I. THE FACTS
THE ISSUES
These consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates
for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary
schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained
in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall
be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of
the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486.
II.
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36,
RA 9165 unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No.
161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633
by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus
permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for
senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only
to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon
and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-
taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as
it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be
implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution
add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership
in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or
after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs
(f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of
public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employees—and students for that
matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary
procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not required or
even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus
on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative
search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees
and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character
of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or
intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v.
Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative.
For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for
drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not
telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested.
And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected
to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As
to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. But the more important consideration lies in the
fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored
by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to
know” basis; that the “drug test result and the records
shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met
by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the
law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the
random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that
it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable penalty
of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In
the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug
testing in this case would violate a person’s right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
LUCAS v LUCAS [G.R. No. 190710 , June 6,
2011]
Facts:
 On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed
a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing)[2] before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City.
 Petitioner narrated that, his mother, Elsie Uy
(Elsie), got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, sometime in 1967, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and she gave birth to
petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners
father was not stated in petitioners certificate of
 live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner
that his father is respondent.
 Respondent allegedly extended financial support
to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two
years. When the relationship of Elsie and
respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondents offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was
growing up, Elsie made several attempts to
introduce petitioner to respondent, but all
attempts were in vain.
 Respondent contends that the allegations in the
petition were hearsay as they were not of
petitioner’s personal knowledge. He argued that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s
father.
 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence does not require that there must be
a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can
be ordered.
 RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordered that
the petition with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing be set for hearing.
 CA ruled in favor of the respondent, ordered to set
aside the decision of the RTC. CA held that DNA
testing should not be allowed because the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
essentially ruled that DNA testing can only be ordered
after the petitioner establishes prima facie proof of filiation
RULING:
 Yes. The SC held that the CA’s observation
that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case, the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case, is misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and
not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
 Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of
the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for
DNA Testing Order. The appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is
relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to
the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation
for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the
scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if
any, which the court may consider
as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding
is commenced.
 SC held that, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show

cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility
of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. A court order for blood testing is
considered a search, which, under our
Constitution, must be preceded by a finding
of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence,
the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
 SC further held that the issuance of a DNA
testing order remains discretionary upon the
court. The court may, for example, consider
whether there is absolute necessity for the
DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would
only be corroborative, the court may, in its
discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMD
.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS DUMAGAY Y
SUACITO, Accused-Appellants.
Version of the Prosecution
October 13, 2006, a confidential informant (CI) informed
him that a certain "Buboy," later identified as appellant
was selling morphine and relayed the information to
Police Chief Inspector. About 5:00 p.m. of the same day,
the CI called up appellant to buy morphine;1that appellant
agreed to meet them at about 7:00 p.m. of the same day,
appellant arrived on board a red motorcycle at the side of
the gasoline station; talked with the CI
in Chavacano dialect and was asked if he was the buyer of
the morphine. They exchanged cellphone numbers and
agreed to meet at noon the next day near
Western Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM)
The next day the buy-bust money, which was placed
inside a white envelope; that it was also agreed that the
prearranged signal would be a "thumbs up" sign. Around
10:00 a.m. that day, appellant contacted him and
informed him that the morphine was ready for delivery at
noon time in the vicinity of WESMINCOM. Appellant
approached him and brought him to a corner so as not to
be seen by passers-by. When appellant asked for the
money, he gave him the white envelope containing the
marked money, appellant in turn, took from his pocket
the morphine placed inside a plastic bag. CI immediately
made a "thumbs up" sign; that the operatives immediately
ran towards them to arrest appellant; that when appellant
tried to flee, he immediately arrested him and informed
him that he was a police officer. Appellant tried to escape
and drew his gun; that they grappled for the gun causing
them to fall on the ground.
Version of the Appellant
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusations
against him and testified that he was at the area to meet a
certain "Bill," a member of the American Navy, to run
errands for him, and while waiting for Bill, he went
inside the canteen located at the back of the gas
dump;47 that when he came out, he saw four policemen
positioned outside the canteen. He was approached,
manhandled and hit continuously by the policemen.
Sgt. Necesario that he saw appellant enter the canteen;
and that after a few minutes, he saw him board the PDEA
van blind-folded, handcuffed, with plaster on his mouth,
and lying face down on the floor.55 On cross-
examination, he clarified that, from where he was
positioned at that time, he could not see what was inside
the canteen; and that about five minutes elapsed from the
time he saw appellant enter the canteen and the time he
saw him again inside the van.
RTC ruled that defendant is guilty. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
Ruling: No.
Appellant contends that there was no valid buy-bust
operation as he was allegedly instigated or induced to
commit the crime by the CI; and that the prosecution
failed to show that the Chain of Custody Rule was
followed since the investigating officer and the forensic
chemist failed to testify in court.

