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Fascist Italy and German Jews in south‐eastern

France in July 1943

Michele Sarfatti

To cite this article: Michele Sarfatti (1998) Fascist Italy and German Jews in south‐eastern France
in July 1943, , 3:3, 318-328, DOI: 10.1080/13545719808454984

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 DOCUMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Fascist Italy and German Jews in south-eastern

France in July 1943

Michele Sarfatti
Fondazione centro di documentazione ebraica contemporanea,
Milan

Abstract
In the summer of 1943, a few days before the political crisis of 25 July, Italy decided to
hand over to Germany German Jews (including those from the former Austria) in the
French territory occupied by the Italians. The hand-over never took place because the
crisis of 25 July intervened. But the decision taken by the Italian Minister of the
Interior on 15 July is nonetheless a historical fact that provides evidence of the
progressive radicalization of Fascist anti-Semitism before the establishment of the
RSI (Salò republic).

Keywords
Fascism, Germany, Italy, Jews, France, anti-Semitism.

The purpose of this article is to make public the two Italian documents
published on pp. 322-3, and to comment on their significance.

I
In 1938 the Italian government launched a ruthless persecution of the approxi-
mately 50,000 Italian and foreign Jews living in the country.1 This policy was
meant to lead to the expulsion of all Jews within roughly ten years.2 When
Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940, this plan could no longer be put into
effect, and as a result persecution was increased. Until Mussolini's first fall (25
July 1943), however, Italian Fascism attacked the rights of Jews, but not their
lives.
When substantial parts of Croatia, Greece and later France were occupied in
1941 and 1942, the Fascist government was faced with the problem of local Jews
and of Jewish refugees living in those territories. How should it proceed? Should
it extend the anti-Jewish laws existing in Italy (and in annexed Dalmatia and
Slovenia) to those lands? Should it expel the refugees already present there, or
transfer them to Italy, or keep them in those territories? Should it bar new
refugees from entering those zones, as it had already done in Italy (and in the

© 1998 Routledge 1354-571X

Journal of Modern Italian Studies 3(3) 1998: 318-328
 Fascist Italy and German Jews

annexed territories)? Most important of all, should it accede to the requests

which, from the summer of 1942 on, were made by Berlin, Zagreb and Vichy
that it hand over the Jews?
As far as the first of these points is concerned, Rome basically did not extend
its legislation, and allowed the laws of Vichy and Zagreb to continue to be
partially applied; on the second point, it pursued a policy of neither expelling
lewish refugees nor transferring them to Italy; as to the third point, its policy was
to prohibit new entrants, but it was not always carried out.3 As to the fourth and
last point (i.e. the requests that it hand over the Jews), historians have argued that
up to 25 July 1943 Rome had always refused those requests, or had granted them
verbally but opposed them in practice. These observations, and the fact that
Berlin, Zagreb and Vichy were - each in its different way — involved in the
Shoah, have led many Italian and foreign witnesses and historians to assert that
these refusals were the consistent result of an intentional policy, and even that
Italy (or a group of senior Italian officials) had been actively engaged in saving the
Jews.4
This second statement is misconceived. Only the granting of requests to hand
over the Jews might be considered an active step; refusing those requests was no
more than an obvious and logical continuation of the anti-Jewish policy (the
attack on the rights of Jews, but not their lives) implemented in the peninsula
since 1938. Actually, when Mussolini in August 1942 wrote that he had no
objection ('nulla osta') to handing over the Jews in occupied Croatia,5 this was
taken by the Germans to mean that he granted their request, but what he really
meant was: 'Personally I agree, but it's up to Italian authorities in charge to decide
whether to hand them over or not';6 diplomatic and military authorities,
however, chose not to make a decision (and did not hand them over).
As far as Rome's intentions are concerned, I am convinced that they were not
clear at all. Both in Croatia and in France (and according to some indications in
Greece as weU), Italian authorities between the summer of 1942 and the spring
of 1943 began to take a census of the 'pertinenze nazionali' of Jewish refugees
(i.e. to ascertain which country they belonged to) and to intern some or all of
them. These operations actually led to a postponement of the final decision
regarding the refugees. One must, however, keep in mind that they were also an
essential first step towards applying — at a later stage — a different treatment to the
various national groups.
A different treatment, after all, had already been applied in March 1942,
when Italian occupying authorities in Pristina (the capital of Kosovo) handed
over fifty-one Central European Jews to German occupation authorities in
Serbia, and transferred 100—150 Serbian Jews to an Italian camp in Albania,
which had been conquered by Italy in 1939. (The first group was immediately
killed, but we do not know at present which Italian authorities made the
decision and if they were aware of the fate awaiting those people.7)
In the course of the second half of 1942, Italian authorities - both in Rome
and outside Italy - received information about the Shoah,8 and this certainly

