero
14.
2026100
117°"-lL:
2026100
Clll: APC:
2026:00
"1f71>43L:
202612.5
MDII 'l'Wl.t
2026:30
Clll Al'C:
2-026:30
Clll APC: All rlpt
l026:30
MDII TWR: Cauae - 011.ly got one ~y we .:an't give thiu - cocmand&x
the right he'• (-1utelliail>le) too close
2{)26:35
CHI APC: Olr.ay forty tlu:aa J.ima ia a th4I uxt ooe comiae 1ap on tha
,.,.r1r;er
2026:40
Nl:JW 'Iii&: All ripe Uait&<l f i . - fUt..y thne v1.ll 0. oa a left turn
one e1.pq ~ ~ feet: c..tJlg to JIOll
202.6:4-0
CHI Ai'C:
15 ..
I
2026:55.
i 1~HT··APc:
1
Forty three Lin1A tnrn 1 efr. hel\d"ing two nine-· zero you ret goin.g
! to go through " little bl.t to intercept
2026.:55
N7043L; Two nine zero
2027:30
c.ttr./\!'C: Forty three Lima ie three miles from Kedzie cleared for the
appro&ch call ~lidway t""er now on one eighteen seven
2027:30.
N7043L: Gcod day
2027:30
·CHI' APC: Good day
2028:15
Mr~.r: TWR: Satellite Midway
2028: LS
CHI l\PC: i'.ah
202·s·:: i.s
Cfff.'1 'f\-JR: You got United five fifty three okay
202.8 :·20
CHJ '1\PC: No I' L" not talking to him
2028 :.20
Klf..i TWR: You' re not talking tr.• him
2023 :'20
CllT 'APC.: l:!egati vP.
,. - - ..
io?g:4o
~w,.r"T\ffi: Y1/H 1:.nlk:i.ng to him
i·
16.
2028: 40
CHI AJ'C:
1.028:1+0
MllW TWR: Yan - too
2UW:45
Clil APC: OkAy
2019:00
CHI Al'C: 11111.ted five n- three witb -
2\UY:25
CRI APC: Forty thr.., Lim11 do you have ground contact
2.0Z9:25
MDil TWE.: (unintelligible)
:!029:30
CHI Al'C: Okay he's·diuppeariug ~ d.1sa1>peared r13ht wh .. re juat.· _.bout
where forty tbree u.i.•s et if forty thr- Li- bse ground
contact I don 1 t kllOw if he <lnee doae or oo t he '• not 011 the
acope thougli
2029:40
HDW TWR1 Ille we don• t heve him ei tiler
2029:40
CHI A:?C: Oh
2031:0~
;{!Ji 'lWR.1 satellite Midway did you ever h . . r from Unit.ltd !iVQ Hfty
three
2031:05
Clll AK::
...
·.: ·.
. '
17.
2031: 05:
l-:!IJW 'ThlR: Oh beautiful
7.031:20
:.mwTW.R: Sate111.te Midway
2031; 20'
CHI APC: Yah
2031: 20·
_H[A.l'T1:1R:
L,ook·s like United_ five ~ifty' three went: down
2031:·20·
G!U AFC: · Y.ih
2031:25
Ah we got a call on the phone I' 11 k""P you advised
MI:M •1-WR:
2031: 25
CHI APC: Okay
7.031: 45
L:HI Al'C: Cl1icago Heights inbound on the. seveu s:ix five·
2031: 50
ARTCC: 'riho' d you want
/.031:55
CHI APC: 'lah ah United ah want the Heights
20.:01:55·
ARTCC: Yah
o
2 32'·.: o:i5 ' Okay ah United five five three looks like':.he. ,;;:;,t. in ahout
CHI APC:
a mile short: of 11idway ah what type of machine ,... ;, he saven
thirty seven
2032 :05
A.R'J.Y..:C: Ah let 1ne drag a strip yah seven thirty $even
1<1.
2032: 10 .
CHI APeJ. ·Otpy
2032:10.
Ante: a. - ill
20321.15
CRl .APCI Yllb llA 'a ab. be u - t in about a mile an aa lf .i. two mi laa
alicnt of tbe ~Y
2{}31:15
Anet: Okay
2032:55.· '
J.r.rcc:
2032:55
CBI Al'C: Yah
2033100
AK'l'CC: Three .Ula ...i: of the 'Ii&U ia two three eight wtlfore •
gulf Krua two leWl aix lallif (s,..ntelligil>t:.) lltl.d!My
2033:.00
' ')lti)W nm.: Satellite M1<Nay (U'Cintellfgtlll.e)
2033:05
Clll AFC:
2033:03
Ancc:
2033:05
CHI.APC.: - Olay l"adar
2.033.:05'
AR'.ICC: .Big Mother
19.
2033:05
CHI APC: Okay
'·':.;.': ...,'.
2U33:10
CHI APCt Say again ditl you cRll Midway
2033: 15
MDW ·TWR: Yah I got a departure for you
2033:15
CHI A?C: Go ahead
2033:20
MDW TWR: Five twenty three Joliet delta ceaana citation he' e got
Moline and he'e got Bradford at one aigllt ob off st two two
2033:25
CHI APC: Bradford one eight oh okay he'a releaaerl
2033:30
HDW TWR: Ah right I've got vercol.a ~nty eight ah
2033:30
CHI APC: Just a minute just a minute
2033:30
N23U: Chi~go approach ah gulf stream two three uniform •ix thouaand
with Miiliuly Oacar
2033: 30
CHI APC: Vercola twenty eight
2033:30
MDW TWR: Yah ah twin beach Roberta "r
2033:35
C!lI APC: Okay
"
.~··
2033:35
Oll APC1
2033:40
~ 'l'wt.: h4 tbat'a all I pt tGr - -·re·ptna to llol.t .,..ryt!U.Dg
•he uatil .. fi.. . llbet '• ti.a -.1 with u.tud
21l33:40
Clll AlC: Okay
2033:50
CHI A.PC: ~ tbr- aigltt . m i - ra41ir ~ct ,..ro 1d.aa aero bM<ii.D;g
vector for thirty - le.ft ea 1-al:lJ••r appir09Cb ia ah Mi411ay .
2033:50
1'12311:
2036:05
MIJW TWl.1
2036:10
illlW nm: Sat.allite Midwey
20)6:25
CR:t APC: Yah
2G36:25
MW T14: Li8t•n we 're going to tutve to get off this. thirty one Approach
till thla thing ill out of the vay
2<}36: }()
CliI APC: (fao y ..tut t
2v'.l6: JO
•·{!)W Th'.R: All ri.gbt - 'r" going to hsv& to go to four that's the 0<1ly one
"" got laft
21..
2036:35
Cfll APC: Okay the first one will be thirty eight uniform he' a about: sh
s4lven mi lea awiiy from Heniiau now
2036.: 35
HW TilR: Okay
·.,
!
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--- ...
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CHICAG0-0 'HARE .TOWER AND MIDWAY TOI/ER
·.:.
LETTER OF AGREEMENT
1. PURPOSE._ The purpose of t..'"ie agreement is to cover the use of Midway Tower
radar in the contr'ol of IT:a traffic arriving and departin~ Xid•..;ray> and to
delegate airs?~ce to per~it Hid-way Tower to conduct IFR/Special VFR
.operations as outlin7d in.current MA.i.\OPS.
2~ AIRSPACE U~DE!f }11DWAY TOl·!ER JURISDICTION. 'The airspace from 2000 P...SL and
below \..•ithin that part. o= :1id·way 1 s con::rol zone vhich lies south 0£ t:b.e
.073° radial of ~aperville (excluding the extensions) is -Oelegated to
Midway Tower for the purpose of conducting IFR/Special VC'R·operaciocs.
:
3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF =AGILITIES.
A. Midway Tower
1. Shall separate all aircraft that ·have been released to Nidway from
all aircraft operating special VFR or IFR under Midway's contra~.
2. Sha 11 not release any IFR/Specia 1 WR departure i.•i thin 45° either
side of• the ap?roach course ia use at. the tirae (XDW-1-!XT, KLJ.3 4-R)
without prior coordination wi.th Chicago Approach Control.'
'·
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3. Shall call Chicago Approach Control, "south sat:ellite posicion
advising when an IFR d~?arture is storting ta~eoff. This c~:l
shalJ include ch2 identification, ty?e, iix, airway, altitude
and de?arcure runway (24D Cessna Naperville V6. 1 4000, de?<:iTtint:;
runway 4).
j~
4~ Shall restrict all departures to the altitude specified by
' Chicago A~proach Control· as indicated in 3 B-1.
'·
....
•.
;t 'I
-. '' I•{.
..·•
:r .. ' .
·./
.:
. ·.. . . :
~
...
}
2. ,. . . ::. -~ .. ...... . •
~ Heading
..
Uaperville** 220°
.;
Joliet* 220°
\· Robei-ts* 220°
Peotone* ' 190°
Crib*** 090°
"
--.... ·'.
;
..
AE:Eroaches Restriction
:..'. ...
.··:
Parallel 32 1 s 2000 MSL* ···.·
! Single 32R/L 25 00 MSL ti 11 past DuPage/Big Run/
V92 or 1/026
14-22-27-4 3000 MSL till past DuPage/Big Run/
V92 or 1/026
.2. Shall) except for traffic landing at Y..idway 1 insure that all
IFR 'troffic under or:Hare 1 s control ~ithin three miles of Midwr.ay's
control zone (as defined in para. 2) is 1000 above the departure
altitude in use as specified'in B.. 1.
3. Shall vector all Midway IFR ·arrivals that are beloq 3000 so as
to rer;:iain three miles clear of th~ Midvay control zone until
they are turned on to· th~ app.roach course.
i
I
6. Shall not change the routing until t~e departure has left the
I Midw'ay z9ne or has reached an altitude 1000 feet above the initial
I alti tud2 being utilized for departures.
' 1
'
.
-.,..~ ~~-----~-w --c:"~---·--•r• ·..-.,-...
·..·
... -..
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.... ,... .· ~~- ....•.
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~
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:: .. ~: . .
.· . .· ..
(. . y 1) ..
·1:. ·. '.
-:· .
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4. GE~~E?.AL OPERA':::ING P?,OCEVJ?.ES
...• ,,·>
A.. Prim;iry Ap?rooch Systems
... ..
·.; l. Runwav in USC Approach SysteQS ·.·.
.: .
;'
f.
1
13 J1DW
I 4 NDB 4R
I ·31
22
MXI
MXI
·1. 0 1 Hare shall activate the light Wen the I.FR arrival is six
flying c~les fro~ th~ ap?ropriate approach fix (Herman, KDW/
MXr outer .marker).
2. Y~dway shall clear the light when·the IFR arrival is under their
... cont'rol •
"
\
.; . - _j
. ~ .
i~ Daniel X. Vucurcvicil Nick Molsen
Chief, Chicago-O'iiare ToW"er Chief, Midvay Tower
I
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.......
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' -- ··- -·-:- ·-·------ ....--- --.--------· --· -----· ------- ·~---~--· , ___ .. ---·-·· ---- ·-----· ....
.;.....
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. ....,,._
UNITED AIR LINES
P.O. Box 66100, Ch1."cago,Oli'nois 60666
Mr.• W. Lamb
1[at.i'ortifl Transportation
Safety Board
Bur~au of Aviation Safety
wa'shingtcin, D. C. 20591
Sincerely,
J ;~·])_.• >smith
Vice'President
Flight .•Safety and Industry Affairs
.-~.
LOcation: Elk Grove 1btt-'nship, lllinois,on Ru1.1te 62, one-hWf1nili:: west of Route 83
___-·;:
/" _,.___ -- I
J. D. SMITH
JAN 26 1973
ACCIDENT REPORT
\\'hi le approaching "IDW from DCA aboard Flight 553 on December 8, 19'/2,
r:was sitting in the forward jump seat on th.e aisle side with my seat belt
fastened. I had checked seat belts in the forward cabin and had secured
the buffet before sitting down. I do not recall if I had made the "No
Smoking announcement.
11
The only thing unusual I remember before impact was noting that the
aircraft was descending rapidly, I do not recall anything else until
1 regained consciousness. On awakening, 1 found myself pinned by debris
inside the aircraft. I screamed and firemen came to my aid. I do not
know how long I \\'as unconscious.
WITNESS:
6
Plane Type. B-737, #9131, enroute from DCA to MDW. Emergency occurred at_
2:25 CST while on final approach into Midway Airport.
53 Ticketed Passengers
2 Infants
I Handicapped - board in forklift
I Elderly
The Captain had announced that we would be landing at Midway Airport in five
minutes, the seat belt sign was on and Mrs. McCausland gave the final landing
announcement as the no-smoking sign came on. Mrs. Duret and I checked the
cabin making sure all seat belts were fastened all cigarettes had been extinguished,
all seat backs and tray tables were in the full upright position and all carry-on baggage
had bee·n placed under a seat. We then took our seats on the rear jump seat. I was
on theleft hand side and Mrs, Duret was on the right. We fastened our seat belts in-
cluding shoulder harness, Shortly thereafter I heard the engines trying to apply
,_ more power, I looked out the window and could see nothing. The engines kept
trying for more power as if to gain altitude. There were 2 or 3 surges. It is
difficult for me to say if there was any change in the planes attitude during this
time. I cannot recall for this report the actual feeling of the initial impact. The
liquor compartment and ovens, which had all been checked and found secure before
landing, broke loose, the interior of the airplane started falling and flashes of fire
could be seen on the left hand side. There was scraping of metal and I remember
thinking how similar it was to the mock-up we had been through in stewardess school.
Then all semmed quiet except for a hissing sound and I knew we had crashed and stopped. My
shoe was embedded in the windscreen and as I got up I managed to pull my foot loose by
leaving my shoe. The jumpseat had to be pushed up before I could open the left cabin
door. From looking out the small round door window, I felt the exit was useable. As
I opened the door I saw flames and realized it could not be used as an exit. The flames
started to come in around the side of the door and I immediately tried to close the
door. This was difficult to do because the hooked slide had come loose from the packet.
However, the door was closed. Mrs. Duret was openina ihP. rear buffet door durinq
?
Page 2
this time so I went into the cabin shouting for the passengers to come to the back
of the pl one and get out.
The evacuation was hampered because the overhead bins and seats on the left
hand side had collapsed blocking the aisle, The passengers who were not pinned
excaped by climbing over the partically collapsed seats on the right hand side.
The plane was rapidly filling with smoke and I had to run to the door (where
Mrs. Duret was assisting passengers out) for air before going back in to assist the
cabin. I kept shouting for passengers to get out the back of the plane and was
trying to release passenger in l6B whose leg was '.angled in the wreckage,
Also, the West boy who was pinned under seat 15B. I could not release their
pinned limbs. J·turned to the little Sherwood girl pushed het to Mrs, Duret who
in turn got her out of the airplane. Passengers were stil I coming out and I
returned to the cabin to assist. The smoke by now was very thick. I went to the
·door for air and went back one last time, The smoke was so black by now that I
could see no one else. I went back to the door, told Kathy to leave and left behind
her. As I turned to look back at the plane, smoke was pouring out the door from which
we had just left, I assisted a passenger after, outside, that could not walk away
from the wreckage along with another man. Some man came over and asked to help the
___p_assenger for me which he did. I shouted for people to get away from the plane, Mrs.
Duret and I tried to get to the front of the airplane. We walked around two houses
but couldn't get through. When we couldn't, we went back to aid thepassengers
who had escaped. They were al I scattered among the crowd that had gathered. The
fire department had come and some ambulances. Some people were bringing blankets
and were also trying to help. I was with a passenger who had an injured back and
was possibly in shock. A United Agent came to me and insisted I put on a coat and
stand on the passengers blankets since I had no shoes, After an ambulance came and
took the man, the United Agent insisted I get into a polic car, He then got Mrs.
Duret. The officer asked where we wanted to go and we wondered if there was any-
thing we could do at the crash site to which he replied no-. He offered to take us to
Holy Cross Hospital and we thought possibly we could do something there so we went,
:J.~n;,_J~
D. J. Griff:r-rr---
Stewardess ..
8
December 15,
Plane Type B-737, #9131, en route from DCA to MDW. Emergency occurred at 2:25 CST
while on final approach into Midway Airport.
53 ticketed passengers
2 infants
1 handicapped - boarded in forklift
1 elderly
five minutes. Mrs. Griffin and I had closed up our buffet; we went through the
cabin to check for carry-on baggage, check seatbelts and check that the children
had been belted in by their parents and that infants not on tickets were being held
by parents. The No Smoking Sign came on. We again went through the cabin to
check seatbacks, that all smoking material had been extinguished and, as is our habit,
we checked the buffet a second time. We generally double check one another.
We went to our jumpseats and we felt a surge in the engines, after we had been on the
jumpseats for perhaps a minute. It was a very powerful surge. I think what went throug.h.
both our minds was that it was a wave off; it was a missed approach and we were waiting
to feel a leveling off. Instead, there was a second surge, what I am almost positive was a
~
9
second surge on the engines, and then within seconds on the left hand side of the
aircraft, you could see flashes of white and gold, not smoke, not fire, but just
flashes and popping· noises. At the same time the buffet, liquor compartment came
out asweli as the oven units, and there was a tremor or series of tremors. If we yelled
anything or not, I do not recall at all. I had the impression that there was a few seconds
of silence and light, and I had the feeling we were settling or, we were drifting down-
wards. There was no motion, no noise. We both got out of our jumpseats and Mrs.
Griffin went to the left hand door which was directly by her seat. I went to the
buffet door and I had a great deal of difficulty opening this door because the amount
of debris on the floor seemed to be blocking not necessarily my getting to the door, but
The cabin seemed to become very, very dark, I was aware that a male passenger was
assisting Mrs. Griffin with the door. He came to assist me and between us we were
able to get this door to swing open and to clear enough stuff away so that it could swing
'· open. As I pushed the door open and latched and came back around, a woman passenger
that I recall being in Seat 16F, was in the doorway, and when I swung the door open,
I realized that we had sort of settled on a basement entrance and there was drop of about
six feet, but to the right rear of the aircraft, within two feet, there was a ground area.
There was a lot of burning debris and wood. I pulled the inflation handle on the slide
which filled up this hollow in the basement stairs. I ran back into the cabin, as far
back as I could get into the cabin. The seats had oecome dislodged in the area that I
could see and the ceiling had collapsed. From what I could see, the right hand side of
the aircraft was, well, you could not see anything on the rJght hand side of the aircraft.
~ .'
We rcn to the door to get fresh air and then would go back into the cabin and try to get
people back toward the door. At one point, I felt something around my feet and it was a
child. I grabbed the child and ran to the door and started shouting to this man outside
of the aircraft to take the child, which he did. I started to go back into the cabin --
at that point, the smoke became extremely black and extremely thick and seemed to iust
, gush through the cabin. I told Mrs. Griffin to get out and we both got out the door iust
as the smoke seemed to bi !low out. We shouted for people to get back. We ran around
a house and tried to get toward the front of the aircraft, thinking there might be
passengers on the ground or there was scme way that we co6.ld get in the front of the
cabin if it was not on fire. We could not get close enough to the airplane so we ran
around a second house and it appeared that the entire front of the aircraft was completely
encased in the house. We could see no way that we could get back into the front and we
did not see any people. We ran around again to the tai I.
DOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-C
r;-·
:
-·---- -·-
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FLIGHT,A'.ITENDANT STATEMENTS
3. Mrs.'Kathleen S. Duret
''
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Bud~t Bureau No, J9-R02-4.J,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATfONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 31
1
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
!
Ci -
Place '. ~~7--~---~h~---
' .
.;4-,.__,.·~ :;- /'.../-
7.1 ~ r _,.<·.._/)~.... ~~1.d/.~- :~...u..--
Date
-
-~c- .... - --/ r-: ·9- J... .:- Z 2-
-'--7-----------------~--n-::L .....!. ------------
1, . . . . . . 'I h
I. ~o~n~-4·-';;-S:s:3__:±-!:'.:.:.:<=_<;'._______________ Date-'.L'.::.:::....:!.J,: ..!£.Z:O-...... Hour .«.:~3-}J'." 1 •
IL Aircraft ...7.2..1 _________________ ._______ FAA Certificate No. and Symbol ·---------------------------------------·-··------·-·
VI. Tell in your own words what you saw before and at the time the accident occurred.
NTSB Form Gl20.11 (Use reverse side of sheet for diagram and additional statement)
U.S. GOV(RNMENT PRINTING orrro:: 1%7--0--265·261
...., '
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., !~-
•,·-·
I. . 31
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRAH5PORTATIOH
HATIONAL TRANSPORTATIOH SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
National Transportation Safety Board, a Federal agency, is charged by an act of Congress with th
investigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of preventing future mishaps. In order rha
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it will be appreciate1
if you will answer the following questions on the reverse side of this letter: (1) where and when you boarde1
the aircraft; (2) what seat you occupied, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat wa:
on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center o
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of the flight; (4) any occurrences while on board which appeare1
unusual to you, prior to or during the accident; (5) other facts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of the National Trans
port at ion Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your assist
ance.
