Armigos v.

CA, Mata, Carpio

Facts

Petition for certiorari filed by Rudy Armigos against Court of Appeals, Cristito Mata, Judge Carpio (as
Judge of Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V) as CA had dismissed petitioner’s appeal vis a
vis prior case due to late filing.

Civil Case No. 971, a complaint against Armigos for collection of damages and attorney’s fees was ruled
in favor of the plaintiff Cristito Mata by the Municipal Court of Digos. The petitioner received the
decision on 8 June 1977 and filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court the following day, 9
June 1977. He completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of
an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee on 24 June 1977.

Issue

Judge Carpio had dismissed the appeal as it was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from
the receipt of the decision. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal
should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period
comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and
the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.

Ruling

The petition was denied on the ground that Article 13 if the civil code provides that "In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included." It is already difficult for the human
mind to remember dates of the year unless an extraordinary event falls thereunder, how much more
the time in hours an act was done?

Concurred by Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.

Question: Reglementary period of 15 days starts when? To look up in Rules of Court.

Answer: REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95. Par. 4 Period of Appeal. – The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen [15] days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the
date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agency a quo.

NAMARCO v. Tecson

Facts

Civil Case No. 20520 between Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of PRATRA the plaintiff
ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and the sum
of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for
attorney's fees, and plus costs.

A decade later, December 21, 1965 to be exact, the National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO), as
successor to all the properties, assets, and rights of the Price Stabilization Corporation, filed, with the
same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701, against the same defendants, for the revival
of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said
complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of
action. The court ordered dismissal on the ground of prescription only.

NAMARCO appealed to CA which then certified to the SC En Banc raising only one law in question.

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, prescriptive period for civil actions is ten years from the time
the right of action accrues, which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the
time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." Section 1 of the Rules of Court on the other
hand states that a judgement becomes final if after thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment, no
appeal/s have been taken therefrom. The judgment was received by the defendants herein on
November 21, 1955 and no appeal/s have since been taken therefrom until 30 days after, hence it
became final, and the prescriptive period commences, on December 21, 1955.

Issue

The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise,
because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-
five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the
month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650
days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its
appealed order of dismissal.

Ruling

The order appealed from was affirmed, without costs, on the basis that the theory of plaintiff-appellant
contravenes Art. 13 of our Civil Code.

Concurred by Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.