Emergency Relief System Evaluation Report

Emergency Relief System Evaluation for Seven Storage
Tanks and Reactor RX at Company A.
Client Company A
Client site location Site A
Contact Mr. Gentleman
Contact job title Operation Manager
Report issue date Feb 9th, 2018
Report number R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final Report
© 20167 DEKRA Insight. All rights reserved.

Contents Page No.
1. Project Details 5
1.1 Revision History 5
2. Executive Summary 6
3. Introduction 7
4. Scope of Study 8
5. Process Description 9
5.1 Reactor RX 9
5.2 Seven Storage Tanks 10
6. Vent System Design 16
6.1 Overall Design Approach 16
6.2 Design Scenario for Emergency Relief Vent Sizing 16
6.3 General Vent Sizing Assumptions 17
6.4 Calculation Approach 17
6.5 Calculation Method for Fire Engulfment 18
6.6 Plant Equipment Details 18
7. Review of Laboratory Testing Data for Reactor RX 22
7.1 Results of RC1 Test and Thermal Analysis 22
7.2 Results of ARC Test for Gelation 25
7.3 VSP Test for Synthesizing Reaction Kinetics 26
8. Vent Sizing for Reactor RX 32
8.1 Vent Sizing Methodology 32
8.2 Failure Scenario 1: N2 Inerting Failure 35
8.3 Failure Scenario 2: Loss of Cooling for Runaway Reaction Initiated at 75 °C 37
8.4 Failure Scenario 3: Loss of Cooling for Runaway Reaction Initiated at 120 °C 37
8.5 Failure Scenario 4: External Fire with Solvent Addition 39
9. Vent Sizing for Seven Storage Tanks 42
9.1 Single Phase Vapor Relief 43
9.2 Churn-turbulent Flow Vapor Relief 44
9.3 Homogeneous Two-Phase Relief 46
9.4 Summary 47
10. Conclusions 49
Appendix A Vent Sizing Results for RX: Relief scenario 1 - nitrogen inerting failure 51
Appendix B Vent Sizing Results for RX: Relief scenario 3 – Loss of Cooling for Normal
Reaction X Temperature of 120 °C 52
Appendix C Vent Sizing Results for RX: Relief scenario 4 – External fire with solvent
addition 53
Appendix D Omega Method for Calculating Vent Line Capacity 54
Appendix E Vent Sizing Based on Vessel Fire Engulfment 56
Appendix F Vent Sizing Calculations for Runaway Reaction 61
Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 2 of 66

Appendix G Vent Sizing for Gassy Systems 65
Appendix H Legal Disclaimer and Liability 66
List of Tables
Table 1: Operation procedure of RX in Company A manufacturing plant 9
Table 2: Details on seven storage tanks 11
Table 3: Details of Reactor RX 20
Table 4: Existing vent line and PRV details of RX 20
Table 5: Existing vent line details of seven storage tanks 21
Table 6: Physical properties of chemicals used in RC1 and RC1 testing mass loading ratio 23
Table 7: ARC testing condition 25
Table 8: Material charging design chart for VSP test 27
Table 9: Relief system sizing for RX at the failure scenario of nitrogen overflow 36
Table 10: Relief system sizing for RX at the failure scenario of loss cooling 39
Table 11: Physical properties of mixture at relief pressure and the maximum accumulated pressure
40
Table 12: Relief system sizing for RX under external fire 41
Table 13: Physical properties of solvents at relieving pressure and the maximum accumulated pressure
42
Table 14: Vapor relief calculation for seven storage tanks 44
Table 15: Churn-turbulent relief calculation for seven storage tanks 47
Table 16: Homogeneous relief calculation for seven storage tanks 48
Table 17: Summary of vent size of seven storage tanks 48
List of Figures
Figure 1: Sketch of temperature in RX as a function of time with chemical addition 10
Figure 2: P&ID of Reactor RX 12
Figure 3: Pressure relief valve installed on Reactor RX 12
Figure 4: Relief line layout of Reactor RX 13
Figure 5: Tank Farm with three (3) below-grade tanks Each in the separated dike area and four (4)
above-grade tanks in one dike area. 13
Figure 6: Relief line layout of four above-grade storage tanks 13
Figure 7: Relief line layout of three below-grade storage tanks 14

Figure 8: Flame arrester installed at the exit of storage tank 14
Figure 9: Flow capacity as a function of pressure drop of flame arrester 15
Figure 10: Mr & Torque vs. time 23
Figure 11: Mr & qflow vs. time 24
Figure 12: Mr & Temp. vs. time 24
Figure 13: Mr & Cp. vs. time 24
Figure 14: ARC testing temperature and pressure vs. time of gelation 25
Figure 15: Testing results of Antoine plot of gelation 26
Figure 16: T & P vs. time of VSP test 27
Figure 17: T & P vs. time during exothermic reaction 28
Figure 18: T & dT/dt vs. time during exothermic reaction 28
Figure 19: ln[(dTm/dt)/(Tmf-Tm)2] vs. -1000/Tm 29
Figure 20: T & dT/dt vs. time, tested data and predicted data 30
Figure 21: ln(dT/dt) vs. -1000/T, tested data and predicted data 30
Figure 22: Final temperature and nozzle size of PRV as a function of initial temperature of runaway
reaction 38

1. PROJECT DETAILS
Quotation Number XXXXX
Project Number XXXXX
Client Address
Site A
DEKRA Insight Address Chilworth Technology Inc., 113 Campus Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540
Contact Details Phone: 609 799 4449

Email: safety-usa@chilworthglobal.com
Web: www.dekra-insight.com
Author Guibing Zhao, PhD., Senior Process Safety Specialist
Peer Reviewer Daniel Watters, Process Safety Specialist
This report has been issued in digital format. In order to maintain the integrity of the data, the secure
digital copy held in the DEKRA Insight archive will be considered the source document; all other
versions will be considered uncontrolled copies.
1.1 Revision History
Version Date RS3son for Revision Author Reviewed

Number by
Draft 08/06/2017 Draft version issued GZ DW
Final 01/09/2018 Final report issued GZ DW

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the request of Company A, a Senior Process Safety Specialist from Chilworth Technology, Inc.
(Chilworth) completed an emergency relief system vent sizing for seven storage tanks under the relief
scenario of external fire and Reactor RX under multiple scenarios at the facility in Site A. Reactor RX has
a pressure relief valve that needs to be properly sized and seven storage tanks have open vents to
atmosphere without any relief devices.
The purpose of the emergency relief system sizing was to avoid the overpressure from certain failure
scenarios that may result in high vapor and/or gas pressure in the vessels, and burst the vessels if an
inadequate emergency relief system was provided. Company A considered the following four failure
scenarios for Reactor RX:
(1) 6 barg N2 inerting failure;
(2) Loss of cooling during Reaction X initiated at 75 °C;
(3) Loss of cooling during Reaction X initiated at 120 °C;
(4) External fire with solvent addition into reactor
Chilworth performed the lab test and deduced the reaction kinetics of Reaction X in RX. The vent sizing
of RX comes to the following conclusions:
For relief scenario 1: nitrogen inerting failure
• The existing PRV and the relief line installation is adequate to protect the RX for failure scenario
of nitrogen inerting.
For relief scenarios 2 & 3: loss of cooling, when adequate solvent S1 exists in reactor.
• When Reaction X is initiated at temperature less 99 °C, reactor RX can contain the overpressure
induced by an exothermic runaway reaction.
• The worst case relief condition is that the runaway reaction is initiated at 113 °C, i.e., the
boiling point of S1 at relief pressure of 2.66 bara, in which
The calculated orifice area of PRV that can adequately prevent overpressure is 29784 mm2
(i.e. 2x API “T” orifices) for the worst case relief of loss of cooling.
For the same relief line routing, enlarging both inlet piping and outlet piping to not less
than NPS 12 inch (Sch 10S) are required to avoid instability issue of PRV.
For relief scenario 4: External fire with solvent addition
• A PRV with a “Q” orifice (the effective flow area 7129.02 mm2) is adequate for emergency
relief.
• The inlet piping of not less than NPS 3.5 inch (Sch40) and the outlet piping of not less than NPS
6 inch (Sch40) are required to avoid instability issue of PRV.
The vent sizes of seven storage tanks at relief scenario of external fire are shown below:
V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Storage Tank V1-S1 Vert V2-S2 Vert V3-S3 Vert V4-S4 Vert
Horizon Horizon Horizon
Vent Diameter,
6 7 6 6 7 7 7
inch

3. INTRODUCTION
This vent sizing evaluation project was planned to complete in two Phases. At Phase I, a Senior Process
Safety Specialist (Dr. Guibing Zhao) of Chilworth visited the Company A facility at Location A, on June 7th
and 8th, 2016 to gather the information and performed a preliminary assessment of the emergency
relief systems associated with 39 process vessels and 7 solvent storage tanks. The Phase I evaluation1
based on US DIERS (Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems) technology indicated that external
fire is a credible failure scenario for vent sizing of relief systems of 39 process vessels in factories
PLANT1 and PLANT2 and 7 solvent storage tanks, but not for vessels in PLANT3. In addition, sufficient
information for the Phase II project, including vessel size, design pressure, chemicals loaded, the
detailed relief line layout for each vessel and all devices and pipe fittings installed on each relief line
was collected in Phase I project.
Chilworth thought that it was quite prudent to comprehensively evaluate and design emergency relief
systems for all 39 process vessels in the factories PLANT1 and PLANT2. However, Company A would like
to reduce the scope to include seven storage tanks and one reactor alone, i.e., RX in PLANT1, since
Company A speculated that the reaction in RX is the most violent reaction. Nonetheless, no solid kinetic
data are available to support this speculation. Chilworth addressed the potential issues but accepted
the scope reduction as Company A requested. Therefore, Phase II of this project only covers evaluation
of the adequacy of the currently installed emergency relief system for reactor RX alone under several
relief scenarios including external fire and seven storage tanks under external fire in the plant.
The design approach has involved laboratory experimentation using adiabatic calorimetry to determine
the appropriate thermochemistry and kinetic parameters of the process formulations for RX and vent
sizing calculations using DIERS methodology. Company A has engaged Chilworth Technology to
undertake the experiments and calculation phases of this work.
A companion report2 details the laboratory results from thermal stability experimentation, whilst the
present report mainly summarizes the vent sizing calculations.
1
Chilworth report# R/XXXXX/0816/GZ, “Preliminary Assessment of Emergency Relief System for Company A.”,
issued on August 8, 2016
2
Chilworth testing report # POXXXXAR

4. SCOPE OF STUDY
This assessment covers vent sizing calculations for emergency relief systems of one reactor RX for
synthesis and seven storage tanks for solvents.
Hazard assessment of the process/plant has been conducted by Company A, and calorimetry tests
including VSP II (Vent Sizing Package II) calorimetry on the resultant worst case design scenarios and
related characterization testing have been undertaken by Chilworth Technology Inc. The data from
these experimental tests, together with a traditionally theoretical approach, has been used in the
present calculations. This work follows discussions between a group of engineers in Company A and Dr.
Guibing Zhao (Chilworth Technology Inc.), and is in response to quotation number xxxxx. The main
Company A staff that participated in the discussions was:
Name Title
Gentleman Operation Manager
xxxx Process Safety, Asia Pacific
xxxx Regional Manufacturing and Process Engineer
xxxx SHE Manager
xxxx Manufacturing Manager
xxxx Manufacturing Engineering Manager
Safety in chemical manufacture requires that all possible operational hazards (i.e. the presence and
possible ignition of flammable atmospheres) and chemical reaction hazards are evaluated and that a
suitable basis for safe operation is determined and implemented. Should the reaction conditions or
plant details be changed (e.g. temperature, times, reaction concentrations, scale, materials of
construction or mal-operations not covered by this assessment) then consideration should be given to
re-assessment of the process.

5. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
5.1 Reactor RX
Company A has a reactor RX in PLANT1 that is employed to synthesize product. The reaction operation
procedure is shown in Table 1. Figure 1 shows the sketch of temperature in RX as a function of time
with chemical additions as provided by Company A. The reaction occurs when the catalyst XXX is added
at step 9, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Table 1: Operation procedure of RX in Company A manufacturing plant

Quantity Charging Mixing
Step Chemical Added % (wt) Remark Temp
, kg Time, min Time, min
1 RAW1 290.00 14.06 15 35°C
2 RAW2 126.00 6.46 15 15 35°C
3 Raw3, flakes 0.50 0.026 1 65~70°C
4 Raw4 flake 0.001 0.00001 Premix well 65~70°C
2
5 Solvent1 8.42E-03 0.0004317 before input 10 65~70°C
6 Raw5 0.08 0.004 2 65~75°C
7 SOLVENT2 33.20 1.70 5 65~75°C
10
8 Raw6 11.35 0.58 5 65~75°C
9 CATALYST 0.10 0.005 2 50 90~115°C
10 Solvent1 322.00 16.52 10 70~75°C
30
Checking FT/IR 20 70~75°C
11 SOLVENT2 2.50 0.13 5% 5 70~75°C
90
12 SOLVENT2 1.00 0.05 4% 5 70~75°C
90
13 Solvent1 120.00 6.16 10 70~75°C
14 SOLVENT2 0.45 0.023 1% 5 70~75°C
Checking FT/IR 20 90 70~75°C
N2 gas off 70~75°C
Cooling water
15 Solvent1 58.17 2.98 10 45~50°C
16 S5tone 400.00 20.52 15 150 45~50°C
17 Solvent4 600.00 30.78 30 45~50°C
Total 1949.35 100.00 217 535
Figure 2 shows P&ID of the reactor RX that Company A provided. RX has a flooded volume of 4.173 m3
and design pressure of 2 barg. A pressure relief valve (DN50, lot# xxx) as shown in Figure 3 is installed
on RX. The supplier of this valve is xxxx, China. Chilworth contacted the supplier and found out that this
valve has a nozzle size of 48mm and a discharge coefficient of 0.22 for either gas or liquid. Open
pressure of this relief valve is 1.5 barg.

Figure 1: Sketch of temperature in RX as a function of time with chemical addition
5.2 Seven Storage Tanks

There are four above-grade storage tanks in one dike area and three below-grade storage tanks that is
Each in its separate dike area, as shown in Figure 5. The relief line layouts of these seven storage tanks
are shown in Figure 6 and
Figure 7. Three below-grade storage tanks are horizontal vessels and four above-grade storage tanks
are vertical vessels. The details on seven storage tanks are shown in Table 2. Each of these seven
storage tanks has open vent and a flame arrester installed at the exit of vent. All flame arresters are 2-
inch xxxx-type from xxxx Steel Power Corp. as shown in Figure 8. Chilworth contacted xxxx Steel Power
Corp. and calculated the flow resistance of this type of flame arrester according to the volumetric flow
rate of air and pressure drop across the flame arrester provided by xxxx Steel Power Corp. as shown in
Figure 9. It was found that the flow resistance of this type of flame arrestor is 3.

Table 2: Details on seven storage tanks
V1-S1 V2-S2 V3-S3 V4-S4 V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Vessel Details Unit
Vert Vert Vert Vert Underg Underg Underg
Inside Diameter mm 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,632 2,632 2,632
wall thickness mm 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Tan/Tan mm 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 4,610 4,610 4,610
Design Pressure barg 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon
material
steel steel steel steel steel steel steel
Top Dish Height mm 130 130 130 130 70 70 70
Dished End Type Cone Cone Cone Cone Ellipse Ellipse Ellipse
Dished End Volume m3 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85
Top DE external Surface
m2 7.00 6.77 6.82 6.79 6.08 6.08 6.08
area
Bottom Dish Height mm 0 0 0 0 70 70 70
Dished End Type Flat Flat Flat Flat Ellipse Ellipse Ellipse
Dished End Volume m3 0 0 0 0 0.85 0.85 0.85

Bottom DE external
m² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.08 6.08 6.08
Surface Area
Specific Cylindrical
m³/m 6.158 6.158 6.158 6.158 5.441 5.441 5.441
Volume
Cylindrical Volume m³ 21.551 21.551 21.551 21.551 25.082 25.082 25.082
Cylindrical Surface Area m² 30.788 30.788 30.788 30.788 38.408 38.408 38.408
Total Surface Area m² 37.790 37.561 37.609 37.580 50.561 50.561 50.561
Total Vessel Volume (2
m³ 22.466 22.451 22.454 22.452 26.785 26.785 26.785
HS3ds)
Liquid Fill Details
MW, kg/mol xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Fill Volume ( Max) m³ 18.500 17.800 17.800 17.800 21.300 21.300 21.300
Fill ratio 0.823 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.795 0.795 0.795
Filled height ( Max) m 3.004 2.891 2.891 2.891 2.925 2.925 2.925
Liquid density @ RT kg/m3 805.0 800.0 902.0 735.0 792.0 805.0 900.0
Solvent weight kg 14893 14240 16056 13083 16870 17147 19170

confidential
Figure 2: P&ID of Reactor RX
confidential
Figure 3: Pressure relief valve installed on Reactor RX

confidential
Figure 4: Relief line layout of Reactor RX
4 above-grade tanks in one dike area

3 below-grade tanks in separated dike area
confidential confidential
Figure 5: Tank Farm with three (3) below-grade tanks each in the separated dike area and four (4)
above-grade tanks in one dike area.
confidential
Figure 6: Relief line layout of four above-grade storage tanks

confidential
Figure 7: Relief line layout of three below-grade storage tanks
confidential
Figure 8: Flame arrester installed at the exit of storage tank

confidential
Figure 9: Flow capacity as a function of pressure drop of flame arrester

6. VENT SYSTEM DESIGN
6.1 Overall Design Approach
The design approach for any emergency relief system is based upon a credible failure condition and
must reflect the nature of the materials handled. In the case of a multi-product plant, additional
complication is introduced owing to the variety of, and potential interaction between, both normal
operating conditions and potential failure cases. The overall emergency vent design procedure may be
summarized as:
• Identify the range of chemicals and processes to be handled
• Establish the potential hazards inherent with the materials and conditions
• Perform hazard assessment studies to identify potential failure scenarios (e.g. by reference to
checklists, What-if or HAZOP studies)
• Consider potential for common events affecting multiple vessels
• Determine the worst case scenario for vent design
• Characterize the materials being handled
• Perform laboratory testing to simulate the failures being considered (adiabatic calorimetry) where
necessary
• Use standard correlations and/or the test data, together with DIERS methodology, to determine the
required vent sizes
• Consider the requirements for secondary treatment of the relS3se strS3m and for the mechanical
restraint of piping and equipment
• Document and archive the results of the study
This sequence has been followed in the case of the present study, with the laboratory testing, data
interpretation and vent sizing calculations being the subject of the present work.
6.2 Design Scenario for Emergency Relief Vent Sizing

The failure scenarios under investigation were determined by Company A, i.e., the ‘fire induced’ relief
scenario has been ascertained to be the worst case for the relief device sizing of seven storage tanks,
and four failure scenarios has been considered as
1) 6 barg N2 inerting overpressure at the maximum N2 flow rate of 90 liters/minute at 6 barg and
ambient temperature.
2) Loss of cooling for normal xxxxxx reaction initiated at 75 °C (no external fire)
3) Loss of cooling for normal xxxxxx reaction initiated at 120 °C (no external fire)
4) External fire with solvent addition
These constitutes the design base of this project. The scenario of loss of cooling and the associated
runaway reaction has been simulated in RC1, VSPII, and ARC calorimetry studies. These data are used

for the vent sizing calculations. The credibility of the fire failure scenario has been investigated in the
Phase I of the project.
6.3 General Vent Sizing Assumptions

The worst case assumption is for the discharge of a homogeneous 2-phase fluid during runaway
reaction. The calculations have also considered the following:
• Experimental data from the closed cell tests is used to describe the runaway kinetics and gas/vapor
pressure behavior, where appropriate.
• Data from open cell tests is used to characterize the formation of gas, where appropriate.
• “Foamy” fluids are assumed to vent a homogeneous 2-phase fluid until the pressure is controlled
within the vessel’s capabilities, or the fill falls to a very low level; whereas “Non-Foamy” fluids are
assumed capable of disengaging vapor once the liquid fill falls below a limiting level. The
assumption for the present analysis on Reactor RX is that the fluids will relieve as a foamy
homogeneous 2-phase discharge when volumetric fill ratio of liquid is greater than 20%; this is valid
for most reacting systems and is particularly so for high viscosity fluids. The seven storage tanks
have been checked using both methods.
• The 2-phase viscosity of the fluid discharged during the runaway is an important parameter in vent
sizing; if <100 cP at the relief temperature, the ‘standard’ DIERS equations may be used, otherwise
calculations must take account of possible laminar flow conditions.
• Vent line capacity is calculated using the omega routine under steady state conditions for fluids of
low viscosity; laminar flow equations are used for high viscosity fluids.
• Required relieving capacity is calculated allowing for overpressure (i.e. the pressure is permitted to
rise from the bursting disc pressure to the maximum accumulated pressure of the vessel whilst
venting occurs) in the case of tempered vapor pressure systems; for gassy systems vent capacity is
evaluated at the maximum allowable accumulated pressure.
• Discharge is to atmosphere, or to a disengagement tank and subsequent treatment before
discharge to atmosphere.
• Due to conservatism of DIERS technology, safety factor has not been applied to the calculated area
due to two-phase flow.
These general assumptions are reviewed, where necessary, in the analysis of the individual processes.
6.4 Calculation Approach

The overall calculation approach is as follows:
• Establish the required discharge rate to keep the vessel within the allowable pressure limits during
the fire engulfment or other scenarios
• Calculate the individual vessel vent device capacity, assuming 2-phase flow where appropriate
• Derive the required vent diameter

6.5 Calculation Method for Fire Engulfment
In the case of the fire engulfment calculations, the heat input is calculated from standard correlations in
API 521 for vessels that have a MAWP more than 15 Psig (1.03 barg), whilst the heat input is calculated
from standard correlations in API 2000 for storage tanks that have a MAWP less than 15 Psig (1.03
barg). The vent line capacity is calculated from homogeneous 2-phase flow method, bubbly flow
method or churn-turbulent flow methods developed during the DIERS program for two-phase venting
and adiabatic single phase flow for single phase venting.
The assumptions made in these calculations include:
• Fire heat input is calculated using API 521 (Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, Sixth
Edition, 2014) or API 2000 (Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks, Sixth Edition,
2009), depending on MAWP of the vessels.
• It is assumed that any spillage could result in a pool fire directly around the vessels.
• The relevant wetted wall area for assessing the heat absorption is taken to be the liquid-full vessel
if two-phase flow is identified.
• “Foamy” fluids are assumed to vent a homogeneous 2-phase fluid until the pressure is controlled
within the vessel’s capabilities; whereas “Non-Foamy” fluids are assumed capable of disengaging
vapor once the liquid fill falls below a limiting level. In the present case, level swell calculations are
performed to identify the threshold of disengagement if the physical properties such as Surface
tension of the solvents/mixtures are known. Otherwise, a homogeneous 2-phase fluid flow is
conservatively assumed.
• The vessel pressure is allowed to rise from design pressure up to an accumulated vessel pressure of
121% of MAWP under external fire for pressure vessel with a MAWP greater than 15 Psig (1.03
barg) during venting, while for storage tanks with a design pressure in the range of 2.5 Psig - 15 Psig
(1.03 barg), vessel pressure is allowed to rise from design pressure up to an accumulated vessel
pressure of 120% of MAWP under external fire, according to API 650, Welded Tanks for Oil Storage.
For relief scenarios without external fire case, the maximum allowable accumulated pressure of
110% of MAWP is applied, in order to minimize the required vent size.
6.6 Plant Equipment Details

Reactor RX and its relief line as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 4 at Company A have been examined. The
emergency relief vent from this reactor discharges to a pressure relief valve, then vents to atmosphere.
The details of Reactor RX and the relief line routing are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
Details of seven storage tanks are shown in Table 2. The relief line details of seven storage tanks are
shown in Figure 6 and
Figure 7, while the flow resistances of these relief lines are shown in Table 5.

