MALACAÑANG

MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 198

PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF NOMINATION AND APPOINTMENT OF SECTORAL

REPRESENTATIVES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WHEREAS, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, that: “The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector;”

WHEREAS, Section 7, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution states, “Until a law is passed,
the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the
seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution;”

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby

order:

SECTION 1. Sectoral Representatives. – There shall be twenty-five (25) sectoral

representatives to the House of Representatives.

Nine (9) sectors shall be represented in the House of Representatives, namely: (a) labor; (b)
peasant; (c) urban poor; (d) indigenous cultural communities; (e) women; (f) youth; (g)
veterans; (h) the elderly and (i) the disabled, whose representatives shall be appointed by
the President from the nominees of their respective sectors or of a member of the sector in
the manner herein provided.

SECTION 2. Scope of the Sectors. – The labor sector refers to the industrial labor group,
which includes all non-agricultural workers and employees.

The peasant sector covers the agricultural group, which includes all persons who personally
and physically till the land as their principal occupation, agricultural tenants and lessees, rural
workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small fishermen.

The urban poor sector includes the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas.

The indigenous cultural communities sector covers all ethnic groups and cultural
communities.

The women sector shall cover all women.

The youth sector embraces persons not more than thirty-five years of age.

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The veterans sector embraces persons recognized as such veterans by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.

The elderly sector covers persons who are sixty-five years of age or over.

The sector of the disabled covers the physically and socially disabled.

SECTION 3. Nominations. – (a) Nominations of the sectoral representatives to the House of

Representatives must be made by the organizations/s or aggroupment of members of the
sectoral groups defined in Section 2 hereof or by a member of the sector.

(b) All nominations shall be filed with the Office of the President not later than July 20, 1987.

(c) Nominations must be in writing and accompanied by the following supporting documents,
namely; (i) curriculum vitae of the nominee/s; (ii) an indication of the sector to be represented
by the nominee; (iii) an endorsement of the nominating group or individual; and (iv) such other
relevant materials as may help the appointing authority.

SECTION 4. Term. – The sectoral representatives appointed to the House of

Representatives shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

SECTION 5. Vacancy. – In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for sectoral representatives
in the House of Representatives, the President shall fill the vacancy by appointing a
representative for such sector who shall serve for the unexpired term.

SECTION 6. Separability Clause. – Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may
be deemed unconstitutional shall not have the effect of nullifying other portions or provisions
thereof as long as such remaining portions or provisions can still subsist and be given effect
in their entirety.

SECTION 7. Effectivity Clause. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES v. COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS,

GR No. 83216, 1989-09-04
Facts:
seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita
Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from
subjecting petitioner's appointment to the confirmation process.

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On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by
the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of
the Constitution.
On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were scheduled to take
their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress after the
Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three... other sectoral representatives-
appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of
Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives... must first be confirmed by the
respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as
members of the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oathtaking... of the four sectoral representatives.
In reply, Speaker Mitra in a letter dated May 2, 1988 (Annex BB) informed petitioner that
since "President Corazon C. Aquino has submitted your appointment to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation in a letter dated April 11,... 1988, x x x the Commission on
Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter."
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and
Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the
Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral
Representative for Women by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, does not require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.
Issues:
The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives
to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Ruling:
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence
of the said Section 16, Article VII require... confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments,... Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives... to
the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16,
Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by
express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the
Ombudsman and... his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had
been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.

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Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant
thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed... appointments of sectoral
representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the
constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner.
We agree with the submission of respondent
Commission that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the manner of
appointment of sectoral representatives. Executive Order No. 198 confines itself to
specifying the sectors to be represented, their number, and... the nomination of such
sectoral representatives.
The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived
from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas"
clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the
President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution.
More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by... virtue of Executive
Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of
the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Principles:
"It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to
which we will hereafter refer from time to time,... are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution
No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their
charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose
charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other
hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when
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COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections,
Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to
Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said
that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage
of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the
Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the
total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province
of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu.
Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise
aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized
as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently
and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to
a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy
of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that
“The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement
that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being
only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the
creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of
their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would
show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient
economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is
geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need thecontinued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election
of provincialofficials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of
the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials.
The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote
for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is
a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right
of suffrage.

