El Corresponsal Que Interpretaba Demás

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research-article2017
JMOXXX10.1177/1522637917719276Journalism & Communication MonographsStoker
Monograph
Journalism & Communication Monographs
2017, Vol. 19(3) 177–236
The Journalist Who © 2017 AEJMC
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DOI: 10.1177/1522637917719276
https://doi.org/10.1177/1522637917719276
New York Times’ Courtship, http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jmo
Defense, and Betrayal of

John W. White
Kevin L. Stoker1
Abstract
This study analyzes the behind-the-scenes correspondence, from 1928 to 1941, between
the New York Times’ news executives and editors and John W. White, who served as the
paper’s first Chief South American Correspondent. An analysis of the correspondence
and White’s dispatches shows that interactions between news management, foreign
governments, and the U.S. State Department influenced White’s writing to the point that
he avoided writing about Argentina’s neighbors; provided more positive, “Pollyanna”
material; and censored his own dispatches. The study provides further evidence that
Arthur Hays Sulzberger meddled in the paper’s news coverage, even before he became
Times publisher in 1935. The correspondence between Sulzberger and White also calls
into question the romantic myth of the autonomous foreign correspondent, free to
report without fear or favor. Instead, it shows that American foreign correspondents
faced scrutiny not only from their news executives and editors but also from foreign
governments, police officials, local newspapers, Nazi and Fascist spies, U.S. business
interests, the State Department, and even the President of the United States.
Keywords
John W. White, foreign correspondence, Argentina, censorship, the New York Times
In July 1928, Adolph Ochs, publisher of the New York Times, dispatched his son-in-
law Arthur Hays Sulzberger and daughter Iphigene, to travel to South America, “a
continent largely neglected by the Times” (Tifft & Jones, 1999, p. 143). Ochs wanted
1University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA
Corresponding Author:
Kevin L. Stoker, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, 4505 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV 89074-5007, USA.
Email: Kevin.stoker@unlv.edu
178 Journalism & Communication Monographs 19(3)
Sulzberger to meet with prominent newspaper editors and political leaders and recruit
part-time “special correspondents” in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. During his stopover
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Sulzberger tried to hire John William White away from a
full-time position with the Chicago Daily News.
White impressed Sulzberger with his brash confidence and dashing good looks. As
a former diplomat and veteran reporter, White came highly recommended by leading
politicians and newspaper editors. He was a student of South American culture and
history; later he would write a well-regarded history of Argentina (White, 1942a). In
White’s obituary, the Times described him as a “newspaperman of the Richard Harding
Davis school” (“John White Dies,” 1974). Like Davis, White dressed in the latest
styles, wearing a suit, white shirt with a detachable stiff collar, and spats over his
shoes. His pince-nez glasses and cane added to a personal style more closely associ-
ated with a foreign diplomat or businessman than a journalist. As envoys “between the
people they cover and the people for whom they report” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 175),
foreign correspondents represented the American government and its people. At the
Times that meant having the stature and style to represent the paper in meetings with
international leaders (Halberstam, 1979).
White rejected Sulzberger’s job offer, citing his full-time staff position with the
Daily News and his freedom to write for other publications. Instead, he recommended
Arthur Miguel, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires.
Sulzberger hoped that White might reconsider. Upon his return to New York, Sulzberger
confided to then acting managing editor Frederick T. Birchall that White “was very
well thought of, but at the time I was there, he felt he could not serve us in view of his
relationship with the Chicago Daily News” (A. H. Sulzberger to F. Birchall, July 1,
1929, Box 84, Folder 15).1 Miguel lasted less than a year with the Times, however,
suffering a nervous breakdown and fleeing to Montevideo, Uruguay. Feeling respon-
sible, White filed stories with the Times but asked that the paper not use his byline.
Sulzberger agreed to the terms while urging White to reconsider his offer (A. H.
Sulzberger to J. W. White, July 3, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15).
White again refused but did offer his opinion on the type of man the Times should
hire. He should be an American, “a respectable, presentable person” rather than “a
thoroughly trained newspaper man.” White gave no explanation as to why Sulzberger
should not hire a journalist. Perhaps White felt that the average journalist lacked the
sophistication and diplomacy to represent the Times. White invoked the Times’ inter-
national standing when he said the paper’s correspondent could influence relations
between Americans and Argentines more than the U.S. Ambassador. Argentine corre-
spondents in Washington, D.C., White claimed, “cable back more quotations from the
Times than from any other paper . . . , [increasing] the effect which every Buenos Aires
story can have on international good will” (J. W. White to Sulzberger, July 5, 1929,
Box 84, Folder 15).
By 1928, the New York Times had become one of the world’s most influential
papers, boasting a daily circulation of 418,000 and a Sunday circulation of 700,000
(Berger, 1951, p. 311). Sulzberger wanted to expand the paper’s influence in South
America so he continued to court White, especially once White began to correspond
Stoker 179
more for the paper. White’s unsigned dispatches often created a stir in Buenos Aires,
causing government officials and others to speculate over the identity of the Times’
mystery correspondent. On several occasions, Sulzberger tried to persuade White to
identify himself openly with the Times, but White preferred his freedom. The anonym-
ity also meant less scrutiny from the Argentine government (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W.
White, October 24, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15).
In March 1932, Sulzberger finally announced that the Times had hired White as its
first Chief South American Correspondent. By then, White had done enough work for
the paper that Argentina’s military leaders had figured out that he was the paper’s cor-
respondent. White was reporting from Montevideo, Uruguay’s capital, because
Argentine officials were censoring his cables and the mail. “Some of [White’s] dis-
patches have aroused no little opposition and excitement,” Sulzberger confided to
Washington Bureau Chief Arthur Krock. He admitted that White tended to opine too
much, including a couple of paragraphs in one story that “were rather too interpretive
and might very well have been lifted out and made into a shirt-tail . . . , [but] that was
not done” (A. H. Sulzberger to A. Krock, March 3, 1932, Box 84, Folder 15). Despite
these flaws, Sulzberger knew that Felipe de Espil, the Argentine Ambassador to
Washington, had verified the accuracy of even White’s most offensive stories. Espil
expressed those sentiments before becoming ambassador but had since met with
Sulzberger, and “never attempted to take back the words then uttered” (A. H. Sulzberger
to A. Krock, March 3, 1932, Box 84, Folder 15).
A study of John W. White’s tumultuous tenure as the Times’ first Chief South
American Correspondent provides a behind-the-scenes look at how the New York
Times recruited, defended, and betrayed its first full-time correspondent to cover South
America. White’s dispatches and correspondence show that Sulzberger played an
active role in managing and directing White’s work. Although White communicated
with his editors, particularly managing editor Edwin L. James, his primary supervisor
was Sulzberger. In a 1951 biography of the Times, Meyer Berger claimed the paper’s
owner and publisher did not intervene in the editorial functions of the paper; but
Berger was a long-time reporter and columnist at the paper, not an editor (Berger,
1951; Chomsky, 1999). A growing body of evidence, including the present study,
showed that Arthur Hays Sulzberger, as a vice president and later as publisher, played
a central role in managing the editorial functions of the paper (Boyland, 1986;
Chomsky, 2000, 2006). Managing Editor Edwin L. James took his marching orders
from Sulzberger while delegating editorial decisions to the “desk” editors, who, prior
to the 1950s and 1960s, wielded more power than reporters (Boyland, 1986). Daniel
Chomsky, a progressive historian, examined 6 years (1956-1962) of Turner Catledge’s
two-decade tenure as managing editor and found that Arthur Hays Sulzberger meddled
in the writing of editorials and foreign news coverage. In 1949, Sulzberger acceded to
Central Intelligence Agency director Allen Dulles’s request to remove Times’ corre-
spondent Sydney Gruson from Guatemala because Gruson suggested U.S. interven-
tion would increase nationalistic feelings. According to Chomsky, Sulzberger tolerated
partisan, even incompetent reporting as long as it was consistent with his political
views or U.S. foreign policy (Chomsky, 1999).
This study provides further evidence of his meddling in the paper’s coverage of
South America, even before Sulzberger became Times publisher in 1935. The exten-
sive correspondence between Sulzberger and White also calls into question the roman-
tic myth of the autonomous foreign correspondent, free to report without fear or favor.
White took direction from Sulzberger and Times’ editors, and they pressured him to
maintain good relations with the Argentine government, Buenos Aires newspapers, the
American embassy, the U.S. State Department, and American business interests. The
Times relied on the State Department to help maintain and protect its international
reporting staff, and the correspondence showed that Sulzberger and the Times’ staff in
Washington stayed in close contact with State Department officials. The Washington
Bureau also informed Sulzberger regarding complaints from foreign diplomats and
gave advice on how the paper should respond to those complaints.
The multiplicity of stakeholders with an interest in how the New York Times cov-
ered South America lends credence to Reese’s (1991) more general description of the
constraints placed on individual reporters by forces inside and outside news organiza-
tions. Citing the work by Hirsch (1977) and Gans (1979), Reese (1991) argued that
top-level editors at major news organizations, including the Times, exerted control
over the news product while interacting with powerful elites outside the organization.
Decisions at one level often constrained actions at the lower levels. Journalism studies
have failed to uncover these influential interactions among elite power brokers because
they have generally focused on frontline journalists. The romantic ideal of reporters
creating the media agenda was shortsighted and overlooked organizational and inter-
organizational influences on news content (Reese, 1991).
The unique contribution of this study is that it analyzes the reporting of a frontline
foreign correspondent and the interactions among news management, foreign govern-
ments, and the U.S. State Department. The study shows that these interactions did
have a direct effect on White’s coverage of South America. In particular, the corre-
spondence reveals that prior to entering World War II, the U.S. government’s support
of Great Britain led to the suppression of stories about Great Britain’s obstruction of
U.S. economic interests in South America. White also censored his own dispatches
because he feared that certain stories would likely anger Argentina’s political leaders.
Much of the correspondence, however, deals with interactions between news exec-
utives, government officials, and White in response to White’s dispatches. Sulzberger
investigated every complaint against White, and internal memoranda and correspon-
dence show that editors sometimes disagreed on how to react to criticism from official
sources. White also had to deal with controversies created as a result of Argentina’s
internal political struggles and the quality of its relationships with the United States
and other South American countries. Indeed, when White reported that the United
States and Uruguay were negotiating for the American military to use Uruguayan
bases, he touched off an international controversy in which the accuracy of the story
was less important than the harm caused to U.S. foreign relations. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt personally complained to Sulzberger about White’s story but never dis-
puted its main points. Sulzberger shared White’s confidential correspondence with the
President (J. W. White to Sulzberger, Memorandum, [n.d.], Box 84, Folder 15) and
Stoker 181
then conspired with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to remove White from
South America (Sulzberger to S. Welles, May 28, 1941, S. Welles to Sulzberger,
October 6, 1942, Box 84, Folder 11). After more than 10 years of direct dealings with
White, Sulzberger delegated the task of White’s dismissal to his managing editor
Edwin L. James and his Washington Bureau Chief Arthur Krock (Sulzberger to E. L.
James, June 27, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11).
The primary source material for this study comes from the New York Times
Company Records housed in the Archives and Manuscripts Division of the New York
Public Library, New York, N.Y. Correspondence between White, Sulzberger, and
James and internal memoranda with respect to White can be found in Box 84, Folders
11 to 15 of the Arthur Sulzberger Papers, 1865 to 1961. The folders represent one of
the largest collections of letters, cables, internal memos, and newspaper clippings
associated with a single correspondent. Additional correspondence was found in fold-
ers for individual South American countries. The material covers the period from 1928
to 1941. White’s dispatches were accessed using the database Proquest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009). Secondary research focused on for-
eign correspondence, South American history, and management of the New York
Times.
First, I examine the paradox of American foreign correspondence, and the unique
political and economic conditions that existed in South America during the 1920s and
1930s. Next, I review John W. White’s journalism and diplomatic career, his recruit-
ment by the Times, and Sulzberger’s instructions as to the responsibilities of a Times’
correspondent. I then focus on White’s early battles against censorship and secrecy
and his coverage of the Fascist movement, the Communist myth, and America’s Good
Neighbor Policy. The final section deals with White’s controversial coverage of Brazil,
the Pan American Conference, the Nazi menace, and the base negotiations. The con-
clusion offers a postscript on White’s career, and the admission that covering Buenos
Aires was no bed of roses.
The Paradox of American Foreign Correspondence

Since American news organizations expanded their international coverage after World
War I, American foreign correspondents have confronted the paradox of trying to
cover nations that do not share American or Western values regarding free expression
and a free press. Emerson (1970) noted that a variety of factors, including history, poli-
tics, and culture, determined the success of free expression in a particular country.
Even in modern times, some American foreign correspondents who applied Western
journalism standards of practice have been expelled from China and Afghanistan
despite being supported and defended by the U.S. government and its leaders
(“Expelled New York Times Correspondent,” 2014; “New York Times Journalist,”
2014; Nordland, 2014). Assigned to cover Czechoslovakia during the Cold War,
Associated Press reporter William Oatis was convicted of espionage by the country’s
Communist government for meeting with a source who happened to be a U.S. embassy
official. President Harry Truman and Congress condemned the conviction, and the
U.S. State Department retaliated with trade and travel restrictions. Nevertheless, Oatis
spent 2 years in a Czechoslovakian prison before an appeal by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower led to his release (Alwood, 2010).
In the 1920s and 1930s, American journalists covering the rise of Nazi Germany
encountered repeated acts of intimidation and violence. The Nazis feared the negative
publicity of expelling American reporters, but that did not stop them from applying
pressure on unfriendly correspondents to leave on their own accord. Even those sym-
pathetic to the Third Reich were forced to leave once they began reporting critically
about Nazi tactics. Those who stayed adhered to the philosophy of the Associated
Press. “Our orders from our bosses were to tell no untruth, but to report only as much
of the truth, without distorting the picture, as would enable us to remain at our posts,”
said AP bureau chief Louis Lochner (Nagorski, 2012, p. 108).
Lochner’s orders reflected the second paradox faced by American correspondents.
To stay in authoritarian countries, they had to figure out how to report what was hap-
pening without offending local authorities and being expelled from the country.
Histories of foreign reporting have tended to focus on the romantic image of foreign
correspondence perpetuated during the Golden Age of international reporting between
World War I and World War II (Desmond, 1984; Emery, 1995; Hamilton, 2009). The
Chicago Tribune’s Vincent Sheean (1934) wrote an award-winning, best-selling
memoir, Personal History. In late fall 1922, the 22-year-old Sheean traveled to Paris,
“the centre of American journalism in Europe” (p. 36), and quickly advanced from
editorial assistant to a foreign correspondent interviewing international leaders. The
book chronicled Sheean’s dangerous trip through the battle lines of two armies to
interview the Riff rebel leader Abd el-Krim in Morocco. Personal History occurred
when the American dollar was strong, living abroad was cheap, and plenty of news
organizations were willing to pay for foreign reporting. Correspondents were free to
report and travel, without the scrutiny of editors and publishers back in the newsroom
(Hamilton, 2008). The importance of this freedom and the number of news organiza-
tions willing to pay for freelance reporting helped to explain John W. White’s early
career in Argentina. He reported for a number of papers and the Associated Press
before joining the Chicago Daily News in 1927. The Daily News fielded the finest
international staff for a newspaper of its size (Hamilton, 2009; Hohenberg, 1964). Its
impressive foreign staff, many with diplomatic experience, represented a new kind of
journalistic statesmen, as journalism historian John Hamilton described them. They
did not just report the news but interpreted and explained international affairs to
American readers (Hamilton, 2009).2
In covering South America in the 1930s, the need for interpretation and explanation
was especially relevant because the continent had long been a blind spot for U.S. for-
eign policy and the American public. In the 1930s, however, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy shifted more attention to South America, attracting
the interest of American newspapers and the public. With few exceptions, journalism
historians have given little attention to coverage of South America. Most journalism
histories mention coverage of the Spanish American War in 1898, the Mexican
Revolution in 1909, and the Iran Contra conflict in the 1980s but have largely ignored
Stoker 183
foreign correspondence in South America during the Golden Age. Only Hamilton’s
(2009) recent history of foreign correspondence mentioned John W. White and his
reporting in the 1920s from South America. Hamilton cited White’s Chicago Sun
Times story about South Americans harboring ill will toward the United States. In the
19th century, South Americans admired the United States and wanted close relations
with their northern neighbors, but after the Spanish–American War and the gunboat
diplomacy of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, South Americans
viewed the United States more as a threat and a rival. In particular, The U.S. military
intervention and paternalism instilled in South American republics a strong sense of
Nationalism that endured well into the 20th century (Maier & Weatherhead, 1964;
Pike, 1992, p. 266).
1930s South America: The Conflict Society