There was a valid buy bust operation as the prosecution
was able to establish details of the transaction from the
initial contact of the poseur-buyer and the appellant up to
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the
morphine. The identities of the poseur-buyer and the
appellant as the seller of the morphine, and the details of
the procedure employed by the police operatives in
conducting; the buy-bust were clearly established by the
prosecution. The fact that the poseur-buyer, through the CI,
solicited morphine from appellant is not prohibited by aw
and does not render the buy bust operation invalid as,
under prevailing jurisprudence, "a police officer's act of
soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust
operation, or what is known as a 'decoy solicitation,' is not
prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust
operation invalid."71
The Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
custody of the seized items.
Chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."
No testimonies or stipulations, however, were made on the
details of the turnover of the seized vials from the police
station to the crime laboratory, and the turnover and
submission of the same from the crime laboratory to the
court, as only the following facts were stipulated:
The prosecution likewise failed to give an explanation or a
justifiable reason why the apprehending police officers had
failed to mark the seized items and conduct the physical
inventory of the same at the place where the appellant was
arrested. It bears stressing that the marking of the
apprehending police officers' initials or signatures on the
seized items must be made in the presence of the accused
immediately upon arrest. And although the Chain of
Custody Rule allows the physical inventory of the seized
items to be done at the nearest police station, this is more
of an exception than a rule. Police officers, therefore, must
provide an explanation to justify their failure to conduct
the marking and the physical inventory at the place of
arrest.
Accordingly, appellant Jesus Dumagay y Suacito
is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
People vs Garry Dela Cruz (Chain of Custody)
FACTS: On Sept 14, 2004, Dela Cruz sold and delivered
to a member of the PNP, who acted as buyer, one (1) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.0120
gram which resulted to METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu) knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug
He also have in his possession and under his custody and
control six (6) pieces heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets each containing white crystalline substance, each
weighing as follows: 1) 0.0135 gram; 2) 0.0183 gram; 3)
0.0542 gram; 4) 0.0197 gram; 5) 0.0100 [gram]; and 6)
0.0128 gram or a total of 0.1285 of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride
On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant Garry dela
Cruz was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs in two separate information.
dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-
bust operation was allegedly conducted after a civilian
informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office that
a certain "Gary" was selling illegal drugs at the parking
area for buses behind Food Mart.
The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Bobon, as
poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roca, as back-up arresting
officer. It was agreed that "PO1 Bobon would remove his
bull cap once the sale of illegal drugs was
[consummated]." The buy-bust team prepared a _100.00
bill with serial number KM 776896 as marked money.
the buy-bust operation team, accompanied by the
informant, went to the target area. The informant
initially brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1 Bobon who
handed the marked money to dela Cruz in exchange for
one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu. After
which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested
dela Cruz.
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered
six (6) more heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu. PO1
Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in
his right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his left
pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked _100.00 bill
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1
Bobon, SPO1 Roca, and forensic chemist Police Inspector
Melvin L. Manuel. The sole witness presented for the
defense was dela Cruz himself.
Dela Cruz was convicted for violating Article II, Section 5
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride used as evidence in these
cases are hereby ordered confiscated to be turned over to the
proper authorities for disposition
dela Cruz assailed the prosecution’s failure to establish the
chain of custody of the seized sachets of shabu. He also
assailed the validity of the buy-bust operation and the
prosecution’s failure to present the informant in court
ISSUE: whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements under Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
RULING: No. Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no
physical inventory of the seized items was conducted.
Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show that the
seized items were photographed in the manner required by
Section 21. CA found no gap in the prosecution’s
presentation of the chain of custody.
Under the law, in actions involving the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took
place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti
or the illicit drug as evidence. On the other hand, in
prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it
must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of
an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug.
Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the
acquittal of an accused.
As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for
which dela Cruz is charged has not been established, it
follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. It is proper that dela Cruz be
acquitted.
People vs Gayoso
Facts: PI Eleazar Barber of PNP Guiuan Police Station
directed SPO3 Victorino De Dios to conduct a surveillance
on Myrna Gayoso after receiving several reports that she
was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, De dios
confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal
drug activities. Barder decided to conduct a confirmatory
test-buy that designated De Dios as the poseur-buyer.
March 24, 2004, Dedios and a civilian asset proceeded to
the house of appellant and asked her if they could buy
shabu. The sale was consummated and De Dios
immediately informed Barber via text message about the
the successful test-buy. Barber and his team, including
the witness SPO3 Salamida, then proceeded towards the
house of appellant and read the search warrant then
proceeded with the search. During the search, sachets of
shabu were found.
Appellant then denied the charges against her. She
claimed that on that day, somebody forcibly kicked the
front door of her house and tried to break it open. When
she opened, Barber pushed her aside and told his
companions to move quickly. She maintained that the
search warrant was shown to her only after an hour and
that the sachets of shabu were planted.