319
Documents and interpretations

caused some of them to be less compliant towards German requests; later on,
however, because of the military victories of the Allies in Africa in the spring of
1943, other Italian authorities displayed an increased anti-Jewish hostility.

The documents that are here being made public (and which I found in an
archival series of the Ministry of the Interior that had escaped the extensive
'clean-up' carried out after 25 April 1945) refer to this latter period and prove
that monarchical and Fascist Italy deliberately took an active step that condemned
Jews to death, a step that fully retains its significance, even if it was not put into
effect due to the events of 25 July 1943.
This is what happened. In the south-eastern regions of France, occupied by
Italy in November 1942, there were between 20,000 and 40,000 Jews, approxi-
mately half of them French and half of them foreign refugees. On 19 March
1943 Mussolini ordered a senior police official, 'Ispettore generale' Guido
Lospinoso, to go to Nice and set up a 'Regio ispettorato di polizia razziale'
(Royal inspectorate of racial police). His task was to superintend the treatment
ofjews, that is to put an end to the illegal entry of Jews trying to escape from the
French zone occupied by Germans, to take a census ofjews, at least of those
with a foreign nationality, and to intern them in places far away from the coast.10
During those same months, due to a general agreement reached directly
between Italy and Germany (similar to those that Germany had reached with
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Romania
and Turkey), Jews having Italian citizenship and living at that time in the
European territories under German rule were exempted from deportation and
were transferred to Italy.11 From France, in particular, there were 500 repatria-
tions before March 1943, a further 271 repatriations from Paris and 123 from
Marseille in the course of that month, and Rome expected in the following
weeks the return of approximately 120 persons from the first of these cities and
about forty from the latter.
Lospinoso carried out the task he had been entrusted with, issuing firm
denials to all requests from Germany or Vichy-France that were in contrast to
the orders he had received from Rome. 13
On 10 July 1943, however, as Lospinoso reported to Rome, two 'German
officials sent by the Commandant of Police in Marseille' (Rolf Miihler) turned
up in the offices of the 'Ispettorato' in Nice, talked to one of Lospinoso's men
and requested 'the consignment by us of the German Jews currently living . . .
in the zone occupied by our troops', in 'reciprocity' for the repatriation of
Italian Jews from the Marseille area. Lospinoso immediately sent a telegram to
the Chief of Police in Rome (Renzo Chierici), stating that 'the request is new
[for] this office, that treats German subjects in the same way as other foreign
subjects'. These last words might be an indication that he was against handing
them over; in any case, he ended by asking for instructions.14