The divide between the continents can be traced to their colonial roots. North America
emerged out of the liberal and democratic traditions of England and Western Europe.
South America, on the contrary, adopted the feudalistic, authoritarian traditions of
Spain and Portugal. Protestantism, libertarianism, and individualism dominated North
American thought, while Catholicism and class distinctions held sway in Latin
America, as did corporatism, which divided society into groups or corporations, such
as the aristocracy, the military, trade unions, and the church. Groups provided political
representation for their members and were expected to keep their members in line and
subordinate to the state. Under state direction and control, these groups helped pro-
mote national stability, development, and coordination (Wiarda, 2015). Even after
winning their independence from Spain and Portugal, South American republics con-
tinued to embrace corporatism, authoritarianism, and theocracy (Wiarda, 2001).
Most Americans considered Latin Americans inferior and looked upon South
America as a single country filled with revolutionaries and incompetent politicians
(Johnson, 1980; Pike, 1992; Silvert, 1968). The New York Times coverage of South
America did little to counter perceptions. With no full-time correspondents in South
America, the Times relied on local newspapers, the wire services, and freelancers to
cover military coups and political revolutions. The Sunday section included interpre-
tive pieces from Dr. Paul Vanorden Shaw, a Brazilian professor of Latin American
history and freelance newspaper correspondent. One of Shaw’s dispatches featured a
headline reflecting the views of many Americans: “They [South Americans] resort to
civil wars to right wrongs, while we who are much more enduring, turn to the ballot”
(Shaw, 1930, p. 82).
South American republics did turn to the ballot to elect their leaders. Yet the Great
Depression hit them hard in 1929 and caused many of their economies to collapse,
undermining their elected civilian governments. Prior to the Depression, South
American governments relied on revenues from exports to run their economies; but
after the Depression, exports fell by more than half, rupturing the economic and politi-
cal systems of almost every country. The U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley)
further crippled the region and alienated South American governments, especially
Argentina. As a major beef producer, Argentina wanted access to U.S. markets, but the
American government, citing health fears, restricted beef imports. Great Britain,
Argentina’s primary trading partner, also enacted tariffs. Many South American gov-
ernments defaulted on their debts, causing widespread unemployment and poor living
standards (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Reid, 2007).
Historians refer to South America in the 1930s as the conflict society (Silvert,
1968). Fifty years of civilian rule ended in Argentina in 1930 when a military junta
took control of the government. The coup helped launch Argentina’s “infamous
decade,” a time marked by military rule, election fraud, and political persecution
(Cantu & Saiegh, 2011). Other South American republics also endured political tur-
moil and corruption. In the space of 4 years, 1930-1934, revolutions occurred in 14 of
the 20 South American countries, dramatically changing the social, political, and eco-
nomic landscape. Corporatist leaders and members of the elite ruling class were forced
to begin incorporating the middle class and make compromises with liberal, demo-
cratic forces (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Reid, 2007; Silvert, 1968). Twentieth-century
corporatists, including dictators, sought legitimacy through democratic elections. This
expanded the political influence of opposition parties and groups beyond the ruling
elite—the aristocracy, church, and military. Although drawn to Nationalism and
Fascism, corporatist leaders cared much more about power than ideology (Anderson,
1967, p. 104). From the economic ruins of the early 1930s, South American republics
reluctantly enacted more elements of capitalism, which exaggerated the disparities
between rich and poor. This created the conditions necessary for a Marxist revolution,
but Marxism and Communism never gained a strong foothold in the region. Instead
corporatist leaders used the threat of Communist uprisings as a justification for inter-
vening militarily or silencing political opposition (Maier & Weatherhead, 1964; Reid,
2007; Silvert, 1968; Wiarda, 2001, p. 230).
South America’s corporatist rulers embraced Fascism because of its affinity for
militarism, national unity, and Catholicism. Corporatists also shared the Fascists’
hatred of Communism and capitalism. This infatuation enabled Germany and Japan to
compete with the United States and Britain for economic and political influence. In
mid-1930s, Germany signed bilateral trade agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Uruguay. In Brazil and Chile, Germany surpassed the United States as the primary
source of imported goods, and German capital played an important role in Argentina’s
banking and energy sectors (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Wustenhagen, 2004). To stymie
competition and deal with a shortage of foreign exchange, Nazi Germany imported
goods only from those countries that bought German exports (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
To undermine American social and political influence, Nazi agents also spread anti-
American propaganda. The United States and Britain countered with their own propa-
ganda campaigns that exaggerated the Nazi threat and sowed fears of Nazi invasions
of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina (Ciccarelli, 2006; Desmond, 1984). The competing
propaganda, combined with state-sponsored censorship and disinformation, made
reporting on the conflict society difficult for even the most experienced American
correspondents.
Stoker 185
Sulzberger’s Courtship of John W. White

In 1930s, having spent more than a decade living in Buenos Aires, John W. White was
considered the dean of American correspondents covering South America. Born in
1890 in St. Louis, Missouri, White studied Spanish for 3 years and German for 2 years
in high school. He broke into journalism in 1910 as 20-year-old cub reporter making
$5 a week for the St. Louis Republic. Even then, during his first year with the Republic,
White dreamed of working as a foreign correspondent for the New York Times (J. W.
White to Sulzberger, March 21, 1932, Box 84, Folder 15).
That dream shaped White’s career path. After more than a year at the Republic, he
moved to the Houston [Texas] Post, earning a big raise to $27.50 a week and an oppor-
tunity to speak Spanish. He returned to the Republic for another year and a half at $30
a week before taking a pay cut to break into Washington journalism. He joined the
Washington Post and a year and a half later, jumped to the Washington Times, again
making $30 a week. On March 26, 1914, he applied to the U.S. Foreign Service
(National Archives: Department of State Records, John W. White). His application
photo reveals a handsome young man in his 20s with slicked back dark hair and dark
eyebrows. The application also included a letter of recommendation from his editor at
the Washington Times, William H. Doyle, a former U.S. diplomat in the port town of
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. “I have had the opportunity to observe that his character is
excellent and that he is instinctively honest and truthful, as well as of good personal
habits,” Doyle wrote. White also received support from Missouri’s two U.S. Senators,
Democrats William J. Stone and James A. Reed (National Archives: Department of
State Records, John W. White).
On June 27, 1914, White received his commission as Deputy Consul for St.
Michaels (São Miguel) in the Portuguese Azores, serving under Consul Arminius T.
Haeberle, his former high school Spanish teacher. In White’s 6-month employment
evaluation, Haeberle described him as having good habits and appearance, intelligent,
reliable, courteous but only “fairly neat in his work.” Nevertheless, Haeberle believed
that White could be an “efficient subordinate” with experience and improved language
skills. In February, Haeberle departed for Brazil, and White was promoted to Vice
Consul. Five months later, White became Vice Consul in Buenos Aires (National
Archives: Department of State Records, John W. White). As a Vice Consul, White
failed to impress his superiors. His performance rating was “very good to fair” while
still exhibiting good appearance, habits, reliability, and honesty. His final performance
review also noted that his service commitment was “only fair” and he tended to be
inaccurate in his work, especially when the work did not interest him (National
Archives: Department of State Records, John W. White).
Resigning from the Foreign Service in 1917, White returned to journalism, working
predominantly as a freelance correspondent for a number of publications. In 1919,
White founded the Associated Press’s first bureau in South America (“John W. White,
Author,” 1974). During his 3 years as AP’s Buenos Aires correspondent, White later
confided in Arthur Hays Sulzberger that he gained more satisfaction from having his
unsigned copy published in the New York Times than the AP, which he described as
“the world’s greatest news organization” (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, July 5,

1929, Box 84, Folder 15).
In 1922, White became the Buenos Aires correspondent for the Chicago Tribune. In
a profile on White, the paper described him as “a wise and careful investigator,”
acquainted with Chicago and skilled in Spanish and Portuguese (“South America Is His
Domain,” 1922). As an example of White’s prowess, the profile praised his bold report-
ing—ironically, the same type of reporting that later got him into trouble with the New
York Times. In a dispatch, White claimed that Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguia
had assumed dictatorial powers by banishing the political opposition, seizing a major
newspaper, and closing a university. According to the profile, the Peruvian government
accused the Tribune of publishing a false story about Peru from nearly 4,000 miles
away in Buenos Aires. The government invited the newspaper to investigate, so The
Tribune ordered White to proceed to Peru. With the railroad pass through the Andes
closed for winter, White traveled 21 days, riding in eight trains, a lake steamer, and two
automobiles. Once in Peru, White’s news dispatches were censored, but on his way
home, he stopped at Iquique, Chile, and cabled an uncensored story confirming the
accuracy of his first dispatch. The profile also lauded White’s exclusive coverage of
“the most violent earthquake of this century” (“South America Is His Domain,” 1922).
In November 1922, White traveled to Brazil on assignment for the Los Angeles
Times and tracked down President-elect Arthur Bernardes, who had secluded himself
behind armed protection at a sugar plantation in his home state of Minas Geraes. White
sent a telegram requesting an interview and even visited the plantation but was refused
entry. Despite not talking to the President-elect, White provided a thorough analysis of
the situation, detailing Sao Paulo’s resentment of an outsider as President-elect, the
government’s censorship of the media, and the arrest of three leading newspaper edi-
tors (White, 1922).
After his stint with the AP, White rejoined the Chicago Tribune, but soon parted
ways with the paper because he claimed that his Chicago-based editor, Charles Pierson,
sensationalized his stories. Fourteen years later, Pierson’s criticism tainted Sulzberger’s
opinion of White (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, June 23, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11).
In 1927, White joined the Chicago Daily News as its staff correspondent in Buenos
Aires, earning a respectable $450 a month. White described his work for the Daily
News in a July 5, 1929, letter to Sulzberger. From Buenos Aires, he covered Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, and using news sources in Buenos Aires, he also sent “good”
stories on Chile and Brazil.
I have traveled for them [the Daily News] in Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay. They seem
well pleased with my work and I probably can remain with them indefinitely, but I
probably could not better my own position much beyond what it is at the present. (J. W.
White to A. H. Sulzberger, July 5, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15)
If the Times, White continued, “should consider the South American field important
enough to have a salaried correspondent here, I should like to be considered for the
post.” By selling the paper’s European specials to local papers, he could offset part of
Stoker 187
the difference between a full-time staff salary and what Sulzberger had paid Miguel.
The quality and quantity of coverage would compensate for additional pay (J. W.
White to A. H. Sulzberger, July 5, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15).
The idea of having a staff correspondent in Buenos Aires intrigued Sulzberger, but he
left for Europe before making a decision. Since touring South America in 1928,
Sulzberger wanted to do a better job of covering South America but resisted investing in
a full-time staff correspondent. Adolph Ochs was still publisher of the paper, and there
was still no certainty that his son-in-law would replace him as publisher (Tifft & Jones,
1999). Sulzberger had joined the Times without any newspaper experience, but by 1928,
he had proved his value. In his first job as an assistant to executive manager George
McAneny, Sulzberger impressed McAneny and his father-in-law by solving the problem
of obtaining a reliable supply of newsprint. The next year, Sulzberger paid out $5,000 to
guarantee Times reporters exclusive access to Charles Lindberg after his historic flight
across the Atlantic (Tifft & Jones, 1999). Indeed, these successes showed that Sulzberger
possessed a “natural instinct for the news business” (Berger, 1951, p. 240).
On his return from Europe September 25, 1929, Sulzberger finally offered White a
permanent, full-time position at a salary of $500 a month, a princely sum even for a
Times correspondent. “From my personal contact with you and the opportunity that
this summer has afforded for seeing your work, there is every reason for us to believe
that the new arrangement should prove mutually satisfactory.” He wanted White to
cover political and financial news, contribute articles to the Sunday paper for no extra
compensation, and write stories on literature, art, and music (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W.
White, September 25, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15).
To Sulzberger’s surprise, White cabled his regrets. In a personal letter dated October
25 and sent to Sulzberger’s private residence, White agreed to continue as a special cor-
respondent, but wanted the arrangement to be kept a secret. White even avoided putting
the name of the newspaper’s office on the envelope. In the letter, White warned Sulzberger
that the American Commercial Attaché in Buenos Aires had cabled the Department of
Commerce denying the facts in one of White’s unsigned dispatches. White said he spent
2 additional days verifying the facts of the story and confirmed its accuracy.
The fact of the matter is that Dye [no first name given] is one of the most incompetent
commercial attaches we have had at this post for some time and he fears that if he sent up
truthful reports, they would be distasteful to the Argentine government and he would lose
his job.
White said he was better informed than Dye and added that he left out information on the
political unrest aggravating the business situation, because he did not want to hurt
Argentina’s credit abroad (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, Cable, [n.d.]; J. W. White to A.
H. Sulzberger, October 25, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15). The exchange revealed Argentinian
politicians’ sensitivity to criticism from foreign diplomats as well as journalists.
Sulzberger responded by again offering White a position with the paper. “I hope
that the mystery of the Times Buenos Aires correspondent will soon be solved and that
you will openly be identified with us” (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, October 24,
1929, Box 84, Folder 15). White cabled his regrets but then in a letter sent October 31,
he suggested an alternative. After his failed first marriage, White had married Florence
Dover, who had been a correspondent for 2 years with the Christian Science Monitor
in Buenos Aires and now wrote for local publications. White wondered if Sulzberger
might consider a “lady correspondent” (J. W. White to Sulzberger, October 31, 1929,
Box 84, Folder 15). Sulzberger was disappointed and tried to resolve White’s objec-
tions (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, November 13, 1929, Box 84, Folder 15). They
soon met face-to-face in New York City, but Sulzberger failed to change White’s mind;
in February, the Times hired Florence Dover as a part-time correspondent (A. H.
Sulzberger to J. W. White, February 8, 1930, Box 84, Folder 15).
The Times’ agreement with Florence Dover was similar to the one with White. The
paper would not use her byline. Neither party offered a reason for this arrangement but
considering that stories about Argentina in the Times received such intense scrutiny,
White wanted to protect his wife from government officials. The arrangement worked
well for both parties. Sulzberger’s only complaint was that Dover relied too much on
the local newspaper, La Prensa, as a source for her material. La Prensa, he said, criti-
cizes everything as a matter of policy, adding, “when a fellow is mad every day it is no
longer news that he is mad” (A. H. Sulzberger to Mrs. White [F. D. White], April 28,
1930, Box 84, Folder 15). Dover must have heeded Sulzberger’s advice because 2
months later, he called her work “the backbone of all the South American material”
(A. H. Sulzberger to F. D. White, July 1, 1930, Box 84, Folder 15).
Everything changed for Dover on May 12, 1931, when the New York Times pub-
lished her analysis of Argentina’s financial problems using a Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
dateline. At the top of the story, an editor’s note specified that the paper’s correspon-
dent “had spent time in Buenos Aires studying conditions under the Provisional
Government” before filing the story from Brazil to avoid government censorship. The
correspondent wrote that contrary to the government’s claim of effective economic
management, it lacked any kind of budget and was overspending available funds. The
writer predicted government’s deficit would exceed $42,00,000 by the end of the year
(“Argentina Facing $42,000,000 Deficit,” 1931). The Argentina government reacted
swiftly, complaining to Acting Managing Editor Frederick Birchall about what he
called “unduly pessimistic” dispatches. Birchall offered Argentina’s military leader,
President Jose Francisco Uriburu, a chance to respond (F. T. Birchall to F. Dover, May
15, 1931, Box 84, Folder 15).
On May 14, the Times published on the front page a statement from Argentina’s
Minister of the Interior Octavio S. Pico. The statement included vague pronounce-
ments about the revolution and the promise to readjust the country’s finances in the
face of a worldwide financial crisis. It also confirmed the government’s deficit spend-
ing and the absence of a budget (Pico, 1931, p. 1). A second statement by Minister of
Finance Enrique Uriburu, cabled to the Times and published May 31, aimed to acquaint
“the American investing public with the financial facts of Argentina at a time when its
bonds have fluctuated more widely on the New York Stock Exchange than at any time
in a generation.” The financial minister claimed that Argentina enjoyed favorable trade
balance of $11 million gold pesos in the first half of 1931 compared with an
Stoker 189
unfavorable balance of $16 million under the previous civilian government (“Argentina
to Meet Debts, Says Uriburu,” 1931). Ironically, a year earlier, President Uriburu used
a similar economic crisis to justify the military takeover of Argentina’s democratically
elected President Hipolito Yrigoyen.
Publishing the statements did little to take the heat off Dover. A day after publica-
tion of the first statement, the Argentine government threatened her expulsion. Fearing
her arrest might damage the Times’ reputation, Dover fled to Montevideo and submit-
ted her resignation. Sulzberger refused her resignation and assured her that the paper
was “prepared to stand up and take what is coming to us as a result of publishing sto-
ries which we believe to be true” (A. H. Sulzberger to F. D. White, May 19, 1931, Box
84, Folder 15). But the controversy did not end there. The First National Bank of
Boston instructed its Buenos Aires branch to identify and expose the Times’ correspon-
dent to the government and insist on her deportation. To have an American business
seek to silence an American journalist revealed the potential financial losses that
occurred when Argentine bonds lost their value. In the 1920s and 1930s, American
banks acted as creditors for South American governments and sold their bonds on the
New York Stock Exchange. South American bonds were attractive to investors because
they promised a 7% return. Reports of financial trouble, much of it brought on by the
worldwide depression, caused bond prices to drop, scaring off investors, and making
it difficult to unload devalued bonds even at a lower price (Garrett, 1932). The First
Bank of Boston served as the creditor for President Uriburu’s government and suffered
financial losses as a result of fluctuating bond prices. As evidence of the government’s
tight relationship with the bank, Dover’s phone was tapped and the secret service
wanted to know her whereabouts. On June 22, 1931, Dover left for New York in hopes
that “the animosity,” as she described it, would calm down (F. D. White to F. Birchall,
June 12, 1931, Box 84, Folder 15).
Instead of calming down, the bank’s anger shifted to her husband. In September
1931, an official from the First National Bank of Boston complained to officials at the
New York Times that its mystery correspondent had exaggerated the Argentine govern-
ment’s financial plight in reporting an economic downturn and growing public dis-
satisfaction with President Uriburu’s government (“Weigh Loan Status,” 1931). Now
covering for his wife, White had reported that the Uriburu’s government had deported
wealthy Argentines, arrested prominent political leaders, and closed the opposition
party’s headquarters. The government, he wrote, had “openly assumed the character-
istics of a military dictatorship” (“Argentine Regime,” 1931).
Sulzberger wanted an explanation for the bank’s criticism. In a detailed letter, White
said that U.S. banks often meddled in South American politics by taking “an active part
in holding up one party and opposing another.” If the Uriburu government fell before
elections, the vice president of the Boston bank would lose his job, and the new govern-
ment would shun the bank for supporting the former regime. The bank was familiar
with White, having threatened him in the past to cancel an overdraft and confiscate his
deposited bonds if he did not stop writing dispatches “unfriendly to the government—
their idea of ‘unfriendly’ being anything that unfavorably affects bond prices or criti-
cizes people in government with whom they are doing business.” As a result of
unfriendly dispatches filed by White and Dover, he had spent what he described as a
“long sojourn” in Montevideo, the Uruguayan capital located across the Rio de la Plata
(River Plate) from Buenos Aires. Indeed, since Dover’s clash with the government and
the Boston bank in May, the Whites had filed their dispatches from Montevideo. After
Dover’s departure for New York, White sojourned in Montevideo until January 1932.
(J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, September 1, 1931, Box 84, Folder 15).
The Argentine government’s criticism made Times editors more sensitive to stories
critical of the country’s financial situation. On January 5, 1932, Managing Editor
Frederick Birchall cabled White and advised him to avoid editorializing, as he appar-
ently had done in his January 3 dispatch, datelined Montevideo, when White claimed
a lack of confidence abroad had made it impossible for Argentina to float loans
(“Argentina Hopeful of Trade Increase,” 1932). “Argentina towers financially over its
neighbors,” Birchall wrote, advising White that taking an “optimistic approach [was]
much better whenever possible” (F. T. Birchall to J. W. White, Western Union Cable,
Box 84, Folder 15). Birchall accurately appraised Argentina’s status as South America’s
richest, most industrial, and most advanced economy. Its only rival was neighboring
Uruguay, which Argentina often bullied. But Birchall underestimated the extent of
Argentina’s economic crisis in 1931. Argentina and its neighbors tried to secure inter-
national loans, but investors were skittish and the market for their bonds did not
improve until after 1932 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). By asking White to put a positive
spin on an otherwise accurate account revealed that the paper’s management wanted
to avoid controversy. It also may have indicated that Sulzberger had reached an agree-
ment for White to take a full-time staff position with the paper.
White’s editorializing was part of a larger trend among journalists, particularly
among international correspondents, to include interpretation and explanation in their
stories. By the 1930s, newspaper editors and reporters were increasingly skeptical
about the effectiveness of fact-based, objective reporting in dealing with the increas-
ing complexity in domestic and international politics (“AP Editors,” 1948; Emery,
Emery, & Roberts, 2000; Forde, 2007; Weaver & McCombs, 1980). Competition from
news magazines, such as Time, also helped persuade newspaper editors to accept inter-
pretive reporting and publish longer, more explanatory narratives (Landers, 2005).
Near the end of the Golden Age of foreign reporting, United Press correspondent
Eugene Lyons noted that the spread of censorship and press restrictions across the
globe had made the foreign correspondent’s job much more difficult and hazardous.
Journalists may not have faced risks of physical harm, but they did endure the constant
threat of expulsion. Lyons feared that these perils and dangers might tempt journalists
“to relax standards of fearless and unbiased reporting. News-gathering today is becom-
ing a continuous test of the correspondent’s moral fiber and intellectual integrity”
(Lyons, 1937, p. 8).
The Great Responsibilities of a Times Correspondent

