Crim Cases 4th Set

G.R. No.
195021, March 15, 2017
NICOLAS VELASQUEZ AND VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code1 admits to the
commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability. However, he asserts that he is
justified in committing the acts. In the process of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks
admitting the imputed acts, which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating
facts. Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying
circumstances.
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the accused petitioners
pray that the assailed March 17, 2010 Decision3 and December 10, 2010 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 be reversed and set aside, and that they be absolved of any criminal liability.
The Court of Appeals' assailed rulings sustained the July 25, 2007 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Dagupan City, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.
In an Information, petitioners Nicolas Velasquez (Nicolas) and Victor Velasquez (Victor), along with four (4)
others - Felix Caballeda (Felix), Jojo Del Mundo (Jojo), Sonny Boy Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong Ocumen
(Ampong) - were charged with attempted murder under Article 248,6 in relation to Article 6,7 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
That on May 24, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Palua, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused while armed with stones and wooden poles, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit JESUS DEL MUNDO
inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus commenced a felony
directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of
Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code.8
All accused, except Ampong, who remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.9 Trial then
ensued.10
According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo
(Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut, which was about 100 meters away.11 Arriving
at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having
sex.12 Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted
invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away.13 Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora,
while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who was then elsewhere.14 Jesus went to the house of
Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there.15 He began making his way back home when he
was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused.16
Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. Petitioner Victor also
hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone.17 Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear.18Accused
Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder.19 Ampong punched
Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind
blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their
house.20
Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the prosecution also presented the
testimony of Maria Teresita Viado (Maria Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus' wife,
Ana, when Jesus failed to immediately return home.21 She and Ana embarked on a search for Jesus but were
separated.22 At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid behind some bamboos.23 From that vantage point,
she saw the accused mauling Jesus.24 The prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5) meters away was
a lamp post, which illuminated the scene.25
At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she had witnessed (Jesus had
managed to return home by then).26 Ana and Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to Barangay Captain Pilita
Villanueva, who assisted them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.27
After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull.28 Dr. Jose D.
De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman) issued a medico-legal certificate indicating the following findings: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath

3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.
x.x.29
Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4) to six (6) weeks.30 Jesus
was also advised to undergo surgery.31 He was, however, unable to avail of the required medical procedure
due to shortage of funds.32
The defense offered a different version of events.
According to the accused, in the evening of May 24, 2003, petitioner Nicolas was roused in his sleep by his
wife, Mercedes Velasquez (Mercedes), as the nearby house of petitioner Victor was being stoned.33
Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus hacking Victor's door. Several neighbors - the
other accused - allegedly tried to pacify Jesus.34 Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon
Nicolas and the other accused, as well as on Mercedes.35 The accused thus responded and countered Jesus'
attacks, leading to his injuries.36
In its July 25, 2007 Decision,37 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City found petitioners and Felix
Caballeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.38 The court also found Sonny Boy Velasquez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of less serious physical injuries.39 He was found to have hit Jesus on the
back with a bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was acquitted.40 The case was archived with respect to Ampong, as
he remained at large.41
The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NICOLAS VELASQUEZ,
VICTOR VELASQUEZ and FELIX CABALLEDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6, paragraph 3 and 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, and pursuant to the law, sentences each of them to suffer on (sic) indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and one (1) day of Arrested (sic) Mayor in its maximum period as minimum to eight (8) years of
Prison (sic) Correctional (sic) in its maximum period to Prison (sic) Mayor in its medium period as maximum
and to pay proportionately to private complainant Jesus del Mundo the amount of Php55,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to pay the cost of suit.
The Court likewise finds the accused SONNY BOY VELASQUEZ [guilty] beyond reasonable doubt of the
[crime] of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code
and pursuant thereto, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Arresto Mayor on one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months.
Accused JOJO DEL MUNDO is hereby acquitted on the ground of absence of evidence.
With respect to accused AMPONG OCUMEN, the case against him is archived without prejudice to its revival
as soon as he is arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.42
Petitioners and Felix Caballeda filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Regional Trial Court denied.43
On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners and Caballeda were only
liable for serious physical injuries because "first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the accused-
appellants, despite their superiority in numbers and strength, left the victim alive and, second, none of [the]
injuries or wounds inflicted upon the victim was fatal."44 The Court of Appeals thus modified the sentence
imposed on petitioners and Caballeda.
The dispositive portion of its assailed March 17, 2010 Decision45 read: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 25, 2007 Decision of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City is hereby MODIFIED. Instead, accused-appellants are found guilty of Serious Physical
Injuries and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition.47 They insist
on their version of events, particularly on how they and their co-accused allegedly merely acted in response
to Jesus Del Mundo's aggressive behavior.
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted
on Jesus Del Mundo. More specifically, this Court is asked to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence: first, to prove that justifying circumstances existed, and second, to convict the petitioners.
Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense of
Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying circumstances
under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the
same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the
first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and
the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the
one making defense had no part therein.
A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another
person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted
harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person
(or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.
The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the
accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be
established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case
must rise on its own merits: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused
claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.48
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense."49 Defense of a relative under
Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in
lieu of the third "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense
had no part therein."50
The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and defense of a
relative:
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed against
appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
claiming self-defense.51
The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression -
requires a reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response: "[t]he
means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the
means of attack and the defense."52 This is a matter that depends on the circumstances: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means
of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter
as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does
not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury . . . As WE stated in the
case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act
irresponsible in law for the consequences.53(Citations omitted)
The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. This also
requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-Caballero,54 "[p]rovocation is
sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the
person claiming self-defense."55
II
We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be sorely wanting.
Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into the
premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical harm upon petitioners
and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.
Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners offered
nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in
the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and credible proof to back up their
assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to
petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.56
The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus launched an
assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4) other
accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his assault despite being outnumbered, and also
despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely
to harm them that, to neutralize him, they had no other recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for
at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with less
severe blows.57
As the Regional Trial Court noted, however: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private complainant and
accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo, private complainant is
shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused. The said accused could have had easily held the
private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of hitting
him.58
The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.59
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by petitioners and
their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a
reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the
second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.
III
In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of Maria Teresita is not worthy
of trust because she parted ways with Ana while searching for Jesus.60 They characterize Maria Teresita as
the prosecution's "lone eyewitness."61 They make it appear that its entire case hinges on her. Thus, they
theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete and utter ruin of the prosecution's
case.62 Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is the prosecution's lone eyewitness at the same time that they
aclmowledge Jesus' testimony, which they dismissed as laden with inconsistencies.63
These contentions no longer merit consideration.
Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need for even passing upon their
assertions against Maria Teresita's and Jesus' testimonies. Upon their mere invocation of self-defense and
defense of a relative, they relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving the acts constitutive of the
offense. They took upon themselves the burden of establishing their innocence, and cast their lot on their
capacity to prove their own affirmative allegations. Unfortunately for them, they failed.
Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail to impress.
Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone eyewitness," upon whose testimony the
prosecution's case was to rise or fall, is plainly erroneous. Apart from her, Jesus testified about his own
experience of being mauled by petitioners and their co-accused. Maria Teresita's testimony was only in
support of what Jesus recounted.
Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted ways with Ana while searching
for Jesus diminishes her credibility. No extraordinary explanation is necessary for this. Their having
proceeded separately may be accounted for simply by the wisdom of how independent searches enabled
them to cover more ground in less time.
Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus' supposedly flawed
recollection of who among the six (6) accused dealt him, which specific blow, and using which specific
weapon.64 These contentions are too trivial to even warrant an independent, point by point audit by this
Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime need not be foolproof:
"Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is especially
true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and
excitement."65 This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal. One who
has undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then
give an accurate account"66 of every minutiae.
Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him which specific blow can be
forgiven. The merit of Jesus' testimony does not depend on whether he has an extraordinary memory
despite being hit on the head multiple times. Rather, it is in his credible narration of his entire ordeal, and
how petitioners and their co-accused were its authors. On this, his testimony was unequivocal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174483 March 31, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO, SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO
REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556 which
affirmed with modification, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13
in Criminal Case No. 3613, finding accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and
Noel, all surnamed Regalario guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00,
and another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the court of origin, accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel were
originally charged with Homicide. However, after reinvestigation of the case, the Panel of
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, Legaspi City, consisting of State Prosecutors Romulo SJ
Tolentino, Mary May B. De Leoz and Elmer M. Lanuzo filed an amended information3 charging the
accused-appellants with murder, committed as follows:
That on February 22, 1997 at about 11:00 in the evening, at Brgy. Natasan, Municipality of Libon,
province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, treachery, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime attack, assault, strike and hit ROLANDO SEVILLA with wooden clubs (bahi) used as their
night sticks, hitting the latter at the different parts of his body and tying down his hands and feet with
a rope, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused his death,
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
On October 9, 1998, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: Zaldy Siglos, Nancy Sara, Ryan Sara,
Armando Cabais Poblete, Ronnie Siglos, Cynthia Sevilla, Norma Torres, Policeman Jose Gregorio,
Cenen Talagtag, Cesar Sazon and Dr. Mario Cerillo, while Antonio Relato and Nicanor Regonia
testified on rebuttal. Nancy Sara, Cynthia Sevilla and Ryan Sara were presented for a second time
also as rebuttal witnesses.
On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand. All raised the defense of denial except for
Ramon who admitted the act charged but claimed self-defense. To corroborate their defense, Jose
Poblete and Adonis Velasco were presented. The defense also presented Senior Police Officer 2
(SPO2) Jimmy Colisao, Harold Reolo, Ma. Julieta Razonable, and Dr. Leopoldo Barrosa II.
On August 24, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision5 giving full faith and credit to the
prosecution’s evidence. It ruled out accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and
held that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime as
shown in the manner in which all of them inflicted the wounds on the victim’s body. It further ruled
that the killing was qualified to murder by abuse of superior strength and by their scoffing at the body
of the victim. It also appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The pertinent dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Ramon, Sotero, Bienvenido, Marciano and
Noel, all surnamed Regalario, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Par. 1,
of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at
the corpse of the victim. However, accused are entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender which offset the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at his corpse, hence,
are hereby sentenced to suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together with the accessory
penalties provided for by law.
The accused are hereby ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Rolando
Sevilla the amount of ₱50,000.00 and another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92 the ₱200,000.00 bail bond put up by
accused Marciano Regalario is hereby cancelled and is ordered recommitted to jail.
SO ORDERED.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in view of the penalty
imposed.
In our Resolution6 of August 13, 2001, We accepted the appeal and directed the Chief of the Judicial
Records Office, to send notices to the parties to file their respective briefs. The Court also required
the Jail Warden, Municipal Jail, Polangui, Albay to transfer accused-appellants to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and make a report of such transfer within ten (10) days from notice.
Likewise, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections was required to confirm the detention of accused-
appellants. Accused-appellants filed their Appellants’ Brief7 on December 4, 2001, while the People,
thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief8 on July 30, 2002.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo9 which modified the provisions of the Rules of
Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was
referred for appropriate action and disposition to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
01556.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:
Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay and
related to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay kagawad
and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay tanod, is their
cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano. (TSN, November 16, 1998, p. 9; RTC Order dated October
9, 1998, pp. 115-117)
On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the barangay
pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. At around ten o’clock that evening, Rolando Sevilla and Armando
Poblete were enjoying the festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them (TSN,
December 7, 1998, p.4). To avoid trouble, the two distanced themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless,
a commotion ensued. (ibid., p. 5). Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking
Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally known as bahi. (TSN,
November 16, 1998, pp. 13-17, 32, 34, 36-37). The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting
position but after a short while he was able to get up (ibid., pp. 16-17). He ran away in the direction
of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain (ibid., pp. 18-38). Bienvenido and
Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla (ibid., p. 38, TSN, December 7, 1998. p. 6). When Sevilla was
already near Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point,
Marciano Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house (TSN, December 7, 1998,
pp. 7-9 and 35). Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife. The five appellants caught the victim in front
of Marciano’s house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting the victim until he
slumped to the ground face down (ibid., pp. 8, 35 and 38). In that position, Sevilla was boxed by
Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered the
others to kill the victim and to tie him up (ibid., pp. 36-37). Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with
the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. (ibid., pp. 37-38).
In the early morning of February 23, 1997, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, after she was
informed of her husband’s death, went to the poblacion of Libon to report the incident at the town’s
police station (TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 7-8). However, her statements were not entered in the
police blotter because appellant Marciano Regalario had earlier reported to them, at two o’clock in
the morning, a different version of the incident, i.e., it was the victim Sevilla who shot Marciano’s
brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed under the custody of the barangay
tanods. (ibid., p. 7; TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 9-10). At around eight o’clock of
the same morning, SPO4 Jose Gregorio, with some other police officers and Cynthia Sevilla, left the
police station on board a truck and proceeded to the crime scene in Natasan. SPO4 Gregorio
conducted an investigation of the incident. (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 10-12).
Thereafter, the policemen took the victim’s cadaver to the police station in the poblacion (ibid., p. 26)
where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands and legs tied behind him [Exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’]
(ibid., pp. 14-15; TSN, December 8, 1998, p. 10; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp 5-7).
On that same day, SPO4 Gregorio requested the Libon’s Rural Health Unit to conduct an autopsy on
the victim’s body but since the municipal health officer was not around, it was only performed the
next day, February 24 (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], p. 26; TSN, December 8, 1998, pp.
10-11; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], p. 11). After Dr. Mario Cerillo, Municipal Health
Officer of Libon conducted the autopsy, he forthwith issued a Medico-Legal Report dated February
24, 1997 (Exhibit ‘B’), the pertinent portions of which read:
Findings:Head : Lacerated wound 4 cm
frontal area, Right.
: Lacerated wound 8 cm.
occipital area, Right.
with fractured skull
(post auricular area),
Right.
: Abrasion 4 x 2 cm.
eyebrow, Right.
: Abrasion 2 cm. x 1 cm.
with lacerated wound
1 cm. eyebrow, Left.
: Periorbital Hematoma
Left and Right eye.
lower lip, Left.
Neck : Stab wound 2 cm.
penetrating lateral base
of the neck just above
the clavicle, Right.
: Stab wound 2 cm., 6 cm.
depth lateral base of the
neck just above the
clavicle, Right.
Trunk : Hematoma 10 x 8 cm.
clavicular area, Right.
: Multiple abrasion chest
: Contusion 7 x 2 cm.,
7th Intercorsal space and
clavicular line, left.
Extremities : Multiple abrasion and
contusion on both Right

