G.R. No.

96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
MANUEL, respondents.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.
Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:
In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as
being "notoriously undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities
in the canvass of supplies and materials. The dismissal was based on Article IX, Presidential Decree
1
No. 807 (Civil Service Law) in relation to LOI 14-A and/or LOI No. 72. The employees' Motion for
Reconsideration was subsequently denied.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the
dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity
given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate
disciplinary proceedings.
The GSIS appealed tothe Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the
Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is illegal, the
GSIS is directed to reinstate them with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not
later than ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof, without prejudice to the right of the
GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It is also directed that the services of
their replacement be terminated effective upon reinstatement of herein respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once more, it was
rebuffed. On July 4, 1988 this Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:
a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civl
Service Commission, the dismissals of the employees having in truth been made without
formal charge and hearin, and
b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice to the
right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them;"
c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 "by elminating
the payment of back salaries to private respondents (employees) until the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the offenses imputed to
2
them ...,
d) ordered reinstateement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, "it appearing tht respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service

Commission Resolution of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It argued that the CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 — directing reinstatement of
the employees and payment to them of back salaries and benefits — had been superseded by the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988 — precisely eliminating
the payment of back salaries.

The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of

deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise." The GSIS filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC dated November 22, 1990.

Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and November 22, 1990. Here it contends that

the Civil Service Commission has no pwer to execute its judgments and final orders or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary, the writ of execution issued on June
20, 1990 is void because it varies this Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, 4
but also
5
with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
6
instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision it within sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party
7
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules
8
should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant tothe authority granted by the

constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as well as Republic Act No. 6713. 9 10
Those rules provide, among other things, that decision in
"administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari,
the same shall still be executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the
11
High Court." This is similar to a provision in the former Civil Service Rules authorizing the
Commissioner, "if public interest so warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed pending appeal to
12
the Civil Service Board of Appeals." The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the
duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted
by the Commission, "to enforce decision on administrative discipline involving officials of the
13
Commission," as well as with Section 37 of the same decree declaring that an appeal to the
14
Commission "shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension
or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during
the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal."
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to
the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or
orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite
obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see taht
what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power,
or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the
grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this Court
in several cases.
15
In Cucharo v. Subido, for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the Civil Service
Commissioner, that his decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten days from receipt
thereof ...". The Court said:
As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme Tribunal that
the Civil Service Commissioner has the discretion toorder the immediate execution in the
public interst of his decisionseparating petitioner-appellant from the service, always sbuject
however to the rule that, in the event the Civil Service Board of Appeals or the proper court
determines that his dismissal is illegal, he should be paid the salary corresponding to the
period of his separation from the service unitl his reinstatement.
Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled tothe retirement/death
and other benefits due them as government employees" since, at the time of their death, they "can be
16
considered not to have been separated from the separated from the service."
It contend, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed against them — as the filing of the proper disciplinary action was yet to have been taken had death not claimed them" — no back

salaries may be paid to them, although they "may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits, if any, and may commute such leave credits to money

value;" 17 18
this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v. Commission on Audit. It is in line
with these considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this Court's Second
19
Division of July 4, 1988 should be construed; and since the Commission's Order of July 20, 1990
maikes a contrary disposition, the latter order obviously cannot prevail and must be deemed void and
ineffectual.
This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service Commission's
Resolution of October 21, 1987 — inter alia granting back salaries tothe five dismissed employees,
including Namuco and Manuel — and pertinently reads as follows:
We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to private
respondents until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the
gravity of the offense imputed to them in connection with the irregularities in the canvass of
supplies and materials at the GSIS.
The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro
and Belen Guerrero, it appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have
since passed away. ....
On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990 directed the
GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period
from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise."
The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the interest of
justice and for other humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not Namuco and Manuel
should receive back salaries was "dependent on the result of the disciplinary proceedings against
their co-respondents in the administrative case before the GSIS," and since at the tiem of their death,
"no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made, nor any finding of their personal culpability ... and ...
they are no longer in a position to refute the charge."
The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and
not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative
in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be
arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back
salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second
Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary
administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased
employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to
all intents and pursposes, it makes exoneration in the adminstrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a
useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender exteinguishes criminal liability,
not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before final
20
judgment. In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on grounds
of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are
concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substatiation in said proceedings of the original
charges: irrigularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned order of the Civil
Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4,
1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970

HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET
AL., respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees of
the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner
"Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the
Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in the
words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion,
violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts
heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon
petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and
performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many
other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by
law.
In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his
application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner
uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth
in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the
provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General,
that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the
petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true
date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla,
purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that
his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he
would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the
municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth
and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne
and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and
the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was
supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the
GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959,
denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion
Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his
request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additional
evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial.
Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that
time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager,
Mr. F. G. Araña in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at
the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner
to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the
proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been
meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the aforesaid
decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and the
Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As
emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth
has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd
indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to petitioner's life
insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or
recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In the
meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No.
335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-
2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of
P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically,
on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine
National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that
"in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found that Mr.
Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other
fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his
sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement
from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961." Acting
on this letter, the Board referred the same to Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel
Hizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6,
1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the determination of the date of
birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal
Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying
petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the
same.
Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his
request for the change of the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898
to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be
legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide such
matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board,
but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General
Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in
approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to petitioner and
impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In
other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our
determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900.
Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its
powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the
change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of
res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual
obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent legal principles
and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended,
together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the
superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this petition.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be
sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent
approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records,
the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should
prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule,
applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager
after its being approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or one or two Department
1
Managers, it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not
beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind that under Section
16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds
that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and
regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other
hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as
follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. — The Board shall have the power to appoint a general
manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject
of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the
System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical
director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall,
subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and
wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this
Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause.
He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain
qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint
committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to
existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the
System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its
power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its
business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board
may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and
complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-
based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide
with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may
entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement
annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's action, of
the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate
and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter.
Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is
concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered more strict by the
fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of
employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well
to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government,
much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the
interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System
act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called the
Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained and
We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees
notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound
discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution
granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite
even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally possible
for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System places under its direct
responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board
and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System
must be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any
action of the General Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the
premises.
Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or
modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the
Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to
August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records,
payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties
concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of
laches or held in estoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of
laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by
petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well
as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum
of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be
sustained.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in
this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall
that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or
negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the
Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity
and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case
depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality
of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of
government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
(Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March
30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)
Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not
the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr.
Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter,
what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr.
Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges,
to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge
thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the
Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the
Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of
unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65
years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and
at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of
their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the
government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline
and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well
as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty
of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and
integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside
what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving the change of date of
petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally
recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such
action of the Board could lie.
Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation
to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth
and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not
the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing inequitous to
petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and
uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his
representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated
request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests,
pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its
members, was duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by
the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. True this negative action
was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with
the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable
action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority
in the System, upon its being informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was
always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and
not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for what they were
worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand,
the authority higher than the General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous.
Under these circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting
representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on
the letter of Mr. Mathay, without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that
since there is no showing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing
are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice
and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as
what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations,
and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for
reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present
his side.
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an
impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction
that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of
government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having any real
relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions
contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other
hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any
contractual stipulation.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity
as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who
has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-
age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977?
This is the issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 as Legal
Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his
transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City
where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila,
the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22,
1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age
pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission whether or not
to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum
No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed
that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11
years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994
at the age of 68 years.
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of
service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired
from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.
Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission
set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his
service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, series
of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not
exceeding one (1) year.
On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSC
Resolution No. 91-101.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as
Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to
complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as provided under
Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No. 27
allowing an extension of service of a compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is
both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146.
Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum
number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision being
generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has no
authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to
government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the power and authority, among others, to grant
or allow extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting
Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if
he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years", is qualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,"
which means that the extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission, as the
appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory
retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be
extended.
We grant the petition.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only
one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age
of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or
connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the modification of
an express provision of a special law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise,
the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 expressly
provides, thus:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a
member who:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of
service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General,
104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakes of the
nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with relative
security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing
retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service
requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary
employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted
to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En
Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana,
who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet the age
requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because
his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for
retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910
of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484
— Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the application for
disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year
lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under Section 1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on
January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin,
applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received was considered by the
Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his
monthly pensions for the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13,
1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming
exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each
grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or
length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on case to case basis.
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a
case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of
the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1)
year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential factor before an application under
Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office concerned. In
the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required
age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text
found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the original
text as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for providing the allowable
extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has
completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short
of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission the
authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be extended
to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto.
Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to
therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised Government Insurance Act
of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-
32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of
Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or
re-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service
Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely
a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to
implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is
meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it
into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself
can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33
SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also,
Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn
citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year
old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the
law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of
the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the "Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of
service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less
than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be
accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed
to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in
P.D. 1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases
where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the
government service to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under
P.D. 1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J.
Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of
65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her services until
October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse
complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the
extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V,
Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her
services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days
because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of government service at the time
she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement
benefits under P.D. No. 1146.
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has
rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . .
upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service."
The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11 years,
9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of
P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of the government office concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because he opted to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the
nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is
entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire
upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of
service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash equivalent
to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does not offend
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in
rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would
be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the
age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years
as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a
greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion.
Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit
under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena
should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six (6)
months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who
have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age
pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of
the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the Department of
Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6
days of government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992

LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President of
the Philippines, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision of the Office of the
President, dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said
decision.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological Colleges from
24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the
appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion to President of the same college on 1
May 1979.
After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy resignation as
President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day
before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sick leave.
On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez
Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed
its President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her
services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to
enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return
to the service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of
Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that
petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number
of years of service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable
service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only claim one
hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or
1
to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS.
On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall
have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years
on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years,
2
seven (7) months and twelve (12) days.
In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and
corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the Office of the President furnished
petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary,
who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending
investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of
3
ninety (90) days. After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and
functions as President of EARIST.
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cariño recommended the compulsory retirement of
4
petitioner.
5
For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, an Ad-Hoc Committee
was created by President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed their respective pleadings
and hearings in the case were conducted by the committee.
Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was detailed with the DECS
Central Office pursuant to a memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by Deputy Executive
Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as EARIST President. After trial,
said petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2
6
April 1991.
Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office, before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She moved for
reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3 December 1991, which prompted
petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3 March
1992, this Court dismissed said petition.
 7
After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision dated 23
October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner for
lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of the President also declared petitioner
as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:
... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months) were to
be added to the respondent's creditable service, together with the period of two (2)
weeks which the respondent's counsel admits in his Memorandum the respondent
had served as Professorial Lecturer, the respondent should be considered as
compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15 years in
the service on or about the said date after reaching the age of 65.
Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged
"irregular appointment and graft and corrupt practices" are hereby dismissed.
However, Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorily retired from the
service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, having completed fifteen (15) years in the government
service on or about he said date after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16,
1989. 8
In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991, petitioner
9
was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992.

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President, assailing the
portion of its decision declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15 October 1991,
alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the
government service.
10
In a resolution dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Office of the President. In the same resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there was an
over extension of petitioner's period of service with the government by failure to reckon with the sixty-
two (62) working days during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986)
and the period of two (2) weeks during which petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering
petitioner as compulsory retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held that it merely
resolved motu proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the extension granted to
petitioner to complete the required fifteen (15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It further
declared that it is for the President to determine whether or not petitioner could still continue as
EARIST President despite her exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one of the
benefits provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. A member who
has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at least sixty (60) years old when separated
from the service, is entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than five (5) years. On
the other hand, a member who has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least
three (3) years of service and is sixty (60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to
a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the average monthly compensation for
every year of service.
However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years
with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be
11
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15) years, to avail of the old-age pension
benefit.
To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for services
performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and
becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be
paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public
purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and
12
remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so employed. Retirement
laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his
sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
13
livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
14
the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees maybe enhanced.
In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen (15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension benefit, she was allowed to continue in the
service and her term as President of EARIST was extended until she shall have completed the fifteen
(15) years service requirement, or for an additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12)
days, as determined by the Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the Office of the President. In
resolving the administrative complaint against petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not only on
the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner and of graft and corrupt practices, but went
further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of service granted to petitioner on the ground
that the latter had already completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. 1146, and
declared petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.
In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. However, the Office of
the President made a new computation of petitioner's period of service with the government, the
Office of the President included as part of her service the sixty-two (62) days sick leave applied for by
petitioner covering the period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her service as a lecturer of
approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new
computation, petitioner's extension of service which was supposed to end in January 1992 was
reduced by the Office of the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.
On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement of petitioner
15
fell on 14 August 1992. Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by the Office of the
President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days which brought her services only
up to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension
of service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and
service as lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the government. Such reduction from
petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension plan, based
on the computation of the GSIS.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a
member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its
16
computation of a member's years of service with the government. The computation of a member's
service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be
17
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 and her
part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be considered as part of her service
with the government and it is only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period
of service.
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirement failed to
take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in
her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner
from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992.
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992,
petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement; she was prepared to render services for said period but was not allowed to
do so; she should, therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during
said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her
former position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement
purposes is no longer possible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service
requirement as of 30 April 1992.
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated 23 October 1991
declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
declared to have been in the service as President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April
1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said office from 16
October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits
for having reached age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to
her compliance with all applicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92284 July 12, 1991

TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Cesar R. Vidal for respondent GSIS.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of Executive Order No. 966,
Section 9, providing as follows:
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary or pay which may be used
in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually
received by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved
appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized and implemented by the
presidential issuance(s) and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary
indicated in an appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or
double compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary services or in an
acting capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per
diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees,
consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing examination papers
shall not be considered in the computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.
The question was raised by the petitioner in connection with the computation of his retirement benefits
which he claims was not made in conformity to the above-quoted requirement.
The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of
P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation
and Communications and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the
1
board of directors of the MIAA passed the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. 88-70
RESOLVED, that, as recommended by Management, the designation of Mr. Teodoro J.
Santiago, Jr., as Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective 15
August 1988, be approved, as it is hereby approved, subject to the following conditions:
1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;
2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary of AGM for
Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV (COA); and
3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.
This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11, 1988, with a request for the
petitioner's indefinite detail to the MIAA. In reply, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on July
2
14, 1988, as follows:
. . . please be informed that we are authorizing such detail through appropriate office order up
to February 15, 1989. The order includes authority to collect representation and transportation
 allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each month and other allowances attendant to the position
chargeable against the funds of the NAIAA.
As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago be allowed to collect the difference in salary of his
position in the COA as State Auditor IV and his designated position as Assistant General
Manager thereat, likewise chargeable against the funds of that office, this Commission
interposes no objection to the proposal to pay him the difference between his present monthly
salary of P7,219.00 and that of Assistant General Manager which reportedly amounts to
P13,068.00 a month or a monthly difference of P5,849.00, provided that he is formally
designated (not appointed) Assistant General Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA, and
that payment of his salary differential is approved by the same office.
xxx xxx xxx
On August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O. Reyes, concurrently chairman of the MIAA board of
directors, issued an office order formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General
3
Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16, 1988.
The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary
of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December
5, 1988, when he was transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order No.
8811448 dated December 6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance System used as basis the
amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the
4
course of his employment. The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the
5
basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest basic salary rate of
P13,068.00. This was denied on December 8, 1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On
March 7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion.
We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the petitioner's occupying the
second position in the MIAA and receiving additional compensation for his services therein. As the
Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from the MIAA was the additional
compensation allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is allowed under Section 8,
6
Paragraph B, Article IX of the Constitution."
7
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, this Court held that double appointments are not prohibited as long as the
positions involved are not incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive
additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The additional compensation
received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar because of its express approval by the
COA and the admission of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:
Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full time officer or employee
of the government shall hereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra
compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the government,
its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created by law except:
(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and enterprise organized,
operated, owned or controlled by the government, who may be paid per them for
each meeting actually attended or when an official travel;
(2) Auditors and accountants;
(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees;
(4) Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and
(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the
provision of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional compensation received by the
petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under
the provision of Section 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement
benefits.
We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of
obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services
8
which admit of no compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the petitioner was in
the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for services
rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even
Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary
differential."
The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 because he was
not appointed to the second position in the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is stressed that under
the said provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement
benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment." The petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved
appointment but only in a designation.
Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial distinction between
appointment and designation. He cites Mechem, who defines appointment as "the act of designation
by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual, who
9 10
is to exercise the functions of a given office." He also invokes Borromeo v. Mariano, where this Court
said that "the term "appoint," whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to
the nomination or designation of an individual."
Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and designation. While
appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment (or
11
election). Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory designation, a member
 12
of the National Economic and Development Authority. A person may also be designated in an acting
capacity, as when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee
thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence of the permanent
13
Secretary for example, an undersecretary is designated acting head of the department.
14
As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where,
in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was
used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended
between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the more
reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be
conferred by a permanent appointment. A contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the
letter of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend the maximum
benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient
service in the government.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on
August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment
or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the
petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been
no need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position in
the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to
additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his
highest basic salary rate.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a few days or weeks but for
more than three months. His designation as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
1âwphi1

