DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs COMELEC
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two
(2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-
RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin
was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its
reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s
power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was
not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any
if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions
made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the
removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a
content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right
to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are
considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does
not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this
court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer
to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the
utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy
is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come
into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech,
given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
 In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in
their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom
of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court
held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s
expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that
the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH
Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers
to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at
bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered
by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the
tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right
to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as
an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a
restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
 court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin
as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.
IMBONG vs OCHOA
Shortly after the President placed his
imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now
faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire
RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and
contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:
1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is
unconstitutional:
1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH
Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
1. The petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide. In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between
them.” To him, judicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation – or
instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation. Lest it be
misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court
does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
 power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.In this case, the Court is of the view that an
actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures
to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. When an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US)
constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known
as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In
this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life
of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at
issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken
away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one
bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where,
as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, “fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages
in the reproductive process. They are not identical
and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he
wrote that medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a
living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law
but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position
that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
 implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is
not the point of beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional
right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting
the right to health. These provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no
need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS, it was stated:
1. x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . .
2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
3. It is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one’s participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with
“faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
… are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners
are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar’s and unto God the
things that are God’s. The Court is of the view
that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis
of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should
be exempt from compliance with the mandates
of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of “the principle of non-
coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to
free exercise of religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2)
in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding
programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers
should be respected. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
 constitutional guarantee which the Court
cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state
interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the
latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH
Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate
a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will
be used to educate the adolescents and whether
they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular
issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the
words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of
the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together
with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in
the government’s reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide
free medical care to paupers. It should be noted
that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce
their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other
similar means of coercion and compulsion. A
reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than
non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty
to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the
Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier
discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation.
The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood
that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is
ordinarily understood as “health products.” Being
the country’s premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe
 includes “service” and “methods.” From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only
those medicines that are proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy
behind the permitted delegation was explained
in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the
task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities, the hiring of skilled health
professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will
provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.
ANG LADLAD vs COMELEC
Petitioner is a national organization which
represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-
list organization to public respondent. However, due to
moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated
that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied,
Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of
accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom
of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws,
as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and
RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE:
1. WON Respondent violated the Non-
establishment clause of the Constitution;
2. WON Respondent erred in denying
Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
HELD:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling
in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section
5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must
have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal
ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would
be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to
purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It
hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval,
without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to
a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals,
rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
ESTRADA vs ESCRITUR
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than
twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC
to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion —the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments
render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: No. The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated
as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
AsJefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred
of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exerciseclaim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or
her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus
the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.
AGLIPAY vs RUIZ
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place
sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then
Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of
certain stamps the design of which would have in their
center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as
border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced
and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which
provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine
Independent Church, assailed the production and sale
of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of
said stamps commemorative to a particular religious
event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine
Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage
of public money for the use or benefit of any church or
denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said
stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the
Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the
stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the
City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No.
4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public
money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated
the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other
expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the
amount appropriated in the manner indicated and “as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government”. The fact that the fund is being used for
such is only incidental to the function of Director of
Posts and under his discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating
influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere.
Evidence would be our preamble where we implored
the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal
government. If should also be further noted that
religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an
inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
GARCES vs ESTENZO
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia,
Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
said projects will be obtained through the selling
of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor
of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the
Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s
feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters,
and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church
of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the
barangay council, as it was the church’s property since
church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for
the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
case against the priest for the recovery of the image.
Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as
a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer
assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the
Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was
violated.
ISSUE: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause
in the Constitution violated.
HELD: No. As said by the Court this case is
a petty quarrel over thecustody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious
matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically,
the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it
could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and
novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to
buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
determination of custody is their right, and even if they
decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of
the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not
every government activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or
property.
INK vs GIRONELLA
It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos,
Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would take
umbrage on the portion of the opinion of respondent
Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella in the course of acquitting
the defendants accused of Triple Rape. Thus: "it will
also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on
July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him from July
28, 1979, to August 21 to denounce to the proper
authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife
Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. Her husband Florencio Ola and
her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced
to become members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. As testified
to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her
brothers of the Iglesia ni Cristo as it was thru their
assistance that made possible the institution of this
action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded
that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a
gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz, Abra
in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia
ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her
problem." 1 There was absolutely no need for the last
sentence therein being included. Respondent judge
was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming a member of the bench. While the
offending portion of such opinion is not impressed with
such gravity, disciplinary action nonetheless is
warranted.