Yours truly,
Investigaror-in-Chargt:
Bureau of A viacion Safety
;: T
On December 8, 1972, I boarded United Airlines 737, Flight 553, in
and my 17-month-old son, Arieh. We were assigned the three seats in row 10,
ft.,;4\
on the left side of the plane; my daughter sat next to the winaoW', my son sat
f/oS) (:oG).
in the middle sea~, And I was in the aisle seatA During the takeoff, Jennifer
and I looked out of the window to determine the point when the plane became air-
borne. This seemed to take an unusually long time, with the plane appearing
to taxi down the whole runway. The remainder of the flight, prior to the ap-
Prior to arrival, the pilot informed us over the public address system
ou~.seat belts, ad~csted the seat backs to the upright position, and prepared
for landing. At this point, I could not see the ground because of the clouds.
At this time, the engine sounds were consistent with normal landing pro-
cedure. However, approximately two minutes later, the engines began to accel-
erate, and I suspected that the pilot was trying to pull out of his landing de-
11
scent. There was some turbulence, I thlfiil heard a passenger say There 1 s snow on
the ground:". I looked out of the right window and noticed that the ground was
slanting away from the front of the plane at what appeared to be a 45-degree
angle. We were underneath the cloud cover and very close to the houses beneath
and nose-up position) and the acceleration of the engines, I thought that the
The impact was extremely violent. However, the specific details of the
crash sequence were a blur. I felt myself being thrown forvard and up within
the confines of my seatbelt. The airplane cabin lights went out and tearing,
The interior shell of the cabin was ripped loose; it fell over my fam-
ily's seats, trapping us and cutting off our visual access to the rest of the
plane. The fire started almost immediately after impact and was located be-
side my row of seats, preventing us from using the exit door over the left wing.
baby's (center) seat had collapsed over him, and he could not be seen. My
belt and Jennifer's and pulled her from her seat. We fell to the ground behind
our row of seats and were momentarily trapped in some debris, under the fallen
interior shell. The fire was raging next to us, along the left side. I held
Jennifer and crawled back to my Ari's seat and tried to unfasten his seat belt.
The belt was jammed. A person was in front of me, and I pulled at that individ-
ual, asking him to help me get my son. The person was able to pull Ari from
under his seat and handed Ari to me. As the cabin was very dark, I could not
see who helped me. (I was later told that it was Mrs. Linda West.)
I then carried both children into the main part of the cabin and walked
toward the opening at the back of the plane (the only source of light that I
could see). We were not given any assistance at this point (and I did not hear
any instructions to evacuate). When I reached the galley door, I handed my child-
ren down out of the plane to Mr. Shaughnessy, Mr. Stachura, and other people who
were standing on the ground near the galley door exit. Then, the stewardess in-
side the plane and the people on the ground helped me to climb down out of the
covered by what appeared to be a deflated life raft. By the time we were a few
yards from the plane, the whole crash site was burning.
~"' . ,
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PASSENGER STATEMENTS
1. ·Marvin E. Anderson
2. Howard H. Christeson
3. Wilbur v. Erickson
4. Harold W. Green
5. Harold R. Metcalf
6. Nancy Parker
T· .~/alter L. Patterson, Jr.
8. ·Pelores M. Pendrey
9. ;John H. Rauen,, Jr.
10. Mrs. Judith Sherwood
11. Mrs. Linda S. West
12. Aloyious E. Wieser
"
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -/+
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASH!NGTOt-1, D.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of r.he National Trans-
portation Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your assi:•t-
ance.
Yours truly,
Investigator-in-Charge
Bureau of Aviation Safety
'
•.1
1• .. r111 /\pprUVf'1I· Aui'<T t 111I t"llH,N tl I' 1J ! •!,·I
.I 11., -2-
-----· December 13, 1972 -~
(Date)
til the very last few seconds, possibly 30 seconds before the
crash. The pilot announced over the P.A. system that we bad
feet; that we bad been cleared for landing, and that we would
announced that we were about to land anrl +-"ar To>a ~i-,~,,1rl ~t"r<1<""-
had been fully deployed with the rear wing flaRS only partially
I
t
deployed. (I do not recall hearing the landing gear being
I
lowere_sL_} Continuing to look out the window, being seated in I!
Seat 1fo9-A which is on the left side of the coach cabin, one or
bient conditions and was looking for the time when we would
yet there was not the feeling of acceleration but the change of
(Sl;:.r1ntu:re)
NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last pai:ie.)
(Page 1)
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. 1i'553
. .
Form Appn1vrd• !311d11:<"l nur• '" 1 Ni '· l•1 ROJ•I ·.. -3-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued) -----·----- ·- - -·-- -- - ·- .U.LJ.llil. _.
· (tJnlC")
(Sl~nature-)
HTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page,) GPO 924-379
(Page 2)
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. #553 12/13/72
-4-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued)
mating part of the buckle. Once I was freed of the seat belt,
portion broke out over the left wing. We then shut the window
were really trapped. But then moving towa'rd the back to find an
opening, I did see the light peering in from the right hand side
opened over an open basement with the foundation wall just adja-
cent to the right hand side of the door. The air chute was par-
tion edge and step on the ground from there, at which point I
proceeded to run across the street aw.ay from the aircraft, only
(Page 3)
-
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. #553 12/13/72 -£""-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued)
However, one could not see beyond the flames of the houses which
be said about the integrity of the fuselage from either the view
the plane from the moment the aircraft stopped could not have
In this day and age of moon flights and our advanced knowledge
landing facilities for the Chicago area and those that are
(Page 4)
F11rin Appru111'lf' llud1t<'I !II 11'l'IOJ N
"·. \U !-?II I 'I I
NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, u:<1e additional paper and sil{n Inst page.) GPO 0!24.379
(Page 5)
· List
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STATEMENT OF WITNESS
Tie · staten1rn t 1::1
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,... ll1n f:il'I~;. 1•n11tlition~ :,nd 1·i1·c11111
stanl'cs, and the probnble rausc of the subject aeeidc•nL
I. Place of accident ___ .Ghicagn.,_Illinois. ___ Date __ D.e.c.emb.er._8. __l'172. ______ Hour _2;A5.~p • .m.
IV. Address ____ 2J_.!f_Q _SQ.>tth _l.0.9_th_ .$_1;,t eJ;>J:_____ - __Qll!1'b.ii~-US'l>_t.1'\§ l>A __ g§]._4.4_------------ ---------
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
The flight from Washington to Chicago had been very routine. As we ap-
proached Midway, the pilot made a rather routine announcement over the
intercom telling the passengers that we had made better time than antici-
pated and that we would be landing on about schedule, together with a
report on the temperature and weather in Chicago, which appeared very
normal for that time of the year. The approach seemed normal. We had
been in the landing glide pattern for some time when suddenly the engines
were turned on. At that point I glanced out of the window and could see
the housetops below. This gave me no particular concern as we were
beginning to pick up speed, and I assumed that we would go back up and
come in for another landing approach. A few seconds later I heard the
sound of the airplane wings striking_ trees or housetops, with the crash
occurring almost immediately thereafter.
I think my seat belt was fastened quite snuggly as this is what I routinely
do. My head apparently struck the seat ahead of me and I blacked out. I
am not sure how long I remained unconscious, but I assume it was probably
5 or 10 minutes. When I regained consciousness, I called to a business
associate who had been sitting in lOF, asking him if he was all right.
His reply indicated that his leg, or legs, were severely injured. I
think my seat belt held all right, and that I routinely unbuckled it .
.q,,t~ (bo,., /..,hr 1"'· .,,, "1, o,,(.,.. · "'~ ], Ft '11J.,. or y/q,._,)
It was ~ dark in the piane,.._'.'nd it was ti~ted to the right. There seemed
to be a good deal of debris inside the plane (possibly broken seats,
sections of the luggage rack, and styr:_~~~=~~~i~-~~~ .~~-om•,
(811(1'.WltUr-e)
NTSB Form lllt.11 (Use reverse side of sheet for diagram and additional statement)
--/Z--
etc.). As I looked about for a possible way out, I saw only two men who
were across the aisle near the emergency exit at Row 8. I heard one of the
11
men say "we can't go out here, we'd better try the right side. Then I
saw them come across the plane and disappear, apparently through an exit
on the right side.· At this point my traveling companion, Walter Patterson,
said "I am going out now," and I saw him crawl forward towards what I t11ougbt
was the wing exit at Row 8. There was no further sound or mov<~ment in the
plane. I started toward the Row 8 exit on the right side very soon after
Mr. Patterson 1 s exit. I found an opening and came out apparently onto the
wing. Fire which apparently traveled down the outside of the plane had
evidently just reached the opening about the time I got there. I received
some burns as I crawled out, and continued to feel heat and flames as I
jumped down off the wing and made my way back along the side of the plane
to the street near the tail of the plane. I found Mr. Patterson sitting
on the steps of a house across the street, talked with him very briefly,
walked around for a few minutes in an effort to keep my blood circulating
to ward off the cold. When I spotted an ambulance (fire or police depart-
ment), I got into the front seat, rolled up the windows, and waited for the
ambulance to be filled. I remained in this seat until we arrived at the
Holy Cross Hospital.
1. The engines came on with a good deal more force than 1 remembered
experiencing on one or two previous occasions when it was nec-
essary to go back up and make a second approach. The plane
actually seemed to jerk as the engines came on.
2. Shortly after the engines came on, the plane tilted sharply to
the left and then straightened out. It seemed more of a dip
then a bank.
3. It seemed to me that the pilot had pulled the nose of the plane
up and that we were beginning to ascend at the time of the crash.
I did not sense that the plane had stalled in any manner.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-/3-
Dl!PARTMEHT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHll-IGTON, 0.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
National Transportation Safety Board 1 a Federal agency, is charged by an act of Congress with the
investigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of prev~nring future mishaps. In order thnt
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it ·o;vill be appreciated
if you will answer the following questions on the reverse side of<his letter: (1) where and when you boarded
the aircraft; (2) what seat you occupied, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat was
_on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of.the flight; (4) any occurrences while on board which appeared
unusual to you, prior to or during the .accident; (5).other facts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of the National 'I'rans-
portacion Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning-your Statement. Thank you for your assist-
ance.
Yours rru1y,
Investigator-in-Charge
Bureau of Aviation Safety
the pilot notified 11s that the ceili~g at Midway was 500
i<"t. with ab011t J mile vissbil.ity and that we would be
loo sine; Hl ti tude towa· d our finR.l apnroauh shortly. ··;ri.0n
we were at abQJJt l 000 Ft. tl·e pilot again come on the PA
and told 'BS we we·~e i•1to our final anproach and at this
time the ";To 'lmoki'lg" arrl "Fasten Seatbelts" lights were
on. The StswP.rdess came P.roung to check that seat backs
and trav tebles were all in the upright position. ~e
continu8d to "escend and everything seemed normal until w
began to break ~hrough the overcast. At this time we see es
to be pretty low ,,nd 't snrl(lenly the nose came up anrl the
pil nt appl 1 ed what seemed 1·.o be flill throttle to the
engines and he seemed to stqrt a l8ft bank. At this time
I tho11gbt n1.1e 1re goir1cr~11nd no-3jn 11 b1Jt we seemed to be
so low and tlte 1Jland assumed a n~se high attitude and
began to sh11dder as i f Pie e,-,gJnes Were unable to lift it
higher. ~.t this time, beinG unable to see. the field I
he_gan ta feel _1,~e mJ ght he in tronbl e S11ddenl 'T we ho1Jncec1
a. couple of times and then crune the impact. I was thrown
forward against the seathel t yri th conei derabl e force.
Every thing loose seemed to 'Qe flying forward especially
dirt, g r j t and a saot7{ like s11petance T11is djrt etc.
seemed to fill t:Hl8 air lilce a liquid almost and rnade
breathing diftfic11Jt )1CT1en the planei; f1nall>r came to a
halt a.11 the flying substance sifted downward and I could
see and bv.eath once more 1\rT'r seat was tilted forward and
only my seatbelt held me in it. My feet could not touch
the fl oar or snyth1ng 11ntil, reaching aro1Jnd, I J.TRS able
to put my foot on what seemed to b" a. cable(approx. ?,· inc
1 n d!tameter) wllrich ran from fro1--t tayrard t11e rAar of the
plane. Supporting my weir:ht on :;his cable I war. able to
release the seatbelt hJc~le end lower myself toward a hol
through whic.h I could se"' light coming through the side o
th" plane f11selag0 I think tlie flopY' l19d collapserl :.i.nc' I
w~s down in the J:ower comnartment. I wa:l:Ji:ed out the hole
anr) fa11nd myself an the rnhbl e of 3 ho1J se 011 the right
side of the plane. Fire .Wfl.S begginni ng to my left anrl wns
pretty close to the sine of the nJ ane, To my right the ·e
WRs also fire but it WRS more out in the house, about 1C:
feet fY>om the pJ sne Si nee I co11l d el QQ see j·be streAt
to my right I went thR t way, toward the ta:Ll of the plane
'·Ihei> I got ta tbe renr aOor the steJ..rardesses 1.rere helpjng
people out (some women and chi:iRdren) and I wa.s abbe to
bel p some of them to cl ilnh ant.a the rnhhl e pdil e in order
MTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page.) GPO 92.4-379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -16-
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
r . WA~HINGTON, D.C. .
PASSENGER ST ATE ME NT
·/ I ( 1
____t~_·,.1~lL1~-k~·'~v~-~@""""-''-t,._/;_,·'-l@u·""',_{_______ records indicate that you were a passenge.r aboard a
~,~
which wns involved in an accident on
NatiClnal ·rransportar)on Safety H0nrd, a Federal ngt'ncy, i~ charged by an act of Congress with the
investigation of accidents inVolving civil ai:rcraft as a meabs of preveniing furure misHaps: In order chat
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it will be appreciated
if you will answer rhefollowing questions onrhe reverse .side ofrhis letter: (1) whe-re aAd When you boarded
the aircraft; (2) what seat you.occup}ed, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat was
on the left or right side of the pl~ne, oit. the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of the flightj (4) any occurr.ences whil~ on board which appeared
unusual to you, prior to or during the accident; (5) other faCts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of che Nation a! 1'rans-
portadon Safety Board, is enclosed for con'venience in returning your statement. Thank )'ou fdr your assist-
ance.
Yours truly,
In ve.stigator-i n-Chargc
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Dangerous Drugs and that I was carrying a firearm. I then advised the
captain of the same fact upon boarding the aircraft. Having received
seat belt I i ght was on for a part of the flight, but I ittle turbu lance
was encountered.
As we neared the end of our journey, about five (5) minutes prior
to the crash (using 2:29 [i.m. CST as time of crash) , the captain
announced that we were above Gary_ l Indiana and would touch down in about
five (5) minutes. He further advised that visibi I ity at Midway Airport
was one ( 1) mi le and the cei I inq five hundred (500) feet.
.I
r.•
mater j a Is and rAttJrn seat backs and tray tables to tu I I uorjqht position
v Is i lb i I i tv of the around.
(CONTINUED)
(Si~nature)
MTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional .paper .imd ~41n lo.st page.) GPO 944.379
-18-
Paq" 2
Al I of a sudden ·the pl~ne's engines were advancod rapidly to ful I throttle,
where they remained unti I impact. I glancP.ci out tl10 window and for the first time
could see tlie ground_, some four hundred (400) to five hundred (500)feet below.
We then entered more clouds. At this same time the nose of the plane came up
sl is1htly above the horizontal. The plane then turned flatly or "crabbed" to the
left.
I then noticed that the ground was again visible about one hundred (100)
feet below. The plane continued in a slight nose down course.
The impact came and with it the cessation of the engines and the failure of
the cabin I ighting. I was thrust forward hard against my already tight seat belt,
water and other debris rushed by my feet, and something hard struck my heel.
Then suddenly the plane had stopped - only darkness and si Jenee.
J undid my seat belt and got out of the seut. My seat and the overhead
clearance seemed to be intact; the aisle near my seat was clear.
I turned toward the rear of the plane, where, in the dim I ight, I could see
the stewardesses were already at work, attempting to open the rear emergency exits.
J then helped open the left rear exit. As it opened flames began to come into
the cabin. The stewardess had the presence of mind to order the door closed in
order to keep the flames outside of the cabin.
Vie then turned to the right rear exit. The handle was jammed, but after a few
yanks it came free and the door released, but would sti 11 not shove outward so
that it could be opened. A plastic pack mounted on the door had shifted and had
to be forced back before the door finally pushed out and away.
As the door was opened I could see the tai I section had come to rest on a
foundation where a house had stood. Directly beneath the door and down about
ten (10) to twelve (12) feet I could see the basement floor.
The stewardess then releaserl the inflatable chute which did noi' extend fill ly
bec~use of the debris but rather afforded a platform from which one could re~~11
the ground . . At this time I looked around and saw several people, perhaps three
(3) or four (4', waiting to exit the pla~e. The stewardess and I helped one woman,
whose face 11as quite bloody, to the chute. The other people exited under their
own power.
CONTINUED
-19-
We then looked back up the aisle and cal led to people that the back exit was
open. No one else came and I could hear no other voices. The stewardess then
to! d me to jump• Csh.e wou l.d not go before me). I jumped from the chute to the
ground and the stew,eirdess exited after me.
As I reached the ground and looked back I could see that the tusilage was
still identifiable by it's roofline and the fire was still burning,.along the
I eft side outs i·de fn·e: cabin. There were i hen a coup I e of f I us hes of ti re f I ar i ng
up, nnd flames· and smoke rolled over the top of the plane obscuring my vision.
I looked about, and the stewardesses Vlere aiding the injured who were ou·t of tho
plnnc.
People from the neighborhood were in the street, and wdhin a minute or two
1~hica~10 Pol ice were there. I talked to one patrolman who relayed my information
ewer his car radi.c>. Next arrived the Fire Department ambulances· who beuan
rounding up the (ijjured. Myself and Mr. Marvin Anderson were driven to Holy
Cross Hospital by ·i'l ChTcago Pol ice Officer where I was treated and released.
j)
Harold R. Metcalf
Budtret Bure&u No, 39-R024.3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
-20-
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
STATEMENT OF WALTER L. Pi.mR:'lON, JR.
~'S.~~1~~~.t
Udt9d. 11.ipt 553 _:. 22.-
Decelli>er B, 1972
~· plae still llad its naoe up •lightly a•d tlte rlgllt wing dftll
ia a banking pesitiea a• we began Aitting tr..e11, lleuau etc.
a•d crasltad te tll• greUJld, It llappeued ver:r suddenly.
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PASSENGER ST ATEMENT
Nndonal 1·ransportation Safety l~n:Jrd, u Fcdernl agency, is charged by an act of Congress with thl'
inve;>stigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of preventing future mishaps. In order char
the f~oard might have the benefit of your observations in condncring the investigation, it will be appreciated
~If you wiJ!answer the following questions on the reverse side ofthis letter: (1) where and when you b0nrded
the aircraft; (2) what ~enr you occupied, (Give sea.t number if possible. Otherwise, indicate wherher seat v..·as
on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief stntement of the history of the flight; (4) any occurrence:-; while on board which appeared
unusua.1 ro you, prior ro or durir·g the accident; (5) other facts which you fe{,>l relate to rht: accident.
A Government postage-free envelope 1 addressed tn the appropriate field offict· nf the Nacion<t! 'J'rnns-
portarion Safety Board 1 is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your •lssist-
anc~.
Yours truly 1
j ~ I
,,1 _.J(j _,
40 .l_± -<! t., "'.' · ,. / /L,:J ; ' " (. 1&-u
1
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(Sl,r:natur")
NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page.) GPO 924-379
-zr-
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UNITED AIR LINES
P.O. Box ?6100, ChicaiO, Illinois 60666 February 1, 1973
Mr. W. Lamb
N'ational Transportation Safety Board
Bureau of Aviation Safety
.. .
Wa'shington, D. C. 20591
Sincerely,
J. D. Smith
Vice President
Flight Safety and Industry Affairs
encls.
- .
Location: Elk Gro~·c Township. Illinois, on Route 6.1, one-ha/{ mile west of Route 83
If "·": ""· f 1' ;-........ •.· ' J
December 19, 1972 -2..-
~ C-90-25-30/22 Tri~ Report
On December 13, 1972, I made a trip to MOW air?ort for the purpose of
looking at the wreckage of the 737 accident, to establish the condition
of the galleys and galley equipment.
Since the ~ccident en December 8th, many people f~om the investigation
team, firemen, etc., have been through the rerrains of the airplane, and
in the meantime the wreckage was also moved fror.; the accident site to
a hangar at the airport. Because of all this handling, a great deal of
the evidence we needed to arrive at conclusive answers to our questions
was destroyed before my arrival.
Aby evaluation of the following observations should be made with the
above iri mind:
·wherever we feel that safety reasons justify campaign improva;ients of
the galley equipment, we are preparing COA's for early accomplishment.
The three main sections.of the fuselage that remain after the accident
are the tail section. including the 12 and #3 galleys; the left half of
the cockpit and the i l galley; the right side of the cockpit 1-.'as torn off
by impact. The tail section has no fire damage up to the rear pressure
bulkhead, the aft section of the right side of the cabin including the
twoealleys is damaged bynre. The left side of the cockpit is burned
out. The forward galley #1 was found virtually intact and without fire
damage and with the cabin flooring still attached to it. It is assumed
that this galley was torn out of the fuselage together with the right
half of the cockpit. ,
Galley #1 - This galley shows an amount of mechanical damage but little
or no fin: damage, the flooring and also the aisle side decora-
tive panel are still attached to it.
Starting at the top, the miscellaneous, five sided carrier box (alum.
