Study Log

Max turnbull

30/4/19
Objectives (Wikipedia)
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American
fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the
Dutch East Indies and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without
interference.
Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval
strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of
victory.
Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were
chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time.
Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale such that the U.S.
government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests, and would seek a
compromise peace with Japan
I think Japan was doing things in the world following the creation of the League of Nations which it
knew would result in other countries placing embargoes etc on it. Japan knew they were doing
something that the world would react negatively to. They knew they were invading China – a
sovereign nation – and that would have consequences. So, Japan brought the embargoes on
themselves. So in that sense, they were the bad guys who fought back when reasonable
consequences were placed on them.

I might instead open with something like: Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour wasn’t entirely
unprovoked. That way you’re still pointing out the fact that they were reacting against America’s
restrictions etc, but you’re also not excusing them of any responsibility. I think they can still be
blamed: they attacked both China and Pearl Harbour. So they are definitely responsible for those
actions. However, they did have reasons for doing so, which they felt justified their cause.

P1: Lifting the trade embargo (revenge for them?) / Trade route through US territory/ keeping the
US out of the war.

2/5/19
Website Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/12/01/blood-and-oil-
why-japan-attacked-pearl/1238a2e3-6055-4d73-817d-baf67d3a9db8/?utm_term=.a4ae902ab20a
Notes:
- because of lack of natural resources, japan was entirely dependent on foreign countries
for oil, 80% came from the U.S as well as the sale of fuel and iron and everything else
required to keep a war machine going.

- As news about the Japanese atrocities in China reached the U.S, it’s citizens wanted
action to be taken, Franklin Roosevelts response was to forbid sale of airplane parts,
chemicals and minerals without a license (The Export Control Act)

- 1940: Japanese leaders start to think war with America will be inevitable and start
planning Pearl harbour ( a year before it actually happens)

JULY 1941
- Japan invades part of Vietnam as part of a plan to conquer the indies Which have lots of
oil.
 - America becomes scared about having to face off alone against a Nazi occupied Europe
and Japan. They take the only course of action they can against japan without using
military force and freeze all Japanese financial assets in America, effectively crippling
Japan’s ability to buy oil. The British and the Dutch shut off supplies from the East indies.

- At the time, the Japanese ambassador to Washington accurately summed up what had
happened: "The Japanese move into south Indochina" had "precipitated" the "freezing
measures, which in turn meant a de facto embargo, and had reacted in Japan to increase
the tension."
- At this point in time japan only has around 2 Years of oil in reserves
- Japan chooses to make an all-out attack on the indies to get more oil

- This quote from The briefing materials for the Sept. 5-6, 1941, meetings at which the
Japanese military sought the emperor's permission to attack put the matter this way: "At
present, oil is the weak point of our Empire's national strength and fighting power . . . . As
time passes, our capacity to carry on war will decline, and our Empire will become
powerless militarily."

Book Source:
“The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, pp. 322–23, 327–28.

“Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda had communicated to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura on July
31: “Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and
the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much
longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw
materials of the South Seas.”

Book Source:
Pearl Harbour by H.P Wilmott
Notes:
- Tensions were already there, Since 1937 and the “China incident” (google that) there had
been an “undeclared war”

Summary sentence: Americas actions in the 1940’s and in 1941 set the

P2: something to do with Japan’s political alliances to Nazi Germany

6/5/19
Book Source:
The Pacific War By David Wragg

- Japan was allied with Nazi Germany and Italy in the Tripartite pact in Jan 27 1940 and
were facing against England, The Commonwealth and France
- Because of this they were against the allies but japan had always been jealous of the
way the Dutch, The English and the French had been able to establish Colonies. The
English and the Dutch were the worst in Japanese eyes because they had the
biggest colonies with the most amount of oil and rubber. Things japan Desperately
needed to keep their war machine running.
- So for the Japanese to see their American assets frozen and to see America helping
escort convoys in the pacific really pissed them off
To what extent did the United states know about the Pearl harbour attack?

7/5/19

General Short had been told the two essential facts: 1) a war with Japan is threatening, 2) hostile
action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given these two facts, both of which were stated
without equivocation in the message of Nov. 27, the outpost commander should be on the alert
to make his fight ... To cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency
they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored
that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance
system, radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a
misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief. ...
- quoted in "National Affairs: Pearl Harbor: Henry Stimson's View". Time. April 1, 1946.

“My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources
including a Japanese source that
the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to
attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities
.” – Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, in a diplomatic cable message to the U.S.
State Department on
January 27, 194

“Prior to December 7, it was evident even to me... that we were pushing Japan into a
corner. I believed that it was the desire of President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill that
we get into the war, as they felt the Allies could not win without us and all our efforts to cause the
Germans to declare war on us failed; the conditions we imposed upon Japan—to get out of
China, for example—were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept them. We
were forcing her so severely that we could have known that she would react toward the
United States. All her preparations in a military way — and we knew their over-all import —
pointed that way.”

- Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, "Another Version of What Started the War with
Japan.," U. S. News and World Report, May 28, 1954, p. 48.

- These quotes show that American generals not only knew about an impending attack but
were expecting it, As Frank E. Beatty recalls in an article: “…The conditions we imposed
upon Japan—to get out of China, for example—were so severe that we knew that nation
could not accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we could have known that
she would react toward the United States. All her preparations in a military way — and
we knew their over-all import — pointed that way.”
 - These quotes also show that even with the knowledge of an imminent attack, the
commanders at Pearl failed to adequately prepare for the attack and were Caught off
guard

- A naval staff conference in March 1941 had considered whether the Japanese would
attack pearl harbour, but few among the senior officers present thought this was a
possibility. The Consensus was that “the Japs would never sail into us”
Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese naval code, the leaders in
Washington knew as well that Japan’s “measures” would include an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Book Source:
Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (NewYork:
Free Press, 2000).

