doi:10.1111/disa.

12132

Building community resilience: business

preparedness lessons in the case of
Adapazarı, Turkey
Ezgi Orhan Assistant Professor, Department of City and Regional Planning,
Pamukkale University, Denizli, Turkey

The lack of attention paid to businesses in disaster management systems from the standpoint of
state policies hampers efforts to build community resilience. This paper examines, therefore, the
extent of business preparedness for disasters. Empirical research was conducted in Adapazarı,
Turkey, 13 years after the İzmit earthquake, which struck the northwest of the country on 17 August
1999, claiming the lives of some 17,000 people. For the study, 232 firms were selected to inquire
about their preparedness before and after the event. It is hypothesised that business preparedness
is influenced by the following set of variables: business size; business sector; business age; finan-
cial condition prior to the disaster; occupancy tenure; market range; education level; and previous
disaster experience. In line with the findings of the research, a policy framework is constructed to
rationalise the allocation of resources for building resilience at the aggregate level by facilitating
business preparedness.

Keywords: Adapazarı, business recovery, community resilience, earthquake,

preparedness, Turkey

Introduction
Businesses are a significant component of the urban structure. As disasters often strike
urban areas, businesses suffer extensively as they attempt to recover from the impacts.
In other words, disasters can have a devastating effect on the viability of a business.
To adapt to such a new situation, they draw on different response capacities and
take different recovery routes. However, each firm does not have similar capacities
to guard against an extreme event. In the case of Adapazarı, Turkey, which was hit
by the 1999 İzmit earthquake on 17 August 1999, these capacities vary among firms
operating across the city. This study aims to highlight disparities among businesses
in terms of disaster preparedness, which determines their chances of recovery from
a disaster, and which, in turn, affects community resilience.
  Since the pioneering work of Crawford Stanley Holling (1973) in the field of
ecology, the concept of resilience has been used to ‘describe the capacity [of urban
systems] to return to the equilibrium after a displacement’ (Norris et al., 2008, p. 127).
Resilience refers to ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure,
identity, and feedbacks’ (Walker et al., 2004, p. 2). The readjustment of a community

Disasters, 2016, 40(1): 45−64. © 2016 The Author(s). Disasters © Overseas Development Institute, 2016
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
46  Ezgi Orhan

to disturbing circumstances necessitates a comprehensive framework that incorporates

the economic, ecological, physical, and social environments. The resilience of commu-
nity components requires preparedness: ‘ensuring the readiness of a society to forecast,
take precautionary measures and respond to an impending disaster’ (Christoplos,
Mitchell, and Liljelund, 2001, p. 186). Preparedness can be defined as ‘any activity
that has the potential to save lives, lessen property damage, and reduce the negative
impacts of disaster events, including long-term interruptions of commercial activities’
(Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995, p. 3). This study addresses the issue of resilience
by focusing on how businesses prepare for disasters that could have consequences for
the entire community from an economic, physical, social, and spatial viewpoint.
  The study context is developed using a Turkish case study. The disaster manage-
ment system in Turkey is rooted in an approach based on post-disaster regulations.
Act No. 7269 (1959) provides the disaster management schema for the country. In
line with this piece of legislation, disaster policies have been shaped by post-disaster
resource allocation, resulting in economic, social, and spatial problems in cities.
Contemporary approaches suggest employing risk reduction measures to build re-
silience in the community. National policymakers, though, are reluctant to put
emphasis on preparedness and risk reduction. This study sheds light on the inade-
quacy of disaster management policies in Turkey by concentrating on long-term
preparedness levels, particularly among businesses.
  Turkey has experienced natural disasters throughout its history, but none has been
more catastrophic than the 1999 İzmit earthquake with respect to fatalities, injuries,
property damage, and economic losses. The event spawned multidimensional prob-
lems (economic, environmental, political, physical, and spatial) in the country’s most
urbanised region. More than a decade has passed since the disaster, permitting an
investigation of the long-term development of business preparedness.
  Marmara region was struck by an earthquake of 7.4 magnitude on the Richter
scale at 03:02 on 17 August 1999. It affected several cities as Bolu, Bursa, Düzce,
Eskişehir, İstanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, and Yalova are all located in Marmara Region,
the most populated, urbanised, and industrialised area of the country. Its popula-
tion was approximately 16 million in 1999, constituting 23 per cent of the total
population of Turkey. Among the aforementioned cities, Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli,
Sakarya, and Yalova experienced the disaster directly in physical terms. In these
cities, 17,225 people lost their lives and 23,781 people were injured (Prime Ministry
Crisis Center, 2000). Of these deaths and injuries, 23 and 22 per cent respectively
occurred in Sakarya province. In addition, urban areas of the five most affected prov-
inces (Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli, Sakarya, and Yalova) experienced destruction. According
to a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
more than 213,000 housing units and 30,000 business premises were affected by the
disaster (Bibbee et al., 2000). Approximately, one-third of housing units and business
premises were heavily damaged or demolished in the affected zone. In Adapazarı, at
the centre of Sakarya province, roughly 50 per cent of the housing stock and 50 per
cent of business premises were damaged in the earthquake.
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 47