320
 Fascist Italy and German Jews

On 15 July Chierici answered Lospinoso: 'Please comply with the request

from the German Police for the handing over of German Jews'.15
No further Italian document explains the reasons behind this order. From the
point of view of diplomacy between friendly countries, the exchange appeared
logical. The German—Italian agreement for the repatriation of Italian Jews,
11 owe ver, did not provide for any reciprocity. Moreover, correspondence
between Muhler and his chief in Paris (Helmuth Knochen) shows that the
Inter was unaware of the former's initiative;16 therefore the suggested exchange
must be considered a move undertaken locally, and independently, by the
German police in Marseille. Under the circumstances, Italian authorities were
under no compulsion to agree to it. The Italian compliance must therefore be
considered an intentional and active decision, and the reasons for it must be looked
for within Italy itself.
In this respect, one must remember that — technically - there was a deep
similarity between the order of 15 July 1943 and the Pristina episode, and that
the order was consistent with taking the census of the 'pertinenze nazionali'; on
the other hand, one must keep in mind that during those weeks the situation of
foreign and Italian Jews in Italy also suffered a serious setback. On 25 July 1943 -
just before hearing of Mussolini's ouster that day - the cabinet office of the
Ministry of the Interior asked the Direzione di polizia to transfer to the province
of Bolzano (from which all foreign Jews had been expelled in 1939) the 2,000
internees (four-fifths of whom were foreign Jews) detained in the concentration
camp of Ferramonti in Calabria . Since the reasons for this decision are
unknown, we can but point out that Ferramonti is in the extreme south of
Italy, while Bolzano was the Italian town nearest to the Third Reich's borders.
Moreover, in the preceding months of May—June Mussolini had decided tó
c ollect Italian Jews in four internment and forced labour camps.18
The telegram of 15 July is signed by Chierici, and we know nothing of how
it came to be written and why it took five days to write; but it is hard to imagine
that the Chief of Police made this decision (an important one, as witnessed by
the fact that he headed his telegram 'Polizia politica', i.e. political police matters,
and not 'pubblica sicurezza', i.e. general police matters) all by himself, without
asking the consent — even in general terms - of the Undersecretary of the
Interior Umberto Albini or of the Minister of the Interior Benito Mussolini.
I have been unable to find other Italian documents on this. Some German
documents, however, indicate that something did happen. On 19 August 1943
Muhler informed Knochen that he had recently reached an 'agreement' with
l.ospinoso on the surrender of German and formerly Austrian Jews. On 28
August he added that the Italian official had previously given him some lists of
Jews then living on the Còte d'Azur, but later (that is on 18 August) had
requested — and obtained — that the lists be returned to him. Until now there
lias been no satisfactory explanation for this; today I believe it can be said that
before 25 July Lospinoso had begun to carry out the orders he had received from
Rome.

321
Documents and interpretations

We do not know if Lospinoso, when he took back the lists on 18 August,

acted on his own initiative or because of new orders from Rome (which he
might conceivably have solicited); on the other hand this fact proves once again
that the German authorities were very respectful of the decisions made by
Italians in the territories under Italian control.
To conclude, it was the landing of the Allies in Sicily and the ensuing Italian
political crisis on 25 July that caused the decision to hand over the German Jews
in south-eastern France to be reversed. It was the major military advance of the
Allies and the complexities within Badoglio's Italy that, for the time being, saved
those Jews from the sentence of death passed on them by Mussolini's Italy.

One of the reviewers of the first draft of this article raised several questions:
What exactly is the author's overall thesis? That Mussolini and Italian Fascism
were actively preparing to give up foreign Jews to the Germans? Was Mussolini
willing to turn over all Jews to the Germans, although Italy did repatriate some
Italian Jews from France as the author says? Did Mussolini regard the Jews as
expendable as part of his foreign policy towards Nazi Germany, or as an attempt
to maintain partial Italian sovereignty, or as part of an attempt to ensure German
support of his tottering personal power, or as part of a more intense anti-
Semitism than the literature has ascribed to Mussolini?
As far as the single points that have been raised are concerned, I can say that I
have no doubts at all that Rome had indeed decided to hand over German Jews
in France; that I don't know if the transfer to Bolzano of the foreign Jews
interned at Ferramonti was meant to lead to their being turned over to
Germany, or to their being used as hostages or as 'human shields' at the
moment of defeat; that no document allows us to assert that during those
weeks Mussolini was planning to surrender Italian Jews to Germany. On the
more general question, I must say at present that it is hard to give a definitive
answer. It is, however, important to point out that, following the Allied
victories in Africa and above all the Allied landing in Sicily on 10 July, two
tendencies took shape within Fascism: one (already well known) led to
Mussolini's first overthrow on 25 July, the other caused his policy to become
increasingly savage. The time has come to look at Mussolini's 'Jewish policy' in
1938-43 as an ongoing process rather than as a static picture.

