Assignment No.

RULE 1
General Provisions
Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or
criminal and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)

RULE 2
Cause of Action
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions,  basis of.  — Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of
action. (n)

Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. (n)

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)

RULE 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(2a)

Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a)
RULE 4
Venue of Actions
Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
(2[b]a)

RULE 6
Kinds Of Pleadings
Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (1a)

Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action.
The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)

RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading
Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not
be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or
upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading. (6a)

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 129
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise: 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The
court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice.

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; "(2) In
all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; "(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(4) In
all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(5) In all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations; "(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; "(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the
Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and "(8) In all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: "(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the
determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and "(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."

Civil Law
Branch of laws that treats the personal and family relations of a person, his properly, successional rights,
and the effects of obligations and contracts.
1. Kring vs Misouri
• Kring was indicted for murder in the first degree, committed January 4, 1875, to which he
pleaded not guilty.
• At the trial, Kring plead plead guilty to murder in the second degree, which was accepted by
the prosecuting attorney and the court, and on this plea he was sentenced to imprisonment
for 25 years.
• On appeal, Kring said that that he had an understanding with the prosecuting attorney that if he
would plead as he did his sentence should not exceed 10 years' imprisonment. The supreme
court reversed that judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings
• Because of his refusal to renew his plea of not guilty which had been withdrawn when he pleaded
guilty to murder in the second degree, the court, against his will, made an order setting aside
his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree, and ordered a general plea of not guilty to
be entered. On this plea he was tried by a jury and found guilty and sentenced to death,
which judgment was affirmed by the supreme court.
• By refusing to plead not guilty to murder in the first degree and to withdraw his plea of
guilty in the second degree, defendant raised the point that the proceedings under that plea,
namely, its acceptance by the prosecuting attorney and the court, and his conviction and
sentence under it, was an acquittal of the charge of murder in the first degree, and that he
could not be tried again for that offense.

no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the same crime.

• According to the court of appeals and in the supreme court, such was the law of the state of
Missouri at the time the homicide was committed. However, this was abrogated by section 23 of
article 2 of the constitution of Missouri, which took effect November 30, 1875. And for this
reason defendant could be tried for murder in the first degree, notwithstanding his conviction
and sentence for murder in the second degree. Hence, this petition.
• Counsel for the defendant said that under the old rule defendant could not be put on his
trial for murder in the first degree, and that he could not be affected by the change of the
constitutional provision, the crime having been committed while the old constitution was in
force.
• There is no question of the right of the state of Missouri, either by the fundamental law or
by an ordinary act of legislation, to abolish said rule, and that it is a valid law as to all
offenses committed after its enactment. The question here is, does it deprive the defendant of
any right of defense which the law gave him when the act was committed, so that as to that
offense it is ex post facto.
• as the new law was in force when the conviction on that plea was had, its effect as to future
trials in that case must be governed by that law. Such, however, is not the ground on which
the supreme court and the court of appeals placed their judgment. 'There is nothing,' say
they, 'in this; the change is a change, not in crimes, but in criminal procedure, and such
changes are not ex post facto.'

ex post facto
• These are all designed to operate as restraints on the general government, and most of
them for the protection of private rights of persons and property
 • signifying something done after, or arising from or to affect, another thing that was
committed before.'
• is one which operates upon a subject not liable to it at the time the law was made.'
• No application to acts concerning civil rights.
• four distinct classes of laws embraced by the clause: '(1) Every law that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action; (2) every law that aggravates the crime of makes it greater than it
was when committed; (3) every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than was annexed to the crime when committed; (4) every law that alters the
legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.'
• these that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules
of evidence for the purpose of conviction.'
• is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was
performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.
• any law which alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony
than the law requires at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
offender,'
• changed the rule of evidence under which the party was punished.
• any law passed after the commission of an offense, 'in relation to that offense, or its
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage,' is an ex post facto law

• A distinguished writer in America, define what is meant by procedure. The term procedure is so broad
in its signification that it is seldom employed in our books as a term of art. It includes in its meaning
whatever is embraced by the three technical terms, 'pleading,' 'evidence,' and 'practice." And in defining
'practice,' in this sense, he says: 'The word means those legal rules which direct the course of
proceeding to bring parties into the court and the course of the court after they are brought in;' and
'evidence,' he says, as part of procedure, 'signifies those rules of law whereby we determine what
testimony is to be admitted and what rejected in each case, and what is the weight to be given to the
testimony admitted.'

No one can be criminally punished in this country, except according to a law prescribed for his
government by the sovereign authority before the imputed offense was committed, and which
existed as a law at the time.'

Issue:
Whether or not Section 23 Article 2 of the constitution of Misouri is ex post facto law?

Held:
Yes.
Any law passed after the commission of an offense which, 'in relation to that offense, or its
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage,' is an ex post facto law.
The provision of the constitution of Missouri which denies to plaintiff in error the benefit which
the previous law gave him of acquittal of the charge of murder in the first degree, on
conviction of murder in the second degree, is, as to his case, an ex post facto law within the
meaning of the constitution of the United States.

In the case of Hartung v. People: 'No one can be criminally punished in this country, except
according to a law prescribed for his government by the sovereign authority before the imputed
offense was committed, and which existed as a law at the time.'

Judgment was reversed.

2. MRR vs Atty General

• Manila Railroad Company (plaintiff) is authorized by law to construct a railroad line from
Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac
• An action for condemnation of real property was instituted in CFI-Tarlac, for property alleged to be
situated in the Province of Tarlac
The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused a thorough search in the office
of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to
whom they belonged.
• After filing and serving the complaint the plaintiff, took possession of and occupied the lands,
building its line and putting the same in operation
• However, few days before the hearing set, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that a
motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the
land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the
Province of Tarlac.
• The trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. Hence, this
appeal, taken from said judgment of dismissal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of one province has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action by a
railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province?

