| . epee ‘ | Ne aa aN STEMOLOGY \ | - | = om) EPISTEMOL é Poop . fi scorn Pr fahby ALES Spend Rey clog rinefoon ERNESTCopyigh® 2007 by Pston Unter Pres Palit by Pnecea Unt Pn Wiliam Stet, Inthe United ingams Poaon Universi Pree, (Orn Sen, Woods, One OX20 TR aiprenton ads ADR Rene Ispuore-cantam0.0 bry f Cogs Cal Nabe MBE? th iy Csaging--Fbenton Dt availa ‘hr one a compendia i nd Ashe sed in th Unie Sh of sca Contents Preface for Readers. and Instructors Aclnenledgments CHAPTER ONE DDescarter's Pythonian Virtue Epistemology (CHAPTERTWO Dream Skepticism (CHAPTER THREE egress Skapticiom CHAPTER FOUR “Knowledge: What It Te end How We Might Have t CHAPTERFIVE Knowledge as Action (CHAPTERSIX ‘Varieties and Lavleof Knowledge CHAPTER SEVEN ‘The Valu of Human Knowledge CHAPTEREIGHT ‘Mind. World Relations Actin, Perception, Knowledge (CHAPTER NINE ‘Two Forms of Virwe Epistemology CHAPTER TEN Knowledge, Time, and Negligence (CHAPTERELEVEN ‘Virrue Theory againtSiuationism (CHAPTER TWELVE ‘Virtue Epistemology and a Theory of Competence 28 n 06 157 m m(CHAPTER THIRTEEN Knowledge and Jutieation Further Reading Indes 207 223 2 Preface for Readers and Instructors _Arauauinn rons line for modern and contemporary epstmol- ‘ogy gives pride of place mainly to perception, to inductive res- foneand to problem ofthe external word tht said to derive fom Descartes though hie epistemological writings and thelr ‘uence on subsequent Westem epstesoogy This sory line con ‘cers the foundational evidence provided by sensory experience fnd describes how inductive reasoning eter enumeratve or hy- pathetic can ead us beyond the skeptic to fll view ofthe wor ‘round usin both its historical length ands sient depth! ‘subplot then welcomes reliable proceses of bli forma tion and sustainment alongside logical inference. These reliable sources are sid to inciade memory and testimony, along with peteepon. nthe expanded petre, these thre sources re given Sanding trough their own rlabity, with no need to reiuce ‘hem to any inference based on the subjective given and its pe- ‘ommenology. We re thor sid oatain a broader and mere pl ‘Sle picture of hraa knowledge nd its attainment ‘Several avalable textbooks already layout that account thor ‘oughly and readsly co ato provide an engaging introduction to ‘piterology a0 conceived, These provide afin introduction to ‘modern and contemporary epiterology, including ts hisoriat development, and important recent work “As argue inthe fet chaper, that story line mseepresents the father of modern epistemology even in ts main plot. The true Cartesian problematic instead goes back o Pyreholanepstemol ‘ogy and focuses on skeptical iss more general han that ofthe ‘ereral worl hat ther minds, that ofthe past through mem ‘ony that ofthe foture dough induction, or that ofthe wor ‘suche pve ioe aie wear niteral 2 eee! xr aPrface depth and general structure through inference to the best ex planation. These ae all important problems, and Descartes did tackle some of them ashe came to grips with the moe genera epistemological problematic of maininteret him, one that ao goes back to the school of ancien Greece. “he fst chapter ay out the ens for understanding Descartes in the alternative way proposed, The net to chapters step bac. ffom such historical deta ta more general understanding ofthe skeptical problematie found within the Prthonian or Cartesian framework. ‘Move fully understanding that problematic requires lose tention to what sort of bli and wht sort of knowledge are ‘mainly of interest that older tradition. explore thoes sen four central chapers, the fourth through the seventh. These ly ‘ut the core ofthe virtue theoreti approach, which prowdes an answer to the Thettus query ato te nature of knowledge and tlso to the Meo problem asf its distinctive value, The Key ele ‘ments of tht account are the apt bell whose correctnest man fats the competence ofthe believer, ad the fully apt bl which 's guided to aptess by the believer’ assesment of isk through 4 Somptnt eof hi heron engalie a shape, nd sltuation, Tn the eighth chapter that theoretalstractuei seen to bear rot only on human knowledge bat alto on perception and on tetion, 20 tht all tee mind-world relations sre iuminated thereby. ‘With chapter 91 return t6 epistemology more narrowly con- strued. Fist take up a reeived division of virtue epistemology Into two camps: one focused on reliability and competence and ‘one on responsibly and character 1 argue in this ptr that the dichotomy i false and misleading. true epistemology wil ppropriately combine all our elements, and indeed will do 50 ‘renin its approach othe most traditional iss of skeptic tnd ofthe ature and value of knowledge Chapter 10 takes up a problem from Saul Keipke, his dogma tam paradox. itconctudes that, inorder to address property that fascinating puzle we needa notion of elem negligence that fits naraaly within a virte-Theortc framework ike that devel opedin the eater chapters, Prface “The meen two capes—the event and wel ike apt htenge ou theory gener oe based on okng Richa tat ned by socal epenlog In expe” mee tm pompt sunita on vitae ory. Ca tClaumine thse ul andthe arguments based on em 1S cle ts ough the hang tring edn stan be met wih suc Cher 1 then dels ‘fn efcompetacand of epsom competence more se SEU ecoah our gra foe opt the stot sack hf ne pte thas fo he ate ae, and cect ofan Raowige and on the epee eo = ‘Kec tat conte uch knowledge. Hwee, some eve ae rot plce in cptelogy tesifeton her tha Ufge Hv then, onto apron comme nach tation? A problem raged here ugha New a Deron apumen tt puro the celrated Carer thooghtepertner The concn ow tht the Cartesian stam cm be sous wel tiled ae nora ts ‘cel ups gel ean enc Sf patenlogy Or dnl caper he heen fe my vera ena vitae eptnolgt simpleton oe the pecan poems orale ep. ‘Ring te aprsch to epteolgy in ts book des smth er epponce ofthe pestered decade er (Stain pts dion steno the res (aur rl nde i pele wis Srltoga! The main modern petapni in hme Super oer ecopaed hounds of ode piso Ti ad ef moder estemolgy more mecca Deserts is to bese bu tnt tbe lled to obscure there Sustain psy of knowledge, th ancient sure “pst ext tris oimante tater aon ad de- eps contemporary coun ih he ane scr whe Tig once ant they, dcs Desert, ut wi ‘ter and comin ese: seen Fst Hae on Sapte (Cay Mare Ua ses 89.Acknowledgments ne runsur othe objectives laid outin the prec, thistextbook expounds a vite epistemology developed over several decades “The main objective rei to make this vew maximally accessible to the uninitiated, Drawing on eae scatered writings, inthe present ext ave reformulated and reassembled the main places {o that end ty to present the view ina unled way accesbe to advanced undergredoats and graduate students ina semester ‘Course In purl ofthat objective, Ihave drawn selectively, from ‘diverse earlier writings, formulations already a8 simple and lucid ‘Tea manage and supplemented thse with new material aimed st interconnecting and unifying the whole have recived very help comments on varios parts ofthe ‘book from Rutgers graduate students, visitors and postdocs in = reading cours, in a slau, and in an epistemology workshop. ‘These have inchadd Sara Aronowit, Sarit Baral Erte Beyruns, Robert eddor, David Black, Rodrigo Borges Lara Calan, Ey (Chen, Megan Feeney, Wil Hisar, Daniel Forman, Bryan Frances, ‘Simon Goldetsn, Veronica Gamez, Jimmy Goodrich, il Kear. iss Mirach Andrew Mooa, Dane Rubio, na Emily Sllian. ‘Austin Raker, David Soss, and Kurt Sylvan gave me writen comments on the whole manuscript as id Georgi Gardiner, who tlso gave me valuable help with the reading lists, both chapter by chapter and atthe end ofthe book. Iam grate also to the superb PUP sf whose help was s hlpfl Rob Tempio, eany ‘Wolkowik, and Marlyn Martin “The virtue epstemelogy presented here was intially devel ‘oped in some of mealies books one wilh Cambridge Univer- sly Brest: Knowledge tn Perspective (991) three with Oxford Un Testy Press A Virtue Epistemology (2007), Reflective Knowledge (2008), and gent ad Agency (201) and ove with Princeton ‘Unters Press Kroving Full Wl (201), ‘With permission in each cae this tert draws (i part) from ry previous work in the ways detaled Belov Thermaterial drawn, is then lotermized with and supplemented by addtional newAcknowledgments terial The objective isa Book tat can serve as an advance in troduction, perhaps in combination with Descartes Meditations, wth supplementary readings, with an advanced standard into ctor text, or with a eallecion of debates in epistemology. A ‘very fee farther eadags are suggested at the end ofench chapter, providing other teazmens ofthe fees in that chapter, nly In dose relation to my virtue theoretic foc. Inetractor might suppemeat a selection of chapter from this text with other ma terial as suggested earlier, i they opt to provide a broader aay of epistemological topes and options Chapter 1 “Descartes Epistemology in Scepticim and Per ceptual ustifeation, 8. Doda and Zarda, 13-3 (Oxford, UR: (Oxford University Press, 201) Chapter 2: "Dreams and Skepticism’ 2004 Presidential Ad resto the Eastern Division ofthe American Philosophical Aeso- ‘intion, in Proeings and Adresses o he American Piosop- eal Asocltion 78, no, 2 (November 2003 7-18 Chapter 3: Drawn in par from my contributions to symp sia on my work in Critica $2 (2010 77-83, nerntional Journal forthe Study of Skepticism (201) 138-48, Piosophical Papers 40 (21): 341-58, Sythe 188 (20) 309-21, and Philosophical ‘Studies 18 (20m): 43-59, ‘Chapter d: Drawn input fom “How to Dest Opposition to “Moore” Philosophical Pepectives 1 (1999): IMIS, sod in part fom "The Metaphysical Geter Problem, andthe XP Critique? in Esplainng Knowledge: New Essays on the Gtr Probleme R.Borpes,Cde Almeida, and ® Klein (Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni ‘erty Pres, forthcoming) ‘Chapters 5,6, and 12: Judgment and Agency (Oxford, UK: Ox- {od Univesity Pres 201), chapters 3 and. (Chapter 7: "Knowing Fall Welt The Normativity of Beles as Performances? Plosophical Stade U2 (2009)-5-1 (Chapter 8: "Mind-Wodld Relations” Estee 12 (2019 55 66, The iste contains the proceedings of «conference to cle- bate the tenth anniversary ofthe journal, Acknovladgments Chapter 8: “Vite Bpisensogy: Character vet Compe scent Coie Vue Tay, Mah Ae fio 62-7 (London Rote, 205 heer: Knowledge a iw Kbps Dgatn Pa dosend he i of Belt The Bis of eli Jota Matheon a Rc Vit 7-69 (Oxford. UR: Oxted Unverty Pree coi ae eri Statons gist Vit: The Stns Ata cn Vue Tenn Pop ote oad Secs: Plo a Thy nd Sof race Chryosaais Manze S74 91 (Cand UK Cambie Untery Pre 203 Capri Vr Tory opt Stetina Epo Sian Mt aoa Aba sitet Oo UK Onc Unvnty Pres orca z Chup "Roce Competences Jaton” This chute whe cont prey wopbbtedna Gd a flo freien aticaon win eho an es & Fhersespone tora sep on hat usEpistemology,CHAPTER ONE Descartes’s Pyrhonian Virtue Epistemology [AT Meruop oF Doust ano Its Onspcrives “Whats Descartes up tin the Mediation On one evel at est, hes not engaged in a project of determining what he shoud be lieve, what ft would be reasonable fr him to believe. Conde, for example, the lowing two passages [when] i i question of organizing our hi it would, of Course, be foolish not to ust te senses, andthe skeptics ‘who neglected human afr tothe point where frends had to sop them filing of preciices deserved tobe laughed tt Hence I pointed out in one pasiage that no sane person ‘her seriouly due uch thing But when eu inquiry con- eens wat can be known with complete certsnty By the Inuman intel quite unreasoable to eefuse to eect. these things inal seriournes a doubtfl and even fale the purpose here lt come to recognize that ean other thlogs which cannot be rejected in this way ae thereby ‘ore cetsn and in eal better known tos [My habit opinions keep coming back and, despite my wishes, they eaptare my el, which iat were bound ‘ver to them ata result of long occupation and the law of ‘stom, I shal ever get ou ofthe habit of confidently as enting to thes opinions, so longas supose ther be what in fac they ae aly highly probable opinions—oplnions eps eB Set of Oban Ctigham Sab ad Mario {ese pa! rings of Darts ves 23 (a ‘rp Unt Pre By eps.Chapter One which, dept the fact hat hey arena sense daub ashas ist been shown, its tll mack more reasonable obeive thas to deny In view ofthis, think i wl bea good plan ‘o tarn my wil in completly the opposite direction snd deceive mysl, by pretending for «ime that these former opinions ae ute false and imaginary. (Pret Medison, SME ISsemphasiadded) Ife take Descartes at his word, then, noone sane ever sei- ‘es doubts his habitual opinions, which are much aor reson abiybeieved than denied. ‘What le might be involved in the Cartesian method of rai- ‘al doubt beyond pretending our customary opnlonsto be doubt fiend even fils? Let usexamine themethod more closely Here, firsts ruc pasage [Those who have never philorophized correctly have vari- ‘us opinions in ther mind which they have begun to tore ‘up since childhood, and wich they therfore have eason to bie may in many cases be false. They then attempt ‘o separate the fale belief fom the other, so as to pre ‘vent their contaminating theres end king the whole fot lncertain. Now the best way they ea accomplish thi s to eet ll thee beliefs together in one go, as if they were all uncertain and false. They can then go over each belief jn turn and readopt only those which they recognize to bbetrueandindubtale Tus wae right to begin by eect. ing all my bells. (Replies to the Seventh Set of Obfectons, CSM) Nea is psge Deca ovots the famous ple uke pe Gos dicing sen ob wet net dot Hane dap st al he apes and rea oy tht pumpin Gly th cn eb eh Roe ‘lleonine to ped unictced The apple we blo pions, mong hen od fear nes, stored since cond Once he bls nau het found enn the tor ee oda hem al Bu Dense Pybonin Vite Fritencloay how do we understand this metaphor? Wht iit to “remove a bei rom the ake What si to reject belie? Ina familiar vies to reject bli to give it upto withold ‘orsuspend judgment on ts content In any case t would be tore- place believing with not believing The ground by the empty bas- {et woud then be fee of bebevigs, because inthe preset view to dump a believing to destroy Suewn there would be found brlevables contents euler believed. Concerningal of thos con tents, the subject would now be suspending judgment. Tat is theview. “Tht view is highly problematic for several reasons, For one thing eecting al our belief that way would ental bliving noth ing. replacing bei unlverely with uabelle What would that require? Could one blag ap each content separately, replacing ‘ceptance of it with suspension? Sarely not The contents would ‘eed tobe bandled in msnagesle casters, for collective suspen ‘Son in one fll sw09p. ‘Suppose, accordingly that we identify the beliefs in question indirectly efor example “bles I hold” or “old and customary tpinions learned since childhood” If we pick them oat only 50 trea, however, no mental operation avaiable to us would fem to result inthe desired universal