14. Zafra v.

People, 25 April 2012 (pro reo)

Doctrine:
“In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of
the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio
pro reo.”

Facts:
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.
9165 before the RTC of Bulacan. The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Apolinario Mendoza
(SPO4 Mendoza) conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store in Bulacan, due to reported
drug trafficking in the area. SPO4 Mendoza saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while Daluz
was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal activity, SPO4 Mendoza
single-handedly apprehended them. The RTC Bulacan convicted Zafra and Marcelino for the
crime of possession of shabu. Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision.

Issue: Whether the prosecution proved petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt or not.

Ruling: No.
During the cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony
and pointed to Daluz as the one holding shabu with a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the
one in possession of drug paraphernalia. These inconsistencies are not minor ones, and, certainly,
not among those which strengthens the credibility of a witness. Possession of drug
paraphernalia vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA No. 9165. That Zafra was
holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is material to this case, to the accusation against him,
and to his defense.

SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police station,
who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs, media, and
in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. And, worse, he was the same
person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to the
crime laboratory for testing. No inventory was ever done; no inventory was presented in court.

The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense
is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in serious
doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what at
the time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether not the two
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects offered in court
as the corpus delicti.
5. Desmoparan v. People, 27 March 2019 (R.A. No. 10951 and Art. 48)

Doctrine:
“The penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the
penalty of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the provisions
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the maximum
period.”

Facts:
Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of P105,000.00 from Cebu CFI Community
Cooperative -Dumaguete City Branch (CFI). He misrepresented himself to be an employee of the
City Engineer's Office, by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Chiyenne Mirasol (Mirasol),
loan clerk of CFI. However, on March 16, 2012, the real Rodulfo Cordura (Cordura) went to CFI
to verify the information that somebody had fraudulently applied for a salary loan using his name
and qualifications. Desmoparan was eventually apprehended and was charged with estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. RTC of Negros Oriental found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and CA denied his appeal. SC found him guilty for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents.

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed under RA 10951 should be given a retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes.
Desmoparan is found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents since the crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit
estafa.

The penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the penalty
of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the provisions of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the maximum
period. Thus, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents should be imposed in the
maximum period, being the more serious crime than estafa. However, the penalty of fine of not
more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) under the old law should be imposed because this is
more favorable to the petitioner than the penalty of fine of not more than One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) under the present law.

SC modified the indeterminate sentence imposable on Desmoparan so that the minimum term
should, come from the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, maximum, to prision
correccional, minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months), and the maximum term
should come from prision correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in its
maximum period (4 yeeirs, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years).
b. People v. Olarbe, 23 July 2018 (self-defense and defense of stranger)

Doctrine:
“The accused who shows by clear and convincing evidence that the death of the victim arose from
the need for self-preservation in the face of the victim's deadly unlawful aggression, and there was
a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the same, is entitled to acquittal
on the ground of self-defense in the absence of any indication of his having provoked such
unlawful aggression. In self-defense and defense of stranger, the circumstances as the accused
perceived them at the time of the incident, not as others perceived them, should be the bases for
determining the merits of the plea.”

Facts:

On 8 May 2006 at around 12:30 o'clock midnight, OLARBE voluntarily surrendered to police
officers at the Police Station of Luisiana, Laguna. OLARBE informed them that he happened to
have killed Romeo Arca (Arca) invoking self-defense. RTC pronounced him guilty of murder as
charged and the CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe. Olarbe’s appeal before the SC submitted
that it was erroneous to reject his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger because he had
killed Arca to save himself and his common-law wife from the latter's unlawful aggression; that
his use of the victim's gun and bolo to repel or stop the unlawful aggression was necessary and
reasonable; and that the killing was consequently legally justified.

Issue: Whether or not Olarbe is entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense
of stranger.

Ruling: Yes.

Olarbe invoked self-defense and defense of stranger under Article 11of the Revised Penal Code.
The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must have
mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful
aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.

SC found that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and
his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and
brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Although Arca
sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations whose nature and extent
were not explained. The lack of explanations has SC the means to fairly adjudge the reasonableness
of the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Arca's unlawful aggression. Lastly, the absence
of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by revenge, resentment
or other evil motive has been equally palpable. SC deem to be established, therefore, that the third
elements of the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of stranger were present.