·alloy) (1) is still in its cavity. The door was found in the ••reckage
ba-Oly mangled but clean and shiny.
The coffeemaker (3) is still in its place in its cavity, the water com-
partment door (2) and water cooler (4) are still in place.
The small triangular door (13) in the upper outboard corner was in place
and latched.
Inboard oven (5) in place, no door. Outboard oven (6) and door missing.
Refrigerated drawer compartment. ( 24} empty, no door, no drawer. Waste
container and door (33) in place. Inboard cold food carrier and door (7)
Ji{.
U$ I ~N. 1 1 -
~CO IP(U. a.A...
·~· ··~---
- - -
missing. Outboard cold food carrier (8) in place but no door; however,
ice tray and one ser,ving tray still inside carrier.
Outboard lower soft drink carrier and door (38) in place and latched.
Galley E2 - The upper miscellaneous carrier (1) was found beside the gal-
ley; however, the bottom panel -of the carrier and the galley
shelf it bears on show matching damage so that it i~ concluded that this
carrier was remov~ from the galley sorretime after the accident. Part of
the door was still in the carrier opening (rest was burned away) and some
of the contents were still inside the carrier.
The four cold food carriers (3) are in their cavities. The two inboard
ones still have doors on them. The two outboard doors are rrissing. The
liquor compartment (21) and crew baggage compartment (30) are cpen, the
doors are missing and the bottom is pushed up.
The galley skin on the outboard side is torn off.
From top to bottom the triangular compartment door (2) is still in place
but distorted, the rectangular door (6) below it is severely distorted
but still attach~. The refrigerated compartment door and drawer (2) are
missing. The lower stowage compartment door (10) is also missing.
Galley #3 - There is some fire damage on this galley but it is generally
intact.
The upper storage compartment door (6) was open but some of the contents
are still inside (coffee can). Door was found to be in good working cond--
tion.
The two upper outboard triangular doors (15 and 28) are in place and latched.
The coffeemaker is in place (7). The water compartment door (2) and the
water cooler (3) are in place and latched. The used cup drawer (4) is in
plate and latched. The waste container and door (35) are in place and
lat~hed.
The upper inboard and lower outboard ovens (5) are in place but the doors
and heater assemblies are missing. The upper outboard and lower inboard
ovens (8) are completely missing; however, the latches are in good condi-
tion. The oven compartments are also in good condition and there are no
detectable reasons why these ovens did not stay in. Were they possibly
removed after the accident?
Tbe lower refrigerated compartment (39) door, carrier and drawers are
.missing.
The drawer (metal) was found clean and undamaged which again ~~kes one
believe that this drawer was inside the carrier (carrier has no door)
and inside the galley during the fire. The c~rrier could not be located.
~-
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I tern 6
(a) The airplane seats and adjacent structure, including the seat tracks,
a re des·i gned for the fo 11 owing 1 oads, as· sp_ecifi ed· in Boei nc;' s Re-
port #06-15098: ·
Passenger Seats
~CTit'G 3EPAF~T:::...Y
8'fERGa!CY :,F'LIGlii };]31 oc·e:::::c
I1f DIREC'l'I011
?E:R ·CC::"DZ·J:Oii
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page 2
..
Item 6 (Continued)
(a) (Continued·)
Cock2it Crew Seats
Notes:
\
(1) All the up and.dOl'{Tl load factors exceed those specified in Ff.A
. ·. TS0-039 for p_as~~nger sea ts .
(2) All factors are increased by 33-1/3 t for the se.at attachment to
~ .....
the aircraft structure and for the seat b€lt attactF:ent to the
,. h.,.._
.:<: seat structure .. (Ref. Boeing's Report #0£-10881.)
l :. .. ;-.-~:;. to'. . '
(3) The seat· track is designed for a single seat stud load of 4400 lbs.
(which is the tear-out·value of the track lips) and a two stud load of
,. 5360 lbs. (which is the value of the track beam in bending midway .be-
tween two floor beams). (Ref. Boeing's Report #0£-10881.)
(b) The galleys and their SUPP-Orting structures are designed for the follow-
ing load factors, as specified in·Boe!ng's Reports ED6-15098 and ED6-10380:
:~ -··
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page 3
Item 6 (Continued)
(c) All items .of equiprr,ent which could injure t.he passengers or crew, if
installation failure occurred, ar-e designed for ultirrate inertia fac-
tors shown·below. These items include the hatracks, ~er Boeing's Re-
port #06-15098.
t..C3~V 2EP.'.R:".T.2.iY
'11 ::ir;.::__,·c·rwSEO>"'.!:
:.5
(d) The main cabin floor. and supporting st~ucture is designed for the fol-
. lowing loading conditions, acting separately:
,
(1) Seat loads consisting of passengers and seats shall be as speci-
fied above under (a) and b~sed on six-abreast seating at 32 inch
fore and aft seat spacing .
..
(2) A unifonnly distributed load of 37.5 pounds per running inch
longitudinally and uniformly distributed laterally outside of
a 15 inch minirrrum center aisle (approx. 47 lbs./sq.ft.).
(3) The floor panels are designed for a 100 lbs. per square foot
loading.
The load factors specified under (a) also apply to the above
loadings under items 2 and 3 .
.(Ref. Boeing's Detail ·spec. #06-17375.)
... ...
.-......... , ·-
Docke L No. flA-41 'i
ElxMJJ Lt No. 2-G
OBJECTIVE
Training for·the purpose of meeting United Air Lines' proficiency standardi!
required for equipment qualification for all flight crew members, and to obtain
an FAA type rating for Captains.
E uc; I B.lLJT y
All Flight Officers must have completed B~wit; Turbine Tx-aining, ground lralning-
hours -- :W:OO, or Initial Second Officer Training (new hire), ground training hours --
70:00 •
. Initial Training. The training required for crew mL!rnbers who haye not qualified
and served in the same capacity o.n another turbojet airplane.
Transition Tr.aining. The training required for crew members who huve qualified
and served in the same capacity on another turbojet airplane.
Upgrade Training. The training required for crew members who h'1Ve quallfil!d
and served as First Officer or Second Officer on a particular airplane typ;.,, be--
fore they serve as pilot-in-command or second-in-command, resp<:ct!vely, on
that airplane. Flight crew members who have been inactive longer thnn three
ycurs on a particular airplane type, may be qualified by attendinl'," the neeeHsary
portions of th.e airplane transition course.
l. Principle Ground Training Subjects (Ddcte for Upgrade)
Training consists of classroom and Cockpit Procedures Trainer periods
covering qormal, irregular, and emergency procedures. Relevant systeme
information, as determined by Speclfiu Behavioral Objectives analysis, is
integrated throughout the training at appropriate points, assuring complete
coverage of all necessary information on the following subjects:
Newly hired Second Officers will complete 84 hourn :rn required by Sec,ornt
Officer New !lire Tralninr;, Chapter 10. (Not applicable to Second Officers
previously qualified as third crew mt:mbcr on 11-7:!7).
.;; ,_
" '1;~0 Flight Operations Trainin}{ ManLal Page G--1
United Air Lines
1
JI. Traini!_!g DcviceH and Aids
Audio/Visual Presentations
Class.room Hesponder Systems
Cockpit Panel Fold-outs
Cockpit Procedures Trainers
Systems Mo_ck-ups (B-727. B-737, & B-nO)
Airplane Simulators
Airplane Flight Manuals
Malfunctions/ Failures
CPT CIYI' CPT CV1'
Electrical CPT CPT
(~VJ' CV!' CJYI' Cl'T
llyd1·:1ulic CPT CPT
SIM SIM SIM SIM
Flight Control SIM SIM
SIM SIM SIM Sli\'l
Flight Instrument SJ.M SIM
OIYl' CPT CPT OPT
Landing Gear CPT CPT
l~I"OSS\.Vin<l i\ 1\
l•:nginu Inoperative i\ 1\
Ground School :i
27 27 3
Classroom 9
12 12 IJ
Cockpit Procedures 6 6
. \i 9
Crew Traln1nl! Session
Airplane
Captain - To Proficiency -
-
First Officer - Proficiency
To
Flight Check
Simulator/Training Devices & Airplane - As Required -
n. DC-8, DC-10
ii/l (i:'.
Ii'light Operations Training Manc.ai
United Air I.ine'
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 2-F
(
I
SEl' 23/71 737 FLIGHT MAHUJ1L 958
2-18 REFEREHCE AND REYlE\'f
OPERATION IN SEVERE TURBULENT AIB:
6.
NORMAL OPERATIONS
1
947 737 FLIGHT MANUAL -MAY ~:J/'iO
REFER:EHCE AND REVIEW 2-19
NORMAL OPERATIONS
JB
NOV 23/72 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 93~
2-20 REFEREHCE AHO REVIEW
NORMAL OPERA TIO NS
·--,_
above field elevation, flight instruments
F /0 HYDRAULIC PRESS &
check" . . . or nature of discrepancy.
QTY • . . • Check
After operating the flaps and gear.
CAUTION: 00 NOT/' CTUATE TTIE
observe the Hydraulic Pressure allld
Quantity gauge for proper indications. RADIO ALTIMETER TEST
BUTTON AFTER FLIGHT DIRECTOR
C SPEED BRAKE LEVER . •• ARMED
. GLIDE SLOPE ENGAGEl\IENT AS THIS
Place the Speed Brake Lever to the WILL CHANGJ' THE J\UTOMATlC
ARMED position and check that the ATTENUATION. (LOCKOUT CHtCUIT
Afu\1ED light illuminates. PREVENTS TEST DUlUNU AlJT·WILOT
APPROACH.)
CAlTTION: 00 NOT LAND WITH THE
"DO NOT ARc,l" LIGHT TLLlThllNATED At 500 feet above field elevation as
AS THE SPEED BRAKES MAY EX'l""END determined by baromr,.tric ullimc.:tcr. the
AUTOl\IATICALLY BEFORE TOUCH- F /Cl will announce: "GOO feel alio1·e field
DOWN IF BOTH THROTTLES ARE elevation". Starting at BOO feet abo\'e
RETARDED TO IDLE. A DA.,.'>GEROUS- field elevation and at ap;wo:-:imalely each
LY HIGH RATE OF DESCENT COffLD 100 feet increments, he will call out only
RESULT. displacement or deviation errors as
pertinent. (1 dot clisplaccmc·nt on
localizer, :'._ l clot on the glide Alope.
FT~AL DESCEi'iT CHALLENGE-RESPOND deviations greater than pin~ JO k1»ob or
ininus 5 knots ft·on1 tn1'[rul app1·oach speed
CHALLENGE RESPOND
and ralc-of-cll~sc;ent in e:«:css of 1000 feel
'_) (PILOT N'OT FL 11NG} {PILOT FLYING)
min.) At arpro:-:imrrtc>ly 100 fc,ot above
FLIGHT & NAY rnini1nurn altitude by use uf the li:~rc 1 1netrf1
INSTRl':">!ENTS No Flags altit11etcr, ho \':ill announce 11 ..\pprn~chin1.'
(Cross-checked by !\1inin1un1s 11 • At rninirnu111 a!lilt1c1e by ust
pilot not flying} .. of the Lwromclrie altinwlc'l' (Hadlo
Lf\N'D!XG GEAH Down 3 green Eights Allimo'0r for CAT ll appt·oach), he will
11
SPEED BHAKES ARMED, Grn. Lt. announce I\1inin1urns 11 • l·'ro1n n1inirnu1n
WING FLAPS Pcis __, Grn. :Lt. altitude to touchdown. he wlll call nut
Pressure & Fluid airspeed chnngcs in 5 knot inc;.1·en1cnts.
llc will also call out any unn,;ual attitude
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED
belo'.v J)l! for landing and lhroup;h r~o
around. If the Captaid c·xc·cutes a missed
C & F/O FLIGHT & NAV approach he \Vill annOil11l'C nGoin~~ 1\roun1
1
category II Operation
A. The First Officer will constantly
monitor approach perlormance
5. Jf VFR, establish a landing profile to
enable touchdown between 500' m:rl
·1
against coclq:ilt instnimentatian to 1000' from the threshold. On ILS the
touchdown and throughout rollout or touchdown target Is 1000' ± 500' from
go-around. the threshold.
B. Pilot-In-command will disengage
6. Ideal rates of descent are about 600-800
autopilot for landing.
FPM. At 500' AG the approach should
C. :Maximum devLation at 100' is 1/3
be stnbilized and remain stabilized or
of a dot arr localizer and± 1 dot
a go-around must be executed.
on glides] c1pe.
7. Maintain the proper constant attitude
STABILIZED APPROACH TECHX'IQUE during approach to toucbdow1i, mid
-avoid any tendency to dive for the end
L Maneuvering flap to the outer marker, of the runway. This tendency c2:1
or if VFR, to a position of beginning result from the illusion presented
final approach. (When maneuvering when breaking out ur~:.ion1cail1 a low
in icing conditions, it is recommended ceiling from a normal ILS appro:ach
that flaps not be extended more than and will result in a high rate-of-
position 5 until on final approach over descent n8ar the ground.
the outer marker. This reduces the
8. During the final 200-300' of descent
exposure to ice build-up on the flaps.)
to the runwriy, the hendwi nd component
2. As glide slope ls being approached, often dec:rcases, resulting in a drop off
extend gear. Landing flap may be in airspeed approxi rn rilely equal to the ..'
applied in . ,ne or more increments as steady he:lclwind corroc;tion. \\~1UE it is
dictated by airspeed and allier not. intended that a pilot should reduce
conditions. thrust (:o achieve tl1ls airs peed l1l8"doff,
the occurrence is norrnaJ. and can be
3. Follow descent path, speed decaying
expected. The airplane shonlcl be
to specified approach spee<\ then
flo\vn so d_S to crvss ihe ihresholli at
stabilized. (See Flight Handbook for
planned threshold speed. Thrust ls
approach speed).
reduced during the flare so as to
Final landing configuration must be
arrive at idle thrust at tclllchdown.
established by 500 ft. above ground
unless the approach procedure (ADF,
The advantages of this type o.f approni!h are:
VOR, CIRCLING) requires an inter-
a. - Improved constant airsp2ecl control.
mediate level off before final descent
b. -Improved c:lpabllity to realize proper
to the airport. In this case, the
threshold speed.
final landing configuration should be
c. - Constant attitude & "trim-out" dming
established, and speetl stabilized, as
entire final approach.
the final descent from this minimum
d. - Better control of desired touchdown spot.
altitude is lY~gun.
e. - Improved autopilot apµroach clue to the
Retrim to maintain light control
stabilized airplane configuration.
forces during the entire approach.
f. - Improved go-around perforrnrince since
4. Control the touchdown spot by keeping engine acceleration from the higher
thrust on (Engines "spooled up") approach thrust settings will be rapid.
during the approach.
J [)
NOV 23/72 737 FLIGHT MANUAL . '
,< REFERE~Cl AND REVIEW
2-22
FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MANEUVERS
PREFLIGHT. 3-1
TAKEOFFS 3-2
INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES 3-3
INFLIGHT PROCEDURES 3-7
LANDINGS AND APPROACHES TO LANDINGS 3-9
NORMAL AND IRREGULAR PROCEDURES 3-111
EMEHGENCY PROCEDURES 3-11
JUDGMENT 3-12
COMMAND 3-12
PROFILES
NORMAL TAKEOFF 3-J.4
ENGINE FAILURE DURJNG TAKEOFF 3-l!l
NON-PRECISION APPHOACHES 3-lG
LANDING PATTERN - TWO ENGINES 3-17
LANDING PATTERN - ONE ENGINE 3-18
!LS APPROACH AND MISSED APPROACH - TWO ENGINE . 3-1 ~I
l LS APPROACH AND MISSED APPROACH - ONE ENGINE 3··20
-·-
This section lists .required maneuvers for ratings and proficiency checks, and describes
the maneuvers, and. techniques that are utilized in training and checking.
Training, the rating ride and the proficiency check are operational, emphasizing instrument
approaches, landings, takeoffs, missed approaches and normal, irregular, and emergency
procedures.
The minimum crew complement for all inflight checking will consist of the pilot being checked
:incl the check pilot. FAA requires that the pilot seated at the controls, other than the pilot
being checked, be qualified to act as pilot-in-command; however, this should in no way affect
the crew concept of flying. The pilot at the controls should always use his crew to aid him in
performing to the highest degree of safety and efficiency. The normal line crew complement
may be used in the simulator portion of the proficiency check.
Each crew member is expected to have in his possession, and use as needed, all regular
equipment, such as charts, manuals, etc., normally required in flight.
The flight director should be used in the appropriate mode when applicable. lts use is man-
datory when performing !LS approaches to low minimums.
The maneuver descriptions and profiles in this section are for general f;Uirlance only. The
pilot is expected to use his judgment in execution of procedures and selection of airplane
configuration and speeds as appropriate to the existing situation and conditions.
A list of typical Questions and References, categorized by system is located at the back of
this section to assist you in self-evaluation of your knowledge of the airplane.
REQUIRED MANEUVERS
REQUIRED MANEUVERS
J. l'IU;FL!GIIT.
2. TJ\.,Xl!NC,.
:i. TAKEOFFS: Types may be combined but must include; NOH.MAL, 'INSTRUMENT,
CROSSWIND (if practical), and *ENGINE FAILURE.
* •l. !LS - NORMAL (autocoupled or manual).
G. ILS - ENGINE OUT (Manual).
* 6. NON-PRECISION APPll.OACHES: Two required, one may be certified by instructor in
non-visual simulator during training.
7. MISSED APPROACH: Only one required and it must be from !LS to facility. May be
required with a simulated engine failure.
8. LANDINGS and APPROACHES: Minimum number of actual landings required is two
on the initial PC (one on subsequent PC's); one must be to a full stop. Types of land inc
may be combined but must include: NORMAL, FROM ILS, CROSSWlND (if practical),
ONE ENGINE OUT AND *REJECTED LANDING .
.zc
94fi 737 FLIGHT MANUAL MAY 23/70
REFEREHCE AHO REVIEW
3-C
uilJJo FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
MANEUVERS
I. PREFLIGHT
The pilot will be required to perform a visual inspection of the exterior and
interior of the airplane aa outlined in the Operations Section of this manual.
C. Taxiing
The 1-'irst Of'ficer is expected to taxi lhe airplane only lo lhe extenl praclicalile
from his crew position.
II. TAKEOFFS
A. Normal Takeoff
hp.mediately following V1, but prior, to Vz, one engine will be retarded to idle,
using approximately three seconds for the thrust reduction.
Hudder should be used to counteract yaw and maintain heading. This will aid
in avoiding undersirable aileron input and spoiler action. A centered control
wheel is an indication of correct rudder use. Proper use of the STEER mode of
the Flight Director will maintain the desired heading during the takeoff profile.
The ball in the turn-and-slip indicator should be used as an additional reference.
2£.
MAY 23/70 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 94ii
3-2 REFERENCE AHO REVIEW
l.'l.fc;ll'I' /'ft(ll•'ICll·:N<'Y
D, Crosswind Takeoff
E. Rejected Takeoff
Departure and arrival clearances will be concise and conform to the normal
practices employed by ATC. Adherence to clearances, the proper use of avail-
able navigation facilities and compliance with airspeed restrictions are essential
to satisfactory performance. Either the departure or the arrival may be waived
on a flight check, but not both.
B. Holding
Captain's ILS training will be to CAT II minimums. The First Officer will receive
training on ILS approaches to 200' but on certification will be required to demon-
strate proficiency to 250 1 •
1. Normal JLS
-
An ILS is considered to be "normal" when all engines and the appropriate
ILS facilities and airborne equipment are operating. A "normal" ILS may
lie autocoupled or manually flown with the flight director.
It is good practice when tuning an ILS to select ADF on the VOR/ ADF s,vitehes.
The pilot tuning the !LS should verify positioning of the VOR/ADF and marker
receiver switches. Both pilots should verify OM passage by the aural/visual
signal and the ADF needle swing and the G/S altitude is as published.
Prin1· to the outer marker, one engine will be retarded to idle, and the lLS
will be performed simulating one engine inoperative. The same evaluation
factors listed in C. 1 apply.
Wht'n m nking thrust or speed changes, proper trim is essential for best
nirplvne and flight <.lircetor performance.
'.;) A flight dircc1."r JLS ~JJproach with one engine inoperative to 100'
followed Ly D .1issed approach.
----·~----
MAY 23/70 7 H FLIGHT MANUAL 94H
RErf.REHCE ,.\HD REVIEW
J-~
- FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
4. Other Approaches
Any one non-precision approach procedure that the pilot is authorized to utw
is required on the PC. During training an ADF, VOR, Back Course ILS, II:
ASR/PAR will be accomplished in a synthetic trainer.
L
FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
-
On D.n ADF, VOR, Back Course ILS, or ASH (without reoomrn encled aliitu:lc s)
approach, the following procedure is recommended. ff a straight-in approach
is anticipated, gear should be extended prior to tho fi:i.al approach fix. Flap.-<
should be cxio11ded and spcccl reclncc<l prior t" sUu·ting <lcsecni to Minirnu 111
Du:<ccnt Altitude (MDA). A r'tto or <i"S<"t'llt shot1lci /i(• 111:1int:.ii;te<I which wiiJ
ensure reaching MDA early enough to perm it alignment with the runway ai1<I
to SP.t up a normal landing profile. I ,andi11g Oaps should be t;dcctcd when , " a
position to intercept a normal descent profile for landing.
a. ADF APPROACH - Tune the radi.o facility accurately and check tho VOH;
ADF switches properly set for both pilots.
c:. DACK COURSE ILS - Setting the FRONT course in tho Course Indicator
wi I l provide proper sensing· on the Course Dar of tlw Cl. ll11 nol use
Flight Director in VOR/LOC or appronch modes.
cl. ASR - Make use of other oper:ating aids to monitor position throughout
approach.