Documents

I
Ministero dell'Interno — Gabinetto
TJffiào del Telegrafo e della cifra
Telegramma No. 16935
Mentone 10 luglio 1943-XXI, ore 13, 40, arrivato ore 19.30

322
 Fascist Italy and German Jews

Ecc. Capo polizia, Roma (Gab. Ps.) [Gabinetto della Pubblica sicurezza]
N. 81. Si sono presentati questo Ufficio [Regio ispettorato di polizia razziale] due
Ufficiali tedeschi inviati da Comandante polizia Marsiglia tale Muhler che desiderano
trattare la consegna da parte nostra degli ebrei tedeschi che si trovano nella zona occupata
nostre truppe sia già in residenza/orzata sia ancora liberi [,] e ciò per reciprocità dato che
ebrei italiani residenti in zona occupata dai tedeschi vengono come è noto dai tedeschi
consegnati a nostre autorità per rimpatrio Regno. Richiestariescenuova questo Ufficio che
tratta sudditi tedeschi stregua altri sudditi stranieri [,] per cui prego E. V. compiacersi darmi
istruzioni circa seguito da dare allarichiestadi cui trattasi.
Ispettore generale polizia Lospinoso

Ministry of the Interior — Cabinet

Office of Telegraphs and Ciphers
Telegram No. 16935

From: Menton 10 July 1943-XXI , sent at 13.40 hours, received 19.30 hours
To: His Excellency, the Chief of Police, Rome (Office of Public Security)
No. 81 Two German officials sent by the Commandant of Police in Marseille,
Muhler, came to my office to discuss the consignment by us of the Germanjews
currently living either under forced domicile [residenza forzata] or at liberty in
the zone occupied by our troops, and this in reciprocity given that the Italian
Jews resident in the German occupied zone are as is known handed over to our
authorities for repatriation to Italy. The request is new [for] this office that treats
German subjects in the same way as other foreign subjects, therefore I request
Your Excellency to give me instructions as to how I should respond to the
request.
Inspector General of Police Lospinoso

Ministero dell'Interno
Dispaccio telegrafico No. 45361 (cifrato 13.30)
Roma, 15 luglio 1943-XXI
Comm. Dr. Lospinoso, Ufficio P.S. confine Mentone-Ponte Unione
500. Poi Poi. [Polizia politica] A telegramma 81 dieci corrente [10 July] vogliate
aderirerichiestePolizia tedesca per consegna ebrei tedeschi.
Capo polizia Chierici

Ministry of the Interior

Telegraphic Dispatch no. 45361 (ciphered 13.30 hours)
Rome, 15 July 1943-XXI
Comm. Dr Lospinoso, Border Public Security Station: Menton, Ponte Unione

323
Documents and interpretations

500. Pol. Pol. Re telegram 81 sent 10th current month, please comply with the
request from the German Police for the handing over of German Jews.
Chief of Police Chierici

Appendix
The documents in this appendix have been known to historians for some time;
they are the correspondence exchanged in July—August 1943 between the
German Police Commander in Marseille (Miihler) and his chief in Paris
(Knochen).
They are now being published in translation by the Journal of Modem Italian
Studies, because they are the only other source available to date on the subject of
this article. Actually my research, which led to the discovery of the Italian
documents, was in part prompted by the 'agreement' mentioned by Miihler in
his telegram of 19 August.
Examining these German documents and comparing them with the Italian
ones would require a separate study. The following points should, however, be
emphasized:
1 the apparently opposite way in which Lospinoso and Miihler reported on the
meeting of 10 July to their respective chiefs (obviously Rome based its
decision on the former's report);
2 the lack of bureaucratic efficiency and the failure to apply the hierarchic rule
on Muhler's part (and the opposite behaviour — or at least so it would seem —
on the part of Lospinoso);
3 after 25 July 1943, Muhler's ingenuousness and Lospinoso's adroitness.