Administration was not a mere accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman
Domingo requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad said,
"Considering his qualifications and work experience, we believe that a finance man of his stature and
caliber can be of great help in the efficient and effective performance of the Airport's functions."
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the
least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to
luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution is SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby rendered DIRECTING the computation of the petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis of
his Highest Basic Salary Rate of P13,068.00, It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion
among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The
strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation"
found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present
compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased
risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of
contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working
conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary
work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents
state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable
because the law says so.
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years
later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision.
Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was
then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that
time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.
The following issues are raised in this petition:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the
present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p.
17, Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively
identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature
of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a
highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the
difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar
worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases
prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
xxx xxx xxx xxx
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood
forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp
and paper mills and plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)
The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl
chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers
which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as
in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific
cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of
contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as
follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed
by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of
employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are
entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by
employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that
since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the
legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot
be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court
recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of
life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by
specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot
conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions
interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been
stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's
compensation law and the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the
new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The
present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission.
The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability.
(Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986];
Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a
social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims
are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new
law by explaining the present system as follows:
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the
constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that
the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when
his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on
appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and
rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the
worker's constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no
notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim
with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on
the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not
compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of
administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums
to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does
not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and
it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules
on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that
should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not
the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions,
adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme
must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the
belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more
advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and
the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5,
and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of
the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed
against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of
favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers
if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees
in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution
which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-
compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove
a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it
from the old and familiar system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout
the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust
fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions
was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers
who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said
fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the
increased amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated
are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for
compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased
contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is
Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in
judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the
actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other
excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be
recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit
payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of
this Court to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision
expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA
473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from
those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan , C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO)
from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and
ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the
minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as
reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the
amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic
of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters
away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer,
Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was
and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the
time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had
finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot
where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias"
and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in
the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the
"proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that
1
"deceptively simple and litigiously prolific", phrase The two components of the coverage formula —
2
"arising out of" and "in the course of employment." The two components of the coverage formula —
"arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
3
independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation
coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can,
4
in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin
or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer
5
to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment"
when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably
6
may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated,
is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his
7
place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts." This rule, however,
admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his
work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the
premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3)
where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home,
or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4)
where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and
8
from the place of employment.
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e.,
injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and
egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs.
9
Ampil. There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to
avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result
of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the
claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated
that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries
suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment."
Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was
not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the
 factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least
thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell
(ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his
place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of
his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular
Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the
Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation
was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work,
along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers.
10
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, which concerned injuries
sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was
dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while
standing about 2-½ meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from
inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a
jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced
by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his
work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New
Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public
highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d
543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the
public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general
public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures
the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the
Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have
a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to
the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown
that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could
have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,
It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have
involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the
premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer
should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956),
we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to
his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main
gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to
its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his
inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is
no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either
his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does
not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the
employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual
waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay
deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw
guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to
165, we glean the following observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work.
Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the
employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee was
walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the
employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time,
place and circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet
of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of"
the employment is flatly raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these
injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person
reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find
something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not
only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or
used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises
are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public
sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets
are protected premises.
There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable
period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or
after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared
that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf
worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but
shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train,
was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes
before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is
discernible, no federal question arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the
employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from
work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to
or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the
 employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours
or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling
workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his
home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even
though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his
place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified,
dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is
generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his
work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity
thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the
natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on
land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an
injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is
exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while
going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the
employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the
employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases,
where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street
in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to
have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice
on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to
report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The
court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from
his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising
out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the
protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this
rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the
scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and
opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court
reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place
of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the
employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business,
and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held
to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes
before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven
by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located at
the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with
another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the
employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their
work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are
such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such
conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering
his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is
pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the
conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his
employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and
the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided
by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of
special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else
appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not
compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts
as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.
However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to
qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions
of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the
injury.
11
Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope
of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries
which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and highways. The
extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle
which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is
not sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is always there as a member
of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to
employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises
his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of
whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the
law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the
premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards
associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the
 employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on
public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference.
Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no
moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not
nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out
of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and
leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within
the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to
indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured
12
party is not legally responsible."
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was
awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in
coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon
being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the
way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and
then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's
brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
13
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit, the truck which Mandaguit was driving
collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately
pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver
then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him
there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death
arose out of and in the course of employment.
14
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac, the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee
who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the
suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted;
shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable
because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his
employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had
its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.
15
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol, the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was
killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the
question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.
16
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera, that question was raised. While the
employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After
about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word,
the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause
of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The
17
majority decision ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee
died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in
other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to
compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's
declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which
increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm
sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to
assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs
enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or
guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the
employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose
the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be
the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called
"increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the
employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to
lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or
18
indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver; (2) jobs
19
where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; and (3) jobs of employees whose work
takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a
dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where
the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the
20
violence was due to labor disputes.
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the
employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption
of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the
21
provisions of the Act. According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New
York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor
of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically
or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial
 evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter,
that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not
occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.
This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the
New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an employee's
death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the
mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is
shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted
these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link
with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow
would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I
therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the
employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the
presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show
neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as
where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is
evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually
supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965)
vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman &
22
Sons:
The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing
that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his
employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates
the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67)
that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has
been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the
conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the
employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where
some connection appears between the accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:
The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment,"
was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate
headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in the
various categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been
kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-
connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection:
that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course"
quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the
necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course"
quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be
met.
As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the
cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business
hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment
premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal
course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on
the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of
the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course"
factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing
with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown
in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the
employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the
conditions of employment — as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the
bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning
hotel — will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as
where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to
the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present
decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also
shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all
times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee,
although living on the premises is not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-
employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of
compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no
such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.
As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising"
element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is
satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active
duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury —
whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken
assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and
is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this
employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt.
Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on
these facts.
 Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for
measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for if
a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of
employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving
the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where
the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to
own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown
Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period
interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a
channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also
weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising
factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation
Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair
preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness
on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course
of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the causal
factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone — lunch period,
care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or
another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and
could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by
the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to
452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out
of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and
the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately,
the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to
exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the
injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be,
and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of
work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in
close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The
reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there
is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature
or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always
that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances
of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the
line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be
usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In
granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of
private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising
the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even
if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was
obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to
make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the
deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the
employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private
road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution
to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office,
IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and
circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office
does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two
minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20)
meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that
"the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away
from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the
place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road
where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is
absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the
IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose "in the course of
23
employment." But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its
main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as
24
the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to
use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right,
therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and
properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage
to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road
was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for
the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters
away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is
immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that
Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place
where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in
question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose
out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in
the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the
employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
25
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time
and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be
done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of
another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's
premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though
it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.
In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as
a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to
the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the
rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and
egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the
main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent,
express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the
IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.
26
In Carter vs. Lanzetta, it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees
from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service
include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under
exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing
the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain
hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the
27
road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales, it was held that, where the employee,
while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately
adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the
street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk,
the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business
establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be
at the end of the private road.
28
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to
its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the
point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question."
29
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee
while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of
employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such
an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the
travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and originating in
the work or business of the employer....
Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In
these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as
a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been
held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are
so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to
the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is
controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246
S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber
Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a
lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the
town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-
way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the
property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public
desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the
decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company
plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the
crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's
death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal
injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The
Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and
especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion
that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act.
The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's
 premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court
pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in
connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the
public. In announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might
perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to
such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber
company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct
to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which
the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the
affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to
this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its
purpose and to promote justice.
xxx xxx xxx
In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this
court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed
while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of
the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his
safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which
he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and
necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated
in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time,
place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this
court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted
from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v.
Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of
and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other
words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was
killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to
the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of
the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the
IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit
of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place
safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one
of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures
over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in
his death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he
could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule
may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and
30
the hazard which resulted in the injury. The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis
31
Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:
While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the
work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of
the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121];
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases
have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to
arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon,
79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his
presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred
because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general
public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit."
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe
Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds &
Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.
But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our
conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be
considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and
there automatically arises the presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out
of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and
space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of
the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters
from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we
need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a
question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:
We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is
not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law:
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this
admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges
placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural
posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing
law.
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to
32
workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. Liberally
construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting
compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable
under the law as an employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows:
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal
of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was
from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was
waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she
was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.
On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant
claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children.
The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon
which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the
conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a
reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of
the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)
The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It
stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically
provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must
have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official
functions." (Rollo, p. 13)
According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the
aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the
deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she
usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school
principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.
The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the
deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment."
The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on
employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428)
and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or
elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)
The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring
the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the
case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto.
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this
Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental
where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.
The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work,
such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the
place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her
place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the
place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.
As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this
case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R.
No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is
a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the
Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules
refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions
(Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One
Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.
Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its
main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00
o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to
arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when
he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his
sack of rice.
On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the
petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was
taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended.
His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —
It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M.
to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06
A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your
superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of
bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular
accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is
evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident
1
occurred.
It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.
Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the
decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while
he was attending to a personal matter.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home
from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus,
compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case
2
of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, where the Court awarded
compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official
station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident,
petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.
Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not
applicable to the present case.
The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give
3 4
effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, the Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is
accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is
going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
course of his employment.
5
Again in Alano v. ECC, it was reiterated:
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal
of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was
from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was
waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she
was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
instantaneous death. ...
 In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work.
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her
to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or
personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was
there because her employment required her to be there.
6
More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, this Court, applying the above quoted decisions,
enunciated:
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July
31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son
as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following
day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the
motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit
the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood
Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these
two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case
at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death,
therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.
In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come
from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in
an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence
7
at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and
intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2,
Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S.
Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where
an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck
of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to
the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be
said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death
is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the
employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been
notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great
speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment
includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be
done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of
the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over
those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in
his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after
his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime.
After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner
deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under
8
the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman
still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection to the accident.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor.'
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
9
maximum aid and protection to labor.
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of
time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the
10
employer's premises.
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work
station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental
injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the
law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's
Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985

EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.),
dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, denying
petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on
August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other
training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men
believed to be communist insurgents.
The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision
rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case.
... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together
with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer
of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per
District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station
when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her
forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for
Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the
ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing
supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as
a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively).
When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be
communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot
wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the
Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical
removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog
Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also
developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and
Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim
was not controverted.
On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the
Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-decision,
dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:
It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs,
you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this happened
on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having
held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No.
1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the Employees'
Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to
mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official functions when it
happened.
In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)
Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On
October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the
Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was
an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June
2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those
dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during
office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City; more
aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her
official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and the
appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's
witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City
on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids
to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative
Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for
there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other
hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's
witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in
themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation
of a future litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au
the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar,
upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still
sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with
her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)
In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has
decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court.
At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in
Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.—(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;
 (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.
The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at
the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other
training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the
Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the
ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita
Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on
their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids
necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in the
decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all
contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.
We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its
decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations
because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a
matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-
Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established.
Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would
suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which
caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for
removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to
12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.
The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving
declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner
could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the same claim
for the injuries she sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of Education and
Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog
City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim was not
controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-Appellant have not at all
been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown why petitioner would have
been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and probity and righteousness must
be presumed until otherwise disproved.
Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this
singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner
and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and
other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of
residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official
functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or
discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is
rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would
necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working
hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which
the Court finds to be so.
The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de
Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260,
where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular
accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein
ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of
work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
course of her employment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the
Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due herein
Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980

GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents.
Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf.
Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service
Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title
II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim.
The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry)
of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability
retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-
Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek.
On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626,
as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).
On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments,
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the
nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:
Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are
found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We
believe that our ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not
work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that
the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja
Soliman High School, Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462).
On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of
her claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein
reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established
that her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.).
On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim,
still alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).
On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records
thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.).
On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:
... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully
agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do
with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.).
On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent
Commission (p. 2, rec.).
Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid
arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are
permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.).
She specifically alleged that —
... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is
aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in school, that appellant belonged
to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting
her to varying climatic (sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of
work, Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north,
Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the
presence of many squatter houses too, and in the south — gasoline stations, bakery,
Textile market as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies
handling 250 students more or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students
who have flu, colds and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments (p.
3, rec.).
Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated
by the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby
pneumonia which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and permanent
in nature is compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20,
1977) as conditions were present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications."
Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and,
that respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted
medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).
Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that —
(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed
by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ...
Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides:
xx xx xx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.
Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:
(c) Only inqiury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.
The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be:
1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or
2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature
is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a
natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes
it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in
general" (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).
To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal
and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which
science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same
industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease"
(Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied).
An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations,
due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairmen),
repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p.
561).
From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like
herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are
subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially
young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments,
aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding
superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high
school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs
and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as
well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are
most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is
further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious food.
In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather —
heavy rains, typhoons — as well as dust — and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary
slum area.
These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar
to" the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher.
But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof
that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher
due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned.
Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid
arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of
employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly,
petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111,
Section 1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1,
1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules."
It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is
located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and
congestion (squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements -
varying degrees of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of
standing while performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from
her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo,
scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.
Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that
yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City
to Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours
or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was
always in contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases
like flu and colds and who were themselves inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a
depressed and congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her
malnutrition or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income
takes to — aside from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice — legumes like mongo,
vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric and.
Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of
rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease
characterized by painful inflammation of the joints, in excessive amount of uric acid in the blood Poor
man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that
uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which
teachers are subject of reason of their duties.
Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her
ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions.
In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that
illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who
was herself a teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature
of employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner.
Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432,
respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the
provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases,
cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma
(Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25,1978).
Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear
indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-
44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the
disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory
retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be
recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is
physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason
of her ailments.
Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers,
recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly
involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in
one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury
in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's
health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja
vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978).
 WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND
CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED
1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS
DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND
2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY
SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.
SO ORDERED.

AMALIA NARAZO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’

COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Provincial Governor’s Office, Negros
Occidental), Respondents.
PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees’

Compensation Commission (ECC) dated 19 May 1987, 1
denying petitioner’s claim for compensation benefits under
PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Geronimo
Narazo.

Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as

Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of
Negros Occidental. His duties included preparation of the
budget of the Province, financial reports and review or
examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal
offices.chanrobles.com : virtual law librar

On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57).

His medical records show that he was confined three (3) times
at the Doña Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod
City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He
was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive
nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly
known as "Uremia."

Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death
benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees’
Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended). However, said
claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of
Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there
is no showing that the position and duties of the deceased as
Budget Examiner had increased the risk of contracting
"Uremia." 2 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said
decision, claiming that although the cause of her husband’s
death is not considered as an occupational disease,
nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner which required long
hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure,
caused him many times to delay urination, which eventually
led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said
motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission

affirmed the decision of the GSIS on the ground that the
ailments of the deceased could not be attributed to
employment factors and as impressed by medical experts,
benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men
over fifty (50) years of age, regardless of occupation, while
uremia is a complication of obstructive nephtropathy due to
benign prostatic hypertrophy; 3 hence, this petition.

Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and

circumstances of the occupation of the deceased were not
considered in determining whether the work of the said
deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments
which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which
required long sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the
risk of contracting the disease leading to his hospital
confinement and death. 4

In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to

show proof that the disease which caused the death of her
husband is work-connected; and that no credence could be
given to petitioner’s claim that her husband’s delayed
urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for
lack of medical bases. All that petitioner has shown,
according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not work-
connection causes. 5

Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No.

626, as amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the ECC or any illness caused by employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable based
on peculiar hazards of employment. 7

Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness is

compensable if the same is listed as an occupational disease.
If it is not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the
illness was aggravated by employment. However, it is
incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of
contracting the illness was increased by his working
conditions.

The death of petitioner’s husband was caused by "Uremia due

to obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy,"
which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational
diseases. 8 As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a toxic
clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular
twitchings, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting
associated with renal insufficiency brought about by the
retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste products."
One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of urinary
waste products. 9

Under the circumstances, the burden of proof was upon

petitioner to show that the conditions under which her
deceased husband was then working had increased the risk of
contracting the illness which caused his death.cralawnad

To establish compensability under the increased risk theory,

the claimant must show proof of reasonable work-connection,
not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence which means such
relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and
convincing evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. To require proof of actual causes or factors which
lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the liberal
interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice
guarantee in favor of the workers. 10 Although strict roles of
evidence are not applicable, yet the basic rule that mere
allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. 11

The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in

the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation
of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination
of the budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full
concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in
the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that
the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not,
delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the
flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC,
12 the Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for

hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their
bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or
preparation of lesson plans. From human experience,
prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in
stagnation of the urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria
in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial
multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms.
Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of
micro-organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the
urinary tract. These are predisposing factors to pyelonephritis
and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses
are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher,
the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated by
their working habits necessitated by demands of job
efficiency."crala virtua1aw library

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold

that the cause of death of petitioner’s husband is work-
connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was
aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that
petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the
death of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Employees’ Compensation Commission denying
petitioner’s claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended,
arising from the death of her husband, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

G.R. No. L-47294 April 8, 1987

HILARIA DABATIAN, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (General Services Department, Cagayan de
Oro City), respondent.
Mando Z. Tagarda and Longino G. Tagarda for petitioner.
Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera for respondent ECC.

