GARCIA v.

DRILON

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts: On March 23, 2006, the private respondent filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order against the petitioner pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. As a result of
the said petition, the regional trial court issued a temporary protection order against the petitioner. The
petitioner is now questioning the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection
and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Issue: Whether or not R.A 9262 is in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
constitution and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials?
 Held: No. First, RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws since equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Second, R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution especially on the issuance of the protection order. The purpose of the
protection order is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. Last, there is no
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials since the preliminary investigation conducted
by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function and that the same holds true with
the issuance of a barangay protection order.

GARCIA vs DRILONG.R. No. 179267June 25, 2013

Equal Protection

Doctrine

the VAWC law is constitutional because there is a substantial distinction between men andwomen as
well as children

!AC"#

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against womenand their
children VAWC! "er"etrated b# women$s intimate "artners% i.e% husband& former husband& or an#
"erson who has or had a se'ual or dating relationshi"% or with whom the womanhas a common child.
(he law "rovides for "rotection orders from the baranga# and the courts to"revent the commission of
further acts of VAWC& and outlines the duties and res"onsibilities of baranga# officials% law enforcers%
"rosecutors and court "ersonnel% social workers% health care"roviders% and other local government
officials in res"onding to com"laints of VAWC or re)uestsfor assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionalit# of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
e)ual "rotection and due "rocess clauses% and an undue delegation of *udicial "ower tobaranga#
officials.
$AC%GRO&ND

+etitioner ,esus -arcia husband! a""ears to have inflicted violence against "rivate res"ondent wife and
daughter!. +etitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. e callousl#boasted about their
se'ual relations to the household hel". is infidelit# emotionall# wounded"rivate res"ondent. (heir
)uarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. +etitioner alsounconscionabl# beat u" their daughter%
,o/ann% whom he blamed for s)uealing on him.

All these drove res"ondent Rosalie -arcia wife! to des"air causing her to attem"t suicide on0ecember
1 % 2334 b# slitting her wrist. 5nstead of taking her to the hos"ital% "etitioner left thehouse. e
never visited her when she was confined for seven ! da#s. e even told his mother/in/law that
res"ondent should *ust acce"t his e'tramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his"aramour and has
not sired a child with her.

(he "rivate res"ondent was determined to se"arate from "etitioner. ut she was afraid he wouldtake
awa# their children and de"rive her of financial su""ort. e warned her that if she "ursuedlegal battle%
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair% heforbade her to
hold office. (his de"rived her of access to full information about their businesses.

(hus% the R(C found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violenceagainst
res"ondent and her children and issued a series of (em"orar# +rotection 7rders (+7!ordering
"etitioner% among other things% to surrender all his firearms including a .988 caliber firearm and a
Walther ++ .

US v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL., GR No. 12592, 1918-03-08

Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman

Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
asking for his removal.

The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges.

The judge of first instance found the first count... not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of
this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby,
recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of
the peace of

Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case
be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."

Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial... the judge of first instance granted the
motion and reopened the hearing;

"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the
said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano

The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S.
Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary... imprisonment in case of insolvency.

"1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.
"2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection inadvertently interposed
by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.

"3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introduction in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

"4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.

"5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the defendants to show
that the alleged libelous statements were true and free from malice.

"6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.

"7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt This is
especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."

Issues:

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of
a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga.

Ruling:

Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution, further, although the charges are probably not
true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the... petitioners.

Good faith surrounded their action.

Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent.

The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal were justifiable. In no... way did they abuse the privilege.

We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather... commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.

Principles:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public...
affairs.

Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.

criticism does not authorize defamation.

Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
good.

Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the

Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment.

If the people... cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled.

it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged...
misconduct.

Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified
privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.

A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the chLracter or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or
a board having some interest or duty in the matter.

Even when the... statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual.

But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a... self-seeking motive is destructive.

The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms.

A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of

malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.

As a general rule... words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or
incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we
do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press,... but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged

Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged.

406United States vs. Bustos [GR L-12592, 8 March 1918]

First Division, Malcolm (J): 5 concur

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, the
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien,
and 5 individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield & O'Brien
submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition
transmitted by these attorneys was signed by 34 citizens. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to
the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action and
report. The Honorable Percy M. Moir, recommended to the Governor-General that Punzalan be
removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga,
and ordered that the proceedings had in the case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary. Later the
justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and
reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president
and is councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of
prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for
personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan
and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-
General. On 12 October 1916, Felipe Bustos, et. al. (the petitioners against Punzalan) were charged for
libel. The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan
S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
and 1/32 of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the
defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, filed on 16 December 1916, a
motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by then
counsel for the defendants

to the admission of the document consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court
denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed.