Document I 2 0
Marseille lOJuly 1943
Sicherheitspolizei — SD [Sicherheitsdienst]
Einsatz Kommando Marseille
IVB 18/Mo/Kr
TGb No. 8423/43
To: BdS [Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei] IV B- Paris
Subject: Measures of the Italians against the Jews
Ref: None
To establish greater clarity regarding the treatment of the Jewish question in the
territories occupied by the Italians and to improve coordination between the
measures envisaged by the Italian services and our own, a meeting should have
been held on 7.7.43 at the offices of the Chief of Italian Police in Nice, Dr.
Barranco (office: Villa de Nobili, boulevard Cimiez, Nice), with members of
our services.

324
 Fascist Italy and German Jews

However, Dr Barranco has explained that for a month and half a special
police for Jews (Polizia razziale) has been established under the direction of
Inspector general Le Spinoza (=Lospinoso) with an office at 32 boulevard
Cimiez in Nice, which has sole responsibility for all Jewish affairs.
Spinoza [=Lospinoso] did not come to a meeting that had been arranged
with him by telephone but sent in his place an assistant, Commissar Luceri
Tommaso, who is Vice-Questore of the Italian Race Police. Tommaso [Luceri]
declared at the outset that he had no authority to make decisions relating to
Jewish affairs and that we must wait for a second meeting with Spinoza
(=Lospinoso) which could take place shortly.
The ways in which these discussions are being held strengthens once more the
impression that the Italian authorities wish to use every means at their disposal to
ensure that the measures they envisage applying to the Jews do not replicate the
measures used by the German authorities. From what we have learned from
Tommaso [Luceri], the Italian Race Police have already carried out a census of
some 22,O0OJews of all nationalities in the Riviera zone. They have already begun
to assemble them in so-called places of obligatory residence (residenza/orzata). The
Italian attitude towards Judaism is typified by the fact that they have chosen as
places of forced residence some of the most renowned spas such as Megeve, Saint-
Gervais and Castellano. For those Jews considered as dangerous, in other words
who are politically active, they have set up a concentration camp at Sospello.
From the numerous reports in our possession it appears indisputable that the
Italian authorities, now as in the past, make a public display of their friendly
attitude towards the Jews. In many cases, Jews arrested for whatever reason by
the French police have had to be immediately released because of pressure from
the Italians.
In enemy propaganda the varied treatment of the Jewish question is fre-
quently cited as evidence of the alleged beginnings of discord or even an already
far advanced discord within the Axis camp.
Further developments will be reported
Miihler
SS-Sturmbannfuhrer and Kommandeur.

Document 2 21
19.8.43
EK [Einsatz Kommando] Marseille No. 6450
To: BdS IV B.Paris
Subject: Meeting with Lospinoso
Ref: None
On 18.8.43 at the request of Lospinoso, the Italian Inspector General for Jewish
Affairs in the zone of southern France occupied by the Italians, a meeting was

32S
Documents and interpretations

held in our offices here [in Marseille]. Lospinoso explained that the recent
unofficial discussions with the chief of the Toulon delegation that had resulted
in an agreement were no longer binding because of the change of government
in Rome. It had previously been agreed that all German and formerly Austrian
Jews in that zone should be handed over to our Kommando. It was also
proposed that the orders of the R.SHA [Reichssicherheitshauptampt] on
measures regarding the Jews in the German occupied territories should be
applied equally in the zone occupied by the Italians.
Lospinoso intends to go to Rome on about 20 August 1943 for four or five
days and he will explain what we want to the competent minister. After his
return from Rome Lospinoso will let us know the outcome of his discussions. I
will keep you informed immediately by telex.
Sipo SD EK Marseille IVB SA 18 BA/Str
Kr [Kommandeur] Miihler
SS-Stubaf