and Left arm and forearm.
: Abrasion (Ropemark)
around Right and Left wrist.
: Abrasion (Ropemark) around
distal 3rd of both Right and
Left leg.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Cause of Death:
Sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and multiple lacerated wound, probably
secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.
On the witness stand, Dr. Cerillo opined that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused
by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or iron bar, his stab wounds by a sharp-edged
instrument or knife, his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a blunt
instrument. Also according to the physician, the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds
could have been a knife 2 cm. wide and 6 cm. long because they were clean cut wounds. (TSN,
November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp. 14-15).10
On the other hand, the accused-appellants’ Brief presents a different story:
At the time of the incident in question, accused Marciano Regalario was the incumbent barangay
captain of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Accused Sotero was a kagawad, while Ramon and Bienvenido
were barangay tanods of the same place. Noel Regalario had no public position. He is the son of
one of the other accused.
On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in their barangay.
Naturally, being barangay officials, the accused, (except Noel who is not an official and whose wife
has just given birth) were at the place of the celebration, discharging their peace-keeping duties.
They were posted at different places in that vicinity.
At first, a fire broke out in the toilet of the Day Care Center. It was attended to by the persons
assigned in that area. A while later, there was another commotion in the area assigned to accused
Ramon Regalario. When he approached the group where the disturbance was taking place and tried
to investigate, Rolando Sevilla suddenly emerged from the group and without any ado, fired a shot at
him. He was hit at the left shoulder. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla from firing more
shots, which might prove fatal, he struck his assailant with his nightstick and hit him at the back of
his head. This is the blow which Nancy Sara and Zaldy Siglos said were delivered by Sotero and
Bienvenido. This blow caused Sevilla to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. To prevent
Sevilla from regaining his balance, Ramon pressed his counter-attack by continuing to harass him
with blows of his nightstick. As Ramon pressed on forward, Sevilla retreated backward. Ramon kept
him busy parrying the blows which hit his arms and front part of the body, as they were face to face
with each other. But even in the course of such harassment, Sevilla was able to fire a second shot
which missed Ramon.
When they reached the end of the road pavement, Sevilla lost his footing on edge of the pavement
and fell down. At that juncture, Sotero arrived and shouted to Ramon to stop beating Rolando. But
Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero plunged at Rolando and they wrestled on
the ground for the possession of the gun. As they struggled, the gun went off but no one was hurt.
When Rolando raised his arms to move the gun away from Sotero, Ramon knocked the gun off his
hand and it fell near the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just arrived at the scene
along with Marciano Regalario who was already told that his brother Ramon was shot by Sevilla.
Poblete picked up the gun. He was instructed by Marciano to keep it until it is turned over to the
authorities.
The wounded Ramon Regalario was brought to town for treatment and later to the provincial
hospital. Marciano and Sotero proceeded to the police station to report the shooting of Ramon.
Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, arrived at the scene after the fact. He was instructed by
Marciano, the barangay captain to effect the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting
Ramon. According to Bienvenido, they were taught in their training seminar to just use a rope in lieu
of handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he tied the hands and feet of Rolando
Sevilla for fear that he might be able to escape.
On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen went to Natasan and found the dead body
of Rolando Sevilla. Jose Poblete also turned over to the police, Rolando Sevilla’s gun. Meanwhile,
Noel Regalario, after learning of the incident, scoured the place where the third shot was fired during
the struggle between Sotero and Rolando. He found a .38 caliber slug which was also turned over to
the police.11
On May 31, 2006, the CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming for the most part the
decision of the trial court with modification as to the penalty imposed. Unlike the trial court, the CA
did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused-
appellants. Thus, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to death, and an additional
award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages was likewise imposed. Pertinently, the CA decision
reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellants

are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rolando Sevilla the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for its review, pursuant to AM
No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty
Cases) which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.12
As can be gleaned from the above quote, the CA elevated the instant case to this Court in view of
the penalty imposed. In our Resolution13 dated November 14, 2006, we required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. On December 12, 2006, the people filed
a manifestation14 stating that it is waiving the filing of a supplemental brief. Accused-appellants filed
their supplemental brief15 on February 15, 2007.
In their Brief, accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE ACCUSED PARTICIPATED IN
THE KILLING OF ROLANDO SEVILLA AND BASING ITS DECISION, NOT ON DIRECT EVIDENCE
BUT ON ITS OWN SUPPOSITIONS, CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES;
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE AND DISPLAYED BIAS
WHEN IT LEANED IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DESPITE THEIR VITAL
CONTRADICTIONS AND OBVIOUS FALSEHOODS;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
ACCUSED AND THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE WAS ATTENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND SCOFFING AT
THE BODY OF THE VICTIM;
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECEASED WAS KILLED IN SELF-
DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED.16
We begin our evaluation with accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self-defense. Both the
CA and the trial court gave no credence to this theory of self-defense.
When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily owns
up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he incurred
no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful aggression,
there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.17
Accused-appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act of unlawful
aggression with no provocation on his [Ramon’s] part. Ramon testified that he was trying to
investigate a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group, thrust and fired
his gun at him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon
struck the victim’s head at the back with his nightstick, causing the victim to reel backward and lean
on the bamboo fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter from regaining his balance
and, as he pressed on farther, the victim retreated backward.
By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he
continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance of
Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still
Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao,18 we held:
…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer
has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance.
Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity
for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his
1avvphi1
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does
not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. (Emphasis
supplied)
Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck,
four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different
parts of the victim’s body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who conducted the
post-mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been
caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab wounds by a sharp-
edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a
blunt instrument. He also declared that the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds
could have been a knife 2 centimeters (cms.) wide and 6 cms. long because they were clean-cut
wounds. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at Ramon, the number, nature and
severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the force used against him by Ramon and
his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent him from doing harm to others.
The four (4) other accused-appellants, namely, Sotero, Marciano, Bienvenido and Noel, to exonerate
themselves, denied their involvement in inflicting wounds on Rolando.
Sotero claimed that he arrived at the scene of the crime at the time when Rolando lost his footing on
the edge of the pavement and fell down. He even shouted at Ramon to stop beating Rolando.
However, when Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun, he jumped on Rolando and they
wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun.
Marciano maintained that he, together with Jose Poblete, arrived at the crime scene when Ramon
had already knocked the gun out of Rolando’s hand and the gun fell near the place where Jose
Poblete was standing. When he went to that place, he already knew that his brother (Ramon) had
been shot, so, he told the latter to go to the hospital. Thereafter, he and Sotero proceeded to the
police station to report the shooting incident.
1avvphi1
Bienvenido asserted that he arrived at the crime scene after the shooting incident. He was asked by
Marciano to arrest Rolando.
Lastly, Noel insisted that he was not present when the shooting incident took place. He was inside
their house sleeping, as his wife had just given birth.
We are not convinced.
Accused-appellants’ denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the prosecution’s

witnesses. Elementary is the rule that positive identification, where categorical and consistent,
prevails over unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving, and thus,
cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice.19The participation of each of the accused-
appellants can be fully ascertained from the clear, categorical and spontaneous testimony given by
prosecution witness, Ronnie Siglos, who was at the scene of the crime, thus:
PROSECUTOR RESARI:
Q While you were walking on your way home, was there an unusual incident and can you
recall?
A Yes, ma’am
Q What was that incident about?

A While I was on my way towards the house of my parents, I just suddenly saw a person
being beaten on the road.
Q When you first noticed that there was a man being beaten along the road, how far were
you?
A I was about more or less 9 to 10 meters.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you saw a man being beaten what did you do?
A I continue walking, but upon reaching that place near the person being beaten, I stopped.
Q Why did you stop?
A To verify and know as to who that person being beaten.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And who was that person being beaten?
A Rolando Sevilla.
Q Who were the persons beating Rolando Sevilla?
A Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Ramon Regalario, Bienvenido Regalario, Noel

Regalario, Ernani Regalario, Reynante Regalario, Jose Poblete, Jose Quinno and Virgilio
Rebanal.
Q Who else?
A Cecilio Lunas.
Q If some of the persons you saw beating Rolando Sevilla are present in this court room, will
you be able to point and identify them?
A Yes, ma’am.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR:
Q You stated that you saw the persons you have just named as beating Rolando Sevilla.
Were there weapons used in beating Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q What kind of weapons (was) used?

A Sotero was armed with bahi wood, and also Ramon. Bienvenido was also armed with bahi,
as well as Cecilio Lunas, Jose Quinno were also armed with ‘malo-palo.’
xxx xxx xxx
Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?
A A knife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you saw Rolando Sevilla being beaten by the persons you mentioned before,
what did you notice on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?
A He was lying on his stomach.
Q Did you see the face of Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to see the face of Rolando Sevilla?
A Because Sotero was holding him by his hair.
Q What was your observation on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
He was already motionless. He is not moving anymore.
PROSECUTOR:
Of the persons you named as holding weapons, you did not mention Marciano Regalario as
holding any weapon. What was Marciano Regalario doing then?
A He boxed Rolando Sevilla and Rolando was hit on his jaw.
Q What else did Marciano Regalario do if any?
A After he boxed Rolando Sevilla, he went inside his house but after about one (1) minute he
again return(ed) back.
Q After Marciano Regalario returned back, what did he do if any?
A He shouted to kill that.
Q After you heard Marciano Regalario (say) to kill "that," what did you do?
A I proceeded towards home.
Q While you were walking, was there any unusual incident which again happened?
A Yes.
Q And, what was that incident?
A While I was walking towards home, again I heard Marciano Regalario shouted to tie him,
that is why I again stopped.
Q When you heard Marciano Regalario to tie him how far were you from him?
A More or less 7 meters.
Q You said that upon hearing Marciano Regalario, you stopped. What else happened?
A Bienvenido Regalario passed by me and went to that sleigh (pababa) which is on the lower
portion and got a rope.
Q What did Bienvenido Regalario do with the rope?
A He tied Rolando Sevilla by placing he rope around his neck and tied his hands.
Q Was there somebody who assisted Bienvenido Regalario in tying Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q Who were the persons, if any?
A Sotero Regalario.
Q Aside from Sotero, was there anybody else who helped Bienvenido Regalario in tying
Rolando Sevilla?
A No more.
Q While Rolando Sevilla was being hog tied, where were the persons of Marciano Regalario,
Noel Regalario, Ramon Regalario and the rest of the persons whom you just mentioned
awhile ago?
A They were there standing beside Rolando Sevilla and they were watching.
Q Did you notice whether Rolando Sevilla was still moving when he was still being tied up by
Bienvenido and Sotero?
A He was not moving anymore.20
The aforequoted testimony of Ronnie Siglos is corroborated by the following testimony of

Armando Poblete:
Q While you were standing by the road, what did you notice?
A Then I saw Rolando Sevilla being chased by Bienvenido and Sotero both surnamed
Regalario
Q To what direction was Rolando Sevilla being chased by Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario?
A Towards the place of Kapitan.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR RESARI:
Q Considering that was already nighttime, how were you able to know that the person being
chased was Rolando Sevilla and the persons chasing him were the two (2) Regalarios which
you have identified?
A Because, I was with Sevilla during that time and it was moonlit night.
Q When the two (2) were chasing Rolando Sevilla, what happened next?
A Ramon waylaid Rolando Sevilla.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you saw Ramon Regalario waylaid Rolando Sevilla, what else did you see?
A After that I saw the group of Sotero, Regalario, Marciano, Noel, caught up with Rolando.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR RESARI:
Q Since Bienvenido Regalario and Sotero Regalario were the ones chasing Rolando Sevilla,
from what direction did Ramon Regalario come from when he waylaid Rolando Sevilla?
A That side, left side going towards the house of Kapitan.
Q And where did Marciano and Noel xxx come from?
A From their house.
Q After the five (5) caught up with Rolando Sevilla, what happened to Rolando Sevilla?
A They took turns in beating him.
Q Did they use any weapon in beating Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes, their night sticks.