suspension. tis doubtful that we can sospend judgment dere on ech content thus picked ‘ut jst sing held opinons'~simply by taking ide dito that these contents are all doabifl or supposing that they reall fae, “And theres further reson why Descartes “ejection” can ‘not plausibly mount to sarpenson or witolding Recall how the process supposed to go. The bells dumped out of the ‘askee must undergo Inepection, Only thas that pass wil be e- dmlted. But the relevant inspection wl have to involve some “otc ot ih see ty ei arty svn he pps Dts col pot bases wy De (ileal ace wort apa opeony. aly ‘nce be oe th weld be ees ore Soul a ee ‘it tarmor ieblenol betes ental orton ht eq ‘Siyaupensn Bote dl nde bei pens(Chapter One proces frag though sochretonlng tt we wl de tine wheter eran condoned ih vl xs that ee amitson And hoy coal we possi pom ay ‘cheng wed Nae el resin i question cao be st condor he eed concn thatthe neta uses nest, Tl we obi the aera fr prac login th ar fot rednison, An aerted consiton (eased eer Sno something unsere or condona) ree aed Premises howee elt or input to sy wees Sin piensa fr sche arti conan tog if resonig only oo song as pemies wi ah ‘strona hel ova ‘Wehave fond tee weighty soso think that Dexcartes as no intention of tng” aby sanding a, al elaine att of eh ht of apes Be ‘rae een is uth tne hat noe tne wu eet Sb sch hing Sond dogs de reach ben ares ‘erond our pyebolga apie The wee oan, pl sch univer supe, he wold neces ck hs poe Es prj ees inspect the tee” bies ‘Suto deemize with they dese talon, And le Inspect ts deermisatn, mast cde og song tht intr would em oe ball Shc obo msn econ ee eset ae at wea onan eae an alternative, a He ‘Dest projet Tat onthe send order aking ‘belief out of the basket is declining to endorse it pstelclly in *cecin wy. (Tish nett eprom vile ting that the jected belt eT pete on the cond ode pcs ot haters of be under a ‘nn design and under despot bho secur hat they se) Whether ond exer eda thor tee to den do oft tra ‘ayn hich Dears destined "teed bet eal he spec mpatnce of the auf cy were neisinno due wntsore toes este Hes pee Descartes Pyhonian Vie Elstemeloey haps the key to how we should understand endorsement. Proper Cartesian endorsement of eli requires on to have no reason, ‘ot the slightest, for any doobt about its rth Tiss, then, the ‘proper endorsement ofa belies doubles tre ‘Cartesian ejection, when proper, would thus involve forbear ing from such endocsemen hat fom endorsement ofa belief tsdooblles tue, at jot as trae, To damp a bali fom ond thst of bel sto forbear fom ths endorsing it. One sy ‘or mey not have previously endorsed it. One may have alld Somuch as conser whether to endorse In any cas, the belie is dumped when one now frbers to endorse And now the Gamping of belie relevant “rejection” seems compatible ‘with undiminished confidence in its content, So we would sur- Tnount two ofthe thee key problems encountered eal If oar count is cores, Descartes need not reduce his confidence in ‘order to engage in his project of Cartesian doubt, Nor must he be deprived of bliin tems of which to conduct the inspec tion, On our acount, Descartes retains suficient confidence on the firs order tht his first-order bles canal remain in place, ‘een when on the second order be frbears consciously endors- ing those first-order belies By staning his first-order ation- fuidng alm confidence he cn sandy go on about his very- ty basines, adc evoding deadly jumps of igh cis and he a continue to engage in frat-order reasoning in terms of those retsned belie. However, we tl fice the third of ou problems. How can Des- cartes neces his beliefs individually der so ast eject (forbear ‘endorsing ther of eventually 03 to endorse them? The answer isthe is project requires no such diributed access this bai separately one by one. He expicy notes how hopeles that would beth evant reetion andthe coerative endorsement must be tinder a description de dct We mst be able to pick outbeliesin ‘stesso aso eet them or endorse them a "hose that satisfy ‘condition C fr some given condition. "Thus, for example, if we find that doubt inevitably clouds any bei based (Aretyon Alrety) on perception, then we may be able to dump all belies "seth end peg often One (CSM)Chapter One based essentlly on perception” by fobearing to endorse them un- ‘er tat description. Tite perhaps how the projec is supposed to go. But we must next considera farter tw. B.Canpence vensus Juba Recall Descartes instence tat noone ever seriou doubts the dlverancesof th ese and tha his hablo re highly probable opinion tha te mach noe reson ta frmthano deny Bato, then cule yer" sch opin. fons dou oa, even when engeed in the rojo of derining the erent of possible aman eng? ‘Wa het sometbing he etc os He cn gay ‘high kes wel boring hi ol ond cstomary op Jons wis undiminished assrace Inthe second page Cond exe sore (om Metaton One fing what be explly rope tod cm the Latin gem ech gan). More Over hecan stl seis top in essninghe pre ‘ven hile aking bee (ging tht p. Ths the moe theater an appropriately forbear shouting warning even when {make ble tat Tae omen about ob tone ie head from behind Here seem to rely through ipl resening ont sssunpion tht 0 one win crt el neds ny sch ar iy And ston ping rig oly edit my cocaret oo is one hing celbee queen That oes however ring up fre goon Why should Descartes have thought ptndg that nop weld ep Jum est he emptaton to cntnge to bebe tht f whe dosing neh belie hereto iting btn oa tide it might be alld ble” One ies impli cnbdence tha sus fo guide oor atoning acon on praca nto, suchas wheter shot a waning The teria act. of judgment made ely and ylstarly of «dpostion to $0 judge upon consdeig the relevant qin, ne plop Gal mediation, Descartes cary concerned wth he econo thet He emphatically dstingishes a facies, Thate fist Descartes Potonlan Views Epetemeloay faculty of understanding whose dlvrances, recived passively, fe “perception” with some degre of clarity and distinctness. ‘Kad there i second a acl of judgment based on the subjects fee will, a vas ‘hpossible explanation ths opens up sto why Descartes may rave thought that by pretending tht pone might be helped to ‘id believing thtt ot. Atte hater one might feign (hough ‘isl imagination) that someones oat to beat wih hatchet. Surely one would not then leo rely jdgethat no-one isaboutto ‘e it tn particul, one is lke to judge consciously thatthe scene before one is unteal The "suspension of disblie” involved In such Imagination tends to block ones consciously disbeleving byafrning te opposite of what one imagines (he two of which may evenflo coher). "Note however tht his can leave ond undesyingsubcon- scious credence ill in place with ndiminlshed confidence. One erin doesnot lose ones confidence atone is siting in a ‘lnkene theater viewing a screen (and ot seeing a gory murder {stead} Despite making harder fo judge tat not-p, moreover, pretending that p does not const an insurmaurzabie obstacle ‘That might thas be how Descartes thought pretense would help im his project. t would counteract our nofmal automatic ten dency to judge ine with ou tored credence, but it would not ‘make it possible for st so Judge HHowerer, we would now be ‘more fee to Judge inline wih tru eason and not us custom “Accordingly, we can ao see hw our every guiding at- tudes, such asthe appearances f the Pyrchoniss, ean remain in place below the surface of eonacousnes and do ther guiding, ven [Fone forbear endorsing them, and also suspends conscious a sent. One an susan bighly conden credence tat peven while Saspending any consions endorsement of tht attitude, and even ‘whe suspending any cored conscious judgment tha p. ‘Consier the Cartesian “perception” that an ave various de- peesof clarity ad deinenese. These are not jst sensory percep ons. Indeed the sost deer and distinct of them inde a print {ntuons involvig ational rater thn sensory awareness. These tester seings ncuding not oly sensory semings but lo 2 pron seemings: Moreover, we should focus aot just on Hutachapter One stomigs het might ctr nto conics to be ele hough Pondering or deliberation. We ould fc rate on ruta Semin eden aig some dei enone ‘sentable through the unit interval, Seeeeeeeiees aed on he tinny of rend fr example might in lyse hat pl ty tein fot ene ted tnd rast end th ln ot novo hing Consdred tems tht op. eer cr aonl vat he, oe ent cing ia suming hat not T leaden then or note ord aconfenes hovers sti analshings considered wring hat up rence ay this be viewed as sip rest eengs he dogs of on, Sdenc repent oogh huni Sick enlns wil hn, come wh sme dee of caty sod datnctnet but apart dagen nce he ‘al dere nner to gly aly utc are i Sin, eign pt ee ‘when it falls short, eee eee ‘di the Pyntan sep lng bere hin, Deere Soest wean guerra ugha cote ooh ening or pps odnry pos ha wold belaighableto pt inser doubt oncnevgaten rary day Sch bl are eer ut in sro dou Soe gin he Sas uc ry and itactness orev not ugh Sec nied ition bt ony indy wap Soa ‘stoning It oud pps tent we kaon tag perceptions! eat ening PycbonanapernseWe ‘onal make our er ud on what en tbe te Fors Sent pte sand evr et and enc al gc ‘ied We anly t nto ount even tenant segs fren ow nto dees of onde ons: thePythgrean there, whch ot mmedatey sod evn ras in twa sng sch te Principle tet noting aleve ht no propa iba fre ands Tht thoes nonteespoe wih est ‘simplicity and persuasiveness.It becomes dearly true with the help ofthat prot Ina more mie cape ome cele esate Pynhonian Virwe Epstemelony sures one-inch line tt ks ke this:-< > andblives oc ordingly Suppose a second line i then unvelled right below that ‘ne lookiaglke this >< Ifnot wise tothe Miler-Lye ile ‘Sine might then conclude immediately that th second ine was Tonge than obe inch, Here he wil hav put togeher two strong renal seeming and al ave arrived thereby at his highly con fidet additonal reuant seeming, tothe etc thatthe second line is longer than one inch Each ofthe thre seemings sa res tant seeming. our subject snot aware satan uson isin play nd hence ative ashe doe st ial things-consdered credences (orall-¢hings-considered seeming) ust s did the Pyrehonits, Descartes can continue to nguie, and to guide ls dally if through the use of such credence (i ‘lading propositional perceptions) even ence they have been putin doubt To put them in doubt is otto disable them from anctionng in the guidance of ation or even inthe reasoning required for inquiry Compatibly witha belt retention of {hel or cogto satus and ts abit to provide the guidance that we expect of such bl, the believer might nonetheless re Fase to endorse his elle when ix brought © consciousness for rational inspection. (¢-Tue Promer oF riz Meprranons Consider how it goes inthe early meditations leading up tthe tego passages Descartes argues that cot propositions at long last give us wat we want contents tat we con believe with proper endorsement. These ofr absolute safety from deception. In argu ing for this bemus, of ure, makeuse of etain premises. These ae the premises in the reasoning tht shows cogit belles o pass ‘Cartesian inspection, Among these premises isthe assumption Ten they undertetha Tea ot posit 0 wrong in arming ht exis whch pte my aoaton Somratcaldeepon Bt the aa sap of Medan One tas patndobteventh tpt oral ood sometry. No sch kept lll Deere st help hm Seto the premise thai he thinks he east then dae exit “his contol sees olen die a's peo i then the inp a prin eth that Descartes set aren ptsee lc in doen th ery mestons ‘ctrl, Desa il ned to coniderwheter sgh chapter Te and eperiences nou deus ae hosted not onlin the dream but ab in ely whew ean, Only th woul ou ot sy lb vated yh poy tn et dream we might bee the eon the sume caper ‘tial basis, at pare 1s that rely how we should conceive of our dieams? Are dreams made wp of consi sts ute we of wag ie ‘ep for hw they tr urodings? The orthodox newer ‘sintheatimmtve Dream sts and akingsttesre though beininiclalke, thsgh dient in tha cases and cs entre nse hn bc eno sity is to dose for comfort. reaming ee betes tied on rl pcnmenl perience en + srl replant od alvay etched by a ajectey et sina bad ads dee eda oe i then, might we now be reaing when me fm prepa ble On the ood conception seaming subject ght then through his dream orm sche bebe ot as nthe ean but in ey bet we desming No doubt woul bee ‘el based on ilsory phenome experience Any Ben Pe cepa bi or one init ite hia ann ae tg edo sneer a x posto cls for comfort ests cpa ‘more than any radical scenario. aaa Forty the orthodox conception ir ot eyed guest Aloteides eptmclyon jt ream are const D.Wuar Deenits Ane Mane OF 1. Do the characters in my dreams have belief and ftetions? They do in general bat do {myself alo have them os potegoist in my dream? Unquestionably Ido believe and intend things in my dream? In my dream Ia consclous, I eset to thls or that, "gah been pen patina te dea hi room pun ar hen nero J vn a ot ~ ream Sheps, judge or choot ‘hi al happens inthe dream, of course, but oes thereby relly happen abet while ream? When. sever, iethat sot ‘When something happens a my dream, rely tends nt 0 follow suit When i ny dream Lam chased by aio, tis poses ro threat to my ki, No physical proposton about the layout of the world around me is crue in actualy just because tis tre in zy dream, What about mental propositions about how its in my ‘nn mind? Mast any such proposition be rel actuality when freitistruein my dream? No even if my doam Lelie thats lions ferme, and even fr my dream intend to keep running in actucty {have no sch belt or intention. What sin question Lethe inference fom to In actuality Tso belive (or intend)>. ‘My exposition eles heavily on distinguishing between two cexpresions “in my deca” and “wile I dream” rom the fact, {thi br my dream something happens t doesnot follow tha it Ihappene while I dreae. Brom the fact that in my dream Tam ‘hase by lion itdoes not elo that while {dream Tam chased. Moreover. rom the fact that while I dream something happens it oes not fallow tht t happens in my dear. Prom the fac that, we | eam tain and thunders i doesnot llow that in my ream ira and thunders 2. Atay given ime, nearly one bale remain Tate. A De- lie might be manifest when formed, ot might occasionally rise to consciousness from storage. To make ones bei explicit one ‘must judge or assent avon, atleast wo oneself The same itu ‘fone’ inetions, few o which rio consclousnessat any given time One dots, of course retin countess bali and intentions while asleep and dreaming, Among thes ze intentions ecenthy {ern Onna gc anh i i fa cent ncaa ‘lca hey woe ay pom prince, “Ish aime re en et pout cn “i cin estos pneu acon (hale ‘andes raining cn aretha and tte). “theres lene coe might row somsing at on oe sec abs dn emg tan be,a Chapter To formed—to stop by the Ubeary the nextday, fr example—and baie recently acquized—that the weather wil be fine inthe ‘morning sy. Iso, then what one know as one dreams is tet ‘one sat home forthe night one lay down in the knowledge that ‘one woud be thre that long and tis knowledge has not been loa. Saying