Table 3: Details of Reactor RX
Reactor RX
Internal Diameter, meter 1.556
Height Tan/Tan, meter 1.665
Dished End Type Elliptical
Volume (to top-tan line), m3 3.669
Flooding Volume, m3 4.173
Reactor Design Pressure 2 barg
Relief Device Set Pressure 1.5 barg
Liquid density, kg/m3 742 - 815
Volumetric fill ratio 0.63 (with solvents), 0.15 (without solvents),
Reactor Charge (kg) 1949.4 (with solvents), 449.2 (without solvents)
Insulation Not a Fireproof insulation, no SS jacketing
Drainage Type (Good or Poor) Poor
Heating Jacket Jacket type
Table 4: Existing vent line and PRV details of RX

Reactor RX
Vent line prior to PRV K
Line diameter (mm) 54.8
Inlet 0.5
Total line length (mm) 200 0.07
Max. line elevation (mm) 200
No. 90° LR bends
No. Tee straight through
Total flow resistance 0.57
Vent line after PRV
Line diameter (mm) 54.79
Total line length (mm) 5900 2.15
Max. line elevation (mm) 3000
No. 90° LR bends 2 0.33
No. Exit 1 1
Total flow resistance 3.82

Table 5: Existing vent line details of seven storage tanks
V1-S1 V2-S2 V3-S3 V4-S4 V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Storage Tank Unit
Vert Vert Vert Vert Underg Underg Underg
Existing vent line diameter m 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627
Total physical length m 12.7 12.7 8.3 8.3 11 15.7 18.3
Vent line elevation increase from
m 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 5.3 5.3 5.3
inlet to outlet
No. Std 90° Bends 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
No. flame arrester 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total flow resistance, K 10.44 10.44 9.03 9.03 9.89 11.39 12.22

7. REVIEW OF LABORATORY TESTING DATA FOR REACTOR RX
Since RX xxxxxx reaction includes multiple steps of material charging as shown in Section 5, the
exothermic behavior at Each step should be thoroughly investigated to find out at which step has the
most exothermic reaction. RC1 test with multiple step material charging to simulate the normal
operation of plant scale reactor and thermal analysis of the corresponding intermediate should give the
insight of the worst-case relief condition. The adiabatic test is further performed to deduce the reaction
kinetics of the large scale industrial reactor that can be directly used for vent sizing.
7.1 Results of RC1 Test and Thermal Analysis

To simulate the normal operation of synthesis in RX, Chilworth USA performed the RC1 test according
to the same procedures as Company A plant did as shown in Table 1. Parts of the physical properties of
chemicals used in RX and mass loading in RC1 test that is scaled down to simulate RX are shown in
Table 6. Testing results of RC1 are shown in Figure 10 (mass of reactants (Mr) & stirrer torque (Rt) vs.
time), Figure 11 (Mr & heat relS3se rate (qflow) vs. time), Figure 12 (Mr & reaction (Tr) / jacket (Tj)
temperatures vs. time), and Figure 13 (Mr & heat capacity (Cp) vs. time). Summary of the RC1 testing
results is
(1) Exothermic reaction occurs when SOLVENT2 is added at the first time, and the reaction is
accelerated when the catalyst is added, as shown in Figure 11 (Mr & qflow vs. time) and Figure 12
(Mr & temperature vs. time).
(2) Stirrer torque of RC1 reactor is gradually increased after charging catalyst as shown in Figure 10 (Mr
& Torque vs. time), which indicates that the viscosity of reaction system is increased during
Reaction X. Experimental observation indicates that viscosity is unexpectedly high when reaction
performed to some degree so that an “ball” like dough around the stirrer during test is finally
formed. This high viscosity would significantly limit the heat transfer rate during test so that
accurate measurement of reaction heat from RC1 is questionable (not an ideal RC1 test).
(3) After integration of qflow vs. time as shown in Figure 11 (Mr & qflow vs. time), it is indicated that
reaction heat is 9.24 kJ. Accordingly, the calculated adiabatic temperature rise is 31.5 °C, which may
be underestimated.
(4) No exothermic reactions are observed after Reaction X is completed, i.e., since Step 10 as shown in
Table 1.
(5) As shown in Figure 13 (Mr & heat capacity vs. time), heat capacities during reaction and after
reaction of charging solvent are 3.21 J⋅g-1⋅k-1 and 2.73 J⋅g-1⋅k-1, respectively.
With above RC1 testing results, the further testing plan was proposed by Chilworth:
(1) RepS3t RC1 to collect dough sample for ARC test, which is used to determine the stability (onset
temperature) of synthesized gelation.
(2) In order to prevent the effect of viscosity on reaction kinetics of the normal synthesizing reaction,
perform VSP test for normal reaction with 42% S1 under adiabatic condition. Company A confirmed
that S1 would not affect the synthesizing reaction kinetics. 42% S1 (Step 10 in Table 1) is selected
because the viscosity would be significantly dropped even after xxxxxx, as shown in Figure 10.

Table 6: Physical properties of chemicals used in RC1 and RC1 testing mass loading ratio
RX Mass RC1 Mass Chemical MW, Specific

Chemicals charged CAS# M.P., °C B.P, °C
load, kg load, g Formula g/mol Gravity
RAW1 274 56.30 no data
RAW2 126 25.89 no data
Raw3 0.5 0.10 1.085@80 °C 58 295

Raw4 + S1 0.0085 0.0017 -87 80
Raw 0.08 0.016 1.07@20 °C -99 213
SOLVENT2 33.2 6.82 1.047@20 °C -67 255
310
Raw6 11.35 2.33 1.06@20 °C -60
initial
CAT 0.095 0.020 3

S1 322 66.16 -87 80
SOLVENT2 2.5 0.51 1.047@20 °C -67 255
SOLVENT2 1 0.21 1.047@20 °C -67 255
S1 120 24.66 -87 80
SOLVENT2 0.45 0.09 1.047@20 °C -67 255
S1 58.17 11.95 -87 80
S5tone 400 82.19 0.79 -95 56
Solvent4 600 123.28 0.902 -83 77
Figure 10: Mr & Torque vs. time

Figure 11: Mr & qflow vs. time
Figure 12: Mr & Temp. vs. time
Figure 13: Mr & Cp. vs. time

7.2 Results of ARC Test for Gelation
Chilworth resynthesized the gelation in RC1 by following the same procedure as in Section 7.1 but
without charging solvents after the synthesis reaction, i.e., sample was collected after synthesis
reaction was completed after charging catalyst at the Step 9 as shown in Table 1. ARC testing condition
is shown in Table 7, and the results are shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15.
ARC testing results as shown in Figure 14 indicate that decomposition of this gelation is endothermic
without exothermic reaction/decomposition up to 400 °C. Product decomposition occurs at about 190
°C, as shown in Figure 15, where cell pressure increases as temperature increases higher than about
190 °C.
Table 7: ARC testing condition
Item Value
Mass of gelation, g 3.34
Heat capacity of sample, J⋅g-1⋅k-1 3.21
Mass of bomb, g 15.56
Heat capacity of bomb, J⋅g-1⋅k-1 0.414
Phi factor (φ): 1.60
Figure 14: ARC testing temperature and pressure vs. time of xxxx

Figure 15: Testing results of Antoine plot of xxxx
7.3 VSP Test for Synthesizing Reaction Kinetics

Due to high viscosity of xxxx during synthesizing reaction, it is unlikely to be possible to obtain
characteristic reaction kinetics through using modern Calorimetry technologies without reducing the
viscosity of the reaction system. Therefore, reducing viscosity of reaction system is critical to deduce
reaction kinetics of synthesis for vent sizing. As shown in Figure 10, stirrer torque of the RC1 reactor
was reduced to the normal value when xxxx g S1 was charged, which simulated Step 10 in plant reactor
RX, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the current test is designed to have the same mass ratio of S1 at
Step 10 during synthesis reaction in RX. Such testing condition is shown in Table 8. The testing process
is as below:
1) Molten xxxx and xxx is charged directly to test cell.
2) Setting cell in VSP containment; all connections and signal calibrations done at room temp. xxxx
and xxxx are solids at room temperature.
3) Under vacuum at room temperature, S1 (19.2 g) is charged into test cell.
4) Started heating (2 °C/min) to 70 °C.
5) Once at 70 °C, 13.9 g mixture of xxx (0.048 g), xxx (0.02 g) SOLVENT2 (3.41 g), xx (1.17 g), S1 (13.0
g) and xxx cat (0.02 g – added to mixture right before charging to VSP) is added to test cell under
vacuum.
Figure 16 shows the testing T & P vs. time for the full scale of time, while Figure 17 shows the T & P vs.
time during exothermic reaction. Figure 18 shows T & dT/dt vs. time during exothermic reaction. Prior
to charging xxxg mixture with catalyst, non-linear heat up as shown in Figure 16 is due to fact that the
xxx/xxx/S1 mixture are not miscible and xxxx/xxxx are solid at temperatures of lower than their melting

point until elevated temperature. Reaction temperature dipped to about 53.6 °C as shown in Figure 16
because xxx g of room temperature mixture was charged. Reaction mixture temperature was heated
up to about 79.7 C by the exothermic reaction of synthesis, where temperature stabilized.
Table 8: Material charging design chart for VSP test
RX loading, VSP Scale Targeted VSP Scale

Master data Cp, J⋅g-1⋅k-1 Comment
kg (Target), g wt % (Actual), g
HC VSP cell 42.6 0.42
RAW1 274 28.149 35.71% 28.2 3.28
RAW2 126 12.944 16.42% 13 3.28
19.2 g S1 added at room
Solvent1
322 33.080 41.97% 33.1 2.2 temperature; 13.9 g S1 added
(S1)
as mixture
Raw3, flakes 0.5 0.051 0.07% 0.048
Raw5 0.08 0.008 0.01% 0.02
SOLVENT2 33.2 3.411 4.33% 3.41
Raw6 11.35 1.166 1.48% 1.17
CATALYST 0.095 0.010 0.01% 0.02
Sum Total 767.225 78.819 100% 78.968
Inject xxxxx
Figure 16: T & P vs. time of VSP test

Figure 17: T & P vs. time during exothermic reaction
Figure 18: T & dT/dt vs. time during exothermic reaction
Theory3 of the adiabatic reaction kinetics demonstrates that the temperature rise rate of an adiabatic
reaction system can be described as
Equation 1: ∙ ∙ ∙
where is the measured temperature of reaction system, t is time, n is the reaction order, E is the
reaction activation energy, R is the gas constant, is the initial concentration of a limited reagent,
3
DIERS, 1992

is the initial temperature of reaction system, and is the final temperature of a runaway
reaction. Equation 1 is transformed as
Equation 2: ′ with ∙
The reaction order can be calculated as
Equation 3: ∙
where !"" is the temperature at the maximum temperature rise rate.

By extensive trial and error analysis of the testing data as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, the
following reaction kinetic information of Reaction X are obtained:
• n=2
• E = 84.0 kJ/mol
&'( /&*
Figure 19 shows ln % - vs. -1000/T, in which the slope is E/R as shown in Equation 2. Figure 20
'(+ ' ,
shows comparison of the testing data of dT/dt vs. time and the predicted dT/dt vs. time by using the
obtained kinetic data of n and reaction activation energy, while Figure 21 shows comparison of the
testing data of ln(dT/dt) vs. -1000/T and the predicted dT/dt vs. -1000/T. The good fit of the data
indicate that the obtained kinetic parameters can be used for vent sizing.
Figure 19: ln[(dTm/dt)/(Tmf-Tm)2] vs. -1000/Tm
Keeping in mind that total 33.1 g S1 is added into the testing cell to reduce the viscosity of the reaction
system as shown in Table 8, while in plant reactor only is added 8.42 g S1 in total 767.23 kg reagents in
Step 5 as shown in Table 1. Although the Phi factor of the current VSP test is small, about 1.08 as below
the calculation

0∙ 10 3 .56 .3
Equation 4: ∅ / / . 9
2 12
∙ 78.96 .7:
while the Phi factor for simulating the reaction system in the plant reactor RX is
0∙ 10 ; < = ∙ 1< = 3 .56 .3 ;::. 6 .
Equation 5: ∅ / / .5
∙ 1 78.9 ::. 6:.
since the added S1 performs as an inert without participating reaction, but has a thermal capacity to
reduce the overall system temperature rise (rate) during the runaway reaction.
Figure 20: T & dT/dt vs. time, tested data and predicted data
Figure 21: ln(dT/dt) vs. -1000/T, tested data and predicted data

Thus, the adiabatic temperature rise for plant reactor RX is
Equation 6: ∆ ? ∅∙∆ ? , = . 5 × 5. =3 . °
where ∆!B& is adiabatic temperature rise at Phi =1, while ∆!B&," is the temperature rise in VSP test,
i.e., 26.0 °C, as shown in Figure 17.
For any Phi factor, ∅C, the temperature rise rate can therefore be expressed as
∅?
= − DE1 F 5. :8 + − G
.5
Equation 7:

8. VENT SIZING FOR REACTOR RX
Company A would like to assess the vent size of RX for the following four failure scenarios:
• 6 barg N2 inerting failure with the maximum N2 flow rate of 90 liters/minute at ambient
temperature
• Loss of cooling for normal Reaction X temperature of 75 °C
• Loss of cooling for abnormal Reaction X temperature of 120 °C
• External fire with solvent addition
The current relief device installed on RX is a pressure relief valve (PRV). For a PRV, if it is not properly
sized, not only cannot reactor be properly protected, but also it would cause issues of valve stability.
8.1 Vent Sizing Methodology