Issue: Whether the intemperate allegations set forth in the information against the public official may
be the basis of a libel case against the petitioning citizens.

Held: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These
paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with
it all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. The interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile
and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized
defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended
over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so
largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in
whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." The right to assemble and
petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to
qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or
a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if
there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
of

privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an
honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons
have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believe he is acting
in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the
person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person
through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. Hence, the Court find the defendants
entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
guaranties in our bill of rights.

US Vs. Bustos Case Digest

US Vs. Bustos

37 Phil. 731

G.R. L-12592

March 8, 1918

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from
persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free
speech and free press.

Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a
duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate
or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to
inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for
the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it
is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.
CASE DIGEST : Estrada Vs Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related
either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that
she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor
testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died
in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in
good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and
immoral conduct."

HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a

different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to
formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct
or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the
programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court,
showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist -
Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An accommodationist holds
that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict
neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the
accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second,
the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions
from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt
hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way
to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different
effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand,
and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely
using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure
the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of
the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.

this live-in arrangement. Escritor is the court interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. She was
charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Section 46 (b) (5) of
the Revised Administrative Code.

Escritor was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999. She started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was
still alive but living with another woman. They have a son. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in conformity with their religious
beliefs and has the approval of her congregation, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society.

Once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases and the
couple should legalize their union. Insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral
about the conjugal arrangement and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. Ministers from her
congregation testified on the authenticity of this practice and that this is to make the “union” of their
members under such circumstances “honorable before God and men.”

The court could not rule on the issue of whether or not Escritor was to be held administratively
liable so the case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and ordered the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Escritor’s religious belief and practice should warrant her claim of religious
freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution.

HELD:

The administrative complaint was dismissed. The OSG categorically concedes that the sincerity
and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt. Her request to
be exempt from attending the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses contrary belief
and practice was duly noted. The OSG failed to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests” which could limit or override Escritor’s fundamental right to religious freedom.

In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor’s conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994,
during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. This was dismissed.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and
actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these
laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.

Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.

Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is
either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language,
while rather awkward, is still plain enough

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than
the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing
the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of
policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill
re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair
declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659
has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in
R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the
heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A.
No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower
House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying
certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in
the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the
foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental,
there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the
death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress
define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death,
only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely
applied.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to
violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications
and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-
political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and
altogether eradicated.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such
crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes."

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam

Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

Date: February 7, 1997

Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.

The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that
can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
(FLAG)

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant

aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for
lack of merit.

Ratio:

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however,
that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures
by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S.
Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the
intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and
sentencing juries.

accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for
the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which
does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime,
rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:

first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death
penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;

Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine
experience and in the context of our own culture.

second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the
death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a
premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth".

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal
system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the
enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with
homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.

People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society

what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was
committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the
law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness
and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.

The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is
obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs.

Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized
a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry

they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does
injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity
to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always
an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

JULY 8, 2014 / ARDYESGUERRA

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same
and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.

The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.

When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.

Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.

Corpuz argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date
when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only
original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was
committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal;
it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect
to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed
by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies,
for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
Pp v Ferrer Digest 1972

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. SIMEON. FERRER (act), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias
Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p

Facts of the Case:

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The abovenamed
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose
of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control
and domination of an alien power.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, under the decision of Hon. Simeon Ferrer in
its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused.

The Government appealed.

Issue: Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law a bill of
attainder

Held:

No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination

of guilt.
 In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party
must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's
unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal
objectives.

Pp v Ferrer Digest 1972

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

Pp v Diaz Conde Digest 1922

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants-appellants.

Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.

Attorney-General Villareal for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Facts of the Case:

On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde
and Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated themselves to pay the defendants 5% per
month, payable within the first ten days beginning on January 1916.

On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.

Held:

No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern
and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its
validity, construction, or discharge.

In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act complained of which had been done
before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation.

An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.

The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.

THE UNITED STATES v. DIAZ-CONDE

42 Phil. 766 (Outline)

G.R. No. L-18208, February 14, 1922 (Resource)

Plaintiff-appellee: THE UNITED STATES

Defendants-appellants: Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde

What happened:

On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco accomplished

and delivered to the defendants a contract (named ‘Exhibit B’) which stated that the
Oliveros and Lianco had borrowed from the latter a sum of three hundred pesos (Php
300), and by virtue of the terms of said contract, Oliveros and Lianco obligated
themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per
month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to
be made on the January 10, 1916.