home afer der ntl the morning what on in tended trough mos ofthe day, even as ne thought about ote things, as one hed inner and soon. Tat was til one intention tone lay down, and there i no reson to suppose that It was lost as one fll seep. One dacs nt lose ones inteations for the ‘coming morning. One resins intentions at to what one wil do ‘pon swakening. One also retain, a one drifts oft ep, the bli that one is at home fr the night. This one knows a one oes to bed and there is no reason to think that one loses that ‘enowledg, given al the knowledge nd intention that one resins sulconscousy ts hard to see how one could then concusrentiy believe tht one is being chased bya on in an ope id rather than athome." (Gant thi fr our guiding stats of belefand intention, with ‘hel crucial funcional profs, perhaps concious episodes are erent. Perhaps one does realy undergo thes while dream lng wienever one does soln one’ dream, consclous judgments snd choices included. Conscious asset to «proposition doesnot, uarante that tis really fsctonally believed, aor does conscious assent 0 courte of action guarantee the cacresponding inten ton. One might even concioaly ageent to the opposite of what ‘one fnctonallybelives or intends, Actions speak louder than ‘words this way and louder than conscous stents ton A deep seated prejudice might be disavowed sincerely while il surviv- ing firmly entrenched, Siar «belle aight survive in storage while consciously dissvowed in a dream. Conscious afirmations snd vltions might ths contradict stored belts and inteatins, A tse pot ren on ot vals eth ct, oes twat reas he ea degrees ae tobeatbonc rte npr an tear ott he webbie Foti ow he der ontbyig yooea e ‘ss noe ats rope yi ng owe vibe cig in ey chad Dretm Step dics sy poi jet spc ct ott gee pe Seson The that oe le sed ble a tations Sie dreamin sume th compte el airman nd ‘volitions to thecontrary mde otal a ‘one’ dream but thereby olny he daning 3. aie of propos hot your we ret asc fate wernt ten oi a {fw desing ode stant otha yo hen Sie yon sap odo sl csi afin tiem ons coin one stone en al in thas whe dal? fin ny es oe cons ‘hokey sly sake at nice we dean? In ‘ram ou my covey aera them ey Sot af dere Do yo thn ia ae non 13 {i eam you go ara scrum ate oa then mje Sint Hg Se in ohn at ny note at {rach you cul bly ecape dace I oe hen ane ser oe mean et mcr a Ip sures nes Dang ysis nets Posgonit inasory pun rc (Oe nigh ame hin or tng ch yoshi a ht dee one doer cy lan im dog what os str) “compe gti inbosk8 t2 e CafaonWe Ta ae tne fr tba tie nd a ‘Steet ee oni cong win ther aprotic ae! bene ape Ty Se ‘Sit Baan ery (bee mu pen ‘Eo ing ny thease th as eng wen | ‘ior tr drt oss eur aca eh ‘ice yen igo 2 ‘Thing ter cnt hm ethno Lard G ak eet ioc dts ed mo inh meet wes Fostom angte droge tenn npg ing Ware eres ‘cae eh agp? A etn mes tral acres pe op ih hee! bbe ‘Scape Bo fod ett ot lo cen ep ‘an cfr pre-e eingat ctp eweChapter Peo Mile dreaming one does actualy assent to misdeeds, even to cximes does its beng just a dream protet one fom discreie? ‘That seems implausible. If sudden paralysis prevents you from carrying out some deplorable intestions, this dacs not protect, you from discredit, rom the fll weight othe Biblia injunction, ow, then, can you be protected by the disengagement of yout ‘bain from the physial causal order? How can you be protected bythe disengagement of your inner mental life arin a drea? 4s dreaming perhaps like beng drunk or drugged? These dis bling conditions lighten responsibil Pechape when dreaming you do make concious choices, whe your disabling state lightens ‘Your responsi, Is tha why we dont blame people fr sins in thei dreamst No, tis nt that one is es esposibl for wat bap ‘ensin one’ dream, Rather one snot responsible inthe dightes.” Dreams seem morelikenaginings stories, or even daydreams, all tons ofa sor, or quas-fetions ven when ina dream one fakes a conn he oe nent do sli Nor dosenececemy ality whatever one consi 5. Wht, then, of cusent phenomenal experiences? Does thelr presence in dream ental her el presence inthe conscious fe ofthe dreamer, abet while he dreamt Here at east it may be Saint mt eth et ‘edn went iavcaern sla Faxtopanen “aes ip pe ingyen tn a a og So a ‘i spe owe pay hte eae ‘ny bran als de ee aa tas ‘pany wntornefocmaiig th ply when ae ec ‘Secanayctng inten Cnn tee cee pe a tt ete apy iy pny ep thane sn gaps Se a ‘nde pany eat et sche at samy Dram Shap ‘thought, we can plausbly draw the line, But consider the conse- “quences, With reypet to sich experience ix supposedly us as ifalon were fle me. Yet may form nether the bel that his Isso northe intention to escape. Am I nat now deserving of ds- ‘eit? Even i sich abel and euch an intention are formed the dram, they ae ot thereby formed in actualy, despite the ‘cual experiences tht would seem to require them in anyone ra- tone Ifthe phenomenal experiences in dreams ae el expei- ‘ences, whe dream belief re at real bei then every night we te gully of massive rationality or epistemic vic. E, Dazas ano Sxapricisne 1. Lets now explore what follows for philosophy rom the view of rearing as imagining IFthat the ight moéel, then traditional formulation of redial skepticism, Descartes included, ae not radical enough. The posit that we dream now threatens aot ‘nly our supposed perceptual knowledge but even our supposed introspective koowledge, our supposed takings ofthe given. tis row in doubt not ony wether we ses fie Dat even whether We think we sea re or experience asi we set. How sot “with my hand vlew,Imay ake Do now thnk sce hand? ‘Well might ienot be asta dream? Might not be only dreaming that think [see and fT am only dreaming then Ido aot aly thnk sees hand, af al ‘ast whether think te ahand however, I eannot thereby ‘be dreaming that I think see «hand fin my dream Tsk my- self question and ansver it with choice or an afrmatin, the ‘slag play belongs withthe choice theafrmation. thelt- ter belongs only in the dear, notin realy, te asking wil lo Ive ite plac in hat same dream. So again, if really as whether think Ise hand, I cannot thereby be only dreaming that 1 think see ahandethis ot pllleged acces ae all protection fiom the possi tha iis usta dreamt 2. Fair enough. But compare my question whether Ise a hand. If ealy ask whether [sea hand, Int thereby be dreaming aChapter To othe had sad ys oe em fo hee Peilge cn othe ft it we seta hand tet uly Pega npc ptn fm he dean agen "Wt igh pny ale te cop peal pegs? Wat cad ive sats nt share by wc prone the ‘nd? neds ater ao ej no ‘pel pot mh pny hoe dem “Thrcogia fueron note fem ark ig tha ee banca the ep a eps, we gh tfend the ag yeti thet ont fang. in whch en dein sd Inga re hem frm “thinking On hth con thang amg tat Syphon toto cc tp do a ey at Tiny cee tsp tall threo ft ing cot nigga pane de hy st end th sane ow te desing On the oer nto, fn dreaming hat .oe doe hc hn tt p Mae natal syrah in deango melange ne hot the hug hat Sa ~hakng tht gi the inne ‘Sense eld uncut “honing the hog on canst Ut hogeen yea ang onl wheter ‘Cnpr (0) oh fein tha on fies tometig wth (ont avn (he hgh) ha oe ts tng Ther ‘hose eng (hn hugh at ay neon we thing ming the ce eyeing ean roa one ‘er now deaning one wad beaming stg atone ‘oud host he ght that one was bing tne So ot ni my pest though Ut Bsa og ar ante beh adn, Would ats nach eo have wot having ot eve if] wee dcaing Compare iy aiming fia, Lanting soning il etl ht by cont ie ine huh ee ead olds ape mgt iit towbedieaning hea fng someting ln tet fing nog So ths iit irs way ea ject se 2 thy do om alow mf canng thoi sing ymin nl mph ta st he wat yey Seming song reo Shape, However, the more defensible thinner thought lls short cru- lyin the dilcte guna the skeptic. isnot the sor of thought that sufices to consi knowledge. Knowledge require some thing thicker than merely hosting thought. cordingly de move from thik thought o thin thoughtis nota way to save the coo sferal. 3, Conscously and afirmativey thinking that think does havea ‘Spec satuone could not go wrong i o thinking I can thus attain a high degree of reliability and epistemic tats. It attains this stats though is being a conscous state of thinking that I think: Moreover this staan removed, or even much dinin- ished by the threst ofan impostor state, one subjectively very ‘uh ike it A vivid an reali deam is, ofcourse subjective ‘ery much likes corresponding ality Peeapsitisonly in my hou that I now afiemativel think that I tink. Despite Beng Subjectively much like the este of thinking that one thinks in dreaming one does nothin one doesnot so much stink that fone thinks. Tha isto ay, even fn one eam one afrmatively thinks that one think, this doesnot ental that in reality ane so ‘thinks tht one thinks, we deaming, “Those two sates can thus be hard to ditngush subjectively, ‘hough in only one i the subject justified in thinking such and such, OF course the two states are constitutively diferent. Oe is fnapperent tat of thinking one thinks, ding so (thinking one thinks) only ine dra, so that ite ely only state of reaming thatone thinks one thinks. By contrast otherisastatof think ing one thnks, doing so (hang one thinks) in actuality. Only {he late yields justification for ones thought that onethiaks. Te former nt onl yields no such justification init there ino such ‘thoght—this despite the fat that, by hypothesis, the two ites Mh meas wh power vi igo in ese snout be inde sn oe Sc heey mh le {ES peste tu enon ot ae =Chapter Too ‘se indistingulshable, 2 indstinglshable ae resty frm re- liste enough dream * 4. Have we here found a way to defend our percept! Knowl- edge from the skeptics dream argument? Ben if we might jst ‘easly be dreaming that we ses hand, tis dos ot etal hat we might now be atray in our perceptal bli For, even if we ‘might be dreaming it doesnot fallow that we might be thinking ‘wee hand on this same experiential basi, without eng any ‘hand, Aer all in dreaming thre eno real thinking td real ‘experiencing, So even if Thad sow been dreaming, which might casiy enough have happened, I would not thereby have been *hinking that saw ahand, based on a corresponding phenomenal experience” ln concusion, we can argue not only that think therefore T ‘am bt alo that I hn, here Iam awake (ra st ot just reaming). And that esposes ofthe special thes alepedly posed by dreams tothe safety of our belief But there are other vrieties of skepticism to consider, o which we fur in the net chapter ‘scoot say he her a ng et noel couse ait en a crate seco aking Feo ‘tye an berry wali tt ine ean we ee egy 0 bce wis ae aay the gh a th ng {the cnet fon rat wang contenant se ete ‘than nl ale econ dra. On coe cn es at ‘toughen eee th descent rye ‘ss cad ned hat wy The pe fom exe Rowe ruption, bpm fit ene ato on tas lr pte ctr one co bint use tering tat pn hgh ats st ge ‘nay edema jee arable apc ol wel tb ly sedi. Th i ie sor coo ‘psd dem th oe ere rt Int ses pata ‘ey ining shane ugh eyed oe ‘hem Forsoperang ning sey Sepa earl ‘Det he lace aoe of Gs Son E58 (Canps i Bc 99, Desa Skeptic _Apremou (Mone ADVANCED MATERIAL) Twosteton deen orate alan ewe 2 reply bach epi oll appeal 0 oe mal cet the 4 at Jn ptiemie mediation, the fea son knoe and ay {Goin the cae of the ance Pyrbonns who aeady engeged {step epee rationality tht thea leva, which ures no defense of ur intelectual procede by comparison ‘7h plying tents sted Inder on casio ght wel be Toe rao fou top for tennis and perhaps (npr or at ‘eaoe) tonal vera afi tat Bat eve he ght Silbe petety atonl penal sin ote ete and toa ee remem fon mi ferrin Sted eens erent ie sega etc cs ee Sr ea eae rn en tn remem hedch ieee Soe ey Factory etic le etic tt the ein any ose hat Perici inne oft rig tem ng Lamy dtp even soe nay: natal tats ueson sta oo Sl oad be sr one Te anna) capt pokey fr ea ‘pent ahr ae onl er tl oth ae aay of etanmeog i ero rad reed hn ae Sept th inoginsion Malet Drea lag MilacpilCurety N8519-2 ge e003.Chapter Two ‘them constou on anyway nf account. Among these ae all sorts of posses a to what my sation might be or might Insveben, What distinguishes the possibly hat might bequest ‘lfinming that am avake when {fim that Iam awake? Why docs n particular, deserve special attention, Well I might sy, “That poss is Jet us suppose, conten-inditingishable om ‘ny station when Taiz that Iam awake” Actually morestity, nt matters as I consdee whether to afm ta cefain te Ie whether my sition\sat ha tine content dtinguisbable fom ‘ny qas-afrming (athe moment! make my decison on how 0 proceed ora the moment that Ido inteatonally 0 proceed). And Jet wssuppose that indced it wil be ths indstinguishable. ‘Why. again, docs that deserve special attention? Hor would such indstingushabty have a ditintive bearing on whether {should afm at that time that Yam avake? Hw would i mat. ter pital? Presumably it would matter because would be «way of going wrong of having fle belie. "The phenomenal {ndstinguishabilty of the two stuations would bear that way It would male the following two case indstingushable tone in temal perspective (a) the caso firming tha one awa wile ‘one i indeed awake and (b) the case of quat-afirming that one ‘sawake while one is only beaming very relia that ove is ‘wake. Bot why should that matter? Whi sich indstinguish= shity wil not matter forthe correctness of ones bli when one oes arm that one is awake? Why expecially fone knows that ‘such indistingulhability could not mater that way? ‘What you know in such a eat that if you afr that you ae wake, that wil be experentaly content Andtinguishable from quas-afirming that you are swale (although youar only dream {ng)- On our shared assumption that the Imagination Rodel is ‘cue and known by ust be trae, however, you alo know that you do afr, then itll be fle that you aly quasar while ‘reaming. So, why should the noted ndstingushabiliy sop you {rom rationally firming that cae? fe al you know that I you do afr, then you donot merely quas-afirm. Indeed. way of preventing youself from merely quas-afring in acetal act 'sto go ahead and afin in that act roe Shap second oto: Pra he rng. Be ing ex ha apen tay reamed lg tle tee ‘eorsadon bert Tan tne mc a re ream sao bet an ee ney a trong The te cverfing the mod den he “Ep ono Sly fr he ht a oe ted ets be aon amd pete, Sot pant geno eoe™ Te that i that qu But Plenum tsar gute Bat ‘snp eps" be at SUPE Greg nce eee ee nsec ea SISSIES incr ini cte e SiN lhc ab hn rh SSIS ty disc pec Seta pny eee pun sae Tit nage cn neve Suga dettagliata ey sip het isa ey ea perigee fit ig Perea else” Tesi ay aly eae i een vee ergo Tetris tite somy nn ra Sitnanatatmep tones ge ef Sieh eg te tj ego am Ee Shy Hog The Si er Nn or Dover 2013) ate tpn opp ‘Sevilla pends!2 chapter So,suppose that our question whether we are awake and not ist dreaming. Our thre options herese bli dbl and sus ‘pension of blur ngulry is drected at choosing among thee ‘options Imagining (qus-aixming and dream. sbadow bel. lng) are wot directly relevant. And, if given those thre options, looks site cannot relvantly go wrongifwe opt forthe fist of ‘them. Tn tis respect our