Typical causes of chatter of PRV (instability and potential valve damage) include:
• Excessive inlet pressure loss (3% rule)
• Excessive back pressure of PRV
• Oversized valve
If PRV and the associated piping are not properly sized, the PRV damage would occur. Emergency relief
system design calculations therefore include:
• PRV orifice sizing,
• PRV inlet pipe sizing, and
• PRV outlet pipe sizing.
According to ASME code, the nominal pipe size of all piping, valves and fittings, and vessel components
between a pressure vessel and its PRV should be at lS3st as large as the nominal size of the PRV inlet,
and the flow characteristics of the upstrS3m system should be such that the cumulative total of all
nonrecoverable inlet losses should not exceed 3% of the valve set pressure. In addition, the effects of
inlet pressure drop on the specification of relieving pressure for PRV sizing can be neglected if the inlet
pressure drop does not exceed 3 % of set pressure, according to API 520.
PRVs installed on RX in Company A’s plant is of the conventional type. Conventional PRV shows
unsatisfactory performance when excessive backpressure develops during a relief incident, due to the
flow through the valve and outlet piping. The built-up backpressure opposes the lifting force that is
holding the valve open. Excessive built-up backpressure can cause the valve to operate in an unstable
manner. This instability may occur as flutter or chatter. Chatter refers to the abnormally rapid
reciprocating motion of the PRV disc where the disc contacts the PRV sS3t during cycling. This type of
operation may cause damage to the valve and interconnecting piping. Flutter is similar to chatter
except that the disc does not come into contact with the sS3t during cycling.
In a conventional PRV application, when the allowable overpressure is 10 %, the built-up backpressure
should not exceed 10 % of the set pressure. A higher maximum allowable built-up backpressure may be
used for allowable overpressures greater than 10 % provided the built-up backpressure does not
exceed the allowable overpressure. For example, for the fire case, where the PRV is set at MAWP, the
built-up backpressure should not exceed 21 % of set pressure. When the superimposed backpressure is

constant, the spring load may be reduced to compensate for the superimposed backpressure. When
the downstrS3m piping is designed within this backpressure criteria, no backpressure capacity
correction is required in the valve sizing equations. When the backpressure is expected to exceed these
specified limits, a balanced or pilot-operated PRV should be specified.
The pressure loss along the piping during fluid flow is grS3tly reliant on flow resistance. The turbulent
flow resistances, N, along the relief line pre-PSV and post-PSV are calculated from:
K
Equation 8: H = ∑ =J + 3 L
where Ki is the flow resistance of pipe fittings, f is the Fanning flow friction coefficient, usually taken as
0.005 for two phase emergency relief, L is the physical length of relief line, and D is the internal pipe
diameter. Flow resistances of pipe fittings for RX are shown in Table 4, which are taken from literature4.
8.1.1 Emergency Venting Mass Flow Rate

Based on different failure scenarios, emergency venting mass flow rate, w, should be determined. For
example, for homogeneous two phase relief of a vapor reaction system, DIERS recommended Leung’s
method5 for vent sizing. For a runaway reaction with two-phase relief, the relief vent mass flowrate, w,
can be calculated through solving the following equation
Q∙R S
M = ∙ FN O + N O G − M ∙ P + ∙∆ U =
2 ∙T S
Equation 9:
(V = FN O + N O G)
2
where WX is the initial mass of mixture in reactor; q is heat relS3se from exothermic reaction in W/kg,
&' &'
YZ is the heat capacity of liquid in the reactor; N &* O and N &* O are temperature rise rate at PRV full-lift
[ "
pressure (10% over the Pset) and the maximum accumulated pressure, respectively; \Z] is the specific
calculated from phase-equilibrium software6 for true fluid of solvent; and ∆! = !" − ![ is the
volume change due to vaporization; V is the reactor volume; hfg is the vaporization heat, which can be
temperature rise from PRV full-lift pressure, ![ , to the maximum accumulated pressure, !" .
For a runaway reaction with a single phase vapor relief, the relief vent mass flowrate, w, can be
calculated through solving the following equation
V TJ R S MR S TJ
M = − 2 − + % − -=
M T S VT S
Equation 10:
4
CCPS Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, 2017
5
J.C. Leung, Simplified Vent Sizing Equations for Emergency Relief Requirements in Reactors and Storage Vessels,
AIChE, J., 1986, V32, p1622-1634
6
Multiflash program supplied by Infochem Computer Services Ltd, Unit 4, The Flag Store, 23 Queen Elisabeth
Street, London SE1 2LP

For external fire without runaway reaction, the relief vent mass flowrate, w, can be calculated through
solving the following equation
^ ^T S QR S
M = − 2 − − − =
M MQR S T S
Equation 11:
where Q is the external heating rate in W, which can be calculated according to API 521.
8.1.2 Sizing PRV Orifice

According to C.2.1.1.7 of API 520, for a homogeneous two phase relief, the PRV orifice flow area can be
sized from
77.9×_
=
= `
Equation 12:
where = is the discharge coefficient. For a preliminary sizing estimation, a discharge coefficient of
0.85 can be used for a two-phase mixture or saturated liquid entering the PRV inlet. The relief capacity,
G, is calculated from an average value of G at relief pressure and at the maximum accumulated
pressure, which are calculated using the OMEGA method7, as shown in Appendix D. The choked mass
flux, ab , through an orifice can be calculated from
e
`0 = c0 d
f⋅ T
Equation 13:
and c0 can be calculated from

Equation 14: c0 + f − f − c0 + f c0 + f − c0 =
where g is the OMEGA parameter and hX and \X are vessel pressure and specific volume, respectively.
By solving Equation 13 and Equation 14, the calculated mass flux at Pset and Pmax are obtained. An
averaged G at Pset and Pmax is used to calculate orifice flow area as shown in Equation 12.
As for a single phase gas/vapor relief, according to Article 5.6.3.1.1 of API 521, the PRV orifice flow area
can be sized from a critical choked flow at the orifice as below,
_ i
= d
= e <M
Equation 15:
where = is the effective coefficient of discharge, 0.975, when a PRV is installed with or without a
rupture disk in combination for preliminary sizing; hj the upstrS3m relieving pressure, kPa; T is the
relieving temperature of the inlet gas or vapor, K, Z is the compressibility factor for the deviation of the
actual gas from a perfect gas. C is
lm
= . :839kl Nl; O
ln
Equation 16:
where k is the ratio of gas specific heats (k = Cp/Cv).
7
J.C. Leung, Easily size Relief Devices and Piping for Two-Phase Flow, Chemical Engineering Progress, 1996,
December, p28-50

8.1.3 Sizing PRV Inlet Piping
inlet pressure loss, ∆hop , can be calculated by

A PRV should be installed with as short as possible inlet piping to minimize the inlet pressure drop. The
_
Equation 17: ∆eJ = HJ N O TJ
J
where qop is flow resistance of the inlet piping, rop is the flow area of the inlet piping, and \op is the
average specific volume in the inlet pipe section. If ∆hop is greater than 3% of PRV Pset, the inlet piping
should be redesigned to reduce inlet pressure loss, such as enlarging the pipe diameter, reduce the
piping length and/or piping fittings, etc.
8.1.4 Sizing PRV Outlet Piping

The limitation here is the flow resistance of the outlet pipe run, given the maximum allowable
backpressure for the particular valve. Pressure loss along the outlet piping of a PRV can be calculated
from the OMEGA method7 as below, and shown in Appendix D
c 0 `0
`0 ∗ = =
√f e
Equation 18:
dT
f
KD c v f c ;fcw% `∗ -
3 = − uc c
c
L `∗
Equation 19:
x f c;fy ;c zJ
With a known PRV backpressure, i.e., c = h{ ⁄hX , the choked pressure at the exit of the outlet piping
(c = c 0 = e ⁄e ) can be calculated from the known flow capacity in the piping, `0 = }⁄ ~• , from
Equation 18 as below
M
Equation 20: e = €e fT
~•
KD
the maximum allowable flow resistance, 3
L
, of the outlet piping of the PRV can therefore be
calculated from Equation 19. If the existing flow resistance is greater than the maximum allowable flow
resistance, the outlet piping should be redesigned to reduce flow resistance, such as enlarging the pipe
diameter, reducing the piping length and/or piping fittings, etc.
8.2 Failure Scenario 1: N2 Inerting Failure

For this failure scenario, reactor RX would experience potential overpressure from the source of
nitrogen flow of 90 liters/minute at 6 barg and ambient temperature (assumed to be 30 °C at Company
A) into reactor RX. Thus, to avoid potential overpressure due to nitrogen flowing into RX, the
emergency relief vent capacity should be large enough to vent mass flow rate of nitrogen:
eQ<M
Equation 21: M=
where P is pressure from source (7.013 bara), V is volumetric flowrate of 90 liters/minute (0.0015 m3⋅s-
1
), Mw is molecular weight of nitrogen (0.028 kg/mol), R is gas constant of 8.314 J⋅mol-1⋅K-1, and T is
temperature, i.e., 303.15K. The calculated mass relief rate is therefore 0.0117 kg⋅s-1.

The existing PRV has a nozzle size of 48 mm and a discharge coefficient of 0.22 for either gas or liquid.
Open pressure of this relief valve is 1.5 barg. MAWP of RX is 2 barg. The maximum accumulated
pressure is therefore 3.21 bara.
A sprS3dsheet of the detailed calculation for a single phase nitrogen relief is shown in Appendix A.
Table 9 summarizes the main results, which indicates
• The required nozzle size is 4.6 mm. The currently installed PRV is oversized for gas relief.
• The inlet piping pressure loss is 1.0% that is less than 3%. Therefore the existing inlet piping
installation is adequate for pressure relief.
• The backpressure at PRV outlet is 1.33 bara, which is lower than the allowable maximum back
pressure of 1.71 bara. Therefore the existing outlet piping is adequate for pressure relief.
• Using the existing PRV may lS3d to PRV instability (chattering) issue that may damage PRV
when it operates. Nonetheless, the smallest API 526 orifice “D” is still far larger than (about 4
times of) the required flow area. Accordingly, the existing PRV and the relief line installation is
adequate to protect the RX from overpressure due to failure of nitrogen inerting.
• If the smallest API 526 orifice “D” is selected, as shown in Table 9, the existing PRV and the
relief line installation is also adequate to protect the RX from overpressure due to failure of
nitrogen inerting.
Table 9: Relief system sizing for RX at the failure scenario of nitrogen overflow
Max. Accumulated
Relieving Pressure Existing PRV
pressure
P, bara 2.66 3.21
Temperature, K 303.15 303.15
Gas density, kg/m3 2.96 3.57
Latent heat, kJ/kg [-] [-]
k = Cp/Cv 1.4 1.4
Omega 1 1
Power input, kW [-] [-]
Mass relieving rate, kg/s 0.0117 0.0117
Compressibility, Z 1 1
Orifice flow capacity, kg/m2s 607.1 733.3
Calculated Orifice area, mm2 19.75 16.35
Calculated Orifice diameter, mm 5.0 4.6
Selected API 526 orifice D (9.51mm) D (9.51mm)
Selected API 526 orifice flow area, mm2 70.97 70.97
Vapor discharge rate, kg/s 0.042 0.051 0.324
∆Pinlet, % 0.025 1.0
Is the inlet piping adequate for pressure
Yes Yes
loss?
PRV outlet backpressure, bara 1.02 1.33
Allowable Max. PRV backpressure, bara 1.71 1.71
Is the outlet piping adequate for
Yes Yes
backpressure?

8.3 Failure Scenario 2: Loss of Cooling for Runaway Reaction Initiated at 75 °C
Since the adiabatic temperature rise of the Reaction X is 42 °C as shown in Section 7.3, the maximum
temperature that the reaction system can reach is 75 + 42 = 117 °C if the onset temperature of
runaway reaction due to loss of cooling is 75 °C. As shown in Table 6, the only component that has the
boiling point less than 117 °C is S1 (its boiling point is 80 °C). Vapor pressure of S1 at 117 °C is about 3
bara, which is less than the maximum accumulated pressure of 3.21 bara (1.1×MAWP + 1.01).
Therefore, no need to consider emergency relief for this failure scenario since reactor RX can contain
the maximum pressure rise.
8.4 Failure Scenario 3: Loss of Cooling for Runaway Reaction Initiated at 120 °C
In this case, the maximum temperature of the reaction system that can reach is 120 + 42 = 162 °C if the
onset temperature of runaway reaction due to loss of cooling is 120 °C. As shown in Table 6, the only
component that has the boiling point less than 162 °C is S1 (its boiling point is 80 °C). In addition, as
shown in Figure 15, temperature of 162 °C would not trigger product decomposition. Vapor pressure of
S1 at 162 °C is about 8.0 bara, which would cause overpressure to RX if the emergency relief vent is
inadequately sized.
At the maximum accumulated pressure of 3.21 bara (boiling temperature of S1 is 120.8 °C), the vapor
density of S1 is 7.1 kg/m3. Volume of the head spS5 in RX during synthesis reaction is about 3.5 m3. The
minimum quantity of S1 is needed to build pressure of 3.21 bara is therefore 24.9 kg. However, as
shown in Table 1, the quantity of S1 in RX during synthesis reaction is 8.42 g at normal operation, which
is far less than 24.9 kg. In other words, no over pressure source due to vapor generation or gas
generation from the reaction system can be identified for this scenario at normal material loading
condition in RX.
Mass of RX is about 2500 kg by a conservative estimation. By assuming that the quantity of S1 in RX
during runaway is at the minimum of 24.9 kg, the Phi factor of the reaction system is therefore 1.9. The
phi-corrected temperature rise is 22.1 °C due to runaway reaction in RX and the final temperature is
therefore T0 + 22.1 °C (T0 is reactor temperature at the time when catalyst is charged, i.e., the initial
temperature of runaway reaction). According to Equation 7, the temperature rise rate can be expressed
as
j.ƒ
=x + . − y DE1 F 5. :8 + •‚ − G
j.„…
Equation 22:
where T is reactor temperature in K.