Document 3 22
Paris 26 August 1943
BdS/Hi
To: Sipo(SD)- Einsatz Kommando
for the attention of SS Sturmbannfuhrer Miihler, Marseille
Subject: meeting with Lospinoso
Ref.: Your telex no. 6450 of 19.8.43
I have taken note of your telegram and I am astonished that negotiations are
taking place with an authorized Italian representative without my service being
informed of this. I request a detailed account and an appraisal of L. [Lospinoso].
The reports are incomplete: because no signed agreement has been concluded at
this point with the Italians regarding issues relating to the Jewish question, there
can be no question of a change in a negative sense. I therefore request that you
inform me in detail of L's [Lospinoso's] arguments.
Dr Knochen
SS Standartenfuhrer and Oberst of Police.

Document 4 23
28.8.43
EK Marseille No. 6730
To: BdS
for the attention of SS Standartenfuhrer and Oberst of Police Dr Knochen, Paris
Subject: meeting with Lospinoso
Ref: Your telex no. 57485 of 26.8.43

326
 Fascist Italy and German Jews

Lospinoso himself asked to discuss with me the Jewish question in the Italian
occupied zone. The conversation was by no means of an official character. L
[Lospinoso] simply wanted some information on certain fundamental points
before lie travelled to Rome. However, I believe that the real reason L
[Lospinoso] came to my office was quite different. Lospinoso communicated
to my service a little while ago some lists of Jews living on the Cote d'Azur,
saying expressly that he would not want the lists to be returned to him. In the
meantime he must have received another order from his superiors, because he
now asked me to return the lists to him. He vaguely promised to let me have the
lists again after his journey to Rome. As I emphasized in my telegram of 19.8.43
the meeting took a very general character.
Sipo-SD EK Marseille
Kdr Miihler
SS-Stubaf.

Notes
1 Michele Sarfatti, 'Gli ebrei negli anni del fascismo: vicende, identità, persecuzione',
in Corrado Vivanti (ed.) Gli ebrei in Italia, II (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), pp. 1623-764;
Renzo De Felice, Stona degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, 4th edn (Turin: Einaudi,
1988).
2 De Felice, Storia degli ebrei, pp. 351-7, 584-94; Sarfatti, 'Gli ebrei', pp. 1696-8,
1700-5.
3 Klaus Voigt, Il rifugio precario. Gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945, II (Florence: La
Nuova Italia, 1996) (original edn, Zuflucht auf Widerruf.Exil in Italien 1933-1945, II
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993)).
4 ibid.; Daniel Carpi, Between Mussolini and Hitler. The Jews and the Italian Authorities in
France and Tunisia (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 1994); Daniel
Carpi, 'The rescue of Jews in the Italian zone of occupied Croatia', in Yisrael Gutman
and Ephraim Zuroff (eds) Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust. Proceedings of the Second
Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, April 1914 (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 465—
525; Jonathan Steinberg, Tutto o niente. L'Asse egli ebrei nei tenitori occupati 1941-1943
(Milan: Mursia, 1997) (original edn, All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-
1943 (London and N e w York: Routledge, 1990); Menachem Shelah, Un debito di
gratitudine. Storia dei rapporti tra l'Esercito italiano e gli ebrei in Dalmazia (1941-1943)
(Rome: Stato maggiore dell'Esercito italiano, 1991) (originai edn, Heshbon damim.
Hazalath ieudei Kroatia aliedei ha-italkim 1941-1943 (Tei Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1986)).
5 The document is published in Carpi, 'The rescue of Jews', p. 512, and in Steinberg,
Tutto o niente, p. 8 (All or Nothing, p. 2).
6 See De Felice, Storia degli ebrei, p. 413.
7 Jasa Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941-1945. Zrtve genocida i ucesnici nor (Belgrade:
Saveza Jevrejskih Opstina Jugoslavije, 1980), pp. 151-4, 199, 581; Settimio Sorani,
L'assistenza ai profughi ebrei in Italia (1933-1941). Contributo alla storia della Delasem
(Rome: Canicci, 1983), pp. 273-4; Zvi Loker, "The Testimony of Dr. Edo.Neufeld:
the Italians and the Jews of Croatia", Holocaust and Genocide Studies VII(l) (Spring
1993): 71.
8 Liliana Picciotto Fargion, Il libro della memoria. Gli ebrei deportati dall'Italia (1943-
1945). Ricerca del Centro di documentazione ebraica contemporanea (Milan: Mursia, 1991),