D. Circling Approach
A circling approach may be initiated from llil instrument approach or from vectors
to a position where a landing can be made. The landing runway must l.ie at least
90° from the final instrument approach course.
Once under the cloud base the pilot must remain contact and circle within sight of
the field. Maneuver the airplane to stay within prescribed distance limits without
exceeding 30° bank. A 25 flap setting and 140 Kts. are recommended during; both
the instrument approach and the circle. Descent to lllilCl shoulcl be started as neces-
sary to follow normal profile. This may occur beforo turning on to the final appro:wl:
Landing flaps should be extended so as t;; he in the final approach configuration and
on approach speed as the descent prufile is intercepted.
E. Missed Approaches
As the missed approach is initiated, the pilot should advance the throttles and
rotate to the go-around attitude (approximately 15°), simultaneously calling for
takeoff thrust and flaps to the missed approach setting.
Follow the missed approach profile as appropriate. Limit bank to 15° until
obtaining maneuvering airspeed for the flap configuration.
Performance will be judged on: proper thrust application and rotation; gear
re(1''1dion upon positive rate of <.:limb; directional control and use of trim.
steep turns will be accomplished in training but are not required for the First
Officer certification flight and may be waived for the Captain on proficiency check/
rating.
8nter the turn with thb airplane trimmed for level flight at 250 knots.. As the bank
nngle steepens, a slight increase in pitch attitude and thrust may be required. Cyru
precession may cause vaJ:iation in the pitch indication during a steep turn, while
constant altitude is Lei11g maintained. lnstantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IV0-,1)
readings will be erroneous rolling into and out of the turn.
NOTE: N<:ither gyro precession nor accelerometer error is present in the sirnuln ··
tor.
Steep turns will be done for at least 180° lwading change in each direction. i'lu1, "r
minus 100' and 10 Kts are the normal tolerances; however, these may be l.ibernli7.ed
if adverse meteorological conditions warrant.
fl4fi
737 FLIGHT M~UAI..
REFERENCE ~D REV1EW MAY 23/70
3-7
F LICHT i'ROF!Clf:NCY
B. ApProaches to stalls
It is not desired that the airplane be allowed to stall, shake or decelerate below
the initial buffet or stick shaker speed. The approach to the stall will be continued
only to the first warning indication.
Normally; stall approaches are entered from level flight. When the pilot is pre-
pared for the entry, the instructor or check pilot will set a suitable thrust setting.
The pilot will not be required to calculate or recall the thrust setting for entries,
or the trim termination speed.
ENTRIES:
At first warning of impending stall advance the throttles and lower the nose,
simultaneously calling: for takeoff thrust and flaps to the recovery setting; gear
up at first indication of positive rate of climb. From the banked entry, level the
wings after lowering the nose. Pull up from descent and regain maneuvering speed
for the flap setting.
D. Engine Failures
A simulated engine failure may be given at any time. The pilot should analyze the
problem and take corrective action as necessary.
\
~-:-PRClA r..:t·J (~(JN'FJ(; •
-~
.· - - --:--...=---·...::::.____:::
*APPROACH COlffTGUHATION:
N('\.j3.t.1/1.L 1-fANJc:UVBHING -or
./
FLA.PS 25/''ltEF + l~ K1'S
FLAI'S 30/VREF + 5 KTS
TWO Ef'·JGIP·!t::S
-A7:'U:'.G;::,:--:~L-:,:--,-;,_;::,:;-1·------------------....;L.___ .. ___ -
- 737FLIGHiMNW.'L 951
3-16 REFERENCE t.HD i(: (fl:\'/
' '·;
I •: , :::,P;..:)~': .. ; ,
737 FLIGHT MANUAL -'REFERENCE AND REVIEW
BULLE.TIN *51 .
JUN9/72
FROM: FLIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING - SFOEU
Please in.aert in Chapter 1 - BULLETINS. Record on the "Bulletin Check List", Remnve
Bulletin .#35,
Crew responsibilities as listed in the Flight Operations Manual apply tCJ this S(l P .
. Irrespective of prior checks by the Second Officer, the Captain and First Officer will
perform iill cockpit preparation items as listed in Chapter 2 of the RC'i'erencc ;md Hcview
Manual.
r
924
924
BULLETIN 11'51
PAGE 4 OF 10
'RIGHT WING AREA 5. NAVIGATIUN l.[(;JTT:-i . .(lN&OSC
1. FLAPS, SLATS, FLAP SEAL PLATES, G. I•:LJ•:VATUlt l'ITOT i'HUBT·::-;
AILERONS AND ST A TIC . . . . . . . Cheek CGnclition
WICKS. . ~ Check Condition
7. AFT ENTRY DOOR . . . C'losed
2. WING LIGHT . . . ON
3. NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON & OSC LEFT ENGINE AREA
924
BULLETIN #51
PAGE G OF 10
--
!"
"II STALL WARNING • • • . • . • Test
- FUEL CROSSFEED . . Test & CLOSED
Hold the switch to the TEST position and Place the switch to the OPEN position
I
observe that the Off Light goes out, the and observe proper illumination of the
indicator rotates, and the stick shaker Valve Open Light. Return the switch
actuates. Re lease the switch to the to the CLOSED position mid observe
NORMAL position. that the Valve Open Light goes out.
PASSENGER OXYGEN • Check Tll-1, 2 and :J • • • • . . . . Check
Check that the Pass Oxygen Switch is in Observe DC volts & 'imps within
the Guarded Normal position, and that limits.
the Pa.ss Oxy On Light is out.
STANDBY POWEll . . . . . . Test
REVERSER OVERRIDE SW'S Place the Standby Power Switch to the
Safetied NORMAL BAT position and observe that the
Standby Pwr Off Light is not illumi-
LIGHTS SW • . • • • • • • • TEST
nated. Observe AC voltage and fre-
With the switch in the Test position,
quency and DC voltage within limits.
observe that all appropriate lights in
the cockpit illuminate. NOTE: Disregard any vibration of
Captain's gyro horizon while
STANDBY HYD LOW QTY
in BAT position.
LIGHT • • • • • • • OUT
Place the Standby Power Switch to the
STANDBY HYD LOW PRESS
OFF position and observe that the
LIGHT OUT
Standby Pwr Off Light illuminates.
ALTERNATE FLAPS
Return the switch to the Guarded AUTO
MASTER SW • • Safetied OFF
position (Standby Pwr Off Light - OUT).
In this position, the Alternate Flap
Control Switch is de-energized.
ALTERNATE FLAP
CONTROL SW • • • OFF
SPOILER SWITCHES Guarded ON
YAW DAMPER SW • ON
Observe that the yaw damper light
is out.
r
924 BULLETIN #51
PAGE 7 OF 10
RAM DOOR FULL OPEN LIGHTS • ON
-
* Vl, VR, V2 . . . . . . . . Determine
(If Required)
FWD OUTFLOW CLOSED LIGHT. OUT llRlnK a.Ir temperature, field
<:lev:lilon, nnd planned t:ikeolf
GASPER FAN • . • • . . . AB Desired wciKht, determine the V1 , YR· V:.'.
Turn the Gasper Fan Switch on, if 8pceds (for the planned t:lkcoff fl:ip)
additional cabin or cockpit ventila- from the Flight H:lndbook.
tion is desired; Operation can be
checked by feellng the increased
airl'low from the "eyeball" outlets.
PRESTART CHALLENGE - RESPOND
OVHT TEST BU l"IUN • • • • • . Push
Observe illumination oi both Wing- Challenge (S/0) Respond (Capt.)
Body Overheat Lights, the Air Cond.
Annunciator Llght, and the Master HYD A & B PUMPS A's OFF,
B'.~ ON
Caution Li~.
GRD INTERCONNECT CLOSED
ISOLATION VALVE SW AUTO FUEL PUMPS ON
The valve is normfilly open at this
time becanse <>De pack switch is EPR Bugs Set
OFF. Equal left and right~
pressure indications verify that STANDBY ATT. IND. ON
the valve is open.
FUEL QTY Lbs. Cleared
PACK TRIP OFF' & BLEED TRIP with__, lbs~
OFF LIGHTS • • • • • • • • . OUT
OIL QTY __ , Gals.
BULLETIN *51
PAGE 8 OF 10
STARTING ENGINES l'HI<:'l'i\KEOFI•' CIIALLJ•:NGI·: - IH-:Si'()NJJ
CRUISE
924
BULT.E1'1N #!:il
PAGE 9 OF 10
CIRCUIT BREAKERS . Monitor
- LANDING ROLL
HYDRAULIC PRESS & QTY • • Monitor
ENGINE INSTRUMENTS . Monitor
LANDING DATA . • . . . • Determine Observe engine instruments
(If Required) within limits.
.___ _ _ _F_IN_A_L_D_E_s_c_E_N_T
_____ ~I APU START.
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED
r
'f
BULLETIN #51
PAGE 10 OF l~
('
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO:
1, HOME DOMICILE
J..OENFN/TK FILE
I SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION Of AIACnAFT MANUAL
~PPllOVED TRAINING COURSE NAME
~ -·-·1RADE I TIME DATE CHECK AlnMAN SIGNATUnE • - -- --·-·- ~ GiiAu1No ceo,No,--·--,-~INC0Mf-ilf'ri=-R1 itiFri
f\I
-- _R_!db)_fi!:JA~
.1' S,1!dili£1ze:_:____
8. NON PAEC. APP. ADF, VOR, BK CRS, RADAR
-c;,:rAitiOri11 -1
fLJC:-8110, fl·T?Ol/4/ • RAllNr. ONL'( 17. EMERGENCY PR CEOU/lES
..9 C.!f!Gt ING -APP. f!.f2lfl37 · RATJNO & !'/(,
-- --- - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - · -- "
REMARKS
--
·-
6. HOLDING
___ J - - ·---· - --
SCHEDULE TRIPS M!SSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICAT!ON BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
CHECK J',iflth'\/J (Si.'.1J :OIGNATURE DATE
REVIEWED .7 j~r· U
tPERA TIONS ·SIGNATURE
,{ 1_ /-)( 1 (_ C{ {_ { d'----_
.
ORIGINAL-EMhOYEE"S FILE
FLIGHT CREW EN ROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
DUPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
---- SEE REGULATIONS 2S·_4
t=='v.7.':S'i~r====:'~~-=~=-~p==.~=({__=.$"",e-"'"
. ~<o=-: PLA71~ T~~~5tLIG HT NU:~E7~?
0
_ _ _ _ E?t/~p
- 1. _;:::-:::_ _ _ _ _ ------'
I. l·l.!CIL'l' PRHPARA'l'ION
~~1:1SFACTO~\'.__[J.J!r:i_s.~_T!~F-"rCTO"Y D
See No, 7 below
INITIA"" FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
COMMENTS
l 'niforin and Equipmt.•nt ' ~ ;1.}~ ,-,
_qa0'1r~~~-
j·J;~ht l'l.1nning
___('.o:·kpic J•r_:pa_rati~_n - - - - - - - ·
z. PRE'J'AKE-C)FF p COMMENTS
:;;5,~ft[
Cruise Conu-ol
Traffic Alertness
Corn mu nicarions
Use of Radar
-------··-------------------
5. APPRt)ACI-l COMMENTS
Dcscco' and Speed Control
A pp roach Procedures
llse or Auto Pilot and Flite Director
-----·---
Landing 1"echnique
Reversing, Braking and flngine Shutdown
-----------------------
6. G.ENE!{AL
d41-:
---~--------- - -----COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
KnowlL'd£e of Take.off and Landing I.imitations
Equiprncnr Knowledge
Adhcn·nc·c to S.O.P.
l 1se of Na;•igation Equipment
Pub!it: Relations - PA S}'stern
Comn1and Ability and Cockpit Management
----_I_ L + - - - - - J - - - + - - · _ _ _ _ , - - + - - - 1
I /
I I
----1-- I
----1 _
~1
_!'7_ "
----1-----+·-----+----f
- __ [_ :-;~j-_-_ _-_ -+ - -
... FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUNu TRAINING RECORD
SEE REGULATIONS 25 -4
)LJTE COPIES: , CHECK MONTH DUE
- fuGHT OFFICER PERsO~L FILE Captains, Second Officers First Officers
-filGH.T OFFICER ~ FHght Navigators
DECEMBER, 19 D JUNE,19
1 STATUS/~~;;~ IN
ME 1 • -~ . DOMIC!lE
WHITEHOUSE, WL 737 DCA
TIME CREDIT A.LLOWANCES - RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING
-- --·-
· - !.ry_AlNING TIME ACC:>M~l:_I!~
------·-·- -·· --
* 1. CLASSROOM TRAINING
/; 3 (l
A. Systems and procedures review (each PT) - 1:30
B. Systoms and procedures review (each PG brif\flng nnd warm-up) - 4:00
L/ ~ 0 (I
C. Second officer annual oral review conducted by Technical Speclallst Aircraft Systems - 4:00
----- - ------ - ----------- .. - -·· ..... -· -···· ·-·- - ---·------- -- --
* 2. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS EXAMINATION
Completod pr!or to Proficiency Training (PT), Time Included for home study of FHght Mnnuals - 3:30 3'.30
- ----·····-·- . . . - . --- ----·- -------. ----
* 3. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL EXAMINATION
3 I :J
Time Included ror home study of Manual and revisions - 3:30 ' --' (!
-- ~·------ -··· ---
* 4, RECURRENT EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES TRAINING - 3;00 3'.o ('
- ----· --· ---·--·-··-. -- ----
5. AUDIO VISUAL PRESENTATIONS (For times involved see current AN presentation list Jn Regulations 25-4,)
NOTE: Approach and Landing A!V presentation required annually.
···- -- -
REQUIRED ANNUALLY
JTAL HOURS REQUIRED ANNUALLY - Piiots - 25:00 Flight Navigators - 16;00 TOTAL HOURS COMPL TED: ·is. L..'f- · - -
--- ··- .. ---·· -·-· -----· - ·····--- D . r "tiT'fMt:;AGEiilGN'ATi:J - - - -- -uArE-· ·
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO:
1. HOME DOMICILE
SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION VF A!ACnAFT
APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME
MAN_u,~'"Lii=====t~~~~~!Arm-sriw'o;m:----
1'- 1• E ANO START DATE
2, DENFN!TK FILE
3. ;:l.IGHT OFFICER ~) )
''--;~~:tu:~T~A~IN~'Jc~l§.m~°kr~"¥~~N~'"''=_~"'/,".,"/""'J".'-,-~;-:_=-:._~'""h-r;~=o:'«=. ~=,,,=..=_=,=.=,==Ti:v"O"M"'~'°'"''"~==T.F'Tig~9;;;"'"~"""'y"'"""'11=~,0',;B"°s'°e1'~~,-~~-.~-~,~··~~==j:~=~--~-~-==r_o~_""-t'*""v"'"'""·A'°1°'c~="~_·-
. ..
~.V~A(F..""'~~~~~~t::~::;~=~~~!:-;:;;.s~"1~ul:;,A11T'EE_J..:Y,,.i'~oRAL RECOMMENDA n0NN.ttlN:;;s51r~RC°.sSir'Go-:.~~~:t=-t--11coJ;AGr'Eerll-1r1===i1:::::7"""1"
~Z.v_,;_ !/;1.J/7; -- __::___:~-;-: ' / e1cl2:SJ
PART121APlV'J?1:::C. <0<(o.?(; !!/tG ry; :;.,7;'!£' GI~;~ ADF( r:rs~rii!"J'.'."/VOR<:
! - - i Rf CtllCK
ORATING
"'",:_t.~0ro1/1N(JMRER 'JJ~,t7:nMe
"'ARAPP
--------------------------t---t-,,-;-ct..-:;ct----·-:----·-------- - · · · · - - · - - - - - - - - - - ! - - - - --
4. TAKEOFF: NORMAL, •:tif
X-WJND ·:::::;.-/;':
---------~~--------------+--+"-"-+=+--"R0oE0oOcoU:::IR_ED ~J-~!~.l!~ATO_f2!..~~~~Sf-._T,-"A"L._T._.- - - - - - + -
50% POWER CAPT. - 4 ENG. A/C
6. HOLDING w
REMARKS
// v
:::HECK AIRMAI~ SIGN DATE
UN!Tli:O AIR LINE~
-·--" I I 3 r·n;& I
~:.121 APPROVED ~ucToiy/
<_;?k;<'/P"? / /~
L.)'J/i~-&" :~/E -:>' '7 BRIEF T 1f..-E: JT;;G.rTi......-:: __ ~-F) II~
·H:s OG-7 T ·-"> /I/-/< 3 0 f°""rC/-'.:> .
CRs lvoR "'ADAAAPP L-1
~
IBt<
.Pi',,,,-~,;,,;;;;;::;;;;;:;;;;;;;;;:;;::~;:~:--;c~;:-:;---:::::-:;-;-l,;;:,~-~--J.ru>""'""i'ii:MC-"Ti,,;;;,-TiCU?~.;:;,,.:...::;:;;;;.="=:;"ii:i'7:::;;:;;;;;;-1..,7nf;;tt;,,jr---iAECHECK
-~ LJRATl<G
AIRCRAFT TYPE a-. NUMBE1. p~,,~-==)'(..../ BLOC,~K/T~C FLIGHT TIME SIMULATOR NUMBER !SIMULATOR TIME c=JspECIAL (.!;
$-J.j--,·7·-' 702,/ /./~'f 7:_, ;3;/ 3 REMARKS) /..'_-50
ORAL ~--.....L-~=---~-'--"-'--""-----l-----
G AADE TJ/>-E OATE CHECK AIRMAN SJGNATURE JGAAOJNG LEGEND: I· INCOMPLETE (OTHER T
I c;
tNor REO P/TJ /i~OO i-// / s-SATISF'ACTORY PROFICIENCY]
"w"-~_,~,~,-.~,~.~'"'"'"'"!-""'"-...J-'-'-..:C~.--~,~.M"""f,,~',';·0?1,,L__.,~·L1L___~-~-,--~------------ _u_-_u_<_.5~_1s_F_A_C_T~':_Y_ _ _ _ _ _w_-_w_A~IV_E_o_(EX~~P..!!..!.::.!
;...;..1FtPL,>.NE vs.VISUAL SIMULATOR A VS 5 MAY BF- REQUIRED IN A/C A VS
-,-_~P~R~E~F~L~IG-HT----------,,-,-;~,-,~,~,-,~.~,-,~,~_~,~.-,-,-,-,--+--+--+--+---;-'-R-~-~-1-~-i;,,~s-~~(c-o··NT-"'o~J-----------·------- :::,-f-----
---------------------------+--+--+--+---- -------·----------------·---·-·- ---
2. TAXIING tzERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
--------------------------+--+--+--+--------- ·---------- ----··----·-
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS
--·
---------
DUPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE FLIGHT CREW ENROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
SEE REGULATIONS 25-4
lJsc of Radar
5. APPROACH l COMMENTS
Descent and Speed Control
Approach Procedures U_)?l <. - M AVA/ <:-·1>
lJse of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL
s·cJP COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of Take·off and Landing Limitations
.Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Use of Navigation Equipment
Public Relations· PA System
Command Abilicy and Cockpit Management
_:U::>::e:_:o::f:_:C::h::a::l,::le:'.n'.!g:'.e:_:a::n::d:_::R::e>~po::'.:n'.'.'::c::Li::'>:.:<>:__:__ _ _ _ _ _ __i.~:.L-..- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · - - · - - -
7. This completes Initial Flight Assignment requirements for R. HE~fARKS ANl) REC()M~tENDA"I"lONS
y ~~/Y/00;;/ Q
J /(
~ ~ HL l f-1.s- f'€~_fs
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
TOTAL
CREW ME~ lSIGNA
\>-J. -J.
.... ' ~- ...,,,.. ........
FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING RECORD
SEE REGULATIONS 25-4
ROUTE COP1ES:
J.- - FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE Captains, Second Officers First Officers
2. - FLIGHT OFFfCER . Flight /"Javigotors
DECEMBER, 19 JUHE. 19
NAME STATUS/EQUIPMENT DOMICILE
-::tx-
* l. CLASSROOM TRAINING
...
7. RECURRENT OVERWATER OITCHtt.IG TRAINING (Required annually by oll 01<erwoter quolified flight officers) 5:00 r:...\ /:.....
·---t--V::--9 ~· ~~.
* REQU!RED Al'INUALLY
TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED ANNUALLY - Pilots· 25:00 Flight Navigators -16:00 TOTAL HOURS COMPLETED! -i-S·.~9
At~(r-
This 1~ 10 certify thot I hove carnpleted 1he obo1<e recurrent ground training
duiing 1h,,. 12 month period ending with the abo"e dote.