As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo
Relova, adopting the memorandum of Deputy Court
Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza: "Respondent
judge, in his comment dated January 20, 1981, alleged
that the charges made against him by herein
complainant are unfair and unfounded as the decision
rendered by him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting
the three cranad(3) accused of Triple Rape, was
prepared by him in the honest conviction that the
evidence adduced at the trial of said case was not
sufficiently clear to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further
contended that the statements complained of are his
honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly the statement of the
complainant witness cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition
to the fact that she had always been accompanied in
court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo
and numerous members of the sect." 2 There was a
reply on the part of complainant, Teofilo Ramos, Sr.
who, according to the report, "claimed that the
statement made by the herein respondent judge that
the complaining witness had always been
accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the
Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of said sect,
was uncalled for and intended to further malign the
Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt
respondent judge's competency and integrity as a
magistrate of the law. He also claimed that the
inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim in
the said criminal case were minor matters that did not
disprove the commission of the crime of rape by the
members of the police authorities as well as their
identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said
inconsistencies the fact that the victim is a simple and
unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil
intent had been shown at the trial which had impelled
said victim to point an accusing finger against the
three cranad(3) accused in the subject criminal case."
3 In the state of the record, it was submitted in such
report that "on the basis of the pleadings and other
documents of record, respondent judge's liability or
lack of it can already be determined without need of
further investigation. Accordingly, the undersigned
finds it unnecessary to refer this case to a Justice of
the Court of Appeals for investigation. This Court, in the
case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay, held that 'cumbersome,
time-consuming procedure of investigation need not be
resorted to if the allegations in the complaint, the
comments thereon, and the documents presented
provide ample basis for a resolution of the
complainant's charges.'"
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for
resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could offend
the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is
not inaccurate to state that as understood in the
popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may
indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to
persuade others to take a course of action, which
without it may not be acceptable. While it would be
going too far to assert that intentional deceit is
employed, it could have that effect. The Latin
maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to
mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused
of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts
would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of
religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one,
much less a public official, is privileged to characterize
the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It
should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at
a trial of many members of a religious sect finds
support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is
safeguarded by the fundamental law. 6 No adverse
implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes
without saying that if their presence would create
disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to
maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact
that the right of a court to give expression to its views
is equally deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not
an affront to rationality if note be taken that not all
members of the bench are possessed of such an
extensive vocabulary in the English language that the
misuse of a word is to be followed automatically by
reprisal of a severe character. While under the
circumstances, some members of the Court are of the
opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of the
majority that an admonition would suffice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby
admonished to be much more careful in the use of
language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs CITY OF MANILA
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-
profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its
Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal
corporation with powers that are to be exercised in
conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409,
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles
and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City
of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November,
1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances
Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to
secure, within three days, the corresponding permit
and license fees, together with compromise covering
the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex
A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said ordinances are
constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and
worship of appellant).
HELD: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the
Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision
aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked
for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court
believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance
No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant,
for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the
Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the
enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor
tax the exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000
cannot be considered unconstitutional, however
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of
the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of
Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so
defendant is powerless to license or tax the business
of plaintiff Society.
PAMIL vs TELERON
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won
the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He
was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato
Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case
against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga.
He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the
1917 Revised Administrative Code:
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However,
Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative
Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971
which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive.
Under the 1935 Constitution, “No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus,
an ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However,
this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court
because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the
RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed
by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower
court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby
ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that
how can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest
above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at
times may conflict with church tenets. This is in
violation of the separation of the church and state. The
Revised Administrative Code still stands because there
is no implied repeal.
VICTORIANO vs ELIZALDE ROPE
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)
member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope
Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of
the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF
and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced
which means that employment in the factory relies on
the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain
employment in the said factory one must be a member
of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his
resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350
he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by
virtue of his being a member of the INC because
apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a
member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his
resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU
which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to
terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from
the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not
exempt from the close shop agreement because RA
3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall
not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization, is unconstitutional and that said law
violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual
rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over
contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member
may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact
that there is a close shop agreement in the factory
where he was employed, his employment could not be
validly terminated for his non-membership in the
majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not
unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions
and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the
same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not
to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy
of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
GERMAN vs BARANGAN
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went
to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke
Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago
Barangan from entering the church because the same
is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And
considering that German’s group is expressively
known as the August Twenty One Movement who were
wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan
deemed that they were not really there to worship but
rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the
Malacañang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners
to worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their
freedom to worship and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice
of their religion, but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into action. There
has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that
they allow German et al to practice their religious belief
but not in the manner that German et al impressed.