RTC found appellant guilty ruling that the appellant had
no evidence that she had license or authority to possess the
shabu. RTC rejected appellant’s defense of denial and
frame-up.IIt also ruled that the evidence sufficiently
established the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu
from the time they were brought from appellant and seized
from her house to its turnover to the PDA and submission
to the PNP crime Laboratory for examination. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue: Whether or not there were gaps in the chain of
custody
Ruling: Yes. While it was settled that there was probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The appellant
was still acquitted because there was a failure to establish
the charges of illegal sale and possession of shabu against
her due to the gaps in the chain of custody.
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.
As a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the
confiscated item must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third,
There was also a violation of SEC 21 of RA 9165 that
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
requires the apprehending team to physically inventory
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and photograph the seized drug immediately after seizure
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
and confiscation in the presence of the accused. In this
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items at the place where the search
warrant was served in the presence of a representative of
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the
the Department of Justice, nor did it photograph the same
poseur-buyer of his initials and signature on the items
in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and
after they have been seized. The chain of custody rule
control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and
requires that the marking of the seized contraband be
confiscating the same. APPEAL IS GRANTED.
done in the presence of the apprehended violator and
APPELLANT ACQUITTED
immediately upon confiscation. In this case, however,
there was no evidence to show that the marking was
accomplished in the presence of the appellant and that the
JORGE DABON, a.k.a. GEORGE DEBONE @
police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic
GEORGE, Petitioner,
sachets of shabu seized in spite of an Inventory of
v.
Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
house.
G.R. No. 208775, January 22, 2018

FACTS:
The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting
officers to the investigating officer in the police station
constitutes the second link in the chain of custody. In
this regard, the Court takes note that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to
whom the seized items were turned over at the police
station. While SP03 Salamida was identified as the
property custodian of the police station, this does not
necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer.
This total want of evidence gains importance considering
that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses
identified the shabu presented during trial as the same
shabu seized from appellant. The second link in the chain
of custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist in the crime laboratory is
the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized
shabu was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no
longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was
handled therein. He also did not identify the police officer
in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed
at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to
forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The
request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies
the police officer who delivered the seized shabu as a
Dabon’s Defense:
certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify
that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the
same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third
break in the chain of custody.
 Search Warrant no. 15 armed the law enforcement
agents to search Dabon's residence for violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
(RA 9165)
 On July 26, 2003, PNP-CIDG, proceeded to an
apartment unit Tagbilaran City where the
residence of Dabon is situated. Upon reaching the
two-storey apartment at about 7:30am, the CIDG
operatives requested Barangay Kagawad Ariel
Angalot other government officials, a media
representative and Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative to witness the search.
 The group entered the house and they found
Eusubio Dumaluan (Dumaluan) in the living
room while Dabon was inside one of the bedrooms.
 After P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search
warrant to Dabon and conducted the search. The
group was able to seize three plastic sachets and the
drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom of Dabon
and the drug paraphernalia recovered from
Dumaluan.
 The seized items were handed over to PNP Crime
Lab for chemical examination which yielded
positive results for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
 Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they were not
allowed to witness the search conducted by the
CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay and sit in
 the living room while other members of the
household were locked inside the room of their
house helper.
RTC:
 Found Dabon guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the violation of Secs 11 and 12 or RA 9165
 Search conducted was valid
 Upheld the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers' duties in the
absence of ill motives on their part
CA:
 Denied Dabon’s appeal.
ISSUE: WON the evidence obtained against Dabon is
admissible
SC: NO. The evidence is inadmissible because the execution
of the warrant was in violation of sec. 8 Rule 126 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 The 1987 Constitution provides for the protection
of the people's rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Art III sec 3. The State
and its agents cannot conduct searches and
seizures without the requisite warrant. Otherwise,
the constitutional right is violated.
 "It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant
issued in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give
the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same Rules provide
parameters in the proper conduct of a search. One
of those parameters set by law is Section 8 of Rule
126, to wit:
Section 8. Search of house, room, or
premise to be made in presence of two
witnesses. — No search of a house, room,
or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality.
 Here, the hierarchy among the witnesses as
explicitly provided under the law was not complied
with. For one, the lawful occupants of the premises
were not absent when the police authorities
implemented the search warrant. Even so, the two-
witness rule was not complied with as only one
witness, Brgy. KagawadAngalot, was present
when the search was conducted.
 Dabon's failure to file a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained against him cannot be
considered as a sufficient indication that he
clearly, categorically, knowingly, and
intelligently made a waiver. In criminal cases
where life, liberty and property are all at stake,
"[t]he standard of waiver requires that it not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." After all, he raised the objection in
his Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration before
the trial court.