L 1
Pl\ rr
vrol ft:.lJ Alf:! LfN.._
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO; SEE REGUL:ATIONS 25 4
1. HOME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME CLASS NUMBER OATE·
2. OENFN/ TK Fl LE
~,FLIGHT Ol"FICER
"~ ,~:J;-£37
-
l/~X~;,: ~:;; A~_T"_'"-~.I.! "'_____ I'~-
__.S' 1_____
~/''.L'.~'.J':'..:::-..:=.-L.._::=:'.'._.J_
[":5- I ;.~Oc? k2~,..--
;;;_,~'~"
--':~':1t:L0. 1:'t"1"'~0
. .c;.; ~';·~:'.:'~1't"~.~~UL,\J0H A VS s MAY Ill nl i)ltlfH [1 IN f\ ·c fl v<;
I ,0 0N "1 .7' =0'1"-- - - - - - -·-----------+- ·--1- -·-
ORAL CHK AIRMAH !HCllATllf•f a,. U"TI
I - LANDI N·G-,,---.,
,
6. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OF 2 W
5
_7_._"o_L_o_'"-G-----------------+--+--'----.-1--~~C/-4:.Z~--------------·---,.:
w
a. ILS APPROACH: NORMAL rA/P OR MANUAL) ~ ...v-::1 / < 7:, e_
----------------------·-"----- _ ... .- -· /.:"A_ __i/..". ,.,,../"#_ .. L.=~-----------+-
__________E_'_'G_._o_u_11_..,_A_"_u_A_L_'__________+- ._ _ __:?. __/-'i,_,.?~~--Cd//7£7~--:C-5 _____ ----
,.-.
9. NON PREC. APP. AOF, var~. OK r:ns, RAOAR 18. £Mf:RG[NCY PHOCEllUllES
r;,F>TAll'< UHl.r --
10. CJRCLING APP.
-- -~--l---1----=-t.0' f'._/5/(~.(_____ ------·----·- -
11_._"'_~~-1_:u_A_P_P..·_________,_o_r_'__c_1L_,_,_v_~-r~~-"'--'-L_s_ __j_ __j_ _,~_5:_..J-_L_,;z!,--YJ',.,,n(--:."~.L~.<:------· ---------
·-
,,_
13. APPROACHES TO STALLS ( 15° BANK) 2 or 3
-'-·~·__:S~P~E~C~l__:FIC~~F~L~l~G~H~T__:C~H~A-•_·_~C~T~E~R~l~S~T_l_c_s_________w-l--l--f-~-f-1~9~·c_:C.::.;OM~M__A_N__
D-_:J~u_u_G~M-"E-,-N:c,,~E;o--;D~U7l;--,H~O~N7A~P~P7L7•C~A-:-;;,7L~Ec-----j--- ~-==
RATING IN AIC ~
15. PQWERPLANT FAILURE pie IN SIM - INITIAL CERTIFICATION ( 2 oo _ !) (CAT!!)
~1~6~,_L:A~Nll_".D~l>~IG~0~-~1-~N~O~R~M"_":A:l~,_><X_W"".l_l~N~D~------------l---l-~~~~~!li~IA~il~i~i"A~l~H~E~D~/~P~E~R~F~D~R~M~E~D'__ll~2~0~0c._:-:_::~1--~IC~A~Ti:_ll~l~)---~-i------::::::
FROM ILS 3 F/O DUTIES (CAT 1!)
================"==~='=~================~·.'o:-_L---.'-
I
' ---- - ----- .
CHECK AIRMA>' SIGNArnRE cHEC~~ E.M~y~~~~-=]"1-E 'J;~~f\,f ;·~·~ ?~~~,
--···
""""'""'
D"E !'p
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER
'~~'__- .
1 A TION
2. DENFN'TK FILE~
3, FLIGHT OFFICER
"["~'"
I IHI
,--:; '/ ; I(,
.,,jA1•1/Jt. I 1 1.1 111•
•• ·,I\ 11 ·.i •\'
ll•llj'./\lld·\• ,,.,
Ai•i·rH.lvi i_j 1ti·1r1"J1 1<.11i !>A 11 ',l/l.Jfl>lll\lll ". 11'1• '11·. \••II
it'J'+::,
0
11. TAKEOFF (NORMAL, X WINO JF PRACTICAL) C:::.
·~---· . --· - - - - - -·- ~7
12. Al1EA DEPARTUf1F. ISEE ITEM 16) 1 OF 2 W
A fAKf"Ol·F
B. CL LAN CONFIGURATION
I I
C LANDlt.jG CONFIGURATION 27, COMMAND
simulator. He requires additional time to bring his performance up to sr1ndard in the following areas:
Flt/Sim Instructor
PART 2
DATE
fo"owin; maneuvers:
f rainino Manaadr
-W-M~E WAIVED
1. ORAL DAT£
INOT J!£O[/IREO·f' n
A. POWERPL,ANT CHECKS
-----··- ·- ·-· ----------------------- "'5
~.!5. TAKE OFF !ENGINE OUT, INSTRUMENTS! 23. LANDING (X-WIND JF APPLICABLE>
5
,. 6. JLS, ENGINE OUT 24, REJECTED TAKEOFF
-'.-:-:.-~-~-SN-~-:-~-NL_~_:_~_VG_A_'~_:_ ~_:_T_,T_sE_._:_u_:_0_,_c_P_L_o_._T_o
5 1 10
___1_c-CJ
___ __~_:_,_:-1-:', -~-~(,;./- t-~-:-~-'~-:-:-T-:_,:_E~0-T_F_O_R _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _:_:__ :-t--t-~~~~~~:~:~T-:-_-:_:_c~~
: __
REMARKS
/,; ~ RC'P«=--rE/) 5,.,....,.,
I I:>
"
r "l L.{)J!O"\...o,S.... E.#-Vr°~-j
IL ..5:
lo i...,•.:,.,~ ... r ALccvNr
f?e..,,_,,/:2_.-r-_e.a To
FLIGHT TIME
DAY NIGHT
OVER-ALL EVALUATION
5" No. 7 below
0 UNSATISFACTORY OtNITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
COMMENTS
5. APPROACH
/) COMMENTS
Descent and Speed Control
Appr"oach Pnxedures
r L. "ht./,{_/ c=-J>
Use of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking "and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL
COMMENTS
ATC Pnxedures
Knowledge of Take-off and landing Limitations
Equipment Knowledge b~JJ:> O'ccK'I//--~Q€6Pttk'c:
SnZJ~ ~ Y-- tU~ /Z,u fe1 ~
Adher"ence to S.O.P.
Use of Navigation Equipment
Public Relations - PA System
Corrimand Abiliry and Cockpit Management
Use of Ch.allenge and Response Lists
7, This completes ID.itia.l Flight Assignment requirements for B. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
type aircraft in accordance with FAR 121.425 ii.s follows;
. TRIP NO,
I I
DATE FROM TO LANDINGS OBSERVED
Fl.T. TIME
OBSERVER
IOOCl TIME
./ I
I II
I I
I I
I I
--- I I
TOTAL
CREW ~EMBE'._R !SIGNAT
\. {'.. ..__--,......_..___
UO 316 REV. 4-68 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUrW TRAINING RECORD
SE£:: REGULATIONS 25·4
ROUTE ·COP/E5:
CHECK MONTH DUE
J. FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE Captains, Second Officers
r;-i Flight Na.,ig~o..rs First Offic,.rs
2. - .FLIGHT OFFICER
NAME
-----~~-§.S:.E~~-R, 19
US, !.';QUI PMEN T --0
,{; D~u~~-:.. ~-'_
DOMICILE'"
B. Recurrent - 6 ;{JO
].
--------------- --· --·--·--·--
2. •· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·-
J .. - - - - - · - - · - - - - - - - -··
4.
Time used for instruction, information on new equipment, Company procedure::>, & operational problems. (List actual time)
Q" A. R.,1ticwini;i training or oponoliona! information conlained in "Cockpit", flight operations numbtH"d
r~ bu!letins, flight information letters, special information green bulletins. (list actual time) I :;;:cJO
[.] '"B. F!ight navigator enn;ivle proficiency ch!!ck debriefing
0 C. Activities not listed above or other required subjects (List :;ubject and lime 5pent below)
I. --- . - · - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - · - - · - - - -
'·------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·
3.
·------H-O_U_R_S~R~E-Q_U_l_R_E_O
_ _ .~-------- - - - ----
CVL, 8737, DC·6·20 HOURS - ---
PILOTS B720, 8727. DC·8·25 HOURS FLIGHTNAVIGATORS-16 HOURS TOTAL HOURS COMPLETED
rh1~ ;s to C:e•t•ft that r have completed the cbove recurrent ground train.mg ()A : I
~\- :L
>..;
'ANNUAL REQUIREMENT
~==-=----·--··"lo.IL{ ./-1 I
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit Noo 2-I
Dear Sir:
1
- 2.
1A
/ ./.-. . '..·
~
DATE: 12-15-72
I was CaWi".1 of Flight 567, December 8, 1972, <;n<l Dave Hunter was
the First Officer.
we t!Xpefience llO turbulence, but We did have engine anti ice and "\Ving
heat on for the approach. We landed without incident.
The first time that we had knowledge of the accident was during boarding
for the return flight. A passenger told one of the stewardesses th1t a
United Air Lines airplane had crashed. She related this information
to us.
. I
/ '
-/.
Isl
H. E. Murphy - .Captain
,.:-·- .( •. ,- . '
1'· ' i . 1·1 .....---··--
\.!\ .... <. '·<... ·:~:-:- .·~ ·'. ,.., ·. .. -
D. c:· Hunte ;-:: ..·~;j 1)___ _
z.,
AIR EXEC
RR # 2, Box 23n
Ft,· Madigan, Iowa 52627
Mr. M. Spei~er;
My etatement a~ reque~ted:
aak
Bil.dpt BUl'el.U No. 31>-UO~,f,,3,
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for 1L9e in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
st&nces, and the probable cause of the subject acddent.
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
of
Fu·s+
wes+ f o
0 f'
/ce.
I F/otuN
~ut-1w")" A-1RC:_~4.JJ1-w~..r
0
f- I f /(1/j!tf l..ef!..1-. r,(e
~isery~J f-o httv~ ,4-bou+ t-/Q. S;fMe__ ,fc.eu,,.,"/,ff-/'o,
.4 s Me 1J J
rt o N ~cti -'
17 h ~Ve. '1-AJ J g o-o
V U Nd Je_ IC/ ,v-g
CT
l0,t5 r-eDvesfer/ f.l-101-- -fo Fur-+{Qj-- rl1<1l..f-,
Flight was unevm tful until just prior to PAPI intersection when approach control issued
vectors for traffic sequencing for landing in ORD on Runway 14L. Shortly thereafter,
our fllght was cleared to descend to 4000' and reduce airspeed to 160 knots to be
vectored l:e.hind a TWA flight. We were then adv_ised that an Air Wisconsin (STOL)
aircraft was being vectored in front of TWA due to an icing probl.em with his aircraft
and a discussion ensued with approach control as to what airspeed he (STOL) could
maintain on approach. He stated 135 knots. TWA and United 737 were requested to
indicate 160 knots until the outer marker. After we passed the 14L outer marker, TWA
was given a missed approach because the STOL was still on the runway. At approxi-
mately 200' and the runway in sight we were given a missed approach because the
STOL was still having difficulty finding a turnoff and was still on the runway. We
were vectored back into sequence and another approach was commenced to a Ianding.
The weather conditions during our descent into the traffic area and during approach was
icing conditions. Icing was encountered at approximately 7000' and continued to build
_quite rapidly to the point where we had approximately 2-1 inches built up on the bottom
screw of the windshield wiper arm at the time of approach over the outer marker. The
approach speed was selected at 135 knots with actual reference of approximately 120
knots, landing weight approximately 90,000# to the best of my memory. Slight buffeting
was felt using 40° (full) flaps and 135 knots, not enough to cause any great concern as
this hos happened to me before; however, on the pull out and during turns the aircraft
nose attitude was sensitive to control, and I remakred to my crew that the aircraft was
tail heavy and that we would use 30a flaps and airsgeed 140 knots for the next approach
and if buffeting was encountered we would go to 25 flaps. No buffeting was-observed
on the second approach using 30° flaps and airspeed 140 knots, except that the autopilot
had larger inputs to control the nose attitude but worked properly once stabilized on the
descent.
On taxi into the gate, the landing flaps were retracted to 25° position for deicing. Up;n
arrival at the.gate, I inspected the leading edge flap, trailing edge flop and rudder on the
entrance side of the aircraft. Ice accumulation on the leading edge flap and underside of
the trailing edge flop was noticeable, but I couldn't discern any accumulation on the fuselage
or rudder until the deicing operation was commenced; and then I observed small chunks of
ice being knocked off the leading edge of the rudder and tail area as the deice fluid was
applied by hos.e from deicer equipment. I did not observe the rest of the deicing operation
because I was satisfied it was being accomplished properly and that the aircraft was, in
fact, clear of ice for our departure to BUF, utilizing the same aircraft. Trip 330 (ORD-
BUF) deported ORD at 1615 Zulu (1115 CST) the same icing conditions were noticed on
departure during the climb out ta enroute clearance to BUF.
It is my considered opinion that moderate icing ~xisted over the Chicago oreo from the
times above mentioned and probably thereafter.
Respectfully submitted,
;,//
'-~~a~=_,,/::_':__(.._______,,
H. R. Trimble, Captain
United Air Lines
HRT :nd
Docket No. SA-435
· r~~xhtbi. i~ No~ 2-H
'l
STALL SPEED
IAS
SPEEDS IN ( ) ,, 130'/& ST,\ LL SPEED
FOR USE IN AN ASYMIVIJ,.;TJUCAL FLAP CONDITION
.... -
GROSSWL
70 75 80 SG 90 95 100
1000 LB.
p.. ----
:s
µ.
25 92 96 99 103 106 109 11~
(119) (123) (127) (13 :<) (I3G) (140) (H•J)
30 87 90 93 96 99 102 10•!
(112) (116) (120) (123) (l 2 7) (131) (J :J ;:;)
40 83 87 90 93 97 100 J03
(108) (112) (116) (120) (123) (12 7) (l :i J)
;
.I
1
.\
..... -· -·
"·'='
REFERENCE SPEED
40 Flaps (V ref)
APPROACH SPEED
Vref (Adjusted) +Wind Corn'clion
I Wind Correction
Add - MAX. 20,K
1/2 Steady Head·.vind Component
plus
Full Gust Value
THRESHOLD SPEED
Vref(adju.stedj +full gust va!L1e (i\Iax. 20K)
NOTE
.Maneuvering, approach and threshold speeds are the
z.
[Af£ROACH D~~CSNT cflECl$__h-_IITJ
·Pflot not flying, check and 11.nnounee "C:u1nple!ed".
Master Caution. Cherck
Reference Speed _ _ _ Sel
!Go-Around EPR _ _ _ set
Altimeters • .. • .. ~ 0 • • • • • Set
JFINAL DESCENT CH/c\,,l~\:.J:0tD
.<PILOT NOT FLYING PlLQ_I_ .!::_1_YING
:t'light & Nav. Instruments ·No Flags
(Cross-checked by pilot not flying)
Landing Gear .D\VN, 3 Green Lts.
Speed Brakes ·ARMED, Green Light
Wing Flaps . -Pas_ _ , Green Light
Pressure & Fluid
----------------·---------------·--
Autopilot • • .
IP ARKJNG,~CH ALLEN GI::)
CAPTAIN
Anti-Skid • • ·.OFF
Parking Brake . . .Set ·
Engine Start Levers • .CUT-OFF
DME'S • . . • • . • -STAND UY
Radar & Transponders . -OFF
Window Heat. . • . . -OFF
Piitot Heat. • . . . • -OFF
Engine & Wing Anti-Ice .OFF
Hydraulic "B" Pumps • .OFF (Wheels Chocked)
Emergency Exit Lights .OFF (Term. Trip Oply)
Fuel Pumps • . . . . -OFF
(Left Tank Pump ON if APU ON)
I Landing Lights : . • • .
Standby Att. Ind. • . • •
· (If inst. , term. trip only} ·
.OFF
.OFF
3.
. {
llMITATIONS
FLAPS
..-------·-. .--· Normal. operation:
1 2 s 10 15 25 30 40
230 23-0 225 210 195 190 J.85 170
Irregular oiieration:
LAUDING GEAR
2'70/.8"2M ~
235 rmcracting
32 0/. 82M exteme,1
I j
'
ANTI-ICE
Eng1nc anli-lc.:e nbould Ix> lurnc,d <lM p1·iot· lo. 11tirl t1Hud
during takaoff and inillal <:ilflli> wll{"n all o/' ll"' /'oli<>w;111:
conditions cxisl:
Visible rnoinhire. ·
Ambient tempcralurc 1G° For less.
Sum of tern per; <1.irc and dcwpolnt
78°F or less.
WINDOW HEAT
Window heat must be ON for all no1·r11:d f'll:{lit opvr: 'ill:.:;
and must be turned on 10 minuLt:i; p1·iu1· to takeoff.
MISCELLANEOUS
SPEEDS
-
CONDITION IAS .MACH
Climb, .cru:.:e, and Descent Schedule
320 . 73
I (FL230 transition)
Best Climb Angle
-200 ----~
11 MIS~[U APP.
ONt Y)
I 11 1
The u,ndersigned certifies that the above-named airman [~·l has 1 "]has not completed the following troining_course.
His knowledge of this equipment and ability to handle it is such that he is considPred qualified for as51gnmcr
as-------------------------c---------------· ---------------------·
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Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 2-D
3. FLIGHT OFFICER
~N (CIRCLE ONE)
~ i.J. o. coble
EVAC. TRNG, COMPL, INSTR, SIG, DATE
========~------+=~/,~~/-+===-~=~c~
PAAl 121 APPnovc:o INSTRUCTOR DATE £lRIEF TIME
~~~~~==~~=/~/=o-J'"""nLCHfl'K
ITnNc llME jADF l"s IBK CRS IVOR R/\DARAPP. ~. · · ,
/ [_-:JnATING
AIRCfiAFT TYPE &cN~U~M~e=rn=--------,.,~"L-,A"C~E~--"-~--+=e~Loc""'K""n~M"E~-~IFF~1u"o~H"r~r1·"M"'E~- · :..:1MU~TOR NUMB EH I SIMULA TOH rtME c=J:H'ECIAL (SE
1
ORAL IGRAD-E !TIME DATE 1 - INCOMPLETE (oittER'TI'.
(NOT AEO P!TJ S' f Q ; J- r /· ' _.,. ·SATISFACTORY PROFICIENCY)
: O (~ 1-! /
S • t;jMUU..TOR
J .2_ 1 • UNSATISFACTORY W. WAIVED IE.XCFPT l'fTJ
1. PREFLIGHT
If f/E REQUIRED. VISl!AL
w t/;fyf $ ~~~JD~~~~6 (CONT'D)
--------------------t--+c±'b-::c-l-··---~-----------------1--jJ---+-
2. TAXIING :;/,'.;? :3 •zERO FLAP {RATING ONLY)
- -·-
s
~·-i--
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - + - - f - - 1 - - - - - - · · · · ---·-·-·--····-----···------ -· -·-
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OR 2 W 5 16. NORMAL/ ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
- - - - - - ----·--------------+-+--+--!---·- -·· ·--·- ·--.. -·-----------·---·-··
_s._H_o_Lo_1_NG_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ w 1----+-1--s-+-_LA'-'P'-"U.. ..£:V¢:-f?.J(.,1~· 14,£ I=_ - - - - - - - -
.. ·
_1_,,_,_s,_A_P_P__R_o_A_c_H__•_N_o_R_,_,_,,_,A_IP_O,_R_M_A_N_u_A_L_J_______-+---+-~-+---+---~-·~~~___i?.£J..__Q~"'-t~_,,,_________---j_ _ I
::::::::::::::::::FR:O::M:l:Ls:::::::::::::::::::::::::::i:::.:.··::::::2:1.:F:/:o:o:u::Tl:E:s:::::::::::::-======(C=,A=T~···=;'=I=_=_=_*-·
REMARKS
t .-
-
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER TRANSPORTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER
DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TR1f', ETC.
·- -·-·
·---· -
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
DATE FLIGHTOFF!G.E~ATURE /;1 _,. ., ,/
~~-~
f\ LjS-'f !r'f__ 6 J · L..dY''-'-- 1
):J:. CU,
·--+-D~A~T.oE-~--+-R"'E"'v""1~~~y~iFLIGHT OP,;_,npTl~NS. sioNi\iV'iiE-
( .-{ ~/ / l, , (_A:. t~~.-:r.I '<" 7• t"-
--~======== ===~==1==1=="°=='=°"'=-"·'==------~==~=~ =-~
....
..
UNITED AIFi LllUES
ADDITIONAL TIME
t) .
Training Alsignment 1 '' I,· ~ \, ~' 1•• Type Equipment __ : · "i '. ...!
PART I c_ h« k
Was given I' 1 c:, hoursofr_ _ _ _ __,;:~~"-·~-."~·c___ _~-----------''..o·~:wil~~.
(Sirn, Pfane, or Ore! Rev!ew, etc.)
He requires additional time to bring his performance up to standard in the following areas,
' . ,· \ (
-\ .
\
(.
' ·-
. .
'~- .,.~.-\.. '-\
11111! uc1Br
4
F" /"I
PART II
DATE t,p .:.;_,./;, L,..
following maneuvers'
4' ~~-
The above maneuvers were completed satisfactorily.~.-"hu_.:,,:;-
, <:IL;;;·'\?d':.?e:t:::;L-----
nstrucior
/)"\ 11 ...
