PORTUGAL V.

PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
GR NO. 155555, AUG. 16, 2005

FACTS:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo and gave birth to a girl,
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel
de la Puerta and gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner. Portugal
and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate
of their father. The Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.
Paz died and Portugal died intestate.

Respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person

adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint against
respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication and they alleged that respondent is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land
and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status
and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
jurisdiction. CA affirmed decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT
issued in her name.

RULING:

No. The present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

There being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration

proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

REYES V. ENRIQUEZ
GR NO. 162956, APRIL 10, 2008

FACTS:

The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu. According to
Petitioners Faustino Reyes, etc. they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject
parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). Respondents
Peter B. Enriquez and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez on the other hand,
alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera
(collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq.
m.

The respondent alleged that the foregoing documents of the petitioners are fraudulent and
fictitious, and filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the documents and for damages. They
likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property. RTC dismissed the case
on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of the real property without first
being declared as legal heirs. Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits and cancel the
new transfer certificates of title issued.

RULING:

YES. An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand,
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend
an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. 13 Such interest, to be considered a real
interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interes

The respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the
legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything
in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for
there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in
interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the
allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one
of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title
that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper
forum.

REPUBLIC V. NILLAS
GR NO. 159595 JANUARY 23, 2007

FACTS:

On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of
Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a decision,
acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor
of named oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous
possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. One of these
lots was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion.
Nillas parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired
the said lot through various purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her heirs between the years
1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor
of the Spouses Abierra. In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim
dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision, no decree of registration has ever
been issued. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration.
 On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in the petition for revival of
judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration
based on the 1941 Decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary
civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes
that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it
is barred by statute of limitations.

ISSUE:
WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead affirmed the assailed rulings of the
lower courts. Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not
to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration
proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of
such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact.

Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required
to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to
order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain
any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in
order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land
registration cases in the first place.

Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of
the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by
Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title.
The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing
the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk
of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the
transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers
charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the
decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure
of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration
system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the
country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land
registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
 Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time
decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in.
From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action
within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure

REPUBLIC V. CA
GR NO. 163604 MAY 6, 2005

FACTS:
` In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of
September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner’s Report 2 and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court’s order by
filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, disapproved the Notice of Appeal. The Republic filed a Petition
for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals. CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding.

RULING:

YES. Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death
of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that
can be enforced against any person.

NATCHER V. CA
GR. NO. 133000, OCT. 2, 2001

FACTS:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana , Graciano, together with his six children entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate and adjudicating and dividing among themselves
the real property. On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land to his wife and was issued in the latter's name. Graciano died leaving
his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

A complaint filed herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner
Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443,
by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the petitioner.

Petitioner alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

RTC rendered a decision on the case but CA reversed and set aside the lower court's decision
stating that It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of
the estate.

ISSUE:

WON RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction adjudicate matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by
the decedent to any of the heirs.
RULING:

NO. Action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.