  Aside from direct physical impacts, the affected region also suffered economic
losses. As the most industrialised part of the country, the region was responsible for
45.6 per cent of total industrial value added before the earthquake (SPO, 1999, p. 12).
Production activity, however, had to cease after the disaster owing to interruptions
to communications, infrastructure, and transportation in the region. In the provinces
of Bolu, Kocaeli, Sakarya, and Yalova, 63.2 per cent of manufacturing industry was
damaged (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2001). Given the serious disruption to business,
the region also experienced major economic consequences.
  There is a substantial amount of documentation on the 1999 İzmit earthquake,
including academic research, official reports, and statistics, which reveals the extent
of the disaster in many aspects, such as deaths and injuries, economic costs, physical
damage, and mental and social impacts. From the official records one can deduce
that there has been an improvement in the affected region’s long-term economic
structure, despite the sharp decline in 1999, and that businesses have recovered in the
long run. Yet, the recovery performance of firms does not necessarily reflect the
disaster preparedness level of businesses and their current response capacity. Since
economic records themselves are not sufficient in this regard, and given the absence
of knowledge of business preparedness, this paper aims to fill the gap and to provide
strategies for businesses and decision-makers.
  Since businesses play a crucial role in the development of a community, their
response capacity is essential to enhancing community resilience. Hence an evalu-
ation of the disaster preparedness of businesses is both warranted and vital. This
paper is structured around the following research question: ‘which underlying factors
determine business preparedness after a disaster?’. To provide theoretical background
for the study, the analysis begins by examining the community resilience frame-
work and then presents a literature review. The variables introduced in the literature
review form the basis of the analysis and the study model. The next section presents
the research methodology and descriptive statistics for the variables. The subsequent
section contains the results of the assessment. This is followed by a discussion of the
disaster preparedness levels of businesses. The final section concludes by interpreting
the findings and assessing the implications of the research.

The community resilience framework

The concept of resilience, rooted in the science of ecology via the thesis of Crawford
Stanley Holling (1973), refers to the adaptive capacity of a system to reorganise and
return to equilibrium after displacement (Norris et al., 2008, p. 127). Adaptive capacity
is used to describe resources with dynamic attributes, that is, diverse and autonomous
components with local interactions and that have a chance of enhancement (Folke,
2006; Norris et al., 2008) to manage resilience collectively (Walker, et al., 2004).
The concept of resilience highlights the importance of the adaptive capacity of the
system to changing conditions (Walker et al., 2004), through absorbing the impacts
48  Ezgi Orhan

and facilitating the ability to reorganise and learn how to respond to a threat (Folke,
2006; Cutter et al., 2008).
  The resilience of a system is not restricted only to the capacity to return to the
pre-event state, and hence to maintain stability without change (Folke, 2006; Walker
et al., 2004). Rather, the concept considers the dynamics of the system that could lead
to the restructuring, sustainment, and development of the whole system. Robustness,
redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity are key properties of resilience for with-
standing the stress (Bruneau et al., 2003, cited in Renschler, 2010). These features
provide opportunities for innovation and development instead of protecting the system
against disturbances. Resilience is a positive attribute of a system that enables it to
learn to manage through change after a stressor manifests itself, as opposed simply to
reacting to it and resisting it (Folke, 2006, p. 255).
  The resilience approach has been influential in fields other than ecology, such as
urban studies, which considers the concept to be a desired feature and an objective
to be achieved. The conceptualisation of resilience at the urban level is identified
as ‘a sustainable network of physical systems and human communities, capable of
managing extreme events; during disaster, both must be able to survive and func-
tion under extreme stress’ (Godschalk, 2003, p. 137). The resilience approach draws
on a holistic framework since it is concerned with connections and relations between
natural, physical, and social systems (Cutter et al., 2008). Resilience at the aggregate
level requires the functioning of the whole system with its elements to withstand
encountered disturbances and stresses.
  The term ‘community resilience’ is defined as ‘a process linking a network of
adaptive capacities to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity’ (Norris et al., 2008,
p. 127). It refers to the ability of a community to cope with an external stressor through
its resources. Tobin (1999, p. 13) employed the concept of community resilience in
hazard planning studies in the following way: ‘structural organization to minimize
the effects of disasters and, at the same time, having the ability to recover quickly by
restoring the socio-economic vitality of the community’. The most crucial aspect of
community resilience is that ‘when one element changes, an appropriate response
could be produced to keep the system in some sort of dynamic equilibrium’ (Tobin,
1999, p. 14). Godschalk (2003, p. 140) argues that a resilient community is supposed
to be adaptable, autonomous, collaborative, diverse, efficient, interdependent, redun-
dant, and strong, in order to undertake the tasks of ‘monitoring vulnerability reduc-
tion, building hazard mitigation capability, developing broad hazard mitigation
commitment, operating networked communications, adopting recognized equity
standards, assisting threatened neighbourhoods and populations, and mitigating busi-
ness interruption impacts’. A resilient community could be achieved through emer-
gency response and recovery strategies as well as through preparedness activities
(Renschler et al., 2010, p. 1).
  Owing to the complex structure of nature and human development, communi-
ties are challenged by natural hazards that are unpredictable sources of destruction.
In recent years, the concept of resilience has gained in importance since ‘communities
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 49