·. \ .' J l-... ( i' '.' .
\ \-."
~
J.-A.Jy_,g
-- .\::_v '~.
---
'.J ' · Training Manager
DENTK
·.•"
- -- ·-
Form U-9 ...:::I'.
PILOT PROFICIENCY ____.~'\·--//3J \
ROl.f,i:.To: SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION OF AIRCRAFT i.i!M'fCJii:L ( ~ ·
1. ~ME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME ~ •• \ ..--- CLAS:\NUMBER AND START DATE
2. OENFN!TK FILE
3.. FUGHT OFF!C~~
\ .\.. . . . . . . ~--_..\ \/'\//,_
\"-r- --
AC. lliNG: COMPL INSTfl. SIG. Oo'\TE ORALRECOMMt:.NDATlON~STR.' IG. "9'\~ J._...:.-- 1 DATE r--1
, I I \ ~~ . l ; I ~.:SJ ['IC L _ rt
°'°'"'"°"°"""~""rn;;;;o;;;,0::;;;;'7--:,,....r----tn.*'-~--+-,,,""'°"""~"rn."'c;>;;""-'";;)-''T;co--.===="°'~T;;=fcc=;-Jt'_·'
V/
PAfn1217rOVEDINSTAUffiTO / / DATE BRIEFTlME 12RNG.TIMl: Al.JI- lru.sC" C-'
DKCnss~.oR .. rn.:cHu..:K
MUAHAPP. l----.1
__- /. / /, /• ;_.«._,..,_, / '.7 ~.., <' C-" C- r--inAflNO r (
, _ ~ _... _... J.- ·/_c? //·..J l_-.,~1 Z>V / I / / /:_) C.:'j. -· J ( .....;;. .> ...> .:> - -....., l__J
AFT TYPE
7 7
&
7
NUMBER" /"
L ,
. r/J,
I
BLOCK TIME FUGHTTIME SIMUt/\TOO NUMBER I SIMULATOO TIME r--1
L___J Sf'r'CIAL (SEE
- /':? . / <-'<' "> ./, . ~-hJe"r" 1::r1 I; Ir I /: 15 m.MARKS)
ORAL
{NOTREOP/T)
IGRjg IT!ME DATE
c;.;/ '°/? )..
CHEC~ ___A,N
Al'lf1
l~-
~IG, NATURE
--...
I GRADING LEGEND:
S-SATISFACTORY
I - INCOMPLETE (OTHER l HI
PROFICIENCY)
------~---~-----~~--'~--~--1--~-~-~-~---------~U~·~U~N~SATISFACTORY W - WAIVED {EXgQ>T_~~
~: ~l~~IB•E~AIVED e9': e:~~1~ULATOR A VS s • MAY BE REQUIRED IN NC A VS S
IF FIE rtEOU!Ral - VISUl<l. w s ,. LANDINGS: {CONTD)
1. PREFLIGHT
•.·
I'
..
"*REJECTED
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS
~------~-~~--~-------+~-t--~r----~r-~-~~-~---~~~-----------+---+----
s ~ 50% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C ')
--- -
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
07
c H~E~C~~7~7r~RMCCCA7N~l~S~IM~)~S~lG=N~A~T~U~R~E---------------,D~A7T~E;o-----r.;FL~l~G~H~T~:_~~~F~IC~~~~~;-~S~l:~N~A~~~U~R"E~(--_--(.-~~-
0
--~---.-~~~~-------------~--
-
.. _,_'}; ~- ·- -~-z.c:. (,
ll l[J_ ,DiJ
PL~i;J r~""'
l!RCRAF"T lYPE NUMBER 0LQCK
IM{··
12237- I
NOT flEQ P/T)
GRADE
1"'£ DATE rCHECK AIRMAN SIGNATURE
LAND1TiGs: fcONT'o)-·-·
I. PREFLIGHT " F/( Ri';QU!R([J.VJSUAL
w <;' •-~~-~~r~o
2, TAXIING •ZERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
---·----·- - -----
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS ~ 5 0% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C
5 6% P<JNER- CAPT. - ·4ENG:A7c··--- ··
~- TAkEOFF: NORMAL, X-WINO
-.s __!:Q_Ul~EO _!~ ?l~LA.TOR, _2R _±IC A1:.~l:!.:._ _____
R
• ENG. OUT, INST.
lS ENGHE OUT (F/O ANO 4 ENG. CAPT_.)
--- __
s
REJECTED w
.s FROM
-·-~f4~G:-A/c:-RATING"QNL_y_J
;_ H()U)ING
------ -- --·-·
. w
~-
}- M.1Nof> +.!>aaef/JJTo__ f(!_:~--
7. ILS APPROACH;
--
NORMAL (A/P OR MANUAL)
- -·------- -··----- -- l.J L.J> /j i . . FfJJ~uf<,F.-s_ ___ _
ENG. OUT (MANUAL}
-------··---- - · -·------- ~-
5 ... S i'.VI SlU. [fi/L_t!,_R..E;_;s __ _
I
3. NON PREC. APP. AOF, VOR, BK CRS, RADAR
\ -·--e._f.J;V/j'-'-!_A'(.SJ)'J!J/.L ~2f"!;___ ..
-C::iPTAIN ONLY
{ 4 E'..NC[IH:: >./C • llATINC·~z~·
3. C!RCLING APP. 17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
---·- - · - - - - - - - - - - - ·---------
:0:: & 3 E'..NCllH: • lll<TINC !ti PC
-···· -·---- -- ··---- --- ------------·--,-- ----
I 0. MISSED APP.
----
TO FACILITY FROM !LS
-
lS £L~c.-r:_2·/l]ok..t;-. or_ t;r'§J _____ _
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY)
--------· f1Li{?t.9__j)_fZf}Resi __ _
11, SITEP TURNS {~Y)
-·
w IS ,,(_~ed7L._1Zf:._5_c_~~-r-----1-+--+
F, ;7;_.
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS [15° BANK] 2 OF 3 w
~- __ Ll_j,:._;;:1..c__i:;_;,
________ _
!3. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
----
w
~-
't!_ 18. co MMAND - JUDGMENT
SCHE O ULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
CHECK Al DATE
D>.TE
ORIGINAL-EMPLOYEE'S FILE
FLIGHT CREW ENROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
DU~LICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
SEE REGULATIONS 25-4
. ~ No, / t~low
(_]INITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
1. 1i1.1ciITt•ltHPARA1'1()N COMMENT.S- ·-····· . -
llniform and Equipment
Flight PI.anning
Cockpit Pn.•p:1.ncion
-l-.-P-R-E"rAK£--:-QFF -------··------ - - COMMENTS
InspKtion and Cockpit Setup
Engine Starting and Tax:i
Engine Runup
COMMENTS.
5.o~
3. TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB
Ta,ke-offTechnique ,4-1f/ut? Co<>i> 7~ 67<--;('<- . .::~
Observation of VI, VR, V2 :':,ft1oo7 rl 0 ;..) ~-D µ -r !('oL. 5
Gear and Flap Management
Speed and Aldtude Control
Traffic and Anti-nol~ Procedures
4. ENROUTE COMMENTS
Cruise Contt0l
Tnffic Alertness
Communications
Use of Radar
---·-----------~COMM EN-rs-----·--·---- - --
5. APPRC>ACli
Descent and Speed Control :s. 0 f7 C ,, "., !) S/'',;-,c::b C!.,::. ,<-<)A?'·' L
Approach Procedures f1fl oc JJ... s to i/L @. & w K'
l!se of Auto Pilot 1nd Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of lake-off a.nd Llnding Llmitarion!I
Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Use of Navigation Equipment
Public Relations· PA System
Command Abilicy and Cockpit Management
Use of Challenge and Response Lists
7. This completes Initial Flight Assignment requirements for 8, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
cype aircrafr in accordance with FAR 12 l.42 '5 as follows:
/~}./Cl-//
TRIP N_o_.f----DA_T_E_ _,f-'-"-o_"__.cf--·T_o_-+_L_A_N_D,_._G_'+~~~~~~:-'-~'eo'J"'~-·-+-''°~o~~'c~~'c.•~~~~~-1
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
/ I
I /
TOTAL
"ouTe COPIES:
1. - FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE
2. - FLIGHT OFFICER
'110 GOBLE
Completed pr!or to Proficiency Training (PT}. Time Included for home study of Fllght Manuats - 3:30 3E
* 3. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL EXAMINATION
Tfme Included for home study of Manual and revisions - 3:30
5. AUDIO VISU#,L PRESENTATIONS (For times !~valved see current A/V presentatlon list In Regulatlons 25·"4.)
NOTE: Approach end Landing A/V presentation required annually.
AN TITLE
;:;s-
; is-
::.,o '/
I>
,,.f'w.. J .)
~~~·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~·-~~~·~~~~~~~~--!~~~.
7. RECURRENT OVERWATER DITCHING TRAINING (Required annually by aU overwater qualified flight officers) 5:00
------------------~----------·--------------+--------
* REQUIRED ANNUALLY .
TOTAL HUlJRS REQUIRED ANNUALLY- PilotsL 25:00 Flight Navlgators-16:00·
This is to certify that I have comptoted the above recurrent ground training
during the 12 month period ending with the above dale.
=~~U=R_'_,t[J.<::__~~---_-_-:_-_-_-~~----_-_-_-_-_-:=-~-=-=T~--no~~:T~E~~~~y-_-->,;,--
NOTE: Jn accordance with FAA 121,401 (b) training may be- completed one month~efore or one month after duo month.
ROUT!:. 10:
I, HOME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING C0uR5E° N1\M€-------- ER ANO START DAT_E_ _
2. QENFN/TK FILE ..----1-_
3. FLIGHT
CAPT Al CIRCl.£ ONC) FILE NUMBER OB ERVER-A/C
<IlJ[:Y.
S/O t'f' $-?--'I
EVAC. CATE ORAL RECOMMENDATION INSTR. S
_a.~N~O=N~PRE~C~.~·-PP_._AD~'·_v_o_R·-~_c
, ... PT ... IH OHL'( {
_<::::_"-+..&-# ~ __K ~C:.cC~ --------
_ _o_AA_______--t--+·-t'~
'4 f:HGIHC A/C. R,._TIHG OHl.Y
9. CIRCL1/'G APP. 2 6' 3 EHGWC - R ... TIHG .. f>C
17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
-- ------~~--- - ·-- - . ·-----r--1----t--:i-··- ... -- --· - --·. ---··-··· -· -- - ------.--------
~~~- ~~:_s_Eo_•__P_P__•___________T_o_FA~~L~: ~Ro~:s_ _ _ ~ . s -- ~D_,_ .6
/& rif.
·-- ---+--+-~6z,C_f!?p,,£c_,_. ---·
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY)
14. POWERPLANT F Al LURE :;~ 1 ~~~ ~~MA/C ··t--f.s"-c:J--,-9-.-,-N-,-T-IA-L C~RTl~:l-~·;T~~~-·· ~i:~~u~·tON A~;~~c;t)LE ___ ... t".
-- -
1_s_._LA_N_o_1_NG_s_,__"_o_R_M_A_L_,_x_w_1N_o_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FROM ILS
-J---t---l_s"-:o~-20-._MA_1N_T_A_1_N_ED~-~~FoRM=.__i200 --~) =(lcc--A~TT_--!.r-rrll
~ 21. F/O DUTIES
- F· -
===-=-====r-===-~~~~=== "-=~~~-. - o- • •
REMARKS
. -
TRANS PO RTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER
- ·- r---·-
3~~AoHEAO, OMC,.-W°"KO~~~:ETC.
DATE TRIP OEAOHEAC 0 OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. CATE TRIP
-·---
CATE
I
- - FLIGHT
_
"OFF:CE~S/G·~~-· - / ) -·-z~A' ~-
·\.J t_~t.<.,,.. l ........ ~. v·c._·--~-- _
---- .
·-- REVIEWED BY" MGR. OFJ:lGHT OPERATIO~S-SIGf<ATURE • ·--- ·-
7
...
'•, PILOT PROFICIEl'h..·•
'•· '•ltf I '·:. ''
), I fl ' I I '< / •• / 1" ~7 ,•
·1. r 1 •·.•••
! qi\'' ...... ,
I
\
,/ . '-·" " . ! I 'I 111-1 !;
. dll :
-'j·oo I /
.....'
3. TAXIING +
-- ·--·--·--·- ---- ----·----
4. POW£RPL,t,.N f CH~ CK!.
-- - ·--·· -- -· .. ------- ' fiLJl'CfFD
5 TAKt.orr: NORM Al Y WIND
!"
• /l'RO ft.Id' lf<AJ !Nt• ONLY)
f'MG O!I r. J,_.Sl.
I OF 2: W
& AREA OE:PAR1UR£/ARRIVAI.
7, HOLDING_
w /r'1' ~ ;;;;f///v S
_Y-'?.2 £-
8. IL~> APPROACH;
......_,_ . . .. . --
~ORMAL (A 1 P _t)H MAHllAl)
. --·-
//y,p£dv4C:. Hf_uL).£.L:L'Yj
/7di~-. -6eL '-· _/Vc:i '- / -1 '-'
- 18. f-Mf:Rc;f_NCY PRo,:rDlJ!H·_•,
9, NON Pl-it.I APP. AlJt. VOFI; Ill'. CtlS. RADAR
(. ~f'I
E../\!{,.-"j'/·!~ /:;(t c="
0
t: J.,c @z;r/.<wL .
!!.
..,
r.Hf<;K Al.fjMAtt 1.• 1"4.. l ',H.t-i/\ lld•! 1llL ~II"//' 1• l!\ I""''· '•
; I ,I
l 1 ·t·.
I I •I : " ',, •. , f. I ..-t
11 •·.111
r;;:P·, •..11'.:..r n :<tf IU ll•i>.LNIN(,
'·CM [-:·"IL
·~uiurc.1 ro Vt-111! 1CA1 IU/'.. HY l-. 11.•rl r (J~ l' li.t "' ) . 1.0
.... ,.,,,, ,. "
')r.'lblnl"l>--i:.."'r..._...,.., ........ _. · - -
)UPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
DATE
.__c~!_/.-------1~/2-:::!./. t_/7;
FLIGHT NUMBER
NIGHT
DAY
Se., No, 7 below
OVER-ALL EVALUATION
IJ"COMMENTS
INITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
-'-~---~~~~~~---------'-~ur""-~S~A~T~ISe:FACTORY r.:::lYJ:l~AT_l?[ACTQ~~ . ···----
t. FLll;!iT PREPARATION
Uniform and Equipment ,:_:;op
Flight Planning
__ c?':.:~pit Prepantion ·------- - ------·-----coMME"fil--
2. PRETAKE-OFF
Inspection and Cockpit Setup
Engine Starting a.nd Taxi
- - - - - - · - - - · · ---~c=o~M~M~=E-NT=s~-
En_ginc Runup
3. TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB
Take-0tfTechniquc
Observation of Vl, VR. V2
Gear and Flap Management
Speed and Alcitude Control
~ffic and Anti-noise Proc_::ed:="c:."::...''----------- ------- COMMENTS
4. ENROUTE
Cruise Control
Traffic Alertness
Communicatioru
-------------c=o=M-M=E-N=T=s_ _ _ _ _ --·· - · - - -
Use of Ra.dar
5. APPROACH
Descent and Speed Control
Approach Procedures
Use of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Br.a.king and Engine Shutdown
------------------·
COMMENTS
----·---
6. GENERAL
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of Take-off and Llnding Limitations
Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Use of Navigation Equipment
Public ~elations - PA System
Command Ability and COckpit Management
Use of Challenge and Response Lists B. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIOl'.'5
7. This complet~ Inidal Flight Assignment ceq~irements for
type airer~ in accordance wirh FAR 121.425 as follows:
OBSERVED OBSERVER
C/J4i ?,:.[=bU "UtP
.LANDINGS •OOCI TIME
DATE FROM TO FLT. TIME
TRIP NO.
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
TOTAL
.. "
' ~· .::._ ;:- '. .
.'
•• •,•;.
:;: "·RECtlRRENT GROUND TRAINING . . ' ... ~
. ·~ ~
;1 · ;:·.
. ,,.·;
·, .. ;.
... ;.l:·:.. ·" ~' :"';; .
.,_.: . ::·· " ~ :1 •
:'r··
.· ·. . . . ."
• J
-~
... ·:...
~· ·,
·,;. ·.•
~".
ICLA~~--~=L R
0
I ~/'. !
I
• ..b';._;·~~IN ... ··.-···-=-·-~,..-,:-:-.-.-:; -: I
/_),. . 11
-~; _, ~~- / ({" ,_·' . I ,;.. //~.~_-tj__ L l RATING
c L..i ___ _
- - --- -~i -o;.n __])(_t}_
SIMULATOli'"NUMBER SIMULATOR TIME I-INCOMPLETE iOTHER 1
PROFICIENCY•
W.WAIVEO
TTi"ME- ·-- B"Rl!i:FING
f_:S-;f.IL) 2. (.I·)
2. PRE-FL.IGHT
;_ ;A~;-~G-
----·--··-
- - . . •.
_ ··--· - - ·
-· . - -· • ·-··
·--· • • - - -
VISUAL- W
I~ STEEP TURNS
c~.~c:~ .Aji:"-.W/1,GNATu~"E - -· .F"JLE NU1-MBE-R TlFLIGHT ~F~l~GNAjt,JRE - • ' lR[\. .IEW~O flY ~ic.11" or l LIGllf
0
lJf<(u1,r1nN!. •Sir,NAl1<fH
1'
}_
/, i I . p·~,;/~~-5~fER -~ f~:..\:'-k! - '
PLAC~- -1' --
FL!Gllf T!ME:
t' . -- -- .
TIME
TYPE: OF Pl.AN£
• rLOC-<
GRA.Oit..iG LEGl'.'.ND 1 INCOMPLE'l'I:. •OH~f Hf~
au,1ULATO~ NUMBER SIMUL.ATOR TIME
S·SATJSFAt.!TORY 1-'RUf'H':IENCY •
·--- . ---· - -· -
PART 1,;1 .AP.rROV.l:D INSTR!jCTOR
·,.,.-:_..·,-·r Jr ,-/ ..·--1, ,_,.,. . ,_:,' I ·,_:;1 ~ /
DATE
,/. /.;3 /·"z'/
ADF
- - ·1 "" .'.'"s
;
\'07 .. -"'
IPA~
-~·
l!
l'IME
.} ..,,-,
!fJRIE"rlNG
I .. .,..,
. ) ,.>' ' I
W-"'1AY BE WAIVED
-;_ o'RAL__ _
A/C SIM
19. OTHER lNSTRUMENl' APPROACHES
(AOF) 4VOR> (PARl lBK CRSJ
1· elsL
I
·-·-·-·-·--·······-·-
11:'.~_r rn:~~!.~:£:
13 STEEP TURNS
A. TAKEOFF
1'.
!.: !'/j,t
,/ - .
I').',-•.-._ •'L•
B CLEAN CONFIGUR ... TION
C LANDING CONFIGURATION s
'r
w 28. JUDGMENT
I!> SPECIFIC Fl.IGHT CHARACTERISTICS nF APPLICABLE!
:······
lt> ARE"'\ ARRIVAL 1SEE ITEM 12l
1OF2 W ..!.; INITIAL CERT 200 'h I OT II
CAT !I!,,_ ..
.S F/0 DUTIES FOR 200
'"1
JI;! LAN;'JING
REMARKS
.... "/' .... .,_. TRA.N:- 0 oRTP..TION FROM TRAININt• <'..lil~l tcH
DISPATCH DOCUMENTS
.•. ...
·-- _
~.;...
..
/A
1
UN . . . !
~ .•'
::"•• ,
t , ~ C }'LT. DECK
' : 1-------------
3 ~ W• -CABIN (F ) 1MI8
·------
IN PIT6
c
..
~.:
..
1--
13
.""'-
CENJER T ANt(
~-
P,lYJ r'\ .... D FUF.L-
DO NOT BURN ·• vv
,. {elTEfl !I"
FfCiQulAEO)
IJTqUCTUAAL CHECK
/
.
. 'di
FUEL - CLEARED
l\b lo]oiif6ii
1•
MUST NOT EXCEED
TAKE-OFF GROSS WEIGHT
LINES 12 OR 1• + 1.5 + 16 ~ A(,..-l&f/ lf]a
RVZ
l"I"... _
~ Pe.ce<T~~ - IA~J \ I~~ cX~I
I I "rrw.
.,. ..
21 I Bl.OCK 9EAT RONS
. THAU I CONFIRMED
BY RADIO
TIME
1'1.J\ G-""'
UlADl!ilJ LA.W.
Mr. W. Lamb
National Transportation Safety Board
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C. 20591
Sincerely,
ice President
Flight Safety and
Industry Affairs
?,,
Location: Elk Grove Township, Dlinois, on Route 62, one-halfmile west of Route 83
U i<O ' " ~·11 '"""~••US~.
• ,,-, '·v ,., .... l.."•t..:>
.,,.i!D 1ntGHT l!ANIFl!ST • RADIO I'
. fATION ~.:~:::::~~!)ER
"
KI. 1'WC.IOl.Anate. ~
r"'"•.111;,1;.
' . , -E - 11 l:i \
PLANNED ACTUAL
-:.