On May 1, 1916, Act no. 2655 or the Usury Law came into effect. The law stated
that that the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits, […] shall be 12% per annum. Any amount of interest paid or to be paid in
excess of that fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore unlawful.

A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on May 6,
1921, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon
said complaint they were arrested, charged, and pleaded not guilty. On September 1,
1921, the case was finally brought on for trial. At the end of the trial, with consideration
to the evidences cited in court, Hon. M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of
them to pay a fine of P120 and, if they cannot meet their debt obligations, the
defendants would suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of
the law. From that sentence each of the defendants made an appeal.

Contention of the State:

The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the execution and delivery of said contract,
there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands that punishes usury. However, the defendants had colle cted a
usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), Therefore,
they were guilty in the violation of that law and should be punished in accordance with its provisions.

Contention of the Accused:

(a) The contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was
adopted.

(b) The time that the said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the
Philippine Islands.

(c) Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the May 1, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract was
executed.

(d) The said law could have no retroactive effect or operation

(e) The said law impairs the obligation of a contract.

For all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be
dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated on February 14, 1922 its ruling on the case of The United States vs
Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde (G.R. No. L-18208). The court has decided that the acts
complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed. A law imposing a
new penalty, liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive
effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time of the contract was made must govern
its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is
legal at its commencement, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted,
then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is prohibited by Philippine law.
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that
makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes
such action, is an ex post facto law. The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done
before its adoption a crime, as in the case of Act No. 2655. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action,
providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.

The complaint was therefore dismissed, and the defendants were discharged from the custody of the law with
costs.
PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES

G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950 Parricide, Feeblemindedness, Imbecility, Article 12 of the RPC

FACTS:

Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his
wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting
in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was
found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, who
witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he
killed, motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels
with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.

He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:

Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 of the RPC?

RULING:

Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without
the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by
law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned
to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According
to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself
in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully
cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a
man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife
whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of
little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

Appellant was found guilty of parricide.

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES

November 29, 1950 (G.R. No. L-3246)

PARTIES:

plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

defendant-appellant: ABELARDO FORMIGONES

FACTS:

From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife Julia
Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find
employment as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung which latter caused her death. When she fall ont he ground the defendant
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. He
was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
His counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined.
They said that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes he would remove his clothes in front
of others, would not take a bath, and remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His counsel
claimed that e is an imbecile therefore exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez told that
Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish
right from wrong. An imbecile so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

ISSUE: WON the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from criminal liability.

HELD:

No. In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that
it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. He could
distinguish right from wrong.

Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 141066, Feb. 17, 2005 BP 22

FACTS:

Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check
No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and
thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank
to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on,
indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned
checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of Alfredo.

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the other hand, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a
special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof.

ISSUE:

a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of
RPC?

b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as
conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is applicable?

RULING:

A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence
in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition
regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws

B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by
their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the
RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of
the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. BUT In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in
his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from
him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990
issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post
dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22,
1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED
ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because
there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks
were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the
checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in
the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced
but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.”
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose

People vs. Martin Simon G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of Prohibited Drugs

NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up by the
police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight
from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to
sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro.
He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He
denied knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that
the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body.

Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
and to pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there
were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling for the 2 tea
bags of marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason
of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750
grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The
same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in
said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the
court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than
the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal,
and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all
doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in
a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range have
fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law,
the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent
Doctrine:
Laws shall take effect fifteen days after its complete publication in
Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Facts:
The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetuafor
violating the Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea
bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which
was sold for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about
October 22, 1988.
In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
Held:
Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22
of the RPC.

Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its
publication on December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his
sentence.

Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto

mayoror prision correctional instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion
perpetua.

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-
appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan
On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint
for adultery

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint

The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in
Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of
the peace dismissed the adultery case

The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo
Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)

Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were gathered
after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was
going to set fire to it

He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana

Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

The fire destroyed about 48 houses

Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson

Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena
temporal)

Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with
regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:

The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice

The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of
reasonable doubt
Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take
a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement
to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do
not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does
not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of
the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who
is acquitted.

People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants

En Banc

Per Curiam, July 6, 1978

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag

No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution

They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra

Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a
couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her

On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo
was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go
down the house and leave them

Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa

About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for
a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time

Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel;
Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police

Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come
down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill
him

On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house

The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations

Corazon's version:

Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting with
Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut
owned by Bernardo

She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"

When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him"
Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down the
house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.