cannot prevent every risk from being realized but rather must learn to adapt and
manage risks in a way that minimizes the impact on human and other systems’
(Renschler et al., 2010, p. 5). The community elements try to withstand disturbances
by reorganising the community in the changing circumstances. However, the resil-
ience of individual elements does not guarantee community resilience. In other words,
community resilience is not equal to the sum of the resilience of its parts, as argued
by Norris et al. (2008, p. 128). The reason is that each element demonstrates variations
in developing adaptive capacities.
  Preparedness is accepted to be one of the primary drivers of resilience, since it
enhances the ability of a system to cope with external shocks through the development
of strategies and the mobilisation of resources beforehand (Tobin, 1999; Paton and
Johnston, 2001; Cutter et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2008). Communities are exposed to
the destruction caused by natural hazards, which is one of the main threats facing
development. The development of response capacities is essential for community
resilience because of the unpredictability of outcomes. Promoting community resil-
ience involves the utilisation of adaptive capacities. The efficient way to develop a
response and to adapt to further changes in the system is to be ready for possible threats.
Readiness relates to making assumptions about possible consequences and allocating
resources based on these judgements. Preparedness, by contrast, involves introducing
precautionary measures, such as allocating robust, accessible, and diverse resources
and strengthening capacities to prevent malfunctioning. However, post-event func-
tioning may not be the equivalent of pre-event functioning since there is a need for
adaption to an altered situation (Norris et al., 2008, p. 132). The outcome of the
event is the ‘new normal’, which varies from the initial case. Preparedness is a tool
to enhance the probability of functioning to attain the new normal for communities.
For businesses, preparedness may alleviate unforeseen expenditure on recovery.

Determinants of business preparedness

Businesses are critical parts of both local communities and global economies, yet disas-
ters can put economic activities at risk. A robust business environment, therefore, is
an essential component of a resilient community and a global supply chain. One aspect
of community resilience is the capacity of a system to readjust itself to the change in
equilibrium by developing responses. There is a strong relation between the respon-
sive mechanisms of a system and community resilience. Businesses, being the eco-
nomic units of the community, develop strategies to cope with disturbances caused
by natural disasters.
  With the development of the concept of disaster vulnerability, a number of schol-
ars have become interested in the effects of disasters on different vulnerable groups.
The majority of research deals primarily with households and their vulnerability to
disasters and their recovery from them (see, for example, Rubin and Barbee, 1985).
Community recovery has been used to explain the recovery of households, whereas
50  Ezgi Orhan

other community elements have attracted little concern. With the shift from the
traditional post-disaster-oriented approach to risk-reduction-oriented discourse, work
has been conducted for businesses on the impacts of disasters on commercial entities
over the next 15 years (see, for example, Powell and Harding, 2009, p. 38). These studies
have examined the vulnerability of businesses, their preparedness for an emergency,
and their responses to a disaster. Numerous empirical assessments have been performed
in developed countries to pinpoint the factors that affect business preparedness
(Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999, 2002; Alesh et
al., 2001; Tierney and Webb, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte; 2002; Runyan, 2006).
  In the light of these studies, a new domain of inquiry has been developing that
centres on the impacts of disasters on private-sector entities. However, there is still
a gap in the literature regarding developing countries that exhibit differentiations in
business vulnerability. The remainder of this section of the paper, therefore, is devoted
to the literature on businesses, dominated by the empirical findings of developed
country cases. The objective is to test them against a developing country, Turkey.

Literature review
Scholars suggest that businesses have different preparedness levels for disasters. Such
variations can be explained by several factors that mainly define the characteristics
of businesses. In the context of this study, these independent variables are: (i) business
size; (ii) business sector; (iii) business age; (iv) financial condition prior to the disaster;
(v) occupancy tenure; (vi) market range; (vii) education level; and (viii) previous
disaster experience (see Table 1).

Table 1. Factors affecting business preparedness

Independent variables References

Business size Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney, 1997; Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1997;
Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999; Tierney and Webb, 2001.

Business sector Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer,
1999; Tierney and Webb, 2001.

Business age Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 2002; Waugh and Smith, 2006.

Financial condition prior to the disaster Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999.

Occupancy tenure Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1997; Dahlhamer and
Tierney, 1998; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999; Wasileski, Rodrigues, and
Walter, 2011.

Market range Tierney and Webb, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Webb, Tierney,
and Dahlhamer, 2002; Zhang, Lindell, and Prater, 2009.