Keeping in mind that the PRV opens at set pressure of 1.5 barg, with a full lift of valve disk at pressure 1.65 barg
(normally 10% over the set pressure), i.e., 2.66 bara. The boiling point of S1 at 2.66 bara is 113.3 °C, while the
boiling temperature of S1 at the maximum accumulated pressure of 3.21 bara is 120.8 °C. If the final temperature
of runaway reaction is less than 120.8 °C (T0 = 120.8 – 22.1 = 98.7 °C), these are no needs to install pressure relief
because reaction RX can contain the overpressure during runaway reaction. However, if the initial temperature,
i.e., T0, is greater than 113.3 °C, the PRV would fully open prior to charging catalyst (Reaction X) so that the
reactor temperature would be finally controlled to the boiling point of S1 at 2.66 bara, i.e., 113.3 °C. Therefore,
the worst case for emergency relief in this case would be charging catalyst at 113.3 °C or higher. Company A
needs to ensure catalyst can’t be charged when PRV is open (probably via procedure, and maybe PRV opening
alarm/trip if the operators aren’t nearby).

For different initial temperature, Figure 22 shows the calculated results of final temperature and nozzle
size of PRV as a function of initial temperature of runaway reaction for RX. The nozzle flow areas are
calculated from Equation 15, in which mass relief rates w in kg/s are obtained by solving Equation 10
through trial and error analysis. It should be reminded that a single phase vapor relief is considered in
current design since the overall volumetric loading ratio in RX during synthesis reaction is low, about
15%. The large hS3d spS5 allows the vapor to separate from the high viscosity product.
PRV open
prior to
charging
Pressure
catalyst
containment, no
need for relief
Figure 22: Final temperature and nozzle size of PRV as a function of initial temperature of runaway
reaction
As shown in Figure 22, the required nozzle size of PRV at the worst case relief condition is about 8
inches (about 203 mm). The current PRV with a nozzle size of 48 mm and the associated relief line are
obviously inadequate to protect RX from overpressure.
A spreadsheet of the detailed calculation including relief line sizing are shown in Appendix B. Table 10
summarizes the main results, which indicates
(1) For the existing PRV (48 mm orifice) for single-phase vapor relief,
• The currently installed PRV is undersized for runaway reaction due to loss of cooling.
• The inlet piping pressure loss is greater than 3%. Therefore the inlet piping is inadequate for
emergency relief.
• The backpressure at PRV outlet is greater than 1.71 bara. Therefore the outlet piping is not
adequate for pressure relief.
(2) For the properly sized API526 PRV orifice (with a larger discharge coefficient of 0.975, as indicated
in API 520),
• The calculated orifice area of PRV that can adequately prevent overpressure is 29784 mm2.
• Two balanced-bellows PRVs with the “T” orifice (total effective flow area 33548.3 mm2) is
therefore adequate to prevent overpressure.

• The inlet piping pressure loss would not greater than 3% if the NPS is not less than 12inch (Sch
10S). Therefore the existing inlet piping is not adequate for pressure relief.
• The backpressure at PRV outlet is 1.65 bara, which is less than the allowable maximum back
pressure of 1.71 bara, only if the NPS is not less than 12inch (Sch 10S). Therefore the existing
outlet piping is not adequate for pressure relief.
• Therefore, enlarging both inlet piping and outlet piping but keeping the same relief line routing
is require to ensure proper emergency relief.
Table 10: Relief system sizing for RX at the failure scenario of loss cooling
Relieving Max. Accumulated Existing
Pressure pressure PRV
P, bara 2.66 3.21
Temperature, K 386.4 393.9
Vapor density, kg/m3 5.98 7.08
Latent heat, kJ/kg 405.2 397.6
k = Cp/Cv 1.09 1.09
Omega 1 1
dT/dt, K/s 12.3 8.9
Compressibility, Z 1 1
Calculated Orifice area, mm2 29784.0
Calculated Orifice diameter, mm 194.7 48
Selected API 526 orifice 2 “T” orifice
Selected API 526 orifice flow area, mm2 33548.3
Vapor discharge rate, kg/s 28.4 1.53
Selected Inlet Pipe NPS 12 inch (Sch10S)
Selected outlet Pipe NPS 12 inch (Sch10S)
∆Pinlet, % 3
Is the inlet piping adequate for pressure loss? Yes No
PRV outlet backpressure, bara 1.65
Allowable Max. PRV backpressure, bara 1.71
Is the outlet piping adequate for backpressure? Yes No
8.5 Failure Scenario 4: External Fire with Solvent Addition

As shown in Table 1, the total mass in the RX with all solvents addition is 1949.35 kg, in which 77% (wt)
of the mixture is solvent including S1 (25.7% wt), S5 (20.5% wt), and Solvent4 (30.8% wt). Therefore,
physical properties of the system can be represented by three major solvent components. Multi-flash
phase-equilibrium software8 is used for generating all physical properties, as shown in Table 11. Since
8
Multiflash program supplied by Infochem Computer Services Ltd, Unit 4, The Flag Store, 23 Queen Elisabeth
Street, London SE1 2LP

the product in the mixture may act as a foaming agent, and the reactor loading is high (62%) the two-
phase of vapor-liquid relief is quite necessary.
Table 11: Physical properties of mixture at relief pressure and the maximum accumulated pressure
Relief Device Opening / Maximum Pressure (bara) 2.66 3.43
Relief Set / Maximum Temperature (C) 100.98 110.71
Relief Set / Maximum Temperature (K) 374.13 383.86
Liquid Density (kg/m3) 754.0 742.0
Vapor Density (kg/m3) 6.330 8.074
Latent heat of Vaporization (J/kg) 397800 387430.0
Specific Volume Difference Vap/Liq (m3/kg) 0.1567 0.1225
Liquid Specific Heat Capacity, Cp (J/kgK) 2429 2472
Liquid Specific Heat Capacity, Cv (J/kgK) 2429 2472
Ratio of Specific Heats, Cp/Cv, of vapor 1.101 1.103
Omega (one-point method) 17.89 15.59
Omega (Two-point method, 0.8 P0) 16.60 14.37
Omega (Two-point method, 0.9 P0) 16.29 14.12
To simulate plant reactor RX under external fire, power input to the plant-scale reactor under external
fire engulfment needs to be determined first. According to API 5219, the power input from an external
fire with poor drainage can be calculated from
Equation 23: ^ = 7 ,8 ∙ .9
M2
where Aws is the wetted heat transfer area from external fire up to the top tangent line (10.3 m2 for RX,
calculated based on the information in Table 3) and Q is the heat input (watt). The calculated power
input to RX under external fire is therefore 479.5 kW.
Thus, solving Equation 11 gives the mass relief rate under external fire, which is 16.1 kg/s. A
sprS3dsheet of the detailed calculation for vapor-liquid two-phase relief including relief line pipe sizing
is shown in Appendix C.
Table 12 summarizes the main results, which indicates
(1) For the existing PRV (48 mm orifice),
• The currently installed PRV orifice is too small to properly relieve overpressure.
• The inlet piping pressure loss is 23% that is far larger than 3%. Therefore the inlet piping is
inadequate for pressure relief.
• To maintain proper mass relief rate, the backpressure at PRV outlet is huge for 2 inch pipe.
Therefore the outlet piping is not adequate for pressure relief.
• Using the existing PRV would lead to burst of RX.
(2) For the properly sized PRV orifice,
9
API Standard 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, Six Ed., January 2014

• A balanced-bellow PRV with a “Q” orifice (the effective flow area 7129.02 mm2) with a 2-phase
discharge coefficient of 0.85 or higher is adequate for emergency relief.
• The inlet piping pressure loss is 3% with an inlet piping NPS of 3.5 inch (Sch40). Therefore the
inlet piping with a diameter not less than 3.5 inch is adequate for pressure relief.
• The backpressure at PRV outlet with an outlet piping NPS of 6 inch (Sch40) is 1.86 bara, which is
less than the allowable maximum back pressure of 1.93 bara. Therefore the outlet piping with a
diameter not less than 6 inch is adequate for pressure relief.
• Using the PRV with a “Q” orifice would ensure that PRV properly operates during emergency
relief of vapor-liquid two-phase relief.
Table 12: Relief system sizing for RX under external fire

Max.
Relieving Existing
Accumulated
Pressure PRV
pressure
P, bara 2.66 3.43
Boiling point, K 374.13 383.86
Vapor density, kg/m3 6.330 8.074
Latent heat, kJ/kg 397.80 387.43
Omega 16.60 14.37
Power input, kW 479.5 479.5
Orifice choked pressure, bara 2.35 3.00
Calculated Orifice area, mm2 7103
Calculated Orifice diameter, mm 95.1
Selected API 526 orifice Q (95.27 mm) 48 mm
Selected API 526 orifice Effective flow area, mm2 7129.02
Mass discharge rate, kg/s 16.2 1.06
Inlet piping diameter, inch 3.5 2
∆Pinlet, % 3.0 23.0
Is the inlet piping adequate for pressure loss? Yes No
Outlet piping diameter, inch 6 2
No
PRV outlet backpressure, bara 1.86
solution
Allowable Max. PRV backpressure, bara 1.93 1.93
Is the outlet piping adequate for backpressure? Yes No

9. VENT SIZING FOR SEVEN STORAGE TANKS
Company A would like to assess the vent size of seven storage tanks at the relief scenario of external
fire. As shown in
Figure 7, those storage tanks have open vents to atmosphere without any relief devices such as rupture
disc or PRV. Vessel details are shown in Table 2 and flow resistances of each relief line for those seven
storage tanks are shown in Table 5. Those storage tanks have the similar design pressure of 1 barg, in
which four of them are vertically installed in one dike area and each of the other three is horizontally
installed in an individual below-grade dike area.
The following three design strategies are considered:
(1) Single phase vapor relief;
(2) Two phase relief with phase separation (disengagement);
(3) Homogeneous two-phase relief.
Prior to proceeding, the physical properties of all solvents at relieving pressure and the maximum
accumulated pressure should be determined. The relieving pressure for seven tanks is 1.01 bara, i.e.,
atmospheric pressure, while the maximum accumulated pressure is 1×1.2 + 1.01 = 2.21 bara, according
to API 650. Multi-flash phase-equilibrium software8 is used for generating all physical properties of
solvents in seven storage tanks, as shown in Table 13.
Vent size of Each storage tank should be taken based on the maximum size from strategy (1) and (2),
since all solvents has low viscosity of less than 100 cP (assume nonfoamy) as shown in Table 13.
Homogeneous two-phase relief from strategy (3) are used for comparison of vent size.
Table 13: Physical properties of solvents at relieving pressure and the maximum accumulated pressure
Solvent S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
P = 101325 Pa
Boiling Point at 1 bara, °C 79.3 100.3 76.7 93.0 55.7 110.3
Viscosity @BP, cP 0.235 0.330 0.254 0.232 0.236 0.240
Heat capacity @BP, J/g/K 2.400 2.320 2.160 2.500 2.340 2.050
Liquid density @BP, kg/m3 752.0 697.0 841.0 637.0 756.0 794.0
surface tension @BP, N/m 0.0180 0.0151 0.0173 0.0133 0.0193 0.0182
Latent Heat @BP, kJ/kg 437.66 318.94 366.14 313.74 502.61 362.42
P = 221325 Pa
Boiling Point at 2.21 bara, °C 106.4 131.2 102.9 122.6 80.9 140.7
Viscosity @BP, cP 0.190 0.294 0.199 0.192 0.196 0.168
Heat capacity @BP, J/g/K 2.520 2.495 2.268 2.669 2.453 2.182
Liquid density @BP, kg/m3 723.9 665.2 809.4 607.2 729.7 765.4
Surface tension @BP, N/m 0.0151 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.015

Latent Heat @BP, kJ/kg 412.20 298.35 344.13 292.92 474.61 341.42
k = Cp/Cv 1.088 1.057 1.080 1.053 1.128 1.073
9.1 Single Phase Vapor Relief