GANCAYCO, J.:
A petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated June 27, 1977
in ECC Case No. 0217 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late Sigfredo A.
Dabatian, was filed on September 26, 1977. However, for failure to file the necessary docket fees, this
Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated September 30, 1977.
A Motion for Reconsideration together with a motion to litigate as pauper was filed by the petitioner
and this Court, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1977, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda, The Employees' Compensation Commission,
which was not formally impleaded as respondent in the petition, filed its memorandum and so did
respondent GSIS. Petitioner failed to file her memorandum. The case was submitted for decision on
August 30, 1978.
The undisputed factual background as found by the ECC which should have been made the proper
respondent in this case, is as follows:
At the time of his death Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver
in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro City.
As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the
time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in
the morning the next day. It was gathered from the evidence on record that the
deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness.
Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler
and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and became unconscious while
on his tour duty and was brought to his residence by his companions. Despite
hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.
A claim for income benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program was filed
by the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance System
decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that decedent's
ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed
under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the same
was directly caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was
 increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. 1
The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that:

... Peptic ulcer, the deceased's main ailment, is a sharp circumscribed loss of tissue
resulting from the digestive action of acid gastric juice. Aggravating factors are
ingestion of alcohol, coffee, tea and cola drinks. Cigarette smoking has also been
documented to be a definite cause of delayed healing of peptic ulcer. Some drugs
also contribute to its occurrence. Another factor in the production of peptic ulcer is the
hereditary predisposition which seems to play a major role in the occurrence of peptic
ulcer. Intractable bleeding is a complication of peptic ulcer. Death will ensue due to
irreversible shock as a result of a bleeding peptic ulcer. (Principles of Internal
Medicine by Harrison).
Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's
ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions
of work. His ailment was principally traceable to factors which were definitely not
work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinking coffee heavily
which could have aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death.
However, aggravation of an illness is not a ground for compensation under the
2
present compensation law.
On these considerations, the ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the GSIS denying
petitioner's claim. Hence, this petitioner certiorari.
The sole issue which the Court must determine is whether or not under the premises the death of
Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable.
The petition obviously addresses itself to the presumption of compensability and the principle of
aggravation which were sufficient grounds for entitlement under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In
fact, all the cases cited by the petitioner were decided under the old compensation law.
The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already
been abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment
was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old
3
compensation law. There are no medical findings, affidavits, reports or any other evidence that
deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No
allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases
such as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend
the limits of such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The new law on compensation should
be applied to this case.
The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the
rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment, the reason being — "to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
4
employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability ... " It was found, and
rightly so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or balance
between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation.
The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the work-related
5
nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational its.
6
Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits,
the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) any illness caused by
employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission,
then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the disease.
Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of
warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her
husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is
no longer a ground for compensation under the present law.
This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work
mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have
not been victims of peptic ulcer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.

G.R. No. L-46454 September 28, 1989

NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION), respondent.
Rodrigo V. Coquia for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.
Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan
Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and
was confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains
accompanied by nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon
with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a surgical operation which was
performed on November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2,
1975, he expired.
On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation under the Labor Code with
respondent Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS). In a letter-
decision dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of
petitioner's husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well
as the working conditions of his employment, could not have directly caused his ailment which
 1
eventuated in his subsequent death. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976,
was denied upon the finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment had
any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same
2
directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof. A second motion for reconsideration filed
on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to
the respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.
On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of
petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for review.
The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims based on the provisions of
the Labor Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that
they must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted
and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working
3
conditions.
If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been
held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition,
that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The fact that the
4
cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof.
The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal relation is indispensably
required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the
development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the
job. Strict rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely substantial
evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
5
sufficient to support a conclusion.
After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the clinical impression that the
deceased was suffering from "Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to Lipomatosis of the Colon and
Adhesion," explained by respondent commission as follows:
... As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction is a condition in which the
passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired. This is due to causes
which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic. Mechanical causes are intrinsic
factors as adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in the instant case, and
hernia, and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces, parasites and gallstones.
Vascular causes include embolism or trombosis of a large blood vessel. The
neurogenic causes consist of those seen in pneumonia and peritonitis and following
abdominal surgery or injuries to the spinal cord. (The Merck Manual-8th edition:
6
Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison). ...
Public respondent GSIS in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to petitioner:
Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to mechanical
causes or to inadequacy of intestinal muscular activity. In your husband's case, it was
due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are benigned (sic) tumors
characteristically found in middle adult life, although they may have been growing
slowly for many years before making clinical mischief. They arise from adipose or
fatty tissue anywhere in the body. The mesentery of the colon contains a large
amount of such tissue and this may produce obstruction by compression of the
intestinal wall. Worthy of note is the fact that the abdomen of your late husband was
7
markedly obese.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher
alone would not have any connection with his disease. However, she posits that the deceased's
auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably
caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body.
According to petitioner, the deceased was a member of the basketball team of the public school
teachers in their school for the last five years prior to his death and had served as a coach in
basketball for three years. He was also said to have been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the
8
Philippines serving as committee chairman of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council.
It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she
presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear
evidence as to when the disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the
deceased's colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a
teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of
the disease as described militate against a finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was
supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor
adequately proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the regular or
primary functions of a teacher, could not have been done every working day. It is safe to assume that
they were done only for certain limited periods of time and on isolated occasions as, for instance,
during competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to
hazards different or greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-styles. There is no showing
that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from playing basketball or being a member
of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly
obese, which circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering the
etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.
Additionally, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that said co-curricular activities can be considered as
"hazards," as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same was on the voluntary choice of the
deceased. As pointed out by respondent commission, the decision to engage therein was at
decedent's option since, not forming part of his work as teacher, there was no compulsion on him to
participate in said activities.
UNDER THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of
respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970
HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET
AL., respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees of
the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner
"Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the
Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in the
words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion,
violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts
heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon
petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and
performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many
other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by
law.
In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his
application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner
uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth
in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the
provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General,
that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the
petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true
date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla,
purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that
his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he
would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the
municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth
and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne
and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and
the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was
supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the
GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959,
denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion
Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his
request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additional
evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial.
Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that
time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager,
Mr. F. G. Araña in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at
the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner
to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the
proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been
meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the aforesaid
decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and the
Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As
emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth
has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd
indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to petitioner's life
insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or
recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In the
meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No.
335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-
2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of
P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically,
on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine
National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that
"in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found that Mr.
Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other
fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his
sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement
from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961." Acting
on this letter, the Board referred the same to Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel
Hizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6,
1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the determination of the date of
birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal
Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying
petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the
same.
Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his
request for the change of the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898
to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be
legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide such
matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board,
but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General
Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in
approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to petitioner and
impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In
other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our
determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900.
Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its
powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the
change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of
res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual
obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent legal principles
and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended,
together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the
superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this petition.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be
sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent
approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records,
the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should
prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule,
applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager
after its being approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or one or two Department
1
Managers, it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not
beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind that under Section
16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds
that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and
regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other
hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as
follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. — The Board shall have the power to appoint a general
manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject
of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the
System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical
director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall,
subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and
wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this
Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause.
He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain
qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint
committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to
existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the
System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its
power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its
business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board
may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and
complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-
based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide
with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may
entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement
annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's action, of
the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate
and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter.
Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is
concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered more strict by the
fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of
employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well
to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government,
much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the
interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System
act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called the
Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained and
We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees
notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound
discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution
granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite
even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally possible
for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System places under its direct
responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board
and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System
must be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any
action of the General Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the
premises.
Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or
modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the
Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to
August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records,
payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties
concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of
laches or held in estoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of
laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by
petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well
as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum
of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be
sustained.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in
this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall
that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or
negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the
Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity
and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case
depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality
of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of
government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
(Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March
30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)
Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not
the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr.
Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter,
what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr.
Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges,
to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge
thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the
Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the
Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of
unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65
years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and
at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of
their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the
government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline
and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well
as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty
of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and
integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside
what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving the change of date of
petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally
recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such
action of the Board could lie.
Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation
to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth
and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not
the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing inequitous to
petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and
uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his
representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated
request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests,
pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its
members, was duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by
the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. True this negative action
was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with
the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable
action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority
in the System, upon its being informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was
always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and
not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for what they were
worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand,
the authority higher than the General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous.
Under these circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting
representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on
the letter of Mr. Mathay, without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that
since there is no showing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing
are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice
and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as
what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations,
and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for
reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present
his side.
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an
impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction
that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of
government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having any real
relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions
contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other
hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any
contractual stipulation.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.

