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Bogue (2017) The Force That Is But Does Not Act: Ruyer, Leibniz and Deleuze
Bogue (2017) The Force That Is But Does Not Act: Ruyer, Leibniz and Deleuze
Abstract
In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari attribute to Leibniz and
Raymond Ruyer a vitalism of ‘a force that is but does not act’. This
is a judicious characterisation of Leibniz’s vitalism, but not Ruyer’s.
In The Fold, Deleuze presents Ruyer as a disciple of Leibniz, but if
Leibniz’s monads have no doors or windows, Ruyer’s are nothing but
doors and windows, nothing but liaisons actively forming themselves.
For Ruyer, there is only one force, a consciousness-force, matter-form
in sustained, non-localisable self-formation. In Deleuze’s reading of
Leibniz’s concept of the vinculum substantiale, Deleuze comes close to
presenting a notion of force like that of Ruyer’s, in that the vinculum
inextricably interfolds monads and bodies, but ultimately the separation
of the forces of monads from those of bodies prevails in a fashion
incompatible with Ruyer’s conception of force. Deleuze and Guattari
make use of Ruyer’s understanding of consciousness and the brain as
the auto-overflight of an absolute surface in their concluding remarks
on philosophy and the arts in What Is Philosophy?, but they depart
from Ruyer in their characterisation of the relation of force to those two
domains, ultimately because they reject Ruyer’s advocacy of a universal,
goal-directed finalism.
Keywords: Ruyer, Leibniz, force, monad, vinculum substantiale, finalism
In an essay on Leibniz and Deleuze, Daniel W. Smith aptly observes:
In the end, Deleuze does with Leibniz what he does with every figure in the
history of philosophy: through an extraordinarily careful conceptual reading,
biological and cosmic, that serves the same function as God in Kant’s
system.
Perhaps the vitalism of Kant and Bernard may be construed as ‘that
of an Idea that acts, but is not’, in that the Idea has no physical
existence, and yet mysteriously manages to direct the formation of
physical phenomena. In the case of Kant especially one may say that the
Idea acts ‘only from the point of view of an external cerebral knowledge’,
given that the purposiveness of nature is evident only through a reflective
judgement. But one might just as well describe this vitalism as that of
an idea ‘that is but does not act’, especially in the case of Bernard,
who explicitly denies that the metaphysical directive force is active.
And indeed, Deleuze himself characterises the vitalism of Kant and
Bernard in such terms in The Fold, noting that their vitalism ‘breaks
with animism, all the while keeping two levels, the one being mechanical
and the other only regulative or directive, in a word, “ideal” without
being active’ (Deleuze 1993: 160). For Ruyer, either characterisation
would be acceptable, since both point to the fundamental problem
of maintaining the existence of purposive ideas or directive forces
and mechanical, deterministic physical phenomena without explaining
how the two levels interact. Ruyer’s solution is to argue that the
forces of directive, purposive ideas and those of deterministic physical
phenomena are the same forces, simply manifested in two different
ways.
from viruses and bacteria to human beings, inherits the memory of the
theme that will guide it in its morphogenesis.
That memory, however, is not like a fully detailed blueprint, program
or code. Ruyer rejects all versions of preformationism, arguing instead
for a kind of guided epigenesis. A mouse embryo, for example, possesses
the memory of its ‘mouseness’, a knowledge of how to make itself as
a mouse, but the process of its self-formation is a task that entails
invention, adaptation, adjustment and constant re-equilibration. The
embryo begins with a rough sketch of its architecture, and then builds
itself through progressive differentiations – first the axes of front–back,
top–bottom and bilateral symmetry, then more specific differentiations,
such as the bud of a limb, a right limb, a right front limb, and so on.
At each stage, the mouse plays out its developmental theme, but as a
guided ad hoc variation on the theme that grows increasingly detailed
as it progresses. Hence, says Ruyer, ‘the organism forms itself with risks
and perils; it is not formed. . . . The living being forms itself directly
according to the theme, without the theme having first to become idea-
image and represented model’ (Ruyer 1958: 261–2).