DP: WHEREFORE, CA Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Jorge
Dabon is ACQUITTED of the crime charged against
him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias "GOGO"
and ENRICO HERRERA y MONTES, Accused-
Appellant
The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the
afternoon of November 19, 2012,8 a confidential
informant (CI) tipped the Manila Police District Station 4
(MPD) of the alleged illegal drug activities of a certain
alias "Gogo" (later identified as Crispo) at Ma. Cristina
Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after coordinating with
the operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
the MPD organized a buy-bust operation at the said area,
with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis Reyes (P02 Reyes) as
the poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the area at around 5:30
in the afternoon of even date, the CI and P02 Reyes saw
Crispo talking to his runner, Herrera, and decided to
approach them. As they went nearer, Herrera approached
the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo remained about five
(5) to six (6) meters away. P02 Reyes then signified his
intention of buying shabu, prompting Herrera to get the
marked money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo
in order to remit the money and get a sachet containing
white crystalline substance from the latter. When Herrera
handed over the sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed
the pre-arranged signal, directly causing his backups to
rush into the scene and apprehend accused-appellants.
Upon frisking accusedappellants, the arresting officers
recovered three (3) other plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from Crispo. The accused-appellants
and the seized items were then taken to the barangay
office where the arresting officers, inter alia, conducted the
inventory and photography in the presence of two (2)
barangay kagawads, as indicated in the Receipt of
Property/Evidence Seized.9 After examination10 at the
Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets
seized from accused-appellants contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.11
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged12 and offered their version of the events.
According to Crispo, he was just on board a tricycle going
to his niece's house when suddenly, a car with five (5)
policemen in civilian clothes blocked the tricycle's path.
One of the policemen then poked a gun at Crispo, and told
him, "Mga pulis kami, sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful
for his life, Crispo complied. Upon arrival at the police
station, the policemen demanded from him ₱30,000.00 for
his release; otherwise, they will plant evidence against
him. The policemen then proceeded to show him four (4)
sachets of shabu which will be used against him. For his
part, Herrera averred that he was riding a bicycle when he
accidentally bumped a brown van. Three (3) men then
alighted from the van, arrested him, and took him to the
police station. Thereat, an affidavit was purportedly
prepared for him and that he signed the same even without
reading it out of confusion.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged (a) for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
and (b) for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,.15
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the CA affi1med
the RTC ruling.19 It held that the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
crimes charged. Further, the CA ruled that the absence of
representatives from the DOJ and the media during the
conduct of the inventory is not fatal to the prosecution of
accused-appellants, so long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.20
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the
crimes charged.
RULING
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established with
moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on
the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.31
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure
which the police officers must follow when handling the
seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.32 Under the said section, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640,33 the apprehending team
shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the
seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.34 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of switching,
'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA]
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their
ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of
the seizure and confiscation of the[said drugs] that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti,and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."36
 After a judicious study of the case, the Court
finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from Crispo.
 The law requires the presence of an elected public
official, as well as representatives from the DOJ
and the media to ensure that the chain of custody
rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion
of tampering, switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence which could
considerably affect a case. However, minor
deviations may be excused in situations where a
justifiable reason for non-compliance is
explained. In this case, despite the non-observance
of the witness requirement, no plausible
explanation was given by the prosecution .. In
fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only feigned
ignorance as to the reason why no representatives
of the DOJ and the media were present during the
inventory of the seized items
 At this point, it is well to note that the absence of
these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.48 However, a
 justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of
any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 must be adduced.
 s such, police officers are compelled not only to
state reasons for their non-compliance, but
mustin fact, also convince the Court that they
exerted earnest efforts to comply with the
mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.[[53]]
 Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide
justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their
transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from Crispo have
been compromised. It is settled that in a
prosecution for the sale and possession of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State
carries the heavy burden of proving not only the
elements of the offense, but also to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which,
renders the case for the State insufficient to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.54
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:
(a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and
declared CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-
appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is concerned due to his
supervening death pending appeal; and
(b) The appeal of accused-appellant Marcelino
Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The Decision dated March
1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
07117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, he
is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for
any other reason.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON B. QUE
[G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996]
FACTS:
 Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter
Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received an information that a
ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through
Ilocos Norte.
 On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with
SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc
went on patrol around the area. At about 1:30 in
the morning, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with
plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the
truck and apprehended it. The truck was boarded
by three persons, the driver identified accused-
appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.
 SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it
contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there
were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut
slabs. When the police officers asked for the
lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant
could not present any.
 Accused-appellant was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277 for having in
possession, control and custody 258 pieces
of various sizes of Forest Products
Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile)
with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or
equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in
the total amount of P93,232.50
at P25.00/bd. ft., without necessary permit,
license or authority to do so from the proper
authorities.
 Accused-appellant denied the charge against him
and he claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber from a legal source. He also
objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of
lumber as evidence against him. He contended
that they were fruits of an illegal search and
seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial
admission.