Held:
Yes.
Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon
the Courts of First Instance of these Islands with respect to real estate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: . x
xx xxx x x x 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of
real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment,
except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.

It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the intention of the
Philippine Commission to give to the CFI the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over
the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend
upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal.
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Other provide for the procedure by
which that power or procedure authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the
powers of the Court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which
such powers are put into action. The one is the thing itself; the other is procedure procedure the
vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to the parties.
The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure procedure that
can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It
 is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the courts to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between
the parties before it.
The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It
does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the
court are made effective in just judgments.
The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and convenient
hearing to the parties with complete procedure justice between them as a result.
While a fair hearing is as essential as the substantive power of the court to
administer justice in the premises, and while the one is the natural result o the
other, it is different in its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began.
Plaintiff relies on Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon special laws relating to
the condemnation of lands railroad corporations.
SEC. 377. Venue of actions. — Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a
partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real
estate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to
real estate, or to establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or
actions for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the
province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated; actions against executors,
administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their official duties, and
actions for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the
estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for the
payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in which the will was
admitted to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or the guardian was
appointed. And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought in
any province where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or
be found, or in any province where the plaintiff, except in cases were other special
provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
resides within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain
title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is
brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine
Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the
plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or is found: Provided, that in an
action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon
the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law, the
action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all cases
process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is
 pending, to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all
orders and decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object to the venue
of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed
a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action
is brought, except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this
section relating to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators, and
guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.

Section 377 provides simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in
the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibition here is directed
against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is
commenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does
the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a
limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take
something from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its wording clearly deprives
the court of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights
which he did not have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject ,after, but
between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches
convenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to
have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its
object is to secure to him a convenient trial.
Venue is not jurisdictional as to subject matter and that defendant's rights in respect
thereto are such that they may be waived.
3. Tan vs Court of Appeals

• Involved in this case is a parcel of land, with an area of 34,829 square meters, more or less, situated in
Bunawan, Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-72067 under the name of the late Jaime C. Tan (Tan, for
short) married to Praxedes V. Tan.
• for a consideration of P59,200.00, Tan executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in
favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
• Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property but failed to redeem
the property until his death.
• Tans heirs filed a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint alleged
that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
• the Magdangals were able to have Tans title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their
names TCT No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later
substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.
• The RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr.,
• The Magdangals appealed the decision in the CA.
• CA affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. Copy of affirmatory judgment was each
received by the Magdangals and Tan, Jr. on October 5, 1995.
• The Clerk of this Court, on March 13, 1996, entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision
and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision has on
October 21, 1995 become final and executory.
• the Magdangals filed a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION alleging that
they did not appeal from the decesion of the CA , hence its judgment has become and executory on
October 20, 1995. And prayed that the title in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Tan be
consolidated and confirmed in their name, since Tan Jr has not exercised his option to pay them within
120days after the finality of the decision.
• In his opposition to the motion, Tan, Jr. alleged, that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the
Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the decision cannot be considered final and
executory.
• Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution, prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88. In a related move, on April 16, 1996, he
filed a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, advising the court a quo of his intention to redeem the
property in question and of the fact that, on such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the
repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original decision.
• The court decided in favor of Tan, and the deposit made by plaintiff (Tan) with the Clerk of Court is
considered full payment of the redemption price and the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deliver said
amount to herein. The Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-134470 in the name of Jose Magdangal
and Estrella Magdangal and, , to reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes
Valles Tan.
• the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration which was denied for being pro-forma and fatally
defective.

(1) the contract between the parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage;
and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the respondents Magdangal within 120 days after the
finality of this decision P 59,200.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2,
1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on October 5, 1995.
On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries
of Judgement the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of
Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on October 21, 1995 become final
and executory.
The Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession.
They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. They
reckoned that the said period began 15 days after October 5, 1995, the date when the finality
of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court commenced to run.
On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the
appellate court praying that it direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 19049-88 (first bullet).
On April 17, 1996, Tan deposited with the clerk of court the repurchase price of the lot plus interest.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of
Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996.
From 1991-1996, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution
shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed
by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and
executory.
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any
appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court
of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the original record or the record on
appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from
which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final
order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper writ for its
enforcement.

The SC issued Circular No. 24-94, which took effect on June 1, 1994, the amendment of Section 1
Rule of the ROC. It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases
cannot be promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the
court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery of said records.
 Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be
applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order
or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied
for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

The second paragraph is an innovation in response to complaints over the delay caused by the former
procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal,
with notice to the parties.
As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing party had
to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could
then move for the issuance of a writ of execution, which could sometimes be substantial,
especially if the court a quo is in a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing
party to delay or thwart actual execution.
Hence, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94.
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the
judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the
court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt
of the records from the appellate court.