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Lozada v. Comelec, 120 SCRA 337 (1983)Parties:
JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA and ROMEO B. IGOT
,
petitioners,

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

,
respondent.
Nature of the Case:
This is a petition for
mandamus
filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot as arepresentative suit for and in
behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespectiveof party affiliation, to
compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill upexisting vacancies
numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition isbased on Section
5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
Facts of the Case:
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold
anelection to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their
contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy
arises
in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission onElection shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after
the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.”
COMELEC opposes the petition alleging,substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to
file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition;and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim BatasanPambansa.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in
thelegislature.
Held:
The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision,
orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution
which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
SupremeCourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.”
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to
bereviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the
aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority
on the SupremeCourt over the COMELEC.It is obvious that the holding of special elections
in several regional districts where vacanciesexist, would entail huge expenditure of money.
Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make thenecessary appropriation for the purpose,
and this power of the BP may neither be subject tomandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power ofappropriation. From the role BP has to

6
play in the holding of special elections, which is toappropriate the funds for the expenses
thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the mattermust come from the BP, not the
COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regularnot IBP. The power to
appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body,the exercise of
which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision
of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies inthe
regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
Ratio:
As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged
thattax money is being illegally spent.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6645

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF

THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the
House of Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of
Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress
is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special
election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall
not be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted
for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be
held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient
for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city
concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three
copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy
in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved, December 28, 1987.

7
PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA
3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of
Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional
ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary
to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes
“selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after
twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every
four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the
retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least
twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision
on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their
compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not
constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment
of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of
a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which
reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos
each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of
travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House
of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies
a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its
members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in
the term compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental
question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within
the purview of the term “other emoluments.”

8
 Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as
salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because
it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which
was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,

vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines, respondents.

Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's
decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30,
1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of
government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received
by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention
that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress; such as himself whose
terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative
with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would commence on December
30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases could take
effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on
June 20, 1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of
Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their
9
term of office) would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition and
increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing indirectly
what could not be done directly.

Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted
into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)

Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but
was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of
this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."

Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term
having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth
Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement
gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty
years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
"in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on
the rates of pay as provided by law."2

On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of
P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received during his
incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs.
Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full
terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however, pending
resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio
T. Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the
warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing
therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's
claim for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.

10
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20, 1972, by
the Auditor General through respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and
furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the
President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's
adverse decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of
P32,000.00 per annum.

Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the
Auditor General.

The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which
was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the
Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should
not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already
P32,000.00 per annum.

Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:

1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members
of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that
approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of
pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as
petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.

2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December

30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be
to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which
they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by
the Auditor General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-
Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what can not be done directly."3

The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during
his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the
last four years of his government service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely because
of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of
retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally
receive such rate as salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it
thereafter by virtue of his retirement."4

11
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was
already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement
gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and
other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation
and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.

This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down Republic Act No.
3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and
the elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is
evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is
a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act
No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately availablethereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."6

It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly."

4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply refuted by
the Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman
Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this
appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:

It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32,000 is the rate

of pay prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in
office, while Mr. Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to
the annual compensation of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his
retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his
term of office would effectively give him the benefits of increased
compensation to which he was not entitled during his term, thereby violating
the constitutional prohibition against increased compensation of legislators
during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably in
the mind of Congress when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary
increases herein fixed shall be in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the

proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started simultaneously
with the beginning of the term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of
his successor and all incoming members of Congress was already the new
rate of P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay that should be made the

12
 basis in computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per
annum is Mr. Singson's authorized compensation during his term of office
and, therefore, the rate of pay prescribed by law for him on his retirement,
while P32,000 per annum is the allowable compensation of incoming
members of Congress during their term and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed
by law for them on their retirement. There is, then, no basis for equating a
constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory
prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his retirement gratuity.