Sulzberger never questioned White’s moral fiber, but he worried about his judgment at
times. Despite these concerns, Sulzberger announced in early March that White
Stoker 191
accepted his offer to become the paper’s first Chief South American Correspondent,
covering Argentina and overseeing special correspondents in South America. After 7
months in Montevideo, White returned to Buenos Aires in February and then sailed to
New York City, arriving in early March to meet with Sulzberger and the paper’s edi-
tors. During the visit, Sulzberger expressed his concerns to White in an extraordinary
memo dated about the same time White was in New York. In the memo, Sulzberger
advised White to avoid offending the Argentine press, Argentine government, and
U.S. diplomats. White should stay on good terms with La Nacion editor Jorge Mitra
and U.S. Ambassador Robert Woods Bliss, both of whom played key roles in estab-
lishing the Times office in Buenos Aires. “Please realize that your usefulness to us as
a correspondent depends upon your being persona grata with our Embassy and with
the Argentine government,” Sulzberger wrote. He warned White not to “misinterpret”
news and give those in authority a fair shake even if White disagreed with the official
statement, which as an official statement was news, Sulzberger continued. White also
should stop editorializing and reporting stories about other South American countries
from Argentina. As to framing stories, Sulzberger urged that White choose a positive
interpretation over an equally plausible negative one. Sulzberger preferred being
beaten on a story portraying Argentina in a negative light than to publish a negative
story that turned out to be incorrect (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, Memorandum,
March 4, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14).
White must overcome his reputation as a journalist who sometimes drew unwar-
ranted conclusions from the facts, Sulzberger continued, because “our reputation in
turn is in your hands. You are accused of having prejudices and of showing them.”
White should be smart enough as a newspaperman to avoid making the same mistakes
twice. “There are great responsibilities resting on the shoulders of every Times corre-
spondent and now that you have them resting squarely on your own we have every
confidence that you will rise to the occasion” (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White,
Memorandum, March 4, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14).
The sobering memo was dated the same day as Arthur Krock filed his report on
White’s visit to the Washington, D.C., for meetings with the Washington staff. He also
met with State Department officials and South American diplomats, including
Ambassador Espil at the Argentine Embassy (A. Krock to Sulzberger, March 4, 1932,
Box 84, Folder 14). White later thanked the ambassador for a cordial reception,
expressing faith that “the Republic is entering a new era of prosperity and progress.”
White hoped to serve Argentina and his newspaper at the same time (J. W. White to F.
D. Espil, April 20, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14).
Disembarking from New Orleans, White sailed through the Panama Canal and then
met with Times’ special correspondents in Central America and Lima, Peru. In prepa-
ration for White’s return home, Sulzberger informed local officials and newspapermen
that White now represented the paper’s interests in Buenos Aires, including business
affairs. In a letter to Jorge A. Mitre, director of La Nacion, one of the country’s leading
newspapers, Sulzberger acknowledged that White had aroused “some feelings against
him in your country but [I] sincerely trust that may be forgotten and that so far as you
and your splendid organization are concerned, he may have your full cooperation” (A.
H. Sulzberger to J. A. Mitre, Box 84, Folder 14). White again confessed to Sulzberger
that working for the Times was a dream come true.
I was delayed several years on reaching the Times by getting side tracked into the
Consular Service but I do not feel that the years were wasted because of the experience
gained during my long residence in South America . . . (J. W. White to Sulzberger, March
21, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14)
Upon his return to Buenos Aires, White called upon La Nacion editor Jorge Mitra
and rented office space in the newspaper’s building. Mitra said he would treat White
as a part of his staff, giving the correspondent access to the editorial room and the
Austral News Agency, which provided “good service” from Asuncion, Paraguay;
Montevideo, Uruguay; Santiago, Chile; and La Paz, Bolivia. White also made peace
with Ambassador Bliss, who went out of his way to talk to White and his wife, Florence
Dover, at the U.S. Embassy’s July 4 reception. Bliss and White had much in common,
both having grown up in St. Louis, Missouri. Bliss had served as Ambassador since
1927, so he was well aware of White’s reporting. White called on the embassy twice a
week to discuss news developments with the Ambassador. The Ambassador rewarded
White with inside information about his conference with Foreign Minister Carlos
Saavedra Lamas. (J. W. White to Sulzberger, July 20, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14).3
White’s first bylined dispatch appeared in the international section of the Sunday
Times, April 10, 1932. The interpretive report described the Communist threat to South
America (White, 1932b) and followed up on a “special cable to The New York Times,”
published without a byline March 29 (“Moscow Accused,” 1932). Both stories reported
on a Communist revolutionary plot in Chile, financed and directed by the Communist
headquarters in Montevideo, Uruguay, but carried out by agents from Moscow. As with
many of White’s bylined stories, he spoke with authority despite not always revealing the
sources of his information (White, 1932b). It was precisely the type of interpretive writing
that Sunday Times editor Lester Markel wanted in the Sunday paper. The week’s news,
Markel advised Adolph Ochs in April 1930, raised a number of questions in the minds of
readers. Those questions “can and should be” answered in the Sunday paper; “there the
interpretation can be supplied full and authoritatively” (A. Ochs Papers: L. Markel to
Adolph Ochs, April 1, 1930, Box 113, Folder 10 Sunday Edition, 1930-1933).
Subsequent stories included White’s byline as he reported on a coup attempt in
Argentina (White, 1932a) and government clashes with Argentine rebels (White,
1934a). From Buenos Aires, he filed dispatches on the Leticia dispute between Peru
and Colombia (White, 1932d) and Uruguay’s president seizing power (White, 1933c).
He provided an analysis about a revolt in Brazil that led to civil war. He reported that
a German military man led the rebel faction in Brazil’s civil war (“Civil War,” 1932;
White, 1932e). In his coverage of the Chaco War, a 7-year conflict between Bolivia
and Paraguay, he noted that a German officer led the Bolivian army in a new offensive
(White, 1932c), and later reported Paraguay’s claims that Bolivia’s entire command
was made up of Germans (White, 1933b). In each case, the Times’ editors put German
involvement in the headline.
Stoker 193
As White covered these stories, he often provided additional background details in

letters to the Times’ new managing editor and former Paris correspondent Edwin L.
James. On September 20, 1932, he updated James on the Chaco War and a territorial
dispute between Peru and Colombia over the Amazon River port city of Leticia. He
claimed that Peru’s “South American Napoleon” Sanchez Cerro had “resorted to the
old South American trick of creating an international crisis to keep himself in office.”
White lamented, “Those who have been deeply disappointed that the progress of civi-
lization and culture has robbed South America of most of its former picturesqueness
appear about to have another inning” (J. W. White to E. L. James, September 20, 1932,
Box 84, Folder 14). In a memo, labeled “Private and Confidential,” White told James
he had evidence that the vice president and assistant manager of the First National
Bank of Boston branch in Buenos Aires were making a personal profit by selling boot-
leg blocks of American pesos. White hesitated writing the story because it would look
like revenge for the bank trying to get him fired after his deportation to Montevideo in
May 1931—which explained his 8-month sojourn in Montevideo (J. W. White to E. L.
James, September 20, 1932; J. W. White to E. L. James, December 6, 1932; J. W.
White to E. L. James, October 31, 1933, Box 84, Folder 14). Eventually White wrote
the story, further fueling the bank’s animosity toward him.
Censorship and Secrecy

The threat of censorship loomed over not only every dispatch but also private memos
and letters to Sulzberger and James. The memos to James provided background infor-
mation, “not safely handled for publication yet.” They also served to defend the cor-
respondent against what he often considered unfair and uninformed criticism. On
December 6, 1932, White informed James that Argentina’s political situation was
deteriorating, with the government censoring meetings, closing newspapers, and
threatening to declare martial law. Even without a political crisis, White wrote, the
country faced severe economic and financial problems. “I have frequently been
referred to as an alarmist,” White noted, possibly referring to Birchall’s criticism a
year earlier.
But even at the risk of again appearing in that light, I cannot for the life of me see how
Argentina can escape the fate of Chile and Brazil if she continues to follow their methods
of handling the same problems.
White did not sign the letter because, he wrote, “The mails are being secretly censored
. . . ” (J. W. White to E. L. James, December 6, 1932, Box 84, Folder 14). White’s cor-
respondence suggests he feared sending confidential material through the Buenos
Aires Post Office because the government’s postal officials censored outgoing mail.
Even private cable companies with headquarters in the United States often referred
outgoing cables to government censors if they feared the information might offend
government officials. White resorted to a number of stratagems to bypass censors. On
one occasion, he cut his dispatch in half and cabled each half separately to fool the
censors (“John White Dies,” 1974). In 1934, White informed Sulzberger and James
that he had won his first major battle in a 2-year long war against censorship by All
America Cables (J. W. White to E. L. James, July 17, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14). All
America Cables, Inc. was a company with headquarters in New York that operated
throughout Central and South America. In dealing with foreign correspondents, the
company’s Buenos Aires office often referred dispatches to government censors if
staff members felt the cables contained information disparaging to Argentina or its
leaders.
On Friday night, May 4, 1934, White walked into All America’s Buenos Aires
office and filed two dispatches on the Chaco War. The Bolivians had bombarded ports
on the Upper Paraguay River, eliciting a public response from Argentina’s Foreign
Minister. White cited Argentine evening newspapers and included a statement by the
Foreign Minister. After leaving the cable office, White received a phone call from an
All America employee, informing White that his dispatches contained “matter deroga-
tory to Argentina and would be referred to post office authorities” (J. W. White to A.
H. Annand, May 8, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14). Knowing the post office would kill the
dispatches, White pleaded with the All America employee not to forward the dis-
patches, arguing that “the Foreign Minister himself had admitted that he was investi-
gating the effects of the bombardment and that a diplomatic protest probably would be
made.” How could the Foreign Minister’s statement be derogatory to Argentine inter-
ests? The employee stood firm. White canceled the dispatches and filed them with
Western Union at a much higher rate (J. W. White to A. H. Annand, May 8, 1934, Box
84, Folder 14).
The next day White sent a letter to A. H. Annand, the vice president of the Buenos
Aires office of All America Cables, accusing the company of imposing a secret censor-
ship policy throughout South America. White told of passing through Lima, Peru, and
filing a dispatch with All America, only to have the office, expecting the government
to impose censorship, hold it for 8 hours until censorship was imposed. Censors then
killed the story. White asked Annand to instruct his staff to return the dispatch to him
if they did not like the way White phrased something (J. W. White to A. H. Annand,
May 8, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14). White could then try to bypass the censors and try
cabling the dispatch through another company. Annand replied to White’s letter and
after a phone call and two private meetings, Annand ordered his staff to stop examin-
ing outgoing press dispatches. Since the order, White confided to James, his dispatches
had sailed through All America Cable without incident. Although Annand admitted to
the secret censorship, he argued that the company had no other choice because Latin
American postal and telegraph laws held “cable companies responsible for any alarm-
ing news that gets out.” White countered with “documentary proof” that the other
cable and radio companies did not enforce the law. “I also told him I was perfectly
willing to assume full responsibility for anything I file if any question is ever made by
the government” (J. W. White to E. L. James, July 17, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14).
White confided in James that by the time the uncensored dispatches were published
and copies of the paper arrived back in Argentina 2 or 3 weeks later, the authorities,
even if upset, would likely do nothing. “The storm has usually blown over by that
Stoker 195
time.” As an example, White told of a press conference at which Argentine Finance

Minister Frederico Pinedo cited his articles “as examples of the martyrdom to which
[Pinedo] is being subjected by foreign correspondents, but he has not yet denied the
truth of any of the facts I’ve cited.” All America Cable had censored other correspon-
dents, but only White objected, which made his victory even more satisfying, espe-
cially when the country was under martial law. “I feel that I have accomplished real
progress in favor of freedom of the press in Argentina, with the hope that I can eventu-
ally get the order extended to other South American stations of All America Cable” (J.
W. White to E. L. James, July 17, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14). Sulzberger responded that
if he had known of White’s troubles with All America Cable, he would have tempered
his remarks in a congratulatory note he had just sent the company regarding its 50th
anniversary (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, August 10, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14).
The agreement with All America was important because White expected big stories
coming out of South America before year’s end. In a letter to James, White predicted
“two wars and at least three serious revolutions.” The letter also revealed the story
behind how White obtained information about other South American countries with-
out leaving Buenos Aires. Young Bolivian army officers on leave in Buenos Aires told
him about the growing dissatisfaction with the Bolivian government’s conduct of the
Chaco War. The officers predicted a coup attempt. Diplomatic sources visiting Buenos
Aires confided in White that Colombia and Peru would go to war over the disputed
Leticia region. White also believed that strong opposition to military dictators in Brazil
and Uruguay might lead to revolutions, which often inspired revolutions in neighbor-
ing countries. “Our principal interest in all this is that the longer economic recovery is
delayed by the unsettled political situation, the longer it will be before these countries
again become profitable markets for our exports” (J. W. White to E. L. James, April
13, 1934, Box 84, Folder 14). Like other correspondents, White wrote with his
American readers in mind, but he also felt a loyalty to American economic interests
and strengthening economic relations between the United States and Argentina.
As 1934 drew to a close, most of the events White predicted came true. With the
Bolivian army retreating in the Chaco (White, 1934b), the vice president overthrew
the president (White, 1934e). White’s stories about revolts in Uruguay and Peru
appeared on the front pages of the Times (White, 1934f). Despite Sulzberger’s counsel
to White to avoid writing about other countries from Buenos Aires, the paper’s editors
asked White to report on the revolts. Strict censorship prevented local correspondents
from reporting anything but government propaganda. The revolts seemed to contradict
White’s dispatch published only a month earlier claiming that Latin America was
headed toward more political stability and economic progress. He reported a return of
party politics organized around political ideologies—much like the conditions that
existed before the Great Depression undermined civilian governments (White, 1934g).
Fascists, Nazis, and Nationalists

Of the major ideologies then emerging, the United States feared Communism the
most. Nevertheless, in the 1930s, Fascism, Nationalism, and to a lesser extent Nazism,
posed the greatest dangers to U.S. interests. In the fall 1934, White reported that one
of Argentina’s most powerful political parties, the Nationalists, had embraced Fascism.
A military chaplain, he wrote, praised Premier Benito Mussolini of Italy at a Catholic
celebration (White, 1934d). A few days later in Sunday’s paper, White told how
Argentine men were returning to the Catholic Church because the fast-growing Fascist
movement had enhanced the church’s image (White, 1934c). The spread of Fascism
alarmed Argentina’s military leaders who had controlled the government since the
1930 revolution. More threatening to White and other foreign correspondents, the
Argentine government also feared that international coverage of Fascism’s expanding
influence might negatively impact its foreign trade.
In spring 1935, the Argentine government went on the offensive against the Fascists.
The headline over White’s story about Fascists seizing power in Buenos Aires pro-
claimed, “Argentines Fight Fascist Menace.” The central government initiated
“impeachment proceedings” against the Buenos Aires Provincial Governor for swear-
ing in a Fascist Cabinet in opposition to his own Conservative party. White also
reported that eight Fascist organizations had agreed to unite under one leader, and the
movement now had 50,000 members in Buenos Aires and 150,000 members across the
country (White, 1935e).
Although not as influential as the Fascists, Nazi agents planted false stories to
undermine the relationship between the wire services, member newspapers, and host
countries. The goal was to make the host country look bad. White surmised that the
Germans’ mischief contributed to the deportation of the United Press reporter Terrence
Patrick Farrell. One theory posed by White was that Farrell had sabotaged his own
stories, but a more likely scenario was that Farrell took the fall for the United Press so
the wire service could stay in the country. The New York Times later obtained a copy
of the German propaganda strategy and had it translated (J. W. White to Sulzberger,
November 5, 1934; Sulzberger to E. L. James, Memorandum, November 15, 1934,
Box 84, Folder 14). The Nazis were not alone in planting false stories. White would
later fall victim to U.S. propaganda regarding Nazi plans to invade Argentina and its
neighbors.
In 1935, however, Argentina’s President Agustin P. Justo feared that the Fascists
would expand their foothold in the state government of Buenos Aires to other states
across the country. White had learned from a well-placed source that the Fascists
planned to launch a national coup in the next 6 to 8 weeks. In a letter to James, White
suspected that Justo also knew about the plan but lacked the power to stop the move-
ment (J. W. White to E. L. James, March 18, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14). The coup never
took place, but Argentina’s weak economy continued to undermine the power of
Justo’s government.
By July, President Justo moved to stop the flow of bad economic and political news
out of the country. On July 19, Justo ordered foreign correspondents to submit their
telegraphed or mailed dispatches for official inspection and deposit cash bonds of
5,000 to 50,000 pesos. Correspondents would lose their bond deposits if they failed to
have their dispatches reviewed. Justo’s decree authorized the Argentine government to
disqualify correspondents and close down news agencies for recently published
Stoker 197
stories, as well as those published in the previous 3 years. The order was effective
immediately and gave the government authority to punish reporters retroactively for
stories it had found offensive. The post office department, White reported, would
enforce the decree, and postal inspectors would oversee censorship at the cable com-
panies, which despite White’s previous successes, continued secret censorship of out-
going cables. White interpreted the decree to mean that the burden of censorship had
now shifted from the censors to the journalists. Any news adversely affecting the
country’s bond prices or political situation would likely be censored (White, 1935h).
Three days later, foreign correspondents, newspapers, and press associations made
plans to leave the country. White prepared to move the Times offices across the River
Plate to Montevideo, Uruguay (White, 1935j).
Then, for 3 straight days, the city’s major newspapers, La Nacion and La Prensa,
condemned the decree in their lead editorials (White, 1935j). The government held
firm while emphasizing that the primary targets for the order were foreign news agen-
cies. An unnamed “eminent constitutional authority” told White that the constitution’s
protections of the press did not extend to foreign correspondents (White, 1935c).
When La Nacion interviewed White about the order, White used the interview to high-
light the New York Times’ commitment to reporting on Argentine affairs; he reminded
Argentines that the paper’s new publisher Arthur Sulzberger had visited the country in
1928. He claimed that the Times published more news about Argentina than did any
other paper in the world, at least outside Argentina. “I was able to do this without in
any way criticizing the decree itself or the government,” White wrote in a letter to
Sulzberger (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, July 25, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14). For the
next month, White and other foreign correspondents lived in fear of deportation. The
government finally lifted the order in August.
In the meantime, the Argentine government remained fearful of Fascist political
gains. In August, White reported that Fascists had infiltrated the civil service in such
high numbers that the government asked some officials, such as the Chief of Personnel,
to resign for showing sympathy toward Fascism. The Socialist and Progressive
Democrats formed a united front against a rapidly growing “pseudo-Fascist” move-
ment (White, 1935d). A week later, August 23, White reported that the Argentine gov-
ernment had failed to censor press coverage of the Chaco peace conference because
diplomats and Bolivian and Paraguayan foreign officials leaked information to the
press. The Argentine government’s justification for censorship, expressed by Foreign
Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas, revealed the cultural chasm between the foreign
press and the government:
You delegates know the difficulties that are caused by the manner in which newspaper
men carry on their activities under the principles of liberty of the press. You also know
what can be done toward upsetting the high morals and spiritual serenity of this conference
through newspaper reports that damage the prestige of the conference.
Two days later, White reported that peace talks had failed (White, 1935i). Though hos-
tilities had ended, 3 years passed before Bolivia and Paraguay agreed to a peace deal.
Since joining the Times staff, White had avoided trouble with American bankers,
but that changed with the publication of a story September 5, 1935. White reported
that the Argentine Supreme Court had ruled that bondholders of defaulted provincial
bonds would need to sue American bankers to get their money back rather than the
province that issued the defaulted bonds. South American countries used U.S. banks
as their fiscal agents in floating bonds for sale in the United States. Further reading of
the story revealed that the court recognized the banks as fiscal agents for the bondhold-
ers and thereby responsible for negotiating with provincial governments, not the bond-
holders. There was a big difference between a responsibility to negotiate for
bondholders and liability that would allow bondholders to sue (White, 1935b). White
had chosen a more negative interpretation of the ruling. American banks complained
to Sulzberger, noting that the actual decision required bondholders to request the fiscal
agents (banks) take action. Sulzberger criticized White’s handling of the story and in
particular, accused him of editorializing in his concluding paragraph. White did not
respond and the crisis soon passed. White also benefited from a meeting 2 weeks later
between Sulzberger and Argentine Ambassador Felipe de Espil, who stopped by the
paper’s New York offices for a friendly visit. “Incidentally,” Sulzberger informed
White, “the Ambassador spoke in glowing terms of the well informed quality of your
dispatches” (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, September 25, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14).
On the same day that Sulzberger passed along Espil’s compliment, the Times pub-
lished White’s story on the Argentine government forcing its congress to pass a bill
postponing national elections (White, 1935g). After Santa Fe’s governor resisted the
federal mandate to delay local elections, the government sent troops to the provincial
capital of Rosario. White claimed that Santa Fe was one of the best-governed prov-
inces in the country, but its leaders were not members of one of the parties in the
government’s ruling coalition (White, 1935a). Although the government of President
Agustin Justo had the backing of the army, White confided to Edwin James that five
generals supported the Radicals, the main opposition party, and were ready to lead a
revolt. “The Fascist movement which is also rapidly developing is said to have the
backing of a lot younger officers . . . [and] a couple of influential admirals who are
expected to swing the navy to the Fascist cause.” With the possibility of two separate
revolutions, the government could justify imposing martial law, but “the government
itself has become so rotten that even La Nacion has ceased to make apologies for it.”
La Nacion withdrew its support after military intervention in Santa Fe. “There is not a
single newspaper in Buenos Aires favorable to the national government” (J. W. White
to E. L. James, Cable 2, November 5, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14).4
In November 1935, Buenos Aires newspapers condemned the government-
controlled special elections in Buenos Aires and Cordoba, calling them the “most
fraudulent, scandalous, and violent in the country’s history” (“Fraud Is Charged,”
1935). The foreign press could not report the story because of strict government cen-
sorship. To avoid the censorship, White took the ferry across the River Plate to
Montevideo and reported the story, attributing his information to Buenos Aires news-
papers received in Montevideo from Buenos Aires (“Fraud Is Charged,” 1935). He
thus implied that he was only reporting information he had gathered while in Uruguay.
Stoker 199
“What took place Sunday was so scandalous to be unbelievable by anyone who has
followed Argentina’s progress in recent years,” White informed James by cable. “The
oligarchy got into power again by the revolution of 1930 and Sunday’s so-called elec-
tions show that it is determined to stay in power by force and fraud.” The censorship
was lifted Tuesday, but White expected the cable companies to continue sending dis-
patches to the post office censors (J. W. White to E. L. James, Cable 1, November 5,
1935, Box 84, Folder 14).
The Communist Myth