Such manner impresses “clear and present danger” to
the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it
even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to
worship.
GERONA vs SEC. OF EDUCATION
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose
children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge
during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued
by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the
manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their
plight and requested to reinstate their children. This
was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from
implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and
contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or
constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual
and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem
of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion
and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not
involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is
or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts.
It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less
to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there
would be confusion and misunderstanding for there
might be as many interpretations and meanings to be
given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are
religious groups or sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on
the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being
persecuted. Neither were they being criminally
prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they
merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens,
nothing more. According to a popular expression, they
could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply
with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited
their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires
religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic
of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of
freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute
is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession
of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the
fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of
the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly
authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8,
series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of
the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said
Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and
exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-
discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations
and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public
schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded
and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
EBRALINAG vs SUPT. OF CEBU
Two special civil actions for certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who
are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public
and private), for refusing, on account of their religious
beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were
expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making
flagceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order
No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag
Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21,
1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing
that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin
to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to
compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious
freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of
Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court
upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that
we are a system of separation of the church and state
and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it
doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of
Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from
participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid
right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by
far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of
religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance
with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners
violated their freedom of religion?
HELD: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the
petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest
priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and
worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first
is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence
of grave and present danger to public safety,
morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
“external acts” or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those
who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.
FR. ROBERT REYES vs CA
Petitioner, Rev. Reyes was among those arrested in
the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 2007
and together with fifty (50) others, they were brought to
Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. On
December 2007, a Hold Departure Order List was
issued ordering the Immigration to include the name of
petitioner and 49 others for the alleged crime of
Rebellion, in the interest of national security and public
safety.
Petitioner’s counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary
requesting the lifting of HDO, in view of the dismissal
of his client’s criminal case on rebellion. That, the DOJ
Secretary has not acted on their request, petitioner
then next recourse was for the availment of the writ of
amparo because of his alleged continued restraint of
right to travel.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of
the HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
HELD: No. The right to travel refers to the right to move
from one place to another. Here, the restriction on
petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not
unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. Where, as in
this case, there is no clear showing that the right to life,
liberty or security of the petitioner is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely
speculative.
Petition is dismissed.
FERDINAND MARCOS vs HON. RAUL
MANGLAPUS
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible
threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos
leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries
aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble
from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and
prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of
President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions
Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national security, public
safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of
their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be
impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it
touches on exercise of certain powers by the
President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs.
14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has
residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
the people, promote their welfare & advance national
interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
the President can do anything which is not forbidden in
the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to
vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on
the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must
take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of
the country & protection of the people. She has to
uphold the Constitution.
SILVERIO vs CA
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of
the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel
the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold
departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel
petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that the
petitioner has not been arraigned and there was
evidence to show that the accused has left the country
with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be
impaired by order of the court.
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been
cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments.
There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is
imposed that the accused must make himself available
whenever the court requires his presence. A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court
from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released
on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may
be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear
in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin
G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently,
the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed
under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach
of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on
his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It
is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without
undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
CAUNCA vs SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern
Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already
been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for
her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to
transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by
the employment agency. Further she was detained and
her liberty was restrained. The employment agency
wanted that the advance payment, which was applied
to her transportation expense from the province should
be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to
leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the
amount it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent
does not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power
of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to
any other psychological element that may curtail the
mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of
the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell
is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim
is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much
as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
KWONG vs PCGG
The petitioners had been barred by the government
from leaving the country. This was done through a
Hold-Order. The petitioners argued that this was
violative of their right to travel.
Petitioners are foreign nationals who are the
representatives of the Hongkong-Chinese investors
who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic
garment corporations, namely, De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-
Fashion Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were
ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25 March 1986
on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominees and
dummies, appear to control 67 % of the firms'
shareholdings.