It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay (P32,000)
authorized him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the instant case, not
to compensate him for services during the constitutionally prohibited period,
but would simply serve as basis for computing his retirement gratuity for
services rendered by him not only as a member of Congress but in other
branches of the government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own
refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered
(PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for
retirement as an "elected official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not
only for services rendered in other branches of the Government but also for
his services as member of Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for
him but allowed for his successor, in the computation of his retirement
gratuity."

Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe

44 SCRA 22 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity from Arrest under the
1935 Constitution
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of
a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest.
They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the
charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of
treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez
and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the
Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution

13
Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity
as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically,
petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from
proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his
charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”
wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President’s administration selling pardons.
For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended
for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating
the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself as stated in the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and
not the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of
which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to
the suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice
may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

14
Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

J. Bengzon

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should
not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to
have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things”
at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity
of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis
in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would
expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was authorized to
summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the
attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to
do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The
special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment
of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmeña alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of
House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer,
without issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmeña
a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on
such report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him
guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the
Committee had thereby ceased to exist.

15
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution,
to suspend one of its members.

Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any
other place." The provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec.
7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in
debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech,
and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured,
committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the
traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members,
including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April
1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against
him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted
to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect
past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are
subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by
a deliberative body when the required number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of

16
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action.
(Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by
the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the House
is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted
in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if
this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene
in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power
to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or
unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California
for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the
Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the
charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the
safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. Given
the exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to
direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our
special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office
for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator
challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation
of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless
went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12
months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that
"each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds votes, expel an elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor
General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.

17
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was
then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation,
except as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the
conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power
of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can
not be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one
of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the
Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no
preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the
House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and
the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be
dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction.

Adaza vs Pacana, Jr. (G.R. L-68159)

Facts:
- Petitioner Homobono Adaza and respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr. were elected to the
positions of
governor and vice-governor, respectively, of Misamis Oriental, in 1980. Their terms were to
expire
on March 3, 1986.
- In 1984, both petitioner and respondent ran for a seat in the Batasang Pambansa.
Petitioner won
and respondent lost.
- Petitioner started serving his term in the BP beginning July 14, 1984, while respondent
assumed
petitioner’s previous position of governor on July 25, 1984.
- This caused petitioner to file the present action against respondent, claiming that:
law, and that parliamentary systems in Europe allow for a local government official to also
hold a seat in Parliament
disqualifying him not just from being governor, but also from his previous position as vice-
governor
Issues:

- WON petitioner can hold both positions

- WON respondent is disqualified from being governor or vice-governor after losing in the
BP

18
elections
Held:
- Petitioner cannot hold both positions. Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the 1973 Constitution is clear in
saying
that members of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in
the
government or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality, or GOCCs during his tenure
- Respondent is not disqualified from being governor, as he was acting within the law. BP
697, the
law governing BP elections, provides that governors, mayors, members of
sangguniang or
barangay officials are only considered to be on forced leave upon filing their certificates of
candidacy for the BP elections.
- Sec. 204 (2a) of the Local Government Code provides that the vice-governor assumes the
office of
the governor for the latter’s unexpired term in this particular case.

Cicero Punsalan vs Estelito Mendoza

140 SCRA 153 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of Office/Position

Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of
Pampanga respectively. Both belong to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his
resignation as the governor but the same should only be “effective at the President’s
pleasure.” On 30 June 1984, Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the
president. On 14 July 1984, he was concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan
Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a request to the Minister of Local Government (MLG)
to consider him as the governor-on-leave of Pampanga while the President was considering
his resignation. The request was subsequently approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised
Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while his resignation is being
considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the acting governor but as
the governor and thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later however, Mendoza
resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of the KBL’s caucus, he returned
to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendoza’s return claiming
that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was impliedly
approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a member of
the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition against
Batasan Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision which
cannot be compromised. Further, Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right and
title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of
“appointive” Batasan Member because of the incompatibility” of the positions with the
Governor’s office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.
HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