The developmental theme of unicellular organisms is relatively simple
compared with those of complex organisms – such as mice, cats and
humans – for such organisms are themselves hierarchies of self-forming
forms. The organs of the mouse, for example, are self-forming forms
brought under the dominance of the ‘mouse form’. The mouse, then, is
a colony of forms, a coordinated group project involving a hierarchy of
agents. Yet the difference between ‘organ’ and ‘individual’ is not always
clear. Indeed, ‘the hesitation between “being an individual” and “being
the organ of an individual” is found throughout the organic domain’
(Ruyer 1958: 95). Since every self-forming form is a consciousness,
which we may call an ‘I’, we may thus say of every human being, as of
every complex organism, ‘“I” am made of all the other I’s that I have
already produced as if through a sort of cellular division of internal
and dominated reproduction. I am a colony, both psychological and
biological’ (Ruyer 1958: 97).
It is important to note that Ruyer’s concept of the developmental
theme does not imply a conventional idealism, for the theme, though
‘trans-spatial’, is always immanent within the material world. The theme
‘never loses contact with the spatio-temporal plane’, even though it ‘is
not constrained to actualise in space, at every moment, the totality of
the structure which it is capable of constructing’ (Ruyer 1946: 13). At
a mouse embryo’s conception, for example, its developmental theme
exists mostly as a virtual potential, but as the mouse grows, the theme
Ruyer, Leibniz and Deleuze 525
Souls do not act on bodies, and the belonging of a body to a soul does
not constitute an action:
But the belonging makes us enter into a strangely intermediate, or rather,
original, zone, in which every body acquires the individuality of a possessive
insofar as it belongs to a private soul, and souls accede to a public status;
that is, they are taken in a crowd or in a heap, inasmuch as they belong to
a collective body. Is it not in this zone, in this depth or this material fabric
between the two levels [of monads and bodies], that the upper is folded over
the lower, such that we can no longer tell where one ends and the other
begins, or where the sensible ends and the intelligible begins? (Deleuze 1993:
119; translation modified)
terms of the vinculum, one may say that reasonable souls, or rational
monads, are always dominant; animal monads are those that may either
be dominated by a dominant vinculum or themselves dominate other
monads (animal monads); and bare entelechies are those monads that
do not come under the control of a vinculum. Bare entelechies, unlike
the other monads, exist only as masses in constant perturbation. They
are mere tendencies, whose unity of movement has to be ‘recreated or
reconstituted at each and every instant’ (Deleuze 1993: 117). Primitive
and derivative forces are commonly divided between monads and bodies,
but via the vinculum Deleuze argues that they are the same force:
Derivative forces are none other than primitive forces, but they differ from
them in status or aspect. Primitive forces are monads or substances in
themselves and by themselves. Derivative forces are the same, but under a
vinculum or in the flash of an instant. In one case, they are taken in multitudes
[en foules] . . . while in the other they are taken in a mass [en amas]. (Deleuze
1993: 117; translation modified)
the unity – of the three planes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 208) of
philosophy, art and science – the plane of immanence, the plane of
composition and the plane of reference. Deleuze and Guattari insist that
the brain is not to be considered in terms of a map of connections
among various specialised sites, nor in terms of a Gestalt of forces in
relations of tension and equilibrium, since both models resort to a logic
of partes extra partes, de proche en proche: ‘Ready-made paths that are
followed step by step [de proche en proche] imply a preestablished track,
but trajectories constituted within a field of forces proceed through
resolution of tensions also acting step by step [de proche en proche]’
(209). Instead, the brain must be seen as an ‘auto-overflight’, ‘a “true
form”, primary, as Ruyer defined it: neither a Gestalt nor a perceived
point of view but a form in itself ’. Such a form ‘remains copresent to
all its determinations without proximity or distance, traverses them at
infinite speed’, and ‘makes of them so many inseparable variations on
which it confers an equipotentiality without confusion’ (210; translation
modified).