 The trial court found accused-appellant guilty
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and
the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of lumber were obtained in
violation of his constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures
Ruling:
 No. The Constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving
vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain
view. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid
as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe
 before search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
 The police officers in the case at bar had probable
cause to search appellant’s truck. A member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received
a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal
lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks
later, while members of the Provincial Task Force
were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue,
they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the
informant. When they apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the
truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn
lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the
police officers asked for the lumbers supporting
documents, accused-appellant could not present
any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient
to prove the existence of probable cause which
justified the extensive search of appellant’s truck
even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were
thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the
guilt of accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. VICENTE SIPIN Y
DE CASTRO,
On August 11, 2007 at about 12:00 midnight, a
confidential asset arrived at the Binangonan Police
Station with an information that a certain Enteng was
selling shabu at Barangay Calumpang. The information
was recorded in the blotter and reported to the chief,
P/Supt. Herminio Cantaco, who then ordered the
formation of a buy-bust team and the conduct of an
operation. A poseur money was marked with the initials
"GAD" by team leader SPO3 Gerardo Delos Reyes, and a
pre-operational coordination was made with the Provincial
Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force by PO1 Gorospe.
. Alias Enteng then approached the asset and PO1
Raagas, and asked if they would buy or "i-score." When
PO1 Raagas replied that he would, Enteng pulled out
something out of his pocket and handed it to PO1 Raagas,
who in turn gave Enteng the marked P100 bill. Thereafter,
PO1 Raagas revealed himself as a police officer and
removed his hat as pre-arranged signal. Upon seeing the
signal, PO1 Diocena approached, ordered Enteng to take
out the contents of his pocket, placed him under arrest,
and read him his rights. PO1 Diocena confiscated the
marked money and the plastic containing shabu, then
turned them over to PO1 Raagas who marked the item he
bought and the other plastic container confiscated by PO1
Diocena with the markings "VDS-1" and "VDS-2" in the
presence of the accused, PO1 Diocena and PO1 Gorospe.
PO1 Raagas took custody and hand-carried the
specimens wrapped in a bond paper, then turned them over
to PO1 Gorospe, who prepared the booking sheet, the arrest
report and the request for laboratory examination of the
specimens. PO1 Gorospe also took pictures of Enteng and
the specimens in the presence of PO1 Raagas and PO1
Diocena. The specimens were then given to PO1 Diocena
who brought them to the crime laboratory
For the defense, only appellant testified. At around 10:00
p.m. of August 11, 2007, appellant was on his way home
from his sister's house when he met Rolly who was an
asset of the "munisipyo". When Rolly asked him to send a
text message when he sees the notorious group of Jun
Bisaya who frequents his place, appellant refused to
cooperate because his life and those of his loved ones would
be in danger. Rolly got angry and told him, "Enteng
alam mo naman masama akong magalit, baka kung
ano lang mangyari sa iyo." Rolly then told appellant to
just forget what they have talked about, and just
accompany him to the person they were talking about.
When appellant accommodated Rolly's request, in less
than 20 minutes, he saw 2 male persons approaching the
place where he and Rolly were talking. Rolly then
said "Sir, ayaw pong makipagtulungan sa atin. " After
Rolly held him, the person, who later turned out to be a
policeman, placed his arm on appellant's shoulder then
told him that he would like to talk him at the municipal
building. Appellant went with the men peacefully,
thinking that they would ask about Jun Bisaya. The three
men tried to convince appellant to cooperate with them and
told him to send a text message when he sees Jun Bisaya.
Out of fear, appellant still refused to cooperate. The
persons, who happened to be policemen, got angry and
ordered that he be put in jail. They also brought appellant
to Pritil for medical examination, and returned him to the
police station where he was punched and forced to point to
a shabu.
RTC held SIPIN guilty.CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantlss search is valid.
For a successful prosecution of an offense for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, on the one hand, the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.5The delivery of the illicit drug to
the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by
the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
The links that must be established in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation, are as follows: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turn-over
of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3)
the turn-over by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and (4) the turn-over and submission of the illegal drug
from the forensic chemist to the court.1
Serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police
officers also broke the chain of custody of the dangerous
drugs from the time they were seized from appellant until
they were presented in court, thereby undermining the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence.
First, it is not clear whether it was PO1 Diocena or PO1
Raagas who confiscated the other sachet of
suspected shabu found in possession of appellant. PO1
Diocena testified that after ordering appellant to empty
his pocket, he confiscated the marked money and the said
sachet, then gave them to PO1 Raagas for marking. In
contrast, PO1 Raagas stated that he was the only one who
recovered both plastic sachets from appellant.
Second, it is doubtful whether a commotion took place
after appellant was arrested, which supposedly prevented
the police officers from making an inventory and taking
pictures of the seized evidence. PO1 Raagas claimed that
nobody else was present, and that appellant did not call
the attention of anyone when he was arrested, but PO1
Gorospe insisted that there was a commotion caused by
appellant's relatives.
Third, a crucial question looms over the safekeeping of the
seized items which were placed in a container on the way
back to the police station. PO1 Diocena testified that PO1
Raagas was in custody of recovered items contained in a
stapled plastic container, but PO1 Raagas said that the
items were placed in a mere bond paper.
