The Syrian Arab Army seeking to

encircle rebels in Aleppo (30 August)

to cut supply lines.

Separating enemy held territories is

a common military strategy.

Military tactics encompasses the art of organising and employing fighting forces on or
near the battlefield. They involve the application of four battlefield functions which are
closely related – kinetic or firepower, mobility, protection or security, and shock action.
Tactics are a separate function from command and control and logistics. In contemporary
military science, tactics are the lowest of three levels of warfighting, the higher levels being
the strategic and operational levels. Throughout history, there has been a shifting balance
between the four tactical functions, generally based on the application of military
technology, which has led to one or more of the tactical functions being dominant for a
period of time, usually accompanied by the dominance of an associated fighting arm
deployed on the battlefield, such as infantry, artillery, cavalry or tanks.[1]

Tactical functions

Kinetic or firepower

Beginning with the use of melee and missile weapons such as clubs and spears, the kinetic
or firepower function of tactics has developed along with technological advances so that
the emphasis has shifted over time from the close-range melee and missile weapons to
longer-range projectile weapons. Kinetic effects were generally delivered by the sword,
spear, javelin and bow until the introduction of artillery by the Romans. Until the mid 19th

century, the value of infantry-delivered missile firepower was not high, meaning that the
result of a given battle was rarely decided by infantry firepower alone, often relying on
artillery to deliver significant kinetic effects. The development of disciplined volley fire,
delivered at close range, began to improve the hitting power of infantry, and compensated
in part for the limited range, poor accuracy and low rate of fire of early muskets. Advances
in technology, particularly the introduction of the rifled musket, used in the Crimean War
and American Civil War, meant flatter trajectories and improved accuracy at greater ranges,
along with higher casualties. The resulting increase in defensive firepower meant infantry
attacks without artillery support became increasingly difficult. Firepower also became
crucial to fixing an enemy in place to allow a decisive strike. Machine guns added
significantly to infantry firepower at the turn of the 20th century, and the mobile firepower
provided by tanks, self-propelled artillery and military aircraft rose significantly in the
century that followed. Along with infantry weapons, tanks and other armoured vehicles, self-
propelled artillery, guided weapons and aircraft provide the firepower of modern armies.[2]

Mobility

Mobility, which determines how quickly a fighting force can move, was for most of human
history limited by the speed of a soldier on foot, even when supplies were carried by beasts
of burden. With this restriction, most armies could not travel more than 32 kilometres
(20 mi) per day, unless travelling on rivers. Only small elements of a force such as cavalry or
specially trained light troops could exceed this limit. This restriction on tactical mobility
remained until the latter years of World War I when the advent of the tank improved mobility
sufficiently to allow decisive tactical manoeuvre. Despite this advance, full tactical mobility
was not achieved until World War II when armoured and motorised formations achieved
remarkable successes. However, large elements of the armies of World War II remained
reliant on horse-drawn transport, which limited tactical mobility within the overall force.
Tactical mobility can be limited by the use of field obstacles, often created by military
engineers.[3]

Protection and security

Personal armour has been worn since the classical period to provide a measure of individual
protection, which was also extended to include barding of the mount. The limitations of
armour have always been weight and bulk, and its consequent effects on mobility as well as
human and animal endurance. By the 18th and 19th centuries, personal armour had been

largely discarded, until the re-introduction of helmets during World War I in response to the
firepower of artillery. Armoured fighting vehicles proliferated during World War II, and after
that war, body armour returned for the infantry, particularly in Western armies.
Fortifications, which have been used since ancient times, provide collective protection, and
modern examples include entrenchments, roadblocks, barbed wire and minefields. Like
obstacles, fortifications are often created by military engineers.[3]