Q When Bienvenido and Sotero caught up with Rolando Sevilla; and the three (3) other
accused also joined the two (2), how far was your distance to them?
A More or less 14 to 15 meters.21
We agree with the findings of the two courts below as to the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their
lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It does not matter who inflicted the mortal
wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.22 We quote with
approval the findings and observations of the CA, thus:
The eyewitnesses’ account surrounding Rolando Sevilla’s death shows that the accused-appellants
performed concerted acts in pursuit of a common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon, armed
with nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven inches in length, beat Rolando Sevilla. All five
accused-appellants caught up with the victim, blocked all means through which the victim could
escape and ensured the achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter already
fell to the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on his jaw and later, ordered his co-
accused to kill and tie the victim. Upon hearing Marciano’s instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied
Rolando’s neck, hands and feet with a rope. The collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient
to make them co-principals to the killing.23
Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was carried
out, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accused-appellants
as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in (a)
disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-defense and (b)
holding that all the accused-appellants acted in concert and killed Rolando.
We likewise rule that both the CA and the trial court were correct in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength in killing Rolando Sevilla. To take advantage of superior
strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend
himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the
part of the malefactors to take advantage thereof.24 In this case, as testified to by the prosecution
eyewitnesses, accused-appellants Ramon, Sotero and Bienvenido, with the exception of Marciano,
were armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of
their superiority in number and arms in killing the victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter
suffered in different parts of his body.
Also affirmed is the ruling of both courts appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim. Accused-appellants did not just kill the victim.
They tied him hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted outraging or scoffing
at the corpse of the victim. In this connection, we agree with the trial court’s observation:
…The concerted acts committed by all the accused mostly armed with wooden clubs and one with a
7-inch long knife after the victim fell pummeling him with mortal blows on the forehead and back of
his head and stab wounds on his neck and one of them telling his co-accused to kill the victim clearly
proved that the Regalarios conspired and took advantage of their strength and number. Not satisfied
with delivering mortal blows even when their hapless victim was already immobile, Bienvenido and
Sotero, upon order of their co-accused Marciano, tied their victim hog style. The manner by which
Rolando was tied as vividly captured in the picture (Exhs. ‘C’ & ‘D’) clearly speaks for itself that it
was nothing but to scoff at their victim.25
The CA was likewise correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of accused-appellants. For said circumstance to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in
such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense of finding and capturing him.26 In the case at bar, accused-appellants remained at large
even after Judge Jose S. Sañez issued the warrant for their arrest on February 6, 1998. Accused-
appellants surrendered only on September 9, 1998 after several alias warrants of arrest were issued
against them. Hence, voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in their favor as mitigating
circumstance.
The accused-appellants’ acts plainly amount to murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. As
the generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim was alleged and proven,
and as there was no mitigating circumstance, the CA correctly sentenced accused-appellants to
death in accordance with Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Art. 63(1) of
the revised Penal Code.
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,27 the imposition of the death penalty has
been prohibited. Thus, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.28 Consequently, the civil indemnity for
the victim is still ₱75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if the penalty of death
is not to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor (292
SCRA 186), the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense.
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the CA correctly held accused-appellants jointly
and severally liable to pay the heirs of Rolando Sevilla for the same. Moral damages are awarded
despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by
human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.30 If a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article
2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to serious
wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured,
or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.31 However, consistent with recent
jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.0032 while the award of exemplary damages should be increased from
₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.33
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellants is lowered to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; (2) the monetary awards to
be paid jointly and severally by accused-appellants are as follows: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) interest on all the
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid is imposed.34
SO ORDERED.TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 171284, June 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not substantiate
the attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful aggression from the victim.
The Case
Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification his conviction for the murder of Francisco Batulan rendered on December
29, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.2 In convicting him, the RTC
had appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and had then sentenced
him to “suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17
years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.” On appeal, the CA prescribed reclusion perpetua.
Antecedents
The information filed on January 7, 1991 averred as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed with a
sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him
several stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.3
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson Macaraniag, (b)
Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their version follows.
Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 22, 1990 when a young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of
Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s
house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing Batulan who was
already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the
ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his
right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife
who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.
Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them fighting in
April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when
he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter,
screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene, he found
Batulan at the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches
long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and
Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 to
inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house. She rushed to Danao’s house but fainted
on the way. Upon regaining consciousness, she learned that her husband had been rushed to the hospital.
On her way to the hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin
killed your husband as he vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two
wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the hospital’s
intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.
Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he had said to
her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to confirm what he
had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s response was: I’m sorry I
cannot go and declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill all those persons
who will testify in their favor.6 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong Bancud, in front of
Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to stab her
husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband, but she then heard Dulin
saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill you.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by Dr. Macaraniag,
who said that the victim was in a state of shock from his 12 stab wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the
three teams that conducted the surgery on Batulan. He issued the Medico-Legal Certificate8 attesting that
Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as follows:
Multiple stab wounds #12
(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.
(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL
(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line
(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula
(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand
(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand
(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left
(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm
(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist
(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot
(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh
(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.
x-x-x.9
Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be “Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive Hemothorax
secondary to Multiple stab wounds.”10 He clarified in court that there were clerical errors in the preparation
of the Medico-Legal Certificate because his handwritten records indicated that Batulan had sustained stab
instead of lacerated wounds. He surmised that one of the clerks could have misread his handwriting in the
process of transcription.11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a monthly income of
P8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one child; that she spent more or less P6,500.00 for Batulan’s
hospitalization, including his medicines, and P36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial attire and his
coffin; that during the wake she butchered one cow worth P6,800.00 and six pigs worth P15,000.00; that
his death caused her and her family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a total of
P70,000.00, plus the P20,000.00 for the counsel’s services in bringing the criminal charge against
Dulin.12 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his defense, Dulin testified that in the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in Atulayan Norte,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag;
that Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by
Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the
evening to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction,
Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund
and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed Angel Bancud who called out
to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he
(Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of his
body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but
Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house,
pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin)
was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until
he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained consciousness only the
next day at the hospital.
Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangaycaptain
would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at night.
Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been injured.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Judgment of the RTC
On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,14 to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
and no aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment
ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of P36,000.00 and moral damages for
P40,000.00.
Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the RTC’s
appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if self-
defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the victim who had
first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had
not been justified in killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was incorrect considering
the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.
On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil liability,
decreeing:
The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification. The Court a
quo committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime committed by appellant in the case
at bench is murder qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should
be imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty
and awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN y NARAGis hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The award of P36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of Francisco Batulan P20,000 as temperate damages and P50,000 by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.16
On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.17 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Issues
In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING
THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS
UNAVAILING.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF FRANCISCO.18
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I.
There was no self-defense
The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving self-defense
rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the
following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.19 The most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression,20 which is the
condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed
unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be
appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases
without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described in People v.
Nugas,21 as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault
must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his
right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming
to throw a pot.
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor
because all its elements had been present in the commission of the crime.
In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack against Dulin
the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter.
The CA thus found and held in its assailed decision:
Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon
and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the
unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for
possession of the weapon, appellant now became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to
wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced
any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from FRANCISCO.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered as unlawful
aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was merely defending
himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no basis for the second requisite
of self-defense.22
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be
the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin
despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the
grappling for the weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of
the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon –
constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in
self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor.23 As such, there
was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the latter
followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was no gap in
the aggression initiated by Batulan.24 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running away
from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent
threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.
It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have sustained
twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the
wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not
defending himself.26 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II.
Incomplete self-defense was not proved
Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the
accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful aggression,
being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may be absent,
namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.27 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete self-defense,
and must be appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance.28 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of incomplete
self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed unlawful aggression against him.
With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the
weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan
several times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury
on Batulan.
III.
The RTC and CA erred in appreciating the attendance of treachery
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying
circumstance.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.29 Two conditions must concur
in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by
the assailant.30 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved,
qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.31
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan had initially
wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in
immediate pursuit. They continued to grapple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it was at that
point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be
appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to
his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault,32 and being thus afforded the
opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the weapon from Dulin. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.33 The mode of attack must not spring
from the unexpected turn of events.
Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal.34There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14
years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months). The indeterminate sentence of Dulin is,
therefore, eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, with full credit of his preventive imprisonment, if any.
Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan P20,000.00 as temperate
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We modify the awards, and grant to the heirs of Batulan
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Indeed, the current judicial policy sets the civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at P50,000.00. In
addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00. The civil indemnity and moral
damages are allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty that the victim’s heirs were
entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of P25,000.00 should further be granted to the
heirs of the victim for they were presumed to have spent for his interment. It would be unjust to deny them
this amount for the reason that they were not able to establish the actual expenditure for his interment with
certainty.35
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In line with recent jurisprudence,36 interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of the civil
liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from the date of the finality of this decision until the items of
the civil liability shall be fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by finding ALFREDO
DULIN Y NARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO
14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his preventive
imprisonment; ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on
each item reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012

vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-
defense as a justifying circumstance.
The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29,
2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
Antecedents
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in
Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a
piece of wood called bellang.2Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the
head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel
Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away.
Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced
dead on arrival.3
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder
against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut
Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with a long
coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the
latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only
several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled
because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their
father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.5
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that
her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of
the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the
victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on
the skull had been radiating.6
SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he
had gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanilla’s father had
denied that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of Fontanilla inside;
and that they had then brought him to the police station.7 Valdez further declared that Fontanilla
asserted that he would only speak in court.8
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk,
had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had
also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a
stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to
the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer
moving.9
Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version.10
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he
accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos ( ₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ
a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the victim attacking
him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the
victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate
attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the
hospital;13 that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was
inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;14 and that the manner of attack against Olais established
the attendance of treachery.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest
opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that the
nature of the victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of
Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself.16
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was
looming upon him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck
Olais from behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17
Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion perpetua
upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan,
La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No cost.
SO ORDERED.18
The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S

CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE

SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-
DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is the indispensable
element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-
defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.20 The character of the element of unlawful
aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself.
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril
must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening;
it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.21
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the
death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.22 Having
thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,23 and he would be held criminally
liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge
the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence,
even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the
burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head
with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital
did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.26 In contrast, the
physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than
once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location
and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent
or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.27
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of
nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing
Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively
denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code,28 which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the
rules on the
application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the
Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH" as the
penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being
indivisible, should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single
felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.
The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of ₱50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death
indemnity, which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral
status quo ante. Given the circumstances, ₱50,000.00 should be reasonable as moral damages,
which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,33 we are bound to award despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so
rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals
from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and
support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.34 1âwphi1
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the
victim to temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral
expenses of ₱36,000.00, but only ₱18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that when
actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than ₱25,000.00, temperate damages of
at least ₱25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved
by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way
of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual expenses by receipts (but
succeeding only in showing expenses lower than ₱25,000.00 in amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should
not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another victim who might be nonetheless allowed
temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 despite not having presented any receipts at all. With the victim’s
wife having proved ₱18,000.00 worth of expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of
₱25,000.00, not only ₱18,000.00, is just and proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic
fairness.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the
civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."36 The Civil
Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."37 In light of such legal
provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to
exemplary damages on account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery
was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As
well explained in People v. Catubig:38
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose, ₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser amount
would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals,
subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y
Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and the ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 199579 December 10, 2012
RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales
(Josue) to assail the Decision 1 dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution2 dated December 1, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33180.
The petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, via an information that reads:
That on or about May 1, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA, by then and there
shooting the said Armando Macario y Pineda a.k.a. Boyet Ora several times with a cal. 45 pistol
hitting him on the different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to the said ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA which prevented his death
thereafter.
Contrary to law.3
The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 05-236299 and raffled to Branch 40 of the RTC. Upon
arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The witnesses for the prosecution were: (1) victim Armando Macario y Pineda (Macario); (2) Dr.
Casimiro Tiongson, Jr. (Dr. Tiongson), Chief Surgical Resident of Chinese General Hospital; (3) Dr.
Edith Calalang (Dr. Calalang), a radiologist; (4) Ariel Villanueva, an eyewitness to the crime; and (5)
Josielyn Macario, wife of the victim. The prosecution presented the following account:
On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying medicine
from a store near the petitioner’s residence in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila when he saw the
petitioner going towards him, while shouting to ask him why he had painted the petitioner’s vehicle.
Macario denied the petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed and shot his gun at Macario.
The gunshots fired by the petitioner hit Macario’s elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to
flee from his assailant, the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot
wound at his back. Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General Hospital for medical treatment.
Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained three (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one on his right hand,
(2) one on his left elbow, and (3) one indicating a bullet’s entry point at the posterior of the chest,
exiting at the anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the tiny metallic foreign bodies found in
Macario’s x-ray results, which confirmed that the wounds were caused by gunshots. Further, she
said that the victim’s injuries were fatal, if not medically attended to. Macario incurred medical
expenses for his treatments.
For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in self-defense. He claimed that on the
evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with his son Rafael, was watching a television program when
they heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was being opened. He then went to the
place where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he
saw Macario, together with Eduardo Matias and Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of
his vehicle’s battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of Macario’s group, Macario pointed
his .38 caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The
petitioner then got his gun and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario
again tried to use his gun, but it still jammed then fell on the ground. As Macario reached down for
the gun, the petitioner fired at him once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario still tried to fire
his gun, the petitioner fired at him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his
gun. The petitioner got Macario’s gun and kept it in his residence.
The petitioner’s son, Rafael Josue, testified in court to corroborate his father’s testimony.
SPO4 Axelito Palmero (SPO4 Palmero) also testified for the defense, declaring that on May 26,
2004, he received from Josue a .38 caliber revolver that allegedly belonged to Macario.
On October 22, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision4 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It gave full credit to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, further noting that the defense had failed to prove that the .38 caliber revolver that was
turned over to SPO4 Palmero actually belonged to Macario. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Frustrated Homicide without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to vary the penalty
imposable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused Ramon Josue y Gonzales is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim, Armando Macario y
Pineda, the sum of [P]32,214.25 for hospitalization and medicine expenses as actual damages.
The accused’s bail is deemed cancelled. Bondsman is ordered to surrender the accused to this
Court for execution of the final judgment.
SO ORDERED.5
Unsatisfied, the petitioner appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA, which affirmed the rulings of
the RTC and thus, dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assails the CA’s dismissal of the appeal, arguing that the
prosecution had failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
We deny the petition.
At the outset, we emphasize that since the petitioner seeks this Court’s review of his case through a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law shall be addressed by
the Court, barring any question that pertains to factual issues on the crime’s commission. The
general rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject
only to certain exceptions as when the trial court’s judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence
or is premised on a misapprehension of facts.6
Upon review, the Court has determined that the present case does not fall under any of the
exceptions. In resolving the present petition, we then defer to the factual findings made by the trial
court, as affirmed by the CA when the case was brought before it on appeal. The Court has, after all,
consistently ruled that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their
credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before
it. Factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled
to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, and will not be
disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which
could substantially affect the outcome of the case.7
As against the foregoing parameters, the Court finds, and so holds, that both the trial and appellate
courts have correctly ruled on the petitioner’s culpability for the crime of frustrated homicide, which
has the following for its elements:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is present.
These elements were duly established during the trial.
The trial court’s factual findings, when taken collectively, clearly prove the existence of the crime’s
first and second elements, pertaining to the petitioner’s intent to kill and his infliction of fatal wound
upon the victim. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim.8 Significantly, among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was
Villanueva, who, while being a friend of the petitioner, had testified against the petitioner as an
eyewitness and specifically identified the petitioner as the assailant that caused the wounds
sustained by the victim Macario. Even the petitioner cites in the petition he filed with this Court the
prosecution’s claim that at the time he fired the first gunshot, he was shouting, "Papatayin kita! (I will
kill you!)"9 The doctors who attended to the victim’s injuries also affirmed before the trial court that
Macario had sustained gunshot wounds, and that the injuries caused thereby were fatal if not given
medical attention. The trial court then held:
Weighing the evidence thus proffered, this Court believes the prosecution’s version.
xxxx
The Court gives credence to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution as it did
not find any fact or circumstance in the shooting incident to show that said witnesses had falsely
testified or that they were actuated by ill-motive.
xxxx
x x x (A)s a result of being shot three (3) times with a .45 caliber gun, complainant sustained mortal
wounds which without medical assistance, complainant could have died therefrom. Dr. Casimiro
Tiongson, Jr., the chief surgical resident who attended the complainant and prescribed his
medicines, testified that the victim, Armando Macario, sustained three (3) gunshot wounds located in
the left elbow, right hand and another bullet entering his posterior chest exiting in front of
complainant’s chest.
These findings were also contained in the x-ray consultation reports testified to by Dr. Edith Calalang
as corroborating witness.10 (Citations omitted)
What is also noteworthy is that the petitioner invoked self-defense, after he had admitted that he
caused the victim’s wounds when he shot the latter several times using a deadly weapon, i.e., the
.45 caliber pistol that he carried with him to the situs of the crime. In People v. Mondigo,11 we
explained:
By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was
charged albeit under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the
crimes. Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.12 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then assumed the burden of proving,
beyond reasonable doubt, that he merely acted in self-defense. Upon review, we agree with the RTC
and the CA that the petitioner failed in this regard.
While the three elements quoted above must concur, self-defense relies, first and foremost, on proof
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-
defense may be successfully pleaded.13 "Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.14
In the present case, particularly significant to this element of "unlawful aggression" is the trial court’s
finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with
him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who
confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store. Granting that the
victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal
safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the
petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the
mortal wound on his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no "real
danger to his life or personal safety,"15 for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise
justified him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end.*
The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and
location of the victim’s wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense
to prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense must be commensurate to the
nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression.16 Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly weapon when his victim
was unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the victim who
had attempted to flee after already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner
did not act merely in self-defense, but was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.
Given the foregoing, and in the absence of any circumstance that would have qualified the crime to
murder, we hold that the trial court committed no error in declaring the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. Applying the rules provided by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court correctly imposed for such offense an indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The award of actual damages is also sustained.
However, we hold that in line with prevailing jurisprudence, 17 the victim is entitled to an award of
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution dated
December 1, 2011 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33180
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales is also ordered
to pay the offended party the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 158057 September 24, 2004
NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23742
affirming on appeal, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch
82, in Criminal Case No. OD-861, convicting the petitioner of homicide.
In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with homicide allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in
Barangay Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F.
GUARTE, which causes (sic) his untimely death.
Contrary to law.3
In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which was synthesized by
the appellate court as follows:
On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo.
When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September
4, 1998, p. 2), appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and
Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s
parents. Appellant’s house is about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte.
Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon,
appellant proceeded inside his house and went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m.,
Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-
over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo
finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s
home is about twelve (12) meters away from the Guarte home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p.
11). Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep
at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at
the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times (TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-3).
Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning their house.
Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant, his
uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the
doorstep of his (appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and,
without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 8).
Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help
(TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed
outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his
hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who
stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez
arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and
taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).
At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky
had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated on
(TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the
injuries sustained by Ricky, thus:
Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long,
irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating (operative findings):
(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of the liver
(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower lobe of
the left lung.
(Exhibit C)
The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death as:
CAUSES OF DEATH:
Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest
Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock
Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal
injury 2º to stab wound
(Exhibit B)4
The Evidence of the Petitioner
The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his
way home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s
friends, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house,
having a drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went
to his house, locked the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around
9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through the
window grills of his house and admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then
already inebriated, was incensed; he pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab
the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the entry of Ricky, but
the latter continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the upper
portion of their house and got his bolo.5He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using
his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo
accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor. The
petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00 a.m. on September 17, 1995.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and is
meted the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
minimum, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum,
as maximum.
Accused is condemned to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil liability to the heirs of the
victim.6
The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner that his
bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR

THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF RICKY GUARTE7
Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed
the victim by accident; hence, he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed
to prove that he acted in self-defense.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not
finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be
acquitted of the crime charged.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide based on the evidence on record.
The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of the
RTC convicting him of homicide, on its finding that he failed to prove that he acted in complete self-
defense when the victim was hit by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in complete self-
defense when his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense
with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision
of the RTC is correct.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA
that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:
In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower court, it is
our humble submission that the death of Ricky Guarte was merely a sad and
unwanted result of an accident without fault or intention of causing it on the part of
accused-appellant. We submit, there were clear and indubitable factual indicators
overlooked by the lower court, bolstering the theory of the defense on accidental
death.8
However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself.
The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-
defense, thus:
A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted in
self-defense.
The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Silvano, 350 SCRA
650)9
However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The
case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a different
point of view. To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse party.10
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in
the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete
self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial
and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to
defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from
criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said
defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the
realm of criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it
ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance
with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from
both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The basis of the exemption in
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused
does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is
no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free
will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16
Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial
and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident
without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such
affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be
acquitted.
The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on his
part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the
essential requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, thus:
Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door and you ran
away?
A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) downstairs and
got my bolo and at that time the body of Ricky Guarte was at the entrance of the door and
accidentally the bolo reached him.
Q Where did you get the bolo?
A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house.
Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him?
A Not hacking but accidentally.
Q What do you mean by accidentally?
A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the bolo which I
was carrying hit him accidentally.
Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?
A In the stomach.17
Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the center part of
the door, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q Where was your right hand?
A Holding a bolo.
Q Where, in what part of the door?
A Right side.
Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened?
A It was opened.
Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, why was it opened?
A Because he was pushing it.
Q With his left hand?
A With his both hands and body.
Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance, the left
side of the body was the first to fell (sic) down, correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position, correct?
A No, Sir, pointing the door.
Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?
A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.
Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door, correct?
A "Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang," meaning I was able to get away from hitting any part of the
door.
Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you were pointing
directly your bolo at the door, not any part of the door hit the bolo (sic), correct?
ATTY. FORMILLEZA:
It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.
COURT:
Answer.
A No, Sir.
PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:
Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it, correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of your body hit the
door, correct?
A No, Sir.18
The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and threatened to kill him as
the said victim pushed, with his body and hands, the fragile door of his house:
Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?
A I was at the door.

Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he do, if any?
A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab you?
Q What did you do?
A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or telling you not to
make noise.
Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you?
A He pushed the door.
Q Whose door did he push?
A My own door.
Q Where were you when he pushed the door?
A Inside our house.19
We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.
First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and
the victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to
adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical
injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.
Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top of
the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The
claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his
claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to
them that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:
Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your bolo, you did
not surrender to the police, correct?
A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the afternoon.
Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to surrender,
correct?
A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.

Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have surrendered,
correct?
A No, Sir.
Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the police what
happened, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of September
16, 1995, correct?
A No, Sir.21
Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit the
victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay captain or the police authorities. Such
failure of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim and
that he acted in self-defense.22
Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete:
The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky.
While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which
would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however,
is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one
purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no
weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from
Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner
did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s
want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that
only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to
appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not
support a finding of unlawful aggression. In People vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held:
"xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,

[un]expected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149
[1989]) and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real
aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful
aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an imagined
threat."
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.
Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-
defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.25
Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is
guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his
deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding
petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its
August 19, 2009 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which
alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to
the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the
deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness
Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards
the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun
pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of
petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.
Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the
gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet
that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the
office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner,
together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz
(Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter
so that their family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the
Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was
frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found
in his possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once
again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to
enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his
wife’s table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the
latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly
told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The
response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo
sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But
Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which
happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The
gun, however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the
gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further
confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted,
"Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about
to smash the same on petitioner’s head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of
parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand
had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey,
which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the
elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he
was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children.
Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of
the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette
Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales
(Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary
evidence to support its claim.
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela
Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to
the witness stand as witness for the defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a
Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher
Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private
prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against
petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads:
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147
dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-

DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE
PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING
THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF
DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE
DECEASED VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS

APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE

DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is
leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner
from the criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to
resist the attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well
settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the
killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even
if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted
the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition
must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was
employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action.15 There is
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought
to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than
petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that
Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may
have caused petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and
therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity
to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he
1avvphi1
wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then
took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had
the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the
accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer
has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is
committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to
attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut
he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be
corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not
impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from
the accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present
victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no
longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the
part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was
unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT
EXAMINATION
Atty. Mariano:
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was
standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of
the head of Jeff.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.
Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they
started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?
A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire
extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.
Q: And who was holding the gun?