While Argentina’s conservative government blamed the Fascists for its crackdown on
the press, Brazil’s authoritarian government pointed fingers at the Communists. New
York Times editors asked White to write an uncensored, in-depth analysis of Brazil’s
political revolt. Writing in the features and editorial section of the December 1, 1935,
Sunday paper, White noted that the government blamed the revolt on Communists, but
the leader of the revolt, though exiled for a time in Moscow, was not a Communist.
Brazil vigorously fought communistic agitation, White continued, and he doubted
whether there were enough Communists in the country to mount a rebellion (White,
1935f). White’s story contradicted dispatch from the Times’ Rio de Janeiro correspon-
dent labeling the revolt a Communist uprising to overthrow the republic. Paulo G.
Hasslocher, commercial attaché at the Brazilian Embassy, complained to Sulzberger
that White’s dispatch had been “written in bad faith.” How could a correspondent in
faraway Buenos Aires have the courage to disagree with the better-informed Brazilian
authorities and meanwhile disagree with the “true and impartial reports” from the
Times correspondent in Rio de Janeiro? Hasslocher made no mention of the fact that
the Brazil correspondent’s dispatches were censored. Sulzberger forwarded the com-
plaint to White (P. G. Hasslocher to A. H. Sulzberger, November 29, 1935; A. H.
Sulzberger to J. W. White, November 30, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14).
Sulzberger also sought advice from his managing editor Edwin James regarding
Hasslocher’s complaint. James covered World War I for the Times and set up the Times
Paris office after the war and covered France. His response reflected the firsthand
reporting experience that Sulzberger lacked:
Now, if Jack Pearl was to ask me his standardized [Vass you dere Charlie?] question the
answer would be in the negative. But, does Mr. Hasslocher contend that the 400 students
from the crack aviation school at Rio who revolted were communists? The fact that the
Prestes and other communists mixed up in the disturbance by no means proves it was
communistic. You know how the communists are—they fish in troubled waters and are
only too glad to increase any racket that is going on. (E. L. James to Sulzberger,
Memorandum, November 30, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14)
White agreed, saying his family had lived in Brazil, and he had more contacts there
than any other country except Argentina. White did not specify when he lived in
Brazil, but he had reported on the country for the Chicago Daily News and other
papers. As a New York Times special correspondent, he covered the 1930 revolution
from the rebel side that ousted Washington Luis as president and installed instead,
Getulio Vargas. During the revolution, he spent several hours a day with Vargas’ key
confidante Osvaldo Aranha, who in 1934, was appointed by Vargas as Brazil’s
Ambassador to the United States. Aranha even named White a “Citizen of the
Revolution” for his coverage. James liked White’s response and passed it along to
Aranha and the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Referring to the ongoing con-
troversy, Arthur Krock quipped, “Well, anyhow, there is some news in this: To wit, Mr.
White is a Communist” (A. Krock to Sulzberger, Memorandum, [n.d.]; E. L. James to
J. W. White, Memorandum, January 20, 1936; J. W. White to Sulzberger, December
26, 1935, Box 84, Folder 14).
Brazil claimed that Soviet agents in Uruguay financed the revolt. In late December,
Uruguay responded by severing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and order-
ing the Soviet Minister Alexander Minkin to leave the country (White, 1935k). The
Soviets protested Uruguay’s actions to the League of Nations but eventually withdrew
Minkin and closed down the Soviet trading agency in Montevideo (White, 1936n).
Although there were legitimate Communist threats, most governments just wanted an
excuse to eliminate political opposition. On February 5, 1936, White reported that
Paraguay’s government deported a Chaco war hero for being a Communist (White,
1936j). Chile’s new government blamed a labor strike on Communists. In his report on
the strike, White wrote that President Arturo Alessandri had exploited a settled rail-
road strike to “clean up a political situation that had been annoying him for more than
two years.” In a Page 1 story, White also alleged that Chile’s president had closed
Congress, put the country under martial law, and arrested opposition leaders. The
irony behind Alessandri targeting Communists, a Buenos Aires newspaper story noted,
was that Chile’s governing military junta accused him of being a Communist after it
seized power from him in 1924. Alessandri spent a year in exile in Argentina. A second
coup returned Alessandri to power in 1925. Seven years later, a more conservative
Alessandri was reelected president and served until 1938 (“Arturo Alessandri Palma,”
2016). Like Alessandri in Chile, government leaders in Brazil and Paraguay sought to
stay in power by blaming Communists for their problems (White, 1936i).
In a Sunday interpretive feature, White explained that “flareups” in Chile, Ecuador,
and Paraguay were blamed on Communists, and Communists were likely behind the
unrest in Ecuador and Chile, but those were the only countries in South America with
any significant Communist movements. Corporatist leaders in Argentina, Chile,
Bolivia, and Peru, he said, controlled elections by silencing opposition leaders. As in
Brazil, the Communists served as a convenient scapegoat for governments trying to
stay in power. White predicted that revolutions would continue in South America
because the masses wanted popular government, and the ruling elite wanted to retain
power. The political upheaval, White wrote, was healthy and signaled “a renewal of
the struggle of the masses for popular government” (White, 1936i). A few days later,
the Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa backed up White’s analysis. The paper admit-
ted that Communists assisted with revolutions, but the real source of discontent was
Stoker 201
with government suppression of political rights and opposition (“Buenos Aires Paper
Denies Red Menace,” 1936).
The dispatches disputing the Communist threat targeted several South American
countries, but it was Argentine Ambassador to the United States Felipe de Espil who
marched into the Times’ Washington bureau and protested the stories. In a letter to
Sulzberger, Bureau Chief Arthur Krock said Espil represented his South American
colleagues in complaining about “matters distasteful to their governments” being
freely reported out of a “friendly capital”—Buenos Aires. Espil hoped a discussion
with Sulzberger would prevent drastic action by Argentina’s government. Krock
presumed that Espil wanted White “shifted to another job for a year or so while
someone else who will be willing to meet people and go about among the news
sources is sent in his stead” (A. Krock to A. H. Sulzberger, February 12, 1936, Box
84, Folder 13).
Sulzberger wired White advising him to write “some constructive local pieces” and
to “watch your step” because Brazil and Chile were protesting to Argentina. Sulzberger
explained that White’s contention that the Brazilian “flare-up” was not “communistic
in origin caused disturbance in that country and brought the Brazilian Ambassador to
our office.” Adding fuel to the flames, Sulzberger said, was Sunday’s story about the
spirit of revolt, and Monday’s story about Chile’s mass arrests. Sulzberger then quoted
from Espil’s criticism of White that Krock included in his letter to the publisher (A. H.
Sulzberger to J. W. White, February 13, 1936, Box 84, Folder 14):
[White] lives an isolated life and because he does not see and know people has an
unbalanced viewpoint. He is [a] congenital reformer and that animates all his writings.
He seldom writes any constructive news dispatches, although there is much going on in
Argentina to justify a mixture of this kind. He inflates the bad news. Lastly, he is involving
the Argentine government unpleasantly with its neighbors by writing hearsay dispatches
about them from the Argentine capital. (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, February 13,
1936, Box 84, Folder 14)
White may take exception to the charges, Sulzberger wrote, but the publisher con-
sidered them more valid than the typical complaints. Moreover, Sulzberger confided
that “some of us here” agreed with the ambassador.
I fully appreciate the fact that there is generally more news association with destructive
forces than with constructive but more of the later should be found . . . After all, there is
very little use for a Buenos Aires correspondents who cannot stay in Buenos Aires.
To avoid embarrassing Argentina, Sulzberger counseled White to abstain writing

about other countries from Buenos Aires. “With censorship what it is in that corner of
the world, however, it stands to reason that we cannot forego this privilege in times of
real necessity but we must be careful.” Sulzberger hoped that by reporting “a little
legitimate Pollyanna,” White could ease tensions and weather the storm (A. H.
Sulzberger to J. W. White, February 13, 1936, Box 84, Folder 14).
White cabled Sulzberger the next day, apologizing for causing protests and offering
to do whatever necessary to pacify protestors. But White added that invoking
Communist myth was the most recent development in South American politics, and he
could not “see how we can ignore it.” Censorship prevented local correspondents from
reporting the story, and official statements created false impressions. Editorials in
Argentine newspapers confirmed his reports. White’s contrite response caused
Sulzberger to second-guess his criticism of the correspondent. At the top of White’s
cable, Sulzberger scrawled, “Was my letter too harsh?” (J. W. White to Sulzberger,
February 14, 1936, Box 84, Folder 13).
In Argentina, the tensions eased somewhat when the Chilean ambassador to
Argentina made a personal visit to White. Acting on orders from President Alessandri,
the Ambassador said that his government did not feel White was trying to misrepresent
it but felt he misunderstood the situation because he had not been in the country (J. W.
White to Sulzberger, February 23, 1936, Box 84, Folder 13). In response, Sulzberger
wrote back that he interpreted that visit “to mean that the dangers which [we] were
given to understand hung over you have now been removed” (A. H. Sulzberger to J.
W. White, March 2, 1936, Box 84, Folder 13).
The dangers may have passed, but Sulzberger’s scolding and White’s finding him-
self at the center of an international incident weighed on him. He began to censor his
own work. White even asked Sulzberger to kill a “timely” story on the influence of
military men in South America because “[i]t is a piece that is bound to stir up anew the
wrath of Ambassador Espil’s colleagues in Washington.” White had two constructive
pieces ready for transmission so he was still meeting his quota even without the critical
piece. But White still wanted to see the military men piece published and asked
Sulzberger to look over the dispatch before making a final decision.
Sulzberger’s response contradicted his previous communication. White, he wrote
back, had misunderstood his directive. “Please, under no circumstances, pass by any
real stories merely because they are not of a so-called constructive nature.” He admit-
ted that constructive stories were less newsworthy and often overlooked, but they were
necessary to prevent White from being kicked out of the country. “On the other hand,
there would be equally little point in having you there if you were not free to send the
news as it arises” (J. W. White to Sulzberger, April 22, 1936; Sulzberger to J. W.
White, May 6, 1936, Box 84, Folder 13).
And news kept coming. To stop Paraguay’s political leaders from signing a peace
agreement with Bolivia, the Paraguayan army seized power and the new military gov-
ernment delayed implementation of the previously agreed to peace plan. On March 12,
1936, White reported from Buenos Aires that Paraguay had set up the first Fascist
regime in the Americas. Colonel Rafael Franco had decreed a totalitarian state, sus-
pended political activity for a year, and put key industries under the Minister of Interior
(White, 1936c, 1936h). On May 17, a bloodless military coup overthrew the civilian
government of Jose Luis Tejada Sorzano in Bolivia and installed a Chaco war hero,
Colonel David Toro, as Provisional President. The new Bolivian government
announced it would recognize all international agreements, including the peace treaty
ending the Chaco War. In a Sunday Section interpretive piece, White analyzed the
Stoker 203
implications of military takeovers in Paraguay and Bolivia. “Both have declared war
on the old existing political parties and are organizing revolutionary Socialist parties
which are to be closely identified with the State” (White, 1936k, p. 1).
Influence of Good Neighbor Policy

Despite all the political unrest, South American relations with the United States had
been steadily improving since the 1933 Pan American Conference in Montevideo
(White, 1933a). South America’s military leaders wanted better relations from the
United States, White reported, especially since Europe seemed headed toward insta-
bility. Civil war raged in Spain and pitted the Loyalists supported by the Soviet Union
against the Nationalists backed by Italy and Germany. President Franklin Roosevelt’s
Good Neighbor Policy had played a key role in changing public attitudes toward the
United States. In an interpretive feature for the Sunday Times, White claimed that,
“American prestige and American influence are higher in South America today than
ever before.” White emphasized, however, that South America did not want leadership
from the United States but wanted a partnership and “friendly cooperation” between
American neighbors. Despite the positive tone of the story, copy desk editors back in
New York included a subhead, “Growing Disappointment Good Neighbor Policy,”
which did not accurately reflect what White had written. Nothing in the story indicated
disappointment over the policy, just a warning that the United States should not lead
out in the relationship. This kind of interpretation by editors may have contributed to
Ambassador Felipe de Espil finding more problems in the editors’ headlines than with
White’s stories.
The era of good feelings between the United States and South America reached its
apex November 30, 1936, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Argentina to
open the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires
(White, 1936d, 1936m). Even White was carried away by the excitement:
What is happening here this week has never happened before anywhere in the world. Its
significance goes far out beyond the borders of Pan-Americanism to take on world-wide
import. Twenty-one nations are meeting in an enthusiastic spirit of mutual trust and
confidence such as never before was shown anywhere. (White, 1936f, p. E6)
White’s coverage of the Pan-American Conference made front-page news on five

of the first 6 days of December. President Roosevelt was quoted calling for “the
nations of the New World to unite to help the Old World avert its impending catastro-
phe of war.” New World nations would stand “shoulder to shoulder,” the President
declared, and work together for their mutual safety and good (White, 1936o). White
reported that the President’s new policies “on international relations were greeted with
wildly enthusiastic applause by the delegations of the twenty-one American nations
gathered here” (White, 1936g, p. 12). A large crowd gathered in the rain to bid President
Roosevelt farewell (White, 1936a). In an interview with White, Foreign Minister Dr.
Carlos Saavedra Lamas, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936, said the main
problem in Argentine–U.S. relations was the application of “sanitary regulations” on