---·
tCVf-IRE"C~ l/~li v I~ c II.- J. c {., ..., -
'!"·.. - ) , ... v
. ~'t.T0 O!C'{
" /
C-·10(,J
;
l.C.... N(F
,,....,. )(R ) ,.....f- v~
~I 9"
-- -
:..
~
l
" (.
.
) SV..Tlil ( ) PACO
()
.... - ''S I Ci
v •
{ i; -, !.
.,~; "'-
CA.BIN CA<!C.0
Af:TENTfON '- • ~
- _V
,~
. \!'ii 11. lo
I ~
- i. IY.
~
r-wo.c ~ . , C)
1
.... !
... I
MUST NOT EXCEED
--1 /l.....::
I fj~I ilifO_j:J
.. J. .
T
· oo -
CONFTRMED
BYAADIO
1
1o ,,,..··
~ . ./
. \
•"\" ..............
I\
' ~--
SIGNED~~-VIJ""-·_:_·~-·~·~·-·~()~~~-~~·~-'--;·-
'{
National Tra~sportation
Safety Board
..
··- -;.·.
·--~
:f: . ,,;
~~::- '.'
···
!~7
I
'
...
'.
"M!'c~·
~
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fM_. . .... .: ~ •.00:-.~.;. ·-:_ '
··~ -.~,:..~--...; ....
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'
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... ,_ ·:~:";I 3.'
. •'· ,. '
.;•_:.iii:
,
H
;.
!ADDO DCADD
nIADDDUA 12081706 2099 ·.. ·.
;r-.. ;~ ,·
553-08 9131 FJBG IAD4 ORDl I AD4 FPF . l. ·-: :·
5641~M 96111000 861/ 9il0 CLB 04-021 741 2 20 TTl.. . : .' <:[, .,, :
'·:.:J:·<.}" '<'
437 26110-096 341 17 30 190 .
RCA . 90 28 73 03 ,: ,; · :·.·,~.;: ~ .': .·
..·~. :
·.'
'.t
POD 401 2fl 73 02 436 25123-099 3 '3 7 71
23063-030
•
17
63
7 ·, .
.
• +·
.,. '
t•
• .~.
I .
I '
·.!. ··,
.. i _:~
. '
·.·.
' .
.1 .
1.
• •1
-l~D'I/ 73 :.•.L'.1
.i ~ .· i ~:·
., 100 M73 •
1 , ,
1
t
'.,' 961 01:49 •.• '·· ."1\ •• f, •
35 r I I ,
. ·. ); . _.,'.·.-.c•.
• :
RLS PER ABV FPF IFR IADDD HENRIKSEN !CW ORDDD •' ! ,·.
.I )'-..I I
'
d ·--e· "' ..
February 8, 1973
6-2810-2983-I/C
Mr • .NB.rty Spieser
National Transportation Safety Board
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Federal Office Building lOA, 8th Floor
8oo Independence Avenue Southwest
Washington, D. c. 20591
Dear .Marty:
Perhaps the enclosed will answer yOJ.r question a.bout the pilot's
forward and down visibility angle.
Fourteen degrees down ia the limit with the eye level close to the
reference eye :position. Model 7Cf1, 727 and 737 airplanes are all
the same in regard to visibility from the cockpit.
~
Enclosure
VISIBILITY AND EYE POSITION RELATIONSHIP
\
·~ ' Docket No. SA-435
EY.hibit No. 2-J
·1
JEPPESEN CHARTS
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764' 756'
82.5'
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~~~
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APT.619 1 0 0.6 .3
PULL UP: Climbing LEFT turn to 2600 feet and proceed to EON VOR via
inbound R-001.
S RAIGHT ·JN LANDING RWY 31 t C!RCtE-T0°LAND
LOC NOB
MOA 1040' 429') MDA J] 20 1 509'
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PULL UP: Climbing RIGHT turn to 2600 feet and proceed direct to EON VOR
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4919'
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27 M!Rl 4306' 4306' 175'
13R0 HIRL HfALS SFL RVR 6055' 6055' 5204'
3Jl H!Rl REil VASl-l an le 3°24' 6141' 6141' 150'
13 l
MlRL 4718' 4569'
31R 5163' 4948' 150'
BY
w. B. Weston
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C.
February l, l973
SYSTEMS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
A. ACCIDENT
B. SYSTEMS GROUP
c. SUMMARY
6. The left wing anti-ice valve was closed. 'fhe right wing anti-ice
valve was destroyed.
- 2 -
7. The "A" system hydraulic pump switches were in the "off" position.
10. Electrical power was available up to the time of crash, based upon
recordings of ill(pact on the voice recorder tape.
Cockpit
The cockpit was disrupted at impact leaving only the captain's instrument
panel intact, but burned. The pedestal was torn out and was recovered some
distance from the cavtain's station. The first Officer's station including
his instrument panel was missing. The center instrument panel was recovered
separately from beneath a large area of wreckage. The instruments normally
installed in the center instrument panel gave evidence of having been affected
by the ensuing ground fire. Several other instruments identified as first
o:f:ficer's were recovered from ashen rubble. These instruments were recognizable
by shape only.
Cockpit Instrumentation
The captain's A.S.I. was recovered and taken to the United Airlines
Maintenance Base for a complete investigation. The instrument was tested
and was found to be operational and normal in all modes except "go around."
Further examination disclosed that the command bars would not function because
of fire damage to components related to their movement.
The captain's airspeed indicator was recovered from the panel intact and
taken to the United Airlines Maintenance Base for examination. The unit met
the specifications for normal operation.
The captain's H .S .I. case was sooted. The course selected was 3l 7~
The compass card indicated a heading of 35l~ All flags were displayed .
The captain's R.M.I. needles were freely rotational. The compass card
0
indicated 34l • The mode selector was set at "A.D.F."
Some of the first officer's instruments were found but were damaged to
the extent that they could not be positively identified.
Engine Instruments
All engine instruments were superfically burned. The number one engine
pressure ratio instrument S/N 0767 indicated l.66 w:ith l.97 showing in the
window.
The number two engine EPR instrwnent S/N D544 indicated l.90 with a
reading of l-95 in the window.
The number one exhaust gas temperature S/N Al4ll gauge pointer was missing.
The number two exhaust gas temperature gauge was damaged to the extent that
no reading could be·observed.
The number one fuel gauge s/N D0286 indicated 5300 pounds per hour.
The number two fuel flow gauge S/N UAL MR 73363-253 indicated 200 pounds
per hour.
The number one fuel g_uanti ty gauge S/N l223C indicated 5700 lb. The
nllinber two fuel quantity S/N l444 instrument indicated 5700 lbs. The center
tank instrument S/N 762c indicated 6000 lbs.
- 4 -
Auto Flig!lt Panel
The captain's flight director panel mode selector switch was in "VOR/LOC
11
position.
The first officer's flight director panel mode selector switch was "off."
The auto pilot switches were "off." The hydraulic system mode selector switch
11
was in B 11 position.
Pedestal
The pedestal was found in the main wreckage area torn entirely away from
the cockpit area. The flap handle was freely movable between the 30 unit
position and full down position. The speed brake handle was stowed. The
number one power lever was in mid range (cruise). The number two power lever
was in "idle detent." The number two start lever was in an intermediate pos-
ition. The stabilizer trim wheel was positioned at 6-1/2 units aircraft
nose up.
Transponder Panel
The mode selector was fl'.W:l.tched to "A". The power switch was in "standby."
ADF Panel
The antenna selector switch was in the "ATIF position. The tuning band
selector was in the low range position.
Overhead Panel
The main overhead panel was incomplete because of impact damage. The
sub panels remaining are herein documented.
- 5 -
Fuel Panel
The fuel panel cros.s feed valve selector was in the "closed" position.
llie center tank fuel pump switches were 11 off." llie main fuel tank fuel
punrp swi•tch es were II on. II
Hydraulic Panel
Both engine anti-ice switches were "on." Pitot heat switches were "on."
Window heat switch positions were determined electrically to be on. Filaments
in bulbs were stretched indicating window heat was on. Filii.ments in bulbs
associated with overheat were normal.
Pressurization Panel
llie panel was deformed. llie No. l bleed swi.tch was "closed." llie No. 2
bleed switch was "on." The APU bleed switch position could not be determined.
Both left and right pack switches were "off." llie isolation valve switch was
in the 11 norinal 11 position ..
Electrical Panel
llie gauges in this panel were unreadable. llie gauge selector switch was
11
in 11 standby... llie battery switch was "on" and guarded. llie galley power
switch was on. llie standby power switch was in "auto."
llie constant speed drive switches were "on" and guarded. llie bus transfer
switch was in "auto" and guarded. llie amp meters indicated "zero." The ground
power switch was "off." The APU generator switches were "off."
The emergency exit light switch was in the "armed" position. This
panel was mostly destroyed by fire and impact.
Landing Lights
The left and right outboard landing light switches were in the center
position. The left and right inboard landing lights were in the down position.
The taxi light switch was in the "off" position.
Pneumatics
The left wing anti..;lj_ce valve was in the "closed" position. The right
wing anti-ice valve was destroyed. Both air conditioning pack valves were
in thenclosed 11 position.
Engine anti-ice and bleed valve positions may be found in the Powerplants
Group Chairman's Factual Report.
Landing Gear
The left main landing gear was found almost full up but not completely
within the up lock.
The nose gear was separated from the aircraft. The right main gear was
separated from the aircraft.
The main stabilizer trim actuator S/N 048-29AA was tested at the United
Airlines Maintenance Base and was found to be normal in all respects.
The auto pilot s/N 22121-28 stabilizer trim actuator motor was also tested
and found to be normal and within test specifications.
The horizontal jackscrew extension was measured at 14 1/2 " The associated
cables drum was intact.
Spoilers
Ground Spoilers
Each outboard ground spoiler panel has one actuator. Only the lef't
actuator, S/N 100 was recovered. The actuator was in the electrically
locked panel retracted posit~on.
S/N 3!34618, S/N 3!34634, S/N 362 and MR 27695-5 (UAL No.) were recovered
f'rom the wreckage. All were retracted, which is the f'light spoiler "stowed"
position. X-rays and shop examination supported the findings of' "stowed"
position.
Slat Actuators
S/N 578, S/N 278 and S/N 134 were recovered f'rom the wreckage in the
extended position equal to slat· "extended."
The landing f'lap jackscrews were extended to within 5 threads of' the
mechanical stop.
The case of both ADC units were sooted and slightly bent at the front.
A complete report on fue above tests may be found in the attached Kollsman
report.
Altimeters
The first officer's altimeter was gutted by fire. The pneumatic capsule
portion was missing. The electronics making up the servo mode of opeation
were burned. The glass was missing and the l0,000 foot pointer was ungeared
and free to take up any position. The ,hundred and thousand foot pointer were
geared together but their relationship geometrically was such that no meaningful
reading could be obtained from the burned face, even though the hands remained
on their respective shafts. A complete report on both altimeters may be found
in the attached Kollsman report.
- 9 -
Hydraulics
The right elevator boost package was subjected to a thorough shop test
at the United Airlines I.nc. Maintenance Base '!-t San Francisco. All findings
were entirely-normal with completely normal l:lJ?8ration.
The left unit was tested similarly and found to be without defect.
This pump was examined by the Systems Group of the United Airlines Inc .
Maintenance Base. The pump was capable of normal operation, with the exception
of a broken solonoid.
This pump was similarly examined and was found to have debris in the
inlet. Further te!lr down disclosed a broken connector to the solonid unit.
Although the pump was not rotational because of the debris, there was no
damage to the pump internally. · All internal parts looked '.normal open dis-
assembly. There was evidence of heat absorption through the pump case.
The motor was rotational but damaged by fire. The pump was damaged
to the extent that it could mt be turned.
This pump was severely fire damaged. The bearings were filled with
molten material.
A pitot probe S/N 576 was recovered nearly intact. It had been torn
away from ·its mounting approximately l/2" above the base. The probe portion
exhibited peening at the pi tot opening and was scrubbed along : i t9 length
in a pattern of appro:x:Lmately 3/8" wide. The wires associated with the
heater coils within,were broken away.
- lO -
A portion of one other probe, S/N )Sl3 was recovered minus the pi tot
tube.
The probe, S/N 576 will be subjected to further study and a report on
that investigation will be attached to the Systems Group Factual Report
as an exhibit.
The right and left static selector valves were recovered from the
wreckage. The valve passages were clear and unobstructed. ·The selector
handles were in the "normal" position. Both selector handles were operational.
Frequency Tuning
The DME/STBY Sw was in "standby." Both audio volUllle controls were pos-
itioned full clockwise.
Connnunications Panel
The No. 2 VHF. Com. b.ead was selected to l3l .60 MHz.
The NAV volUllle control was just off the counter clock-lri.Be stop.
Y. B. Weston
Air Safety InVestigator
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-A
ADDENDUM
By
Noel D. I,a.wson
Bureau of Aviation Safety
' ~' .
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASITTNGTON, D. C. 2059l
;
i
By
Noel D. Lawson
Bureau of Aviation Safety
.,
·''
~
.j
•
ij
NATIONAL TRANSPORTA.TION SAFETY BOARD
BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY
A. ACCIDENT I
I
I
B. RECORDS GROUP
Members: Noel D. Lawson, National Transportation Safety Board
Robert c. Sanchez, Federal Aviation Administration
J. H ~ Kearns, United Air Lines
Fred Ryalis, Airline Pilots Association
C. SUMMARY
The Record Group assembled on December ll, 1972, at 0800 P.s,t.,
I' however, the actual records review began on December l2, 1972, at
the United Air Lines,· Maintenance Facility, San Francisco,
California. A comprehensive examination of the complete maintenance
records and flight log sheets from September 1972 through Dec.ember 8,
I
;
'
1972, was accomplished. In addition, the records involved in the
last major inspection ("C" check - dated March 23, 1972) were reviewed.
A total of nine (9) specific items were covered as listed below.
'
- 2 -
E. RECORDS REVIEW
Item l. Flight Log Sheets (Exhibit llB)
Examination of the flight log pages showed six (6) repetitive
type flightcrew w.riteup/discrepancies. These were:
l
1
Item la above. On November 3, 1972, log page 595-08
a crew w.riteup was: "Capt. altimeter will not operate
in corrected mode.n
l
l Corrective action: Replaced altimeter static check O.K.
l
1 c. Captain's Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IVSI)
l
·1
1 Three (3) w.riteups_, all with corrective action taken.
:i
i The la.st.such discrepancy occurred on November 21, 1972.
~
d. "A11 & nB 11 Hydraulic Systems
! I
!
Three (3) writeups, all with corrective action taken.
i.I One discrepancy wa.s found on a B6 maintenance check and
corrective action was taken.
1l
The la.st discrepancy occurred on December 6, l972.
i ·.
\
I
~
·~
'
- 3 -
'·
·- ·····-·-··---- --··--· .. .-
- 4-
'Item 5. Major Inspection (L3.st "C" Check)
Attacbments
'·
I
Docketd,fo. 435
,. , Ex:hibi t' No. 11-C
.
·!
NA:r'IONAL TRA1'1SFORrATION SAFE.PY BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF Tfo\HSFORTATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591
; .
By
})oel D. Lawson
Bureau of Aviation Safety
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D:Jcket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 8A '
A. ACCIDENT.
7. The No. 1 engine fuel shutoff valve, located on the wing front
spar, was open. Valve
Page 4; l'aragraph 4
The No. 1 bearing rollers were missing from the cage, the bearing
cage and inner race remaining on the hub journal.
·.
'Dbtket No. SA-43··
Exhibit No. 8A
By
Edward P. Wizniak
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Bu:ceau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C.
A. ACCIDENT
United Air Lines, Flight 553, Boeing B-131, N9031U, Chicago, Illinois,
December 8, 19[2.
B• POWE.RPLANT GROUP
C. SUMMARY
4. Thrust reverser lock hooks on the No. 1 engine were disengaged, but
the thrust reverser was found in the forward thrust (stowed) position. The
No. 2 engine thrust reverser was found locked in the forward thrust position.
5. Vegetation and debris were found in the eighth stage engine and
aircraft bleed air system. The 13th stage bleed manifold diC! not contain
any debris or vegetation.
C. SUMMARY (cont'd).
7. The No. 1 engine fuel shutoff valve was open. Valve positi~·
determination for the No. 2 engine fuel shutoff valve was not possibl,.
9. The main oil pumps of both engines were undamaged and free of
foreign material. The main oil filters of both engines were also ·free of
foreign particles.
10. The engine inlet and nose cowl anti-ice valves on both engines
were open.
D. DETAIIS OF INVESTIGATION
Statistics
The aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
(P&WA) JT8D-7A turbo-fan engines.
No. l Engine
General Conditions
All of the first stage fan blades were broken off above
the blade root platform. Most of the second stage fan blades
were bent opposite to the direction of compressor rotationj
however, four blades were bent in the direction of rotation in
an area where the "engine had sustained impact flainage.
No. 2 Engine
General Conditions
Engine Condition
After the engine was removed from its initial resting place,
the fuel filter was disassembled and examined. The fuel filter
sump drain contained a small crystalline ice deposit. The fuel
filter element was blackened and separated frc~ its metal support.
No fuel 1'/as found in the filter or housing; ho·we 1er_, a small
1
Cowling
The nose cowls) which were separated frc::; the engi!1es; 1rere
located in areas slightly forward of their !'2spective poi·lerplants.
The nose co1-1ls sustained severe impact da.!!lage.
. Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 6 -
Fuel System
APU
The APU turbine rotated freely and the APU fire bottle
was undamaged (the pressure gauge read 500 p.~.i.).
Components
No. l Engine
General Observations
The engine was covered with debris from the accident scene;
the exterior cowling, although crushed and fractured, remained
attached to the engine.
The engine front mount bolts were in place with the threaded
portions missing. The aft mounting bolt was missing.
Accessorv Section
The fan inlet case was broken in half with eight inlet
vanes still attached to the outer and inner walls, four vanes
attached to the inner walls only, and all other vanes missing.
Stator vanes from the first three compressor stages were separ-
ated. Rotor blades and disks from the first three stages were
separated from the rear hub.
Combustion Section
Turbine Section
Slight rub marks were found 7.5 and l0.5 inches aft
of the shaft splines on the low-pressure turbine shaft. Low-
pressure turbine shaft torsional creep (shaft twist) was
measured to be 0.424 inches between the shaft tierod hole
plane and the shaft face spherical indentation plane.
Exhaust Section
Bearings
Engine Systems
Pneumatic System
The engine bleed valve was open and was not damaged.
Fuel System
The jet fuel control (JFC) was broken in two pieces with
one piece remaining attached to the fuel pump. The JFC was
subjected to severe heat and impact damage. The power and
start lever input shaft (cross-shaft) and compressor inlet
temperature housing were separated from the main JFC housing.
This made lever position determination impossible. The pieces
of the JFC were subjected to a radiographical examination and
disassembled. Results of this procedure are presented in the
component test result section of the report.
Oil System
Ignition
No. 2 Engine
General Observations
The engine front mount bolts were intact and the saddle
mount was attached to the engine. The rear mount bolt was
sheared.
Accessory Section
The fan inlet case was impacted with debris, and the
vanes were bent. Some first and second stage blades were
broken above the blade root platforms. The remaining blades
were bent opposite to the direction of rotation. Damage. from
broken blades and foreign objects ingested by the compressor
was evident throughout all thirteen stages of the compressor.
Blades which remained attached to their disks were exte:osively
dainaged and bent opposite to the direction of compressor
rotation.
Combustion Section
Turbine Section
Exhaust Section
Bearings
Pneumatic System
The engine bleed valve was open and was in good condition.
The precooler valve vras open. Some fine debris was fou1'd
on the face of the heat exchanger. The precooler outlet was
free of foreign debris.
Fuel System
Oil System
The ends of the fuel oil cooler were sheared off. The
oil pressure transmitter and low oil pressure switch received
slight damage.
Ignition
Nos. 1 and 2 engine jet fuel control units was conducted during
the afternoon of December 21, 19"{2. The group requested United
Air .Lines to disassemble and/or conduct any appropriate 'tests
relative to the fue.l control/fuel pump investigations, and to
report upon the results of these tests and/or disassembly.
1. Units Involved
2. Phase I Investigation
MR73216-627* MR73216-429*
N9031U-Pos. 1 H9031U-Pos. 2
Engine 655956 Engine 655840
3D Cam Servo Valve
Table II
MR732l6-627 MR73216-429
N9031U-Pos. 1 N9031U-Pos. 2
Engine 644956 Engine 655840
3. Phase II Investigation
Recovered Components
The following engine components listed by manufacturer serial
number were identified during the investigation:
Hydraulic Pump GS GS
Fuel Heater NL NL
N2 Tach Generator NF NF
Starter NL P2729
''
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NATIOflf\J, TRl\NSPORT.l\.~:ION SAJi'E'rY JlOARD
Bureau of Avi~tion Safety. ·~i
Washington, D.·C.
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SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER
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·~ ... ' '1-· By
Jobn D. Rawson
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c. SUMMARY J ;';
The subject Gockpit voice recorder (CVR) was recovered from the·
.,. JV·-
aircraft wreckar;e and hand-carried from the accidenti site to the
•F
National Transportation Safety Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety
offices in Washington, D. C., on rec ember 9, 1972, by two NTSB- .. ·¥.·. ~
designated members of the Air Line Pilots Association. A ree.:i=t ·' "; •.
of the recorder tape yielded pc:rtinent information which '{as tram;- .~ ,, ,.