Two methods are used to cross check the vent size for seven storage tanks: OMEGA method and the
adiabatic flow method, for a single phase vapor relief.
Based on the flow resistance and tank pressure and temperature, the flow capacity in relieving pipe line
can be calculated based on either OMEGA method7 or adiabatic flow as shown in literature10. Such
calculated results are shown in Table 14, in which location 0 is in the tank, location 1 is the outlet of the
tank nozzle, and location 2 is the exit of the relief line, T0 and P0 are the stagnation temperature and
pressure in the tank, M is the vapor flow velocity in Mach number, η is the pressure ratio, T and P are
the actual temperature and pressure during vapor flow, G is the flow capacity, A is the flow area, and D
is the diameter of pipe.
The flow area is calculated from the require mass flow rate of storage tank and the calculated flow
capacity, G, based on the flow resistance of relief line as below (A safety factor of 0.9 should be applied
according to UG-127 (A) (2) of ASME Code Section VIII-Division 1)
M
=
.8∙`
Equation 24:
where w is the vapor mass venting rate from reactor at the maximum accumulated pressure of 2.21
bara and boiling point of the solvent in Each specific storage tank, which is
^
Equation 25: M=R
S
where hfg is the vaporization heat, which can be calculated from thermodynamic phase equilibrium
fS3ture of Each solvent as shown in Table 13. Q in here is the heat input from external fire calculated
from API 2000 for storage tank (not for pressure vessel as shown in Equation 23), as below
Equation 26: ^= 3, ∙ .†55
M2
Results in Table 14 indicate that the calculated vent sizes of seven storage tanks under external fire
from both OMEGA method and adiabatic flow are almost the same.
10
Guibing Zhao, An easy method to design gas/vapor relief system with rupture disk, Journal of Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries, 2015, Vol.35, 321-328

Table 14: Vapor relief calculation for seven storage tanks
V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Cylindrical Surface Area, m² 30.788 30.788 30.788 30.788 38.408 38.408 38.408
Total Surface Area, m² 37.790 37.561 37.609 37.580 50.561 50.561 50.561
Heat input, Q, kW 1560 1560 1560 1560 2065 2065 2065

Required vapor venting rate, w
3.784 5.228 4.532 5.325 4.352 5.011 6.049
kg/s
P0, bara 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21
T0, K 106.4 131.2 102.9 122.6 80.9 106.4 140.7
Flow resistance N 10.44 10.44 9.03 9.03 9.89 11.39 12.22
OMEGA method
OMEGA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
η1 = P1/P0 0.968 0.968 0.964 0.964 0.967 0.970 0.972
η2 = P2/P0 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458
G, kg/m2.s 261.22 295.32 307.21 318.59 248.00 252.07 265.01
Relief Area, A, m2 1.610E-02 1.967E-02 1.639E-02 1.857E-02 1.950E-02 2.209E-02 2.536E-02
Relief Diameter, D, inch 5.64 6.23 5.69 6.05 6.20 6.60 7.07
Adiabatic Flow
M1 0.245 0.248 0.262 0.265 0.246 0.236 0.230
M2 0.516 0.524 0.548 0.556 0.517 0.498 0.487
P1, Pa 214224 214230 213306 213313 213887 214738 215129
T1, K 378.53 403.67 375.06 394.99 352.73 378.60 413.06
P2, Pa 101325 101325 101325 101325 101325 101325 101325
T2, K 375.15 401.24 371.63 392.49 348.17 375.45 410.31
G, kg/m2.s 262.05 295.95 308.24 319.32 249.17 252.80 265.61
9.2 Churn-turbulent Flow Vapor Relief

Since overall viscosity of solvent in each storage tank is low (less than 100 cP, as shown in Table 13),
whether two-phase churn-turbulent relief would occur or not needs to be carefully reviewed based on
DIERS technology4 as below.

If energy is being put into or generated within an open vessel containing a saturated liquid and the
swelled liquid is below the top of the vessel, the superficial vapor velocity at the liquid Surface is given
by
^
‡Sˆ =
R S ‰S
Equation 27:
where rŠ‹ is the cross-sectional area of equivalent vertical cylinder. For horizontal cylinder rŠ‹ =
ŒLK/3. Physical properties in Equation 27 are evaluated at peak conditions.
A vessel characteristic single bubble rise velocity for churn-turbulent onset/disengagement can be
estimated by
/3
vŽS ‰ ‰S w
•ˆ = . †: /
‰
Equation 28:
where • is the Surface tension of the solvent and g is acceleration of the gravity (9.82 m/s2).
A churn-turbulent dimensionless superficial vapor velocity can be defined as
‡S‘
Equation 29: •ˆ = •‘
bound equations for void fraction αŠ' of swelling liquid in tank under external fire as a function Ψˆ
For external fire exposure, vapor generation occurs at the vessel walls. Simple, conservative upper
have been established by application of the complex models. These upper hound equations are
presented below.
Right Circular Cylindrical Vessel with Fire on Vertical Sides Only
•‘
Equation 30: ” = :F ; .†•‘
G
Horizontal vessels
•‘
Equation 31: ” = ; .†•‘
flow pattern at the vent entrance. The void fraction required to avoid this entrainment in terms of Ψˆ
In addition to the level swell, severe entrainment can occur at high liquid levels due to the convergent
and the vessel height Hv is given by

/3
—S
. 938 • •‘ /
–— ˜
” H =
™Q
Equation 32:
The total average void fraction for disengagement of a churn-turbulent fluid including consideration of
both level swell and entrainment is given by
Equation 33: ”L =” H + −” H ”
The vessel average void fraction can be calculated using
›
–Q ˜
”Q =
—
Equation 34: š Q

where œ' is volume of storage tank and MZ is mass of solvent in storage tank. Comparison of Equations
34 and 33 determines whether or not there will be multiphase vent flow for a vessel containing churn-
turbulent liquid.
If ”L ≤ ”Ÿ ¡ , all vapor flow is predicted.
If ”L > ”Ÿ ¡ , two-phase flow is predicted.
•
•
The calculation results are shown in Table 15. It is indicated that churn-turbulent flow would occur
during emergency relief under external fire in all seven storage tanks. Thus, the flow capacity in the
relief line is determined by OMEGA method, as also shown in Table 15.
The emergency relief vent size can be determined from integration from initial void fraction to
disengagement, which is given by
^ n¤J
=
£ ` n¤L
Equation 35: R S ‰S
2; ‰ n¤L n¤J
where ¥¦ = ¥¦Š' and ¥o = αŸ ¡ , ![ and !" are solvent boiling point at pressure of 1.01 bara and 2.21
bara, respectively.
The calculated vent size is shown in Table 15. After disengagement of two-phase relief, a single phase
vapor relief would follow. The greater vent size from both Table 15 and Table 14 should be selected for
respective storage tanks.
9.3 Homogeneous Two-Phase Relief

For homogeneous two-phase relief, since no exothermic reaction occurs during relief, the relief vent
mass flowrate, w, can be calculated through solving Equation 11. Nonetheless, heat input, Q, from
external fire for storage tank should be calculated from Equation 26. Here Ts and Tm are the calculated
boiling temperature at relief pressure of 1.013 bara and the maximum accumulated pressure 2.213
bara, respectively. Other physical properties are shown in Table 13.
The relief capacity G is calculated from an average value of G at relief pressure and at the maximum
accumulated pressure, which are calculated from OMEGA method, as shown in Appendix D. The relief
area therefore can be calculated from:
§
Equation 36: r= ¨
The calculated results are shown in Table 16.

Table 15: Churn-turbulent relief calculation for seven storage tanks
V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Heat input, Q, kW 1560 1560 1560 1560 2065 2065 2065
ACR, m² 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16 9.53 9.53 9.53
ρg, kg/m3 5.06 6.46 6.24 6.71 4.37 5.06 5.92
jg∞, m/s 0.121 0.131 0.118 0.129 0.105 0.104 0.107
U∞, m/s 0.183 0.176 0.176 0.174 0.186 0.183 0.180
Ψg = jg∞/U∞ 0.665 0.746 0.672 0.739 0.563 0.569 0.596
αCT 0.074 0.080 0.074 0.079 0.305 0.307 0.315
α ENT 0.048 0.055 0.049 0.056 0.040 0.042 0.044
α DCT 0.118 0.130 0.120 0.131 0.333 0.336 0.345
αVES 0.084 0.047 0.117 0.040 0.137 0.116 0.065
Two-phase flow? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
G average, kg/m2s 541.7 504.1 603.2 502.9 541.0 505.6 502.0
Integrate to disengagement
9.4 Summary
Table 17 shows the summary of vent sizing of seven storage tanks for three calculation scenarios. As
expected, the vent sizes of homogeneous flow for all seven storage tanks are far greater than those for
single phase vapor relief or churn-turbulent flow. Industrial practices as shown in API 2000 and NFPA 30
indicate that it is not necessary to adopt the vent size calculated from homogeneous relief for clean,
nonfoamy solvent in storage tank without chemical reactions during relief. Therefore vent sizes in bold
as shown in Table 17 are recommended for seven storage tanks. The currently installed relief lines are
therefore inadequate for emergency relief under external fire.

Table 16: Homogeneous relief calculation for seven storage tanks
V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Heat input, Q, kW 1560 1560 1560 1560 2065 2065 2065
Ps, bara 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Ts, K 352.45 373.45 349.85 366.15 328.85 352.55 383.45
Pm, bara 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21
Tm, K 379.52 404.38 376.08 395.73 354.10 379.52 413.86
hfg average, J/kg 424928.4 308645.0 355134.9 303329.5 488613 424928.4 351916.5
ρg average, kg/m3 3.78 4.83 4.65 5.01 3.26 3.78 4.43
ρf average, kg/m3 737.96 681.12 825.18 622.08 742.84 737.96 779.68
Cp average, J/kg⋅K 2460.06 2407.39 2213.77 2584.55 2396.39 2460.06 2116.02
vfg average, m3/kg 0.263 0.205 0.214 0.198 0.305 0.264 0.225
W, kg/s 58.29 54.08 65.23 51.60 81.81 76.67 81.42
G average, kg/m2s 538.0 495.6 602.8 511.4 517.7 481.5 472.9
Table 17: Summary of vent size of seven storage tanks

V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Churn-turbulent two-phase
1.81 2.79 0.59 2.82 5.71 5.95 6.77
Relief Diameter, D, inch
Single-phase Vapor Relief
5.63 6.22 5.68 6.05 6.19 6.59 7.07
Diameter, D, inch
Homogeneous two-phase
14.62 14.67 14.61 14.11 17.66 17.73 18.43
Relief Diameter, D, inch

10. CONCLUSIONS
At the request of Company A, a Senior Process Safety Specialist from Chilworth Technology, Inc.
(Chilworth) completed an emergency relief system vent sizing for seven storage tanks under the relief
scenario of external fire and Reactor RX under multiple scenarios at the facility in Site A.
The main conclusions are:
(1) For Reactor RX:
Relief scenario 1: Nitrogen inerting failure
• The existing PRV and the relief line installation is adequate to protect the RX from overpressure
from failure of nitrogen inerting.
Relief scenario 2 & 3: loss of cooling
• When Reaction X is initiated at temperature less 98.7 °C, reactor RX can contain the
overpressure from exothermic runaway reactions.
• The worst case relief condition is that the runaway reaction is initiated at 113.3 °C, i.e., the
boiling point of S1 at 2.66 bara, in which
The calculated orifice area of PRV that can adequately prevent overpressure is 29784 mm2.
Two PRVs with the “T” orifice (total effective flow area 33548.3 mm2) are therefore
adequate to prevent overpressure.
The inlet piping pressure loss would not greater than 3% if the NPS is not less than 12inch
(Sch 10S). Therefore the existing inlet piping is not adequate for pressure relief.
The backpressure at PRV outlet is 1.65 bara, which is less than the allowable maximum back
pressure of 1.71 bara, only if the NPS is not less than 12inch (Sch 10S). Therefore the
existing outlet piping is not adequate for pressure relief.
Therefore, enlarging both inlet piping and outlet piping but keeping the same relief line
routing is require to ensure proper emergency relief.
Relief scenario 4: External fire with solvent addition
• A PRV with a “Q” orifice (the effective flow area 7129.02 mm2) is adequate for emergency
relief.
• The inlet piping pressure loss is 3% with an inlet piping NPS of 3.5 inch (Sch40). Therefore the
inlet piping with a diameter not less than 3.5 inch is adequate for pressure relief.
• The backpressure at PRV outlet with an outlet piping NPS of 6 inch (Sch40) is 1.86 bara, which is
less than the allowable maximum back pressure of 1.93 bara. Therefore the outlet piping with a
diameter not less than 6 inch is adequate for pressure relief.
• Using the PRV with a “Q” orifice would ensure that PRV properly operates during emergency
relief of vapor-liquid two-phase relief.
(2) For seven storage tanks:
The required vent sizes of seven storage tanks at relief scenario of external fire are shown below:
V5-S5 V6-S1 V7-S6
Vent Diameter,
5.63 6.22 5.68 6.05 6.19 6.59 7.07
inch

It is recommended that all flame arrestors are regularly inspected to ensure that they do not become
blocked. Company A should also ensure that only single pure solvents are used in these tanks (via
management of change/SOPs), and that this is recorded as part of the Basis of Safety. Any impurities
(e.g. cleaning fluid) will invalidate the vent sizes.