On 13 February 1987 respondent Ramon A. Diaz, then
Secretary of the PCGG, wrote the Minister of Public
Information advising the latter that petitioners had been
included in the Hold-Order list of the PCGG (Annex "L"
Petition).
On 12 March 1987 petitioners filed before the PCGG
an Urgent Motion to Lift Hold-Order with the request
that the Motion be set for hearing on 16 March 1987
(Annex "M," Petition). The Motion, however, was not
calendared for hearing on said date. On 19 March 1987
the PCGG denied the Motion to Lift in an Order reading
as follows
Issue: A. The Hold-Order issued against the petitioners
is a gross and unlawful violation of their constitutional
right of travel and locomotion.
Ruling: In the interest of the early and full restoration of
petitioners' right to travel, the Court hereby LIFTS the
Hold-Orders issued by respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government against petitioners,
effective immediately, upon the condition that they
shall hold themselves available if and whenever
needed by said Commission in the performance of its
task.
The Court held that the Hold-Orders impaired
the petitioners' constitutional right to travel. The Hold-
Orders had already expired and the grounds for their
issuance had become moot. The Court said, "The right
to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the
Philippines is a signatory. That right extends to all
residents regardless of nationality. And everyone has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. While
such right is not absolute but must yield to the State's
inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders
were premised, no 'good reasons' have been
advanced which could justify the continued
enforcement of the Hold-Orders." Thus, the Court held
that the government had abused its discretion in
maintaining the Hold-Orders for an indefinite length of
time, as to do so arbitrarily violated the petitioners'
fundamental right to freedom of movement.
MANOTOC vs CA
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted
bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions
and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied
the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26,
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as
well as the communication-request of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail
as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted
him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission
which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent
him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel
has been violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed
to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel
abroad. There is no indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person
in his behalf.
VILLAVICENCIO vs LUKBAN
: One hundred and seventy women were isolated from
society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is
shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police
and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a
fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
ISSUE: WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport
women with ill repute.
HELD: Law defines power. No official, no matter how
high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave
abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a
new domicile against their will. There is no law
expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there
is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
person to change his residence Furthermore, the
prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines,
entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of
Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It
may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but
it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes
to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race.
These women have been deprived of their liberty by
being exiled to Davao without even being given the
opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse,
without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely
punished
ROAN vs GONZALES
The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However,
the officers conducting the search found in the
premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live
bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases
of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P.
Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in
the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented
to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not
yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to
comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search
Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause,
to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted
with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no
need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant
on the basis of the information provided by the
witnesses whose depositions had already been taken
by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the
issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to
him, as required by settled jurisprudence.
SALONG vs HERMOSO
During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a
case for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso of the
Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue
a certificate of eligibility to travel in favor of Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be
prohibited during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic
because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not
deny Salonga’s request for a certificate of eligibility to
travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to
Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial
law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human
rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise
the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right
to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or
annoyance – this is to avoid such similar cases to face
the Court which needlessly expire the Court’s effort
and time.

23. hazel antolin vs domondon
Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she
took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass
the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy
(Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-
corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since
these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to
determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she
asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her
answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of
the grading system (collectively, the Examination
Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1)
Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994,
only allowed access to her answer sheets, and
reconsideration of the result of her examination can be
made only on grounds of mechanical error in the
grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2)
the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by
Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338,
series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her
exam was investigated and no mechanical error was
found in the grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Mandamus with Damages, with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board
and its members before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all
documents that would show whether the Board fairly
administered the exam and correctly graded her
answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate
of registration as a CPA. She later amended her
Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the
documents requested, not recorrection of her exam,
deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance
of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner passed
the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath
as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her
application for mandatory injunction for being moot.
She amended her Petition a second time to implead
the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the
documents she had requested, that if warranted,
appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results
be made by the Board and the PRC. The RTC
considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition.
On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the
dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent
CPA examination did not render the petition moot
because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a
certificate of registration as Certified Public
Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As
regards whether she had the constitutional right to
have access to the documents she requested, the RTC
resolved to let the parties first adduce evidence, and to
have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also
ordered the PRC to preserve and safeguard the
questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the
answer keys for the October 1997 CPA Licensure
Exam. When their motion for reconsideration was
denied, respondents brought the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and
ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the
petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May
1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC
Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid
limitation on her right to information and access to
government documents; (3) the Examination
Documents were not of public concern, because she
merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not
the ministerial or mandatory function of the
respondents to review and reassess the answers to
examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5)
she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when
she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before
seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought
the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial
intervention to compel the re-correction of her
examination; (2) Whether or not petitioner failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies; (3) Whether or
not the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the
May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4)
Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to
have access to the Examination Papers.