The third paragraph is likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate courts
wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or
unreasonably refuses to act on the motion.
The appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. It applied the new rule retroactively.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 1 Rule 39 of the 1997 ROC can be given a retroactive application?
Held:
No.
Rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect, however, this accepts certain exceptions.
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied
to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural
laws. It has been held that a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. The general rule against giving
statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb
vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of
their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are
pending.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
However, The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work
injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.
Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect
in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the
right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date
of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the
rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would
result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot.
It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of
fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption.
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on
the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of
redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
4. Cabrera vs Ng

• Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner
and her husband Marionilo Cabrera (spouses Cabrera), alleging that the check issued to him by
the latter were all dishonored as the accounts from which they had been drawn were already closed.
• The RTC ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent (Ng) the amount of ₱2,569,074.00
plus legal interest, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and (4) litigation expenses.
• Spouses Cabrera filed with a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing on August
17, 2007, a copy of the motion for reconsideration was sent to Ng thru registered mail; and was
actually received by the Ng on August 21, 2007 (or 4days after the supposed scheduled hearing).
• However, the said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard as the new acting
presiding judge of the said court had just assumed office. The RTC issued a notice, which set
the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on September 25, 2007.
• Ng filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera, alleging
that the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper since it violated the three-day
notice requirement. He pointed out that the spouses Cabrera sent to him a copy of their motion
for reconsideration, which was set for hearing on August 17, 2007, via registered mail on
August 14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only on August 21, 2007 – four days after
the scheduled hearing thereon.
• Again, the scheduled hearing of the spouses motion for reconsideration on September 25, 2007
did not push through. Consequently, on September 26, 2007, the RTC issued another notice,
which set the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on October 26, 2007.
• RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
• The RTC pointed out that the spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that every motion required to be heard should be served by the movant
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of
hearing.
• On appeal, the CA denied the petition for certiorari. Motion for recon was also denied, hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affiring RTC’s decision, denying the motion for reconsideration of Spouses
Cabrera

Held:
Yes.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice
 of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the
filing of the motion.

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and
5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.
The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the
benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter
and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the
arguments interposed therein.
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon.Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to
reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.
Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the
adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard
through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice
requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are
substantially complied with.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
In Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, the Court ruled that: The
three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the
adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26,
2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had
passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21,
2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to
meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition
thereto on September 20, 2007. Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the
said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the
hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance
to argue his position.
Petition is granted.
5. Sebastian vs Morales

• Private respondents are the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate and owned
several agricultural landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City.
• Petitioner Damaso Sebastian is a tenant of one of the agricultural lots;
• Respondents filed an application with the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, for
retention of over five hectares of the late Guillermos landholdings, which includes the lot held by
Sebastian as tenant.
• DAR Regional Office granted private respondents application.
• Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the order before the DAR Regional Director.
• The DAR Regional Director found that the order of DARO was contrary to law for violating
Section 6 of RA No. 6657 (CARL) and its IRR. He issued a new order which instead allowed
private respondents (heirs) to retain a different parcel of land.
• Private respondents then appealed the order of the DAR Secretary.
• DAR Secretary set aside the order of the DAR Regional Director , and in lieu thereof issued a new
one the decretal portion of which reads which includes among others, the grant to the heirs of
Guillermo the right to retain 2.8032 hectare of land covered by TCT No. 8608.
• Sebastian’s filed for motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
• petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of Appeals. Without going into the merits, CA
dismissed the case after finding that petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal.
• Motion for recon of CA decision was also denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA has committed reversible error

Held:
No.

Petitioners admit that there was error in the remedy resorted to before the Court of
Appeals. But insisted, that a perusal of their initiatory pleading would show that it.
contained all the features and contents for a petition for review under Rule 43, Section 6
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, CA should have treated their special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 as a petition for review under Rule 43,
since dismissals based on technicalities are frowned upon. Petitioners contend that
procedural rules are but a means to an end and should be liberally construed to effect
substantial justice.

Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the
rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that
procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
 Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of
the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to show any compelling reason for not resorting
to the proper remedy. Instead, perusal of their pleadings before the CA, showed that they stoutly
and persistently insisted that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari was their correct remedy.
First, petitioners categorically invoked the jurisdiction of the CA to have the questioned orders of the
DAR Secretary declared null and void for having been issued and promulgated with grave abuse
of discretion . . . a mounting to lack of jurisdiction. Second, after the appellate court dismissed
their petition on the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for review, petitioners
continued to insist in their motion for reconsideration that under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, a
petition for certiorari is both adequate and proper. It was only as an afterthought that they
asked the appellate court to treat their special civil action for certiorari as a petition for review,
after a belated and grudging admission that their reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 was
an honest mistake or excusable error.
We agree with the appellate court that petitioners reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No.
6657 is not merely a mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous
appeal from the assailed Orders. For in relying solely on Section 54, petitioners patently ignored
or conveniently overlooked Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides
that:
“An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or
decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the
Supreme Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
of said decision.”

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, SC issued Circular 1-95 dated May 16, 1995
governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for
review, regardless of the nature of the question raised.
By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory
petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to
the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R.
SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal.
Petition is denied.
Petition for Review Special Civil Action for Certiorari (under Rule
65)

Mode of appeal Special extraordinary process for the correction of

errors of jurisdiction

seeks to correct errors of judgment committed proper if the tribunal, board, or officer
by the court, tribunal, or officer. exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
acted without or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in law.

errors of judgment are not proper subjects of

a special civil action for certiorari

Errors which may be reviewed by the SC, are

those of the CA

not the proper remedy to assail the denial by

the trial court of a motion to dismiss
6. Boston Equity Resources, Inc vs CA
• petitioner (Boston) filed a complaint for sum of money against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo
• Respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among
others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo.
• Petitioner Motion for Substitution (praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-
defendants)was granted by the trial court. And trial ensued.
• respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) failure
to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest(2) that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the
substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss the
case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
• The trial court denied the motion for having been filed out of time.
citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the ROC which states that:
"Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made x x x."