question is jut ike the Cartesian ques- tlons a o whether on exists and whether one thik a given time t Finally the afrmative answer to our question isp well founded rs it ion the mgination modelo dreating, ‘Forrien Reape ‘Blumen, Devi nd Jan Bee Bln. "Cant Know I Am Not Dreuing” In Descarts:Criteal and inerpretive ae. Michal oor, 234-5. Balimore Jobs Hopes Unversy ress 1978. ‘ees, onatian Jenks, “Skeptic and he magnon Mod of Dreaming” Pelz! Quarterly 38200) 19-27. CHAPTER THREE Regress Skepticism SSarery-naseo avo eensrnivinY-nase skeptic deserve an- ‘ers. Fortuny swe have seen answers are avalible! Bat that [eaves standing a tetionally important variety of septs. A Srapmicisn an CIRCULARITY |. Two main strands of thought an be distinguished in the dae ‘icon philosophical skepticism. focus hereon what take o be ‘the moce fundamental ofthese ta. Once we se ove to handle ‘hat one it should have clear implication for how to handle the ‘other one nd for ow the two responses shouldbe interwoven {are more sntisictory epistemology. “The leser strand concer the problem ofthe external world sand how that relates tos particular srt of externalism in epste- ‘mology, atuais externas, which has taken various forms in the epistemology of recent years, icding cans trcking pro ‘ess and virtue varieties” Theis the worry hat we pataside here, Inthe expectation that the poston tobe defended concerning the ‘other worry wl ep with this one a wel: Here we consider this laser worry no farther, notin itsown right. "ony popu beigh tin ss bly mre venf eu dnd nee et ets Th ch lb ‘Stern nner kein eum wt eye cing hr args er "Seth ona ens te Sf Expt 0 Pop logy MSpace by ba Strip ‘ny ddr and Gime ond vie stein by ro {SUT Tu Areata(ChaparThee ‘he more important worry concerns a much more general epistemologcal and skeptical problematic found in Pyehonism sn dio important in Desc eptember 2. Consider bein, th flag psp nearthe begining ‘Descartes's Meditation Three: ee 1am certain that Tam a thinking thing, But do Ino there fore lo know whats reqled forme tobe certain of ny- ‘thing? Surely in this fist instance of knowledge, there fs ‘nothing but certain clear and dint perception of what | slr, Yet ths would hardly be enough to render me certain ‘ofthe truth ofa hing could eve happen hat smething that perceived so eal and distinc werefilse And thus now seem able to posts a genera rule that everything | ‘very clearly and dstinelly perceive true "Note the sequence here, Descartes begins with the strbution to ‘lmself of etait that he ra thinking bela. Ande hen rea 008 fllows: (a) Tam certain tht lam a thinking belng. (©) Nothing gives me this certainty but the cle and distinct perception that Tam a thinking being. (6) But sich dear and distin perception could provide such or o since I think, Tam>." Alle neds that such cto belief be inherently nl [ile and thatthe competenceto stain truthby such afirmation be ninflible competence, This seme tobe al hate defends In his sequence of rebuttals the various skeptical scenario except oly forthe fourth, where he ascends to the second order in consider ing the origin ofhis eis and competences, Al hat he defends in ‘those thee earlier scenarios hate cold ot posi go wrong Inafizming the relevant ogo poposiionslcotests, such as hat hhethinks and that he ees He never adverts to any prejudgment seeming or experience ‘So all that Descartes has atthe end of those meditations is that cogito bells have certain epistemic stats Whit stas, exally? Well ata minimus, the tats o ili. Bat, aga abi alo the stams of mimal sor of proper reflective endots- ability. Ether way. there no appeal ta prejudgment reasons of ‘evidence. No such rational bai plays role tat I can decerm Oration ns on ogre Septem nthe early meditations, at Descartes eects on is sequene of ‘epic seearoe He does, of cou aren even athe sat tt edtaton The, have «sao ass fr recive endowe- tment That the eile won ins rugle wth he ep theeatier meiatlons And ofcourse he ging © ado at tect bus for endoretent He ging oo that wi he ‘Belogy to flow inser meitations eer hot fw wean ly eo hp ternlogy ofthe Spt olathe end ometey sod on the eptnlgy of geet ket en more han ve Seconds in taken ew the seeming vole ere {fe song enough to yield etn! seeming of reat tena, sche tudkmest with igh eof einem standing nd thse cing ss er eval pistes in oa remy uring top seingratonl ar Here ave tind ental eng tthe ean one sic th ater tr prenmly bse onthe rmer=Partheore no pene ideo pt tm aoe ‘itades based on percep exerincs (ase, refs on Sov of cxpeieoes that ar absent Inte ese of math, lope {fc The eon therein sch vie athe ere ex ‘esences in queton ae themselves eal blog tates tht ‘anand dofuncion wh pte propriety They ate fanctonal epic sats can mane proper epistemic fancon or can alto doo. “Anjo wat we ad with gto propostons 0 some things bi suonge someting tet goes Rrtier dong peer bln Hows Wal fe reuon slong wth Descartes eoaks ifr ned nt invoke ny janet eemingyallWeean focus just on the cof ato ac wee with Descartes, take ot ofthe ct that sept ecenaion dont threaten the Aa a sein te acon ts ht dees foe oe pt lar teraction spec na ‘ll wich abet on a ae ‘rots toptniatrir rme ‘Sint tie onthe quo ne Meyers at weed dade ot at ‘hel spac tao th cu ean we ea ee neman be tsieny ober 0(ChaperThee ‘nfl of these afirmations, piven jst their content. We can ‘thus se that there fsa competence st workin so airing an in- faible one a that. And we can now even ztlectvely endorse the functioning ofthat competence, in general and in specific aes, to the effet ofa relecively endorsed judgment that is apt and now also fully ap Fuamutun Reapiva Alon, Wiliam B psec Calas? Pvp and Phenomen lal Research 4 (9851-30 Repited in Alon pit if ‘to: Eas the Ther of Koes, 319-18. Ries NE Carnal Univers Pres 1988. ‘erpann, Mice “Epistenic Clary: Malignant and Benga” "Psp an Phenomaralogl Research 69 (208): 708-27 ‘Cohen Start “Bai owed andthe robles of any Knowledge” ‘Plply an Phenomenaopeal Research 65202) 309-28. ‘meron, Rehr. Mtanptemalgy end Skeptic. Laban, MD: "win and itil 1985) chap 6. ‘ops I Epitemle Bootrayping” Journal of Plwphy 105 (2008): 31839. Ratan Lev ural of hal 97200) 602-28 CHAPTER FOUR Knowledge: What It Is and How We ‘Might Have It Acconoa 10 rie foregoing chapters, we can and do enjoy knowledge despite the protestations of skeptics But whats this Knowledge? Ata minimum how might we determine the cond ‘ions necessary and sficen forts attainment? A. Wax Is Kwownspas? 1A gambler rolling ice might be persuaded thatthe dic wil ‘ome up 7 or I on his sex toss, and he might be right Bat he stl would not ow: What more would he need in order to know, besides a belief that struc? ‘reason, perhaps good reason? “At noon you may think its soon based on readings lek but suppose the clack happened to top a nooa days go ven ifyou have excellent reason to tet tat clock, you could hardy know the te that way. "You may believe that someone here owns a Ford because you Ihave exellent reason to think tht Noget bre owns one. And somone here dos indeed own a Ford, namely Heit, ot Nogo (Out for «ride in the councy, you see a arn facade and of ‘course take tat the trctre you sei teal bars. However, realy all the fades inthe are are mere fagaes,partof a movie se nal thee of thos eases, you havea treble and you have (by hypothesis) excellent rezon for s believing, bat you do not ‘acrid fe con be mith no ang eto tnt a bes cat longchapter For ‘know Even a true ele based on excellent reason may thus ll shor of knowledge. 2 Pethaps we need not truebliethat ass good rational basis ‘bt rather one that fe snstely true? We thus return to a kde broached in chapter to which we almed to return. Here, then, isthe new proposal: Sensitivity Contin: In order fr rv Bebe o be sate of Knowledge, must beso: t mast be oe tha the be lever wold narhold iis content wer fle ater han trae ‘This requirement violated by the true believer in ou for ‘examples aboe. Al fur of hate belies are ues. The m- ber would (or anyhow might well stil believe that the dice would ome up 7 a even i were fale that they woud do 0. The lock reader would (or might wl) sil bebeve that it was noon (Gram reading the topped loc) even fhe were reading the clock state other than noon (say at 150) You would (or might wel) Sal bleve that someone here owned a Ford, even fm one di (aay.becase not even Havit owned one o because Havit ws ct ‘here feral). And you would (or might wel) sill bebeve thatthe structure you saw war a el bar even when that was not 0 (and yousawe mere bar age) ‘What sore, theresa farther casein which one fils to know espe geting right with good jarfistion es one expect co fede te dhe aes wee mpd topes at wen ting ‘he eto en iting ee otra "Eun he ar ‘a of tenet Aad steno bce ped th cee ‘kee imporatpineni lores Secret tan ‘ty (Ox Ox trey Pra 2), Ler end eth en day ert of cel pec kl ht re va rian pte Bu heres eon te Geter oblast clr omer ter speach A ral sat maybe (ean the ron he sy Kreis by mn kn Ka ‘oft Sup athe Sanford np Psp ale ip lntaeeccomes tr Ire frm tic epee Erp ip Cay ey 9.27 tnt tre ony ren ate vest ence” T | | owed: What ele realy and justiedly to lowe «lottery (one with stzononiclly Tong odd) Here again the subject plausibly bellves based on fine rational basi Flere again a true belie i widely aeumed fall short despite being based os such rational basis Moreover bere again the senatvity condition ostensibly delivers the right est because our subjects bei that his ticket willose is insen- sive it woud stil beheld by the elever onthe same probabi- istic basis even if agains all odds, asa mater of contingent ct the ticket would win, 3. We shall ind that our sensitivity condition is open to serious objections Fortunately its undeniable intuitive attractiveness an ‘beexplained through an easily confused but fr preferable notion of ae? This was sugested already in chapter 2, and now we ‘andeepen our treatment. The denouement feu elections wil ‘beto show how replacing sensitivity with salty makes it posible to defend plain common sense aguns the spurious advantages ‘overt claimed byalterative acount. What follows suppors that replacement by showing how the seasivty requirement runs ‘ganst serous problems First of al, suppose we require sensitivity for knowledge and ‘we agree with the following: that any cnclsion reached hough Competent deduction from something known to be true ls also Tonown tobe tru, Given the, consdernotorlous skeptic ce aos such as these: One naa bra fe stmultons ha present comin sense wold of faa sat On alternatively: “Ail demon fads one rca natura core ofcommon sense experiene, ‘Consider in sme such as ne bein the ordinary suround. ings that would normally corespond to such 2 course of expe rience, Thor are the beliefs one would then have regardless of the suroundings so long as the course of experience remained the ame Because ofhov they originate in experiences with ach sources, thos experience-based bell falta be sensitive8 Chaper Four “ue ner he elif that one i atin any such kp sarioarthatfhe ban ina or tnt fio demo iti “ended ony sh bled the fet tht one no tha pe ‘erly vind ay sich elit wos then be cst fd aga bythe sent condson. yb tat You are ot Viintd fast con owe en whe Jouhat competent deduce et cndson yu weet {in you would nonhasbeleve that you werent victim. re ifyou had competi ddiced thar you were oti, yo wou si ku ht you ad ot sed hate Fr your beet hat you ad no red tha ae won tl be inestive ve ou had competent deduced om varios ‘tol pce knoe rich hat you se oor ends orpecied ae “re now ot epaoantimpestion, Cnsdr Set this peace (DK) Compt ction iets wg anything Beker ar conchson sed on compet deduction rom tow Promina thy Ir Civen that principle, we cannot nove sch hing 3 that we se a Ind or perceives fire. Frifwe could know sich things, the om the premise that we do see the hand or the ire we could compe tently deduce that we were not relevant vitimized, and accord Ing w principle DK, we would be cle to know thal we were not so victimized, But, as we have Just sen, ou sensitivity conlton precludes our being able to now that conclusion ‘owe havea eduction (a) the sent conton() rin ciple DK, and (the assumption that wear able to make such Suple deductions it fllows that we cannot know the world round us. “However, ths arguments tubes seen as «broader reduc to, one that dace to absurdity that sensitivity condition. “owe eset us by essen olen ‘cbc wing uh at wade our oe ng ‘schoo ee hi etion doset gure crease emi) aoe: What te 4. Better Safe Than Senstive. The problems we hve found wo af ‘ect sensitivity do nt afta closely related “af” A belief is senstive had itbeen fle, S would not have eld, whereas belt esol would not hold without ts being rae? “The requirement tht a belief must be sensitive {tito be “knowledge” is found to be prima facie plausible as wehave seen, ‘tisfound intlvely that the fare of bella tobe knowledge” ‘may be explained through the fc that the bei would remain in place eves fg. The problem or this way of arguing is that an ternative explanation is eqully adequate for undispted cases ‘According to this alteratve explanation, ts sally that "kno: ‘edge requces, bat this requirement i ile inthe ordinary aes cited wherein the subject also know. (One fails to know in those cases, its now sid, because ones bei i no sf. Soppose this generalizes to all uncontentions cases adduced in favor of seasvity requirement. Suppose that ‘nal such ass the condition required could justaswellbe safety 5 sensitivity. And suppose that, as argued eae, the problems for sensitivity briefly noted do not act suey Iso, then one cannot diferentlly favor sensitivity a5 the nght equiement, apport of the skeptics main premise. Here the strng resul if we opt for say asthe ight oe ‘qulrement, then 2 eommon-sens stance defensible from the sesitity based objections, which enables ust escape hat route to sepia. Tat lato say, one docs satisfy the requirement thatones belie of not H (atone was not so radialy deceived) ‘oe safe: after all, nat easly would one believe that not-H with ‘out being ru (which fo to say that not possibly could one ‘esa ple bee Bp) seve p> Bh ‘ete ie). ot gue can ce cane ‘bat ange Th fig man pi hee ee ‘hither touche ome tae om pb ee ‘sd asthe Dred om hacen et en at (Bie ae ari wet or Set ache et we he ‘Sune a ced ew ol ot ow om th hen fe Sct ‘Secaminossfech alee pole atjnceandena do ee(Chapter Four believe that aot without its beng tue). Inthe actual world, and for quit a dstance away fom the actual weld, upto quite, remote posible world, our bel that we are not radically de Celved matches the fact eto whether we are or ae not redcally scene, 5A Defense of Common Sone. Granted skeptic requirement of Senshi quite plausible st we have sen. However, one need ot expan pausity in terms of trath, Many false things ae Pause; we can explain why they ae plausible without having to consider them true and we ean explain why other things ae Pause by appeal to such son. We are said face illusions every tur, from the hamble percepts] and cogetve iasions of nteres to poychologis to the more momentos illusions a> Tegedby Fred and Marx. In al such ates sion may besa o plain laos ‘Conse, moreover the need to explain how the skeptic prem ine—thatone doesnt know oneself not tobe radicly mile, and so on-ias plausible as it That requirement must be balanced ‘yan egal relevant and etrngent requirements rare that one plain how that premise is as implausible ast. To many of us ijt doce not stm so uniformly plas tat no-one can ever know tit they arent envated wl being fed experiences a they were normally stusted It jast does not sem so uniformly plausible that one cannot be ld corey to know that one isnot at this very moment being fd experiences while envated So the ‘planstory eguiement sin fit rather moee complex han might seemat st And, yiven the dstrbution of inuons here the seep te woud stl owe us an explanation Tntrstingly, our distinction between sens and sfety may hp us meet the more complex explanatory demand, compat one mii, ho ro ew to apse ag 0 ‘atte psi onto esr wi teee cot emp rely nal suchen Son ay be pied ly omen rs ‘ar ie tpn beng Koonedge What ele ‘wth ou prefered common-sense stance Here, now sa sketch ‘four preferred explanation (a) es safety that isrequized for knowledge (ndfritscorect. steribution) not sensi It egulred that Bp) > p and sotthat =p > B() (@) Take ourbelehat wearentradialy deceived asin askep tial scenario, Becate that eli sf, the spec cannot ‘segue for hie distinctive premise by alleging that here we wilt the safety requirement. (6) Safty and sent, being motu eontsposives, ar ex: ly confused otis easy to cones the correct requirement ‘of safety (or knowledge and its coretaftrbution) with requirement ofsenstivity. is easy to orerlok that subunce tive conditional done eontrapose vali (4) Those wo find the skeptic dsinctive premise plausible on the bass of elvis consideratins may dus be conus {ng sensitvty with safer and may on that basis aes 5 correct firmatios of thet premise. Aer al, the reqie ment of saley is well supported bythe sorts of consider stionsaddced generally by the sensitivity based oppos!