Argentine beef exports. The President promised to try to remove those restrictions,
causing Saavedra Lamas to declare Roosevelt’s visit a Godsend (White, 1936l).
Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s eight-point peace plan was also well-received (White,
1936e). White marveled that the month-long conference exceeded even the most opti-
mistic expectations, showing that when there was good news, White was happy to
report it (White, 1936l). The conference, he wrote in a Sunday interpretive piece, set
up “new peace machinery designed to prevent war.” He said that every time delegates
met with newspaper reporters, they exclaimed, “The United States has at last joined
the Pan-American Family” (White, 1936b).
White also took advantage of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance
of Peace to advocate for more press freedom in South America. During the conference,
the Argentine Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas hosted a reception for White and
other foreign correspondents. In a speech at that gathering, Dr. Lamas defined the mis-
sion of the press as creating goodwill among the people of the world. John W. White
had served as vice president and president of the English Speaking Correspondents
Association of South America. As dean of South American correspondents, he repre-
sented the foreign correspondents in responding to the Foreign Minister’s speech.
White condemned government censorship in many of the South American countries,
arguing that it hindered great newspapers from influencing the world for peace. In its
lead editorial, Buenos Aires newspaper El Mundo agreed and urged South American
governments to give heed to White’s speech and assist newspapers in creating interna-
tional goodwill by ending censorship: “Governments would be well advised to give up
their vain attempts to prevent the free flow of news” (“Backs a Free,” 1936, p. 21).
White’s statement on censorship drew praise from his old newspaper, The Chicago
Tribune. It cited White’s statement that censorship stops full reports and speeds distri-
bution of rumors and incomplete reports that lead to irritation and ill will. The
Christmas Day editorial called press censorship “an instrument of the dictatorships
that are the chief disturbers of the peace” (“Press Censorship and Peace,” 1936, p. 16).
Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger also lauded White’s speech, agreeing that the
newspaper could not serve as a peacemaker unless people knew what was going on in
the world. “More power to you,” Sulzberger wrote White. “You’ll be pleased to know
that the President today sent a message congratulating us upon our coverage of the
Argentine conference. Those of us here share his enthusiasm” (A. H. Sulzberger to J.
W. White, December 17, 1936, Box 84, Folder 13).
The good feelings continued into the New Year as White continued to campaign for
more press freedoms. As head of the American delegation at the Pan-American Press
Conference in Valparaiso, Chile, he proposed a resolution that governments abolish
censorship “to enable newspapers to fulfill their mission of creating good-will, under-
standing and mutual respect among the American nations.” In essence, White argued
that American-style reporting actually supported the corporatist goals of unity and sta-
bility. Based on an un-bylined New York Times’ story, the conference approved “White’s
project” condemning censorship as ineffectual and the cause of rumors in other coun-
tries that lead to inaccurate dispatches and cause ill feelings among friendly nations. In
Stoker 205
some ways, “White’s project” sounded like a defense for his filing dispatches about
other countries from his Buenos Aires office. A conference committee of South
American journalists approved the proposal and the head of the committee, Manuel
Seaone Corrales, a Peruvian newspaperman and political activist, likewise signed the
resolution. The resolution would come back to haunt White because it associated him
with Seaone, who turned out to be a leader in Peru’s opposition party (“Censors
Attacked,” 1937).5
The relative quiet of the next 6 months indicated that Argentina’s improving econ-
omy and good relations with the United States directly affected how both governments
responded to White’s correspondence. In July 1937, White scooped other papers on a
story about the Paraguayan army refusing to obey President Rafael Franco’s peace
terms with Bolivia. White wrote James that his source urged him to “lie low” on this
story but White refused. Argentine Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas received a clip-
ping from Felipe de Espil in Washington and confirmed that White was right on every
detail. White had lunch with American diplomat Spruille Braden, who also confirmed
White’s story and tried to persuade White to tell how he got his information (J. W.
White to E. L. James, July 7, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13).
A Troublesome Foreign Correspondent

The Paraguayan story was another example of White reporting about Argentina’s
neighbors from Buenos Aires. Sulzberger had instructed him to avoid this practice, but
then other editors repeatedly asked White to file dispatches on neighboring republics
because of censorship in those countries. Unless instructed by the editors in New York,
White had heeded Publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger’s admonition not to write about
Brazil from Buenos Aires. Based on their experience, the editors should have known
that reporting on other countries from Buenos Aires meant that White, not the newspa-
per, would face repercussions, especially if the other countries complained to
Argentina. In November 1937, at the request of his editors, White reported on the
political unrest in Brazil. The ensuing controversy revealed that Argentina’s military
leaders were willing to go to great lengths—even if it meant creating an international
incident—to stay in power and get rid of what they considered a troublesome
correspondent.
In November 1937, Argentina elected Roberto Maria Ortiz as its first civilian presi-
dent in nearly 8 years. Ortiz, the ruling party’s handpicked candidate, would replace
President Augustin Justo, a military officer who had ruled since 1932. Like his fellow
presidents in Brazil and other South American countries, President Justo wanted to
prevent his successor from taking power. Justo saw his opportunity when White wrote
a story about Brazil’s President Getulio Vargas seizing emergency powers prior to the
end of his constitutionally mandated 4-year term. Justo hoped to follow the game plan
established by Vargas in 1937 when Vargas refused to surrender the presidency at the
end of his 4-year term as required by the country’s constitution. Vargas had led a mili-
tary takeover of Brazil in 1930 and ruled as the interim president until he was elected
to the presidency in 1934. In 1937, he seized emergency powers, preventing the
election of a successor. Censorship stopped the Times special correspondent in Sao

Paulo from reporting anything but government propaganda. Once again, Times editors
asked White to provide an uncensored report.
On November 13, White accurately reported that after allegedly discovering plans
for a Communist revolution, Vargas assumed dictatorial powers. White’s first dispatch,
datelined Buenos Aires and published November 13, critiqued Brazil’s new constitu-
tion, reporting that it featured aspects of Fascism and democracy and gave Vargas
“close control over the legislative and judicial branches of government as well as the
executive” (White, 1937b, p. 9). The next day, in the Sunday Times, White interpreted
the South American political situation and contended that the most recent coup in Brazil
had increased the power of President Getulio Vargas and set up a pseudo-Fascist corpo-
ratist state. By pseudo, he meant that Brazil, like other Latin countries, embraced a form
of European Fascism but had no interest in joining the German-Italian-Japanese alli-
ance (White, 1937a). The next week, the Times ran White’s profile of Vargas, who
would go on to rule Brazil 7 more years. White described Vargas as “the traditional type
of successful South American dictator, a little man, short stocky . . . prepared at all times
to sacrifice even his best friends rather than accept any compromise. He demands con-
tinuous and unwavering support” (White, 1937d, p. 141).
By the time the second story ran, White had become “a minor, but aggravating,
detail in a serious international incident . . . between Argentina and Brazil,” the cor-
respondent wrote in a letter to managing editor E. L. James (J. W. White to E. L.
James, November 21, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13). According to Argentine officials,
President Vargas lodged a formal diplomatic protest against Argentina for the
“unfriendly act of ‘harboring’ a correspondent who . . . writes only unfavorable news
about Brazil.” According to White, Vargas alleged that White colluded with White’s
close personal friend Argentine Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas in writing the story.
White dismissed the protest as “following the old South American custom of creating
an international incident to strengthen [Vargas’s] political situation at home” (J. W.
White to E. L. James, November 21, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13).
Whatever Vargas’s motivations, Argentine President Augustin Justo reacted to
Brazil’s diplomatic protest by ordering White to leave the country by December 1. The
police immediately began harassing White and prohibiting him from communicating
with his editors in New York. White sought help from Foreign Minister Lamas and the
Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Oscar Ibarra Garcia, who cordially received him.
They reaffirmed the Brazilian charges and noted that these had coincided with the fric-
tion between Argentina and Brazil over the United States’s leasing of destroyers to
Brazil. According to Garcia, Brazil also accused White of being an employee of the
foreign ministry and that his source for Brazil’s bad news was Lamas, the Foreign
Minister. With a clever appeal to nationalistic sentiments, White said he could stop
filing stories about Brazil from Argentina but that would mean Brazilian censorship
had also silenced Argentina (J. W. White to A. W. Weddell, November 18, 1938, Box
84, Folder 13).
With no word from White in more than a week, James cabled his correspondent on
November 29, asking, “How are you?” (E. L. James to J. W. White, Cable, November
Stoker 207
29, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13). White replied that he was packing up his “stuff” because
the order had not been lifted. He only hesitated, he said, because he wanted to see if
U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Alexander W. Weddell could achieve a diplomatic solu-
tion (J. W. White to Sulzberger, Cable, November 30, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13). James
informed Sulzberger that unless Argentine President Agustin Justo backed down on
the deportation order, White must head to Montevideo, Uruguay. “I fancy if we do not
replace him in Buenos Aires—and I think we should not—they will be sending him
bouquets with invitations to return . . . ,” James wrote. “I would just like to add this
instance solidifies my belief that it is bad onions to cover one country from another
country” (E. L. James to A. H. Sulzberger, November 30, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13). A
few days later, White cabled that he would “probably go raving mad if [the] intense
nervous strain” continued (J. W. White to New York Times, Cable, [ca. December
1937], Box 84, Folder 13).
Ambassador Weddell insisted White remain in Buenos Aires until Weddell received
a definite answer from someone, although whether this was President Justo or
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles is unclear. Weddell had served as the U.S.
Ambassador to the country since 1933, a year after Justo took power. A British diplo-
mat described Weddell as shrewd and kind, “with a certain refreshing naiveté” (quoted
in Halstead, 1974, p. 12). Weddell worked back channels to prevent White’s expul-
sion. He advised White to keep a low profile and not inform the Argentine newspapers.
Based on White’s account of the incident, President Justo refused to meet with Weddell
until the end of November at which time the ambassador persuaded Justo that White’s
deportation would harm Argentina and help Brazil’s Fascism to spread to Argentina.
As a goodwill gesture, Justo granted White a 2-week extension, meaning he now had
until December 15 to leave the country (J. W. White to E. L. James, March 18, 1938,
Box 84, Folder 13). Weddell later informed Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles
that President Justo was looking for a way to save face and let White stay in the coun-
try. Welles shared the information with Washington correspondent Arthur Krock, who
cabled James about its contents that same day (A. Krock to E. L. James, December 17,
1937, Box 84, Folder 13).
Before Weddell could solve the controversy through private channels, the story
leaked to the Buenos Aires newspapers, which responded with what White described
as a “tremendous outburst” of editorial protests against Justo for allowing Brazil to
meddle Argentina’s affairs. In hopes of calming the protests, Buenos Aires Inspector
General of Police Miguel A. Viancarlos sent four detectives to force White to take the
night boat to Montevideo. Tipped off that the detectives were coming, White slipped
out of his office on the upper floors of the La Nacion building and walked unnoticed
past a detective in a downstairs corridor before exiting the building (J. W. White to E.
L. James, March 18, 1938, Box 84, Folder 13). White fled to the U.S. Embassy and
told Weddell about his close call. To avoid challenging the Argentine government,
Weddell did not offer White asylum, but asked him to remain at the embassy until
Weddell and his wife, Virginia, returned from a cocktail party. The Weddells then
picked White up and took him to their home for dinner. After dinner, the Ambassador
read to Virginia and White until 11:30 p.m., past the time for the Montevideo boat’s
departure. Weddell then dispatched a diplomatic car to drive White home. According
to White, the next morning, Weddell contacted Viancarlos and reaffirmed that White
had until December 15 to leave and discouraged the chief detective from trying to
accelerate the correspondent’s departure (J. W. White to E. L. James, March 18, 1938,
Box 84, Folder 13).
Weddell arranged another meeting with President Justo on December 6 and this
time Justo agreed to eliminate the expulsion order’s December 15 deadline and estab-
lish an indefinite departure time for White. According New York Times Washington
correspondent Delbert Clark, who received Weddell’s report from Sumner Welles,
Justo admitted to Weddell that the order had nothing to do with Brazil or any request
from Brazil but with a series of unspecified incidents in White’s reporting. White
could stay as long as he promised “satisfactory conduct in the future.” Clark noted that
as Sulzberger was coming to Washington the next week, the publisher should meet
with Welles, who had devoted a lot of time to the case (D. Clark, Washington, D.C.,
December 7, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13).6 At that meeting, Welles showed Weddell’s
report to Sulzberger. Welles did not criticize White’s story, but neither did he hide his
dislike for White. Welles took issue with White covering Brazil from Argentina and
hoped that Sulzberger would voluntarily transfer White out of Argentina. In White’s
defense, Sulzberger indicated “that Brazil made it impossible to get the news out in
any other manner” (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, December 20, 1937, Box 84,
Folder 13).
After the meeting with Welles, Sulzberger talked on the phone to Argentine
Ambassador Felipe de Espil. In a letter to White, Sulzberger said he assured Espil that
the newspaper would request that White only cover
news of Brazil if Brazil made it impossible for us to get news in any other manner; that if
this got us into difficulties, we would have to face that situation when it arose, just as we
were facing the present one.
By adding the exception, Sulzberger assured White that he still had freedom to report
as needed. Sulzberger also passed along Espil’s usual criticisms of White: The corre-
spondent spent too much time with leftist groups and credited the landed aristocracy
with too much political power (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, December 20, 1937,
Box 84, Folder 13). But Espil also praised White’s dispatches on the situation in Brazil,
explaining that relations between Brazil and Argentina had deteriorated because the
United States had leased destroyers to Brazil, and Espil felt “that something that showed
Brazil up was entirely to his liking” (A. H. Sulzberger, Memorandum, [ca. December,
1937], Box 84, Folder 13). To ease tensions with Brazil, Sulzberger sent Washington
correspondent Turner Catledge to Brazil to do a series of stories about the new govern-
ment (A. H. Sulzberger to J. W. White, December 20, 1937, Box 84, Folder 13).
Although the Argentine government did not deport White, it continued to monitor
his correspondence and dispatches. Three months passed before White could find
someone traveling to New York with whom he entrusted a confidential letter to James.
The nearly six-page letter, written March 18, 1938, revealed that White had been
Stoker 209
caught up in an internal struggle for power within Argentina’s government. When the
government ordered White’s deportation in November, two plots existed to prevent the
newly elected government of President Roberto Maria Ortiz from taking office in
February. President Justo plotted to lead a military coup, and the Nationalists plotted
to set up a totalitarian state. If Justo’s favorite son and a cadre of high-ranking army
officers, who were to lead the coup, had not died in a plane crash, Justo could have
succeeded. “President Justo knew that I knew about the plans for a Nationalist revolt
and I supposed he presumed that I knew too much about his own plot,” White wrote.
The government planned to follow White’s deportation with the “wholesale” deporta-
tion of other foreign correspondents and the closure of the Associated Press and United
Press offices in Buenos Aires. But President Justo failed to anticipate the backlash
from the local press to Brazil’s alleged meddling and White’s deportation order. The
Argentine press launched a “prolonged” front-page editorial attack on the government
for allowing Brazil to dictate domestic policy. Under pressure from his own press and
the U.S. government, President Justo suspended the deportation order (J. W. White to
E. L. James, March 18, 1938, Box 84, Folder 12).7
White’s letter to James reflected his concern that his New York editors and pub-
lisher could not appreciate the challenges of covering news from Argentina’s capital.
The Buenos Aires police department classified White as a Fascist because of his well-
placed sources inside the Nationalist movement, and the Argentine Ambassador to the
United States, Felipe de Espil, considered White a leftist and Communist. “It is beyond
the capacity of a Latin mind to comprehend that a newspaper correspondent might
look at anything objectively. You either must be with them or against them.” White
surmised that Justo wanted him out of the country because he knew about Justo’s plan
to prevent Ortiz from taking office. By accusing his minister of foreign affairs Saavedra
Lamas of conspiring with White, Justo hoped to “get rid of his minister and a trouble-
some foreign correspondent at the same time,” White wrote. “Which sounds com-
pletely goofy and could happen only in South America and even then only under a
military mind” (J. W. White to E. L. James, March 18, 1938, Box 84, Folder 12).
James congratulated White for the way he handled the difficulties with the Justo
government. “I think your dignity and that of the New York Times was well main-
tained,” James wrote. “And, I cannot think, in reading the record, of anything that
could have been done better” (E. L. James to J. W. White, April 19, 1938, Box 84,
Folder 13). But even with the new president, some Argentine officials still wanted
White out of the country. A Dr. Enrique Gil of Buenos Aires informed Sulzberger in
November 1938 that Argentina’s new Foreign Under Secretary Dr. Luis Castineiras
considered White “persona non grata.” Gil asked Castineiras for evidence of White’s
offenses, but the secretary had none. Gil set up a meeting between White and Dr.
Castineiras to reduce tensions. In Sulzberger’s response to Gil, he wrote, “So far as I
know, White is a capable, conservative, honest newspaper man, and the difficulties in
which he has found himself from time to time in the past are those which any man with
similar qualifications would encounter.” Sulzberger attributed the problems in part to
the poor relations between the United States and Argentina (E. G. Gil to A. H.
Sulzberger, November 15, 1938; Sulzberger to E. G. Gil, [n.d.], Box 84, Folder 13).
The Pan American Controversy