• Respondent’s motion for reconsiderationwas likewise denied on the ground that "defendants’
attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches".
• CA granted respondent petition for certiorari, on the ground that well-settled issue - jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. By timely
raising the issue on jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss x x x respondent is not estopped from
raising the question on jurisdiction.
• The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquires jurisdiction over Manuel Toledo

Held:
No.
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of
summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo. In the first place,
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant
is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person."
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead
even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.
The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal
to the person claiming it.
Failure to serve summons on one of named defendants who is already dead will not be a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have
been served with copies of the summons and complaints.
Petition is granted.
Aspects of jurisdiction:
(1) jurisdiction over the subject matter
- is referred to as the power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then
before it. The term also refers to the jurisdiction of the court over the class of cases to which a
particular case belongs
- subject matter also refers to the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen
- is conferred by law which may be either the Constitution or a statute
- Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law,
it cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged, or
diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the
courts
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case “is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
- lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised anytime, even first time on appeal,
subect to the principle of estoppel by laches
- aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel
by laches (parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily)

(2) jurisdiction over the parties

- is the legal power of the court to render a personal judgment against a party to an
action or proceeding
- Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his filing of the complaint or petition.
- Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons

(3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case

- is the power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the pleadings of the parties
- An issue is a disputed point or question to which parties to an action have narrowed
down their several allega tions and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a decision
- jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and determined by the pleadings of the parties;
stipulation of the parties; waiver or failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a matter not
raised in the pleadings
(4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation
- Res in civil law is a ‘thing,’ an ‘object.’ It means everything that may form an object of
rights in opposition to ‘persona’ which is the subject of rights. It includes an object,
subjectmatter or status
- refers to the court’s juris diction over the thing or the property which is the subject of
the action
- Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired by the court by placing the property or thing
under its custody (custodia legis) or constructive seizure.
7. Pantranco North Express, Inc vs Standard Insurance Co, Inc.
• A Pantranco bus driven by petitioner, Alexander Buncan, overtook and hit a passenger jeepney driven
by Crispin Gicale, and owned by his mother Martina Gicale.
• The incident was reported to the Police Station and Standard Insurance Co., Inc., insurer of the
jeepney.
• The total cost of the repair was P 21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P 8,000.00, the
balance of P 13,415.00 shouldered by Martina Gicale.
• A complaint for sum of money was filed against Pantranco for their refusal to reimbuurse Standard and
Marina.
• petitioners specifically denied the allegations and contends that it is the MTC, not the RTC, which
has jurisdiction over the case.
• The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents Standard and Martina, and ordered Pantranco to
pay P8,000 and P13,415 to Standard and Marina respectively; including interest, attorneys fees and
cost of suit.
• On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
• Motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes.
The appellants (Pantranco) argue that appellee Gicales claim of P13,415.00 and appellee
insurance companys claim of P 8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19,
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional
amount.
In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P 20,000.00 which at the
time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the RTC.

Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of
action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no
common questions of law and fact common to both parties.
Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of
law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but
the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.
 Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to
the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the
plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the
Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting
the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents,
consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.

Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provide presupposes that the different causes of action
which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and
that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents claims shall be
lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the said provision. This paragraph embodies
the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others,
that where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions

Petition is denied.
8. Tijam vs Sibonghanoy

• This is a suit for collection of money against (Magdaleno Sibonghanoy) in the sum of P1,908.00
exclusive of interest, instituted in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948.
• A writ of attachment was issued against defendants’ properties. This was subsequently discharged
under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc.
• After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs (spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog)
• Plaintiff moved for issuance of writ of execution against the Surety was denied on the ground solely
that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Hence,
necessary demand was made.
• Upon the suretys failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion, for issuance of writ of
execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957.
• During the hearing on the motion, the Court, upon motion of the Surety’s counsel, granted the latter a
period of five days within which to answer the motion.
• Upon Surety’s failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the
corresponding writ was issued.
• A motion to quash the writ of execution was filed on the ground that the same was issued without the
required summary hearing provided for inSection 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court This motion was
denied. And its motion for recon was also denied.
• the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its
motion for recon. The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the
writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of
Rule 59, which reads:
SECTION 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — if the execution
be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to
the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on
such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment,
which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing
in the same action.

• CA affirned the orders appealed from.

• The CA granted the Surety’s motion for extention of time to file MR. However, instead of filing MR,
Surety filed a motion to dismiss, alleging CFI lack of jurisdiction.
• The CAresolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the CFI has jurisidiction over the case.

Held:
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the CFI of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced.
True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case we are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case
with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
The court frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the
sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were We to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Summary hearing is ‘not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted’. It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved ‘with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings’. What is essential is
that ‘the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged
upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties’.;
and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the
court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs’ motion for execution and of the date
when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety’s counsel, was present in court
when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four
days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or
objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
10. Calimlim vs Ramirez

• Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent
Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali. After said judgment became final, a writ of
execution was issued. The Notice of Levy on a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 9138 registered
in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy
was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel
Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the
Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that
the sale referred only to the rights and interest of Manuel Magali.
• However, the final Deed of Sale erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to
"the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the
rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of
Sale was annotated at the back of said title.
• Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court to surrender the said TCT9138.
• Based on approved motion of Independent Mercantile Corporation, TCT9138 was cancelled and a new
titile in the name of the corporation was issued, identified as TCT68568.
• petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent
Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. The petition
was dismissed.
• Instead of filing an appeal to the dismissal of the petition, Calimlim filed a complaint praying for
cancellation of conveyances and sales with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138.
Named as defendant in said civil case was private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed
to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Ramos, however failed to
obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
• Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss the case on the ground that the same is barred by prior
judgement or by statute of limitations.
• The court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. Motion For
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Calimlim was estopped from asserting ownership ovet the property.