- tion to GE, Moores common sence standpoint. Because scotty iv similar o safety, so easy to confuse wit itisno srprise that one would ind sensitivity so plavsile ‘enough soo mislead one into assessing as correct affirms ‘ons ofthat premise. (The plausblty ofthe shepics snstviy premise is thus explained compa wil ts fast, which isthe stance fof those who agree with Moore. “Thus may a Mooreen epistemology defend sl guns sensi sed?” objections, Sch objection presupposethat in oder to con ste knowledge able must fist be “sensive” We rect hat requirement, and therdy support our preferred common-sense aheratve ‘Of cours all we relly noed inorder to explain the plausibly ofthe skepicspreml that tle enovgh follows rom sme thing plausible enough. And the sensitive requirement falls ‘hat role well enough independently of whether tis confused with a2 chapter Four a safety requirement. But that til aves the question of why the requirement af senivty so plasle it just alse. And her there isstlla ole fr sft iftean function ae plausible enough requirement, one both tre and defensible through election and ‘one that appeals to us simpy through our ailiy to dcer the ‘rue fom thease in such pri! mater. Compatibly with ha, Some ous maybe mised im aceepting the requirement of en tity because isso easly confused with he correct requirement, that of safety, thus succumbing to cognitive sisio, ‘Next we sep back rderto consider the methodology we ave mpd felowed up to now In doings, we shal lo tn tothe full acount ofknowledge that was one the consensus ie inthe analyte epistemology wdiion I mean the tess that nowledge ‘a tantamount ojstfed true blie This was, in fc, the specific ‘thesis targeted by Bdmand Geter wth hiefmous refutation, We il consider the thes, tou min faces willbe on the method logy whose employment ld othe concusve refutation of hat 3B, Tar Mrrarivstont. Grrviza Prost 1 The English schema °S knows that ps ftcinated philoso ‘hers and linguists, who have sought an account ofits meaning ‘Others ave focused alternatively, on adion-—on the com ‘cept (r concepts) expressed by that schema, Philosophers bave slso been Interested in knowlege ise, however, m8 way that 06s beyond semantics and conceptual analysis. 2. Consider the following thesis: rm Neca S knows that pian only if Shas justified tr el tht p, “Ths thesis on tfc about ner language no concep es ychlogia ets). Take ot face vale tea nec on {tinal about people osbjerte ding the cope of he modal operator ashe fori univers cue on the varie) TF JT isthe target then Geter counterecaple postates a.caseC shou which tse intial plausible ta bth awl: Wht tle (@)is posible and (b) ental tha someone has jstifed true bebe without ving ienowledge “This would refte TB by means of he principle that ifX bh s posible and entals¥ then Yispossible The example would thus how tobe possible for someone tohave juried tr belie hat without knowing that , which contradicts TB” 3, Timothy Willamon questions whether the wal Getter case ‘nti that someone has used trc bel while lacking now ‘ge He questions whether, neces, the Geter casei ‘ual then someone hs Justified trv ble that p without know ‘ng that p In i view, Getler examples lack enough content 10 ‘make tit sicientlyplaubl. In particular, it not relly 0 lear that ifthe example a dscrbad i cual, fellows neces- ‘arly that someone does have Justified tue ble while falling to ‘know what he ths believes. Nor iit ell eur how to expand the example so as to yield that result witout Jas beging the ‘question trivial. Moreover, Willansons reasoning would sem to aply at just to Getter examples but to counterexamples in plulosopy snore generally Villanzon targets philosophical theses including purported “ealye”) nthe form of modal aims such as TB His own ap proach ito develop a methodology for assessing sich dans in {erm of subjunctive conditional, with no reasoning distinctive ‘of philosophy. The reasoning i rthe of sort sed constanily ‘reryay ataament of each conditional? "Here wil no try to evaluate Willams’ propos which is developed wih much interest and detail? Iwiletitstandunchal: lenged as proposal forthe epistemic assesment of modal aims nie nth ht te camp een cn ve EB wt Ke mtb conma herp en ss fsa. achat ‘Sayings rans Cal sre, “hts yt ie Ply andr Bal, 27). "Coupe borer hit daseeby oan ces Eon tte esd Rin i Coster Pp eae 1 20 ‘S51 Ano Sr Mayen ato nd he Cont fate ‘Rens Mind 20 Df 97) and Ges Gatne (Neral a oe ‘Co igi enn ney 5055318.)CChapeor Four such as TB. wil aslcinstead: Mast philosophical these take the ‘orm of such simple conditional or biconitional modal clas? “There is of couse, an analyte project that does seek conditions individually necessary and jointly ecient fr the spplsbilty ‘ofthe concept under analysis, Thee individually necessary and joint sufilent conditions most avoid vicious cca by aot Invoking explcly in the anaheone the very concept unde anal- is, the anand. That project we ete pu aide, We en Instead 0 project of ‘philosophical analy hove aalyes do ot most deeply take quit that frm 4. Crucial co our approach wil be the distinction between the falowing two claims" TTH(odal) —__Necassardhe Sknows that pana only fS has jot tre belie tat p, JTRefaplanatory) _Necesariyz Whenever § knows that pS Jenows that by Gn virtue of) having & Justified truebeliefthat and wheneverS Ins justified true bei tha, hereby Snows that" Willamsons tac plausibly on target agunst Geter counter samples to JTBa, bu it woald be of tege against Geter cou ‘erexamples to JTBe. ‘ereiswhyTe tak targets the asumpton that, ness, Ifthe Geter example as dered i acta, then srmeone just Sealy baleves rath tht he doesnt knows ‘This ejected a in sficieny plausible ont fce. ake an example where compe- tently deduces truth frome justified believed falehood What ives us the right to suppose that he shen justed in Believing ht consi Migh he net ave agate dette ade sort fr “Poa sod“ "Tega to Te een ri emia cewek "hansen meng onl cy pond lly ed ng ts Tena er nthe open pd epson Ian anyne ee geo to atp yg ed be ot, owedge: What ele ‘That mach we can easy x by jst plating that in our ex anapleS does jstifedy believeth conlsion However, fora refutation of Jim, we need it slko tobe the case that in the example § does not now his concusin to be true. What gives as the right to conclude that this is o, simply fom how the example is described? This isa best unclear. Noh ing in the example rele ot knowing the conciusion in some ‘way or then possibly nay unrelated othe argument specified inthe example. Willamsont objection against ditionally con- ‘ved Getler counterexamples to JT does then eppareily ssceeed™ 5, Compare, on the ater hand, the flowing question: Does S thereby know his concusin tobe tre Geter rection on this (question has a gute diferent ostcome. Our ltultive reaction ‘ov canbe decave. Iie quite plausible that fin the example docs know his conclusion tobe true he must know itn sme ‘ther way, He does aot know it spy by Bleving i corectiy ad Justified Traditional eracair Geter reasoning against Be {ethus protected from Willamson- style refutation. pat te eal rp os Gdn a eg retested reese eye Gat an ae I lec tap ah foe spare at ey eta oe re we hat ciate Nias See lee eae atta Senne Freer te eosin merrmirne oon Saeed apt nsf kh ei mtg a at ohne heer poplin tetvceay ya ae wetrneet ptm a ce Engr ig leit 5 at a eee septa a sa ere bomny Spain Ts Se Sore 666 (Chapter ear “The same sort of contrast can be drawn generally as we con- sider proposed philosophical modal claims The oes of in in- terest to the philosopher are the explanatory ones. And not all ‘modi biconitionals are explanatory. Conlder the gallery of phllocophically interesting phenomena sch a justice, virtue, happiness rghmess af action, action ise and eo on, a well os ‘Knowledge. Not all modal bicondtonlsconcersing such phe nomena wil be of interest to the piloropher We sek rather bi- by psig, emt tn coy nah ho ead on wed ere oe Sey eng toe reba esto oe, ‘Sen eset ha wy ening ‘ees je sry pcb ie tsk te cod sadn viva so of aye ch ene down hr Te ab tubo i ohet oe te et re Thy il el ararean ced fre wo bor are whch te ves enmpnce at iy caer totter arene Peay eter pnsecen aot preey eee "Dyin ste of een ce ea age esc sic the rbot of together aay wh ur acon ‘tie Ta psa Navneet cn tcp ‘atone ampere deta da (ubeowet i mag ‘tometer nate oe Fort ey aw ere {net guy arte ante jet uot the oe or cortion Kove as Action 5. Ago asthe eter gt sulle even as we tart gusing, we ‘night stil Kno in some very bas wy wih sue" owed” blow even the animal knowledge that eqire bie ‘What re we ming as we descend to at ioe evel a ko edge What disinguses te higher knowledge tht weeaoy on therows with big eters Perhaps what makes he dfrenc jus more conience.In ender to know when he tes get mal, do we jst ced be ‘oc vate? Given howe rable we ar by potest we ned tthe point rt more confdens? Is thst te only ‘evant ference tht gives uno ofthe bigger eters? Some of wareconttonly nerve rik ers others can acquit confidence Uvoughtherpy. Suppose we gal ur cons dence onl hough therapy wih ho other change. Tat would note tthe sot of owedge we enjoy wih he arger eters Indeed uch rfc cea ofconSdenr an verona iets evistemi poston Compare somene who an ot jst coufiene bal con fiat ate ens rebiyigheven whe eles sik. ‘Ths in, beyond mere confidence, might ras him oa higher for . When we consider whether we faces hand o fre, Iowever we determine what to aficm based on diferent sort of rationale. eis nota second-order rationale concerning what Wwe woul be key to arm corectiy given our elevate set, ‘Shape and suation et the time, When we determine what obe- Tiee perceptually based on our relevant sensory experiences the time our experience has «content that may attract our aseat in ‘various depres of suength, and other fctrs may then do so a8 drellon that same questlon, Some of thee factors maybe cons Tent, some conflicting, unt «seeming rests whore degree of strength in tars, helps us determine whether atent is o snot then proper If raion, the atenti then bared on the result scaring ietly A resultant seeming automatically «posesed ‘ational. eis in the subjects posession and ean perform its job ‘of rationalizing afirmatlon (oe assent) cn its own through the proper operation of psyehologlal mechanism. Thi isll prop tslyso when things the sem hat way othe subject his copa tie paycholgy i fanctioning peop 'S proper rationale fr alti afizmation tthe endeavor to at- tat uh mastbe ofa sr hat bearson the truth ofthat afr ton If would be rationally improper to arm i that endeavor based on a ratonae that did not bear oa the objective at which ‘hat afrmation sims, Consider the eonstinive alm of an air ‘mation that quale ae jodgment It mast beat minima a ‘Mlrmation that alti that aims a rth and, as we have seen, iso et aptneis, Ressone that bear on other ends that eould be Sitnined by so fring are hence not relevant o judgment, and indeed one cannot coherently afi fr sich eons when ones timings apy aalaing tut ‘Consider ond attempt to turn on light by Bipping 2 switch Coherent reasons fr fpping that switch in that endeavor would then be restos that atleast ostensibly would bear on ow ip ing i would si one staining the aim constatve ofthe en ‘exvor, Compare one’ judgment that , which is consti an sitempt by affirming that p to answer spy the question wheter 'p Proper coherent reasons fr afm tat pin that endeavor 8586 (Chapter ive ‘would then be reasons that bear on how so aiming would ald fonds atsning the sm conatitve ofthe endeavor. This is what sso incoherent about judging that p forthe reason that it would please someone or would yield some other pragmatic objective. ‘Attaining that objective is evidently irelevant to attaining the sm constitutive of fdgmentifudgment ona question (whether )is constitutively an atempr to get itright om that question. Fortaen Reapwve ‘reco. "Salty in Son Sythe forthcoming The wil be ap Calis on Ernest Sons, eed by Christoph ap. ‘ona Pent Canaan rad Pely 35 9, pp) 18-47, Shah Nish "How Tah Govens Bat” Poop Review (2005 (CHAPTER SIX ‘Varieties and Levels of Knowledge A.Germten Cases 1. Consider the examples that have proved important inthe Get- tier tradition (3) Inferentl case. A subject S believes on exellent evidence ‘that Nogt ere hata Ford Bu Nogot ha no Ford, alle Har, leo here and, unbeknownst tS, «Ford owner. $ concludes that someone here has Ford fom his premise that Nogot docs. His conlusion bei thus justiied, and also true. Yet $ doce not thereby kaow, sce that belts true only because of Hit not Nogot Here falls to know {hough justified tue belie” ‘The barns example, Barney vers a barn and believes accord ingly although he might as cay be vewing e mere bara faa, ofthe many neato Most epistemologits deny tht Ihe knows, bat eabetanil minoiy snot 50 sure? o) "ended be Gratton oie tate ort ‘Ger eps le tn me oes at prof. ‘Sw! lle high a eames be on wh id tebe "Pod Goi vm eal ered Tre Biel op se di 90] 95-2). Oar tN en os Kah a CRT ioc” An 25 (5) 219). "Ai Gallant Cet, tent and Copaiton Camisig MAS anardUnveay hs 1985) Howe om plese say a, elton St Bunyip dagen hitb be ‘Seppe coment Cala acer Sper {Edna acey peor Tag sere ‘uo 2 (000, 9-11 ppe a Yen of he pi ear ‘ie Teneo tnowli to ih ah aces a Tart ‘ie ot ode el hn igs (eh re28 chuper Sx Compare Simons, who nears the end of er pot traning and cach morning might, to all appearances, from her viewpoint, ‘sly be pilotingin a simelator asin a eal pane, When she hap ‘ens tobe realy in flgh, as she believes, can she know that she «How could she, given tha she might sts easily be na sim lator, with no way to el the diference? (©) Bonfours larvayant, Leber’ Taetomp, the chicken sxe the Bindsghter. These subjects nd themselves believing ‘quite reliably But with no ides how they ae doing so of ‘ven that they are dong so, These cases vide respondents ‘ore eval, Some take such subject to knows oer think the opposite. And some can fel the pull ofthe opposing ew butdeideto "bt the bl” 2, Subjects of sr, suchas Barney and Simone, seem oallshort ‘because of thee poor situation. Wat deprives them of knowledge sees to ethe dager posed by nearby posblties because ofthe eaby rere fgade of the simulation cockpit. Bt just where is the aft located? Ths question arses once wo orders of alety ‘merge, a {nour bisketall example. Where and how do Barney {and Simone perform una Ist min on the fist or rather on the second order? 