Education level –

Previous disaster experience Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999, 2002; Tierney and Webb,
2001; Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998.

Preparedness Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer,
1999; Tierney and Webb, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Powell and
Harding, 2009; Zhang, Lindell, and Prater, 2009.
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 51

  Studies on business preparedness reveal that business size affects the engagement
of firms in relation to preparedness. Many scholars indicate that large firms are more
likely to conduct preventive activities than are small firms. Small firms ignore pre-
paredness owing to their resources and their abilities, whereas larger firms have the
capacity to allocate time, staff, and resources (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney,
1997, Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999; Tierney
and Webb, 2001).
  Business sector also impacts on engagement in preparedness. Firms operating in
different economic fields differ in terms of reliance on employees, selling essential
goods, and so on. These variations affect the level of preparedness. Scholars have found
a relation between economic sector and the level of preparedness of a firm (Dahlhamer
and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999; Tierney
and Webb, 2001). Firms in the finance, insurance, and real-estate (FIRE) sectors are
more prepared than those in the retail and service sectors.
  In addition to business size and sector, business age may also affect the level of
preparedness. According to Waugh and Smith (2006, p. 214), ‘older business owners
tend to take their insurance payments and retire rather than attempt rebuilding their
businesses’. Consequently, young firms are less likely to invest in disaster prepared-
ness than are older firms.
  The pre-disaster financial condition may also contribute to the degree of engage-
ment in preparedness. That is, firms with a robust financial base before a disaster are
more likely to invest in preparedness than those in a poor condition (Dahlhamer and
Tierney, 1998; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999).
  Similarly, occupancy tenure is known to be correlated with disaster preparedness.
Scholars emphasise that renters of business properties are less likely to employ pre-
paredness measures than are owners (Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1997; Webb, Tierney,
and Dahlhamer, 1999; Wasileski, Rodrigues, and Walter, 2011). Dahlhamer and
D’Souza (1995, p. 19) note that ‘owners of property may consider themselves as having
more to lose in the event of a disaster’. Since the owners of a business property can take
steps and obtain loans easier than leaseholders, business ownership is seemingly advanta-
geous with regard to business preparedness (Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998, p. 124).
  In addition, the market range of a business appears to be associated with prepared-
ness. Firms selling goods and services to local people seem to be more vulnerable than
those with a geographically diverse market. Firms with a wider market scope are
more likely to invest in preparedness than are those serving local markets (Tierney
and Webb, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer,
2002; Zhang, Lindell, and Prater, 2009). This is a reasonable assumption, since firms
active beyond local economies are more likely to be financially robust and allocate
resources for the avoidance of risk.
  There is some evidence that firms that have experienced business interruption in
the past have higher levels of preparedness than those who have not. In other words,
previous experience is expected to have a positive impact on disaster preparedness for
future risks (Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999; Tierney and Webb,
2001). It is assumed that firms that have been exposed to a disaster tend to enhance
52  Ezgi Orhan

their ability to deal with further events (Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998; Tierney and
Webb, 2001; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 2002). Experience can foster prepar-
edness through lessons learned. Firms that have been challenged know about the
requirements before, during, and after a disaster. Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1995, p. 20)
found a significant relation between previous disaster experience and preparedness,
and claimed that firms with experience tend to invest more in preparedness. By con-
trast, Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer (1999) stated that previous disaster experience
does not lead to a significant shift in the preparedness level of firms.
  In addition to the aforementioned factors analysed in previous research, this study
includes the education level of the business manager or owner. The profile of the
owner or the manager of a firm is expected to affect the impact of a disaster on a
business. Here, the profile of the owner or the manager is defined by his/her edu-
cation. It is assumed that an owner or manager with better education will help the
firm to develop a higher response capacity to disasters. One should note, though,
that the ability of a business owner/manager in this respect cannot be gauged only
by education. A good manager needs to possess other distinctive features and traits,
such as experience, foresight, vision, and leadership. However, since these character-
istics are directly related to the managerial aspects of businesses, and since this study
concentrates on the response mechanisms of the businesses, ‘good’ managerial ability
and the awareness of the manager are simplified and reduced to ‘education level’.
  Although preparedness can facilitate to some extent control over the outcomes
of a disaster, studies show that a substantial number of businesses are unlikely to
accord priority to disaster preparedness. The findings of previous research on pre-
paredness suggest that firms engage in preparedness when they find these activities
easy and when they necessitate little investment (Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer,
1999; Tierney and Webb, 2001). Otherwise firms may not tend to make such arrange-
ments. Instead, business preparedness tends to focus on life safety activities and
workplace-oriented measures that do not provide for the continuity of the business.
It is fair to say, therefore, that ‘firms are preparing to respond, rather than to recover,
so that preparedness actions do not address the real recovery-related problems they
faced’ (Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 1999, p. 15).