Fourth, the records do not indicate that an inventory was
identified and formally offered in evidence, and the
prosecution witnesses could not agree on whether there was
an inventory of the items seized from appellant. PO1
Diocena claimed that there was none, but PO1 Raagas
said that PO1 Gorospe prepared one at the police station.
PO1 Gorospe added that he did not give an inventory
despite the presence of appellant's relatives.
The failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken
chain of custody was compounded by the police officers'
non-compliance with the procedure for the custody and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs as set forth m
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Sipin is acquitted.
Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a
pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru
Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit.
However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to
YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found
that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes)
confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up
price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which
was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an
envelope addressed to Catolico.
Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the
clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an
open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to
Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico
for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents
(check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue
of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v.
Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
Zulueta vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and the other. The review for petition is DENIED for lack of
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents merit.
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS CA
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
against her husband.
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
Dr. Martin then brought an action for recovery of the incapacity of the petitioner.
documents and papers and damages against petitioner.
RTC of Manila ruled that Dr. Martin is the owner of the
properties and ordered Zulueta and any persona acting in
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were
her behalf to immediately return the properties and pay
three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
him Php 5,000.00 for nominal damages, another Php
between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner
5,000.00 for moral damages and pay cost of the suit. On
submitted objections to the submission of evidence, but the
appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC
trial court admitted all evidence presented, and denied
motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence;

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the

Held: Yes. The documents and papers in question are
Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
the aforementioned cassette tapes. CA, dismissed the
declaring "the privacy of communication and
motion on the ground that Tape recordings are not
correspondence inviolable" is no less applicable simply
inadmissible per se
because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is
a "lawful order or when public safety or order requires Thus this petition.
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding." Issue: W/N The Cassette Tapes are inadmissible as
evidence.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
Rule: yes - Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever under Rep. Act No. 4200.
available to him or to her.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and
The law insures absolute freedom of communication Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes"
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
without the consent of the affected spouse while the evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the as follows:
consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
 Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
being authorized by all the parties to any private meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or  The Fourth Amendment governs not only the
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
seizure of tangible items but extends as well
record such communication or spoken word by
to the recording of oral statements. Because
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or the Fourth Amendment protects people rather
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . . than places, its reach cannot turn on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or into any given enclosure.
the existence, contents, substance, purport, or  The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v.
information therein contained, obtained or United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is no longer
secured by any person in violation of the controlling.
preceding sections of this Act shall not be  What Katz sought to exclude when he entered
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
the booth was not the intruding eye - it was
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to
investigation.
do so simply because he made his calls from a
place where he might be seen. No less than an
individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a
Katz vs. United States
telephone booth may rely upon the protection
[389 US 347, 18 December 1967]
of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies
it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
FACTS:
that permits him to place a call is surely
 Katz was convicted in the District Court for
entitled to assume that the words he utters
the Southern District of California under an
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
eight-count indictment charging him with
world.
transmitting wagering information by
 To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and
ignore the vital role that the public telephone
Boston, in violation of a federal statute (18
has come to play in private communication.
U.S.C. 1084).
Further, although the surveillance in this case
 At trial the Government was permitted, over
may have been so narrowly circumscribed
Katz's objection, to introduce evidence of
that it could constitutionally have been
Katz's end of telephone conversations,
authorized in advance, it was not in fact
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure
electronic listening and recording device to
which is a constitutional precondition of such
the outside of the public telephone booth from
electronic surveillance.
which he had placed his calls.
 In affirming his conviction, the Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the
recordings had been obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by
[the petitioner]." Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18
October 2011
ISSUE: Whether the Government’s eavesdropping
activities violated Katz’ privacy (while using a
Facts
telephone booth).
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly
HELD: YES. The Government's eavesdropping taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The
activities violated the privacy upon which Katz respondent then formed a team and issued a memo
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and directing the team “to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced
from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were
turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the
diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the
17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering
about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC
and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order,
requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave,
to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five
days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against
him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition”
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in
his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an
Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss
and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without
basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the
motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of
the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have
waived his right to the formal investigation which then
proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a
petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the
ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of
the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a
violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases
illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US
Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner
in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to
privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because
the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such
area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a
person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20
L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court
categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for
the government instead of a private employer.”
In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs”
authorize warrantless searches involving public employees
for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are
weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs
Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November
3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141,
169),recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate
intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in
the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair,
the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s
computer reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-
2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA
361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the
personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property
the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate
and monitor.
REPUBLIC v BOLANTE [G.R. No. 186717, April 17,
2017]
FACTS:
 The Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted
to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)
a series of suspicious transaction reports
involving the accounts of Livelihood Corporation
(LIVECOR), Molugan Foundation (Molugan),
and Assembly of Gracious Samaritans, Inc.