This account of the brain relies heavily on Ruyer, who himself speaks
at length about the brain as a self-forming form. Ruyer approaches
the topic via the concept of ‘equipotentiality’, a characteristic exhibited
by embryos and, Ruyer argues, by brains as well. Embryonic cells
initially are unspecified in their function, equipotential in their ability
to assume various forms during the process of differentiation. (Today
we speak of pluripotent stem cells.) Such equipotentiality, he argues,
‘is not, properly speaking, a “property” of material tissues and their
chemistry’ (Ruyer 1952: 59; 2012: 66), but the characteristic of an
absolute domain in auto-overflight. Experiments demonstrating the non-
localisable functions of the brain lead Ruyer to conclude that the brain,
too, is an absolute surface in auto-overflight, and hence equipotential.
‘The brain, in the adult organism, is an area that remains embryonic.’
Hence, ‘the brain is an embryo that has not completed its growth’,
whereas ‘the embryo is a brain, which begins to organise itself before
it organises the external world’ (Ruyer 1952: 73; 2012: 82).
Deleuze and Guattari associate the brain’s auto-overflight with
philosophy. In their analysis of the arts, by contrast, they identify a
second function of the brain – that of contracting sensations. Something
of Ruyer remains in this analysis when Deleuze and Guattari posit the
existence of ‘microbrains’, arguing that ‘not every organism has a brain,
and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute
microbrains, or an inorganic life of things’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:
213). Ruyer could assent to this observation, since in his terms, the
532 Ronald Bogue
VI. Conclusion
In the texts of Ruyer that Deleuze cites, there are many themes that
resonate with Deleuze’s philosophy, and hence there are grounds to
hypothesise a broad influence of Ruyer on Deleuze’s thought. But when
Deleuze actually cites Ruyer, it is most often to invoke his concept
of the auto-overflight of an absolute surface. To deploy this concept,
Deleuze extracts it from its context and directs it to his own uses
– chiefly, those of expanding on Leibniz’s theory of monads and of
characterising philosophy’s plane of consistency. In both instances, he
treats Ruyer as a disciple of Leibniz who advocates the vitalism of a
force that is but does not act. But Ruyer, though inspired by Leibniz,
formulates a much different monadology, one in which monads are
nothing but doors and windows, nothing but liaisons actively forming
themselves. His is a vitalism in which forces exist and act – indeed, their
action is synonymous with their being. For him, there is only one force,
always dynamic and goal-oriented. That force is consciousness-force,
matter-form in sustained, non-localisable self-formation. Deleuze finds
an ingenious and inventive use for the concept of auto-overflight, seizing
on its trans-spatial nature and utilising it in his own thought within
Ruyer, Leibniz and Deleuze 535
the domains of the virtual and the possible. But Deleuze’s Ruyer is an
other Ruyer, just as his Leibniz is an other Leibniz. Each is transformed
and reconfigured, subsumed within Deleuze’s ongoing philosophical
project. It is important to specify the changes Deleuze imposes on
Ruyer and Leibniz, not simply to differentiate Deleuze from Ruyer and
Leibniz, and thereby recognise the autonomous ends each pursues in
his respective philosophy, but also to appreciate the creative possibilities
that Deleuze opens up through his appropriations and transmutations of
their thought.
Notes
1. There is little secondary literature on Ruyer in French or English. Meslet 2005
provides a thorough examination of Ruyer’s philosophy of nature. Several
insightful essays may be found in Vax and Wunenburger 1995. For a brief
synopsis of Ruyer’s philosophy in English, see Wiklund 1960. For studies of
Ruyer and Deleuze, see Bains 2002 and Bogue 2009.