2. Plausibly, Barney falls shot of knowledge because he aims somehow safely. Too casi night Barney have aimed that he faced bar when twas only s bara facade However, tat would ‘ot explain why iis so intulvely attractive that Clair (the cae Sings, uh ot ge) wt rag amples, Oeil 0 + (nda an ees shee 475 S| Tar Band Bowel fd Lt Donon Bala oe ai 2 (5 ‘70 heared tat sme pro fem ie” ne ‘enh fae nc cng fe pane kaw es gh (eater opeig pret nd ve it rm rir cp of Fecal Fy hoe ao pape y Tart Rome and A ‘eo in Gar Care Pied Pye vie), ch ‘slender cae Teeth ect at aot ene nda” igh 0 pest an dos ot ier ‘om alany ple pret ol, Vases ond Lav of Knowledge ‘yoyant) and Truetemp Ikewise flo know. The alethi affirm Hons of Claire and Treterp might be conideaty sf! By conta f knowledge regules apes of judgment his ‘hin why Clee and Tructmp fill short and aso why Barneys ‘Mfimtionnewds tobe sae? Apnes of dgment entails xy of ‘Mlrnaion In jcgng se does, Barney mast on sore level be Svat ofthe flowing by aking it for granted, perhaps, o prep posing tha otto easy mag he go wrong othe mater of @ icing barn fhe affirmed tally then exerci his perceptual com etnc In jdglng os he des, afte all Barney sims to afm pty that he does face «barn. So is judgment willbe apt nly fhe apy tains dhs im: thet fairing apy. And hs wl eppen only ithe is guided tothe anes of is afirmation (athe does fice barn) by his second-order awareness that fhe thea armed (hat ‘face bare) he would ikely enough) be right From this fl lowe that his jadgment apt, then hisafrmaton ssa We thas ‘co-opt hisaley requirement and condade tat Barney and his ike fat judge py which explains why the alo know fll we. ‘Agta in order to know fll wel, Barney must know that fn his condition heals that he faces «barn, at easly wil he thereby go wrong He eed to know this conditional sao guide mee to pt afimation, ab required fr ful pines of firma- ton, which i what apt adgment requires, So his judgment can then be apt onl isl. Accordingly, Barney knows all well nly IF hls jdgment is safe. But the nearby fakes make his jodgment ‘nsf, ich prchadeshis knowing full wel hus we cn under- ‘fund the ataction to thik that Barney does not know if the Iowledge of interest to ss judgmental knowiedge full wel. "Weare focused on apt judgment (andjudgmental bel) andon corresponding knoledge above meresubcredl animal nowedge (sin the eyeexam case. judgment affrmaton in the endeavor to afirm apy In adgment one aims 0 alta afm ep. Jigmentlsfirmation tat p must hence maniest competence ue igi cous od die expat haere em cout tame peti or asso th epi = esr ates “a ibe denped tee "Rat ebay he wea dB ei coin 2 tego ype‘Chaper Sie ot only to get itright on the question whether p ut ato do so py onder for judgment tbe apt, thesbject must apy atin pes of afimation ‘Accordingly, Barney’ judgment succeeds If and only if t= tain aot Just correctness bu lo apes. And ths aim is ply ‘aalned, nally ithe apes of Barney’ afration manifests his competence to succeed i afrening opty “Tat beings, inorder tobe apt, Barney judgment must be safe. Since it is constutvely an affirmation aimed at geting it ‘ight apt, a judgment that p wil suczed ony if meets to eguremens (esi ena apt ero 3S heatiseee sees Seana cence mea porn anne cang oy eee ae fap tees Ebspcempisigrpasel UES ani yet eee ae gare earl ge er a Sioa eae ern rts einige neice te epee a eam cinene aac ae eee ere Serta nore oma ie peeps feeceren cme rena pone eee ect earlodee arent amie sceenoenaae epee ear lle acest me re tt Seen ay Ter ernment SSSEE yin cu Spt ‘ote pce srt af ty re eps ene sine We oad en bly gh waa Weed Vesa an Lave of Koomladge et bat judg, this judgment of hls wil or be ape. Ben ifthe fib afrmaton spt a stplated, these subjects stl do hoteacceed apy in hus airing ply. They aim apy through Tack not competence. Alihough Clare snd Truetemp have nial Knowledge, do our eye-xam subjects, they sil lack knowledge fill well And the same goes for bindsightes, chicken sexes, et ‘cetera? What pallu to deny that bese subjects ally now isthe evident fictthat they il short of knowledge ll wel ‘Consider the ition that or eye-exam gussers do aot ally ‘know (even ifsomchow they do "now That iatuon play lows from thelr fur to know fl well They lack the required ape avarenss tat if they armed on the Sis ode they would Cikely enough) do so correctly and apy, OF course, what they te missing i not jot fall medatve conscious swareness. Rather they lack even a presupposion or implicit awareness that their Sit order frmations are and weuld be apt! ‘Ween hus explin ou divided intuionsin ech ofthe and 1 eazes? The subjects in thse cass do enjoy the srt of animal >a hp care ey io a fn eg) ‘Si apyate tt he wl ai pi hese! tn eat ‘een 6) py ang tee a ceo be gus wet ‘ny ei uve tnt Shafi nave he goto he be ole rt sore nr ht he ne qo tet rel be anos Aod hewn ce ato {edn wenn ui craton ee Tc ‘ir mcmahon ht apn eter Out ‘nan cco te it rr rt anf one prt iccanpecne "comin of so gh analy sa curt ston hte hie rcp Wem eat ee aa trea wihwe ison ont openvndoe besa ene lh {bhi ensan Who lth escent we ay tt ‘nt nyo det so hve ae a ended ‘plc seon ac ede’ ang ping condos sere er ‘Bis olpmet Ao hat opps toa nc ch pee Fonte eens the ppt ot ore SS condsons Os ‘Beconry ch epnpeens iat repeal beste ‘Scrip tether (fennel or oy he ery aera Sic lps tea asp corn ah oe epon ry ing ov iter ger Bui djs venient "rp dao ied Sone rp ony eat sido ahem at ty oto wie es edd el pul aoe Chapter Six ‘knowlege that comes wih sp afrmation. But hey donot know {all wel As forthe inferential 1a cases, these subject cel have no knowledge of any sort: not ofthe animal sory, and even es of the cefletve sort Nor, of course do they know fl el, ‘The requirement of full aptness account or ll three srt of examples, Te fact that knowledge bas varieties accommodates, ‘the spparent conflict. Some intultins ze sensitive tothe lower and some to the higher varieties of knowledge even if aone need De conscious or explictin order to have ts eft. 3B. Ow rie Enerewotoay oP nix Rerzacrive 1 Independent ofthe importance of knowing ll well human ‘knowledge intimately involves higher-order phenomena. Here are sme reasons why tha is plausibly 20a b, and d below — fren without fll pay ofthe supporting arguments (@) Judgments atirmatio with the intention to thers fire, ‘competently encugh, and indeed apy. That dtingulhes Judgments from mere guess. The qui-sbow contestant f- Sem in dhe endeavor to thereby afr eoeectiy(and thas ‘win the prize) while taking his efirmation to bea sheer us far from apt epistemic performance Judgment ths invaves a second-order stance regarding ones ‘ownsflrming, When one judges, one afm wih the imo gtit heey yoni (ingen ivi or hoping ‘i deco Ofc ent eos on etapa eh cr ‘sant waa ston ut ae ap) a at {fr epec wen ap tacos heb te oe pos pe ‘Ss rig ow rh ping i sh on eng der bow thse phenom ned ede Cray ‘a ii cn ate ry mp "bj argues ryan, ira hat chang hy iy al Secs non obggehhl ing ei gl ep fan et Se amen ea wo ee \Vesetis and Lvl of Kaowlage (©) Suspension of judgment is an intentional doube-omision whereby one omits afirmation, whether positive or ngs tive. Inherent o rational suspension isthe asessment that ‘frmation then 00 esky, which implies tha, wheter postive o negative, st would not then be apt, or atleast. Irplies the abrence of assessment that it would be apt Suspension hs ndetodoais ascend order iteation toda ont nition tnd otbeconacosrtep tly pir) gmat hes ptveo eave, rons rd ‘rh Sapenon spares oe ig Sg peng Jaton odgnet to, thieves» cd Src ntl afin nth coor ti pi wes ‘Senna supension inle tata eleoon “Sram bth pote sn ee inthe cadena ta Spy Soba ican sin ones ton and Spear n afm ey dy at (6 Forcompetenceoffudgment on frst order question, epi- stemic negligence must be avoided trough esponsivenss to reasons that fly prope judgment most weigh. Reasons of what sort? Reasons against judging that p can be cuntrveghing reasons easons for the oppose jagment, the Judgment that ner-p. By contrast, ndermining eeasons work agaist the judgment tha p without fvoring the oppose Jadgrneat. These might be resions ist, for thinking that so good reasons ae available Sec- ‘ond, they might be reasons for thinking that one isnot then in igood shape to render a judgment. Third they might be reasons for thinking tht one sil for rendering a udgment i degrade oraltoether absent, (Skil an innermost competence that ont ‘ight keep evn when in bd shape or poody situated) “Thesethies, teat are reasons to which ope must be sensitive so to avoid epistemic nelgene in fist-orer Judgment. And ‘ote what tue about them alone sensi son the second ‘order, ivlvig second-order competence. ‘Because fr-order judgment must be responsive to such fc~ tors, which must nt be neglected, Girt order judgment must be tided by second-order competence, Consider a bali that says | | |9% Chapter Sie In place becuse no sscond onder defeaters emerge. But soppo%e that, being unresponsive tthe presencear absence of dfeters the agent would have bllved the same even f defeters had emerge. Here again ea King of ick that reduces, and may even remove, credit tat might otherwise be due, (@) Finally consider that historic paradigm ofthe highest form of certain knowledge: the Cartesian gto, the thought ‘hat I now think, What acount fo its partially high sta- ‘ust Our approach ofersa distinctive way to ulna that status. Consider myjgment hat now thnk, and suppose this to be my aimtion ofthe indexial content , an afirmation made in an endeavor to aim ply (indeed with atest, nflible anes) Is my judgment ‘yl atsn ts objective iffy afrmation aan ptnes and oes s apy This means that my apnes in 0 affirming must tel be secured ep. So must then enjoy second fonder competence to secure epness in my fist order af Srmaton. Ir snot enough that my Srs-onder aration stain corectnes, or even that it do soapy wth enough ‘ebb, ee equ in adtion that hs eptest fone ‘imation bef telnet ply. And this isprecily what the cots afrmation does, flr the thinkers tour through the gallery of skeptical scenarios in ‘he euler Cartesian medtatons. ‘nce wearive atthe cogito passage st the begining of Med tution “vee, Descartes hab slid himself that in afirming the index content and inthe crzlatve judg ment be sgh and he ir Bound to be right. Suppose thls ln- Sight gules his apt afirmaton. In that case the apones of that alirmation (of ) is now attained under the gud ‘nce of is pt belie that tis would bean ap afirmatin, which ‘makes his lnowledge that he then thinks cae of knowing fll well 2."The foregoing cnsiderations—in a by and dof the peed Sn meena hy ince cealy ‘rete ad Lave of Kage Imig be replied that such second-order competence Is not necessarily competence form a judgment that one first-order Judgment would be apt. And of course no such conscious ad ‘inte rquie, even fin certain asesit is importa present, fein the cave ofthe colo, and even if ts required fora level ‘of meditate escent of seca interest the thought But the ‘second-order ance required nced not in gnealtake the form of ‘concious adgment. Ik might jst be a presupposition, an i= pl avarenes tha al is well enough fr first-order judgment. ‘And in certain basic cass this might even bea defiut stance ropely sustained sbsent deletes. No spcil rational basing is Feguireds one eed only be sensitely ready to detect defeaters. ‘So much fo the distinction of animal versus reflective knowl lige and for reasons in fiver oft deployment What speaks infor ‘of going beyond tht, to more developed virwe epistemology? ctw Razecrive:IMontan Bur SuasiDiany 1. A farther theory will be more explanatory than the simpler sccount, Why does the second-order dimension mater for our first-order knowledge? Why does it matter whether one has ‘metely animal knowledge o “ascends? rather to dhe more reflec tive levels? Why does reflective knowledge vole ust mare Tonowiedge animal knoe on top of animal knowledge? Why should the scond-onder knowledge improve the knowledge on the fie order, reisng ito a beter level of knowledge? “hflectve qual important for naman knowledge largely for the reason already suggested (a) because ofthe nature of ad ‘mentand how itdifers fom guesing() because ofthe nature of fuspenslon, and (c)beease af how competence must avid ne Iigence and insensitivity to defeaters. Alf these—a by and e— Involveascenttoa second order inthe waysnoted And, asabonus, "etn do mt lif th fact ha gant mst Brean svn tn ie mt sly a re opt ot ul ae ae tg te alc anal ae wr rte uel fot tnt ne Nene tm re ‘nih engl) or ae Rep Cae be96 Chapter Six (@) we also gun insight ito the special status ofthe Cartesian cog. Butletus now consider whether and how we should go further ‘The importance of the refecve sno explained fly ntl we ce what relly maters:naroaly that the apes on the first order beatsind oder the guidance ofthe second-order awareness. The performance on the Girt level must be guided to aptnes through the apt second-order awareness expt or impli) dat the ub ect nha stance competent to avoid exesive rik ofall ‘Ths would comport withthe subjects apt srarenes that ihe ps formed on the first evel he woul (ikeyenowgh) do 0 aptly. Requiring fal eptnss provides a more stisictory treatment ofthe complete aay of data. The account of man knowledge as requirng knowledge ul well tain that further success, We ‘hve ser how much beta fares in guiding through the Get ‘er problematic. Bur it 6 not fa ie explaining of Geter data ‘hat matters. The accouatofs desirable level of himan knowedge as knowing fall wel infact «special case of something such ‘more general “The fly desirable