APPENDIX A VENT SIZING RESULTS FOR RX: RELIEF SCENARIO 1 - NITROGEN INERTING FAILURE
Report R/18067/1216/GZ Draft for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 51 of 66

APPENDIX B VENT SIZING RESULTS FOR RX: RELIEF SCENARIO 3 – LOSS OF COOLING FOR NORMAL REACTION X TEMPERATURE OF 120 °C

APPENDIX C VENT SIZING RESULTS FOR RX: RELIEF SCENARIO 4 – EXTERNAL FIRE WITH SOLVENT ADDITION

APPENDIX D OMEGA METHOD FOR CALCULATING VENT LINE CAPACITY
The Omega method [viii] calculates the two-phase flow capacity per unit area, G, of a nozzle or pipe of
constant diameter using the homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM). It is a particularly convenient
method since it requires only the upstrS3m vessel conditions and does not require complex
computational capability (as other methods for calculating G require). Omega is a correlating
parameter in an equation of state (EOS) which links the specific volume of a potentially two-phase
mixture flowing in a relief system with the pressure at any point (i.e. preventing the need for repS3ted
flash calculations). The EOS used by the Omega method is:
© hX
−1 =g −1
©X h
Omega is a dimensionless number that characterises the compressibility of the two-phase mixture. The
Omega method is applicable for turbulent, homogeneous two-phase flow and assumes that friction is
constant and that vapour / liquid equilibrium is maintained for vapour pressure systems.
For vapour pressure systems, a range of equations are available for the determination of ω. The
equation most commonly employed is:
¥X YZ !X h¬X \Z]X
…
g= + – ˜
« \X ℎZ]X
Where:
α0 Initial vessel void fraction (dimensionless)
k Ratio of specific heats for gas and liquid phases (dimensionless)
Cf Heat capacity of liquid phase (J kg-1 K-1)
T0 Relief opening temperature (K)
Pv0 Set pressure of relief device (N m-2)
ν0 Initial specific volume of discharge strS3m (m³ kg-1)
νfg0 Difference between liquid and vapour specific volume (m³ kg-1)
hfg0 Latent heat of vaporisation of liquid (J kg-1)
D.1 Calculation for Choked Nozzle Flow

The Omega method can be used to obtain the dimensionless choked mass flux (Gc*) and the critical
pressure ratio, ηc. Analytical solutions for these are:
®b … + g… − 2g 1 − ®b …
+ 2g… ln ®b + 2g… 1 − ®b = 0
®b
and
ab ∗ =
√g
The value of ηc can be obtained from the former equation using an iterative method. Having
subsequently determined the value of Gc*, the value of G for choked flow (Gc) can be obtained from:
Report R/18067/1216/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 54 of 66

hX
a = a ∗k
©X
D.2 Calculation of Correction Factor for Vent Line

The equivalent length of the proposed (or existing) relief line, including the contribution of bends, the
relief device and any fittings, must be evaluated. Within the Omega method, the value of G for a long
vent line is correlated with the dimensionless group 4fL/D, where f is the Fanning friction factor. This
method is applicable to turbulent flow only. If there is a significant incline in the vent pipe work, a
dimensionless flow inclination factor (Fi) can be obtained.
³´ cos ¸ »X ³¼
±² = =
4ºhX ©X ½
hX N4º ´ O
Where:
θ Angle of inclination to the vertical (°)
g Acceleration due to gravity (m s-2)
D Diameter of vent line (m)
The non-dimensionalised momentum equation which needs to be solved is:
∗… g
À, x 1 − g ® + g®y %1 − a -
…
½ ®…
4º = − ¾ ¿®
´ ÀÁ a
∗…
x
2 1 − g ® + gy + ® ±²
… …
Leung has presented the integration of this equation in closed form [x]. Due to the complexity of this
equation, design charts are generally employed for known values of 4fL/D, Fi and Omega to extract
G*/Gc*. It is, however, possible to sprS3dsheet the calculation to provide a more accurate evaluation
(this procedure is employed at DEKRA Insight). Further equations within the Omega method are
available to account for other situations (such as hybrid pressure regimes, non-choked flow and sub-
cooled inlet liquid regimes).

APPENDIX E VENT SIZING BASED ON VESSEL FIRE ENGULFMENT
E.1 Methods for Determining Heat Flux from Fire
Empirical methods are provided by the American Petroleum Institute (API) for determination of fire
heat flux. The method employed in the current assessment is detailed below.
A number of different Codes of Practice are available for calculating fire relief rates, including API Std.
521 [i], API Std. 2000 [iii], NFPA 30 [iv], OSHA 1910.106 [xii], etc. This section concentrates upon the
approach taken by the first of these; however, the differences between the various codes do not result
in significantly different calculation results. This is because all of these American codes are based upon
the same experimental resS3rch.
API Std. 521 is applicable to pressure vessels with design pressures in excess of 70 mbarg. Atmospheric
pressure storage tanks are covered by the API Std. 2000. Fire engulfment of vessels is assumed to occur
as a result of a gross spillage of flammable liquid resulting in a pool fire. Jet fire impingement on the
vessel wall is expressly discounted; this would result in a considerably increased venting duty. The heat
absorbed by a vessel engulfed in a pool fire is given by:
Â = 43.2 ± ∙ rÄ X.Å…
Where:
Q heat absorbed (kW)
AW wetted Surface area of vessel (m2)
F environmental factor
This equation assumes that the area around the vessel is well drained, and that prompt and effective
fire-fighting measures are available. If these criteria are not fulfilled, the constant in the equation
changes to become:
Â = 70.9 ± ∙ rÄ X.Å…
The wetted Surface area is that Surface in contact with the liquid, up to a height of 7.62 m (25 ft.) above
any Surface which could sustain a fire. Thus any vessel sited at the top of a tall structure where open
grate flooring is used, for example, would not be capable of sustaining a prolonged pool fire. In vessels
such as reactors the fill level is normally taken as the highest normal working level, whilst for storage
tanks the average fill level is employed. For small vessels (e.g. transportable containers), the total
Surface area is often used as a conservative approach.
The environmental factor, F, is taken as:
Bare vessels above ground 1.0
Underground vessels 0
S3rth-covered vessels above ground 0.03
Vessels lagged with fire-resistant insulation 0.3
Vessels protected by water sprays 1.0

Jacketed reactor vessels are generally taken as bare vessels, although clS3rly there will be some heat
transfer resistance across the jacket.
API Std. 521 does allow lower values of F to be calculated for varying thicknesses of insulation (the
above value is based upon 1" of lagging having a thermal conductivity of 0.6 W m-2 K-1), however, many
companies consider that 0.3 should be taken as a minimum value, except in special situations. Indeed,
the NFPA and OSHA codes only permit a value of 0.3. "Fire resistant insulation" requires that the
lagging maintains its insulation value at the temperature of the fire and has sufficient mechanical
strength to resist fire hoses. Thus "mineral wool with stainless steel cladding" is not normally
considered adequate, whilst "calcium silicate / cement" type systems are appropriate. API 2218 [iv]
gives guidance on such types of insulation.
Credit for water sprays is not permitted by the API codes, unlike certain of the other codes. The rS3son
for this that such systems are not generally considered sufficiently reliable to deliver the large
quantities of water required to absorb the radiant heat of the flame impingement. Additionally, the
drainage requirements for these large quantities of water can result in loss of drainage for the
flammable liquid (hydrocarbons generally have a lower density than water).
Relief requirements for gas filled vessels are not covered by the above equations.
E.2 Methods for Determining the Nature of Discharged Material

Disengagement (i.e. separation of vapour and liquid phases prior to entering the vent system) can, in
certain circumstances, be calculated using equations developed during the DIERS programme. It should
be emphasised however, that two-phase flow is normally encountered for runaway reaction systems.
The occurrence of two-phase or single phase flow characteristics can only be estimated based on
physical property data, provided the material is not inherently foamy in nature; inherently foamy
materials will always vent as a 2-phase mixture. In the absence of reliable physical properties data for
the reactor contents at elevated temperature (or during runaway) the physical properties of the
predominant solvent material can be assumed from the DIPPR database of physical properties. The
calculation method which can be applied is detailed in the DIERS project manual [v] and is provided for
reference purposes below.
1. Calculate the Superficial Vapour Velocity
±
È]ˆ =
»] ∙ rÉ
Where:
jg∞ Superficial vapour velocity (m s-1)
F Vapour flow rate (kg s-1)
ρg Vapour density (kg m-3)
Aτ Vessel cross-sectional area (m2)

2. Calculate the bubble rise velocity
Ï.,Ð
Ëv]∙Ì Í+ ÍÎ w
3. Êˆ =
Í+ Ï.Ð
Where:
U∞ Bubble rise velocity (m s-1)
σ Surface tension (N m-1)
K Constant (churn-turbulent flow regime = 1.53) (bubbly flow regime = 1.18)
G Acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m s-2)
ρf Liquid density (kg m-3)
ρg Vapour density (kg m-3)
3. Calculate the dimensionless superficial vapour velocity due to flow

È]X
ÑÒ =
Êˆ
Where:
ΨF Dimensionless superficial vapour velocity due to flow
For churn-turbulent flow, the dimensionless superficial vapour velocity is given by:
2¥
Ñ=
1 − YX ¥
For bubbly flow, the superficial vapour velocity is given by:
¥ 1−¥ …
Ñ=
1 − ¥ Ó 1 − YX ¥
Where:
α The initial void fraction
C0 Correlating parameter (1.0 is a conservative value for tempered systems
while 1.5 is a conservative value for untempered systems).
It should be understood that the physical properties assumed for a solvent may be considerably
affected by the presence of other materials. Where there is any doubt about the nature of a material,
laboratory testing using correctly designed simulation experiments (boil-up or blowdown tests) can
definitively characterise a system.

E.3 Methods for Vent Sizing for a 2-Phase Fluid with Constant Heat Input
Homogeneous 2-Phase Relief Allowing for Overpressure
A number of methods are available to calculate the appropriate vent size for two-phase flow. The
choice of method is determined from the flow regime pertaining (bubbly, churn-turbulent, droplet,
homogeneous). A key parameter required for Each of these methods is the inlet fluid quality (i.e.
proportion of vapour to total mass flow). This is frequently an unknown condition, although the
homogeneous regime assumes the same proportions as existing in the vessel (described by the charge
mass and vessel volume terms in the equation below). This homogeneous condition will be a worst
case, although often for fire engulfment, it is unlikely that sufficient liquid will be entrained to allow the
homogeneous regime to persist (unless the material is naturally foamy).
Leung [viii] has presented a method of calculating the vent size required for homogeneous two-phase
flow, where the pressure (and temperature) is allowed to rise from the “opening” condition to the
“maximum” condition. An iterative approach is required to extract the vent area from the following
relationship:
Â W ∙ Â ∙ ©Z] œ ∙ ℎZ]
!" − ![ = ln – ˜−1 +
a∙r∙Y œ ∙ a ∙ r ∙ ℎZ] W ∙ Y ∙ ©Z]
Homogeneous Relief at Constant Pressure
Wilday [xiii] has presented a method of calculating the vent size required for homogeneous two-phase
flow, where the pressure (and thus temperature) is held constant at the maximum permitted pressure
in the vessel. The resultant vent size is generally oversized by this method, owing to the steady state
analysis being performed with the initial fill conditions. As a result, it is wise to take advantage of any
allowable pressure rise during venting to minimise the calculated size.
Â ∙ ©Z] ∙ »Z
r=
ℎZ] ∙ a
Homogeneous 2-Phase Relief Taking Advantage of Disengagement
Wilday [xiii] has presented a method of calculating the vent size required for homogeneous two-phase
flow, where the pressure (and temperature) are allowed to increase rapidly during venting to a point
where liquid disengagement occurs and vapour only flow results. This is only valid for cases where
disengagement can be assured and predicted by the DIERS derived equations, and where this
disengagement will occur before pressure turnover would occur using the method described at the
start of Appendix E.3. This method will occasionally yield vent sizes smaller than those predicted for
vapour only flow and care must therefore be taken with the interpretation of the results.
1 − ¥X
Â ∙ ln
1−¥
r=
ℎZ] ¥ − ¥X
a% + Y ∙ Δ!-
©Z] ∙ »Z 1 − ¥X 1 − ¥

Where the churn-turbulent disengagement point is given by:
Ñ
¥=
2 + YX Ñ
Where:
Â ∙ »Z X.Õ
Ñ= X.…Õ
1.53 ∙ ℎZ] ∙ r ' v• ∙ ³ »Z − »] w
Subject to:
a ∙ r ∙ ℎZ]
Â>
©Z] ∙ »Z 1 − ¥