Methodology
Despite the growing body of literature on businesses and the threat of disasters, there
has been little interest in the response behaviour of firms. This study aims to con-
tribute to the community resilience literature by investigating the factors that affect
business preparedness.
  The study uses a case study to exam the disaster response behaviour of businesses.
The case-study methodology can be defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple
sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1989, cited in Reddy, 2000, p. 187). The case
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 53

study of Adapazarı, Turkey, was carefully selected: it is a disaster-prone city where the
consequences of post-disaster processes can be seen throughout the business community.
  The ability to take precautionary measures to counter the disturbances posed by
natural disasters is accepted as the dependent variable in this paper. A set of variables
is defined, in accordance with the literature reviewed, in order to evaluate business
preparedness and disparities among businesses in the chosen area. The determi-
nants of preparedness used here to explain the response capacity of businesses are:
(i) business size; (ii) business sector; (iii) business age; (iv) financial condition prior
to the disaster; (v) occupancy tenure; (vi) market range; (vii) education level; and
(viii) previous disaster experience.
  Data were gathered through a questionnaire composed of a series of questions on the
pre- and post-disaster conditions of businesses. The survey instrument was applied
to 232 business owners or managers identified via a random stratified sample within
Adapazarı Metropolitan Municipality in June 2012.

Sampling
The study employed a stratified random sampling method to provide an adequate
number of firms from among disaster survivors and from various economic sectors.
Each firm operating in the area had an equal chance to be selected initially. The
original list of potential interviewees was then sampled randomly in a number of
stages (Cloke et al., 2004, p. 145). The stratifying variables were: (i) eligibility; and
(ii) business sector. First, the sample group is selected from among firms that must
have been in business since the occurrence of an earthquake up to the time of the
survey (2012). Second, the case-study sample has to represent businesses from differ-
ent sectors. Each sample group in the second stage is supposed to represent economic
sectors such as construction, FIRE, manufacturing, professional services except FIRE,
and retail and wholesale trade.
  Following collection of the data, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis
methods was utilised to assess the degree of business preparedness. Descriptive statis-
tics were used to reveal the profile of the businesses. To investigate relations between
dependent and independent variables, cross tabulation was employed. The SPSS
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) 15 software package was used to conduct
the analytical procedure.

Limitations
Unfortunately, firms that were closed, destroyed, or relocated outside of the case-
study area before the inquiry had to be excluded from the sampling procedure, because
it is virtually impossible to contact them. This is the primary limitation of the study.
Owing to time and financial restrictions, this study could not produce an overall
database for the case-study area. Rather, the research had to be limited to the results
of the sampling area. However, the findings can be generalised to the entire business
population in the case-study area. Another potential limitation is the accuracy of
the data, since it came from self-reported information that could not be tested or
54  Ezgi Orhan

verified. The information collected from the affected area tended to be overstated
to draw attention to losses. In addition, there is no other research on or record of busi-
ness preparedness.

Independent variables
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the study’s independent variables. Business
size is measured on an ordinal scale and grouped as small and large firms according
to the number of employees. Since the research includes businesses ranging from
self-employed small firms to labour-intensive entities, and the division of the sample
is very uneven in this regard, the sample does not allow for a meaningful analysis
of the relation between business size and preparedness level. Therefore, the business

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent variables

Independent variables % N

Number of employees 1–5 97.0 225

>5 3.0 7

Business sector Manufacturing 21.1 49

Construction 9.5 22

Trade 29.7 69

FIRE 14.7 34

Service 22.4 52

Other 2.6 6

Financial condition prior to the disaster In trouble 4.7 11

Not so good 22.0 51

Good 67.7 157

Excellent 5.6 13

Occupancy tenure Own 60.3 140

Lease 39.7 92

Market range Neighbourhood 17.2 40

City 78.0 181

Regional 4.7 11

Education level Primary school 3.0 7

High school 40.9 95

Graduate 53.9 125

Master’s degree/Doctor of Philosophy 2.2 5

Business age 14–­9 9 mean 20.7

Previous disaster experience Yes 13.8 32

No 86.2 200
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 55

size variable is excluded from the following analytical procedures. The business
sector variable is broken down into six sectors: manufacturing; construction; trade;
FIRE; service; and other. The variables of occupancy tenure and previous disaster
experience are measured dichotomously: whether the property is owned or leased;
and whether or not the firm has experienced a disaster. The remaining variables are
measured on an ordinal scale.