15/5/19
Question changed to: “To what extent was the United States responsible for the Pearl
Harbor attack?”
- Because the last question was too broad and I was having trouble finding
sources/information for some of the paragraph points.

16/5/19

Investigate: Secretary Knox – a former journalist – issued a report that was comprehensive
about the pearl harbour attacks. Could have some interesting details.

Link to report: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/knox/knox_sec.html

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/PearlHarbor.htm

“A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on
November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message
of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight,
before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after
the attack had been made.“

“Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful [2]
estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent
danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most
imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the
known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on
this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this
danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching the planes on the various
fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully
guarded against possible subversive Action by Japanese agents. This
condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage
was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This
bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more
effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of
planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was
not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service
lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the
enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack
and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.”

At least
90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack
came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition
Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-
aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were
supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.”

The US DID know about Pearl harbour but took the wrong preparations towards a Japanese attack and as a
result they more or less shot themselves in the foot. Interestingly, this report contradicts Henry Stimson’s
report in 1946 that claimed that the anti-aircraft Ammunition was stored away and could not be accessed as
opposed to this report that says all anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition. Both reports DO state
however, that the planes were clustered on the runway in a state that prevented take-off in an attempt to
prevent Japanese sabotage.

“At least a half hour before the attack was

made this officer's Radar indicator showed a concentration of planes to
the northward, out 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft
Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should
have been reported to Headquarters. The Officer there, a Second
Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he
had been told the Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had
located were probably from that carrier. No report of this discovery of
an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or
the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it
would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a
state of readiness.”

“There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi

the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted [11]
they did not expect it and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if
it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as
extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would
have to travel to make the attack and the consequent exposure of such a
task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the
Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the
Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both
felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the
Far East.”

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air
attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.

[l7] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning
on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War
Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until
some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the
Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate
measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air
attack.
(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer
period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December
7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate
information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to
the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information Center by an
unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other
information from Army Radar showing the retirement of enemy aircraft to
their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the
attack.

20/5/19

Source:
- After the freezing of Japanese assets In the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull held
multiple meetings in order to resolve Japanese-American relations. No solution could be
agreed upon for three key reasons:

1. Japan honoured its alliance to Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact.
2. Japan wanted economic control and responsibility for southeast Asia (as envisioned in
the Greater East-Asia prosperity Sphere)
3. Japan refused to leave mainland China (without its puppet state of machukuo

- Japan failed to issue a declaration of war to the united states before the Pearl
Harbour attacks began.
-
22/5/19
Did America Want japan to attack?
(aka, the “Back Door to War” Theory

http://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=1930

In response to that decision, Roosevelt instructed his chief of naval

operations to order the Asiatic Fleet to send a line of ships directly into
harm’s way in the Gulf of Siam, hoping to entice the Japanese to fire
the first shot. Admiral Harold Stark immediately sent a telegram to
Asiatic Fleet commander Admiral Thomas Hart in Manila, directing him
to send three small vessels to form a “defensive information patrol” and
to report any Japanese movements in the West China Sea and the Gulf of
Siam. The Army Air Force was already shadowing the Japanese moves.
Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese naval
code, the leaders in Washington knew as well that Japan’s “measures”
would include an attack on Pearl Harbor.[4] Yet they withheld this
critical information from the commanders in Hawaii, who might have
headed off the attack or prepared themselves to defend against it. That
Roosevelt and his chieftains did not ring the tocsin makes perfect sense:
after all, the impending attack constituted precisely what they had been
seeking for a long time. As Stimson confided to his diary after a meeting
of the war cabinet on November 25, “The question was how we
should maneuver them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot
without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”[5]( How Stimson
Meant to "Maneuver" the Japanese ,Richard N. Current

The Mississippi Valley Historical Review

Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jun., 1953)
After the attack, Stimson confessed that “my first feeling was of
relief ... that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all
our people.[6]
U.S. forces sought to create a war-justifying incident by
cooperating with the British navy in attacks on German U-
boats in the north Atlantic, but Hitler refused to take the bait, thus
denying Roosevelt the pretext he craved for making the United States a
full-fledged, declared belligerent

If he had to go to war, Roosevelt wanted japan to fire the first shot because if he chose to go
to war then he needed his nation to stand unified with him. At the time of ww2 the public
would not support him and neither would congress.

Roosevelt ordered the Navy to escort convoys of American and later

Allied ships and to shoot German and Italian warships on sight.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pearl-Harbor-and-the-back-door-to-war-theory-1688287

Despite the existence of an undeclared naval war between Germany

and the United States, however, Roosevelt hesitated to ask for a formal
declaration, because most of the American public still supported neutrality.
At this point, according to the revisionists, he believed that he could
obtain a public consensus in favour of war only if the country were
attacked by a foreign power.

He allegedly created this consensus by provoking the Japanese into

the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the revisionists describe it, Roosevelt
purposefully increased tensions between Washington and Tokyo by
introducing embargoes in 1940–41 on scrap metals and petroleum
products that Japan needed for its war machine. By the fall of 1941,
according to the revisionists, American policy makers had concluded
that Japan would attack the U.S. fleet in Hawaii in the belief that the United
States would then seek a settlement in the Pacific, thereby freeing Japan to
create an East Asian “co-prosperity sphere.” Although Roosevelt and his
closest advisers in the State, War, and Navy departments knew that
an attack was imminent, the revisionists argue, they did not alert the
military, believing that a surprise attack would create an
overwhelming consensus for involvement in both the European and
Pacific wars. As evidence of Roosevelt’s duplicity, they cite the fact that
the administration failed to notify the military of decoded Japanese
messages indicating that an attack would take place on December 6–7.