2. In 2012, the Presses universitaires de France published a reprint of
Néo-finalisme, with pagination different from that of the 1952 edition. In my
citations of Néo-finalisme, I include references to both the 1952 and 2012
editions.
3. The word survol poses special problems for English translators. The verb
survoler means literally ‘to fly over’, and a survol is a ‘flight over’ something.
In What Is Philosophy?, survol is translated as ‘survey’. In The Fold, survol is
rendered as ‘overview’, and en auto-survol as ‘self-surveiling’. To emphasise the
literal sense of the word, I have chosen to translate survol as ‘overflight’, and
auto-survol as ‘auto-overflight’.
4. It is worth noting that Ruyer says he takes the term ‘self-enjoyment’ (which he
always maintains in the original English) from Samuel Alexander’s 1920 Space,
Time and Deity (Ruyer 1952: 81), not from Whitehead, who himself borrowed
the term from Alexander. Ruyer shows sympathy for Whitehead throughout his
works, but Ruyer’s use of ‘self-enjoyment’ is distinct from that of Whitehead.
For Ruyer, ‘erlebt, enjoys, survole, pense’ (Ruyer 1946: 24) are synonyms.
5. Ruyer’s theology does provide a context in which it may be said that themes
exist beyond the living entities in which they are actualised. For Ruyer, all living
forms are agents working towards ideals. He identifies God ‘not with a being
or a meaning or an activity that is transcendent to the world, but with the two
poles [agent and ideal] of all finalist activities, which together make up the world.
God is thus the supreme Agent as well as the supreme Ideal, and “Creativity”
cannot be distinguished from a God who is simultaneously and indissolubly
Agent and Ideal’ (Ruyer 1952: 261; 2012: 285). God exists as agent within all
living forms and subsists within all the ideals towards which living forms work.
All living forms are free activities, but ‘there is only one free being, God in us,
and we only exist in creating, that is, in working according to the order of the
ideal, which is also God in all Ideals. . . . Our soul makes itself in making our
bodies and those prolongations of our body that are our tools. But the soul of
our soul, according to the expression of the mystics, never has to make itself,
because it is eternal, and it creates time and everything else. Just as we survive
the changes in objects on which we work, just as we can pass from one activity
536 Ronald Bogue
to another, . . . so God survives the changes of bodies and souls. Our soul dies
with our body, but the soul of our soul changes in body and soul, as we can
change the object of our activity. The metamorphoses of ancient Zeus are the
symbols of this truth: God takes us and leaves us just as we are able to take
up and leave an on-going task, although we are not truly able to cease acting’
(Ruyer 1952: 263; 2012: 287). In my judgement, the existence of an eternal
God as the ‘soul of the soul’ of all living forms does not alter the fact that the
developmental themes of all living forms qua living forms remain tied to their
material existence. God ‘cannot be isolated from the World. His finality is not
added to the finalities [of living forms]; his finality is the Sense/Meaning [Sens]
of those finalities’ (Ruyer 1952: 266; 2012: 290). It should be noted that Ruyer
rejects any notion of pre-established harmony in his conception of God. ‘Finally,
the idea of God as Ideal and as Agent is not in contradiction with our mediocre
traits, our faults, our evils, our sufferings, which are also his. The objection to
pantheism, positive mysticism and finalism has always been posed in terms of
the existence of negative values: ugliness, falseness, injustice, weakness, hate,
wickedness. But, just as one must not confuse vision of blackness with no vision
at all, so one must not confuse negative value and the absence of any axiology.
The philosophy that establishes the reality of finalism has no pretention to being
a theodicy’ (Ruyer 1952: 267; 2012: 291).
6. Deleuze cites as sources for his treatment of the vinculum substantiale Belaval
1952 and Frémont 1981. These are but two of a wide range of interpretations
of this difficult concept that have been offered by Leibniz scholars. For a
summary of the diverse positions that have been staked out in this contentious
interpretative field, see Look and Rutherford 2007.
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