Dependent variable
The dependent variable of the analysis is the degree of preparedness, a continuous
measure. In this paper, the ability to take precautionary measures and to develop
responsive mechanisms to counter the threat of a natural hazard is accepted as the
indicator of preparedness. This indicator is considered to be the dependent variable
in the analysis. There is a wide range of precautionary measures that businesses can
introduce to guard against disasters. This paper accepts that firms that have taken
precautionary measures are prepared to differing degrees for a disaster. That is, pre-
paredness is related to the total number of measures undertaken by firms. While firms
that implement measures are assumed to be prepared, those that have not done so
are accepted as being unprepared. The dependent variable of this study, prepared-
ness level, is the index of the eight items listed in Table 3. Specifically, respondent
firms were asked to indicate what types of preparedness activities they had engaged
in before the 1999 İzmit earthquake. Initiatives included purchasing insurance, con-
ducting a structural assessment, preparing an emergency plan, training employees,
hiring a disaster manager, making alternative location arrangements, and building
redundancy into the business (see Table 3).
  The mean number of preparedness activities conducted by firms in Adapazarı
before the 1999 İzmit earthquake is 0.81 (out of eight measures). Less than one-half
of the respondent firms mentioned taking preparedness measures before the event.
Nineteen per cent of respondent firms implemented a single preparedness measure

Table 3. Type of prevention measures

Types of prevention measures Before (%) After (%)

Insurance for property, equipment and machinery 29.27 74.14

Business interruption insurance 3.45 30.17

Structural measures (retrofitting, fixing equipment) 22.41 55.17

Preparation of an emergency plan 3.45 17.24

Training employees for disaster risk management 3.45 10.34

Hiring a disaster manager 13.36 33.62

Making alternative location arrangements 3.02 12.93

Building of redundancy into the business 3.88 17.24

Other 0 10.34
56  Ezgi Orhan

whereas 21 per cent of the sample introduced two or more measures before the
seismic shock. These figures show that businesses are reluctant to participate in any
emergency activities.
  The most common type of preparedness measure among businesses was insur-
ance for property, equipment, and machinery (29.27 per cent). This was followed
by structural measures (22.41 per cent) and hiring a disaster manager (13.36 per cent).
Other preparedness measures comprise a small proportion in comparison to these
variables. Since the listed measures are scored at very low levels, it is apparent that the
business community of Adapazarı was not prepared for the 1999 İzmit earthquake.
It is important to note that, despite the city being struck by earthquakes in 1923,
1943, 1957, and 1967 (Altun et al., 1967), businesses had not implemented measures
adequately before 1999.
  Regarding the post-disaster period, firms were asked what kind of preparedness
measures they had carried out after the event. The mean number of preparedness
measures rose from 0.81 to 2.61 (out of eight measures), yet this is still below the
expected level. Again, the most common type of measure was insurance for prop-
erty, equipment, and machinery (74.14 per cent). This was followed by structural
measures (55.17 per cent) and hiring a disaster manager (33.62 per cent). Furthermore,
an increase was observed in relation to all types of prevention measures after the dis-
aster as compared to before the disaster.
  The case study reveals that a business that takes preventive measures before a
disaster also tends to engage in preparedness after a disaster, a point consistent with
previous research (see, for example, Tierney, 1997; Tierney and Webb, 2001; Powell
and Harding, 2009). However, pre-event measures mainly centre on life-saving and
structural actions whereas post-event measures focus primarily on making arrange-
ments for business continuity. In their study of the Northridge earthquake of 1994,
Tierney and Dahlhamer (1997, p. 3) found that ‘the measures undertaken frequently
before the earthquake included having first aid supplies on hand, learning first aid,
attending meetings or obtaining preparedness information; after the earthquake, the
measures most commonly undertaken were bracing shelves and equipment, [and] talk-
ing to employees about preparedness’. The pre- and post-event difference reported
in this study is that actions related to business continuity have increased among firms.
Business continuity insurance, building redundancy into the business, making alter-
native location arrangements, and preparing emergency plans seem to serve as respon-
sive mechanisms for potential future threats.

Results
To understand which factors determine business preparedness prior to a disaster shock,
this study analyses the relationship between preparedness and independent variables.
The mean value of preparedness as the index of eight items is determined accord-
ing to the independent variables. Higher scores indicate more preparedness activi-
ties for the given variable than do lower scores.
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 57

Figure 1. Relationship between business preparedness and independent factors

Figure 1a. Relationship between preparedness and business sector

Figure 1b. Relationship between preparedness and pre-disaster economic condition

Figure 1c. Relationship between preparedness and business age

Figure 1d. Relationship between preparedness and occupancy status

58  Ezgi Orhan

Figure 1e. Relationship between preparedness and market range

Figure 1f. Relationship between preparedness and education level

Figure 1g. Relationship between preparedness and previous disaster experience education level

Source: author.

  The first variable examined is that of the business sector. According to the results,
the construction sector obtained the highest mean scores (see Figure 1a), followed by
firms in the manufacturing and FIRE sectors. This finding is difficult to explain.
The reason could be that firms operating in the construction, manufacturing, and
FIRE sectors have paid more attention to the potential effects of disasters due to
having earthquake insurance or employing structural measures. By contrast, busi-
nesses in the trade sector engage least in preparedness. This finding corresponds with
previous studies (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Tierney, 1997), which assert that
firms in the trade sector are less likely to introduce measures before a disaster. This
finding may relate to the small size of firms operating in the trade sector and the
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 59