19
“A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of
the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof
increased while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.”
Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that
the Constitution made a distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership
into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral
representatives who are either “elected or selected as may be provided by law”; and those
“chosen” from Members of the Cabinet. It is the SC’s opinion that the prohibition in question
does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The
prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal with “a Member” who enters the Batasan primarily as a
legislator voted into office by the electorate of his constituency, the “elected” provincial or city
or district representative with a “fixed term” (6 years) of office i.e an elected governor who,
while in office, was elected as a member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two
elective positions. Mendoza was elected as the governor but was not elected as a member
of the Batasan; he was appointed. Punsalan’s contention that Mendoza’s resignation was
impliedly approved by the president is not tenable. The president in fact needed more time
to consider the validity of the resignation and upon the KBL’s recommendation, he instead
chose to approve Mendoza’s return to his governorship.

Raul Villegas vs Valentino Legaspi

113 SCRA 39 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court by a
Congressman
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of
Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the
complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang
Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the
spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of
the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate
jurisdiction”. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and proceeded
with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken
Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as
counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for
the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member
of the Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of
the Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

20
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting
in their original jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general
original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took
cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general
original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts.
Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN,
113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo
warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979.
Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group.
And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31,
1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for
an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as
the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for
Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to
intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in
effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene
in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not
appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the
litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it
is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere
workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not
likewise be done indirectly.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any

21
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank,
composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal
and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are include

United States vs Juan Pons

34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On
the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this
is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive
on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when
they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with
the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The
journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC
passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito

78 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat

22
in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed
but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the
said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue
by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,
for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs
of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects
of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals
and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand
that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed
by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed
by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.

Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido

26 SCRA 150 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau

23
of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career
in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the
former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo
Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting
chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons
as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section
reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police
department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when
the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by
Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made
in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in
the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being
deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon
the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that
the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable
and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of
lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at

24
bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central
Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde.
Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers
were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund.
Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components
are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed
by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of
Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should
be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and,
“formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as
a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled
bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of

25
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.

Herminio Astorga vs Antonio Villegas

56 SCRA 714 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;When to be
Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city
police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under
authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with
the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of
RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this
said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to
the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill
was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate.
The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The
bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out
however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval
and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that
had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the
Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject
to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The
SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and

26
therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill
intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be
to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.

Carmelo Lazatin vs Commission on Elections

157 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s
Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests
Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to
annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged
the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all
election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition
had become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already
become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the
COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course because
the proclamation was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing
board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,”
was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the
winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of
Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by
Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan,
Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course
to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed
winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of
office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival
candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal

166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals –
Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the

27
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the
following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if
not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote
with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest
to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification
is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative”
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

Daza vs Singson Digest

Daza vs Singson

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

Facts:

28
 The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the
new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.

Issue:

Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on Appointments.

Held:

As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting

of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each
house respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties
therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that
the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not
only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the
court.

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to
use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the
CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each

29
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971, March 1, 1993

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political partiesrepresented in the

Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN-
-.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted
a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or
.5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other
party’sfractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nominationand election of the LDP
majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12
senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membershipof the political
parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by
utilizing the fractionalmembership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a
representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

30
character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to
the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory
to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must
be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that
the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the
maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up
the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the
parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the
composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully
constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

DECISION
(En Banc)

OZAETA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought
to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the
two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway
long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he
gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

31
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either

House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot
be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person
to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination
— it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question
is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative
body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session.

32
 We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to
be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which
is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as
he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question
may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he
has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some
fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it
is for the trial judge to decide that question.

June 24, 2009

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

33
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power

by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,

Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials

Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other

Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various

Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,

inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,

and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive

Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway

project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire

tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided

by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to

secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)

to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,

valid and constitutional?