She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.

Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.

Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention

Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door

He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan

The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again

Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides warned
her that he will kill her if she calls for help

Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the former
threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone

The defendants'' version:

Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.

Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an illicit
relationship never existed between them

Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued
from June 22 to June 26

Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-300
meters from the place of the killing

Issue:

Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder

It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspuracy to kill her
husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their
culpable acts that led to his death

It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator

Holding:
Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.

Ratio:

Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.

It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she
cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not
clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she
knew it was going to be done and did not object.

There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed.

She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no
suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate

Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the
conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants

These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum.

EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

defendants
G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005

Facts:

Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in
1996. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was “single”. However, starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. In January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support. In August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
NSO in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a GRO. He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his
previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their
marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a
“love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he
declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not
heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as
maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed
the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private
complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral
damage when it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be
an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those
specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damagesto the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following:
act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured
her that he was single. He even brought his parents to Tina’s house where he and his
parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry the
him, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with
Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he
was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her,
Tina had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception,
the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day,
he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant,
who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband.

The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with Tina were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury
to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for
moral damages. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and
the interest and general welfare of society.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 165842

November 29, 2005

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P.
Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the
former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him
after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old.
Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without
Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and
Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a
criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of
“single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of
imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral
damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages
was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s
wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

RULINGS:

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of
the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus,
even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

People vs. Puno (Crim1)

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique
Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there)
arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place

When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's
Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her

Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a
check for P100,000

Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the
car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to
her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo,
he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car

He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride

He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

No.

No.

Ratio:

There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under
the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty

In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another
offense primarily intended by the offenders

This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands
were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate
to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law
on highway robbery)

PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway
does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case

This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision

correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code

"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto
Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an
adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the
house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both
armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and
alibi as their evidence against the charge.

*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove
ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:

a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity

to defend himself

b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted

in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed
and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto
was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.

Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:

APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)
Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been
placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual
who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took
place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the
doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

Landmark Case: United States vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-

5272 March 19, 1910 (Digested Case)
The events in this case happened in 1908, during the American regime, yet it is still quoted today as the
textbook example of a "mistake of fact". The accused was absolved of stabbing and killing the person trying to
enter his room. He thought it was a robber, but it was only his roommate.

US vs Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272
15 Phil 488
March 19, 1910

Petitioner: The United States

 Respondent: Ah Chong

FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed,
he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice "Who is there?", but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "If you enter the room, I will kill you." But at
that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed the door and believing that he was being
attacked he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Thereupon, he called to his employers and rushed back int the room to secure the bandages to bind up the wound.
Defendant was charged with murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for murder in the case at bar.

HELD: The Court held that Ah Chong must be acquitted.

Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art
XI of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that in order for the act to be justified, the requisites must be present.

Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact):

1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful
aggression, there would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home and the
knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression.

The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah
Chong.

Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:
 Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
 The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector.
 Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded,
and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by
the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour.
 According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter
asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson
 HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
 ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
 appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
 "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
 a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest
 The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
 According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

People vs. Oanis

(G.R. No. 47722. July 27, 1943)

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendants-appellants: Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta
Ponente: J. Moran

FACTS:
Upon receiving a telegram from Major Guido ordering the arrest of Anselmo
Balagtas, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, asked that he be given four men, one of whom who
reported was defendant Alberto Galanta. The same instruction was given to
defendant Antonio Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party
into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta taking the route leading to
the house of a bailarina named Irene, where Balagtas was believed to be staying.
Upon arriving, the group went to the Irene’s room and on seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively
fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. It turned out later that the
person shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene’s paramour.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Serapio
Tecson.
2) Whether or not the defendants are entitled to a privileged mitigating
circumstance in case they are found criminally liable

HELD:
1) Yes. If a person acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of his official duties, then he incurs no criminal liability. Nonetheless, the
maxim ignorantia facti excusat, applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the instant case, the defendants found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action, as the
person in the room being then asleep would give them ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity. Moreover, they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance
or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by defendants was
not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.

2) Yes. The Court held that the defendants committed the crime of murder with
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, but may be entitled to an incomplete
justifying circumstance as provided in Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal
Code. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is
present. Thus, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that a
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law in case the
crime committed is not wholly excusable, was imposed, entitling the defendants
to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.
Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006)
AUGUST 27, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY

FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial
elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along
with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of
the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was
acquited due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime
defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.

Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there
was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation
of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of
the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate
of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared
by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries
must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence
to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.