Held:
No.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the Calimli in LRC for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No.
SCC-180.
In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot
operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
The petition filed by petitioners in LRC No 39492 was an apparent invocation of the
authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court, that reliance was apparently
placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of
this Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited
and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues
pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real
property.
Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration court to order the
cancellation, alteration or amendment of a certificate of title but withdraws from the
Court the power to pass upon any question concerning ownership of the registered
property, or any incident where the issues involved have become controversial.

The issues raised by the petitioners in their petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the
ownership or title over the property covered thereby. The petition raised a highly controversial
matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.

It is an error on the part of the respondent judge to uphold the view that the petitioners are
deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court, they being the ones
who invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein.
We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of
jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15)
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches.

The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned
that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and
registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a
petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had
to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of
general jurisdiction.

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which
was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the
attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of
the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be
asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made
with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth
of the matter. The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which
could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding.
 The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding
in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once
be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or
of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party
taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall
entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in
the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years
from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
11. Mangaliag vs Pastoral

• Private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano.
• It was alleged that a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven by her employee,
petitioner Solano, sideswiped the tricycle ridden by private respondent.
• Serquina sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a fractured nose and suffers from severe
depression. He prayed that the he be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages.
• petitioners, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim, alleging that the MTC has jurisdiction over the case since the principal
amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction.
• The RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes.

Petitioners contention
• that the specification in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court signifies that the courts jurisdiction must be tested
solely by the amount of that damage which is principally and primarily demanded, and not the
totality of all the damages sought to be recovered.
• That the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages,
excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys
fee, etc.
• Private respondents claim for actual damages in the amount of P71,392.00 is the principal and
primary demand, the same being the direct result of the alleged negligence of petitioners,
while the moral damages for P500,000.00 and attorneys fee, being the consequent effects
thereof, may prosper only upon a prior finding by the court of the existence of petitioners
negligence that caused the actual damages. Considering that the amount of actual damages
claimed does not exceed P200,000.00, which was then the jurisdictional amount of the MTC,
the jurisdiction over the case clearly pertains to the MTC, and not to the RTC.
• Jurisdiction may be raised anytime, even after judgment, but before it is barred by laches or
estoppel. They submit that they seasonably presented the objection to the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction, i.e., during the trial stage where no decision had as yet been rendered, must less
one unfavorable to them.

Private respondent’s contention

• In an action for recovery of damages arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages
is not merely an incidental or consequential claim but must be considered in the amount of
demand which will determine the courts jurisdiction.
• Private respondent also contends that, being incapable of pecuniary computation, the amount of
moral damages that he may be awarded depends on the sound discretion of the trial court,
not restrained by the limitation of the jurisdictional amount.
• that it is too late in the day for petitioners to question the jurisdiction of the RTC since they
are estopped from invoking this ground. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial
proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally
improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to this Court is
highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy
of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. This Court, as a rule, will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. In the present
case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of
paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid
further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction in the first instance.

The Court shall deal first on the question of estoppel.

Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by
estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an
exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In
Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact,
as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect
to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be
absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. Instead, the
general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
 Section 1 of R.A 7691, provides that where the amount of the demand in civil cases
exceeds P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in the RTC.
Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint does not
exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial
Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The jurisdictional amount was increased to
P200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 and
Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court specified the
guidelines in the implementation of R.A.No. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as

merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate
and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a
person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are
due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a
separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be
included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 09-94.

Petition for certiorari was dismissed.

12. Frianela vs Banayad

• Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, Frianela , who was named as
devisee in the will, filed before the RTC, for the allowance of the holographic will of the
decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left to her the various
properties.
• a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two
other holographic wills of the decedent.
• the RTC, declared that the second holographic will as having revoked the first will, allowing
Banayad, and appointing him as administrator of Moisess estate.
• On appeal, the CA, modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that the second
holographic will had only revoked the first will insofar as the testamentary disposition of
Moisess real property was concerned.
• With the denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case before us via
the instant petition.
• However, The Court notes that the trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the
case without first determining whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and
decide. On appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue on the jurisdictional
competence of the trial court over the said case.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
None.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.
Jurisdiction is moreover determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or
petition.
In this case, Sections 19 and 33 of BP 129 were in force, thus:
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00);
xxxx
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
demand does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but
inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the
 same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; and x x x x

The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate
proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in the
complaint or petition to be filed. Significantly, in this case, the original petition does not
contain a statement of the gross value of the estate of Moises. Thus, it cannot be determined
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.

Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied. First,
because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has
been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa,
the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to
the factual milieu in Tijam.

In Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the execution
stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts denial of the suretys motion to quash
the writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review.
Here, the trial courts assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings has been discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case,
not during the execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule
laid down in Tijam cannot apply. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.
13. Briones vs CA

• Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 160689.
• His sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had
already been issued in favor of Cash Asia.
• Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan
agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage covering the subject property in favor of Cash Asia
in order to obtain a loan in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00 and (b) since the said loan was left
unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property.
• Briones claimed that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and
working in Vietnam since October 31, 2007.
• Essentially, Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be
forged.
• For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss, praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
• Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that "all legal actions
arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only
be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City." It contended
that all actions arising out of the subject contracts may only be exclusively brought in the
courts of Makati City, and as such, Briones’s complaint should be dismissed for having been
filed in the City of Manila.
• Briones filed an opposition, that he should not be covered by the venue stipulation in the
subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that his signatures on the
said contracts were forgeries.
• the RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. MR was also denied.
• the CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Briones’s complaint The CA
concluded that Briones’s complaint should have been dismissed outright on the ground of
improper venue, this, notwithstanding Briones’s claim of forgery.
• Briones MR was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for improper
venue.