RULING:

34
 No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive

privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information

must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The

privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in

this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public

interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is

sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the

ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must

be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade

congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so

and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,

the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Facts:
1. Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the
President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law
be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of
the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one
conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or confidential
information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.

2. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project.
Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations to officials of the AFP.

3. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On
the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the
investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the

35
 AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President’s
order.

4. Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and
prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.

1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the

Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess
the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper
subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.

2. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is defined by Schwartz
as “the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the
Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic privilege)

3. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. The
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

5. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by
the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the

36
 exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while
closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that
may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

7. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power –
the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the
Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from
this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as
well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution

and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as
limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the
basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way
that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances
to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.

9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore,
cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive
privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the
Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead
of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient
for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

37
11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the
power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given
up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in
aid of legislation – Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The
SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under
executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
38
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power
to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies
and their effective implementation

39
Juan Bengzon vs Secretary of Justice
68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) – Political law – Bill – Veto – Veto a Bill
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon
reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later
sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 “An Act to provide for the payment of retirement
gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a
result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the
peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-
eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.”
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon
but that provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond
the power of the governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity
Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his
power; for this is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a
law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it
provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-
General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the
provisions of the Organic Act.

Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia

11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate
and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned
by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit
has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and
their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been
violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does

40
not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by
Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig G.R. No 87636 November 19, 1990Ponente: J. Melencio

–
HerreraFacts:December 16, 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 akaGeneral
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1989. December 29,1988, President signed the Bill into law and
had become Rep.Act No 6688. In the process, seven special provisions and
Section 55 on “General Provision” were vetoed.
Senate issued Resolution No. 381 expressing the veto by thepresident
were unconstitutional."SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recomm
ended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced byCongress: No item of appropriation
recommended by thePresident in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant toArticle VII,
Section 22 of the Constitution which has beendisapproved or reduced in this Act shall be
restored orincreased by the use of appropriations authorized for otherpurposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation for anypurpose recommended by the President in the
Budget shall bedeemed to have been disapproved by Congress if nocorresponding appropriation
for the specific purpose isprovided in this Act."Issue:Whether or not veto made by the
president is constitutionalHeld:Yes.1) Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2
parts, 1)President generally can veto the entire bill as exercise of herpower and 2)
president shall have the power to veto anyparticular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue of tariff billbut the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he doesnot object.2)
General provisions made in an appropriations bill shallultimately refer to a specific
appropriation for it to take effect;Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in
theentire bill. Similarly, the contents of this section is concerned onAppropriation
Disapproved and/or reduced by Congress that isnot included on the face of the bill.Court ruled
the constitutionality of the presidential veto and thepetition was DISMISSED.

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following:
(1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire

41
bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has
to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in
the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even
assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section
55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term,
they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject
of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however
did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances
of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices
of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

42
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot
be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which
pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.
Bengzon v. Drilon

Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a
resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The
vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme
Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

Issue:

whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons
Act

Held:

The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a

constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she
is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It
is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid
inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.

Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to

43
 communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof
automatically causes the bill to become a law.

This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing
veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to
what new laws are in force.

When is it allowed?

The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants
the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff
bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

3 ways how a bill becomes a law:

1. When the President signs it

2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of
each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been
presented to him.

Facts: Republic Act No 1797 provided that pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals who served for 20 years shall be adjusted. In 1979, Presidential
Decree 644 repealed RA 1797 but was not published. In 1991, the Court issued a
resolution adjusting their pensions in accordance to RA 1797. The General Appropriations
Act authorized the Chief Justice to use savings for the adjusted pensions. The president
vetoed all portions containing references to the adjustment of pensions.
Issue: Whether or not the selective veto of the President is valid?
Decision: Petition granted. The veto power is not absolute. The Constitution provides that
only a particular item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

Philippine Constitution Association vs Salvador Enriquez

235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork
barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot
specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the
function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto
Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the
44
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994
for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and
that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions
and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot
validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president
herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found
that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the
legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already
funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this
as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund
Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The
SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and
30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from
the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The
veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

45
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant
to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided
by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of
said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads
of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed
by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional
or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such
statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their
local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national
government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen
are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 9:14 AM
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the
individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment

46
the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,
and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said
transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to
transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

235 SCRA 506

Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner

vs.