Shock action

Shock action is as much a psychological function of tactics as a physical one, and can be
significantly enhanced by the use of surprise. It has been provided by charging infantry, and
well as by chariots, war elephants, cavalry and armoured vehicles which provide momentum
to an assault. It has also been used in a defensive way, for example by the drenching flights
of arrows from English longbowmen at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 which caused the
horses of the French knights to panic. During early modern warfare, the use of the tactical
formations of columns and lines had a greater effect than the firepower of the formations
alone. During the early stages of World War II, the combined effects of German machine
gun and tank gun firepower, enhanced by accurate indirect fire and air attack, often broke
up Allied units before their assault commenced, or caused them to falter due to casualties
among key unit leaders. In both the early modern and World War II examples, the cumulative
psychological shock effect on the enemy was often greater than the actual casualties
incurred.[4]

Development over time

The development of tactics has involved a shifting balance between the four tactical
functions since ancient times, and changes in firepower and mobility have been
fundamental to these changes. Various models have been proposed to explain the
interaction between the tactical functions and the dominance of individual fighting arms
during different periods. J. F. C. Fuller proposed three "tactical cycles" in each of the
classical and Christian eras. For the latter epoch, he proposed a "shock" cycle between 650
and 1450, a "shock and projectile" cycle 1450–1850, and a "projectile" cycle from 1850, with
respect to the Western and North American warfare[5]. During World War II, Tom
Wintringham proposed six chronological periods, which alternate the dominance between
unarmoured and armoured forces and highlight tactical trends in each period.[1]

Development of tactics[6]
Period Dominant fighting arm Tactical trends

First
unarmoured None – both infantry and cavalry
Egyptian, Persian and Greek armies
period have relatively low kinetic power,
become better organised and
(to the Battle of chariots provide a measure of
equipped
Plataea shock action
(479 BC))

First armoured
Infantry – the phalanx and Roman
period Armies and casualties increase
legion, experimentation with
(to the Battle of significantly, introduction of siege and
elephants for shock action only a
Adrianople field artillery by the Romans
limited success
(378)

Second
unarmoured
period
Light cavalry – horse archers and Mobility dominates until checked by
(to
shock action defeat infantry armoured cavalry
Charlemagne's
victory at Pavia
(774))

Second
armoured
Expense limits numbers of armoured
period Heavy cavalry – facilitated by the
cavalry, Swiss infantry armed with
(to the battles introduction of the stirrup and
halberds and English longbowmen
of Morgarten armour
rebalance the scales
(1315) and
Crécy (1346))

Third
unarmoured
Infantry – with steadily increasing Combined arms, with artillery
period
firepower firepower becoming predominant
(to the Battle of
Cambrai (1917)

Third
Armoured combined arms countered
armoured
Armoured forces restore mobility by military aircraft and infantry anti-
period
(to the present) armour weapons

Massed volley fire by archers brought infantry firepower to the fore in Japanese warfare in
the second half of the 13th century, preceding the rise of the English longbowman.[7] The
mobility and shock action of the Oirat Mongol army at the Battle of Tumu in 1449
demonstrated that cavalry could still defeat a large infantry force.[8] In both the European
and Oriental traditions of warfare, the advent of gunpowder during the late Medieval and
Early Modern periods created a relentless shift to infantry firepower becoming "a decisive, if
not dominant" arm on the battlefield,[9] exemplified by the significant impact of massed
arquebusiers at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575.[10]

Combined arms tactics

The synchronisation of the various fighting arms to achieve the tactical mission is known as
combined arms tactics. One method of measuring tactical effectiveness is the extent to
which the arms, including military aviation, are integrated on the battlefield. A key principle
of effective combined arms tactics is that for maximum potential to be achieved, all
elements of combined arms teams need the same level of mobility, and sufficient firepower
and protection. The history of the development of combined arms tactics has been dogged
by costly and painful lessons. For example, while German commanders in World War II
clearly understood from the outset the key principle of combined arms tactics outlined
above, British commanders were late to this realisation. Successful combined arms tactics
require the fighting arms to train alongside each other and to be familiar with each others
capabilities.[11]

Impact of air power

Beginning in the latter stages of World War I, airpower has brought a significant change to
military tactics. World War II saw the development of close air support which greatly
enhanced the effect of ground forces with the use of aerial firepower and improved tactical
reconnaissance and the interdiction of hostile air power. It also made possible the supply of
ground forces by air, achieved by the British during the Burma Campaign but unsuccessful
for the Germans at the Battle of Stalingrad. Following World War II, rotary-wing aircraft had
a significant impact on firepower and mobility, comprising a fighting arm in its own right in
many armies. Aircraft, particularly those operating at low or medium altitudes, remain

vulnerable to ground-based air defence systems as well as other aircraft.[11]