A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty.
Agoot:
Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side?
Atty. Mariano:
Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
Atty. Agoot:
I am on cross examination, your Honor.
COURT
You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back
of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…
COURT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?
A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.
Atty. Agoot
He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?
A: Yes, Sir.
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21
Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair
and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses
probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but
also extremely doubtful in itself.22
In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged
unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the
latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of
the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire
extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression
that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a
deadly weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was
holding the gun already?
Witness:
A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.
COURT
For the record.
Atty. Mariano:
Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with
his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.
Witness:
The left hand would support the weight basically.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who
was in possession of the gun?
Witness
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
Witness
A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at
thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you
affirmand confirm this statement?
Witness
A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey
and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same
time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?
Witness
A: Three (3) times, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
Witness
A: They were still pushing each other at that time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…
Witness
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at
him.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going
on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September
2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23
Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore,
devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe
wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a
justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey,
the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was
reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the
victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant)
stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a
wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as
alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as
correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the
use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo,
382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim
who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the
circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled
rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his
lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja
v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite
any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor
where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities
as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with
Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot
finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior
struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the
time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005).
Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire
extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She
heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the
circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The
discharge of the gun which led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple
and/or struggle for the possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the
detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may
nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively,
his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat
the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia
which disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously
occurred while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There
could nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a
vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and
to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it
is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying
circumstance of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-
defense will have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a
privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless the
victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete
or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32
Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence
the prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-
duty at the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of
the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted
to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the
prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the
security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is
guilty of suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the
security guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could have
compelled the security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses
and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA
and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would
have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the
CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in
Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey,
the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed
out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify
against petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that
Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose
of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA
that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of
the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond
cavil or doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show
that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was
further proved during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division.
Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should
be in its maximum period.38Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor
ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in
order, since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been
established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is
₱30,000.00.40
Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six percent (6%)
per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning
capacity shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS,
to wit:
(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;
(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:
a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;
f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of
six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until
full payment thereof; and
g. the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170462, February 05, 2014
RODOLFO GUEVARRA AND JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification on the amount of damages, the
joint decision3 dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City, Isabela,
finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
frustrated homicide and homicide.
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under two
Informations which read:
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1560 for Frustrated Homicide: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin
Ordoñez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erwin Ordoñez, thus, performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the said Erwin Ordoñez, which prevented his death.4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1561 for Homicide: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with. sharp pointed bolo one David
Ordoñez, who as. result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date of their
commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise
any objection to the discrepancy.7 cralawred
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were jointly tried with the
conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre–trial, the petitioners interposed self–defense,
which prompted the RTC to conduct reverse trial of the case.9 During the trial, the parties presented
different versions of the events that transpired on November 8, 2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners’ claim of self–defense, the defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and
the petitioners’ neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty–five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000,
brothers Erwin Ordoñez and David Ordoñez, together with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way
into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo
went down to the basement or “silung” and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw him, threatened to
kill him, and struck him with a “panabas,” hitting him on the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by
reaching for the bolo tucked in the “solera” of his house, and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the
two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on
someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty–one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000,
he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela.
Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and
interlink wire and located five (5) to six (6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father Rodolfo
say to the three men, “kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag–usapan[,]”10 and David retorted in
their dialect, ”Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka[.]”11cralawred
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around 10:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, he heard. person from the outside saying “Sige banatan ninyo na[.]” 12 He opened his
door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones
got mad and scolded the three men, “Why are you hitting my house? Why don’t you hit the house of your
enemy, mga tarantado kayo!”13 David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners’ house.
Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, “Joey,kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito
tayo magpatayan[,]”14 but no one came out of Rodolfo’s house. The stoning lasted for about thirty (30)
minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo’s gate and pull the gate towards the road.
He heard David say to his companions, “koberan ninyo ako at papasok kami[.]”15 David, Erwin and Philip
entered the petitioners’ compound and damaged Rodolfo’s tricycle with stones and their “panabas.” Also, he
heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the following
day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a “panabas.” Rodolfo parried the blow with the
back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the “panabas.”
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot, causing
Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the “silung” of their house from where Rodolfo got “something shiny,” and
with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the ground.
Version of the Prosecution
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and Philip
went to. birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners’ compound. He was walking twenty (20)
meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed
by Joey with. bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from
where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back.
Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners’ compound and kept on hacking him. He
was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners’ house and damaged Rodolfo’s tricycle. They
did not likewise destroy the petitioners’ gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it
while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and
stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners’ gate were
saying, “Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out.”16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the
hospital while being treated for his wounds.
The RTC’s Ruling
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident and
found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. It
disbelieved the defense’s version of the events due to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners’ claim of self–defense for lack of clear, convincing and
satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that “[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self–
defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with clear
and convincing evidence, the justification for his act”;17 that self–defense is an affirmative allegation which
must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige
of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the petitioners miserably
failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin and David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that
attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer –
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1560 for Frustrated Homicide – an indeterminate penalty ranging from Three
(3) years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum
and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordoñez moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1561 for Homicide – an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased David Ordoñez Sixty Thousand. P60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty
Thousand. P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA’s Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes charged. As the
RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the
actions of the petitioners; that “[a]ggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there
is. real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self–defense or to others whom that person is
seeking to defend.”20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners’ claims that David challenged Joey to a fight
and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do not
constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners’ actions as no real or actual danger existed as the
petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.
The CA further held that the petitioners’ plea of self–defense was belied by the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David, who
suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically
indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self–defense but a determined homicidal aggression on
the part of the petitioners.21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC.
Thus, the CA modified the RTC’s decision in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20–1561,
appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.22 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF–DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF–DEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY
GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24,
2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court’s review of the present case is via petition for review under Rule
45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well–settled rule is that
questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions,
among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the appellate court’s
misapprehension of the adduced facts.24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual findings of
the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed
final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained
the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and circumstances
that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA
which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an “accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but
did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present.”26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide.27
The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their
victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the
means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.28 The CA
aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death,
and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory that the
petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29 In fact, the petitioners admitted at the
pre–trial that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez would have caused his death were it not for
immediate medical attendance.”30
By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they
were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission,
the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and
Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self–defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least. threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon.
person.32 The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self–defense to be
successfully pleaded. There can be no self–defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self–defense.33
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the petitioners’
compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was
attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners’ compound, as
evidenced by the way the petitioners’ gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was
broken coincided with Erwin’s testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was
dragged into the petitioners’ compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of
wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self–defense in killing David
and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.
As to the penalties and damages awarded
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges provided by law,
but modify the damages awarded by the CA.
In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, we award
P25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages they sustained by
reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin Ordoñez and
the heirs of David Ordoñez the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral
and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015