Enriquez, respondent

Facts:

RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An
Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from
January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President
and vetoed some of the provisions.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates
Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the
Supreme Court.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on
the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and
the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt services.

47
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.)
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH;
and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.

Issue:

Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and
valid?

Held:

Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the
Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane
to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be
vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of
income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. &
Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing
law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by
the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not
alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of

Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto.
Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval
must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment
pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may
exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation
act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

48
Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)
211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%.
In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific
limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs
Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992Feliciano, J.:FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and
othero i l p r o d u c t s , a d d i t i o n a l d u t y a d v a l o r e m . T h e T a r i f f C o m m i s s i o n h e l
d public hearingson said EO and submitted a report to the President for
c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d a p p r o p r i a t e action. The President, on the other hand issued an
EO which levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of
imported oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in
thenature of revenue-generating measures.
RULING:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue
a n d t a r i f f b i l l s is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that
49
EO in question, assumingthey may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited
to the President, that theymust be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionprovides:“The Congress may, by law authorize the
President to fix… tariff rates and other duties orimposts…” The relevant Congressional
statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines andSections 104 and401,
the pertinent provisions thereof.

Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. vs City of Butuan

24 SCRA 789 – Political Law – Uniformity in Taxation
In 1960, Ordinance No. 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance 122.
This Ordinance imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles
of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi operates within Butuan and it paid under protest the amount of
P4.926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from January
1 to July 30, 1961 pursuant to said ordinance. Pepsi filed a complaint for the recovery of the
total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may later on pay until the
termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of the City of
Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional. Pepsi
averred it is unconstitutional because of the following reasons:
1. it partakes of the nature of an import tax because the tax “shall be based and computed
from the cargo manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases” — not sold;
2. it is highly unjust and discriminatory because some dealers engaged in selling of
carbonated drinks are exempt while others are covered and such exemption is not justified
in the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.
HELD: No, it is invalid. The tax prescribed in said Ordinance, as originally approved, was
imposed upon dealers “engaged in selling” soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would
seem that the intent was then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended
by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon “any agent and/or consignee of any
person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in selling . . . soft drinks
or carbonated drinks.” As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drinks or
carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents and/or consignees of
another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business outside
the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than
1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month.
When we consider, also, that the tax “shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest
or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases” — not sold — but “received” by the taxpayer,
the intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks
brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax
partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendant’s authority to impose by
express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the
power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate the
authority to classify the objects of taxation.
The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be
reasonable and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but,

50
also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the
classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions are
not fully met by the ordinance in question.
Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or carbonated
beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents or consignees
of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from the
tax.
Pepsi Cola Bottiling Co. vs City of Butuan (1968)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: Ordinance 110 was enacted by the City of Butuan imposing a tax of P0.10 per case
of 24 bottles of softdrinks or carbonated drinks. The tax was imposed upon dealers
engeged in selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks. When Ordinance 110, the tax was
imposed upon an agent or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or
corporation engaged in selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks, with “agent or consignee”
being particularly defined on the inserted provision Section 3-A. In effect, merchants
engaged in the sale of softdrinks, etc. are not subject to the tax unless they are agents or
consignees of another dealer who must be one engaged in business outside the City.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. filed suit to recover sums paid by it to the city pursuant to the
Ordinance, which it claims to be null and void.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance is discriminatory.

Held: The Ordinance, as amended, is discriminatory since only sales by “agents or

consignees” of outside dealers would be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not
acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales , and
even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or
merchants established outside the city, would be exempt from the tax. The classification
made in the exercise of the authority to tax, to be valid must be reasonable, which would be
satisfied if the classification is based upon substantial distinctions which makes real
differences; these are germane to the purpose of legislation or ordinance; the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions substantially identical to
those of the present; and the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the
same class. These conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question.