Relations had soured because the United States had strengthened Brazil’s military and
still refused to import Argentine beef. Argentina and other South American countries
turned to Nazi Germany for bilateral trade agreements, further complicating relations
with the United States. Revolutions, revolts, and coups had placed the reins of govern-
ment in the hands of military strongmen who sought to maintain power by controlling
the flow of information. Most special correspondents covering these countries were
not newspapermen and thus were unwilling to challenge government censorship and
propaganda. “South America, like the rest of the world is going through an important
period of change and the South American changes are much closer to us in many ways
than are the European changes.” White liked the idea of having a Times staff corre-
spondent tour the continent on a regular basis—though he was not interested in the job
(J. W. White to E. L. James, December 16, 1938, Box 84, Folder 13). The 48-year-old
White was well established in Buenos Aires and preferred to enjoy spring in the city
rather than travel the continent. In a letter to Sulzberger’s secretary Louise P. Huger,
White described the city that had been his home for the past 23 years. The downtown
business center of Buenos Aires, he wrote, featured roadways lined with flowering
trees—pink cherry blossoms and blue Jacarandas. The arches leading to the city’s
Rose Garden were covered with beautiful purple wisteria, and the garden itself was
home to “56,000 rose bushes bursting into 5,000 different kinds of blooms.” White
added that the River Plate that separated Argentina from Uruguay flowed brown in the
mornings but “in the afternoons it stretches to beyond the horizon in a beautiful blue
which makes it easy to imagine that it is the sea” (J. W. White to L. P. Huger, October
20, 1938, Box 84, Folder 13).
In November, White actually left Buenos Aires for a week, traveling to Bolivia’s
mountain capital of La Paz and spending a week developing sources in Bolivia and
Paraguay, the recent adversaries in the 7-year Chaco War (1928-1935). The trip
included a train ride with Justo Pastor Benitez, the Paraguayan minister to Bolivia and
Paraguay’s delegate for December’s Pan American Conference in Peru. The two men
ate and drank together, providing White with “a lot of interesting stuff.” White also
interviewed Bolivian Foreign Minister Eduardo Diez de Medina, whom White called
one of the best diplomats in South America. Medina asked that White not write about
the meeting because Medina did not want to create any controversy on the eve of
negotiations with Paraguay and Brazil over a final Chaco peace treaty. White did say
that Medina expected a fight between the United States and Argentina at the Peru Pan
American Conference (J. W. White to E. L. James, November 27, 1938, Box 84, Folder
13). From La Paz, White filed a dispatch claiming that Germany had launched a pro-
paganda offensive against the United States in South America, attacking “American
institutions, American activities in South America, and American prestige as a whole”
(White, 1938e, p. 52).
Agents from the Rome–Berlin axis also sought to prevent formation of a united
coalition of the United States with Central and South America in the weeks prior to the
Pan American Conference in Lima, Peru. “Their main argument is that Pan Americanism
Stoker 211
makes Latin Americans the tail of the North American dog, which does all the wag-
ging,” White wrote. “They urge that Latin Americans tie up with Europe commercially
and politically as independent nations rather than as protectorates” (White, 1938e,
p. 52). White also reported that Nazi and Fascist correspondents openly displayed their
disapproval of the conference and flooded home papers and Latin American newspa-
pers with “distorted reports” and “bitter attacks” (White, 1938f).
The Rome–Berlin axis failed to disrupt the conference, but significant internal divi-
sions emerged among Pan American member states, particularly between Argentina
and the United States. Argentina opposed a U.S. proposal that an attack on one Pan
American member would constitute an attack on all members. White also reported that
the United States had suffered its biggest loss of prestige in the last 10 years because
it had failed to assume leadership of the conference and had not allowed any other
country to fill that role (White, 1938b). The story presumably did not sit well with the
U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. White did follow up with a
Page 1 dispatch reporting that Hull had accomplished his three main goals for the
conference: Reaffirm previous trade and political principles, adopt his eight-point
peace program, and issue a declaration of solidarity among the 21 member nations
(White, 1938c). In a personal interview with White, President Oscar Raimundes
Benavides called the conference a success in expressing Pan American solidarity
(White, 1936a). White rarely referred to himself in stories, but in this interview, he
wrote that the president “greeted the correspondent cordially, recalling previous meet-
ings and said he was happy . . . to express his opinions on the conference.” But when
White asked about conditions in Peru, Benavides said he only wanted to establish
peace and order (White, 1938d).
At the time, President Benavides was Peru’s most important political figure. He
ruled the country from 1933 to 1939, one of the country’s bloodiest and most turbulent
periods. Some liberal factions in the United States and Europe labeled Benavides a
Fascist, but Peruvian Rightists questioned his loyalty to the cause. Benavides adopted
the Italian system of government and enjoyed good relations with Italy, Germany, and
Japan. Historians credit Benavides with enacting constructive policies that benefited
the country but won him few friends outside the military (Ciccarelli, 2006, pp. 487-
500, 505). Benavides feared the growing influence of the Aprista (APRA), a dynamic,
reformist political organization that represented opposition groups from the left and
center. In his personal interview with White, he accused the journalist of collaborating
with APRA (J. W. White to E. L. James, January 22, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).8
The Pan American Conference ended with the Declaration of Lima, a formal state-
ment of Pan American solidarity to stand together if faced with the political and eco-
nomic unrest plaguing Europe. In an interpretive analysis of the conference, White
reported that although the Eighth Pan American Conference was the first to end with-
out a treaty or convention, the key players believed that the united Declaration of Lima
was far more important than any treaties or conventions from prior conferences. The
declaration fell short of establishing a military alliance but emphasized that the peace
and security problems of one member nation would be a problem for all members
(White, 1939k).
The day after leaving Peru, White stopped in Arica, Chile, and filed an uncensored
account that ran on the front page of the Times, dated January 1, 1939. The conference,
White wrote, operated “under a dictatorial regime of censorship, intimidation and spy-
ing such as never before had been seen in any Pan-American assembly.” The American
delegation discovered two Peruvian detectives searching desks and files in the office
of two U.S. delegates, Green H. Hackworth and Dr. Ben M. Cherrington. Although
White labeled much of the spying as “amateurish,” he claimed Peruvian secret police
shadowed delegates and correspondents throughout the 3-week conference. He also
reported that government officials supervised the “persecution and intimidation of vis-
iting newspaper correspondents” (White, 1939m). The Peruvian Foreign Office spe-
cifically targeted him, White continued, and “seriously considered deporting this
correspondent because of a dispatch printed in the New York Times exposing the efforts
of Nazi and Fascist agents to sabotage the conference.” White contended that the
Peruvian government sympathized with the Fascists and was upset by his reports
about German and Italian interference in the conference (White, 1939m). The next
day, White reported that the Pan American conference, designed to “protect democra-
cies from invasion by Fascist and Nazi ideologies, failed to address a major issue: how
to protect democracies if the people in South America welcomed Fascist ideology as
many of them already are doing” (White, 1939p, p. 1).
In Washington, D.C., and New York, White’s dispatches sparked a firestorm.
White’s allegations contradicted the official U.S. portrayal of the conference by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, who had praised the delegates’
unity based on trusting friendships (Hinton, 1938). Foreign ambassadors and the U.S.
State Department complained to Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, questioning
White’s facts, particularly the allegations of spying on delegates and harassing corre-
spondents. “That’s why I filled it with names and dates and facts,” White said in a
January 22 letter to Edwin L. James. “I haven’t tried to reply to any of the denials by
cable because I don’t suppose you want to keep up a controversy about it.” White said
the only denial he could find from Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s press conference
was that none of the correspondents reported being censored. He said U.S. Ambassador
Lawrence Steinhardt knew about the censorship and intimidation because White and
other correspondents discussed it with him. After the discussion, White went to the
“conference secretariat” and worked out an agreement not to censor conference news.
White defended the rest of the story, even telling James that his source for the informa-
tion on the two police photographers breaking into U.S. diplomats’ hotel room was a
stenographer who saw the two detectives force the chambermaid to open the door (J.
W. White to E. L. James, January 22, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12). Dr. Cherrington, one
of the men whose room was “rifled” through, denied that any such thing took place
and “expressed surprise that we (The New York Times) should tolerate on our staff
someone who made up a story of this kind so obviously out of whole cloth and, in his
judgment, for ulterior reasons” (A. H. Sulzberger to E. L. James, March 22, 1939, Box
84, Folder 12).9 The ulterior reasons were never specified.
Six days after publication of the story, the New York Times published a reply from
F. Pardo de Zela, the Consul General of Peru in the United States. He denied White’s
Stoker 213
allegations that President Benavides had Fascist and Nazi inclinations and questioned
several other facts. The Peruvian Navy worked with the American Navy, Zela wrote,
and its army relied on French Army officers. Zela also said a fellow correspondent
discredited White’s story. William Philip Simms, foreign editor of the Scripps-Howard
newspapers, said he was accosted by a man named Brown—“who certainly could not
be a Peruvian with such a name”—proposing an interview with a Peruvian minority
politician (“Peruvian Consul denies spy story,” 1939). In an extraordinary move,
White defended himself in a letter to the editor published January 24. The police spied
on him, White wrote, not the military, and the police were “being reorganized and
directed by an Italian mission lent by Mussolini.” “Brown” was the alias of a well-
known Peruvian customs broker whose real name was Moreno, Spanish for Brown.
White wrote, “When the American delegation formally protested to Foreign Minister
Concha against political activities among the American delegates and correspondents,
Senor Concha appeared surprised that the Americans knew the agent’s real name”
(White, 1939h, p. 15).10
On January 12, Sulzberger asked James to place the censorship story in White’s
file. “I have a feeling that we have not heard the last of it, and I would like to have the
report made up while it is fresh in the minds of all concerned” (A. H. Sulzberger to E.
L. James, Memorandum, January 12, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12). He was right. Three
weeks after its publication, Sulzberger sent a note to William L. Laurence, the Times
editorial writer on science issues, admitting that by this time, Laurence was probably
sick of the controversy. “I have every confidence in White as an honest and capable
reporter,” Sulzberger wrote.
But whenever a story is questioned we make it our business to check up. We go way out
on the end of a limb for our people but we like to check whenever we can to make sure
that limb is not rotten.
He enclosed the story and asked Laurence to write him in confidence and offer guid-
ance (A. H. Sulzberger to W. L. Laurence, January 22, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
The publisher also asked Washington Bureau Chief Arthur Krock to investigate. “It
seems to me that the way in which Mr. Hull dealt with the question on his return is
evidence of the fact that White’s story is correct,” Sulzberger wrote. “The Secretary
could very easily have said that it was false and spared himself all the lather” (A. H.
Sulzberger to A. Krock, January 14, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12). Krock was given access
to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles’s confidential report on the matter. It offered
little support for White’s allegations. Hackworth and other members of the delegation
denied ever seeing any evidence of a search “by a spy, a sneak-thief or even some
merely curious person.” Welles also queried other correspondents, and each replied
that the Peruvian government abided by the rules and allowed dispatches marked
“Conferencia” to go through unexamined (A. Krock to Sulzberger, January 17, 1939).
At the end of his note to Sulzberger, Krock wrote that, regarding censorship, White
probably received special attention from the Peruvian government because he “is cred-
ited (undoubtedly inaccurately) as being hand in glove with the most radical groups in
Argentina.” Krock speculated that Peru’s president Oscar Raimendez Benavides had
White’s materials examined. “And I imagine also that the APRAs [Peruvian opposi-
tion party] tried to talk with him [White] and sent him reports through others because
they felt sure of his sympathy with their effort to upset the Benavides government” (A.
Krock to Sulzberger, January 17, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
White said as much in his original story. In their one-on-one meeting, White said
President Benavides accused him of trying to study Peru’s internal politics while attend-
ing the conference. White denied the charge, but the president did not believe him. “I
know all about your activities in Chile two years ago,” White quoted the president as
saying. “You were much interested in Peruvian politics at that time.” White wrote that
the president probably referred to White’s proposal condemning censorship at the Pan-
American Conference of Journalists in Chile (White, 1939m). White later found out
that the president was referring to a resolution against censorship presented by White at
the conference and sent to committee for review. When the proposal was adopted, two
signatures appeared on the document, White’s and the name of the committee chair-
man, Manuel Seaone Corrales, who White later learned was the No. 2 leader of APRA.
White surmised that Benavides considered the proposal an attack on Peruvian censor-
ship (J. W. White to E. L. James, January 22, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
In February, Sulzberger received a “Personal and Strictly Confidential” letter from
lifelong friend Lawrence Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Peru. “The broad assertions
made by White in the article enclosed in your letter were not only gross exaggerations
but insofar as they were specific, constitute violent distortion of the facts,” Steinhardt
wrote. But the ambassador confirmed that it was reported to him that a member of the
delegation found an individual, who he was planning to meet, looking through “papers
of no importance” when the American walked into the room. Steinhardt confirmed
many other facts in White’s story, including his report about strict censorship, but
questioned the overall tone and depiction of the conference. Steinhardt did not want to
harm White, but his letter reinforced allegations that White was overly critical and
negative and drew unwarranted conclusions from the facts (L. Steinhardt to A. H.
Sulzberger, February 16, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
All the criticism and complaints began to undermine Sulzberger’s confidence in his
correspondent. In a memorandum to James, he sounded agitated that White had not
addressed questions raised about two of his stories, one of which was 2 years old.
Women’s activist Josephine Schain complained about White’s dispatches from the
January 1937 Montevideo Pan American Conference, and New York attorney and
women’s activist Dorothy Straus criticized his coverage of women’s issues at the 1939
Lima Conference. If answers were not on the way, Sulzberger wrote, “I think we ought
to talk this situation over rather seriously, and possibly reconsider our ideas concern-
ing him” (A. H. Sulzberger to E. L. James, March 22, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
Internal Censorship at the Times

A few months later, the tone of White’s story again got him in trouble and on the front
page. On July 25, 1939, the New York Times featured a two-column story by White
Stoker 215
contending that Argentina claimed land in Antarctica in direct conflict with the United
States and Great Britain. “Argentina is preparing to vigorously oppose any attempt by
the United States to extend the Monroe Doctrine into Antarctic regions as a result of
the new expedition to be led by Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd,” White wrote. Argentina
had long opposed the Monroe Doctrine, White continued, “on the ground that it is a
unilateral declaration of the United States having no force as an international policy.”
Argentina also disputed British claims over several islands, including the Falklands
(White, 1939b, p. 1).
The next day Argentina’s Ambassador to the United States Felipe de Espil marched
into the New York Times Washington Bureau and expressed his government’s displea-
sure with White’s story. In a letter to publisher Arthur Sulzberger, Bureau Chief Arthur
Krock noted that Ambassador Espil did not question the facts of the story, just the way
it was written.
He says his government is surprised at the tone of the article since . . . its Antarctic policy
“has nothing in view but the friendly assertion of its proper interests along with those of
other governments such as that of the United States which it is on good terms.”
As an aside, Krock added, “I fear the Argentine authorities will never become recon-
ciled to interpretive reporting” (A. Krock to Sulzberger, July 26, 1939, Box 84, Folder
12).
Espil’s complaints had little effect on Sulzberger because the ambassador often
reassured him that White’s reporting was accurate. In a January 27, 1940, letter to
Sulzberger, White related a conversation with Espil in the presence of Brazilian
Ambassador Osvaldo Aranha. According to White, Espil said if he “did not complain
about how White did his job, he wouldn’t be doing his job and would be fired” (J. W.
White to Sulzberger, January 27, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11). White included Espil’s
comments in long letter to a Sulzberger, responding to allegations that he had violated
the newspaper’s policy regarding Anglo-Argentine trade. “But I very obviously was
out of step because three factual pieces on the subject have been turned down—two by
the news department and one by the Sunday department,” White wrote.
The information which I want to give you in this letter is not designed to support any
attitude I may have on the situation, especially what the British are doing to us in South
America. I have been carefully checking facts with an unimpeachable diplomatic source
for six months, in addition to checking them with banking and commercial contacts.
White explained that the British had blocked the United States from signing a trade
agreement with Argentina. The significance of White’s letter is that he referred to a
newspaper policy that coincided with U.S. foreign policy at the time. The Neutrality
Act of 1939 allowed the United States to sell obsolete destroyers, war materials, and
food to Great Britain. Negative public opinion toward Great Britain could have under-
mined efforts to help Britain without taking sides in the war. (J. W. White to Sulzberger,
January 27, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
The British had long enjoyed preferential access to Argentina’s markets because of
the 1930 Roca-Runciman Treaty. Britain also controlled much of the country’s trans-
portation system. The treaty placed stiff tariffs on U.S. goods and gave favored access
to U.K. imports and exports (Rock, 1993). Washington Bureau Chief Arthur Krock
passed along White’s letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who confirmed the
accuracy of what White wrote. Hull noted that Britain was “deeply entrenched in
Argentina” and earnestly sought goods the United States did not want, namely
Argentine wheat, meats, and wool. Hull had tried to develop triangular trade agree-
ment but with little success. “Just to keep protesting over the details would mean
merely playing tag and not getting anywhere,” wrote Krock in regard to Hull’s opin-
ion. Hull hoped the problems would be settled after the war (A. Krock to A. H.
Sulzberger, February 7, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11). White also referred to Hull’s efforts
to negotiate free trade treaties with Argentina but said the country’s “clique” of young
economists preferred the totalitarian system of controlled bilateral trade pacts with
Germany and Great Britain (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, November 8, 1940, Box
84, Folder 11).
The Nazi Menace

Although stories about Britain’s unfair trade pacts were killed, those detailing
Argentina’s fight against a growing Nazi influence received good play in the Times.
On April 1, 1939, the Times published White’s dispatch regarding the discovery of a
secret document revealing Nazi plans to annex the sparsely populated southern
Argentine region of Patagonia. The German Embassy claimed that the document was
a forgery (White, 1939l), and based on historical evidence, they were most likely forg-
eries (Newton, 1981, 1992). Ten days later, White reported on the ongoing investiga-
tion into the authenticity of a photograph of a document detailing Nazi annexation
plans and the revelation that Nazi spying extended to all parts of Argentina (White,
1939a). In July, the government launched an investigation of “subversive action”
(White, 1939d). The Patagonia annexation document was later exposed as a hoax, but
not before it sparked an expansive investigation to identify spies throughout Argentina.
Adolf Mueller, acting head of the Nazi organization in Argentina, was arrested on
charges of conducting subversive activities (White, 1939f). Argentine newspapers also
reported the discovery of other documents containing German reports about the loca-
tion of Argentine oil fields in relation to various ports on the Patagonian coast. Based
on documents found while arresting German spies, White reported that Nazi penetra-
tions were directed toward colonizing Argentina (White, 1939e).
In May 1939, White’s dispatch, headlined “Argentina Finds Nazi Menace Real,”
included a quote from the Federal Prosecuting Attorney, saying the “Nazi invasion of
Argentina has reached dimensions that constitute affront against Argentine sovereignty
and the local Nazi party’s activities are completely illicit and contrary to the Argentine
Constitution and require urgent protective legislation” (White, 1939c, p. 14). In October
1939, White reported that Germany was “fighting a propaganda war, with South
America as the battlefield, and fighting it just as efficiently and ruthlessly as the mili-
tary campaigns she fought on the battlefields of Poland” (White, 1939o, p. 35).
Stoker 217
The actual war spread to South America when British warships attacked the German
battleship Admiral Graf Spee off the Uruguayan coast. From his hotel balcony in
Montevideo, White described the British blockade of the “buffeted” battleship in
Montevideo harbor and the ensuing “death watch” of the doomed ship (White, 1939g).
The story ran on the front page of the Times December 15, 1939, and several more
front-page stories tracked the scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee (White, 1939n) and
the internment of its crew in Argentina (White, 1939j). White wrapped up the coverage
with a page 2 story of the Argentine navy’s analysis of the battle (White, 1939i).
The United States launched a propaganda campaign against the Nazis because
many South American countries sympathized with the Axis powers. Playing on public
fears of Nazi invasions of Argentina and the colonization of neighboring Uruguay and
other countries, the propaganda proved highly effective. On June 6, 1940, the Times
published a front-page story under White’s byline, alleging that plans had been discov-
ered that Nazi groups in Argentina and Brazil would help in the German occupation of
Uruguay (White, 1940e). Although the two countries reacted by putting their militar-
ies on alert, they purposely avoided any action that might offend Germany, including
the release, for lack of evidence, of Nazi agents arrested in connection with the planned
invasion (White, 1940a). The Argentine government, citing threats of Nazi intrigue,
proposed greater censorship on local newspapers and foreign correspondents, but the
proposal was defeated after an outcry from the local press (White, 1940b). The explo-
sion of two bombs on a British steamer led to the arrest of five young Argentine reserve
officers linked to the Nazis (White, 1940f). White also reported on a government
arrests of Nazi agents and their supporters (White, 1940d) and the actual deportation
of one Gestapo agent (White, 1940i). Although White considered most of the rumors
about Nazi invasions as “undoubtedly” false, they had unnerved people and caused
them to react to even the most improbable conspiracies. But in the same story, he
reported that, “The Nazis appear to have two clearly defined plans for getting posses-
sion of South America.” Citing reliable German sources in South America, White
claimed the Nazis planned to land in southern Brazil and then rapidly occupy Uruguay,
Paraguay, northern Argentina, and eventually Chile. In the second plan, the Nazis
would inspire internal uprisings by nationalist forces sympathetic to their cause
(White, 1940k).
Only later did White learn that he had been the victim of U.S. propaganda alleging
a Nazi invasion of Uruguay. In a memo to Edwin James and passed along to Sulzberger,
White detailed how he had been fooled by American Minister Edwin Wilson, a close
friend of Sumner Welles, and a young Socialist professor, Hugo Fernandez Artucio,
into publishing the stories about the Nazi plot to invade Uruguay. The stories served to
create enough alarm to justify the U.S. government’s deal to sell destroyers to Great
Britain. White credited the hoax with helping Wilson earn a promotion to Ambassador
(in Panama) after only a year as a Minister. White later found out he had been played
by Wilson and Artucio. Nearly a year had passed before White informed Sulzberger
about being misled about the Nazi threat. “Wilson later told me that Washington was
very pleased with what I had written about the Nazi investigation,” White wrote.
“[Wilson] told Artucio that White had cooperated very efficiently in creating the
desired state of alarm.” By the time White learned about the ruse, he had left Argentina
as a result of the Uruguayan base story, and it was too late to do anything about it. “The
Gestapo got after me for my participation in the story and I was in considerable danger
during the last months I was in Montevideo” (J. W. White to Sulzberger, memo, [ca.
May 1941], Box 84, Folder 12).
The Final Scoop That Cost White His Job