(AGS). , LIVECOR transferred to Molugan a
total amount of P172.6 million in a span of 15
months and transferred P40 million to AGS. The
transactions were reported "suspicious" because
they had no underlying legal or trade obligation,
purpose or economic justification; nor were they
commensurate to the business or financial
capacity of Molugan and AGS, which were both
lowly capitalized at P50,000 each.
 Committee Report No. 54 narrated that former
Undersecretary of Agriculture Jocelyn I. Bolante
(Bolante) requested the Department of Budget
and Management to release to the Department of
Agriculture the amount of P728 million for the
purchase of farm inputs under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani Program. Based on the Audit
Report prepared by COA, the use of the funds was
characterized by massive irregularities,
overpricing, violations of the procurement law,
and wanton wastage of scarce government
resources. It also stated that at the time that he
served as Undersecretary of Agriculture, Bolante
was also appointed by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as acting Chairman of
LIVECOR.
 The AMLC issued Resolution No. 75 finding
probable cause to believe that the accounts of
LIVECOR, Molugan and AGS the subjects of the
suspicious transaction reports submitted by PNB
- were related to what became known as the
"fertilizer fund scam."
 The AMLC authorized the filing of a petition for
the issuance of an order allowing an inquiry into
the six accountsof LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS,
Samuel S. Bombeo and Ariel Panganiban.
Meanwhile, based on the investigation of the
Compliance and Investigation Group of the
AMLC Secretariat, a total of 70 bank accounts or
investments were found to be part of the related
web of accounts involved in the fertilizer fund
scam.
 The petition was filed ex parte before the RTC. The
trial court found probable cause and allowed the
AMLC to inquire into and examine the six bank
deposits by LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS, and of the
70 accounts or investments and the related web
of accounts. The CA issued a freeze order on the
70 accounts for a total of 5 months and 20 days.
 After the investigation, the RTC found no
probable cause to believe that the deposits and
investments of respondents were related to an
unlawful activity. It pointed out that the
Republic, in support of the latter's application,
relied merely on two pieces of evidence: Senate
Committee Report No. 54 and the court
testimony of witness Thelma Espina of the
AMLC Secretariat.
 Petitioner applied to further extend the freeze order
over the bank deposits and investments of
respondents, however, the CA denied their
application. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the inquiries and examinations of
the bank accounts constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to privacy.
RULING:
No. A court order ex parte must first be obtained before the
AMLC can inquire into these related Accounts: Provided
that the procedure for the ex parte application of the ex parte
court order for the principal account shall be the same with
that of the related accounts.
The authority to inquire into or examine the main account
and the related accounts shall comply with the
requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987
Constitution.
As regards the purported violation of the right to privacy,
the SC held that the source of the right to privacy
governing bank deposits is statutory, not constitutional.
The legislature may validly carve out exceptions to the
rule on the secrecy of bank deposits, and one such
legislation is Section 11 of R.A. 9160.
------
The constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 9160, as
presently worded, was upheld by the Court En Banc in the
recently promulgated SubidoPagenteCerteza Mendoza
and Binay Law Offices v. CA. The Court therein ruled
that the AMLC's ex parte application for a bank inquiry,
which is allowed under Section 11 of R.A. 9160, does not
violate substantive due process. There is no such violation,
because the physical seizure of the targeted corporeal
property is not contemplated in any form by the law. The
AMLC may indeed be authorized to apply ex parte for an
inquiry into bank accounts, but only in pursuance of its
investigative functions akin to those of the National
Bureau of Investigation. As the AMLC does not exercise
quasi-judicial functions, its inquiry by court order into
bank deposits or investments cannot be said to violate
any person's constitutional right to procedural due
process.
The Court in Subido emphasized that the holder of a bank
account that is the subject of a bank inquiry order
issued ex parte has the opportunity to question the
issuance of such an order after a freeze order has been
issued against the account. The account holder can then
question not only the finding of probable cause for the
issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the bank inquiry order.
-----
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
DISINI v SOJ
FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code
and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law
carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice”
even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for
conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed
malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by
virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of
“actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis
for conviction of libel.
RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of
actual malice in instances where such element is required
to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice,
even when the statement turns out to be false, is available
where the offended party is a public official or a public
figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official)
and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National
Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code
and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that these
laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended
party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable
reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.
Other involved provisions which constitutionality is
questioned:
1. VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes
posting of unsolicited commercial communications;
Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time; and
Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department
of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.
2. VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer
system without right;
Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference,
including transmission of viruses;
Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or
acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to
the prejudice of others;
Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or
misuse of identifying information belonging to another;
Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;
Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child
pornography;
Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when
crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are
committed with the use of information and
communications technologies;
Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to
require service providers to preserve traffic data and
subscriber information as well as specified content data
for six months;
Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;
Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and
examination of computer data under a court-issued
warrant;
Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously
preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;
Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation
to cybercrime investigations;
Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC);
Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and
Functions; and
Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal
Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the
original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and
attempt in the commission of cybercrimes
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5)
on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section
4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4)
on online Libel.