stats for performances in genealisfullapt- nes it i aptness on the fist order glided by apt awareness on ‘he second onder thatthe first-order performance would be pt (likely enough). A fratonder performance wll lm to atx a cetan basic objective iting target, ast ight be This win ‘econ ender cs ht han aged be ind ath se agent ‘ts ant ra eod egen hto aen thefit th ‘cutee The eat afin sa beh cor oo ‘intr ndspnes ain ss ndesomati ese matteo You ‘st eo tein isa at Xabati ar ‘pul ttf oer tine anna tech ‘wus be cont terse) Bt tha ald edb Se (i ven outer doe mason of aes td conta ‘pest al sot gt a ey nace of tapers ce of ‘rte on tong mys de Sn ted ng eer and ny pepe ein ik Thi git stn Se ‘tne or tbe poses pend pth a ac ert Sey erent ating pty og Vesa nd Lave of Koedge dace the correlated aim to sucezed apelin thatbasic aim. Attain lng the basic succes ap is eter than attaining tinal. Moreover, ating aly the apness of anes success i also beter than atsning fs inapy. That isa lesson drawn from ‘ur basketball phyer near he threshold of competence, and es eval from the amazing shot tat spans the fll length ofthe ‘Court score a goal. Tis success sufles by comparison wit that (of shot sled not jst a scoring but at dang so competenty enough, even aly A shot sles iit falls shoe offal apeness: {hat tbe player fet guide hers apes through knowl- ‘ge that her shot would then be apt. What neded fr these Further levee of occese what sil Ince by our payer when she stands to nearer threshold of eable enough competence. ‘She fl to know that she is above the threshold (even fshe now isbarely 0). “Te amazing shot that safes becaue it sna lly apis of cour ail adzirabein many way. It scores the winning pints forthe plyer team, for one thing, and ts quite creleble it manifests competence far above the ordinary. But the coach is ‘git anyhow in chastsing the paper forhaving taken such risky shot when she need aot have done so. So the sot sl fl hort ‘in being very poorly selected. Moreover, ts not jus the tempo- rally prior selection that is deplorable. The more imporanly de- plorable ape ofthe shot stat the decision to shoot scarred throug tetionally. After al the player coud bave reconsidered righ up to the point at which se leased the bal, What matters ‘most i the players intentionally shooting in dsregard of whether ‘he shot would likely enough be pt Thats, moreover, nip tant respect ofevlation for performances generally. A petor- ‘mance is poorly selected iit fal below the threshold of elable ‘ough competence operative in is domain. Hence, even while ‘ceeding in te sisi, a peeformance fal shrt ft neglects "obj Teche il ht on ple hrf hot ing Be sat sas you ain dy et he eo li Ryton tht oo eter {hb choc so inte cng ued nd ing neton(igs- Incest s sagan ling he ste eon cond npr ody edenChaper Sx staining tht aim apy. Ths later ean im also required for fall ‘cedtinthe domain ofthat performance, Whats mors fallreit egies that hs aim, too be attained apy. The performance sll sues iit attains apes oa by ack ‘Thats so fora ist-order performances, in whatever domatn, ‘whether cognitive or not The case of cognitive performances specialaseinwhichthe sptnssofepistemicafrmationonthe fist ‘order is ane though the guidance of ap second-order avate= ‘es that such afimation would then be apt hice of lly apt performance ijusthat of owing all wel 2.Ouradvance over simpler versions of iue epistemology takes ‘oo steps. Fast we highlight that ul eptnes of performance re "Atonement enn pat py tiers To tc alo ps ot ‘ie ng sana papa ccd sc ‘rod on tonight sn mh th {peri fae eng ro apt rar py Ds sel pg re Nem min dade cnt oe ape pes ‘in ato erence ‘eos ia swam open hese ed neh Setar ets od ttn cera ned igo tel cdunenen ety ap ce gh ge, however, flue to surpass that limits no baman fine re "heer prt er ye pops cne tenant tetas Fearersom plac ptf compen er TES play Ties mu se al ‘es Westlaw sie doen ad ‘caine mtg oan och ty ey See Eittu neuter fosters olen henge “end tama Ste pty let fm ay supe pede in py ea) ee ‘orihespcoy ic Bere pm e ‘ina cetiecs csaen eapear ar aene, {cen pl jc nde och cn as ‘tong nor open nostic ‘Selsey aerosol Pyne alerted ce ‘Snap tow ys oe rte pein slg ‘Sree fon bog ern Seals ‘Vasntic and Levels of Kowa quires guidance through the agents knowledge that is peror- {hance would be apt. Through tht fc we ten secondly, explain ‘hy Knowing fall well not just snimal knowledge on top of. ritmal knowledge, which explains alo ou spread of intuitions in the fll aray of Geter cates. Iti crucial o this further ex- planstory bene that inorder to know fll well the subject mast ‘beaply araze tat his afizmtion would be apt Barney fais to now also know ull el-because his judgment, is firma tion nthe endeavor to firm apy, ight socal have fled. a falling ths short of knowing fll wel, does Barney fall shost of somthing epsemically significant In aseting here, am fulded by a more general atativel plausible principle namely, that nay domain of haran interes, fit ordr performance sul fers if nt filly apt That i lesion of our basketball shot sos the fl length ofthe cour, and even ofthe mid-cout shot faken in ignorance that i es jst barely above the threshold of reliably ally ap performance goes beyand the merely successful the competent, and even the eflectvely pt Anditistbehuman, ratio= ‘alain that can most deeply and extensively guide hs peror- ‘ances based onthe ik involved nthe light ofthe competence ft is disposal: That i why eason mus lord it over the pasins, both the sppetive and de emotional Opting for such rational guidance docs Invavejadgment and risk in any given ease, and & Feith in reason as or bes guide “The dimension of cognition i, moreover, just the ypc ase In which our modulsly competent seemings most be subject © {atonal competence that signs them proper eights. It is uch fod mon ehh plat waldhesg ede es el dag eh onda pega rege ly hearin ucefen tan resend veh nnd hat ew, ore hat nyse heap i eo agent Tho we ‘in npn on oan sons compe rar a hdres yy country ae ‘cet ton Suto, nh nt mene ae toa sige eyCChaper ie atonal competence that propel determines the bslince required forthe wis filly apt coi, which for cognition i the choice of whether to aim, postively or negatively. or whether o suspend jdgment™ 'D-Tas Ertsevic Nomarive HiEeancay In condasion, the epistemic normative hlerschy (on the let below) ina special cae ofthe action leary (onthe ight, as fallow: (2) (lei) aeration attempt (2) succesflafirmation ———_succenfu aterpt competent afirmation competent attr (©) competent and successful competet and seca Mfiemation ‘item ( aptatirmation sptatempt (6) reflectivey ap armation elective apt attempt (©) ally opt afirmation fully aptaternpt (Afrmation here means, again, ahi affrmation hts, aying thats aired a tut)” “Tis highlights how the distneions and value judgments that ‘we bave lid out in epistemology ae relly jst a special case of something with fr broader import. Inthe next chapter we bronden the scope of our prformance- theoretic approach to include mind-world eatons oer than Knowledge, such as perception and action. Appendix (More Advanced Materia): A.igeney and Refetion |The epistemic agency involved in our judgment nd judgmental bli can be ether free or unfree, The aligns with dtiacion ‘the coffin ae wold eae nage een ht famevorchl onthe ard are eamancer at ced op le ed rage ncn et ‘pens smehig (et singh sg spc ot ‘ingyen inti (Ofc huey tla) ‘Vasation and Leal of Knowledge between two sorte of knowledge, the fully reflective snd the an smal We next take up the nature and significance ofthese two forts of knowl, tarting with the recive ‘Reflection hs two aspects fist reflection a cael conscious ‘thought, a8 mediation, and, second, reflection as thought that turnsbackon sl, as higher order thought The twoaspectscome together in Descartes Meditations and alsin British Empiriism, ‘where refletan Is the operation ofthe mind by which ts con- soul are of ts ow conscious contents. “The two aspects ae separable since higher-order reference to cones own mind ean be subeonscious- So we can dtnguish two degrees ofreflecton. A st degree ives th min turnng back fon tel whether consciously or subconsciously A second degre tleo requires the higher cede thought tobe conscious. 2. Both spect of election are important in epstemelogy—both IRsconsciousand ts higher order character—each nits own Way. “Theimportance ofthe higher onder meres, st wth epistemic aspenson of judgment. Suspension is consutvely a second- ‘order mental phenomenon, a | argued ear and wild s ter (insection 8). The higher order matters, second, Because of our ‘sm to keep epistemic isk within proper bounds in ou search for ‘ruth Thier esesement ie inherently second-order It san a5- scum of ow ky t wuld bo ade tap. Does the sk pe rmitjudgment, or des it require suspension instead? ‘So much forthe higher onder. Te importance of ensciousass merges through contexts of crtalasessment, whether in pl ‘ate thought rin pub let, where oe mist weigh ll per- ‘inet reasons while judging in ight ofthe total evidence. Among the relevant eons as one ponder questions the fact that one slready hols cera belief on that question, fone does, even ‘one ja stored in memory. Take any contet oferta svezsment ‘hat of legislation, fr example, or ofthe courtroom, the doctors ofc, thea, the erin investigation, othe pilsophy smi- “Questions in such coters mist be addressed by weighingall, ‘the resto in view. Ye, the fit thatoneelzeady believes a gven fannwer ix mong the reasons in view as one considers whether ‘(contin to) believe going forward But cannot be allowedChapter ix to trump automatically any contrary reson that may also come Imo view. Nor wil the sored answer necesariy outweigh the rnewiyavalable reasons simply cause of how very reliable the eration plas merry that acroncally dears that stored a ‘er A beleer who has forgotten just how relly he acquired and retained his ble cannot now draw te bel frm storage tha weight determined simply bys dacrone ilablty. The be lever now needs reason to elatebut uch eliablty. And this self-tibution wl be onthe scond oder and uso conscious” 53. Reflective knowledge ofthe highest degree involves elective ‘ought thats both conscious and higher-order. Thi shes ‘emia that Descartes takes ahs epistemic ai. I is knowiedge ‘consciously endorsed on the second order a5 reliable enough, as bie whose correctness manifest superlative competence, Here ‘we ave both components requted for appropriate election of the higher sort, A firsvorder bel i endorsed consciously on the econ ender as one whasecorecness marist saperatve competence ‘Should we als allow lesser degre of reflective knowledge requiring no conscious awarenesst Ntey all onc knowledge re- ‘mains implicit any given ime, and noe ll implicit belles are “pistemically on apa. Only some derive frm proper risk asses ‘ment, for one thing, and from a proper grap of one relevat ‘competence. Some are on merely animal level unaccompanied by slfcientesesament of rik r grasp of competence whether coniciows or subconscious, For example, the beliefs of « lind sightergnorant af his competence fll short pistericaly despite their animal epistemic standing, We shoud thus recognize a de tintion between knowledge that is merely animal and lsowledge that sretectve even subconscious This distinction Sepa tre te dere of tne of toed bee ay le ono adh wig oe ven lef atm ie fig red th Uh ero ance Bt a ect of thc wl tl ut \Vaite an Lev of Krowladge cally wort drawing not just Because the knowledge thats thus ‘modesty rtlectveslready Seems supecior in that respect t the owledge that falls short. Our distinction i epstemelogically significant ele fora further reason: because mala tradional ar ‘giments for skepticism threaten relive knowledge respective ‘fwhethe the second-order endorsement conscious or stbeon ‘lout, The threat of vicious regress or eicalrity applies ether my 4. What that threat? We attain the reflective level of knowledge ‘nly when we strate the competence manifest in the ot realness of ft order ble isthe ostensibly vicious euler ity ivolved in seeking knowledge of sch competence that poses the threat. The tages ince Snst-order sources ike percep- tion, testimony, and introspection but alo the facutes Of arm ‘lr thought, such a renal intuition and deduction. Ree ‘ive knoledge would alleged involve a vicious crcl or eres, because it requres second-order endorsement of the reliably fof ones sours, a requirement thet supporely cannot be met ‘without lying on those very sources. This gies ws reason to ds tinguish between animal knowledge, on one side, and reflective ‘noledge, onthe othe, whether this later derives fram subeon scious or from conscious endorsement. Ether sort of elective ‘scent would be blocked by the skeptics argument. _B.Epitemic Negligonce {A “thot isa shooting performance atbutable othe agent pet ape a deed, whether intentional oF not of alternatively is 3 fall edged intentional ation, an attempt. Ifthe later, then it contittively contains an ntentlonal in: indeed an alm taspe- ‘Bc target, ‘What shuld we sy shout an ation thats negligent? Suppose someone drives drank and swerves over 2 sidewalk. There hap ‘penstobe ao one there, so he hs god moral lacks there, thes, hothing wrong with his act of driving drank on that occasion, ‘over that painemporal stretch? Hes jot ming to deve home, fd he does drive Home, He atsins that objective. He also as 03Chapter Six ‘odo so without harming syone. And he ata this objective as well Sodo wesayhis drive home drunkisa ine atsine t harms ‘no one Is there something wrong only with the agent, wl the actitselfisjust fine? ‘What, thes, makes the agen blameworthy? Thathe neglects take into acount th risk of harm derived from driving drunk? ‘On this eecount what he does i fine, What is wrong ie what be flo do: nama to take his nebrinton propery into account In my view, the ation elf x wrong, with a wrongs resi- ent in the atendant neglect. Iisa negligent action and for hat reason wrong. ‘The neglect that tends the choice and the eu {ant intention (design) infers a last one action that our driver performs It infects his action of driving ashe does on that 0c- ‘sion. He does this intentonll, by design. But his choice and ensuing intention are wrong, andthe ensuing intention icon stave part ofthat action Yet the iatention is morally wrong and bad, and the action of whic ts an esentil consent i ‘hereby wrong and bad. The wrongnes derive from the neglect ‘What is more, the neglect is ona second order and bespeaks second-order moral incompetence. The agent males his choice ‘and coninss thos the corresponding intention doing whick ‘eft take propery into account the isk he runs by 0 doing. ‘This rk asessment is incompetetly done. And it coald bave been even worse, I could have been that well wae ofthe ik, he asestedit competently but ignored it alloy and reciesy Sothe neglect might have resided notin theasesement but in the Ignoring of its result. Hither way, the choice is bad, and 2 is the Imation going forward, and ss the at tal since