With Olarbe being entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger,
his acquittal follows.
6. People vs. Lupac, September 19, 2012 (determining the age)

Doctrine:
The Pruna Guidelines (People v. Pruna) was set by SC in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
Facts:
RTC Antipolo City convicted Lupac of statutory rape. On intermediate appeal, Lupac assailed the
credibility of AAA and argued that the RTC erred in accepting AAA’s testimony as proof of her
date of birth and her minority under 12 years. The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified it by
holding that Lupac was guilty of simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code. It noted that the Prosecution was not able to effectively establish the victim’s minority
under 12 years because of the non-submission of AAA’s birth certificate, such fact being essential
in qualifying the offense to statutory rape.

Issue: Whether or not the Pruna Guidelines was satisfied in the present case.

Ruling: No.
With the minority under 12 years of AAA being an element in statutory rape, the proof of such
minority age should conform to the Pruna guidelines in order that such essential element would
be established beyond reasonable doubt. That was not done because the evidence adduced by the
Prosecution did not satisfy Pruna guidelines 4 and 5, supra, to wit:
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning
the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
8. Rustia Jr v. People, 05 October 2016 (treachery)
Doctrine:
In a criminal prosecution for murder qualified by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the
means, method, or form of the attack must be shown to have been consciously and deliberately
adopted by the offender before the same can be considered to qualify the killing. Otherwise, the
killing amounts only to homicide.

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with murder for the killing of the late Ambrocio Cristin (Ambrocio). RTC
rendered judgment finding and pronouncing Benjamin, Jr. guilty as principal in murder, and
Rustia, Sr. and Faustino guilty as accomplices in murder, On appeal, the petitioners assailed the
adverse findings of the RTC, asserting that they had only acted in self-defense; that the RTC had
is regarded Benjamin, Jr.'s testimony showing that Ambrocio had been reaching for the gun tucked
in his waist; that Benjamin, Jr. had only reacted to defend himself by the instinct of self-
preservation; and that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino had not been sufficiently identified by the
Prosecution's witnesses. CA denied the appeal and modified the civil liability. In their appeal
before the SC, the Office of the Solicitor General points out that the petitioners took issue with the
perceived insufficiency of the amended information on the circumstance of treachery being raised
only for the first time on appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the offense committed was murder, qualified by treachery.

Ruling: No. There being no treachery, the crime committed was homicide.

All the circumstances in the record indicated that the killing of Ambrocio had been done in the
heat of the moment. It is quite clear that Benjamin, Jr. had not set out to kill Ambrocio when they
both agreed to meet in order to discuss their land dispute. The fact also remains that it was the
victim who had brought the gun to the meeting. In contrast, Benjamin, Jr. did not appear to have
prepared his own weapon to commit the crime.

To establish the attendance of treachery in such an environment, the State's evidence must
competently and convincingly show that the accused made some preparation to kill the victim;
hence, a killing done at the spur of the moment cannot be treacherous. Even where the victim was
shot from behind, if the shooting was done in the course of a heated argument between the victim
and the assailant, treachery should not be appreciated, for in that situation, the assailant was filled
with anger and rage and excitement, and had no time to reflect on his actions; in other words, he
could not be shown to have consciously adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to
facilitate the killing without risk to himself.
1. Colinares vs. People, December 13, 2011 (appeal)
Doctrine:
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.

Facts:
Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur. RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years
and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking
self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC
decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. Not
satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.

Issue: Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court.

Ruling: Yes.
Firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The
Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows
him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances
of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide
by the Supreme Court.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
v. People v. Sayo, 10 April 2019 (civil liability)
Doctrine:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.

Facts:
Susan Sayo was charged with recruiting and transporting AAA and BBB (minors), as well as CCC
(of legal age) for prostitution. In the same Information, Alfredo Roxas was separately accused of
managing and operating a room in his apartment to be used for prostitution. The RTC held that
accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification, by adding an award of moral and exemplary damages, but only to AAA and BBB.
Sayo had already died pending appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the death of Sayo extinguished her criminal and civil liability.

Ruling: Yes.
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is ·extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability is extinguished upon her
death. The rules on the effect of the death of the accused on civil liability pending appeal are
summarized in People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict Article 1157 of
the Civil Code

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section I, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.