Held: (4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right
to information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters of
public concern” and is further “subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7,
Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s
policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions
involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the
meanings of “public interest” and “public concern”
which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis, up to the
courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535
(1987)]. National board examinations such as the CPA
Board Exams are matters of public concern. The
populace in general, and the examinees in particular,
would understandably be interested in the fair and
competent administration of these exams in order to
ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to
further improve the teaching and learning of the art and
science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless,
realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access
to the Examination Papers in order to properly
administer the exam. More than the mere convenience
of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent
difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice
exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC,
however, had not been given an opportunity to explain
the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Papers
confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of
this case, which may impact on every board
examination administered by the PRC, and in order
that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court
deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.
24. province of north cotabato vs government of the
republic of Philippines peace panel
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP
- MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing
of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's
right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991)
RULINGS:
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation
of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the
right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount
public concern involving public interest in the highest
order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no
distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek
relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
25. akbayan vs Thomas Aquino
FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the
petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them
the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the
government to disclose the said agreement violates
there right to information on matters of public concern
and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective
and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They
relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a
diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and
the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public
concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation
are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue: Whether the information sought by the
petitioners are of public concern and are still covered
by the doctrine of executive privilege?
Held:
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court
Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears
emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing a type of information as privileged does not
mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there
is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the
desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v.
Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the
state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the
petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of
the freedom of access to information.
26. re: request for a copy of the 2008 statement of
assets
Facts:
Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ,
sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the
SupremeCourt for the year 2008. She also requested
for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the Justices
of thisCourt for the purpose of updating their database
of information on government officials.
Issue #1:
Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to
information?
Ruling:
Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosureand
honesty in the public service
Issue #2:
What are the limitations on the constitutional right to
information?
Ruling:
The right to information is not absolute. It is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided bylaw.
Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to
that right:(1) national security matters andintelligence
information;(2) trade secrets and banking
transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other
confidential information such as confidential or
classified information officially known to public
officersand employees by reason of their office and not
made available to the public as well as
diplomaticcorrespondence, closed door Cabinet
meetings and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, andthe internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
27. sabio vs Gordon (repeated)
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio
declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
“No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the
purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence
he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of
inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”
Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to enable them to exercise
effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the
right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation.
28. valmonte vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right
to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a)
to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access
to the public records for the subject information On
June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the
reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that
for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within
the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens
and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting
the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court
can only declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches
of the government, and of the people themselves as
the repository of all State power. The concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose
to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a
more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading
to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental
functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
29. Legaspi vs csc
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians
in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security It follows that, in every case,
the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by
law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant
or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it
is of public concern, that the same has been exempted
by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As
aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret
arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional
right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even
as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In
the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to
the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's
civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence
of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny
the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore
lies
30. brilliants vs chang
Facts:
In December 1989, due to coup d' etat attempt
President of the Philippines created a fact finding-
commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide.
Consequently, he has to leave his chairmanship in the
Commission on Elections. Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by
then President Corazon Aquino as an Acting
Commissioner of CCOMELEC. Sixto Brillantes, Jr.,
petitioner herein questioned such appointment urging
Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision of Article
IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case
shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity." The petitioner further contends that the
choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved
by the members themselves and that the intrusion of
the President of the Philippines violates their
independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting
Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is
necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the President
violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.
HELD:
Yes,
Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the
discharge of their respective functions. Each of these
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of
its own discretion. The designation made by the
president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to
present the functions of the COMELEC.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of
the Commission on Elections would most likely have
been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves
would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice
and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make. To
emphasize the importance of the COMELEC’s
constitutionally guaranteed independence, the
Court said that the choice of a temporary Chairman is
an internal matter which comes under their discretion
of the Commission a body and that such discretion
cannot be exercised for the Commission by anybody
else.

31. canlas vs Vazquez (lot of cases)

32. Aquino-sarmiento vs manuel morato