const ‘ely contains that intention. ‘esha return in chapter 0 othe similar importa of neg- ligence for epistemology. n connection with Sal Kripke dogma ‘ism parado. Ponrser Reapwve ree, foo, “A (Dire Vitwe Epistemology” Philp and Phe- omevolpiel Research 85 (2012) 1-26. ‘Vase and Lvl of Koomledge nn in ti ta “enn oe in The unfd Snape of Ploy (eae 204 {i ed ad 2a Slr CX Moupges Rec a, Cen for Sy f Langs Intro Aap ‘anonted ecto sys at Hlry On Bion, or xa Une Pes 2012.CHAPTER SEVEN The Value of Human Knowledge ‘Two oF PLaro’s best-known dialogues are nqules bout knowl edge. The Thentetus inquires into ts nature, the Meno als into its value. Each dicloge invites the same mote base question: ‘What srt of nrmatvyisconstttiveof ur knowledge A be lif tha fal short of knowledge i thereby infer, tis ete to Know than to gett wrong of cure, and ls ete than fo gett "ah k What vad nach rant ‘two Patonic problems ae dosely related. A satisctory answer tothe value problem likly requlres«coreet view ofthe defn problem. Weslo ri satlon sar problem, at est in fst spprorimation, enabling in turn, an roach tthe vlue problem, oe A We assume that knowledge requires, at « minimum, « be- lief that is true. Our inquiry into the nature of knowledge thos ‘takes a more speci form. Our question ie this What canton sta Deli sty, in aditon to being tre, in order to con stitute knowledge? This question about the matare of knowiedge hasbeen central to epistemology in recent decades twas for Pla. “The celebrated Geter problem derives fom the fct thatthe further condition hata belief must satis cannot be at te Being ‘competent held, competes acquired or sustained. More strict, {hi is form of the Geer problem, its main frm a we sa ready two chapters back. Ad here we underand “competence” 45 short fr “pistemic competence” belo adgment thus ‘pstemicaly compeeat If i formed well enough in epistemic ‘especs, This show we shall think of what so ofen goes unde ‘he abel “epistemic jastcaton” What makes such jstifation ‘epistemic iow it eltes to bebe sim at rath which is what we ‘he Valu of Human Knordadge sume, while taking the label “competent” to i his conception beter than the more customary “used” “This Geter problem arses because able can be alse despite being competent. ifthe believer then competently deduces some thing true frombis false bei this true condusion cannot thereby mount to knowledge’ Yet, if we competently deduce a cond ‘Shon bel froma premize that we competently eleve (even afer ‘raring the conclusion), we thereby compet bieve that con chuson a wel Post Gites ou fst Platonic problem takes the flowing form: What farther contin, added oo in place of being compe. tently held rust tru lft inorder to consti owleige ‘Onthe contemporary scene, the second Platonic problem. that ‘ofthe value of knowledge, as more recently moved to center ‘tage. We can interpret Pltos Mono so tht it presents the rob Tem of how Enowiedge can be quite generally more valuable than its covesponding rue bela Is merely tre bl would be no les useful Thus, a tre Dll as tothe location ofa certain cy, arse, wil guide you there no less eficiennly than would thecor- responding knowiedge. In ine with tis, weask Flow faa, con ened be a such aways Bete than the caresponding merely true ble Harking back to the Platonic dalogue, his problem ‘hasbeen mach discussed in contemporary epistemology. "in connection with both problems~the definition and the ‘ale prablems—wehave assumed tht beyond being a belief and bring tue there fs some farther condition (however simple oF Complex) that bel must sti in oder wo constitute kxow- fgg, We should that be able to explain how it shat knowledge ‘wich must stay thi father condition, is such aleays better than would be the corzesponding merely true belie When one ponders a question, for example, theres Some respect in which it ‘would say be Better to answer knowedgraby than to answer ‘onrecly but jt by Ince "asin se ees pin mh curd ence so ey opin rade sees tocar en).oa (Chapa Seven ‘We turn inthis chapter to that Meno problem based on our cari spproach to the Tieettus problem, Suceeding chaplers wil farther develop and defend ou virtue theoretic acount of Propositional knowledge ofits nature end its place inhuman ie ‘ALT Vanus oF KwowssDen ‘Th mo led be tt, Wen you sine pose « qucson yl fr eae, yo wa at ses ‘hen each an noe tour queso sping cs ‘ale thm fourier osama corey ies Salim tne hate ol eth ‘in ely mater epics os ely ow ten, cans al ety proce teal beter thane te tpt a oly ty spc? Conus oowe rein etertos ‘than merely true belief. sari “Ayres etn tht concn’ nih beep “iste rnin erp tha ots tiny ot tbat ss knoe Tr od Bln how and nyt ht nots ek Say inate a hte tas mec ee ‘Wh flow wl fend ie plaingin cote, ‘oaing tone sty ving mn B.ASrep Back ‘owt indeed is truth our ain? How should we undeisind the ‘vale we place one? More explicitly, aur aim sto have the tat So tis theattalning of ruth that has corresponding value. How, then, should we more ily describe ur rue abjecive® It jot ‘the accumulation of true Beli? Compare how we asst acc ‘ate shots, thos that hit their targets. What ii tht people value under this rubric sit the accumulation of ecurate shots? Someone casually draws large cele on the beach right by his ‘eet, aims his gun, and ite the target, Does he thereby atta, st ‘The Vl of Haman Knowledge lest in some sal papery adi ojo: ae that ofsecringaccrte sho stat en objec we al sar then bowel share h concept of od shat Dat weal at food tings other hings eqs? “hats we gree iar ‘ettheott neath old bean acute pod shot none tiles the marae hs stage in th a Aloogh ifomene pointe ew given ele oreven nea abe ofthe ftps theca a tle ae town yt oma the peromans tera perspective graded sq ‘Xrateogoodsho maybe even anexcelent ifthe marksman Step tack far neg ro the age ren whe the sot i fet howeves sats dort derive fom any andng pre tens of pope foram scemelaton facet au ts ‘There inne normative reson wf bring abot god shot, tot even fe gop perfec wel wht i ke fo be 8 good Shot and have thi ction uppermot in tr cnsclouet a thet. There ne normative resis ring about even x Cele sts one whntever tt ean eer (What we Rot forma prenue ose ists spud of how treet ey eay be) Compare now tr inlet shots our bli Abie may ane etn crt bt ay hae ver itl vale one {feof the queen ne worth aking The taser of rs vl bearon ibe woth any ako aimed eth tre Arbirery {Section of anaes by youre tthe Desh il ily rp Similar pone ou enop up sme sind end proc abor nin count the prin Yu then ae up he qrston fe Sty grains ere cotsined in that gan oand you rch Your cc of anrwering st quton corey wt oor Ptormancevrtt Doyo they al etn soe al rts prevouy tang eject tht of ectring ore and Tore tte bel Ths err hot impel the cor tsponing view aout he shot te ech In what then dncthe th of au beletsae vaaet ‘ne thing tint dcr ay ve ima aaa thes isto of or eran So even he gestions the ma ter gn sand if wort someone gs inert 208Chapter Seren ‘in that question anyhow, the the station of his cust wil ‘an obvious way have value to him (and perhaps ever to some small extent. fs him) This, ofcourse, ty forthe uth to bane ‘Yalu to someone and fr someone. After alone is cries a8 to whether, this just to be curios aso wheter ts tr tht Tere ae not two instances of curity ere: () a to wether P and () sto wheter is true that p. So what we want when ‘we value the ruth in that way Isto have our questions sneered, and of coun answered corel Sher curios, whatever basis thos invests the rg answer toa quston with some value, ‘though he vale might be smal and ey to outwelgh, a with the question abou the grains of sand. Having the answer ovat pa ‘ular question may ada so itl othe ie ofthe ele, while latering his mind, thatit iin fact a etsiment ll things const red ifonly through the opportunity oso misieted tention, Similarly forthe sho aed from foot away tthe seadon he ‘each: the sheer dese to hit that age, whatever ts bass ves ‘ale tothe agents hiting the mare Butt might wel be tha i {ing that mark mmports litle aie for ayn. Spending his tone ‘hat way may evenbea detimentothe genta ere fhe sand 's soft and yeding enough thatthe shot poses no phyla dan 2). Nor isi plausible that we humane general hee sanding Asie for accurate shots or that we place antecedent value ons uring such shots, Accuracy wil giv valet that shot tthe send only through the gunman’ hi it that target Even if hat hota the beach falls no human interest other ‘than the gunman’ wh, itmay stil bea better shot, beter at shot, than many with higher overall value. Take «shot at lose quarters in self defense that mises the targeted head of thes. tucker but hits him inthe shoulder and stops the atte bad Inaceurae shot, this one, but more valle then the scart shat at the beach, (Hd it been beter at shot, oteoves a mote Accurate shot it might ave conte sterile murder since ‘hesttack dd not just shooting to kl) ‘Are bel ke shots in tat respect? Isa ble performance that can atin its internal aim whl leaving it open whether thes ‘any intrinse value and whether serves or dsserves nextel ‘ln? Let us explore this view of belie. ‘The Valu of Haman Keowee (C.KNowLEDGE ASA SPECIAL CASE ‘A sorts of hings can “perfor” wel hen pt tothe et. onl gate ovo, can oped Intrument ad epen sts tha feacton chs ges ‘ie can ero wel tet ss pert of af rey ‘When's thermo ct mace ny pero wel Keeping the ambien tempers confor, When het Deanna pero wel a moving some lod. And 00. * wondea puppet pero wel der he onal p> peteiftshingerar smooth noon ad wall le otha Hibs are sma sesposn A brie might pero wl iy waning str, We create popes ed he ge iit gad Peormance flows apropetly fom he sae nd consti : ce “he puret penne (lor does the brides ths pes performances” Bat woud be gle sth ‘lnc itsn sent” Human eng fren nay ese, nly beete wee ronal gets Not nl there reasons stepson tw 6. Thee alo ress fr performing {Si nd es a ener ering nf Schild by whch we perf swe 3. Thi Festa mer vig sss pring. Aral thee Insta andthe hen do ave th aime But hy ae motte By nosh sim mo sic im ges he ean fr cho hated by wich pero they da hm neatn on tel een hen he per mance egy sin lett performance “The archer shot ira god esp he sha ss ot he tug andi res cs be ged by wheter oe 0 or 0, “ay ec pathy te a eo ‘Siig va snes aby oT mot Sain fr ering es ad Src cel en ce rate pe rteChapter Seven byits accuracy. However accurate may be, there isa further die ‘mension oferauation- namely how sli ashot itis how much shill t manifests, how ade iA hot might it the bullseye, however and might even manifest grest ll whl fling tery, 288 sho, in a frther dimension. Recall the example of shot not ast through the fact hat p bat through ts bringing it sbout that ps "The case of knowledge ijt the spectal casein which the per formance is cognitive ot doxatc, Bel sims at wuth and isa ‘rate o cores iftrue. A guess can also alm at truth, however, Ifthat show a contestant wll win prize Bel alms not ust at ‘accuracy (truth) but elo a aptness period (knowledge of sor) [Abele that tans both aims, that of rath and that of knevl- cee (ofthat sot), for that reason beter than one that tans tnerely theft Tha the, i «way in which knowledge seams a uch beter than merely true belie But let ws takes closer look Tier Vator oF Hunean KuowLrDar wt way Knowle vale, ad ow el doe toe eptenog soma ret He mig oo ite {pttenaogy comet eer cpt ius soak ‘Kenora anting ftoiedge on shnt peony ewtvebet "Ae ae. fp and Aone (Os UX: Ot Unesiy ra 5 tor ga ste fen in epee Se (ereepne oct me ad dpe ef pas bt ot ee lege nice wnt tf hy Serato ‘ete dana conet prs) comptes peri er cet ‘Shots pnd Inn cenit mesa ate ee (gocug cnet fed nt od neo pad athe ‘ech nyc ting ne Spe of compete ate ‘Sas een ay letdown ort tag tat {eto ore ay tone tng lose aro ‘niswnnodsoen "ft ng ht nas ing tre thts at eh pts nny ttc ant “fet eee sn st yoy ihtr mey e ene prancing eet nth tha a sme hot pe ah ‘Scio rte cinpeeorbomerio cating aitue CChaperSeres 2. Here are some thoughts sbout knowledge, belie and tath With respect to yevno questions taken up "alt wt the im fencing them corey (© Any qutton taken up slethicly beter answered knowl oy anergy Iisa beter ansere corey than incorrect Caret bees beter dane oe (© Anditis beter answered competent than incompetent (@) Final, tis beeranewered both coneciandcompetety than whe ling short ether way ‘he ne platae at oeeptolgy woud ol Sri Adhere opr Gags mas otog ~Eachof hose oar plates especial case ofa more geez latitude, as follows. iets 3 Takeany attempt to tan agen aim, (0) Any tempts ood sch it aceds ply and eter thanaconsponing alre® (0) Anatenpt ster nch it sxced homer py. it fils. arte (© Aatenp beter st sicompetet ti fiaconptent (@ isbeter ian ten bth octane nds ears, asin PKA, competence comes along, and eo docs the rele ‘ant sor af causation ‘What s more, one might well ect ha Stalag pss in -M does necessary have value grster than ls component M ot ven any valueat al, despite the aie of M (given how deserrng ‘Mary pli that gong to depend on how appropriate is ones approvingly knowing that M obtains? Maybe the reason why one approvingly knows tisonlythatone thinks wil case untold un ‘Tho Valo of aman Koowedge deserved sufi, rough some go wrath In the end we wil edo conde wt he pov i ap not Bat the knowing seems required in any case” ‘Neat we broaden the scope of our performance theoeetic proach to ince mind-world relations other than knowledge, uch ax perception and scion. Fowtuga Reape Hyman Joa, Action, Knowledge Wil Oxford, UX: Oxford aire "iy Pes, 2015 vig Jou, The Vale of Krolee andthe Psat of Uae "eng, Catige, UK: Cambedge Unie Pres, 203 chars Dunao, John Tar. The Yale af Kao” In Te Sao Enlai of Plospy (Spring 2014 etn), var TN. Zalt. Sled, CA: Metophysen Research Lab, Caer forthe Sy of Language ad Information. vada t ep tod ‘sdaenriedbrowige-te, ‘age. Linda “nella Motvton an the Good of Truth In "cial Vue epacte fom Brand Epsterly,el M. DePaland L Zguba 135-55. Orford, UK: Oxford Univety Pres, 200, rene etree eee fath aapnee nore eee ooen ee oats SES Seis semenCHAPTER EIGHT ‘Mind-World Relations Action, Pmnezrniow, kwowsDen 1. Metaphysical analysis goes beyond conceptual or sant in- ‘uiry and also beyond necesarybicondionals, which can fll {o provide the metaphysial explanation of special interest in pillosop Recall ur eater example ofthe metaphysics of persons. In the broad domain of persons, we find a threefold divide among (@) words, such asthe word “person's (b) concepts, such es the ‘concept of person; and () extrlinguisti,exraconceptual ex tes, the ving pertons. Concerning the later we Sind various metaphysical options. According to ne, an Aristotelian view petsoa Is never identical wit, but only constituted by, «Body ‘The body needs tobe alive and in posession of certain powers and abilities inorder to (thereby) consttute «person. “hls Aristotelian view onthe metaphysis of persons valves ‘metspysical dependence, One thing exes ofl actual depen ‘ently on certain oher things snd thelr properties, The depen-

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