Held:
Yes. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
 Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial
court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
SEC. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of the defendants does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may
be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where
the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the
action on the exclusive venue thereof.

The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of
personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.33
instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue.

The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as
qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in
the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in
that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively,"
"waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Further, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the
terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus,
the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Because, it
would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue
stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such
stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in
nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the
courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones' s complaint directly assails
the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this
circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation,
as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence,
pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in
the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
Assignment No. 2

RULE 10
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply,
at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (2a)
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. (3a)

RULE 14
Summons
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him. (7a)
Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. (8a)
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. (13a)
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)
1. PNB vs Spouses Manalo

• Spouses Manalo failed to settle their account with PNB despite demand. Hence, PNB
foreclosed the mortgage, and was awarded as the highest bidder on the foreclosure sale.
• After more than a year after the Certificate of Sale had been issued to PNB,
Spouses Manalo instituted an action for the nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings and damages.
• Spouses Manalo alleged that they have obtained a 1M loan from certain Benito Tan,
with the understanding that the proceeds will be used to update their loan and that their
loan will be restructured and converted into a long term loan.
• PNB and its BM contends that the 1M was credited to the account of the Spouses; they
did not make any assurances on the restructuring and conversion of the loan; PNB’s
right to foreclose the mortgage had been clear especially because the Spouses
Manalo had not assailed the validity of the loans and of the mortgage; and that
the Spouses Manalo did not allege having fully paid their indebtedness
• During pre-trial, Spouses modified their position. They claimed that the loan
document executed were contracts of adhesion. The Spouses also questioned the
interest rates and penalty charges imposed for being iniquitous, unconscionable and
therefore likewise void. PNB did not interpose any objections on these matters.
• The RTC ruled in favor of PNB. The Spouses "contract of adhesion" argument was
unfounded because they had still accepted the terms and conditions of their
credit agreement with PNB and had exerted efforts to pay their obligation; that
the Spouses were now estopped from questioning the interest rates unilaterally imposed
by PNB because they had paid at those rates for three years without protest; and
that their allegation about PNB violating the notice and publication requirements
during the foreclosure proceedings was untenable because personal notice to the
mortgagee was not required under Act No. 3135.
• Spouses Manalo appealed to the CA.
• the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC insofar as it upheld the validity of
the foreclosure proceedings initiated by PNB, but modified the Spouses Manalo’s
liability for interest.
• the CA denied the Spouses Manalo’s MR and PNB’s Partial MR.
• PNB raises the issue of WON the CA erred in nullifying the interest rates, despite that
fact that it was only raised for the first time on appeal by the Spouses, that it was never
part of their complaint, was excluded as an issue on pre-trial and worse, there was no
formally offered pertaining to the same during trial.

Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Manalo raised the issue of interest only for the first time on
appeal.
Held:
No. Contrary to PNB’s argument, the validity of interest rates and of the increases,
and on the lack of mutuality between the parties were not raised by the Spouses
Manalo’s for the first time on appeal. Rather, the issues were impliedly raised
during the trial itself, and PNB’s lack of vigilance in voicing out a timely objection
made that possible. It appears that Enrique Manalo’s Judicial Affidavit introduced
the issues of the validity of the interest rates and the increases, and the lack of
mutuality between the parties.

PNB cross-examined Enrique Manalo upon his Judicial Affidavit. There is no

showing that PNB raised any objection in the course of the cross examination.

The RTC rightly passed upon such issues in deciding the case, and its having done so
was in total accord with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
– When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation
of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to
be made.

The RTC did not need to direct the amendment of the complaint by the Spouses
Manalo. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically declares that the
"failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

In the case of Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay,

Inc.: xxx When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied
consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment
may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be considered as if
they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied, consent to the evidence
thus presented when the adverse party fails to object thereto."
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before
it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as
no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party.

There is also no merit in PNB’s contention that the CA should not have considered
and ruled on the issue of the validity of the interest rates because the Judicial
Affidavit of Enrique Manalo had not been offered to prove the same but only "for
the purpose of identifying his affidavit." Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court is
applicable in two situations. The first is when evidence is introduced on an issue
not alleged in the pleadings and no objection is interposed by the adverse party.
The second is when evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the pleadings
but an objection is raised against the offer. This case comes under the first
situation. Enrique Manalo’s Judicial Affidavit would introduce the very issues that
PNB is now assailing. The validity of the interest rates and their increases, and
the lack of mutuality between the parties were issues validly raised in the
RTC, giving the Spouses Manalo every right to raise them in their appeal to
the CA. PNB’s contention was based on its wrong appreciation of what transpired
during the trial. It is also interesting to note that PNB did not itself assail the
RTC’s ruling on the issues obviously because the RTC had decided in its favor.
2. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., vs Benito

• Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal
office at Davao City and with branch offices at Paranaque, Metro Manila and
Cagayan de Oro City.
• Petitioner and private respondent (Imperial Development Corporation) executed a
Deed of Sale with Development Agreement, where Villarosa agreed to develop
certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to
the Imperial into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing
units.
• Imperial filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
Villarosa allegedly for its failure to comply with its contractual obligation.
• Summons, together with the complaint, were served to Villarosa’s CDO Branch
Manager.
• Defendant (Villarosa) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper service of
summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Because
the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at
CDO who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.
• Meanwhile, Imperial filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for its failure
to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly of the summons and the complaint,
as shown in the Sheriffs Return.
• Further, Imperial filed an Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss alleging that
the records show that defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell
Sabulbero actually received the summons ; that defendant has transferred its
office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at Villa
Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring
home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
• the trial court issued an Order denying defendants Motion to Dismiss as well as
plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. The trial court stated that
since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the
corporation through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial
compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
• Petitioner (Villarosa) contends that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not
liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons
enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that
the word manager was changed to general manager, secretary to corporate secretary,
and excluding therefrom agent and director. While defendant, contends that the
changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics.
• MR was also denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/petitioner
(Villarosa)