competitive structure of the market (Runyan, 2006). In crowded markets, firms

are challenged by competition on a daily basis and face difficulties in coping with tax
burdens and other expenses related to business operations (Tierney and Webb, 2001).
One could conclude, therefore, that firms in the trade and service sectors of a small
size and confronting a competitive market are less likely to engage in preparedness.
  The study went on to show that firms with a worse pre-disaster economic condi-
tion are more likely to engage in preparedness (see Figure 1b). This finding is not
consistent with expectations. The research assumes that financially-robust businesses
are more likely to engage in preparedness since they have more resources to allocate
prior to a disaster. It is surprising to find that firms in a poor financial condition are
more likely to initiate preparedness activities. The negative relation between finan-
cial robustness and preparedness indicates that the most vulnerable firms in financial
terms are more likely to invest in preparedness to survive the aftermath of a disaster.
This finding could be associated with the adaptive strategy of such businesses, as they
try to reach a new equilibrium post disaster by investing in preparedness.
  The next variable evaluated was business age. It was assumed that older firms
would be more likely to allocate resources for preparedness (Webb, Tierney, and
Dahlhamer, 2002). Firms aged between 20 and 39 years scored the highest percent-
ages with regard to employing preparedness activities (see Figure 1c). Older firms in
the sample are more likely to take precautionary measures than are their younger
counterparts since they are more established and may have more resources to draw
on in the pre-event period (Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 2002).
  For the occupancy status variable, it was expected that owner-occupied firms
would engage more in preparedness than would firms with rented property. In line
with the existing literature (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995; Webb, Tierney, and
Dahlhamer, 1999), this study confirms that occupancy status influences the likeli-
hood of measures being taken. It found that owner-occupied firms are more likely
to initiate preparedness activities than those with rented property (see Figure 1d).
The reason may be that owners simply are able to undertake a broader range of pre-
paredness measures. That is, the legal structure may accord owners more rights to
employ precautionary measures, such as insurance and retrofitting. In addition, prop-
erty owners may feel that they have more to lose than do lease holders.
  With respect to preparedness and market range, the highest percentage of pre-
paredness scores was among firms serving a regional market (see Figure 1e). Those
whose primary markets are mainly regional or national are more likely to introduce
measures before a disaster than are those operating on a neighbourhood or urban
scale. This finding can be explained by their ability to operate outside of the earth-
quake-hit area and to develop strategies to maintain business continuity through a
broader market range. Firms serving a market beyond the local economy are able
to spread risks via diverse business linkages and input–output relations that support
responsive mechanisms.
  Next, the study found that firms with a better education level are more likely to
engage in preparedness activities, despite the scores of those with a primary school
60  Ezgi Orhan

degree (see Figure 1f ). The highest mean scores were observed in firms with a man-
ager or an owner with a master’s or a doctorate degree. It could be that firms with
a better educated manager or owner are more aware of the possible outcomes of a
disaster and thus are more likely to invest in preparedness than those with a manager
or owner with a lower education level.
  The final variable examined was previous disaster experience. It was expected that
firms with previous disaster experience would be more likely to engage in prepar-
edness (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1995, p. 20). Yet, the research revealed that firms
without any disaster experience took more measures than those with previous disaster
experience (see Figure 1g). This is particularly surprising considering the earthquakes
that have occurred in Adapazarı; one would assume that businesses previously chal-
lenged by an earthquake would engage in more preparedness activities to increase
their responsive capacity than those without any such experience. However, the out-
come may be related to the rare frequency of destructive earthquakes, leading to
limited recall among firms.

Discussion
Given that disaster-related risks are becoming increasingly important in urban plan-
ning, national security, and development, attempts are being made to make the built
environment and economic units more resilient to disruptive challenges. Since the
aim of community resilience is to minimise any reductions in the quality of life,
business entities need to be able to guarantee their functioning after a disaster.
  This paper asserts that preparedness is a significant tool for enhancing the adap-
tive capacity of communities vis-à-vis the disturbances posed by natural hazards.
Preparedness increases opportunities for communities to achieve the new normal and
to continue functioning. Every community actor needs to be prepared, particularly
businesses, as the economic units.
  This study shows, though, that the disaster response capacity of businesses is low
in Adapazarı in terms of the preparedness level. It found that a vast majority of
businesses had little preparedness before the 1999 İzmit earthquake. Although busi-
ness preparedness contributes to community resilience to disasters, more than one-
half of the firms under review did not engage in any preparedness activities prior
to the event. And only 20 per cent of businesses introduced a single measure. The
most common type of preparedness is the taking out of insurance, yet only 30 per cent
of the businesses surveyed invested before the earthquake.
  The low level of preparedness revealed in this research underlines that policies are
needed to increase the resilience of businesses. The respondent firms are aware of
the risk of an earthquake, but they demonstrate little willingness to engage in pre-
paredness and mitigation activities, even after the 1999 İzmit earthquake. To deal
successfully with natural disasters, it is essential that community resilience focuses on
augmenting the preparedness capacity of the community and its various components.
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 61

  Consequently, it is suggested here that each community member assess and address
their own vulnerabilities and enhance their own disaster-related capacities (Norris
et al., 2008). However, preparedness and recovery strategies developed individually
are not enough to enable business continuity. To be effective, additional initiatives
that target business preparedness should be implemented at the policy level, including
financial, physical, and spatial measures.
  In this regard, the findings of this study could be used to address four key points:

• First, the preparedness activities of businesses must be supported by financial measures.