.cribed and appears as an att'.l.cbment to this report. ..,. , W
l
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l. Visua 1'D3J!llna ·ion
.
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"·"· t· '(;
• ~ · ·.· .
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plug had melted due to beat exposure with no evidence of a measu..""3.ble. ,;t· .....-
amount of ethylene glycol/water solution remaining ·in the fibrous ... '"·.'
1
~.
material. """. .. , 1•
F..xamination of the tape showed numerous small areas where the"' . .' ,,.~.
magnetic particle impregnated coating wa~
missing, leaving only the · ·:'· t.
clear mylar base. !t vas noted that the irmer surface of the magaz:l,tle. ' .:·>
was damp; and several droplets of ~
clear wa~er-like
material were .. ~-<.~.i·t.
found. After removal of ·the tape, the magazine assembly was caref'ully ~· .7 ..
sealed and submitted to the Federal Buroau of Investigation (FBI) f'.rrr/i';,. iY;
·.·.: .'>""'.l·~
1
a ciuali tati ve . analysis of the. droplets. Samples of the standard ·lltf:""_,lt".• . ~
the'.,::..~:_,
comna::cisor!·.,;,r~·(!;,.
sealing compound and ethylene glycol solution were secured frol!l
manufacturer of the CVR and also forwarded to the FBI for
studies. The results were .not conclusi v8 due to the lack of ;;,noug4 1}', .. •·'•<:(.
, ';.
r.>J.terinl i:i. the subject inap.;azin8 for comparative analysis with the·r·"""'· ..r.,:,.
above-mentioned samples; .-~.,,ilJ)if:
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3. Simulator and Flight Tests . •. r ·f~·?'
Due to the nature of the accident and the fact that the flight:•:ioy•:•'t'!f . ' ·
'•
data recorder was inoperative at the till)e of the accident, the coch-:<;>it.·f,I..,
voice recorder data became the prime, if not sole source, for deter-.. .·•
.mi.nation of aircraft flight configuration and crew activities J?rior ,to ..! ..
and during the accident. This obviously reci.uired identification of· ·" •':'::
•.-. "~iilfl'
the aural sounds heard over the CAM, crew voice identification, ancl .,·l·~."t...1.
~. i. p ' • "'.I>!
message context .. ._. '.f• ,.Jl~
With these objectives in mind, the cockpit voice recorder grol!J? :"",''.
Linet"<'~.·~!'.:.
planned and conducted studies in the United Air Lines Boeing 737
simulator at Denver, Colorado, and flight tests at United Air
Overhaul Base, San Francisco,_ California. The flight· tests were nb't > : ;1.·
conducted as performance tests per se, but to record voice and cock-.·:·.,;·. •
pit sounds during cr.ew activities necessary to fly the aircraft tbrsugli"~I"
certain maneuvers and regimes. T'ne tests consisted of flying ~he·.,.,·;.,/'~·.,.
simulator and later the test aircraft to try to duplicate as nearl:/'>a~"'\:~,.
• possible .a series of profiles based on the CVTI readout and data supplied!,,
by the Federal Aviation Administration's Automatic Radar Terminal-system'
(ARTS) recorded on I:ecember 8, 1972, as pertaining to UAL Flight 553. ·:'~':
Flight plans and 'scripts were prepared for the simulator a.'1.d B-73T teit';'
flight. ·... ' ~· ··:,;;;,,,
The simulator tests were conducted on rec ember 14, 1972, at '• ·· '. ~ '.r·tl,-
Uni ted Air Lines Training Facility, Lenver, Co.lorado. The follow:Lng '"'. J,..J.,
-r·-
pers ons paTticipatcd in the tests: ./t, ..
John D. Rawson ,
·I
S. L. Huntington,
J. W. l'1cWillio.ms,
Jo.mes M. ]3:J.bb
F. E. Kabel )
Roger Casterline,
Gordon McKinzie
Jack Aasen
as fcllc~·rs :
:f
. '{,r:
. . ~~
b. Simulation, to the degree possible, o:f the gross weight and ~1t- ..,,,.·.
center o:f gravity o:f the subject aircraft.at the time o:f the 4(
accident.
John D. Rawson Second Officer (right rear sea't) !~:i "' ~: ·,., '.'' ,.
Gordon McKinzie ', Observer-Coordinator (left rear seat) ~~~~. . y·
Roger Casterline, Observer .· •t' ·-~ '.' '."' . .-t::'.
F. E. Kabel Observer ·''. ~·:" ' ,:,,
' Obserrer . ·~ ~·.;._.1
•
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1_,~
.'I speech, ns '.~ell ac; other o.ur:1l oounds, were stu•ii:ed on the spectrog:ti!nfa)"j!;i~:,• .. ,..
u11 d c omr,n.rcd tu P•-~t rt.::u\JrJ..i: 1r;t__; CCi"v-e.t.· i ric: tl:~ G·J.lllL: (trt to. :fo1: -'..;.i.~"O f:X11i•efJ~ecf:~-:~rf\.
])Ul'J•OOCof' lii:fiil'i.ng voi.C'.0 icl.e11tlflc:.tti Oll OJtd contc:-:t anil rlefJ.ning tha"' 1 ~·.'-·'~.
ootircc oi' o..11cli1J].c so11nds such uf.; fln.p lnnd.lc rnovemcnt, etc. As 9- re,~11.:f·e:;;jj:·~·
of these studies, ccrtuin pertinent inforrno.tion ·. .ras !1oted: '". ,f :.'.!14!.-'
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a. Flap handlo movements in and out of detent were identified . .-.· .... · .,.,
In some ca.sen wl!uro <1 double click was identified, the hand.le
position was identified with respect to setting. '.
b.
'
The times of landing gear handle movement were identified.
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established. .. ·--~~IQ
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d. The time of speed brake handle movement was identified.
• 1
e. The fact that the autopiJ.ot was disengaged· prior to the time ~
of tl1e accident was ascertaiP..ed. ·~ ·'\. ·~q
,
f. The initiation of the stickshaker warning signal was
identified.
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Attachment
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THJ\N:JCHJ'.Fl1l (JH CH: .I" 1:;1'\'1; JJTbL1' C(;c ;G)~1.'j.1 '!\;IC G i::::corr::!-: 1 : r:~,_T/I.• .
SUND::.i'l'f\A.Irn (UCDD) MODEL V- '5 5'(, :J/lT 101B) UHI'l1m AIH LII!I:s
J30EING 737- 222 , N9031U, FLIGllT '.:>53, C1D:CAGO MIDWAY AD1POHT,
CHICA.GO, ILLHTOIS, DEcmru.rn 8, 19 7 2 ,' •.I.·
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AIR-GROUWD co;4M!JNICATIOil'S
INTRA-COCiCT'IT
SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT
SOURCE - ... ,.,
& TIME CON'l'ENT \
i959:50.5 . United five five .three, an we're level two four OH
RJXJ-2
i959:56.o i
United five fifty three, unders-:and level t-,,o. four
CHI CNTR
OH
2002:49.5
( Shootin )' ILS to one three right 2005:04.5
CAM-? United five five three, descend and maintain eleven
CHI CNTR thousand, one one thousand, Chicego altimet,er tbree
zero zero four
2005 :11. 5 Three zero 'zero four, an down t.J eleven, United five
RD0-2
five three leaving two four OH
2005:16.0 United five five three, Roger contact Chicago one two
CHI CNTR
six point six, good day
2005: 51. 5 United five five three out of t'.o four OH f :r eleven
RD0-2
2005:55.5 United five five three, s~uawk code zero seven one
CHI· CN'l'R
two
2011:42.5 ,
·~
CHI CNTR
Five five three, altitude ... -.?
'•
2011.:45. 5 Eh, we' re about to leave f.Ollf~e.en: _fer eleve:i
-~.... . :·t...·;,-t~,,.. .. +.. -. : ... -~
RD0-'2 .· '>
,.
A:CR-GRQUND COMMUJ'fICATIONS
HlTPA-COCKPIT
SOURCE
SOURCE & TIME COl'l'L'El'TT
& TIME CONTENT
2011:48.5
· Level at eleven, Roger
~HI CNTR .I
} .
2011:52.0
Naw, I think you must ta misunderstood, I said we're
RD'.l-2
out of fourteen for eleven
2011:55.5
CHI CNTR Out of fourteen, okay, somewhere around there
2011:59.5
RD0-2 There you go
2012:18.0
CHI CNTR United five five three, you're cleared to five
thousand now
2012:22.0
RD0-2 Okay, down to five thousand
·.
2Jl5: lO. 0 !
about ninety-four?
C..'...~-~-2 ·-
CPJ:i-1 o:~ay
Ninety-seven
- ;--
" ->::. •
Ya got-one three:
2017:15.0
Yeah, but, ah·--- there's a Kedzie localizer too
CAM-2
Yeah'! :Sat tliree one is one oh nine nine too
Chll-:i. ...
Yeah, that's >·lhat I was thinkin' one oh nine nine
--- down here
Yeah
CAM-2
. .
·'
llHiiA-COCKPIT AIE-GHOUND COMMU1'iJ:CATIONS
S01:.JRCE
SCURCE
& TIME CONTENT
&, Til•IB CON'BNT
2'Jl7:3T,5
CA£.f-l liuh?
2017:39.d
CHI CIIJTH .. United five five three, can continue down to four
thousand now, your altitude?
2017 :4J.O
RD0-2 Eh, we're about to leave six for four
ZJ17:46.5
C.:U.1-2 ~e're going to the same fre~uency as the front
cou.rse
Yeah
?.ight
2017:57.5
B.D0-2 Sml:1d of LOM IDENT ( (Hines, LOY!, ffiSH, ffiSH, IASH,
LOT, LOT) )
.?'.ll8 :Co7. 5
c.~-:-2 'kay you got Hines'on yours now, is that right?
And I have mine on Kedzie Sound of LOM IDENT ( (Kedzie LCIM, D\.SH, msa:, D\SH,
.LOT, LOT, msH))
c..u~-1 !'..ave you listened to the news lately,· they didn't
char.ge there a while ago, did they?
* ·» *
* ,'jo the airport ·'
.·.
'
... ·--
,,· ._,,,,-:
1T'~".J.:-.~ .. -.,_.
,, ~ c .• ,
-Jo.·; .,..
AT;l-GHOUND COMMUNICATIONS
ITi.rRA-COCKPIT ', ~- ...
SOUHCE
SOlJRCE CONTENT ,. ···~
& TIME
& TJ!.!E
•'
CAJ.;.• 1 Oh five
CAM-2 Oscar
1\ecorC.cor go off?
·- ··.·
('.tJ.f-3 Pn.rdo1;. rne?
2019:32.0
RJ.XJ-2 Ah, Midway approach, United fi•1e five tlcree, we're at
four thousand, understand it's three one left
Recorder go off?
Ye3.h
***
' .
8:!19:45.5 ' .· .
G.".M-1.
.
I
- '( -
SOURCE
Il·FfHJ~-COGKPIT
-
l\IH-CllOuND COMM1JJIJ"ICATIONS
soUTICE
CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
&. Tif.:E
2019 :52.0.
CHI APC Sir, I was busy on that phone over there, you're in
radar contact, two ninety heacing, intercej)t thirty-
one left localizer for Vudway, Oscar's current
2020:00.0
RIXl-2 Okay, thank you, we got Oscar, ah, two ninety on the
heading --- intercept three or.e left
2020 :o4.o
CHI APC --S) sir
2020:09.0
CHI APC Nine Victor Sugar radar contact south heading, t'"o
thousand fi V8 lJur;dred, vector for thirty-o.1e left
again
RIXl-2 Sound of LOM IDENT ( (Kedzie LCM, IASH, IASH, D\SH, IXJT,
IXJT, TASH))
2020 :37 ~ 5
C.\!1'.-3 Brakir>.g action repo;rted fair by a guppy
Fair?
c..~:-?
. '
----~---- ------- ------ --
.soUTICE •
SOURCE & THIE CONTENT
, '
'.0'02l:lj.O
8.AJ.f-3 It tests
y
***
2021:23.0
It says •)ff 2021:23-5 Zero nine VS turn left tc,-·one three zero
CHI APC
You got an "off" light :
0101-1
Yeah, l:"""' ah, the signal, the encode light
cor.es on
CAM
Sound of two clicks ((similar to flap lever
l!'ovement)) 2021:56.5 'nited five five three, slow to a tundred an eigLty
cm APC
knots
\
~ ·~.._~\ --·~<•. ~<· .. ' '
·. kn~ts, i.'i:~
/ . i"'
·,
~ '--~ ~ ' ;; ;..'.. . -:f ~:, ~- : ;; ~ ' .. ~ ~~ ""·.. . '
.,. ,.
.,. -,,,,. -.: '
Hwidred an eighty
. ... " five•J'ive
~- ,,... thi-ee
..
.
;l· .·~;:.~~.t-.~>?92~.:f0}'oi'\~~~ ~"'i.-li --~~·.:;;~.~ i . '" ·• "" ~,.~, · -"' i'' .. c~
--~ ··,~
'~. --Y._._;: ~-
: "·_·""":~;,,,;CAM "'St-\;"'. '·le '$il\UJ.il·of ·.wo·oo.icl::s ((sim.t:J;o.i\ :Co":f'lAP. l.e:iOX' .,
mo\h;ir,:en·c) ) ·
I
AIR-GROUI\TD C0,~1UNICATIONS
SOURCE •
SOURCZ & TIME CONTENT
&. TIJ·;B COJITTENT
2022:26.5
CKI APC . Z'."ro nine VS, descend ta two thousand feet
2022:~2,5
C/'..N-2
Wonder why they put that in there, final approach
fJ:om holding pattern at Kedzie not authorized?
2022:45.5
CKI APC Zero nine VS turn left zero nine zero
Worcder why?
I don 1 t ~.::.no'..r
2023:26.0
CKI APC Five fi V€ three, slow to a hund:~ed an .,siity knots
~·4 "'
2023:28.5
\ .. RD0-2,.
·:: " '\ " .
clicks ( (situilr.r to mov~ment of ·J: ,_, --~ ·;:'..
-.~
-~ r. - ( "· . -
~- ' .;--~·:
·..
- l·
',..~,
~ -, ·:-~ _: . . ~'"'· ~ .... -· ~ ~.. :;-: .,. ' ~ ' : --
'"
. '
AIR..Gl\Oill!D COMMUNICATIONS
sou:RCE · •
SOUPCE CONTENT
~,.&TIME
& Til,'fE CONTENT·
~)l>i"' '2023 : 30 • 0
CHI AFC S, sir, then descend to two thc:isand feet-· 'nited
five five three
.·(,,
2023 :33.0
:COvm to two thousand five fi ·re three, leavin' fo;rr
RW-2
2023:49.5
cm AFC 'kay, keep it up for a while, r:lease
2023 :52.0
CHI
Five five three start slowi.n' to yer approach speed,
, APC
please
Okay, slowin' up
Scnncb of several clicks ( (similar to sound of
stabiEzer trim act-Uation)) ·
2024:08.5
ClIT APC
* VS, turn left heading three two zero now, intercept,
cleared for the approach, stay with me
2021;:3L 5
CA.1·!-3 C!':!'.'ist, I can't even find the circuit breaker
for thin
Over hc,re
~.10,call ,tbe, toyer noy, ,cen.ll. e\ghte~1} sev,~n.~ _. .:l :.. ,c ,,_
_ _ _::"":_ ··- _.
:~ ·;)E1 :., ·~·~:;·~~}{~_-.':. t;"; ~;··t~ .·. '~·,.. .~ ,"/ .~. .· ~---
,,,.·:.,:'!-:..~: '
'
~
.
~
•,
.
;·~~-
~
~
.'!:
.f ··_.;
•
'>,· ""z~~ /#:b!~ · ;, ' ,; .': , ' . ·;' ~- ' .. · 'f:~·~<ot '" '...~'.}·_,~; ' ·, :i; ' 'i
.
'
'
"
- ------ -~---- --- _..,.. --------'"""'-- - ~---~-
- -~.!- -
AIR-GROUND cor.i;.;UNICATIONS
SOURCE
SOURCE & TIME CONTENT
&, Tii>2 CONTENT
2024:50.0
CAM-3 I don't know
Call it in
Is this tape ·1 Or uh
202~:~.5
C.~-~-:- 3 I' 11 have ·~o call Dispatch
2025:25.0
CHI APC Five five three, call the tower now on one eighteen
. J
seven
2025:28.0
RD0-2 Eighteen seven, five five tbre<>
2025: 35.5 Jv'Jidway tower, United· five· five three, an' we' re out
RlXl-2
of three for two
2025 :39 .o . United five five three, report passing the outer JT3J'.'ker,
MJ:WR
number two on the approach ...
3J25 :41,0
C.tlJ·1-3 . Chico.go,· this iG five five th:r.ee ((second officer ',' -·
-r·':
c:i.liing i\RIHC)) ·-- · · . ·... ·. , - "·"" < *._,
.
0
AIR-GHOIBm COI-u·fUillICATIONS
\
SOURCE •
SOl.GCE
& TIME
&: TIME CONTENT
2025 :lf6. 5
CAM-l Let 's have the gear down please ,
2025 :)Oo97
CJ\IvI- 3 Chicago, United five five tln:ee ((second officer
calling ARINC) )
2025:51.62
CA1~1 Sound of a click ( (similar to sound of landing
gear hF-~dle going into down a.etent))
2025:55.cG
8Alft ::r::lcre::cse in ambient noBe level ( (similar to
increo,se made by nose landing gear extended))
2025 : 56. 82 '
MrVIR Ah hundred and twenty, okay
202C :OL 5J
Gexr· 1
0WY1
.... •
. '
- i:; -
.. ----
HlTHA-COCKPIT . AIR-GROuND COMMUNICATIONS
'.;
SOURCE
CONTENT.
"'CONTENT ,, .
-S: iJ:I_~IB
2026:24.66
Cril·-1-1 Final descent check
2026:25,66
Flight and nav
2026:27.ll
Cross-checked
rt."}' 0
\...-...~·~-:
***
n"»
v..-....:.·1 Soclild of clicks ((similar to sound of stabilizer
trim actUl3.tion))
2026:30.62
RL0-2 United five five three, an, at, Kedzie inbound
2J26:35.97.
,...,. 0
\.....;-....·.-. 2026:36.38
Ml.'WR United five five three, contir.ue inbounO,, ;.•ou 're nUlliber
.. two on the approach -- 'll keep you advised
2::;::;6:40.10
... ·'
c.:~.] Sound of several elicks ((similar to sound of
electrical stabilizer trim actUl3.tion))
2026:4o.46
RL0-2 Okay
2·:::·z.6 :1;,). 96
c..~...:.~-2 Cross-checked
.... ,, ..., With a glideslope flag
L --..:.·--.)
C:'.J-~-2 . No gli.deslope
2026: ~lJ. .10 .·.
9VS Eli, nine vs has the. runway
'.
·' . ..
-~. . .
Nine VS, :runway trll'ee one left cleared to land
·'l;
-· •. .-.
,. ,j·
i126 :41+.• 67
- C.~·1-3
..
'
A!R-GROUNb' C01'3':ul'JICA'l'IONS
~NTRA-COCKPJT
... SOURCE
SOURCE ~'~:tM8 CONTEfllT , .
& TIME CONTENT
2026:46.l8
9vs · ' Okay
2026: 5:+. 69
CAl-'. Som'd of click ( (similar to sou.'ld rr.ade by moving ;.
s:peed brake lever to anned )?Osi tion))
2026:56.04
CAM-3 Wing fla:ps
2026:58. 75
C.'U·!
Sound of click ( (similar to sou.'ld mg.de by fla:p
lever moving into detent))
2026: 59. 42
CAN-2 ·.. Thirty, green light, :pressure and fluid
,.
j""' t .
: -_,
- J.) -
• ;• j;;'c ...
2027:04.ll ...
CAH-2 .Ah thousand feet
2027:04.50
MTWR United five fifty-three, execute a missed approac)J,
make a left turn to a head:'..ng Jf --- one eight zero,
11 11 11 11
climb to two thousand ( (beti.;ree1. 1-1ords 0£' and ori.e
there is a pause and a voice i~ the background says
"one eighty. 11 ) )
2027:05.74 •
Sound of sticksha.ker begins and continues to·
OAf.j
end of reC'.ording
2027:07.56
CW·!-?. ((Two to three hurried words at very low·
amplitude and masked by noise of stick-
sha.ker))
.--' .·'
' ~- - ~ .. ',...,. -
''--~"'
~ '- .;_f • , .
~~.~:: .~.-~ ~
.--<
1• -·--"'
'i
\ - .-
-,-
lL -
AIR-GROUND COiYJl>!UiHCATIONS
SOURCE •
SOURCE &'TIME CONTENT
& TIKE CONTENT
20
L.
~c.~f ·. 1-0/ 0
4
CAM Sound of click ( (sound similar to landing gear J
lever moved out of down detent))
2027:20.14
CAN Sound of double click ( (sound similar to landing
gear le~er moved into up detent))
2'J2/:2.3.55
C/1~·~
So·cnd of i.nitial impact and garbled voice
2027:24.46
Sounds of impact and unintell: gible voice ·'. (over.
RD'.l-1
open micropLone))
2027:25.02
RD0-1 END OF REl'.JORDING
..
. ....... ~.-
... .. r
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•
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