G.R. No. 121545 November 14, 1996

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA S. ARREOLA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Did the respondent Court of Appeals err in holding that the nature of the private respondent's work
increased the risk of contracting ureterolithiasis, thereby entitling her to compensation under P.D. No.
626, as amended? This issue confronts us in this petition for the review of the decision of the Court of
1
Appeals of 7 August 1995 in CA-G.R SP No. 34223.
The antecedent facts are summarized in the challenged decision as follows:
Lilia Arreola [private respondent herein] was employed as a Chemical Laboratory
Technician in the National Bureau of Investigation on March 23, 1972.
Thereafter, Arreola was promoted as Senior Chemical Technician, Chemical
Engineer, and finally as Engineer II.
As Engineer II, Arreola performs the following duties:.
1. Makes researches on and designs equipment needed to facilitate conclusive
analysis by Forensic Chemist:
2. Computes cost of proposed equipment based on designs made;
3. Performs instrumental analysis of drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels and
inorganic compounds, using gas (GS) and liquid (LC) chromatograph, UV, VIS and IR
Spectrophotometers;
4. Incharge (sic) of the supervision, maintenance and repair of modem chemical
laboratory equipment installed in the Bureau;
5. Computes cost of analysis performed;
6. Attends to field cases and takes paraffin casts at the morgue and in the office;
7. Renders holiday and night duties once a week and help the chemist in the
examinations on incoming cases during the tour of duty;
8. Assists the supervisor and chemist of the unit in conducting researches on some
special cases;
9. May assist NBI Agents in field work re investigation of industrial companies
engaged in nefarious activities;
10. Performs other duties assigned to me (her) by (sic) supervisor from time to time.
(Annex "B" of the instant Petition).
Sometime in May, 1993, Arreola suffered pains at her left flank accompanied by
nausea, vomiting, and low moderate fever. Her medical examination revealed the
presence of stone deposits at her left urethra.
On May 18, 1993, Arreola underwent Ureterolithiasis (L) S/P Ureterolithomy (L)
operation, followed by regular check-ups and medication for one month. She spent
P16,019.00 for her hospital bills, doctor's fees, x-ray, laboratory analysis, and
medicine.
On June 16, 1993, Arreola filed with the GSIS an application for compensation
benefit under PD No. 626, as amended.
On July 17, 1993, the GSIS denied her claim on the grounds that her ailment
"Ureterolithiasis left" is a non-occupational disease; and that she failed to show that
her position as Engineer II of the NBI has increased the risk of contracting the
sickness.
Upon the denial of Arreola's request for reconsideration with the GSIS, she
interposed an appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission, docketed as
ECC Case No. 6494.
On December 2. 1993, the ECC rendered a decision, the pertinent portions of which
read:
After a study of the records of the case, he failed to find proof that
appellant's ailment, Ureterolithiasis left, Ureterolithomy, left, was
brought about by her duties as Engineer II at the National Bureau of
Investigation. Where the ailment is not the direct or customary result
of the employment and the herein appellant failed to show proof that
the risk of contracting the disease was increased by her work and
working conditions, the claim for compensation cannot be sustained.
This is the clear implication of Section I (B) of Rule III of the Rules
Implementing PD 626, as amended, which explicitly provides that "for
the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under the rules with conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting it is increased by the
working conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing discussions, the case therefore, is not
meritorious for compensation benefits under the Employees
Compensation Law (P) 6262 (sic), as amended.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant case is Dismissed for lack of merit.
2
SO ORDERED.
We also note that the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) made the following
observations:
 Moreover, medical findings show that Ureterolithiasis is the presence of renal stones
in the ureter. The ureter conveys urine from the renal pelvis to the bladder. When
stones in the renal pappillae or within the urinary collecting system break loose, they
enter the ureter or occlude the ureteropelvic causing obstruction and pain.
Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. The
kidneys must conserve water, but they must also excrete materials that have low
solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced against one another
during adaptation to a particular combination of diet and activity. (Reference:
3
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition, pp. 1211-1212).
Undaunted by the two adverse judgments, Arreola then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. She insisted that she was entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, since
she was able to prove that the exigency and nature of her work as Engineer II of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) greatly increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
In their Comments to the above petition, herein petitioners (respondents below) Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and ECC reiterated their stand that Arreola's disease was not included in
the list of occupational diseases and the risk of contracting it had not been proved to have been
4
increased by the nature of the petitioner's work.
5
In its decision of 7 August, 1995, the Court of Appeals sustained the position of Arreola, reversed the
appealed decision of the ECC, and ordered the GSIS to pay Arreola "the amount due her under P.D.
6
626, as amended." In support of its disposition, the appellate court stated:
The nature of the work of petitioner Arreola as Engineer II in the National Bureau of
Investigation deals with research; instrumental analysis of drugs, insecticides, volatile
poisons, fuels, and inorganic compound; attendance to field cases; taking of paraffin
casts at morgue and in the office; and assisting NBI agents in field work in the
matters of investigation of industrial corporations engaged in nefarious activities.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the exingency (sic) of petitioner's assigned tasks
was such that she had to forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of
concentration. In addition, tension, stress, and pressure must have aggravated her
physical condition.
The Supreme Court in Narazo vs. Employees' Compensation
7
Commission held that ". . . [i]t may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for
hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes
with their teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience,
prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. This
encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance
between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed
excretion may permit the retention and survival of micro-organisms posing factors to
pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses are not
directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the
same is certainly aggravated by their working habits necessitated by demands of job
efficiency.
Similarly, considering the nature of the work of herein petitioner, the same could have
increased the risk of contracting the disease. We thus find her entitled to receive
8
compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.
In addition, the Court of Appeals commented that the ECC failed to appreciate the petitioner's more
than twenty years of devoted public service, which earned her successive promotions to greater
responsibilities and the fact that she had been performing the strenuous and demanding task of
9
Chemical Engineer. It also quoted Santos vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, which
reiterates that claims falling under the Employee's Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to
fulfill its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our
10
society.
The petitioners forthwith appealed to us from the decision of the Court of Appeals by way of this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the appellate court's
determination that Arreola's work increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis is "pure
speculation." The petitioners pointedly state that there is no need to apply Article 4 of the Labor Code
on the liberal interpretation of social legislation when the provisions of such are clear.
In her Comment, Arreola posits that while it is true that ureterolithiasis is not a listed occupational
disease, yet under the "increased risk" theory, she has sufficiently proved that her claim for
compensation is meritorious. Moreover, she satisfactorily established that the nature of her work for
the past twenty years, as former Chemical Lab Technician and Chemical Engineer, and currently as
Engineer II, made her miss important health habits such as regularly drinking water and urinating. She
then chides the petitioners for making her claim for compensation a circuitous and painful path.
After a further evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of the parties, we rule for the
private respondent and affirm the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals.
P.D. No. 626 (27 December 1974) further amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State
Insurance fund of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442, as amended). This law abandoned
the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation
11
Act. For the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove
that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Rules on Employees' Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
12
claimant's working conditions. This means that if the claimant's illness or disease is not included in
the said Annex "A," then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of contracting
13
the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions.
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the
present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency
charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
14
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987
15
Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less
than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach
16
to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must
be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the
17
law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
The private respondent concedes that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not included in Annex "A" of the
Rules on Employees' Compensation. Nevertheless, she asserts that she was able to prove that the
risk of contracting it was increased by the exigency and nature of her work. Her burden of evidence
did not require the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt nor a preponderance of evidence.
It was enough that she adduced substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, like the ECC, a fact is deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
18
conclusion. It was then enough if the private respondent was able to show that the nature of her
work or her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis. Certainly, it was
not necessary for her to breach the parameters of substantial evidence and to cross the difficult area
of preponderance of evidence. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the private respondent
successfully discharged her burden of evidence and convincingly showed that, indeed, the nature of
her work or her working conditions increased the risk of contracting ureterolithiasis.
According to the ECC in its impugned decision, ureterolithiasis is the presence of renal stones in the
ureter and urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. Quoting
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th edition, it added: "The kidneys must conserve water,
but they must excrete materials that have low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be
19
balanced against one another during adaptation to a particular combination of diet and activity."
In the 13th Edition of Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, vol. 2 (International Edition, 1994),
page 1330, we find the following entries:
PATHOGENESIS OF STONES
Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. The
kidneys must conserve water, but they also must excrete materials that have a low
solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced during adaptation to
diet, climate, and activity. The problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that
urine contains substances that inhibit crystallization of calcium salts and others that
bind calcium in soluble complexes. These protective mechanisms are less than
perfect. When the urine becomes supersaturated with insoluble materials, because
excretion rates are excessive and/or because water conservation is extreme, crystals
form and may grow and aggregate to form a stone. (emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, diet, climate, and activity are important considerations in achieving the delicate
balance. Note, however, that climate was excluded from the quotation made by the ECC.
The following are factors which contribute to the development of stones:
Geographic factors contribute to the development of stones. In developing countries,
children — especially prepubescent boys — are prone to bladder calculi. In
industrialized countries, most calculi are seen in adults as renal or ureteral stones.
Areas of high humidity and elevated temperatures appear to be contributing factors,
and the incidence of symptomatic ureteral stones is greatest during hot summer
months.
Diet and fluid intake may be important factors in the development of urinary
stones. Excess intake of calcium, oxalate, and puriness can increase the incidence of
stones in predisposed individuals. Additionally, water or other fluid intake is important
in preventing urolithiasis. Persons in sedentary occupations have a higher incidence
of stones that manual laborers.
Genetic factors may contribute to urinary stone formation. Cystinuria is an autosomal
recessive disorder. Homozygous individuals have markedly increased excertion of
cystine and frequently have numerous recurrent episodes of urinary stones despite
attempts to optimize medical treatment. Renal tubular acidosis appears to be
transmitted as a hereditary trait, and urolithiasis occurs in up to 75% of patients
20
affected with this disorder. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus medically established that the environment (included in geographic factor), water or other
fluid intake and the nature of the occupation — sedentary or otherwise — are important factors in the
development or inhibition of urinary stones or ureterolithiasis in general. Certainly, too, the regularity
of urination plays an important role since withholding urine for sometime may disturb the balance. It is
not denied that the private respondent's work exposed her to drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons,
fuels and inorganic compounds, and chemical laboratory equipment. Moreover, she attended to field
cases and rendered holiday and night duties once a week and helped the chemists in the
examinations of incoming cases. Neither have the petitioners refuted the claim of the private
respondent that she missed some important health habits such as regularly drinking enough water
and urination. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the exigency of [Arreola's]
assigned tasks was such that she had to forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of
concentration."
All told then, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its challenged decision. It is
apropos at this juncture to reiterate what we said in Vicente vs. Employees' Compensation
21
Commission.
The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare
of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry,
and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little
recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that
the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by
its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise
for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingman's struggle
for his just dues.
The private respondent, however, is entitled to only twelve thousand six hundred and nineteen pesos
(P12,619.00) and not P16,619.00, as the records are bereft of any substantiation representing her
expenses for X-ray (P1,600.00), laboratory analysis (P300.00), and medicines (P1,500.00).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 34223 is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay private
respondent Ms. Lilia B. Arreola the sum of P12,619.00 as compensation. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132916 November 16, 2001

