TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.), INC., AND MST MARINE SERVICES PHILS.

,
INC. VS. SHIRLEY G. DE CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 198225
September 27, 2017

FACTS:
Ryan de Chavez was hired as a Chief Cook onboard the oil tanker
vessel Hanma Express for a period of nine months. However, on February
26, 2006, Ryan was found dead inside his cabin bathroom hanging by the
shower cord and covered with blood. Thus, Ryan’s surviving spouse, Shirley
filed a complaint for death benefits.
Shirley alleged that Ryan did not commit suicide and that Ryan died
during the effectivity of his contract and while on board the vessel, hence,
his heirs are entitled to death benefits; that petitioners did not clarify how
Ryan could have committed suicide. On the other hand, petitioners claimed
that Shirley is not entitled to death benefits under Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC)
because the Medical certificate issued by Ulsan City Hospital and the
investigation report prepared by International Inspection and Testing
Corporation (INTECO), uniformly found Ryan’s cause of death as suicide;
and possible reason for the suicide was Ryan’s loss of direction or
overwhelming despair after his mother virtually pushed him to take a huge
loan to purchase a house.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
pieces of evidence aforementioned convincingly showed that Ryan’s death
was authored by Ryan himself.

NLRC rendered its decision denying Shirley’s appeal and affirming the
LA’s ruling.
Shirley elevated the case to CA contending that petitioners had not
presented substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Ryan indeed
committed suicide and insisting that his death was compensable. CA
reversed the NLRC decision. It did not give credence to INTECO’s Report as
well as the Medical Certificate of Death issued by the Ulsan City Hospital. CA
found no sufficient evidence that Ryan took his own life, hence it declared
Shirley entitled to death benefits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA is correct in reversing NLRC’s decision.

HELD:
The CA erred in reversing NLRC’s decision. The unbending precept
that must guide this Court in resolving a petition of the character elevated
before this Court is: “As claimant for death benefits, [the seafarer’s heir] has
the burden to prove by substantial evidence that [the seafarer’s] death is
work-related and that it transpired during the term of his employment
contract.

Section 20(A) and (D) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provide that:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

 A COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term

of his contract the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand
US dollars (US$50,000) x x x at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.

xxxx

D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of

any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer
resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of
his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that
such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable
to the seafarer.

The SC held that Ryan’s death was due to his own deliberate act and
deed. Indeed the Medical Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul
Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital, who attested that the direct cause of Ryan’s
death was “Intentional Self-Harm by [Hanging], Strangulation and
Suffocation.”; and the INTECO’s Report which contained information
involving the self-same death, must be deemed as substantial evidence of
that fact. Moreover, the SC was satisfied that the material facts set forth in
the Decisions of both the LA and the NLRC constitute substantial evidence
that Ryan took his own life, that he died by his own hands. “That [the
seafarer’s] death was a result of his willful act is a matter of defense. Thus,
petitioners [as employers] have the burden to prove this circumstance by
substantial evidence” which is the quantum of proof in labor cases.
SC believes that the above mentioned pieces of documentary evidence
upon which both the LA and the NLRC erected their conclusions that Ryan’s
death was directly attributable to his own deliberate act and will, in other
words, a suicide, constitute substantial evidence that Ryan was the author of
his own death. It is evident that the appellate tribunal had engaged in petty
nitpicking in pitting the findings made in the two documents. That quasi-
judicial agencies like the LA and the NLRC are not bound by the technical
rules of evidence that are observed by the regular courts of justice

Absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant
of benefits prayed for can be drawn, SC is left with no choice but to deny her
petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer.
The Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
 ENGR. OSCAR A. MARMETO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.
G.R. No. 213953
September 26, 2017

FACTS:

On January 21, 2013, Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People

Power (MPP) a proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Muntinlupa. The proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council
composed of 12 sectoral representatives. This sectoral council will act as a
legislative body that will directly propose, enact, approve, or reject any
ordinance through the power of initiative and referendum and the
appropriation of the amount of P200 million for the livelihood programs and
projects that would benefit the people of Muntinlupa City. Sanggunian
Panlungsod failed to act on the proposition within 30 days from its filing
which led Marmeto to file a petition for initiative with the same body to
invoke the power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). The SP wrote to him the proposal could not be acted upon because
the City’s budget for FY 2013 had already been enacted.
COMELEC issued Resolution setting aside Marmeto’s initiative petition
because the propositions therein were beyond the powers of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod to enact and were not in accordance with the provisions of
existing laws and rules.

Marmeto sought reconsideration of COMELEC’s Resolution by

contending that the sectoral council sought to be created would not
constitute as a legislative body separate from the Sanggunian Panlungsod.
He clarified that the sectoral council would merely act as the people’s
representative, which would facilitate the exercise of the people’s power of
initiative and referendum.

On the hopes thet the newly-elected members of SP will be more

sympathetic to Marmeto,he again filed the proposed ordinance with the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa with. Again, no favorable action was
done by the Sanggunian within 30 days from the filing of the proposal,
prompting Marmeto file a second initiative petition with the Office of the City
Election Officer. On July 22, 2014, The COMELEC issued a Resolution which
effectively dismissed Marmeto’s second initiative petition for lack of
budgetary allocation.

Disagreeing with the resolution, Marmeto filed the present certiorari

and mandamus petition contending that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed his second initiative petition. The COMELEC, on the other hand,
claims that the that the denial of Marmeto’s initiative petition was proper,
since the propositions therein were beyond the legal powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC is correct in denying the initiative petition of

Marmeto.
HELD:

Yes. Under the LGC, local legislative power within the city is to be
exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which shall be comprised of
elected district and sectoral representatives. The sectoral representatives,
moreover shall be limited to three members, coming from
enumerated/identified sectors. Significantly, nothing in the LGC allows the
creation of another local legislative body that will enact, approve, or reject
local laws either through the regular legislative process or through initiative
or referendum.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has quasi-judicial and

administrative functions to determine whether the propositions in an
initiative petition are within the powers of a concerned sanggunian to enact.
In Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections, 262
SCRA 492 (1996), the Court ruled that — while regular courts may take
jurisdiction over ‘approved propositions’ per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative
powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as
their form and language are concerned x x x and it may be added,
even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently
and clearly outside the ‘capacity of the local legislative body to
enact.’ x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The COMELEC’s power to review the substance of the propositions is
also implied in Section 12 of RA No. 6735, which gives this Court appellate
power to review the COMELEC’s “findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
the petition for initiative or referendum x x x.”
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and cannot be ordered
to conduct and supervise the procedure for the conduct of initiative
elections.
Petition is dismissed. COMELEC’s resolution is affirmed.