327
Documents and interpretations

pp. 838-41; Voigt, Il rifugio precario, II, pp. 374-78 (Zuflucht auf Widerruf, II, pp.
306-9).
9 Archivio centrale dello stato (Roma), Ministero dell'Interno, Gabinetto, Ufficio cifra
(hereafter ACS MI UC), Telegrammi in arrivo; ACS MI UC, Telegrammi in
partenza. This is where all telegrams sent or received by the Ministry of the Interior
are kept. I have been unable to locate the two telegrams published in this article in the
ordinary files where the papers of the Ministry of the Interior are arranged according
to specific topics.
10 Voigt, Il rifugio precario, II, pp. 311-18 (Zuflucht auf Widerruf, II, pp. 255-61).
11 Liliana Picciotto Fargion, 'Italian citizens in Nazi-occupied Europe: documents from
the files of the German Foreign Office, 1941-1943', Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual
7 (1990): 93-141.
12. Sarfatti, Gli ebrei, p. 1703.
13 See Note 10.
14 ACS MI UC, Telegrammi in arrivo, 1943, no. 16935, Ispettore generale Lospinoso
to Capo della polizia Chierici, Mentone, 10 luglio 1943.
15 ACS MI UC, Telegrammi in partenza, 1943, no. 45361, Capo della polizia Chierici
to Ispettore generale Lospinoso, Roma, 15 luglio 1943.
16 See the documents kept in the archives of the Centre de Documentation Juive
Contemporaine (Paris) and published in Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz. Die
Zusammenarbeit der deutschen undfranzösischen Behörden bei der 'Endlösung der Judenfrage'
in Frankreich (Nördlingen: Delphi Politik, 1989), pp. 541-2, 554, 558, 560ff. (also, in
non-official post-war French or Italian translations, in Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-
Auschwitz. Le Rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France. 1943-
1944 (Paris: Fayard, 1985), pp. 302, 330, 335, 339-40ff.; Léon Poliakov, La
Condition des Juifs en France sous l'occupation italienne (Paris: CDJC, 1946), pp. 112-
14, 126-8ff.; Léon Poliakov and Jacques Sabille, Gli ebrei sotto l'occupazione italiana
(Milan: Comunità, 1956), pp. 99-101, 112-15ff.)
17 The document is published in Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, 'L'internamento degli
ebrei stranieri ed apolidi dal 1940 al 1943: il caso di Ferramonti-Tarsia', in Italia
Judaica. Gli ebrei nell'Italia unital. 1870—1945. Atti del IV convegno intemazionale, Siena,
12—16 giugno 1989 (Rome: Ministero peri Beni culturali e ambientali, 1993). p. 561;
see also Sarfatti, Gli ebrei, pp. 1699-1700.
18 ibid., pp. 1706-8.
19 See Note 16.
20 Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz. Die zusamntenarbeit, pp. 541-2.
21 ibid., p. 554.
22 ibid., p. 558.
23 ibid., p. 560.

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