The Nazis may not been planning an invasion of South America until after conquering
Europe, but as spring arrived in Argentina, Germany occupied enough of Europe to put
the United States and South American countries on edge. With the war limiting
Argentina’s ability to export its goods, President Roberto Maria Ortiz reached out to
the United States with plans for hemispheric cooperation and a plea for open markets.
The United States rejected Argentina’s diplomatic overtures, interpreting its actions as
an effort to play a more dominant role in pan American leadership (Tulchin, 1969).
The distrust between the two countries increased as subsequent trade negotiations
achieved only minor concessions from both sides (Bethell, 1993). This allowed the
more conservative Nationalists in the government to keep Argentina neutral and in
some minds, antagonistic toward the United States and sympathetic to the Axis pow-
ers. The United States had been negotiating with individual South American countries
for military and economic cooperation. These unilateral agreements with Argentina’s
neighbors, particularly military arms exports to Brazil and Uruguay, angered
Argentina’s Nationalists and threatened to undermine its leadership role in South
America (Tulchin, 1969).
White may have been aware of these political undercurrents, but the journalist in
him could not resist jumping on a story that had international repercussions. On
October 4, 1940, the New York Times published on the front page White’s bylined
dispatch reporting that the U.S. government “was conducting conversations with most
South American republics, if not all of them, for establishment of local naval, land and
air bases which then would be made available for use by the armed forces of any
American country” (White, 1940i, p. 1). Ten days later, White cited “an unimpeach-
able diplomatic source” who had confirmed “that Brazil and Chile had agreed to lease
naval and air bases to the United States.” White also noted that Uruguay might change
its mind regarding leasing military bases to the United States and return to the negoti-
ating table (White, 1940h). On November 7, Times correspondent Frank L. Kluckhorn
reported from Washington that “understandings” had been reached with virtually
every Latin American country to permit the United States to use air and naval bases if
necessary for hemisphere defense. Argentina was not included among the countries
mentioned in the story (Kluckhorn, 1940). Four days later, the Times’ front page
included White’s big scoop reporting that, “Uruguay and the United States have
reached an agreement for the establishment of naval and air bases on the Uruguayan
coast.” White added that naval and military sources said the “agreement” was based on
“a proposal made by Uruguay last June that the bases be Pan American rather than
United States bases and that they be open to occupation by forces of any and all
American vessels engaged in continental defense” (White, 1940j, p. 1).
Stoker 219
The next day White claimed that diplomats and political leaders supported the
agreement but his only identified source in the story was an editorial from a leading
Montevideo newspaper. He noted that the only opposition to the agreement had come
from pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi newspapers (White, 1940c). Then, however, Uruguayan
opposition leaders began vigorously protesting what they called a violation of their
country’s national sovereignty. This sparked a public backlash that caused the govern-
ment to backtrack and deny that the negotiations were even taking place (White,
1940g). The Argentine government, which did not hesitate to bully its neighbor on the
other side of the River Plate, condemned the agreement as a threat to its sovereignty.
State Department officials in Washington also reacted with anger, blaming White for
undermining sensitive negotiations. President Franklin Roosevelt demanded an expla-
nation from Sulzberger, and the publisher promised an immediate investigation (F. D.
Roosevelt to Sulzberger, November 13, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
At Sulzberger’s request, White provided a detailed letter in which he claimed to
have documents to support the story. “I am informed by [Uruguayan President Alfredo]
Baldomir’s secretary that [Uruguayan Foreign Minister Alberto] Guani’s statement
yester-night was not intended to deny our story,” White wrote. The correspondent
claimed that the United Press had misrepresented his dispatch. He questioned whether
the complaints dealt with the wire service’s rewrite of the story. Despite White’s plea
to keep parts of his letter confidential for fear of revealing his diplomatic sources,
Sulzberger sent a copy to Roosevelt. The President responded to White’s explanation
by saying the quote in connection with Guani’s statement was
in conflict with the information which has come to me. Our minister in Uruguay [Edwin
Wilson] was told by Foreign Minister Guani . . . that [Guani] was deeply incensed by the
publication of these ‘inexact and irresponsible reports which play into the hands of those
obstructing efforts at continental defense.
Roosevelt added that, “this is far from being the first instance of serious trouble cre-
ated for this Government which has resulted from John White’s stories.” The President
accused White of causing “serious difficulties” for more than 5 years, including “very
vigorous complaints” from the governments of Argentina and Brazil. The President
specified Brazil’s criticism of White, without noting that Argentine President Agustin
Justo had manufactured the story in an effort to get rid of White. The next statement
by Roosevelt revealed the extent of the U.S. government’s interest and involvement in
monitoring editorial decisions, at least in the case of White, regarding the Times for-
eign correspondents. Roosevelt said he had learned last year that the Times planned to
replace White. The comment served as a subtle reminder that the President did not go
so far as to ask Sulzberger to remove White but wanted Sulzberger to know the gov-
ernment clearly preferred the paper follow-through with those intentions. If the Times
continued publication of such stories as the one written by White, Roosevelt warned,
it would harm the friendly relations that now existed between the United States and its
South American neighbors. Though unsaid, the implication was that such stories also
would harm the friendly relations between the United States and the New York Times
(F. D. Roosevelt to Sulzberger, November 13, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
President Roosevelt never denied the story, a fact noted by Managing Editor Edwin
James in a memo to Sulzberger.
The New York Times would be concerned were it to develop that Mr. White had sent an
erroneous story on this subject, but I take it that our attitude would be different if Mr.
White’s story although annoying the diplomats was the truth. (E. L. James to Sulzberger,
November 15, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11)
In a handwritten response to President Roosevelt that was never sent, Sulzberger pro-
vided his usual response to criticism of White.
It was no lack of confidence in White that caused us to consider moving him last year.
Our correspondents are being moved about much as our ambassadors are and it was to
make room for Arnaldo Cortesi that [we] considered shifting Mr. White.
But Cortesi was sent to Mexico City, and the Times had no plans to make a change in
Buenos Aires “so long as I continue to have confidence in our present representation.”
Ambassador Felipe de Espil, Sulzberger said, vouched for the accuracy of White’s
stories, and the Ambassador’s only complaint was with the headlines. There was no
explanation as to why Sulzberger never sent the letter (A. H. Sulzberger to F. D.
Roosevelt, [handwritten], [n.d.], Box 84, Folder 11).
In his actual response to the President on November 15, Sulzberger said he was
launching an “immediate investigation” of the allegations against White. Sulzberger
started by asking his correspondent for another explanation, and White sent a detailed
memorandum to the publisher. Like James, White pointed out that neither the presi-
dent’s letter nor Foreign Minister Alberto Guani denied the facts of the story. In an
appearance before the Uruguayan Senate, Guani attacked him for writing the story but
confirmed the accuracy of the story. White’s source for this information was a
Uruguayan senator, who thanked the New York Times for publishing the story. White
admitted that U.S. Minister Edwin Wilson carefully denied a plan by Uruguay to “cede”
bases to the United States but did not deny that discussions had taken place. White had
documentary evidence supporting his story and noted that AP and United Press were
hot on the story, and the local press was upset that White had scooped them. “My crime
seems to have that I got a clear scoop on the biggest South American story of the year,
the facts of which were subsequently confirmed by both the United States and
Uruguayan governments” (J. W. White to Sulzberger, memorandum, [ca. November
1940], Box 84, Folder 11).
On November 22, White cabled James from Montevideo to say that the Buenos
Aires police were looking for him; meanwhile, Nazi sympathizers in the Argentine
government were lobbying for his expulsion. He also feared the Nazis had intercepted
information he had sent to Sulzberger (J. W. White to E. L. James [cable], November
22, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11). Two days later, White cabled to say that Argentine Vice
President Ramon Castillo had issued an expulsion order on the grounds that White had
upset peaceful relations between Argentina and Uruguay by transmitting from
Stoker 221
Montevideo his dispatch on the negotiations. White stayed in Montevideo while U.S.
Ambassador Armour met with Minister of Foreign Relations Julio Argentino Pascual
Roca on November 25. If Armour failed to get the expulsion order annulled, the
ambassador would have a member of the embassy staff meet White in Buenos Aires
and take him to the police station (J. W. White to E. L. James [cable], November 24,
1940, Box 84, Folder 11). White marveled at the irony that Argentina blamed him for
upsetting relations between neighboring countries because the government wanted to
dictate Uruguay’s relations with the United States. Indeed, Argentine Foreign Minister
Saavedra Lamas ordered Uruguayan Foreign Minister Alberto Guani to break off con-
versations with the United States or face reprisals (J. W. White to Sulzberger, memo,
[ca. November 1940], Box 84, Folder 11).
White provided as evidence a memorandum in Spanish presented by the U.S. naval
representative to the Uruguayan government as well as Uruguay’s counter proposal.
The translation of the first document confirmed that Uruguay was not asked to cede or
lease any of its bases; but, according to White, the Uruguayans misinterpreted the
proposal because the naval representative botched the presentation. White also sup-
plied a copy of the Uruguayan counter proposal signed by both parties. But his source
had not given him permission to publicly refer to the signed memo or even to say that
it was signed. “The conversations are still so secret that there is a danger of the leak
being traced and then a man in high position here will lose his job and I shall have
several valuable doors closed to me.” White claimed that Edwin Wilson knew White
had the documents but denied their existence. “We are all right on the story.” The day
he sent the memo, White continued, President Baldomir’s secretary verified every
detail of the story, except White’s translation of the word “cuerdo.” Spanish newspa-
pers translated the word in English as “agreement,” but a more accurate translation
was “understanding.” White admitted that he did not think about it as he was writing
for English publication. White closed with a warning: The Times should not let the
U.S. Government know he had the documents because the source of the leak would be
identified immediately (J. W. White to James, November 14, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
Despite this clear warning, Sulzberger again sent White’s account to President
Roosevelt. As a condition, he specified that the President return the original letter.
Roosevelt adhered to the request and included the original in his response, but added
that the government had found no record of the United Press dispatch that White
alleged misinterpreted his story. The President also contested White’s defense that
Guani’s statement did not deny the story, saying it conflicted with the account supplied
by Edwin Wilson (F. D. Roosevelt to A. H. Sulzberger, December 2, 1940, Box 84,
Folder 11).
By the end of November, Edwin L. James shared the results of his investigation
with Sulzberger. He documented the three stories by White and one by Kluckhorn. He
also included White’s letter protesting the United Press’s rewrite of his original story,
a cable concerning White’s threatened expulsion, two memoranda from White defend-
ing his reporting, and a letter from the President of the United States.
May I add that Mr. Krock, at our request, saw Mr. Sumner Welles and found him
somewhat unsympathetic. It seems to be Mr. Welles’ opinion, according to Krock, that we
would do better to have another correspondent in BA and he did not make any bones
about not liking White.
James concluded that the Times did not ask the State Department to intervene on
White’s behalf, but United States Ambassador to Argentina Arnold Armour exerted
some “gentle” pressure at White’s request (E. L. James to A. H. Sulzberger, November
27, 1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
On December 2, an unsigned memorandum, likely written by James, was provided
to Sulzberger. According to the memo, the files showed no evidence of the President’s
allegation that the State Department voiced “vigorous complaints” against White over
a 5-year period. After the 1937 incident in which Ambassador Weddell intervened on
White’s behalf, the State Department hinted that it wanted White transferred but would
allow him to remain if he did not write any more stories about Brazil from Buenos
Aires. At the time, Sulzberger refused to agree to those conditions, and the memo
noted that Argentina, not Brazil, had protested White’s Brazilian story. As to the inci-
dent with the Uruguayan bases, all the stories, correspondence, and documents relat-
ing to the incident were reviewed, including Uruguay’s opposition party’s thanking
White and the Times for publishing the story. According to the memo, the documents
appeared to confirm the accuracy of White’s story (“John W. White,” December 2,
1940, Box 84, Folder 11).
Sulzberger’s Betrayal and White’s Dismissal

Although banished to Montevideo, White continued filing dispatches and providing
background information to Sulzberger and James. On January 13, White gave
Sulzberger a summary of what historians refer to as Argentina’s infamous decade.
Since the 1930 revolution, White wrote, all presidential elections in Argentina had
been fraudulent, with each president handpicking his successor. As President Roberto
Maria Ortiz completed his term, he tried to avoid another sham election but his efforts
led to his forced resignation. At the end of the letter, White informed the publisher that
Press Wireless in Montevideo was accepting payments to run Italian propaganda and
dispatches from the Russian propaganda service Tass. He alleged the Press Wireless
had recruited Argentine and Uruguayan newspapers to run Tass news reports. U.S.
Minister Edwin Wilson told White that he was reporting Press Wireless’s actions to the
State Department. The actions of Press Wireless were relevant to Sulzberger because
the New York Times was one of 13 news organizations that owned the service (J. W.
White to Sulzberger, January 13, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11).
Sulzberger issued no response to the Press Wireless report. The last stories with
White’s byline appeared in March 1941. On Sunday, March 9, he wrote an interpretive
story dealing with South America’s response to Adolf Hitler’s diplomatic victories in
the Balkans. The story carried a Buenos Aires dateline (White, 1941d). White’s last
bylined story for the New York Times appeared March 19, 1941, with a Montevideo
Stoker 223
dateline and dealt with a political crisis in Uruguay (White, 1941a). He was replaced
in Buenos Aires by Arnaldo Cortesi, the Times correspondent in Mexico City. An
Italian citizen, Cortesi had covered Italy for 17 years. In 1939, Italian dictator Benito
Mussolini prohibited Italian citizens from working for foreign news organizations, and
the Times transferred Cortesi to Mexico City (Fischer & Fischer, 2002). Cortesi’s first
bylined story, with a Buenos Aires dateline, appeared April 6, 1941 (Cortesi, 1941).
Sometime in May, likely after his return to the United States, White sent a memo-
randum to Sulzberger in which he confided that he had received a letter from a
well-informed friend of mine tipping me off that Washington had asked that I be taken out
of South America because I had gotten too close to what was going on. And the UP
[United Press] in South America had the report that I had been fired from the New York
Times at the request of the State Department. (J. W. White to Sulzberger, memo, [ca. May
1941], Box 84, Folder 11)
James forwarded the memo to Sulzberger (E. L. James to A. H. Sulzberger, May 22,
194, Box 84, Folder 11). A few days later, Sulzberger sent Undersecretary of State
Sumner Welles a copy of an undated Memorandum from John W. White dealing with
the November military bases stories. “These are busy days and matters that have been
disposed of should not be resurrected,” Sulzberger wrote. “Nonetheless, I think it might
be desirable for you to place in your John White file the enclosed copy of memorandum
that I have from him.” In the memo, White again provided an explanation as to why
American Minister Edwin Wilson did not know the details of the Uruguayan base
agreement, the care with which he reported the story, and the urgency to publish because
the wire services were “hard after” the story. Apparently, White’s status was still up in
the air because Sulzberger asked Welles for help in dealing with their mutual problem.
“It occurs to me,” Sulzberger wrote the Undersecretary, “that one further approach in
the White matter would be actually to ask him to perform a specific task for the admin-
istration” (A. H. Sulzberger to S. Welles, May 28, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11).
On May 31, 1941, Welles responded that he appreciated the memo and had saved
it. “The suggestion contained in the second paragraph of your letter is admirable and I
will see what we can do to follow it out” (S. Welles to Sulzberger, May 31, 1941, Box
84, Folder 1: Sumner Welles, 1939-1949). Subsequent correspondence between
Sulzberger and Welles makes no mention of White. Nothing in State Department files
indicates that White returned to full-time work for the government. By June, White
was in New York City, awaiting reassignment by the Times. As indication that White
still did not know his fate, White provided on June 5 a confidential memorandum to
Sulzberger detailing the clandestine and illegal activities of Press Wireless. The
Argentine postal authorities refused to permit Press Wireless from opening an office in
Buenos Aires, so the company operated out of Montevideo but still found ways to send
documents from Buenos Aires. White had learned from the director of the Montevideo
office that the company’s New York headquarters had pressured the local office to
evade Uruguayan taxes, route traffic through fake offices, and earn additional income
by transmitting propaganda from Italy, Germany, and Russia. At the bottom of the first
page, White included in parentheses the following note:
Mr. Sulzberger, [t]his information was given me by the Press Wireless manager at
Montevideo, whom I am anxious to protect in this matter, as it was only by gaining his
confidence that I was able to get information I thought you should have.
At the end of the memo, White added in parentheses, “Confidentially, the U.S.
Minister, Wilson, told me he was reporting these things to the State Department” (J. W.
White to Sulzberger, Memorandum, June 5, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11).
Sulzberger disregarded White’s promise of confidentiality and gave the informa-
tion to Joseph Pierson, president of the Press Wireless, Inc. in Chicago and former
cable editor of the Chicago Tribune. White felt betrayed. “Mr. Pierson has written to
the American and British Legations, I understand, to check up on the facts I reported
as coming from them, thereby showing them both that I have violated their confi-
dence,” White wrote Sulzberger. According to White, Pierson was defending his
actions by saying he had fired White from the Chicago Tribune, and that White had
been hostile to him ever since. White contended that he was not fired but quit the
Tribune because Pierson falsified White’s dispatches, sensationalized others, and pub-
lished confidential letters White had written to Colonel Robert R. McCormick, pub-
lisher of the Tribune. White left the Tribune to work for the Chicago Daily News, his
position when he joined the New York Times (J. W. White to Sulzberger, June 23, 1941,
Box 84, Folder 11).
For the third time in 6 months, Sulzberger failed to honor White’s request for con-
fidentiality. “The situation that he disclosed was so serious, however, that I felt under
an obligation to share the information,” Sulzberger wrote in a Memorandum dated
June 30, 1941. The publisher noted that he had not answered White’s letter. In his own
defense, he quoted from the letter he sent the directors of Press Wireless, emphasizing
White’s request to protect the informant. But Sulzberger wanted the directors to have
all the information. “I am confident that you will see to it that no one suffers unjustly
in the matter” (A. H. Sulzberger, June 30, 1941, Box 84, Folder 11). The irony is that
during his years with the Times, White went to great lengths to protect the integrity of
his journalism. His Times obituary noted that,
To avoid censorship he would telephone his often unsympathetic interviews from another
country . . . [and] cut his copy vertically, [giving] half of a page to one cable company to
transmit and the other half to a second company. (“John White Dies,” 1974, p. 38)
His publisher did not afford White the same courtesy.