vs.
OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For this Court's resolution is the appeal filed by Oscar Sevillano y Retanal (appellant) assailing the
17 August 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court's (RTC) 4 December 2009 Judgment2 finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged before the RTC, Branch 1 7, Manila with murder in an information that reads:
That on or about March 11, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of PABLO MADDAUIN y
TAMANG by then and there suddenly and unexpectedly stabbing him several times with a deadly
bladed weapon hitting upon the said Pablo T. Maddauin fatal stab wounds which are the direct
cause of his death immediately thereafter.3
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial
thereafter ensued.
Statement of Facts
The version of the prosecution was summarized by the CA thus wise:
Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years old, respectively,
testified that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March 2007, they, together with Victim Pablo Maddauin, were
seated on a long bench having their usual chit-chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street Guadal
Canal, St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the watchman of this property. While conversing,
they saw appellant coming towards their direction. Appellant could not walk straight and appeared to
be drunk. Without warning, appellant pulled out a knife from his waist and stabbed the victim on the
chest. Jose and Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking the victim, but Jose
experienced leg cramps and lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned again on the victim and
continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard asking appellant, "Bakit?".
Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife came to the scene and embraced appellant as she
wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the University of the East Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died that same day.4
Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve
himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful afternoon, he went to the vacant lot
where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the victim,
whom he described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While
he was on his knees because of the pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The latter thereafter
stabbed at him while uttering: "Ikaw pa, putang ina mo," but missed his target. As he and the victim
grappled for the knife, the latter was accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the
victim, he became apprehensive of the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid
to as far as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.
Ruling of the RTC
In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder for the death
of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of the deceased ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00
as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that appellant, who
appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived and stabbed Pablo seven times with a knife. The
trial court disregarded appellant’s denial as his testimony was outweighed by the positive statements
of the prosecution witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime,
as demonstrated by the fact that the victim was seated and engaged in a conversation when
suddenly attacked by the appellant. The trial court ruled that such situation foreclosed any
opportunity on the part of the victim to ward off the impending harm.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his appeal before the CA, appellant contended that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INNOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN
SELF-DEFENSE.6
The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling but with modification
on the amount of damages awarded. The CA ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Pablo in the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of prosecution
witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and their positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator, aptly complemented by the findings of the postmortem examination, are more plausible
than the appellant’s claim of self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the trial court’s findings that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the case. It held that although the attack on
the victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or to defend himself.8
Issues
Undaunted, appellant is now before this Court continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
convicting him of murder instead of homicide.
Our Ruling
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of
the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his
demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination.9 Absent any showing that the trial
court’s calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment. In the
prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not
infanticide or parricide.10
After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The
prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo several
times on the chest which eventually caused the latter’s death. They testified that they even tried to
stop appellant’s attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no reason to disbelieve the
testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of facts were straightforward and
replete with details that coincide with the medical examination conducted on the body of the victim.
We are not persuaded by the appellant’s defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the
eyewitnesses’ positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving
of weight in law.11
Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution was
able to establish that the attack on the unsuspecting victim, who was merely seated on a bench and
talking with his friends, was very sudden. In fact, the victim was able to utter only "Bakit?". We note
that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim by the
perpetrator of the crime, depriving the former of any chance to defend himself or to repel the
aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation
on the part of the victim.
By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which killed
the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in self-
1âwphi1
defense. In Razon v. People,12 this Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he assumes
the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when corroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself.
Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that a
plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability:
First. Unlawful Aggression;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was
found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s conclusion. Assuming
arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence of that
danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus,
there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the
victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.13 The fact that the
victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of
the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind
resolved to end the life of the victim.14
As to the penalties and damages
We affirm the penalty imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, the crime
of murder qualified by treachery is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. The lower courts were
correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, upon consideration of the
absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the
offense.
We likewise affirm the CA’s award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages;
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim’s heirs, as these amounts are consistent with
current jurisprudence.15 In addition, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the resolution until fully paid.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar Sevillano y Retanal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Pablo Maddauin in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall pay interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum
on the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages awarded from finality of this resolution until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody
on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as
provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused
had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from
its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the
posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels
producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this
wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time,
Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however,
appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo
went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to place a bet.
Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas'
rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me
when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that
since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor
living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to
Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to
their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to
Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was.
Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant
and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed
that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out
the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He
was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a
hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive
smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed
covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing
this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas'
rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead
body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben
who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparadora
metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe
measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2)
inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom
was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken
outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible
for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and
his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded
that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15,
1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling
since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk
upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her
to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight.
She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the
use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a
rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck,
and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that
she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to
it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of
Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben
at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death,
as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents
were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from
courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'.
But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would
become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben
and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in
1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently
having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex
and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and
Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently
again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage
went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after
the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when
Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to
help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three
(3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles
each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was
not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for
the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on
masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place
my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They
were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him
was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am
innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence.
Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday.
He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic
Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would
leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had
been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but
Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino
Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her
by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting
for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben
had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.
(Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified
that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped
through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the
spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the
neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece
and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always
quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the
money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so
angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive
'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say,
'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and
look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right
breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he
saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for
Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could
not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the
Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already
there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and
I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily.
(Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as
Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because
the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.'
She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he
got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.'
She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said
that when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9,
1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries
were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted
the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-
three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of
Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and
the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether
the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who
is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified
that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the
evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing
'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again
and assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with
each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas
lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did
not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did
not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded
by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he
kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his
things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the
prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at
the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there,
she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area
of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had
been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her
with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and
further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate
penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date
of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not
conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January
2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without
counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable
Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the
only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death
wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound
than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman
syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this
Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done
at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her
own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor.
Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a
member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's
College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an
AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past
president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the
American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of
Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association;
and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled
'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa
case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case
of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked
at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of
variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological
abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion
of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually
think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their
spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion
of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very
arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low
tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and
drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family
which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often
how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the
family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave
her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself
which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house,
or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical
violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also
happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In
an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and
'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it
was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her
feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss,
such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person.
And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in
the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing
for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that
Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was
in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he
was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained
his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical
Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international
congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook
published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-
86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the
other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to
become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably
ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing
a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr.
Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may
induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the
victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress
disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis
or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as
if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing
but the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent.
She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such
as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he
normally 'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own
personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows
his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the
one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic)
because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted
for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and
social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric
Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed
her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He
said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a
pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to
this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if
any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and
admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of
the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial
and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her
unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense
and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution
of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion
or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case.
In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the
self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial
judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to
reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case
with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find
his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this
Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased
spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to
these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by
a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his
head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of
said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the
death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had
not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have
been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly
appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal
character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As
correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and
her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life
of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule
that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While
new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about
the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the
tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,

sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature
can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may
later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her
past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the
other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen
again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the
real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim,
especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional
help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this

phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and
forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may
really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses.
She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and
a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you
and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me

down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to
him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by
your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your
clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion
(R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr.
Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What
do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain]
meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told
me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month
of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I
have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for
twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history
in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask
to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which
is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood
pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic
would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the
Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple
"were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into
Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with
a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but
they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again
afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw
or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night
when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked
my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was
worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting
for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time
because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me
so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the
same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if
any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried
he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for
fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light
when the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who were
doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went
to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he
was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?

A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to
the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term
describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal
abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who
was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices,
going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going
home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience
a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she
was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly
put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts
of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond
of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of
battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think
that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering
that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the
time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all
the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this]
all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that
test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.
That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was
fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in
drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to
his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive
every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected
that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and
practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by
her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of
her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a
new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an
ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have
not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has
had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner.
The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an
abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in
suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent
family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a
result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of
consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change
their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to
try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can
do will have a predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that
"even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely
to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was
the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less
important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women
don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else
does will alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior
of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In
relating to the court a quohow the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly
described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the
typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past,
she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did
Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek
her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel
helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they
were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven
in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all
the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order
to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face
a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on
past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet.
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can
defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may
be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of
the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances
that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor
circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal
case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the
parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis
which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is
the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she
will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder
is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus
that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus,
like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest
now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and
probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be
thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it
is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months
is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal
and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these
cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x
his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that
this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there
is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a
cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and
used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of
time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality
[or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and
the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is
beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic
experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity.
Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of
his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed
to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding
his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I
ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at
the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself
and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that
gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to
ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown
to have attended the commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision
mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum.
Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor
simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court
agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal
manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to
the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look
at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the
distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such
learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

195021, March 15, 2017

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ AND VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath

The defense offered a different version of events.

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

These contentions no longer merit consideration.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Findings:Head : Lacerated wound 4 cm

frontal area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 8 cm.

occipital area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 4 cm.

with fractured skull

(post auricular area),

: Abrasion 2 cm. x 1 cm.

with lacerated wound

1 cm. eyebrow, Left.

Left and Right eye.

: Lacerated wound 1 cm.

lower lip, Left.

Neck : Stab wound 2 cm.

penetrating lateral base

of the neck just above

the clavicle, Right.

: Stab wound 2 cm., 6 cm.

depth lateral base of the

neck just above the

Trunk : Hematoma 10 x 8 cm.

clavicular area, Right.

: Multiple abrasion chest

7th Intercorsal space and

clavicular line, left.

Extremities : Multiple abrasion and

contusion on both Right

around Right and Left wrist.

: Abrasion (Ropemark) around

distal 3rd of both Right and

xxx xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, the accused-appellants’ Brief presents a different story:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellants

In their Brief, accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

We are not convinced.

Accused-appellants’ denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the prosecution’s

Q What was that incident about?

A I was about more or less 9 to 10 meters.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why did you stop?

A To verify and know as to who that person being beaten.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And who was that person being beaten?

Q Who were the persons beating Rolando Sevilla?

A Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Ramon Regalario, Bienvenido Regalario, Noel

xxx xxx xxx

Q What kind of weapons (was) used?

xxx xxx xxx

Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?