• Second, pre-disaster planning is an outcome of a participatory process.
• Third, disaster insights are needed within all segments of a community.
• Fourth, businesses need to launch education campaigns to prepare effectively for
disasters.

  The case-study findings reveal that businesses are less likely to invest in insurance,
so they should be able to obtain a loan or credit to recover after a disaster. Firms
tend to allocate personal savings or business reserves for recovery, which may result
in substantial economic losses—this money could be used to further business invest-
ments. For the sustainable development of businesses, firms should introduce meas-
ures that would increase their investment in insurance. One financial policy tool in
this respect is the Investment Incitement Code that supports firms in taking out
insurance and carrying out preparedness measures. The Code, first initiated in
Turkey in 2004 (Act No. 5084), may provide advantages such as energy provision, tax
relief, and free land for investments (Acar and Ça ğ lar, 2012). Incitement codes can
enhance the investment and employment opportunities facing businesses in disaster-
prone areas, as well as their disaster response capacity, through debt relief, low-interest
loans, tax exemption, and so on. Furthermore, they should accord priority to cities
confronting a higher risk of disaster—to make their business environment resilient—
and to firms that are less likely to access resources following a disaster.
  Pre-disaster planning aims to boost community resilience. The process could involve
all community units, widely believed to be fundamental for community resilience
(Pfefferbaum et al., 2005, cited in Norris et al., 2003, p. 139). The participatory
environment allows decision-makers to be sensitive to the diversity, the abilities, and
the interests of community members, and to consider the different expectations of
community components, such as businesses, households, local governments, and public
organisations. During the preparation of mitigation plans, businesses could be informed
about their vulnerabilities, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, policymakers
evaluate the needs and expectations of businesses. Hence, the plan would reflect the
perceptions of firms, and more significantly, lead to the efficient use of resources.
  Despite the vulnerability of businesses, this study underlines that, even after the
1999 İzmit earthquake, the mean number of preparedness measures is slightly higher
than before the disaster. To increase preparedness for future disasters, the perception
of the disaster should be kept alive. Disaster awareness could be enhanced through
62  Ezgi Orhan

the creation of a public memory. Goodman et al. (1998, p. 261, cited in Norris et al.,
2008, p. 139) contend that the development of such a public memory is an attribute
of resilient communities, solidifying the sense of place attachment. An urban memo-
rial contributes to inspiration regarding disaster risks and losses, especially among
firms without disaster experience. A disaster memory, therefore, may increase willing-
ness to engage in preparedness activities, particularly in the long term.

Conclusion
This study shows that the education level variable is positively associated with busi-
ness preparedness. Thus, managers or owners of firms with poorer education levels
need to be informed about their vulnerability to disasters.
  Disaster mitigation should be part of the education curriculum. Lessons on disaster
mitigation should be designed at each level, especially at the primary level. Students
should be informed about disaster risks and the ways to cope with them. As a result,
business owners and employees could gain insights during the compulsory education
years. Aside from these lessons, relevant institutions, such as chambers, ministries,
and universities, could organise campaigns to raise awareness of the disaster risks
to businesses.
  This paper has presented a scientific approach to the business aspects of the dis-
aster literature. The debate, which is in its infancy, can be advanced with further
research. The findings of this study suggest two principal lines of inquiry for future
work. The first is to examine the outcomes of preparedness for business recovery.
Decision-makers must consider the problems that occur during the recovery period
and recognise the shortcomings of policies before a disaster strikes an urban area,
in order to maintain resources and to keep businesses operational. To do so, addi-
tional information is required on how businesses are affected by disasters, what type
of assistance really ensures business viability, and which pre-disaster measures reduce
vulnerability at the aggregate level. The second potential line of inquiry concerns
factors that may explain the response capacity of businesses, other than the variables
employed here. Community- and neighbourhood-related factors, including the
renewal of the location, alternative routes for accessing the area, and the strengthen-
ing of infrastructure, make the research more powerful in understanding the impacts
of site on response capacity at the aggregate level. Since businesses are not only
affected by disasters in terms of direct physical damage, a variety of measures to ensure
business viability need to be defined, apart from those that concentrate on the retro-
fitting of a building to protect lives and property. Hence, there is an urgent need to
comprehend how businesses react to disasters in order to enhance community resilience.

Correspondence
Ezgi Orhan, Department of City and Regional Planning, Pamukkale University,
20070 Denizli, Turkey. E-mail: ezgiorhann@gmail.com
 Building community resilience: business preparedness lessons in the case of Adapazarı, Turkey 63

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