Instead, on June 27, 1941, Sulzberger advised Edwin L. James to inform Arthur
Krock to put White to work in Washington for the balance of the year. By then, if
White had not found another job, the Times would offer him dismissal pay.
Please explain to him that we believe that this solution should afford him the opportunity
of placing himself elsewhere—that we have no desire to hurt him unduly, but that the
unfortunate episode that has just occurred has caused us to lose confidence in him. If
Stoker 225
nothing else it was such a display of bad judgment that we would not feel secure in
having him acting on his own in a foreign post. (A. H. Sulzberger to E. L. James, June 27,
1941, Box 84, Folder 11)
Sulzberger probably meant the Uruguayan bases story but never specified the exact
“unfortunate episode” of bad judgment that led to White’s dismissal. The timing of
White’s firing raised questions as to whether Sulzberger’s connections to Press
Wireless and his betrayal of White’s confidential sources played a role in his decision
not to reassign White. After 12 years of directly corresponding with White on a regular
basis, Sulzberger instructed Edwin James and Arthur Krock to inform White that the
Times no longer required his services.
Conclusion: It Is Not Just About Getting the News

White likely accepted his dismissal pay; there is no evidence he reported to the
Times’ Washington Bureau. Within a few months, he joined the foreign staff of the
Washington Post, covering Mexico City. His first byline in the Post appeared
October 21, 1941 and dealt with “Mexican Socialism.” White claimed that the
Communist Party controlled the country’s school system, and President Avila
Camacho had launched a campaign to “clean out” the Communists. The rest of the
story explained how the Communists had gained control of Mexico’s ministry of
education and detailed the government’s efforts to retake control (White, 1941b). A
month later, White hailed an agreement between the United States and Mexico as a
diplomatic victory for the Mexicans and a reflection of what the Good Neighbor
Policy meant to Latin America (White, 1941c). In January 1942, he wrote from
Mexico City about Nazi-Fascist propaganda trying to convince Latin Americans that
their governments would betray them and face reprisals when the Axis powers won
the war (White, 1942b). Obviously, White was back in the newspaper game.
While in Mexico City, White finished the manuscript of a book on Argentina. In
June 1942, he wrote in the book’s introduction about his last trip up the River Plate to
Buenos Aires. He knew he was leaving in a few days, so he arose at sunrise to see the
“boundless river” and “the many tall white apartment houses and office buildings of
the third metropolis of the western world . . . ” He had made the same journey in 1915
as “a young and probably insufferably conceited vice consul, excited and enthusiastic
over having been promoted to this important post . . . ” (White, 1942a, pp. ix-x).
Argentina: The Life Story of a Nation was published in August 1942 to favorable
reviews, including two published in the New York Times. The Times’ main reviewer,
Orville Prescott, called the book “clear, concise, yet comprehensive” (Prescott, 1942).
The second review, written by Ernesto Montenegro, described White as a newspaper-
man who had tackled the difficult task of explaining Argentina to the United States and
provided the best-informed book on the subject.
As the man on the spot for The New York Times in the River Plate countries for many
years, he probably had his full share of professional headaches; yet neither the hail of
official threats nor the fog of censorship seems to have swerved him from the straight and
narrow path of his appointed duties. (Montenegro, 1943, p. BR1)
The next mention of White sounded much more familiar. On July 17, 1944, an
Associated Press story, datelined from Washington, reported that Secretary of State
Cordell Hull denounced as “deliberately false” a statement published in John W.
White’s dispatch for The Baltimore Sun. In a story, written from Santiago, Chile,
White claimed that the United States and Britain were preparing to appease Argentina,
then a neutral country, yet strongly sympathetic to Axis powers. The story included a
source saying the Allies’ approach to Argentina was similar to the Munich Accord that
the British signed with Germany before the war. In other words, the Allies would look
the other way if Argentina invaded Chile and Uruguay. “A State Department official
said Mr. Hull was not criticizing White’s story nor its publication . . . [He] had alluded
to South American reports and their authors” (Associated Press, 1944b). Four days
later, the Times published an Associated Press story that included the Argentine
Ambassador to the United States, Adrian Escobar, denying his country had any hostile
intentions toward its neighbors. Escobar falsely claimed that Argentina had expelled
White from its country in 1937 for “transmitting to the United States dispatches that
Senor Escobar described as having systematically attacked the Brazilian government”
(Associated Press, 1944a, p. 8). The Times did not bother to correct the obvious inac-
curacy, and The AP did not include a response from White, a former correspondent for
the wire service and founder of its Buenos Aires office.
John W. White’s career with the New York Times sheds light on the complex profes-
sional, political, cultural, and economic forces that enabled and constrained foreign
correspondents. As White noted, the idea of a nonpartisan reporter covering the news
made little sense in Argentina and other South American countries. Political officials
determined what was true, not a foreign journalist. A meeting between White and
Argentina’s Foreign Under Secretary Dr. Luis Castineiras showed what White was up
against. After demanding White come to his office, Castineiras “bawled” White out for
having sent the New York Times a story about a South American alliance. “First, he
wanted me to tell him the source of my information and then got abusive when I
refused to disclose it,” White recalled. The foreign secretary said White had no right
to send “any news out on international matters without first consulting with the minis-
try of foreign affairs.” White responded that the Buenos Aires government never gave
out any news on negotiations even after closing the deal. Castineiras disagreed. White,
he argued, had no right to publish anything Castineiras did not want published and if
White did, he would prove himself “to be an enemy of the government and of the
country.” White defiantly replied that his job was to get the news (J. W. White to E. L.
James, March 19, 1938, Box 84, Folder 13).
If getting the news out was only that simple. White had to balance the reporting of
the news with keeping good relations with the Argentine government, the U.S.
Embassy, and his editors. He faced near constant criticism for reporting about other
countries from Buenos Aires, but as he said himself, he avoided writing those stories
unless requested by the Times’ editors. The very fact that the Times’ editors requested
Stoker 227
those stories from White indicated that he was one of the few correspondents who
could provide reliable, uncensored accounts about what was happening in South
America. In this regard, the Times sent White contradictory messages. On one hand,
Arthur Hays Sulzberger scolded White for reporting stories about other countries from
Buenos Aires but then admitted in other correspondence that he could not promise that
the newspaper would not ask White to report these stories. Sulzberger also advised
White to balance his hard news reporting with constructive Pollyanna stories but then
counseled him not to overlook legitimate news, even if it were negative.
Based on White’s experience with the Times, the ability of American foreign cor-
respondents to report the news depended upon a multiplicity of factors, many of which
were beyond the control of the correspondent. White found himself in the crosshairs
of political leaders trying to stay in power, opposition parties vying for influence, and
foreign ambassadors defending their governments. In addition, he faced scrutiny from
the State Department, the First Bank of Boston, women’s activists, Nazi spies, and
even his own publisher. At times, Sulzberger seemed numb to complaints about
White’s reporting, but he investigated each one and eventually sided with White’s crit-
ics. The irony is that the Uruguayan base negotiation stories that led to White’s dis-
missal were never denied by those involved. Ironically, an agreement between the
United States and Uruguay was reached at about the same time White reported the
story (Tulchin, 1969). An internal investigation by the Times never turned up any evi-
dence that White had done anything more than mistranslate an understanding as an
agreement between two countries.
The correspondence also raised questions as to which of White’s stories led to his
firing. Although the controversial base negotiation stories were published in November
1940 and investigated in December, the correspondence indicated that White was not
informed about his dismissal until late June or early July 1941. Sulzberger’s exchanges
with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in which he conspired to find a way to
remove White included White’s memorandum on the base negotiations stories. Welles
had long made it clear that he did not like White and wanted him out, so their corre-
spondence points to White’s Uruguayan base reports as directly leading to his dismissal.
But, other reasons might have led to Sulzberger’s actions. Sulzberger could have been
motivated by White’s revelation that Press Wireless—again, an organization partly
sponsored by the Times—was breaking Argentine law and distributing Russian and
Nazi propaganda. It was a charge so serious that Sulzberger violated a sacred journalis-
tic norm—a reporter’s promise of confidentiality. Sulzberger also learned in May 1941
about White’s filing of planted stories about Nazi invasion plans for South America.
That same month, White informed Sulzberger about the State Department wanting
White out of South America because he knew too much. White also had heard reports
that he had been fired. It appears that Sulzberger had not made a final decision concern-
ing White’s future and did not make that decision until after White chided Sulzberger
for violating a promise of confidentiality and telling Joseph Pierson of Press Wireless
about White’s allegations. On June 27, more than 7 months after the Uruguayan base
story, Sulzberger asked Edwin L. James to have Arthur Krock take White on for a tem-
porary position in Washington, essentially firing White from his dream job.
White’s replacement, Arnaldo Cortesi, soon encountered the harsh realities of

reporting from Argentina. A little more than a year after being posted to Buenos Aires,
Cortesi was threatened with expulsion. Sulzberger called in a favor, and Undersecretary
of State Sumner Welles intervened on Cortesi’s behalf (S. Welles to Sulzberger,
October 6, 1942, Box 84, Folder 1: Sumner Welles, 1939-1949). Three years later,
Cortesi reported to Edwin L. James that his “relations with the Argentine government
have become extremely tense,” and pro-Nazi officials had threatened him with physi-
cal violence. If something bad happened, U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden promised
to use the “full weight of his authority” to help Cortesi, but Braden could only do so
much because Cortesi was not a U.S. citizen. Cortesi viewed the threats as part of “the
war of nerves against me and I only mention it to show that Buenos Aires is not a bed
of roses for a man in my position” (A. Cortesi to E. L. James, June 17, 1945, Box 14,
Folder 7). Cortesi may have been referring to the fact that he was not a U.S. citizen,
but more than likely he was referring to his position covering Argentina for the New
York Times.
In May 1946, Cortesi was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of Argentina.
One of the stories cited by the Pulitzer Board sounded similar to many of White’s
reports about the country. In a story published by the Times on June 1, 1945, Cortesi
wrote that after the Argentine government declared war on Germany and Japan in May
1945, it “deprived the Argentine people of what small remains of freedom they still
possessed.” Using the declaration of war as a pretext, the government had imposed
strict censorship on newspapers and foreign correspondents. To get the truth past
Argentine censors, Cortesi sent out his dispatch “by channels other than the normal
ones” (Cortesi, 1945, quoted in Cortesi, 1987, p. 100). Cortesi became an American
citizen in May 1946 and could not return to Argentina. He was replaced by veteran war
correspondent Frank I. Kluckhorn, who hated the assignment. With the election of
Juan Peron to a 6-year term as Argentine president, Kluckhorn felt his talents were
wasted in Argentina. “My opinion is that this assignment can be covered by a young
bachelor of much less experience” (F. L. Kluckhorn to A. H. Sulzberger, May 1, 1946,
Box 37, Folder 32).
Ironically, John W. White has been credited as the first to spot Juan Peron as a
future leader of Argentina (“John W. White, Author,” 1974). White remained in jour-
nalism and Latin America until the 1950s. For a time, he served as the New York
Herald Tribune’s bureau chief in Mexico City. His interpretive stories appeared in the
Nation, Colliers, and the Saturday Evening Post. In the 1950s and 1960s, he served as
an executive director of the United States Inter American Chamber of Commerce in
Washington, D.C. White died in 1974 at age 84 in Hamburg, New York.
Acknowledgments
I would especially like to thank two of my former graduate assistants, Mehrnaz Rahimi at Texas
Tech University and Leticia Adams Watson at Brigham Young University, for their research
and early analysis of John W. White’s reporting. Leticia was the first to introduce me to John W.
White’s battles against censorship, and Mehrnaz, now Dr. Rahimi, added to Letecia’s original
draft. As I conducted additional research, interpretation, and writing, I changed the direction and
Stoker 229
focus of the article, eliminating all elements of those early drafts. I also express thanks to the
staff of the New York Public Library’s Manuscripts and Archives Division, home of Arthur
Hays Sulzberger Papers.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: The College of Media and Communication at Texas Tech
University provided financial support for trips to New York City.
Notes
1. Unless otherwise specified, all Arthur Hays Sulzberger correspondence comes from the
New York Times Company Records, Arthur Hays Sulzberger papers, 1823-1999, Archives
& Manuscripts Division, The New York Public Library, New York City, New York.
2. Journalist statesmen should not be confused with journalistic activism. Two accounts of
American journalists covering Latin America focused on activist journalism: Long-time
Latin American correspondent Jules Dubois published an autobiography in 1959 in which
he admitted to promoting U.S.-style democracy and press freedom in South America. He
feared the region’s dictatorships opened the door for Communism and other revolutionary
movements. In 1977, the New York Times alleged that Dubois worked for the CIA. No
one would have accused American journalist Carleton Beals of working for the CIA. The
Marxist Beals portrayed the United States as an imperialistic power that often resorted
to “military intervention, diplomatic intimidation, economic domination and clandes-
tine manipulation.” He decried Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy as insincere and fake
(Britton, 1987, pp. 2-3; Crewdson & Treaster, 1977; Dubois, 1959, p. 290).
3. This is the last mention of Florence Dover White in the correspondence. She never again
reported for the New York Times and White never mentioned whether she continued to
report for local Argentine publications.
4. White sent two separate cables to James on November 5: The first dealt with the Argentine
newspapers’ response to government actions and the second focused on the censorship
imposed on the day of the elections.
5. But the American delegation’s victorious resolution against censorship was offset by the
conference’s adoption of a resolution opposing “Yankee imperialism” in Puerto Rico. The
approval of the proposal supporting Puerto Rican independence contributed to an attack
against the American delegation by the American Newspaper Guild, which repudiated the
delegation’s members as not representing American journalists. White responded that the
U.S. journalists represented their newspapers and press associations and not American
journalism (“U.S. Delegation Repudiated,” 1937; White, 1937c).
6. The memorandum from Clark did not list a first name. However, the Times did have a
Washington correspondent named Delbert Clark. The memorandum did not include an
addressee, but based on a previous note, it was likely meant for Edwin L. James.
7. Ironically, shortly after the order was lifted, in an interview broadcast on NBC’s blue net-
work, White described President Justo’s government as stable and successful, having led
the country out of the Depression. He also praised Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull for reestablishing U.S. credibility and prestige in the region
(“Argentina Is Seen,” 1938).
8. Liberal democratic factions in the United States and Europe, competing with Axis nations
for economic and political influence, exaggerated the Fascist threat in Latin America.
Indeed, the United States launched a campaign in 1937 to encourage South American sup-
porters of liberal democracy and stop the spread of Fascism. The United States also pro-
moted rumors of Axis plots to overthrow South American independence.
9. Sulzberger heard Cherrinton’s comment secondhand through a Miss Huger.
10. The New York Times also published an account of a radio address by Adolf A. Berle Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State, giving a glowing report of the conference, for which he was a
delegate. Berle denied White’s contention that spies had gone through his hotel room. He
also said the Peruvians treated the American delegation well and worked side by side with
them (“Report of Spying,” 1939). White defended himself in cables to Edwin L. James.
He twice saw delegates’ mail delivered to censors, and the hotel clerks admitted that all
letters arriving at the hotel were first sent to censors. John Whitaker, a correspondent for
the Chicago Daily News, said many hotel employees were arrested after the conference
because they talked to the press. Meanwhile, the Peruvian government was trying to get
White deported from Argentina (A. H. J. W. White to E. L. James, Cable, January 24, 1939;
J. W. White to E. L. James, Cable 2, January 24, 1939, Box 84, Folder 12).
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White, J. W. (1938a, December 31). Benavides praises results of parley. The New York Times,
p. 5.
White, J. W. (1938b, December 21). Betrayal by U.S. is charged at Lima. The New York Times,
p. 1.
White, J. W. (1938c, December 27). Hull’s peace plan dominates in Lima. The New York Times,
p. 1.
Stoker 235
White, J. W. (1938d, December 28). Nazi and fascist reporters protest at Lima. The New York
Times, p. 1.
White, J. W. (1938e, December 4). Propaganda war on U.S. launched. The New York Times,
p. 52.
White, J. W. (1938f, December 6). Rome-Berlin axis opens fight in Lima. The New York Times,
p. 1.
White, J. W. (1939a, April 11). Argentina bares wide Nazi spying. The New York Times, p. 6.
White, J. W. (1939b, July 25). Argentina claims Antarctic land in conflict with U.S. and Britain.
The New York Times, p. 1.
White, J. W. (1939c, May 5). Argentina finds Nazi menace real. The New York Times, p. 14.
White, J. W. (1939d, July 8). Argentina will open Nazi probe to challenge subversive action.
The New York Times, p. 4.
White, J. W. (1939e, April 2). Argentine inquiry nets six Germans. The New York Times, p. 43.
White, J. W. (1939f, April 5). Argentine police raid Nazi offices. The New York Times, p. 6.
White, J. W. (1939g, December 5). Big cruiser joins “death watch.” The New York Times, p. 1.
White, J. W. (1939h, January 24). Correspondent disputes statements of Peruvian consul gen-
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White, J. W. (1939i, December 27). Exeter fought Spee till dusk. The New York Times, p. 2.
White, J. W. (1939j, December 19). Graph Spee’s crew will be interned. The New York Times,
p. 1.
White, J. W. (1939k, January 1). Lima conference meets best hopes of Americas. The New York
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White, J. W. (1939l, April 1). Nazi plot to seize Patagonia is aired. The New York Times, p. 4.
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White, J. W. (1940e, June 6). Nazi plan to seize Uruguay indicated. The New York Times, p. 1.
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Author Biography
Kevin L. Stoker is director of the Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He conducts research in media ethics and media his-
tory and teaches media ethics, media history, war reporting, and long-form storytelling. Before
earning a PhD in 1998 from the University of Alabama, he worked as a journalist in Oklahoma
and Utah.

El Corresponsal Que Interpretaba Demás

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719276

Defense, and Betrayal of

1University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA

The Paradox of American Foreign Correspondence

1930s South America: The Conflict Society

Sulzberger’s Courtship of John W. White

“the world’s greatest news organization” (J. W. White to A. H. Sulzberger, July 5,

The Great Responsibilities of a Times Correspondent

As White covered these stories, he often provided additional background details in

Censorship and Secrecy

time.” As an example, White told of a press conference at which Argentine Finance

Fascists, Nazis, and Nationalists

The Communist Myth

To avoid embarrassing Argentina, Sulzberger counseled White to abstain writing

Influence of Good Neighbor Policy

White’s coverage of the Pan-American Conference made front-page news on five

problem in Argentine–U.S. relations was the application of “sanitary regulations” on

A Troublesome Foreign Correspondent

election of a successor. Censorship stopped the Times special correspondent in Sao

The Pan American Controversy

Internal Censorship at the Times

The Nazi Menace

The Final Scoop That Cost White His Job

Sulzberger’s Betrayal and White’s Dismissal

His publisher did not afford White the same courtesy.

Conclusion: It Is Not Just About Getting the News

White’s replacement, Arnaldo Cortesi, soon encountered the harsh realities of

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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