Parachute and glider operations and rotary-wing aircraft have provided significant mobility
to ground forces but the reduced mobility, protection and firepower of troops delivered by
air once landed has limited the tactical utility of such vertical envelopment or air assault
operations. This was demonstrated during Operation Market Garden in September 1944,
and during the Vietnam War, in the latter case despite the additional firepower provided by
helicopter gunships and the ability quickly to remove casualties, provided by aeromedical
evacuation.[12]

Concept

German World War I observation

post disguised as a tree.
Military tactics answer the questions of how best to deploy and employ forces on a small
scale.[13] Some practices have not changed since the dawn of warfare: assault, ambushes,
skirmishing, turning flanks, reconnaissance, creating and using obstacles and defenses, etc.
Using ground to best advantage has not changed much either. Heights, rivers, swamps,
passes, choke points, and natural cover, can all be used in multiple ways. Before the
nineteenth century, many military tactics were confined to battlefield concerns: how to
maneuver units during combat in open terrain. Nowadays, specialized tactics exist for many
situations, for example for securing a room in a building.

Technological changes can render existing tactics obsolete, and sociological changes can
shift the goals and methods of warfare, requiring new tactics. Tactics define how soldiers
are armed and trained. Thus technology and society influence the development of types of
soldiers or warriors through history: Greek Hoplite, Roman Legionary, Medieval Knight, Turk-
Mongol Horse Archer, Chinese Crossbowman, or an Air Cavalry trooper. Each – constrained
by his weaponry, logistics and social conditioning – would use a battlefield differently, but
would usually seek the same outcomes from their use of tactics. The First World War forced
great changes in tactics as advances in technology rendered prior tactics useless.[14]

See also

Ancient Macedonian battle tactics

 List of military tactics

Combat arms

References

Notes
h. Holmes et al. 2001, pp. 893–894.

i. Holmes et al. 2001, pp. 894–895.

j. Holmes et al. 2001, p. 895.

k. Holmes et al. 2001, pp. 895–896.

l. Holmes 2001, p. "Introduction".

m. Holmes et al. 2001, p. 894.

n. Haskew et al. 2008, p. 17.

o. Haskew et al. 2008, pp. 12–17.

p. Haskew et al. 2008, pp. 7–8.

hq. Haskew et al. 2008, pp. 54–62.

hh. Holmes et al. 2001, p. 896.

hi. Holmes et al. 2001, pp. 896–897.

hj. Rogers, Clifford J. (2006). "Strategy, Operational Design, and Tactics" . In Bradford,
James C. (ed.). International Encyclopedia of Military History. New York: Routledge.

hk. Paddy Griffith (1994). Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of
Attack, 1916–18. Yale University Press. p. 20.

Bibliography
Haskew, Michael; Jorgensen, Christer; McNab, Chris; Niderost, Eric; Rice, Rob S. (2008).
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and
Tactics . London, United Kingdom: Amber Books. ISBN 978-1-905704-96-5.

Holmes, Richard; Strachan, Hew; Bellamy, Chris; Bicheno, Hugh (2001). The Oxford
Companion to Military History . Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
ISBN 978-0-19-866209-9.

Johnson, Rob, Michael Whitby, John France (2010). How to win on the battlefield : 25 key
tactics to outwit, outflank, and outfight the enemy. Thames & Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-
25161-4.

Muhm, Gerhard. "German Tactics in the Italian Campaign" . Archived from the original
on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 27 September 2007.
 Gerhard Muhm : La Tattica nella campagna ass dʼItalia, in LINEA GOTICA AVAMPOSTO
DEI BALCANI, (Hrsg.) Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993.

External links

Contemporary Marine tactics for war fighting

Napoleon's tactics and strategy

Small Unit Actions during German Campaign in Russia

Last edited 6 months ago by Zongxi