APPENDIX F VENT SIZING CALCULATIONS FOR RUNAWAY REACTION
Vessel venting is the most commonly used of all runaway reaction protection systems. However, the
technology required to size such systems has only rEached acceptable levels since the initiation of the
DIERS (Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems) [v] project.
DIERS was formed from a consortium of 29 companies in 1976 under the auspices of the AIChE to
evaluate existing methods to design pressure relief systems for runaway reactions and to develop
additional technology as needed. Of particular interest was the prediction of when two-phase
vapour/liquid flow, of the type that can affect relief system size, occurs as a result of vaporisation/gas
generation during a runaway reaction.
Boiling takes plS5 through the entire volume of liquid rather than solely at the Surface. Each bubble
occupies volume and displS5s the liquid Surface upward.
Individual bubbles are able to rise (slip) through the liquid with a velocity that depends on the buoyancy
and Surface tension and are retarded by viscosity and the foamy character of the liquid. If a sufficient
volume of bubbles become trapped, the liquid Surface rEaches the height of the relief device and two-
phase flow occurs.
Generally, two-phase flow requires a larger relief area than all vapour or sub-cooled (non-flashing)
liquid flow.
Techniques for sizing an emergency relief system are:
• Direct empirical scaling of experimental data obtained in vessels with a very low thermal inertia
(e.g. Adiabatic Dewar Calorimeter or Phi-Tec apparatus)
• Analytical calculated solutions to mass flow balances
• Computer simulations of flow through relief systems
The initial stage of process safety design includes a definition of the "worst case scenario". Some of the
items to be considered in selecting the worst case include specifying:
• The amount, concentration and fill fraction of reactants, solvents and potential contaminants
• The temperature, pressure and viscosity of the process
• Potential operational and maintenance procedure errors
• The acceptable risks relative to fire exposure and/or runaway reaction, and environmental impact
of an emergency relief incident
In laboratory experiments, a carefully designed experimental programme must be followed that uses
representative samples in order to provide the required data for relief device sizing.
The calculations required to size emergency relief devices are very dependent on the type of reaction.
Generally there are three classes of reaction:
Tempered / Vapour Pressure Only Reactions
The pressure arising during a runaway reaction is due solely to vapour pressure. The loss of heat due to
the latent heat of vaporisation or two-phase flow venting is sufficient to control the reaction at a set

temperature, hence pressure, during the entire course of the reaction. This effect is known as
tempering.
Tempered Hybrid Reactions
The pressure rise in a vessel during a runaway reaction or decomposition being due to both vapour
pressure effects and permanent gas evolution. However, sufficient vapour exists that, during venting,
the temperature, and hence pressure, in the vessel are controlled by heat removal due to vaporisation
of the volatile component during the entire course of the reaction.
Gassy Reactions
The pressure arising in a vessel due to a runaway decomposition or reaction being due solely to the
generation of non-condensable, permanent gas. Any vapour pressure effect is insufficient to control
the reaction pressure by tempering.
At DEKRA Insight, two general methods of sizing relief systems are employed:
F.1 Analytical Calculations

Calculation techniques derived by Leung [viii] are used for sizing for gas only, hybrid or vapour pressure
systems.
The calculations make several assumptions:
• Relief is two-phase and flashing
• The gases produced are ideal, and liquids are incompressible
• The contents of the reactor are at homogenous equilibrium
In general terms, the calculations for Each system depend on:
For Vapour Pressure Systems: The rate of pressure rise with temperature at the set venting point and
the overpressurisation allowed to occur once the vent opens. Obviously, since vapour loss cools the
system, the vent size calculated for a vapour only system is generally lower than that calculated for a
gas only system.
For Gassy Systems: The maximum rate of gas evolution at any stage during the reaction is used to
calculate the required relief area.
For both types, the actual capacity of the relief vent (G) is also calculated. This factor determines the
mass discharge rate through a specific vent area. For vapour pressure systems, the G is typically
between 1000 and 7000 kg s-1 m-2 while for gassy systems, G is typically between 3000 and 15 000 kg s-1
m-2.

F.2 Direct Empirical Scaling Techniques
Relief area to vessel charge scaling using top vented tests is valid for sizing top-mounted emergency
relief devices for:
• Vapour pressure reactions which exhibit fully homogeneous vessel behaviour
• Gassy reactions which have a very high superficial gas velocity (i.e. vent as effectively as a large
scale vessel)
In direct scaling tests it is important that a 4 inch (100 mm) relaxation length of vent is attached to the
cell to attain homogeneous equilibrium flashing flow. Short nozzles or orifices tend to give non-
conservative results. The onset of two-phase vapour - liquid flow during a relief incident is dependent
on vessel height. Materials that exhibit homogenous (foamy/viscous) behaviour will be almost entirely
emptied from the vessel. The scale of the vessel is hence unimportant. This mS3ns that direct scaling is
appropriate to this case.
The heat loss characteristics, mechanical integrity and versatility of the adiabatic Dewar calorimeter
make it an ideal piece of apparatus in which to collect all relevant data required for emergency relief
system design.
F.3 Vent Pipe Considerations

The discharge piping from the rupture disk or safety valve to the knock-out drum, catchpot or quench
tank should be as short and straight as equipment layout conditions will permit. The ideal arrangement
should contain no severe elbows in the piping run or, if elbows are necessary, long-radius (‘swept’)
elbows should be used.
The calculations for vent area presented in previous appendices will yield only the vessel orifice
dimensions. In practice, all reactor vessels are fitted with discharge pipework to duct the vented fluids
either to atmosphere or to secondary treatment systems. The downrating effects of such pipes may be
evaluated using an iterative approach. Factors considered include the total vertical rise of the 2-phase
fluid (owing to the backpressure imposed by the static hS3d), together with the 2 phase friction losses
and phase ratio changes (owing to flashing).
An important variable is the pipework geometry, which will influence the position of the primary choke.
If a safety valve is used as the relief device, it will generally be the choke point, provided the
downstrS3m piping does not involve a reduction in diameter. For bursting disc systems this is not so
clS3r; the primary choke could appS3r further downstrS3m. The significance of the choke position is
that downstrS3m pressure drop will have minimal effect on the overall system capacity, up to a limit
determined by the magnitude of the choke (the pressure singularity may therefore be thought of as
free downstrS3m pressure drop).
Further discussion on the determination of the pipework effects is given in Appendix D.
In the case of systems where there is a risk of fluid discharges with high viscosity or changing viscosity
(e.g. polymerising materials), particular attention should be paid to the vent design. Under these

conditions, the DIERS equations are no longer proven and additional safety factors should be applied.
In the ultimate case, solidification within the vent system may occur - if this is a recognised risk,
alternative strategies for the control of overpressure will be necessary.

APPENDIX G VENT SIZING FOR GASSY SYSTEMS
The procedure for vent sizing for a gas generating reaction varies significantly from that for vapour
pressure systems. In the case of vapour pressure systems, venting (at adequate rate) causes the
temperature to "turnover" by tempering before the adiabatic peak temperature is attained. In the case
of gas generating systems, the venting process will not significantly affect the kinetics of the reaction
and the vent size is designed based on the maximum rate of gas generation.
The first stage of the vent sizing procedure involves determination of the void fraction in the vessel, this
is given by:
W
œ−
»
¥=
œ
The critical pressure ratio, η is given by:
X.ØjÙ
1−¥ X.ØX
® = 2.016 +
2¥
If the value of Pm∙η is less than PA (i.e. if the vent line flow is subsonic), then η is set to PA/Pm. The mass
flow rate (G) is given by the following short-cut equation (the Omega method may also be used, see
Appendix D):
X.Õ
Ú
NÜ… FNj ÜÜÏ O 1 − ® − ln ®GO
a = dÛÏ Ï Ï
Á ÁnÞ
Ï
Ý
;N Þ Ï O
Ï
The vent orifice flow area can then be calculated from:
Â] + Â¬ ∙ W
r=
a∙œ
ClS3rly, the principal parameter required for use in these equations is the maximum gas generation
rate. This value should be experimentally determined under adiabatic reaction conditions. Values of
gas generation rate collected under isothermal conditions will significantly underestimate the maximum
rate. The value of Qg can be determined directly from the maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/dtmax)
during adiabatic pressure Dewar trials using the equation:
¿h W
∙ Nœ*á[* − *á[*
¿ß "Bà » O ∙ W‹
Â] =
h"Bà ∙ W*á[*

APPENDIX H LEGAL DISCLAIMER AND LIABILITY
(a) Limitation of Liability. The consulting services conducted by Chilworth Technology, Inc.
(the “Company”) were performed using generally accepted guidelines, standards, and/or practices,
which the Company considers reliable. Although the Company performed its consulting services
pursuant to reliable and generally accepted practices in the industry, the Company does not guarantee
or provide any representations or warranties with respect to Client’s use, interpretation or application
of the findings, conclusions, and/or suggestions of the consulting services provided by the Company.
Moreover, the findings, conclusions, and the suggestions resulting from the consulting service are
based upon certain assumptions, information, documents, and procedures provided by the Customer.
AS SUCH, IN NO EVENT AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHALL THE COMPANY BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL,
INDIRECT, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING
WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY LOST REVENUE OR PROFITS OF THE CUSTOMER OR ITS CUSTOMERS,
AGENTS AND DISTRIBUTORS, RESULTING FROM, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH, THE
SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY. The Customer agrees that the Company shall have no liability
for damages, which may result from Client’s use, interpretation or application of the consulting services
provided by the Company.
(b) The Company’s pricing of the consulting services provided does not contemplate that
the Company shall have any liability resulting from its performance of the consulting services, except as
otherwise set forth in the Quotation from the Company. Accordingly, the Customer shall indemnify and
hold harmless the Company, its shareholders, directors, officers, employees and agents (the
“Indemnified Parties”) from and against any and all loss, cost, liability and expense, including
rS3sonable attorney’s fees and costs, which any of the Indemnified Parties may incur, sustain or be
subject to, as a result of any claim, demand, action, investigation or proceeding arising out of or relating
to either: (a) the consulting services provided by the Company; or (b) any material, equipment,
specifications or safety information (or lack thereof) supplied to the Company (or which should have
been supplied to the Company) by Customer and/or any failure of such materials, equipment,
specifications and safety information to comply with any federal, state or local law or safety standard.
(c) For additional terms and conditions, which apply with respect to the provision of this
report, see the Quotation provided by the Company and executed by Customer. If any terms set forth
in the Quotation conflict with the terms set forth herein, the terms set forth herein shall apply.

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Emergency Relief System Evaluation for Seven Storage

Tanks and Reactor RX at Company A.

© 20167 DEKRA Insight. All rights reserved.

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 2 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 3 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 4 of 66

Quotation Number XXXXX

Project Number XXXXX

Contact Details Phone: 609 799 4449

Author Guibing Zhao, PhD., Senior Process Safety Specialist

Peer Reviewer Daniel Watters, Process Safety Specialist

1.1 Revision History

Version Date RS3son for Revision Author Reviewed

Draft 08/06/2017 Draft version issued GZ DW

Final 01/09/2018 Final report issued GZ DW

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 5 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 6 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 7 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 8 of 66

Table 1: Operation procedure of RX in Company A manufacturing plant

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 9 of 66

5.2 Seven Storage Tanks

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 10 of 66

Tan/Tan mm 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 4,610 4,610 4,610

Dished End Volume m3 0 0 0 0 0.85 0.85 0.85

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 11 of 66

Figure 2: P&ID of Reactor RX

Figure 3: Pressure relief valve installed on Reactor RX

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 12 of 66

Figure 4: Relief line layout of Reactor RX

4 above-grade tanks in one dike area

Figure 6: Relief line layout of four above-grade storage tanks

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 13 of 66

Figure 7: Relief line layout of three below-grade storage tanks

Figure 8: Flame arrester installed at the exit of storage tank

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 14 of 66

Figure 9: Flow capacity as a function of pressure drop of flame arrester

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 15 of 66

6.2 Design Scenario for Emergency Relief Vent Sizing

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 16 of 66

6.3 General Vent Sizing Assumptions

6.4 Calculation Approach

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 17 of 66

6.6 Plant Equipment Details

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 18 of 66

Table 4: Existing vent line and PRV details of RX

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 20 of 66

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 21 of 66

7.1 Results of RC1 Test and Thermal Analysis

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 22 of 66

RX Mass RC1 Mass Chemical MW, Specific

RAW1 274 56.30 no data

RAW2 126 25.89 no data

Raw3 0.5 0.10 1.085@80 °C 58 295

Raw 0.08 0.016 1.07@20 °C -99 213

SOLVENT2 33.2 6.82 1.047@20 °C -67 255

CAT 0.095 0.020 3

Figure 10: Mr & Torque vs. time

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 23 of 66

Figure 12: Mr & Temp. vs. time

Figure 13: Mr & Cp. vs. time

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 24 of 66

Table 7: ARC testing condition

Report R/XXXXX/0218/GZ Final for Chilworth Technology, Inc. Page Number 25 of 66