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE
DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7
that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual
cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes
of:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of
the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these,
is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Vivares vs St. Theresa’a College (Writ of habeas data)
FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida
Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresa's College
while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook profile.
Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher
at STC’s high school department, learned from her
students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to
their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia
and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along
the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified
students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
student’s Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine
Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook
Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of
Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe, STC’s high school principal
and ICM Directress. They claimed that during the
meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the
STC officials present in the conference.
Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day
that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining
the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30,
2012.
Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of
Cebu City against STC
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred
the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained
unresolved.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ
of habeas data.
ISUUE: whether or not a writ of habeas data should be
issued given the factual circumstances
RULING: No. Writ of Habeas data should not be issued.
Under the law, the writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. In developing the writ of habeas data,
the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others.
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the
right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will
not prosper. In the case at bar, this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network
(OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time
interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans
the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical
space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users?
Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the
procedural issues in this case.
STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of
teaching its students to be responsible in their dealings
and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when
it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process,
it violated the students’ rights.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not
violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo
Lee vs Ilagan
Facts: Neri A. Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee were former
common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, Ilagan
visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while
and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Ilagan notice that
his digital camera was missing when he arrived. On
August 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s officer
regarding a purported sex video she discovered from the
camera involving the latter and another woman. Ilagan
denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera.
Lee utilized the said video in filing various complaints
against Ilagan (a) a criminal complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati;
and (b) an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute
the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and
uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to
life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the
other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas
data in his favor is warranted.
In her Verified Return, Lee admitted that she indeed kept
the memory card of the digital camera and reproduce the
video. But averred that she only did so to utilize the same
as evidence on the cases she filed against Ilagan.
Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition of the
writ of habeas data should be dismissed because (a) its
filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence
against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan.
RTC granted privilege of writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s
favor. It did not give credence to Lee’s defense. RTC opined
that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the
various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough
justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC
clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the
aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other
tribunals. Hence the petition by Lee.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling: No. The petition is meritorious.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ
of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in
order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, the
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other . Corollarily, the
allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful.
In the case at bar, the SC found that Ilagan was not able
to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty, or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in
the suppression of this video, he failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his
right to life, liberty or security. Alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the rights
to life, liberty, or security are crucial in habeas data cases
and failure on either account renders the petition
dismissible.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the
allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due
to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records
show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition
was his testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that
Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards
the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to
use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends –
say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear
in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced
the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that
she filed against Ilagan. DECISION REVERSED.
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA DISMISSED
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, et.al.
FACTS:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. It was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected
zone of privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
HELD:
The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The
right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself,
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of the said order. The broadness,
vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear
and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes
from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), et. al., Petitioners,
- versus –
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL of NEDA, DBM Secretary,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006
FACTS:
 This case involves two consolidated petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO
420), issued by Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
 Under EO 420, the President directs all
government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform
data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems.
PETIOTIONER’s Contention:
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO
420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government. Furthermore,
they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens
right to privacy.
 EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on
the right to privacy
I. It allows access to personal confidential
data without the owners consent.
II. EO 420 is vague and without adequate
safeguards or penalties for any violation
of its provisions.
III. There are no compelling reasons that will
legitimize the necessity of EO 420.
ISSUE: WON EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to
privacy.
SC: NO. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional
infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that
can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguardsi to protect the
confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the
prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards.
 The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of
reasonable ID systems by government
entities. Some one hundred countries have
compulsory national ID systems, including
democracies such as Spain, France, Germany,
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Portugal. Even with EO 420, the Philippines will
still fall under the countries that do not have
compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services,
and other specific purposes.
 Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and similar government entities stand
to suffer substantial losses arising from false
names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs
licensing system will suffer in the absence of a
reliable ID system.
 Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will
violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot
show such violation by a mere facial examination
of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the
data collection, recording and exhibition while
prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v.
Torresis not authority to hold that EO 420
violates the right to privacy because in that case
the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn
and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on
the ground that the subject matter required
legislation.
 EO 420 applies only to government entities that
already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In contrast,
the assailed executive issuance in Ople v.
Torres sought to establish
a National Computerized Identification Reference
System, a national ID system that did not exist
prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new
national data collection and card issuance
system where none existed before.
 In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a
national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly,
more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the Presidents
 constitutional power of control over government
entities in the Executive department, as well as
under the Presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

DP: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID

i
Prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to
government entities prescribing safeguards on the
collection, recording, and disclosure of personal
identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now,
under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are
instituted:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall
be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of
this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of
other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be
allowed or tolerated under this order;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall
be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal
or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be
protected by advanced security features and cryptographic
technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the
identification card shall be required for any correction or
revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card shall
prescribe.

c. Stringent systems of access control to data

in the identification system shall be instituted;