Apex Mining Company vs NLRC

Facts: Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining
Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at
Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which
was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

While she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry,
she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to
her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D.
Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She
was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of
P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit
her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did
not allow her to return to work and dismissed her.

private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and
Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter
assigned to the case. The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be
treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of
petitioner.

Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:

The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic

servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or

domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.

Held: The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working

in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
 The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper,
domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar
in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are
actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the
employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business
concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner.

Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for
valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

Charlito Penaranda vs Bangaga Plywood Corporation

Facts: Sometime in June 1999, Petitioner Charlito Peñaranda was hired as an employee of
Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of
its steam plant boiler.6 In May 2001, Peñaranda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC.7

"[Peñaranda] through counsel in his position paper alleges that he was employed
by respondent [Baganga] on March 15, 1999 with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 as
Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally terminated on December
19, 2000. Further, [he] alleges that his services [were] terminated without the
benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he
was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days,
night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorney’s
fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint.

The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner’s Complaint was
premature because he was still employed by BPC.11 The temporary closure of BPC’s plant did
not terminate his employment, hence, he need not reapply when the plant reopened. The
labor arbiter found petitioner entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days,
and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P21,257.98.

Ruling of the NLRC

Respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, which deleted the award of overtime pay
and premium pay for working on rest days. According to the Commission, petitioner
was not entitled to these awards because he was a managerial employee.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 In its Resolution dated January 27, 2003, the CA dismissed Peñaranda’s Petition for
Certiorari. The appellate court held that he failed to: 1) attach copies of the
pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter and NLRC; and 2) explain why the
filing and service of the Petition was not done by personal service.15

In its later Resolution dated July 4, 2003, the CA denied reconsideration on the
ground that petitioner still failed to submit the pleadings filed before the NLRC.16

Issue: Whether or not Penaranda is a regular employee who is entitled to monetary benefits
under Article 82 of the Labor Code

Held: Article 82 of the Labor Code exempts managerial employees from the coverage of labor
standards. Labor standards provide the working conditions of employees, including
entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days.29 Under this
provision, managerial employees are "those whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision."30

The Court disagrees with the NLRC’s finding that petitioner was a managerial
employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also
takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees,
officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of
law on labor standards

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code state that managerial employees are
those who meet the following conditions:

"(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in

which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof;

"(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more
employees therein;

"(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank;
or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as
to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given
particular weight."31

Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work
involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers
in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and
independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As
supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.
 Legend Hotel vs. Realuyo

Facts: This labor case for illegal dismissal involves a pianist employed to perform in the
restaurant of a hotel. On August 9, 1999, respondent, whose stage name was Joey R.
Roa, filed a complaint for alleged unfair labor practice, constructive illegal dismissal,
and the underpayment/nonpayment of his premium pay for holidays, separation pay,
service incentive leave pay, and 13111 month pay.

Respondent averred that he had worked as a pianist at the Legend Hotel s Tanglaw
Restaurant from September 1992 with an initial rate of P400.00/night that was given
to him after each night s performance; that his rate had increased to P750.00/night;
and that during his employment, he could not choose the time of performance, which
had been fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm for three to six times/week. He added that
the Legend Hotel s restaurant manager had required him to conform with the venue s
motif; that he had been subjected to the rules on employees representation checks and
chits, a privilege granted to other employees; that on July 9, 1999, the management
had notified him that as a cost-cutting measure his services as a pianist would no longer
be required effective July 30, 1999; that he disputed the excuse, insisting that Legend
Hotel had been lucratively operating as of the filing of his complaint; and that the loss
of his employment made him bring his complaint.

In its defense, petitioner denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship

with respondent, insisting that he had been only a talent engaged to provide live music
at Legend Hotel s Madison Coffee Shop for three hours/day on two days each week;
and stated that the economic crisis that had hit the country constrained management
to dispense with his service.

On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
upon finding that the parties had no employer-employee relationship. (Complainant
was receiving talent fee, not salary)

Issue: Whether or not there was employee-employer relationship between petitioner

and respondent

Held: A review of the circumstances reveals that respondent was, indeed, petitioner s
employee. He was undeniably employed as a pianist in petitioner s Madison Coffee
Shop/Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992 until his services were terminated on
July 9, 1999.

Respondent s remuneration, albeit denominated as talent fees, was still considered

as included in the term wage in the sense and context of the Labor Code, regardless
of how petitioner chose to designate the remuneration. Anent this, Article 97(f) of
the Labor Code clearly states:ςrαlαω
 xxx wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a
written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities
customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.

Clearly, respondent received compensation for the services he rendered as a pianist in

petitioner s hotel. Petitioner cannot use the service contract to rid itself of the
consequences of its employment of respondent. There is no denying that whatever
amounts he received for his performance, howsoever designated by petitioner, were
his wages.