RUFINA TANCINCO, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION,respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the Resolutions dated May
30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 issued by the former Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44148. The first resolution dismissed petitioner's appeal from the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, whereas the second resolution denied her motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are:
At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his house along
the National Road in Barangay Palanas, Lemery, Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead
by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security Protection
Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his death, was assigned as part of the
close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the
time inasmuch as the former Vice-President was in the United States for medical treatment.
His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). On February 19, 1996, the GSIS denied petitioner's claim on the ground
that there was no proof that petitioner's husband's death was work-related. Petitioner appealed the
denial to the Employees' Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on December 19, 1996,
2
issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the Commission:
It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on off duty
status did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as a member of the PNP
Security Command.
Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the present case. Notably,
SPO1 Tancinco was repairing his service vehicle at the time of his death. He was neither
executing an order for VP Estrada nor performing an official function on that fateful day
inasmuch as Police Superintendent Atilano Miranda duly certified that SPO1 Tancinco was on
"off-duty status" on July 17, 1995.
We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as injury, disability, or death
which befall an employee are compensable. The same must be the result of accident arising
out of and in the course of employment.
Since the cause of SPO1 Tancinco's death is no longer part of his official functions, the claim
for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, cannot be given
due course.
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the Commission before the Court of
3
Appeals. On May 30, 1997, the appellate court issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for review on the following grounds: (a) that the certification of non-forum shopping was
defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the record were not attached to the
petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the material dates which would establish the
timeliness thereof. As admitted by petitioner herself, she received a copy of the resolution on June 9,
1997, and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or seven-and-a-half (7 ½) months later, that she filed a
motion for reconsideration. As can be expected, the appellate court denied her motion in the second
4
assailed resolution of March 5, 1998.
Petitioner seeks recourse before us via this petition for review on certiorari, arguing that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONER WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULES AND WAS ON ITS FACE MERITORIOUS.
5
In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation signifying its solidarity
with petitioner. The Solicitor General adopts the view that SPO1 Tancinco's death is work-related
given the circumstances under which he was killed, given that (a) the deceased was a policeman and
(b) the killing was done in a professional manner. He speculates that the motive behind the killing "is
likely to have arisen during the duration of the almost eighteen (18) years that he served as constable
in the PC and as a policeman."
With regret, we deny the petition.
6
The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed. Under section 1 of Rule
45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal from a decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of dismissal two hundred
thirty one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said resolution final and executory. The gap of more
than seven (7) months is too large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to
account for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality in the application of procedural rules
7
to at least explain his non-compliance therewith. We have held that the period of appeal is not only
8
mandatory, but more importantly, it is jurisdictional. Even we cannot ignore the immutable character
9
of a final judgment.
Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail on the merits. Rule III
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:
 SECTION 1. Grounds—(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for
the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-President's
security detail, the decedent was required to guard the person of the former; hence, his presence was
officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was
off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was at home; it is not even
known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-President was away. Clearly,
he was not at the place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died while
performing his official functions. In this regard, we held that policemen are regarded as being on
twenty-four (24) hour alert. As we explained in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of
10
Appeals,
xxx But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the
national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24
hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at any
time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining
the peace and security of the community.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as
amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
11
The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed forces, until it was
12
applied by extension to policemen, as aforesaid, and eventually to firemen.
13
However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable. Thus,
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims
for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work
requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions;
and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should
be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to
at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and
unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his
superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura,
or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even
without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt.
Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in
the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will
not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where
he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to
render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour
duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket
license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the
24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing
the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character. [italics supplied]
In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. We have tried
to view it from all possible angles, but the inescapable conclusion is that he was not performing acts
that are "basically police service in character." As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is part of "an
organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws
14
xxx". Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was discharging official
functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco was at
home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband was discharging a task pursuant to an
order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a claim is substantial
15
evidence, which is that "amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
16
adequate to justify a conclusion." Unfortunately, the burden was not successfully met.
In closing, we express our heartfelt commiseration with petitioner for the misfortune which has
befallen her and her family. Even this Court, the embodiment of justice dispensed impartially, can feel
very human emotions, as it does so now. However, for reasons both procedural and substantive, we
cannot grant her petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 30, 1997 and
March 5, 1998 are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
 UTH JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents.

Isidro Pasana for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION;
COMPENSABILITY OF ILLNESS; CANCER OF THE
LUNGS, A BORDERLINE CASE REQUIRING STUDY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CASE. — Admittedly, cancer of the
lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline
cases where a study of the circumstances of the case is
mandated to fully appreciate whether the nature of the work of
the deceased increased the possibility of contracting such an
ailment. WE have ruled in the case of Dator v. Employees
Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416,
January 30, 1982) that" (U)ntil now, the cause of cancer is not
known." Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening
through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the
possibility that the deceased’s ailment could have been caused
by the working conditions while employed with the Philippine
Constabulary. Respondents maintain that the deceased was a
smoker and the logical conclusion is that the cause of the fatal
lung cancer could only be smoking which cannot in any way
be justified as work-connected. However, medical authorities
support the conclusion that up to now, the etiology or cause of
cancer of the lungs is still largely unknown.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION OF COMMISSION

NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MEDICAL AUTHORITIES
AND FACTS ON RECORD. — The sweeping conclusion of
the respondent Employees Compensation Commission to the
effect that the cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma of the
deceased was due to his being a smoker and not in any
manner connected with his work as a soldier, is not in
accordance with medical authorities nor with the facts on
record. No certitude can arise from a position of uncertainty.
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have
given credence to the stand of the petitioner that her husband
developed bronchogenic carcinoma while working as a soldier
with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when
the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in
1969, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. A
soldier’s life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to field duty,
exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of
sleep and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals
while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be
discounted. WE take note also of the fact that he became the
security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and
he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p.
26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved irregular
working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and
body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other
similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY OF INCREASED RISK. —

The theory of increased risk is applicable in the case at bar. In
the case of Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA, 336-337) where the
Court held that "to establish compensability under the said
theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection.
Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence to support a
decision’ (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and
National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and
convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed
out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on
evidence which would establish direct causal relation between
the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased.
Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot
support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the
disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the
matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires
is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states
that ‘all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICT RULES ON EVIDENCE NOT

APPLICABLE; STATE POLICY OF LIBERALITY
TOWARDS LABOR MUST BE MAINTAINED. — In San
Valentin v. ECC (118 SCRA 160), the Court held that "In
compensation cases, strict rules on evidence are not
applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is
required or that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working condition." This is in line with the avowed
policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution (Art. II,
Sec. 9) and restated in the New Labor Code (Art. 4) to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.
DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent

Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated August
20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC Case
No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denying
petitioner’s claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended.

The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library

Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who

joined the government service in June, 1969 as a constable in
the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.)

After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the

rank of constable second class. On December 16, 1974, he
was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p. 26, rec.)

Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from

Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan. While on their
way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left side of the bus,
fell down from the bus because of the sudden stop of the
vehicle. As a result, he was confined at the Cagayan
Provincial Hospital for about one (1) week, and thereafter,
released (comment of respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He
was again confined for further treatment from November 7,
1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center in Quezon
City.