Held:
No. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: When
the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

We agree with petitioner’s contention that the enumeration of persons to whom

summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on
statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the
Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project
manager assistant manager; ordinary clerk of a corporation; a corporations; private
secretary of corporate executives counsel; retained; officials who had charge or
control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager; or
the corporations Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. In these cases, these
persons were considered as agent within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably,
under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons
for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states
general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary;
and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

Further, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of
Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, the Court held: A strict compliance
with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation.
The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient. XXX The purpose is to render it reasonably certain
that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other
words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x.

The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a
domestic corporation.

Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13

of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service
upon a general manager of a firms branch office has been held as improper as
summons should have been served at the firms principal office. We rule that the
service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at
Davao City is improper.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed
by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be
deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules.
Section 20 now provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance. The emplacement of this rule clearly
underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take
cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any
proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.
RTC is declared without jurisidiction.
3. Sablas vs Sablas

• The case traces its roots to a complaint for judicial partition, inventory and
accounting filed by respondents Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S. Sablas
against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S. Sablas
• Few days upon service of summons and copy of complaint, Petitioner filed a motion
for extension of time to file their answer (11/5/99) However, they were able to
file it only on November 8, 1999. While the trial court observed that the answer
was filed out of time, it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare
petitioner spouses in default was filed.
• respondents motion to declare petitioner spouses in default was denied by the trial
court. MR was also denied. Thereafter, they challenged order in the Court of
Appeals alleging that the admission of the answer by the trial court was contrary
to the rules of procedure and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
• The appellate court ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
because, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules a Court, the trial court had
no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file
their answer on or before November 5, 1999. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition.
• Aggrieved, petitioner spouses (defendants in the trial court) assail the July 17,
2000 decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner spouses contend that the Court
of Appeals decision was not in accord with the rules of procedure as it
misconstrued Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and was in contravention
of jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court should have declared the
petitioner in default.

Held:
Yes. An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
party.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. x x x.
 The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such
motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer
the complaint within the reglementary period to ``declare a defendant in default.
The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default as the rules
leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court
should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the claiming party.
Also, where there is no declaration of default, answer may be admitted even if filed
out of time. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the
defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the
reglementary period for filing the answer expires. Thus, the appellate court erred
when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses
in default when they failed to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
Lastly, where answer has been filed, there can be no declaration of default anymore.
Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in denying the
subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner spouses in default.
The policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried on the merits as
much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best
decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims,
present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. The parties are
thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are
subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual
findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.
Assignment No. 3

RULE 15
Motions
Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.

RULE 16
Motion to Dismiss
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of
the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

Section 4. Time to plead. — If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer
within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the
time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from his
receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file
his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended
pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.

RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff.  — A complaint may be dismissed by the
plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the
same claim.

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.  — Except as provided in the preceding

section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of
the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim
has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or
any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

Failure to state a cause of action

> refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading (no coa is stated in the
pleading)
> Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule16 of the Rules
of Court
> remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading

lack of cause of action

> insufficiency of the factual or legal basis for the action
> dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by
the plaintiff
> remedy is to demur to the evidence

essential elements of a cause of action

(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
(b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and
(c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant tothe
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages

doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements

(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3) the judgment must be on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action

There is forum shopping when there exist:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions,
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other

Fresh period rule

by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final
order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity
of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought.
Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
Assignment No. 4
1. Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.—First and foremost, the right to appeal
is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period
to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.—Based on the
foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect
to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action.
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration to
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules.—To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

Held:
The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended,
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions
of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus
cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from.
xxx

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
 Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on
the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses
an action.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably

2. St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC
Labor Law; Judicial Review; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; The Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune
to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted
and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.—Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at
bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the
NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes
introduced, over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call
for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Statutes; The excepting clause provided for in paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No.
129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, contradicts what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
from decisions of the NLRC.—It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and
the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, “those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.” This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said
all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed,
the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.—The same
exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can,
of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because
of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other
court for that matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A.
No. 7902 persuades the Court that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said
Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein.—A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of
R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act
or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for
the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn
from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the
Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The Court is of the considered opinion that
ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC;
Appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts.—The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and
still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal” in relation
thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to
indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Hierarchy of Courts; All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P.
No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are inter preted and hereby declared to mean
and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65—consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals.—While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the
NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped
for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
3. Relampagos vs. Comelec

In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba were candidates for
Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of
twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC
which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC.
The petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial
court granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
execution which was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid
order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. On 9 February
1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored
to her position as Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the
resolution, the petitioner filed this special civil action. 

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? 

Held: The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not been repealed by
the Omnibus Election Code, held that the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 

Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner’s motion for
execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be
filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed
only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. 

COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

Election Law; Commission on Elections; The authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by the Constitution
or by law.—This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by the Constitution
or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction,
it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, unlike in the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of
Article VIII.