Province of Abra vs Harold Hernando

107 SCRA 104 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxes – The Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of
Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side.
Hernando ruled that there “is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the
Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.”
Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly
and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or
charitable purposes.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.

51
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that “charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of
“lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually”
and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer. However, in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and
directly used for religious or charitable uses.

Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province vs Treasurer of Baguio

71 phil. 547 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxation – Assessment
In 1937, an ordinance (Ordinance No. 137: Special Assessment List, City of Baguio) was
passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess properties of property
owners within the defined city limits. The Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the
other hand, is a religious corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the
ordinance, it paid a total amount of P1,019.37 in protest. APMP later averred that it should
be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious institution, it has a
constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No. In the first place, the ordinance was in the nature of an assessment and not a
taxation.
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley’s words:
While the word ‘tax’ in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and special
assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax,
yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local
impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate
vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. The differences
between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be levied only
on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability
of the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a
special assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The imposition of a charge on
all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a tax and not an assessment, although
the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or highway. A charge imposed only
on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax notwithstanding the
statute calls it a tax.
In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the assessment is not
taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He

52
claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned
by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved
the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns
those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta,
on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not
cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was
still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only
for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052
by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect
or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent
does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only
‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court
stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing
that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

Case DIgest: Aglipay vs Ruiz

53
Facts of the Case:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order
the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head
of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the
Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were
actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Held:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the
commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to
determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the
Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize
the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was
not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not
benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage
of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the
Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design
made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic
chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription
that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering
these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the
issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Manuel Alba vs Francisco Perez

November 16, 2011

54
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154 SCRA 225 – Political Law – Appropriation

Dr. Francisco Perez, the City Health Officer of San Pablo City, was named “Outstanding
Health Worker” in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase pursuant
to Letter Of Instruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for Perez’ salary. The SP
however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials
of the national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered.
Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national
government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Manuel Alba – the
Minister of Budget – refused to recognize Perez’ right to such increase because he averred
that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Perez then filed a mandamus case against Alba.
The trial court judge granted the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per the said LOI.
HELD: Yes. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials
irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a
national service. Besides, Perez is an employee of the Ministry of Health and not of the city
of San Pablo. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are
receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local
funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the national government.
There is no basis in Alba’s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the
appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the
Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government official,
hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health
Ministry wherein Perez is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes
the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed
to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.

Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto

295 SCRA 470 – Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies

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Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with
a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to
the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman
but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to
the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was
intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction
of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower
courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted
to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Facts: Section 27 of RA 6770 was assailed on the ground that it provides for an appeal to
the Supreme Court from decisions in administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman. It is
contended that the provisions goes against Section 30 of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.”
Issue: Whether or not the court may appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman?
Decision: Section 27 of RA 6770 can not validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court
from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently

56
violates the proscription of Section 30 Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was
intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction, otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

I. — General Provisions

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing

amendments to the Constitution;

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 a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent
to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation

through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an

act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a

law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies.

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is

approved or rejected by the people.

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required
number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the
Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays.

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors
and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least

ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof,
shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after

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 five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the

legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly
initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative
district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be

deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum
(10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly

initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said
barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special

registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election.

II. — National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall

call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

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Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least
twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90)
days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of

the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to
and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the

votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as
certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the
repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication
of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected
or amended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the

votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety
(90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents
of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill
shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.

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Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency
or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. — Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces
and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays,
may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or
resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days
from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered
representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of
Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous
regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in
subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be.
Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or
not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then
set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within
ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days
in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the
results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.

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Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the
Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body
and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is
considered defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not
be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those
against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein
provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance
or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided
shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within
six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the
local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all
its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year
after the expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any
local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within
sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities
and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said
measure.

IV. — Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to
all initiatives and referenda.

Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to

promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Act.

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Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

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