While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao,

Cagayan, he was assigned as security to one Dr. Emilio
Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec., Proceedings of the
PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In compliance with his
duty, he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter
went (p. 26, rec.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined at the

Cagayan Provincial Hospital and then transferred to the AFP
V. Luna Medical Center at Quezon City for further treatment.
He complained of off-and-on back pains, associated with
occasional cough and also the swelling of the right forearm.
The doctors found a mass growth on his right forearm, which
grew to the size of 3 by 2 inches, hard and associated with
pain, which the doctors diagnosed as "aortic aneurysm,
medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.)
His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he was
released on May 16, 1979. He was advised to have complete
rest and to continue medication. He was then given light duty
inside the barracks of their company.

Unfortunately, his ailment continued and became more

serious.

On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung, Cagayan,

at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening. He was barely 35 years
old at the time of his death.

The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic

carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of the lungs.

On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was conducted

before the PC Regional Board. It was their official findings
that the subject enlisted man "died in line of duty" ; that the
deceased was a PC member of the 111th PC Company at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; that he died due to "bronchogenic CA"
; and that he "died not as a result of his misconduct and did
not violate any provisions of the Articles of War" (ECC rec.,
Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980).

The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or become

due subject EP be paid and settled to his legal heirs" (ECC
rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980).
Thus, as per records of the GSIS, petitioner was paid benefits
due to her deceased husband under Republic Act No. 610
(Comment of respondent ECC, p. 27, rec.)cralawnad

Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under

PD No. 626, as amended with the respondent GSIS. Said
claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that her
husband’s death is not compensable "for the reason that the
injury/sickness that caused his death is not due to the
circumstances of the employment or in the performance of the
duties and responsibilities of said employment" (Letter of
denial by the GSIS dated July 14, 1980, ECC rec.)

The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees

Compensation Commission in its decision dated August 21,
1981, stating among others:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on

record and the applicable law on the case, we conclude that
the law has been properly applied by the respondent System. .
..

"Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is the

most common form of malignancy in males reaching a peak
between the fifth and seventh decades and accounting for one
in four male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1,
male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical
authorities have confirmed the relationship between lung
cancer and cigarette smoking. Other factors that may have
potential roles are exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to
chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel,
beryllium and asbestos (Harrison’s Principles of Internal
Medicine by Wintrobe, Et Al., 7th Edition, p. 1322).

"Although Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, was

envisioned to give relief to workingmen, who sustain an
injury or contract an ailment in the course of employment and
that to best attain its lofty objective, a liberal interpretation of
the law should pervade in its implementation, this precept,
however, may not be invoked as not even a slight causal link
between the development of the ailment and the decedent’s
(sic) duties and working conditions as a PC sergeant could be
deduced from the records of this case. The respondent
System’s ruling that appellant’s claim does not fall within the
beneficiant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, and therefore the same should be denied, is in full
harmony with the law and the facts obtaining herein.

. . ." (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.)

On September 28, 1981, Petitioner, assisted by counsel, filed

the instant petition, the only pertinent issue being whether or
not her husband’s death from bronchogenic carcinoma is
compensable under the law.

The petitioner contends that her husband’s death is

compensable and that respondent Commission erred in not
taking into consideration the uncontroverted circumstance that
when the deceased entered into the Philippine Constabulary,
he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. She
farther contends that as a soldier, her husband’s work has
always been in the field where exposure to the elements, dust
and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest was the rule rather
than the exception. The nature of work of a soldier being to
protect life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at
any time of day or night. Furthermore, he was even assigned
as security to one Emilio Cordero and always accompanied
the latter wherever he went. Exposed to these circumstances
for several years, the deceased’s physical constitution began
to deteriorate, which eventually resulted to his death from
bronchogenic carcinoma (Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.)

On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that

while the deceased soldier may have been exposed to
elements of dust and dirt and condition of lack of rest and
continued fatigue by virtue of his duties to protect the life and
property of the citizens, such conditions have no causal
relation to his contraction of bronchogenic carcinoma. It is
also the opinion of the respondent that since there is evidence
of the deceased to be a smoker, "the late Sgt. Jimenez may
have indulged heavily in smoking and drinking, not merely
‘occasionally’. And it has been demonstrated medically that
the more cigarettes a person smokes, the greater the risk of
developing lung cancer" (Memorandum, p. 62, rec.). In short,
the respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to a
large degree for his having contracted bronchogenic
carcinoma that led to his demise.cralawnad

WE find the petitioner’s claim meritorious.

Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal

cancer and its frequency is increasing (The Merck Manual,
13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly, cancer of the lungs
(bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline cases
where a study of the circumstances of the case is mandated to
fully appreciate whether the nature of the work of the
deceased increased the possibility of contracting such an
ailment. In the case of Laron v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE held, citing Schmidt’s
Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman v.
Public Service Coordinated Transport, 191 A 297, 299; Words
and Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61, "The English word
‘cancer’ means ‘crab’, in the medical sense, it refers to a
malignant, usually fatal, tumor or growth." Findings of fact by
the respondent points out that bronchogenic carcinoma is a
malignant tumor of the lungs. WE have ruled in the case of
Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA
634, L-57416, January 30, 1982) that" (U)ntil now, the cause
of cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has provided
an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did
pursue the possibility that the deceased’s ailment could have
been caused by the working conditions while employed with
the Philippine Constabulary.

Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker and the

logical conclusion is that the cause of the fatal lung cancer
could only be smoking which cannot in any way be justified
as work-connected. However, medical authorities support the
conclusion that up to now, the etiology or cause of cancer of
the lungs is still largely unknown as provided for in the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be

explained at the molecular level, it is clear that genetic
composition of the host is important in cancer induction.
Related immunologic factors may predispose the host to a
putative carcinogen. There is some evidence that viruses may
play a role in the neoplastic process. In addition, both
environmental and therapeutic agents have been identified of
carcinogens" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th
Edition, 1980, p. 1584).

"Considerable attention has been directed to the potential role

of air pollution exposure to ionizing radiation and numerous
occupational hazards, including exposure to chromates,
metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and
asbestos" (Harrison, Ibid, p. 1259).

"The lungs are the site of origin of primary benign and

malignant tumors and receive metastases from many other
organs and tissues. Specific causes have not been established
but a strong dose-related statistical association exists between
cigarette smoking and squamous cell and undifferentiated
small (oat) cell bronchogenic carcinomas. There is suggestive
evidence that prolonged exposure to air pollution promotes
lung neoplasms" (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647).

"What emerges from such concepts is the belief that cancers

in man do not appear suddenly ‘out of the blue’. . . .
Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or pathogenesis.
Many influences may be at work during the evolution of the
lesion and many pathways may be involved. Indeed, the term
cancer may embrace a multiplicity of diseases of diverse
origins" (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition,
1979, p. 185, Emphasis supplied).

WE cannot deny the fact that the causes of the illness of the
deceased are still unknown and may embrace such diverse
origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with
reasonable certainty. Indeed, scientists attending the World
Genetic Congress in New Delhi, India, have warned that
about 25,000 chemicals used around the world could
potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence Fishbein of the U.S.
National Center for Toxilogical Research pointed out that
humans were daily exposed to literally hundreds of chemical
agents via air, food, medication, both in their industrial home
and environments (Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3,
cols. 2-3).
The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case.
WE had the occasion to interpret the theory of increased risk
in the case of Cristobal v. Employees Compensation
Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-49280, February 26,
1981):chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"To establish compensability under the said theory, the

claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the
degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which
means ‘such relevant evidence to support a decision’ (Ang
Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor
Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In
this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.
Respondents however insist on evidence which would
establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal
cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict
requirement which even medical experts cannot support
considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would
negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence,
Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of
interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of
the new Labor Code which states that ‘all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor.’

". . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the social

justice guarantee secured by both 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude
in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is
some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This
should not be confused with the presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. While these doctrines may
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code (the
constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged),
it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still
subsists. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

The sweeping conclusion of the respondent Employees

Compensation Commission to the effect that the cause of the
bronchogenic carcinoma of the deceased was due to his being
a smoker and not in any manner connected with his work as a
soldier, is not in accordance with medical authorities nor with
the facts on record. No certitude can arise from a position of
uncertainty.
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have
given credence to the stand of the petitioner that her husband
developed bronchogenic carcinoma while working as a soldier
with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when
the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in
1969, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. A
soldier’s life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to field duty,
exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of
sleep and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals
while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be
discounted. WE take note also of the fact that he became the
security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and
he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p.
26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved irregular
working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and
body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other
similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailment.

WE held in the case of San Valentin v. Employees

Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160)
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

"In compensation cases. strict rules of evidence are not

applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is
required or that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation

Commission

(L-57416, January 30, 1982), WE held the death of Wenifreda

Dator, a librarian for 15 years, caused by bronchogenic
carcinoma compensable. Being a librarian, "she was exposed
to duty books and other deleterious substances in the library
under unsanitary conditions" (Ibid., 632). WE do not see any
reason to depart from the ruling in the said case, considering
that a soldier’s duties and environment are more hazardous.

This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as

mandated by the Constitution (Article II, Section 9) and
restated in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give maximum
aid and protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS

HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED.
1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;

2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER’s MEDICAL AND

HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER
RECEIPTS; AND

3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR
BURIAL EXPENSES.

SO ORDERED.