Same; Same; Same; In Garcia and Uy, and later, in Veloria, the Court ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or
statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.—As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, and later, in Veloria, this Court
ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.—By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not
evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them
with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts
thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. This being the case, the Court
painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if
the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter. It found none. In the face of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now
hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested
with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases, remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; COMELEC correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.—Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed
before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P.
Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43
of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July
1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994,
the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC.
Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could
no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the
appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
The Doctrine of Residual Jurisdiction

- The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still
retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF RESIDUAL POWERS?

 
- They  are  powers  which  the  trial  court  retains  even  after  the perfection of the appeal.
• For  example:  X  was  charged  and  convicted  with  a  crime  so  he filed a notice of
appeal.  If he wants to put up bail, where should he file his application?  If the records of the case have
not been transmitted to the appellate court, X can file the application with the trial court.  However, once
the records have been transmitted to the appellate court, the trial court loses his jurisdiction over the bail
application.

IS THE RULE ABSOLUTE? 

- No,  if  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  upgraded  the  offense  from non-bailable  to 
bailable,  the  application  should  be  filed  with  and could only be resolved by the appellate court.

Residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to
him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (Italics
supplied)
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.[13] In either instance, the trial court
still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
Assignment No. 5
1. De Pedro vs Romasan
• Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a) the
cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the
remedy. Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide
cases of a general class. It is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is not acquired through
administrative issuances or court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver, or silence. Any
decision by a court, without a law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is void. Jurisdiction over the thing
or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated. The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court’s custody. Jurisdiction over
the parties refers to the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. The courts
acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their complaints or petitions. Over
the persons of defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or
through their voluntary submission. Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction when
he or she participates in the trial despite improper service of summons.
• The relation of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the standard
of evidence is relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla, 574 SCRA 831 (2008): The cardinal precept is
that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
• An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an action “against a person on the
basis of his personal liability,” but an action that subjects a person’s interest over a property to a burden.
The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens petitioner’s interest in the property. Petitioner is
entitled to due process with respect to that interest. The court does not have competence or authority to
proceed with an action for annulment of certificate of title without giving the person, in whose name the
certificate was issued all the opportunities to be heard.
• Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered
without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding
for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res,
but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority and competence.
• Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons. Thus, as a rule, summons must
be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant
or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her. If the defendant or
respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be effected upon its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or she
may be found.
• Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through other modes
will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through personal service. Thus,
the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant
or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time. Substituted service is effected “(a) by leaving
 copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.”
• Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the defendant or
respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry.” It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons
personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.
• Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or
respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.

• The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights. The
judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had petitioner
learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper.
After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.
Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action for
annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground. Rule
37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a new trial based on the
following causes: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
• A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character. It is independent of the
case and is “allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.” An
action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court judgments when resort to
other remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner. Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides: Section 1. Coverage.—This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. An action for annulment of judgment may be based on only two grounds:
1) extrinsic fraud; and 2) lack of jurisdiction.
• Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate the court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction — including defective service of summons — are causes for an action for
annulment of judgments. However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of
judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.” Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always
readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.
• Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and
lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by
abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this court
 tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of the cases that an action for
annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed.
• An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the
judgment decree of title. In Goco v. Court of Appeals, 617 SCRA 397 (2010), this court said that “[a]n
action for annulment of certificates of title to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land
covered by a Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s
true owner.” Hence, there was no violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when petitioner’s
title was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court.
• The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
2. People vs Bitanga
• Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the
following: Section 1. Coverage.—This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not
permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof,
provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.—The provisions of Rules
42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
• A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed
of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered by
a court lacking jurisdiction or through proceedings attended by extrinsic fraud. When the ground invoked is
extrinsic fraud, annulment of judgment must be sought within four years from discovery of the fraud, which
fact should be alleged and proven. In addition, the particular acts or omissions constituting extrinsic fraud
must be clearly established. Extrinsic or collateral fraud is trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon
the unsuccessful party, which prevents the latter from fully proving his case. It affects not the judgment
itself but the manner in which said judgment is obtained.
• Extrinsic fraud is that perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party’s own counsel. As a
general rule, counsel’s ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment, for the latter’s management of the
case binds his client. The rationale behind this rule is that, once retained, counsel holds the implied
authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of
the suit in behalf of his client, and any act performed by said counsel within the scope of such authority is,
in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself. There is an exception to the foregoing rule,
and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client’s interest and
denied him his day in court. For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not
be accompanied by his client’s own negligence or malice. Clients have the duty to be vigilant of their
interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case. Failing in this duty, they suffer
whatever adverse judgment is rendered against them.
• In the present case, the acts and omissions attributed to counsel amounted to negligence only, which cannot
be considered extrinsic fraud. Moreover, said counsel’s negligence was caused by Bitanga’s act of jumping
bail. There appears to be no issue about how Atty. Razon represented Bitanga during the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution. The CA itself noted that during said period, Atty. Razon conducted the cross-
examination and recross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution.
3. Galang vs CA
• Rule 47 on annulment of judgments is a new provision under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the
remedy has long been given imprimatur by the courts. It covers only the judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts and not those of the SEC. In fact, Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, only vests in the Court of Appeals “exclusive jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.”
• An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be resorted to as an
instrument to delay a final and executory judgment has prompted safeguards to be put in place in order to
avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, among other things, the right to have a final judgment annulled must be
expressly granted by law.
• Any alleged irregular implementation of a writ of execution, however, cannot be corrected through the
equitable relief of annulment of judgment. The purpose of annulment of judgment is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. The remedy to correct any alleged
irregular implementation of the writ of execution thus lies elsewhere. In Canlas v. Court of Appeals, we stated
that “while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of
the writ.” As a rule, “irregular execution” means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision
executed.